Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting)

John Milne Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 11th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Torsten Bell]

Chapter 3 sets out the criteria for approving superfund transfers. The clause protects the integrity of the superfund regime that we are aiming to put in place through the Bill by making it clear that the penalty for committing an unauthorised superfund transfer may be a fine, imprisonment for up to two years, or both. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 57 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 58

Approval of superfund transfers

[John Milne (Horsham) (LD)]

I beg to move amendment 268, in clause 58, page 67, line 34, leave out subsection (a) and insert—

“(a) that, as at the date of the application, the financial position of the ceding scheme is—

(i) not strong enough to enable the trustees to arrange an insurer buy-out, or

(ii) not affordable for the next 36 months following an assessment, certified by the scheme actuary, of all funding options to become strong enough;”.

This amendment expands the onboarding condition to give an alternative to a single day snapshot of a scheme’s funding position.

The Bill tests a scheme’s funding position on a single snapshot day. We feel that is too rigid and could unfairly exclude schemes. A scheme might just miss the mark on that day, even though funding prospects over the next three years are realistic and affordable. The amendment would allow actuaries to certify affordability over a 36-month horizon, providing a fairer and more flexible test. It would protect members by ensuring viable schemes are not shut out, while still requiring strong actuarial oversight. That is especially important in an environment where economic conditions and markets can move significantly and take scheme funding positions with them.

Schemes have not always enjoyed the present funding levels, and today’s surplus is tomorrow’s deficit. We should have regard to that fact and approach the legislation in a manner that reflects it. In the assessment over a longer time period, the trustees would also be able to consider and respond to the situation in relation to dividends, changing investment strategies and expected scheme contributions, among other key factors. In summary, the purpose of the amendment is not to block the superfund option for schemes, but rather to ensure that the legislative framework is set squarely on the basis of protecting DB scheme member benefits and the security and soundness of the pensions system.

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

We have discussed other parts of the regime—for example, new entrants and their ability to scale up, and the longer-term prospects for that—which were perhaps a bit more flexible than this part. Although I am not entirely convinced that the exact wording of the amendment provides the best way to go about it, if the Minister gives some reassurance and a commitment to consider the possibility of not just taking a snapshot day, and to look at the potential ability to scale up or grow, I would be more comfortable with the legislation than I am currently.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Members for Torbay and for Horsham for the amendment. It is sensible to discuss one of the key questions in the design of superfunds policy. My main reassurance is that this exact option, or options in this space, were part of the extensive consultation on superfunds. That is important to understand. They were in the consultation, and a wide range of views were expressed in the responses, many of them pointing to the clear practical difficulties of providing the legislative test to assess whether a scheme could afford an insurance buy-out in future, as opposed to its exact position at the time of the assessment.

For reasons I will come on to, that does not mean that it is not important to look ahead to whether a scheme is likely to be able to buy out in the future, but we have taken the view, following the consultation, that that should not be the test on the face of the Bill. That is because, when it comes to projections looking ahead, both the cost of an insurance buy-out and the scheme funding levels can fluctuate significantly. Forecasts ask for more judgment to be exercised compared with an assessment of what the buy-out market is offering at the time it is carried out. It is about the current funding levels. Clause 58 already states that schemes can transfer a superfund only when they are currently unable to secure members’ benefits with an insurer.

I will offer two elements of reassurance to the hon. Member for Horsham. First, we need to be clear about the role of the legislation, which is as I just set out, and the role of the trustees, who are the ones who would approve a transfer to a superfund. Trustees will absolutely be looking ahead and thinking about the kinds of issue that the hon. Member highlighted. Do they wish to see a superfund transfer or a buy-out transfer in future? Is it plausible that they would get one? They will be relying on the guidance of the TPR and the clear intent in the legislation, which is that superfunds will provide an additional option, not replace the core approach of most defined-benefit schemes’ goal, which is an insurance buy-out. I therefore do not support putting the proposed test on the face of the Bill. Also, as the hon. Member for Aberdeen North pointed out, there are issues with the drafting of the amendment, which requires trustees in legislation to do what they will, in practice, be doing anyway.

The second point of reassurance I can offer is that the Bill sets out a power to substitute another condition to replace this condition, if needed. We will consult the industry to assess what, if any, further requirements might be added to satisfy members before the regime comes into effect. I hope that on that basis, the hon. Member will be happy to withdraw his amendment.

[John Milne]

I thank the Minister for his reassurance, but urge him to keep this in mind. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I beg to move amendment 277, in clause 58, page 67, line 34, leave out from “application” to end of line 36 and insert

“the Trustees agree, after due consideration, that it is the best option for their fund’s members;”.

This amendment would prevent a fund from having to carry out an insurance buy-out option.

The amendment asks a reasonable question about the duties of the trustees, and the possibility that they will be overwritten by the legislation and taken away from trustees. I would appreciate some reassurance from the Minister on whether the trustees will still have a duty to act in the best interests of scheme members once the legislation goes through, and whether the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Tamworth would make things better for trustees, with them better able to act in the best interests of pension scheme members.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

These new clauses are intended to help schemes affected by the implications of the Virgin Media v. NTL pension trustees court judgments, which found that certain benefit changes could be void if a scheme cannot produce actuarial confirmation that they met the requirements at the time. That has created significant uncertainty about affected schemes’ liabilities and funding requirements.

The new clauses apply to private and public sector defined-benefit pension schemes that were contracted out between 1997 and 2016 under the reference scheme test, which imposed certain legal requirements upon them. The new clauses let schemes ask their actuary to confirm retrospectively that a past change to benefits would not have stopped the scheme from meeting these legal requirements at the time, rather than requiring the scheme to produce actuarial confirmation of the same facts at the time that the change was actually made. They will help members and schemes get the certainty they need.

I want to assure the Committee that these new clauses do not change the underpinning standards that were required. They are not a retrospective pardon for benefit changes that did not meet the legal standards within existing schemes. If a scheme did not obtain written confirmation at the time, and cannot obtain retrospective confirmation, the benefit changes can be held to be void, as provided for under current law.

New clause 23 defines the language and parameters of the other clauses of this section of the Bill. New clause 24 gives the trustees or managers of a scheme the power to ask the scheme actuary to confirm that a previous change to benefits would not have stopped the scheme from meeting legal requirements at that time.

New clause 25 introduces an approach for schemes whose liabilities have already been transferred to the Pension Protection Fund or to the financial assistance scheme. Any benefit changes will be deemed to have been made with actuarial confirmation in those cases. This different approach is needed because individual schemes no longer exist when they have entered the PPF, and there is no longer a scheme actuary. The PPF and FAS would also not have the information required on individual schemes to enable an actuary to provide retrospective confirmation. This ensures that the level of compensation or assistance will continue to be paid to members at current levels.

New clause 25 also introduces an explicit provision for wound-up schemes that deems that benefit changes made to the scheme were compliant with the requirement to have confirmation from an actuary. This will make sure that the benefits provided to members, for example through an annuity, will not be incorrect as a result of any historical failure to obtain a written actuarial confirmation.

The legal recourse for members would otherwise be against the former scheme trustees, because they cannot have recourse against the provider of the annuity. However, we think it would be unreasonable for these trustees to be potentially personally liable in a situation where they could not obtain a retrospective actuarial confirmation because the scheme and its records no longer exist.

New clause 26 provides a regulation-making power to provide for specified alterations to be excluded from the scope of the retrospective confirmation route and to make consequential amendments to the legislation. The power is not intended for immediate use but is included to future-proof the legislation. The clause also contains a separate power to amend existing primary legislation. I want to assure the Committee that the power is narrow, enables consequential amendments to be made, and is subject to the affirmative procedure.

New clauses 27 to 30 make mirroring provisions for Northern Ireland, at the request of the Northern Ireland Executive. I commend the new clauses to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 23 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 24

Validity of certain alterations to GB salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes

“(1) This section applies to any potentially remediable alteration purportedly made to a scheme other than one to which section (Validity of certain alterations to GB salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: wound up schemes and other special cases) applies.

(2) If the conditions mentioned in subsection (3) are met in relation to it, the alteration is to be treated for all purposes as having met the requirements of paragraph (2)(a) and (b) of regulation 42 before it was purportedly made, and so as having always been a valid alteration so far as those requirements are concerned.

(3) The conditions are—

(a) that the trustees or managers of the scheme have made a request in writing to the scheme actuary for the actuary to consider whether or not, on the assumption that it was validly made, the alteration would have prevented the scheme from continuing to satisfy the statutory standard, and

(b) that the scheme actuary has confirmed to the trustees or managers in writing that in the actuary’s opinion it is reasonable to conclude that, on the assumption that it was validly made, the alteration would not have prevented the scheme from continuing to satisfy the statutory standard.

In this subsection ‘the statutory standard’ means the statutory standard for a contracted-out scheme under section 12A of the Pension Schemes Act 1993 as it had effect at the time the alteration was purportedly made.

(4) A scheme actuary who has received a request under subsection (3)(a) in relation to a potentially remediable alteration to a scheme—

(a) may take any professional approach (including making assumptions or relying on presumptions) that is open to the actuary in all the circumstances of the case;

(b) may act on the basis of the information available to the actuary, as long as the actuary considers it sufficient for the purpose of forming an opinion on the subject-matter of the request.

(5) A condition mentioned in subsection (3) may be met by action taken before (as well as action taken after) this section comes into force.

(6) Subsection (7) applies to a scheme if —

(a) there is an assessment period in relation to the scheme within the meaning of Part 2 of the Pensions Act 2004, or

(b) the scheme is operating as a closed scheme under section 153 of that Act.

(7) The powers of the Board of the Pension Protection Fund under section 134 and section 155 of the Pensions Act 2004 to give directions includes power to give a direction to the trustees or managers of the scheme requiring them—

(a) to make a request under subsection (3)(a) above in relation to a potentially remediable alteration to the scheme, and

(b) to take any necessary action to enable or facilitate the making of a decision by the scheme actuary as to whether to give the confirmation described in subsection (3)(b) above in relation to that alteration.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This new clause enables the trustees or managers of a scheme to ask the scheme actuary to consider the position of an alteration when it was (purportedly) made. If the actuary confirms that it is reasonable to conclude that at that time the alteration would not have prevented the scheme from continuing to meet the statutory standard for contracted-out schemes, then the alteration is retrospectively deemed by subsection (2) to have been validly made, so far as the requirements of regulation 42(2)(a) and (b) are concerned.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 25

Validity of certain alterations to GB salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: wound up schemes and other special cases

“(1) This section applies to any potentially remediable alteration purportedly made to the rules of—

(a) a scheme which has been wound up before this section comes into force,

(b) a scheme for which the Board of the Pension Protection Fund has, before this section comes into force, assumed responsibility in accordance with Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Pensions Act 2004 (see section 161 of that Act), or

(c) a scheme which is a qualifying pension scheme for the purposes of regulation 9 of the Financial Assistance Scheme Regulations 2005 (SI 2005/1986) and in respect of which payments are required to be made under section 286 of the Pensions Act 2004.

(2) The alteration is to be treated for all purposes as having met the requirements of paragraph (2)(a) and (b) of regulation 42 before it was purportedly made and so as having always been a valid alteration so far as those requirements are concerned.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This new clause deals with cases where it would not now be practicable for the confirmation described in NC24(3)(b) to be obtained in relation to a potentially remediable alteration. In such cases the clause retrospectively deems the alteration to have been validly made so far as the requirements of regulation 42(2)(a) and (b) are concerned.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 26

Power to amend provisions of Chapter 1 etc: Great Britain

“(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend any of sections (Sections (Validity of certain alterations to GB salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) to (Powers to amend Chapter 1): interpretation and scope), (Validity of certain alterations to GB salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) and (Validity of certain alterations to GB salary-related contracted out pension schemes: wound up schemes and other special cases) for the purpose of providing for purported alterations of any specified description to be outside the scope of remediation under either or both of sections (Validity of certain alterations to salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) and (Validity of certain alterations to salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: wound up schemes and other special cases).

(2) In subsection (1) ‘specified’ means specified in the regulations; and a specified description of purported alterations may be framed by reference to features of the alterations or of the schemes purportedly altered by them (or a combination of both).

(3) Regulations under subsection (1) are subject to the negative procedure.

(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations make incidental, supplementary, consequential or transitional provision in connection with any provision of this Chapter (other than this section and section (Powers to amend Chapter 1 etc: Northern Ireland)).

(5) Regulations under subsection (4) may amend any Act passed before or in the same Session as this Act.

(6) Regulations under subsection (4) are subject to the affirmative procedure if they contain provision made under subsection (5); otherwise they are subject to the negative procedure.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This new clause enables regulations made for England and Wales or Scotland (a) to specify further categories of alterations in respect of which the clauses validating otherwise void alterations do not apply and (b) to make incidental, supplementary, transitional or consequential provision relating to any provision of the new Chapter addressing the validity of alterations to pension schemes.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 27

Sections (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) to (Power to amend Chapter 1): interpretation and scope

“(1) The provisions of this section have effect for the purposes of this section and sections (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) to (Powers to amend Chapter 1 etc: Northern Ireland).

(2) ‘NI scheme’ means an occupational pension scheme that was a salary-related contracted-out scheme in Northern Ireland; and for this purpose an occupational pension scheme was a salary-related contracted-out scheme in Northern Ireland at any time if the scheme was contracted-out at that time by virtue of satisfying section 5(2) of the Pension Schemes (Northern Ireland) Act 1993 (as it then had effect).

(3) ‘Scheme actuary’, in relation to an NI scheme, means—

(a) the person for the time being appointed as actuary for the scheme under Article 47 of the Pensions (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 (SI 1995/3213 (N.I. 22)) (professional advisers), or

(b) if there is no person so appointed, a Fellow of the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries appointed by the trustees or managers of the scheme to carry out the functions of the scheme actuary under section (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes).

(4) ‘Section 33(1)’ refers to section 33(1) of the Pension Schemes (Northern Ireland) Act 1993 (prohibition of alterations to rules of contracted-out schemes in certain circumstances).

(5) ‘Regulation 42’ refers to regulation 42 of the Occupational Pension Schemes (Contracting-out) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 1996 (SR 1996 No. 493).

(6) An alteration purporting to have been made to the rules of an NI scheme is a ‘potentially remediable alteration’ if—

(a) by virtue of section 33(1) and paragraphs (1) and (2) of regulation 42 (as they had effect at the time), the alteration could not be made unless the requirements of paragraph (2)(a), (b) and (c) of regulation 42 (as they then had effect) had been met,

(b) it was treated by the trustees or managers of the scheme, after it was purportedly made, as a valid alteration,

(c) no positive action has been taken by the trustees or managers of the scheme on the basis that they consider the alteration to be void (and so of no legal effect) by reason of non-compliance with the requirements of paragraph (2)(a) and (b) of regulation 42, and

(d) it is not excluded from the scope of remediation under section (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: wound up schemes and other special cases) (see subsection (7)).

(7) In subsection (6)(c) ‘positive action’, in relation to a purported alteration, means—

(a) notifying any members of the scheme in writing to the effect that the trustees or managers consider the alteration to be void (by reason of non-compliance with the requirements of paragraph (2)(a) and (b) of regulation 42) and that the scheme will be administered on the basis that it has no legal effect, or

(b) taking any other step in relation to the administration of the scheme, in consequence of the trustees or managers considering the alteration to be void, which has (or will have) the effect of altering payments to or in respect of members of the scheme.

(8) An alteration purporting to have been made to the rules of an NI scheme is excluded from the scope of remediation under sections (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) and (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: wound up schemes and other special cases) if any question relating to the validity of the alteration, so far as relating to the requirements of paragraph (2)(a) and (b) of regulation 42—

(a) has been determined by a court before this section comes into force in legal proceedings to which the trustees or managers were a party,

(b) was in issue on or before 5 June 2025 in legal proceedings to which the trustees or managers were a party, but has been settled by agreement between the parties at any time before this section comes into force, or

(c) was in issue on or before 5 June 2025 in legal proceedings to which the trustees or managers were a party, and remains in issue when this section comes into force.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This new clause makes provision for Northern Ireland corresponding to NC23. Northern Ireland generally has its own pensions legislation which is separate from the legislation applying to England and Wales and Scotland.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 28

Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes

“(1) This section applies to any potentially remediable alteration purportedly made to an NI scheme other than one to which section (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: wound up schemes and other special cases) applies.

(2) If the conditions mentioned in subsection (3) are met in relation to it, the alteration is to be treated for all purposes as having met the requirements of paragraph (2)(a) and (b) of regulation 42 before it was purportedly made, and so as having always been a valid alteration so far as those requirements are concerned.

(3) The conditions are—

(a) that the trustees or managers of the scheme have made a request in writing to the scheme actuary for the actuary to consider whether or not, on the assumption that it was validly made, the alteration would have prevented the scheme from continuing to satisfy the statutory standard, and

(b) that the scheme actuary has confirmed to the trustees or managers in writing that in the actuary’s opinion it is reasonable to conclude that, on the assumption that it was validly made, the alteration would not have prevented the scheme from continuing to satisfy the statutory standard.

In this subsection ‘the statutory standard’ means the statutory standard for a contracted-out scheme under section 8A of the Pension Schemes (Northern Ireland) Act 1993 as it had effect at the time the alteration was purportedly made.

(4) A scheme actuary who has received a request under subsection (3)(a) in relation to a potentially remediable alteration to a scheme—

(a) may take any professional approach (including making assumptions or relying on presumptions) that is open to the actuary in all the circumstances of the case:

(b) may act on the basis of the information available to the actuary, as long as the actuary considers it sufficient for the purpose of forming an opinion on the subject-matter of the request.

(5) A condition mentioned in subsection (3) may be met by action taken before (as well as action taken after) this section comes into force.

(6) Subsection (7) applies to a scheme if —

(a) there is an assessment period in relation to the scheme within the meaning of Chapter 3 of Part 3 of the Pensions (Northern Ireland) Order 2005 (SI 2005/255 (N.I. 1)) , or

(b) the scheme is operating as a closed scheme under Article 137 of that Order.

(7) The powers of the Board of the Pension Protection Fund under Article 118 and 139 of the Pensions (Northern Ireland) Order 2005 to give directions include power to give a direction to the trustees or managers of the scheme requiring them—

(a) to make a request under subsection (3)(a) in relation to a potentially remediable alteration to the scheme, and

(b) to take any necessary action to enable or facilitate the making of a decision by the actuary as to whether to give the confirmation described in subsection (3)(b) in relation to that alteration.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This new clause makes provision for Northern Ireland corresponding to NC24.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 29

Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: wound up schemes and other special cases

“(1) This section applies to any potentially remediable alteration purportedly made to the rules of—

(a) a scheme which has been wound up before this section comes into force,

(b) a scheme for which the Board of the Pension Protection Fund has, before this section comes into force, assumed responsibility in accordance with Chapter 3 of Part 3 of the Pensions (Northern Ireland) Order 2005 (see Article 145 of that Order), or

(c) a scheme which is a qualifying pension scheme for the purposes of regulation 9 of the Financial Assistance Scheme Regulations 2005 (SI 2005/1986) and in respect of which payments are required to be made under section 286 of the Pensions Act 2004.

(2) The alteration is be treated for all purposes as having met the requirements of paragraph (2)(a) and (b) of regulation 42 before it was purportedly made and so as having always been a valid alteration so far as those requirements are concerned.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This new clause makes provision for Northern Ireland corresponding to NC25.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 30

Powers to amend Chapter 1 etc: Northern Ireland

“(1) A Northern Ireland Department may by regulations amend any of sections (Sections (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) to (Powers to amend Chapter 1 etc: Northern Ireland): interpretation and scope), (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) and (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: wound up schemes and other special cases) for the purpose of providing for purported alterations of any specified description not to be within the scope of remediation under either or both of sections (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) and (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: wound up schemes and other special cases).

(2) In subsection (1) ‘specified’ means specified in the regulations; and a specified description of purported alterations may be framed by reference to features of the alterations or of the schemes purportedly altered by them (or a combination of both).

(3) A Northern Ireland Department may by regulations make incidental, supplementary, consequential or transitional provision in connection with any provision of this Chapter (other than section (Powers to amend Chapter 1 etc: Great Britain) and this section).

(4) Regulations made under this section are subject to negative resolution within the meaning given by section 41(6) of the Interpretation Act (Northern Ireland) 1954.

(5) The power of a Northern Ireland Department to make regulations under this section is exercisable by statutory rule for the purposes of the Statutory Rules (Northern Ireland) Order 1979 (S.I. 1979/1573 (N.I. 12)).”—(Torsten Bell.)

This new clause enables regulations made for Northern Ireland (a) to specify further categories of alterations in respect of which the clauses validating otherwise void alterations do not apply and (b) to make incidental, supplementary, transitional or consequential provision relating to any provision of the new Chapter addressing the validity of alterations to pension schemes.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 1

Universal Pension Advice Entitlement

“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations establish a system to ensure that every individual has a right to receive free, impartial pension advice at prescribed times.

(2) Regulations under subsection (1) must provide for individuals to be offered advice—

(a) at or around the age of 40; and

(b) at a prescribed age, not more than six years before the individual's expected retirement age.

(3) The regulations must make provision about—

(a) the content and scope of the free, impartial pension advice, which may include, but is not limited to, guidance on—

(i) pension types (including both defined contribution and defined benefit schemes),

(ii) investment strategies,

(iii) charges,

(iv) consolidation of pension pots, and

(v) retirement income options;

(b) the qualifications, independence, and impartiality requirements for any person or body providing advice;

(c) the means by which individuals are notified of their entitlement to receive the advice and how they may access it;

(d) the roles and responsibilities of pension scheme trustees, managers, and providers in facilitating access to advice;

(e) the sharing member information with prescribed persons or bodies subject to appropriate data protection safeguards.

(4) Regulations under this section may—

(a) make different provision for different descriptions of pension schemes or different descriptions of individuals;

(b) confer functions in connection with the provision or oversight of the advice on—

(i) the Pensions Regulator,

(ii) the Financial Conduct Authority,

(iii) the Money and Pensions Service, or

(iv) other prescribed bodies;

(c) require the provision of funding for the advice service from prescribed sources.

(5) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”—(John Milne.)

This new clause makes provision by regulations for everyone to receive free, impartial pension advice at age 40 and again around five years before their expected retirement.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[John Milne]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 40—Targeted Advice Access for Under-Saving Cohorts—

“(1) The Secretary of State must make regulations to provide enhanced access to pension advice or guidance for cohorts identified as under-saving for retirement.

(2) Regulations may make provision for—

(a) identifying under-saving groups, including but not limited to—

(i) women,

(ii) ethnic minority groups, and

(iii) others affected by long-term pay or pension gaps;

(b) mechanisms to fund and deliver targeted support;

(c) reporting and evaluation requirements to assess take-up and effectiveness.

(3) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”

This new clause allows for the creation of targeted pension advice or guidance interventions for groups at risk of under-saving for retirement.

New clause 41—Cap on cost of advice for pension holders—

“(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations introduce a cap on the cost recoverable for providing pension advice per pension holder under any scheme operating free or subsidised advice.

(2) The cap may vary depending on—

(a) the value of the pension pot;

(b) the type of pension scheme;

(c) the complexity of advice required.

(3) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”

This new clause enables the introduction of a cost ceiling for advice provision to members of pension schemes.

New clause 43—Auto-Enrolment into Pension Wise Guidance Sessions—

“(1) The Secretary of State must make regulations requiring that individuals reaching prescribed ages are auto-enrolled into Pension Wise guidance appointments.

(2) The regulations may provide for—

(a) opt-out procedures;

(b) the prescribed ages or pension milestones at which auto-enrolment occurs;

(c) the means by which schemes notify members and facilitate appointments.

(3) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”

This new clause aims to increase engagement with Pension Wise by auto-enrolling members into guidance sessions at key decision points, with the ability to opt out.

[John Milne]

We have tabled a number of amendments designed to improve people’s access to advice. As I said in a previous sitting, for me, the biggest missing link in this Bill is the absence of action on pensions advice. Relatively few people are able—or perhaps willing— to access paid advice, and that situation is not likely to change. We have to find another way.

The purpose of new clause 1 is to help people to properly understand their pension options through universal access to free, impartial advice at key life stages. We previously debated how that might be funded—slightly ahead of time—but this is purely about the principle of that advice.

Most people find pensions very complicated. It is hard to persuade people to engage with the issue at a young enough age, and it is even harder for someone to grasp what would constitute an adequate pension many years before they might have to draw on it. The Work and Pensions Committee, of which I am a member, has repeatedly highlighted this issue and examined ways to improve things.

The intention of new clause 1 is to ensure that everyone—not just the financially literate or well advised—can make informed decisions about retirement. Advice would be offered at or around age 40, which is a critical moment for mid-life planning and pension consolidation, and again within six years of expected retirement, to support decisions about drawdowns, annuities and retirement income options. That change is designed to give people confidence and clarity about their pensions, and to avoid poor decisions that would undermine retirement security.

[Rachel Blake (Cities of London and Westminster) (Lab/Co-op)]

I have read the new clause with interest, and listened carefully, and I am sure that this Committee is united in wanting there to be good advice on pensions. It would help me to better understand the proposal if the hon. Member could describe why he thinks the Money and Pensions Service is not already providing that, and why he thinks there is a gap that would justify this type of measure.

[John Milne]

I thank the hon. Member for her question. We have to look at performance: over the years, most people—the great majority of people—have not been getting any advice. Those who do tend to be better off because they have more private pensions, so they are obviously far more engaged, but the majority of people, especially now we have many on auto-enrolment, have minimal engagement. There are some very good services on hand—such as Pension Wise advice, which is free; I will come on to that in another measure—but, overall, people are simply not accessing that advice.

We are keeping the wording of the new clause reasonably open to establish the principle. There are many ways to solve the problem, and we will come to some of those in other new clauses. We are hoping to get agreement on the principle, though there are many ways to crack this particular egg.

Moving on to new clause 40, this is about targeted advice access for under-saving cohorts. Its purpose is to put the focus on groups of people who have historically been among the worst served by our current pension system.

[John Grady (Glasgow East) (Lab)]

Has the hon. Gentleman considered some of the reforms that the FCA is considering, such as the advice guidance boundary review? I understand the thrust of what he is trying to do—to ensure that people get proper pension advice. Hopefully, everyone would agree with that, but I wonder how it fits in with the wider context of the work that the FCA is doing.

[John Milne]

This is really about trying to place the Minister’s attention on this important issue—we will not press the new clause to a vote. It is about focusing the Minister’s mind on the task at hand. The undersaving groups include, but are not limited to, women, ethnic minority groups and others affected by long-term pay or pension gaps. The new clause would provide mechanisms to fund and deliver targeted support.

New clause 41 is designed to put a cap or ceiling on the amount of free advice accessed by any individual saver. It is a subset of new clause 1. Some individuals have very complicated financial affairs, which threaten to take a disproportionate amount of effort to decipher, in the event that we were to provide free advice. Those individuals will tend to be much better off and with multiple pension pots, which is precisely why they will end up needing more advice. Placing a ceiling on the advice available would ensure that the free advice was targeted only at those who needed it most.

New clause 43 is a potential solution to the information deficit that we are trying to address. It would enable auto-enrolment into Pension Wise as the vehicle for giving advice. We tabled it as a probing amendment to provoke the Minister’s consideration. The purpose of the new clause is to help people properly understand and engage with their pension by auto-enrolment into Pension Wise advice at key stages, with the freedom to opt out. Pension Wise guidance is free, impartial and has very high satisfaction rates—94%—among those who have used it, yet uptake remains strangely low, which is an excellent illustration of exactly why the whole advice area needs urgent attention.

Government data shows that of those who have accessed defined-contribution pension pots, only 14% have done so after receiving Pension Wise advice. That is despite various efforts, including a stronger nudge to encourage taking guidance before pots are accessed. Wake-up packs and other communications have shown limited effectiveness, and the evidence shows that savers will need more than passive information; they need action-oriented support.

If anything, the situation is getting worse. The proportion of pensions accessed after receiving guidance or advice has reduced by around 9 percentage points since 2021-22. Evidence from the DWP’s 2022 research shows that although most people start saving for retirement in their 20s and 30s, many do not start planning for retirement until their 50s. Auto-enrolment into guidance would therefore significantly increase take-up and improve retirement outcomes for many. Defined-contribution scheme members, in particular, often lack clear information about their options; Pension Wise would help fill that gap.

New clause 43 leaves flexibility for the Secretary of State to determine the appropriate ages, processes and notification methods. We recognise that it would be a significant move, and that there would be technical issues to solve. That is why we have tabled it only as a probing new clause, to explore whether the Government will look at trials or further measures to boost guidance uptake. Auto-enrolment into a pension scheme has been a great success, so perhaps the next logical step is auto-enrolment into advice. Why not try it?

[Mark Garnier]

I am keen to speak to these Liberal Democrat new clauses, because we have a fundamental problem. Research by Pensions UK shows that more than 50% of savers will fail to reach their retirement income targets set by the 2005 Pensions Commission, and closing the gap between what people are saving and what they will need must be a pressing concern of any Government. So, we need the second part of the pensions review to be fast-tracked, with a laser-like focus on pensions adequacy.

This takes me back to when I first became a Member of Parliament some 14 or 15 years ago. The big issue at the time in the independent financial advisers market was the retail distribution review. My hon. Friend the Member for West Worcestershire (Dame Harriett Baldwin) and I held our first Backbench Business debate on the retail distribution review, and it is recorded in Hansard that we predicted this would be a problem as a result—fewer independent financial advisers being available to give advice.

There were three key elements of the retail distribution review. They were very well-intended, and let us not beat about the bush: there were reasons why they were brought about. One of them was intended to raise the professional standards of independent financial advisers, and I think we would all agree that that has to be a good thing. The advisers complained at the time because they did not want to take exams. If they had been in the business for 40 years, why would they feel that they needed to take an exam? But why should they not improve their standards? There were issues to do with lifetime liability—advisers’ taking responsibility beyond seven years for advice that they had given, which was very contentious. Also there was clarity on the models of advice being given.

However, the key element that caused the problems was where independent financial advisers, prior to that moment, were being paid a commission on the product that was being sold, which potentially led to product bias. If a commission was being paid at 2.5% on one product and 1% on another, the independent financial adviser would have a material interest in selling that higher-commission product, even if it was a worse product. That could have been dealt with by having a maximum commission rate on all the products; it could have been set at 100 or 150 basis points, which would have dealt with that problem. We saw this issue in the London stock exchange until 1986, when there were fixed rates of commission, so nobody could undercut another broker by providing cheaper dealing measures. We therefore knew it could work.

The direct result of all this was that when the retail distribution review was brought in by the FCA in January 2013, we saw a massive drop in the 35,000 independent financial advisers. That has since recovered, and we now have around 36,000 advisers. The important point is that a financial adviser who goes out to persuade somebody to take advice on their pension now needs to charge a fee. Before that, to the person receiving the advice, the financial adviser would appear to be doing it for nothing. There would be an agreement, so it would be transparent and they would know exactly what was going on.

However, the point is that now, if I am being asked to put money into a pension fund and I know I am paying the 1.5%, the fact that the commission is coming out of the money going in feels much less restrictive than being sent a bill for £1,500 or £2,000. That is much more difficult to meet, even though it comes to the same point in the end. The result of this is that, whereas about 50% of people used to put money into pensions and receive financial advice, the number is now 9%.

There are an awful lot of newly elected Members of Parliament here. After 10 or 15 years, they will find themselves in a Bill Committee making these points and saying, “We told you this would be a problem. We told you so, yet here we are trying to resolve a problem that we knew was going to happen, and we allowed it to.” I am very cynical about Parliament sometimes, as all Members will be eventually. The important point is that the Liberal Democrat new clauses are an attempt to deal with the problems that we knew would come about. Auto-enrolment is brilliant—we really like auto-enrolment—but there are various things coming in under this Bill. We have to be careful that the things we bring in with the best intentions do not end up creating bigger problems due to unforeseen circumstances.

If the Liberal Democrats pressed new clause 1, we would happily support it, as it is a good amendment. It will be interesting to see if that comes through, but this is something we have to get right. People need to get advice because far too many people are going to go barrelling into their 67th birthday, or whatever it is, and suddenly discover that they have run out of money, and that is not a good place to be.

Pension Schemes Bill (Sixth sitting)

John Milne Excerpts

Tuesday 9th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[John Milne (Horsham) (LD)]

To add briefly to the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay, I emphasise that with new clause 3 we are taking a non-prescriptive approach. It says that

“the Secretary of State must have regard to the need to identify and mitigate barriers faced by new market entrants in the defined contribution pensions market.”

It is a very gentle ask. We are all very aware of the issues today, but will they still be in everybody’s mind in the future?

[Torsten Bell]

I will come back on the question about the word “product” and definitions. I reassure the Committee that I will go away and make sure that is clear if it is not clear enough already.

The core Liberal Democrat question is, are we baking innovation in? It is a good question for us all to be asking. I think the answer is yes. To broaden the conversation out slightly, we want to see innovation from existing providers as well. We anticipate that there will still be 15 or so large providers in the 2030s. That is still a highly competitive market. Not just looking at costs but also at customer service and all the rest in the value for money regime should be a spur to that innovation. That is a key part of the set of clauses we were discussing last week.

I should explicitly note that the scale tests do not cover the most obvious innovation that is likely to come in the market in the coming years, which is CDC schemes. By their nature, if they are to be successful, they will get to scale anyway, but to make their path easier and to be clear that we do see a role for CDC innovation moving forward, those are not part of these requirements. The innovation pathway exists for exactly this reason, as we have discussed.

Several Members have raised a question about consultation. I confirm that there is a requirement for a public consultation, which should certainly learn lessons that go beyond the experience of the pensions industry to the wider financial services sector—lessons of competition entry. We talked about that in the banking sector earlier, but the same thing would apply, for example, to other parts of the insurance sector and others. We will take that away. We are very conscious at the moment, in our wider approach to regulation, of providing earlier authorisation, where that can be done. I suspect we may come back to that in the superfunds discussion later this week.

Amendment 112 agreed to.

Amendments made: 113, in clause 38, page 44, leave out lines 21 and 22 and insert—

“(a) the scheme in question has strong potential to grow so as to meet the scale requirement under section 28A,

(aa) the scheme in question has an innovative product design, and”.

This amendment ensures that the eligibility conditions for new entrant pathway relief are more precisely articulated.

Amendment 114, in clause 38, page 44, line 34, leave out from “of” to “(including” in line 35 and insert “ “strong potential to grow” and “innovative product design” ”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 113.

Amendment 115, in clause 38, page 44, line 36, leave out from “has” to end of line 37 and insert “strong potential to grow or an innovative product design”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 113.

Amendment 116, in clause 38, page 45, leave out lines 1 and 2.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 129.

Pension Schemes Bill (Fifth sitting)

John Milne Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Members for Wyre Forest and for Aberdeen North. The main question raised is about the level of the fines. To provide some context, the answer is yes—that would need to be amended by further primary legislation; there is not a power in the Bill to change that. It is an increase on previous levels of fines for individuals and organisations—from £5,000 to £10,000 for individuals, reflecting the high inflation we have seen in recent years. On that basis, it gives us certainty that we have seen a substantial increase, and we would not need to change it in the near future, but I take the point that in the longer term, we always need to keep the levels of fines under review, and we will need to do that in this case. I hope that provides the answers to hon. Members’ questions.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 30 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 31

Enforcement by the FCA

Amendment made: 41, in clause 31, page 29, line 38, leave out subsection (4) and insert—

“(4) For the purposes of this Chapter a person is ‘FCA-regulated’ if they are an authorised person (within the meaning of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000) in relation to the operation of a pension scheme.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment clarifies that the definition of “FCA-regulated”, in relation to a person, refers to the person being FCA-regulated in respect of the operation of a pension scheme (as opposed to in a capacity unrelated to small pots regulations).

Clause 31, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 32

Power to alter definition of “small”

[John Milne (Horsham) (LD)]

I beg to move amendment 4, in clause 32, page 30, line 12, at end insert—

“(4) The Secretary of State must, at least once every three years, review the amount for the time being specified in section 20(2) to consider whether that amount should be increased, having regard to—

(a) the effectiveness, and

(b) the benefit to members

of the consolidation of small dormant pension pots.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to review and consider increasing the level of small pension pot consolidation every three years.

The purpose of the amendment is to require the Secretary of State to review at least once every three years the threshold for small dormant pension pot consolidation. It aims to ensure that the level set in clause 20(2) remains effective and relevant over time. The Minister will be aware that we have already considered the right level at which to set the consolidation; we tabled amendment 262 as a probing amendment, which would have changed the small pot consolidation limit from £1,000 to £2,000. As we have discussed, industry has a very wide range of views on what would be the best figure.

However, this amendment asks for a review, not a particular figure. As before, we do not intend to push it to a vote. To us, a formal review process seems sensible, but whether it should be set at three-year intervals or any other figure is open to question. Given the lack of certainty about what figure industry would like, it seems a good idea to review the threshold after we have seen the measure working in practice.

The pensions landscape evolves quickly, with more job changes and rising numbers of small inactive pots. Therefore, a static threshold risks becoming out of date and undermining the policy’s effectiveness, whereas a regular review keeps the system responsive to members’ needs. It would consider effectiveness—whether consolidation is working to reduce fragmentation and improve efficiency, and the benefit to members, so whether savers are seeing clearer statements, reduced charges and better value for money. It would also simplify retirement saving by reducing the number of scattered small pots, would help members to keep track of their savings and avoid losing pensions altogether, and would improve efficiency for providers, which could reduce costs for savers.

I stress that the amendment does not dictate that there should be an automatic increase. It simply requires the Secretary of State to consider whether the amount is still appropriate. Therefore, in our view, it strikes the right balance between flexibility and accountability. To summarise, this measure would keep consolidation policy up to date, effective and beneficial for pension savers. A regular, three-year review is a simple, proportionate step to ensure that the system works as intended.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I am happy to support the Liberal Democrat amendment. I have already mentioned the Regulatory Policy Committee’s impact assessment—it considers the monitoring and evaluation plan to be weak, saying:

“The policies are all due to be reviewed in 2030. More detailed plans are needed, outlining success metrics, reporting requirements, and methodologies, across the policies.”

The amendment fits quite neatly into what the RPC said, which looks for an understanding and acceptance that there needs to be regular reviews, given that the Government have not committed to a three-year—or shorter—time period on this issue.

There seems to be widespread support for the small pots consolidation across the House. This amount has been picked, and as I said in a previous sitting, there is not necessarily a perfect answer. It could be that change is required, or that all the companies and organisations that are consolidating small pots immediately manage to do it amazingly. It could happen as smoothly as possible, as a result of which the Government could decide to increase the threshold.

I think that compelling the Secretary of State to look at this is completely reasonable to ensure that they are doing it on a relatively regular basis, so that the threshold can be changed if necessary. There is potentially widespread support across the House for ensuring that there is a requirement to monitor the threshold on an ongoing basis. It is not that we do not trust, agree with or appreciate the Secretary of State’s work, but it would give us a level of comfort that it would be done regularly should the Minister accept that, consider something similar on Report or, at the very least, make a commitment from the Dispatch Box that a written statement will be made to Parliament on a fairly regular basis explaining the reasons for keeping or changing the level.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Member for that comment. The nature of every piece of legislation means that a future Government can take a different decision. Thanks for the reminder of the nature of British politics—that is how it operates. I am slightly more relaxed than she is, because there will be significant pressure from the industry, and from everybody, to keep this under review. That is not a matter of controversy. It is conceivable that there may be a Government who are steadfastly against ever again looking at the small pots threshold, but having lived through the last 15 years, I would put that low down the list of uncertainties in British politics. However, I take the intention behind the hon. Lady’s point, and I promise never to assume that Labour will win every election from now until eternity.

[John Milne]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clauses 33 to 36 stand part.

Government amendment 43.

Clause 37 stand part.

New Clause 36—Automatically amalgamated pension pots—

“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations provide for the establishment of a scheme to ensure that an individual’s pension pot is linked to the person and upon a person’s change in employment the pension pot automatically moves into the pension scheme of the new workplace.

(2) All employees in the UK will be automatically enrolled into the scheme defined in subsection (1) upon its establishment but must be given the option of opting out.

(3) Where a person opts out, they are able to nominate their qualifying scheme of choice for pensions contributions.”

This new clause allows pension pots automatically to follow members from job to job, consolidating with each new workplace scheme rather than relying on a single lifetime provider.

--- Later in debate ---

That is why have tabled an amendment specifically on the water industry, which we intend to push to a vote. I hope the Government will appreciate that their policy is fundamentally wrong. I am sure the Government will not vote for our amendment, but if the Minister could make all the right noises about mandating pension funds to bail out the Government, I would be grateful.

[John Milne]

I will speak to new clause 4 on targeted investment vehicles. Its purpose is to empower the Secretary of State to establish or facilitate targeted investment vehicles for pension funds. Overall, the pensions industry is supportive of the Bill, as are the Liberal Democrats, but some sections have expressed concern that a requirement to invest in UK infrastructure and assets could lead to excess demand for a limited stock of investment, especially in the early days when the economy is adjusting. In a worst-case scenario, it could lead to overpaying for investments or difficulty in reaching Government targets. Government assistance to ensure a healthy flow of investment vehicles would therefore serve to prevent that from happening.

Furthermore, there is a unique opportunity to create vehicles that would allow schemes to invest in projects with clear social and economic benefits. It could include many different types of investments. For example, the Government could support the development of investment vehicles designed to revitalise high streets and local communities, provide affordable and social housing development, provide care home accommodation or support other projects that deliver long-term value while strengthening society.

The new clause sets out regulations that would set clear rules on which schemes can participate. Different provision could be made for different schemes and types of investment vehicles. The Pensions Regulator and the Financial Conduct Authority would be given defined responsibilities in authorising, supervising and regulating these vehicles. To be clear, trustees would only be expected to consider the investments where consistent with their fiduciary duties and long-term value for money for members. Pension funds are among the largest sources of long-term capital in the UK, so harnessing even a small proportion for socially beneficial investment could deliver real economic and community impact. Pooling of assets would also facilitate open access for smaller schemes. Done properly, that could align members’ retirement interests with a wider public good.

To summarise, the new clause is designed to ensure a constant supply of suitable investment vehicles so that pension funds can invest at scale in areas that are currently not receiving sufficient attention. At the same time, it would create a framework where pensions could be a force for social renewal and financial security. The clause ensures opportunities with safeguards in place for schemes to contribute to national priorities, while still securing value for members.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Although I am delighted by the intention of the hon. Member for Wyre Forest to get one over Reform with amendment 275, and I am quite happy to back that notion, I am also pretty happy with nationalised water in Scotland. Scottish Water is significantly better performing than the other water companies, so I would not automatically say that nationalised water is a bad thing, given that our water is lovely in Scotland. However, we could do with a little more rain on the north-east coast, given that we have had the driest spring and summer for 40 years, which is not ideal. I gently disagree with the hon. Member because the amendment does not take into account the Scottish context. I would love to see more investment in Scottish Water from pension funds or from Government-led investment vehicles or decision making.

On amendments 248 and 249, I am much more relaxed about mandation than the Conservatives are, as Members might expect given my ideological position. I have much less of an issue with going in that direction. I have heard all the Government have said about not planning to use those powers. It is reasonable for the Government to direct the economy in certain directions—that is what tax and Government spend are for. A good chunk of that is about ensuring that we make interventions so that the economy grows in the way that we want it to.

In many cases, Governments have historically refrained from picking winners when a decision to do so could have grown the economy faster. For example, historically, the Government could have given more backing to certain ports to ensure that they could grow, particularly through renewable energy or by building offshore wind farms, because we could do with more local capacity throughout the UK. Had Governments of all colours been clearer about which areas and regions they were backing, that understanding could have enabled those areas to win more contracts.

On new clause 4, the options for how mandation could work and the investment vehicles that are in place, I have talked about affordable and social housing development. The biggest thing the Government could do to encourage social housing, in particular, is to cancel the right to buy, which would allow local authorities to build significant levels of social housing. That is how we are managing to increase our housing stock in Scotland. We are not there yet—nobody says that we are—but we are able to build new social housing in Scotland at a scale that most local authorities south of the border are not, because cancelling the right to buy has made it affordable. I would love to see more investment in social housing.

I would have liked renewable energy to be included in the Lib Dems’ new clause 4. I appreciate that we cannot include everything, but it would have been nice, particularly when it comes to smaller renewable energy projects and in combined heat and power initiatives. Large-scale CHP makes a really positive difference in Aberdeen city. We have a large combined heat and power network, which heats a significant number of our multi-storey blocks at far lower prices. They are still seeing an increase in prices, absolutely, but they do not need to worry about putting money in the meter, because they know they will have hot water and heating for a fixed monthly fee, rather than paying more in winter and less in summer.

Lastly, harking back to the Future Generations Commissioner for Wales, it would be interesting for the Government to consider whether any potential mandation benefits future generations, given the intergenerational gap and given that people my age and younger are increasingly of the view that we will never get a state pension, because it will simply not exist by the time we reach retirement age—I am sorry if not everybody is at that level of cynicism, but most people my age and younger are. Looking at where our private pensions are invested and at the Government’s direction of travel, it would at least be an interesting thought exercise, in advance of any Government decision on mandation, to consider whether that money would benefit future generations or make things worse for them. In Wales, decisions can be called in for judicial review, should a public authority act against the wellbeing of future generations.

Looking at whether investments that could be directed by the Government would benefit or have a detrimental impact on future generations would be an interesting way to tie the Government’s hands. That way, we could see investment not simply in massive motorways, High Speed 2 or dual carriageways, but in things that have a demonstrable benefit, or at least no adverse impact, on the wellbeing of future generations. Surely that should be a positive thing for us all, given our huge responsibilities for the future of the planet and to those who will be living on these islands. Requiring that to be considered when the Government look at mandation could be a great way to do it.

I am not sure what I will do when we come to new clause 4—it will be voted on at the very end because it is a new clause. I like the idea, but I am not convinced that I would go down that exact route. I will not be supporting the Conservative amendments in this group, which I understand the shadow Minister is terribly shocked about, but there are places where we can have significant ideological disagreements, and this is definitely one of them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

I corrected the Minister the other day on the definition of fiduciary duty, and the hon. Member for Mid Leicestershire just made a similar error. The fiduciary duty is not to act in the best interests of scheme members but to act in the best interests of getting them the pensions they were promised, or of growing their pensions. It is not necessarily about their best interests; it is about the best interests of their pension and the size of it.

We spoke about this quite a lot in relation to the local government pension scheme. There could be investments that make a person’s life significantly better than having an extra fiver a year in their pension. These are two different things. I appreciate that fiduciary duties should be what they are—I am not arguing with that; I am saying that the definition is not about acting in the best interests of scheme members but simply about growing their pension pots.

In terms of the two Lib Dem amendments and the points made about the investability of projects, we could argue about chickens and eggs and what will come first: will it be the economy growing in order that pension funds can find more investable projects, or will it be a pipeline of projects ready for funds to invest in, which is what the witnesses giving evidence last Tuesday suggested they need? If the Government are clear, not necessarily that they will include mandation but that there is a stick at the end of the process if the carrots do not work, confidence in that pipeline will grow in order for those projects to be there. I would love those projects to include what the Liberal Democrats are suggesting—housing and regeneration of town centres, for example—as well as investment in renewable energy and an increase in energy efficiency measures.

[John Milne]

Renewable energy schemes—particularly community energy, which I am a big fan of—are a very good addition, so we would support that.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I am delighted that the hon. Member agrees with me.

Pension Schemes Bill (Fourth sitting)

John Milne Excerpts

Thursday 4th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

Division 4

Question accordingly negatived.

Ayes: 6

---

Conservative: 3
Liberal Democrat: 2
Scottish National Party: 1

Noes: 9

---

Labour: 9

[John Milne (Horsham) (LD)]

I beg to move amendment 3, in clause 9, page 9, line 4, at end insert—

“(e) about the proportion of any surplus that may be allocated, or the manner in which it may be determined, for the purpose of contributing to the provision of free, impartial pension advice and guidance services for scheme members.”

This amendment enables a proportion of surplus funds to be used to fund free pension advice.

The purpose of the amendment is to allow a proportion of pension scheme surplus funds to be allocated to funding free, impartial pension advice and guidance services for members. In my former life in advertising, it was sometimes my job to help people to understand their pension options so that they could make the right choices, and I can tell the Committee it was not an easy task. Pensions are complicated, and far too many people have no idea at all what is in store for them, and therefore do not take advice. We argue that rectifying this gap is the key task that at the moment is underserved by the Bill. There are proposals such as the pensions dashboard that certainly help, but they are by no means sufficient. More action needs to be taken, and that is the essence of the amendment.

Without proper advice, members risk making poor financial decisions, such as taking all their lump sum and getting taxed unnecessarily, which could severely damage their long-term security. Free, impartial advice is essential to level the playing field between those who are more informed and perhaps have higher incomes, and those who are not. The details of our revised proposals are laid out in new clause 1, which, slightly inconveniently, will be discussed later in the proceedings; this amendment is about the funding for that measure. We propose two stages of advice: at age 40, which is a critical moment for all midlife planning and pension consolidation, and again within six years of expected retirement, when the emphasis shifts more to decisions about drawdown, annuities and retirement income options.

The first question that is always asked when any extension to a Government service is proposed is, “How will we pay for it?”. This measure is a highly relevant, targeted solution to that question, made possible by accessing surplus funds. We have general agreement, I think, that surpluses in pension schemes should not be allowed to sit idle or be seen simply as windfall funds, but we have less clarity and agreement on what exactly is the best use for them. I would argue that the measure we propose, employing a small proportion of the surplus to fund member advice, is at once a highly relevant targeted use for the funds, and something that will have a disproportionately large impact on pension adequacy, which is of course a matter of great concern to the Minister outside this Bill.

The amendment does not mandate a fixed proportion; it simply gives the Secretary of State powers to determine what proportion he or she thinks should be used. It creates flexibility and safeguards, so that the balance between scheme health and member benefit can be properly managed. Importantly, funding advice from surpluses would reduce the need for members to pay out of their own pockets; for many, the cost is prohibitive, so it simply does not happen. A further benefit is that it would build trust among the public that schemes are actively supporting member outcomes beyond just the pension pot itself.

To summarise, the amendment is designed to ensure that pension surpluses, when they arise, are used to strengthen member outcomes. Advice and guidance are just as important as the pension itself in ensuring good retirement outcomes. The amendment is a practical, fair and member-focused way of improving the system.

[Mark Garnier]

As we have heard, the amendment authorises the use of surplus pension funds to contribute to the provision of free, impartial pension advice and guidance services to scheme members. The age of 40 is very important, and I hope that the Minister, on his 42nd birthday—

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

I shall give a short speech, because there is a worrying habit developing of the hon. Member for Aberdeen North giving the Government Front-Bench speech for me. I should encourage that as we go on—she might be slightly traumatised by that, but we are where we are. Everybody in this room will agree on the importance of the principle that has been highlighted, and we have just heard a powerful point exactly along those lines.

Although the Government understand the intent behind amendment 3, there are two reasons why we will not support it. The first is a point of principle, which I have already set out: it is for trustees, not the Government, to decide how surpluses that benefit members should take place. We discussed the issue of discretionary benefits just now.

The second reason is less a point of principle and more a matter of reality. The amendment would provide advice only to existing members of specific schemes. I think we all agree, particularly in the light of the point made by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, that the main problems are about the defined-contribution space and people coming up towards retirement. Lots of the people who are in schemes who would be coming forward for surplus release are already drawing down a very well-defined pension income.

It is not the ideal way to focus on the particular problem that we all agree exists, but we completely agree that robust guidance that assures that everyone has access to free and impartial advice is very important. That is the job of the Money and Pensions Service, but I completely hear what has been said about how it needs to go further. I am grateful for hon. Members’ contributions, but I urge the hon. Member for Horsham to withdraw his amendment.

[John Milne]

I thank the Minister for his reply, and I thank hon. Members for their contributions. One thing we all absolutely agree on is the importance and centrality of this issue. If there is one area in which I feel the Bill could have gone further, it is this one.

It is a scary thing to look to the future and see all the trends in where we are heading with pension adequacy. The number of people who will have zero or a very small pension is deeply frightening, particularly when we lay alongside that the fact that many of those people will not own their own house and will still be paying private market rent. The state pension is not designed for that.

It is a crucial issue. I appreciate both the Minister’s objection in principle and the practical objections from him and the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, but we will still push the amendment to a vote. That is more to lay a marker than anything else; I appreciate that our chances of winning the vote are small. We want to lay as much emphasis on the issue as possible. Whether or not it ends up as part of the Bill, perhaps under new clause 1, we want it highlighted.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Milne]

I rise to support what my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay said. As has been emphasised, we are not talking about making things mandatory. It is about making things possible, because there have been cases in which managers take a rather narrow view of fiduciary duty and almost deliberately exclude other considerations. It is about removing that blockage. We feel that the requirement in the amendment is of value and hope that the Minister will consider it.

It is also worth saying that very often one cannot definitively say that one investment will be better than another. There are all the projections and estimates. If it was that clear, every single fund would have the same 10 investments and that would be the end of it, and it would be a very small industry. It is often a matter of assertion, or a calculation. It is often not a case of choosing a lesser return; any return is conjectural in the first place.

[Torsten Bell]

My support for the Welsh Government’s Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015 is on the record, so I get to disagree with the hon. Member for Aberdeen North on something, which will be a relief for everybody.

I thank the hon. Member for Torbay for tabling the amendments. Clearly, addressing climate change is absolutely central to this Government’s agenda. It needs to be done in the right way. Pension funds hold significant capital, and I am pleased to say that at every conference and every session I hold with people involved in the industry I see that investors and pension schemes do now use their influence on companies to encourage them to take responsible action. That has been a big change over the course of the last decade. It can lead to better risk management and potentially also improve returns on investments, as well as helping companies to perform better in relation to environmental targets.

My overall argument, though, is that trustees must already consider financially material risks, including ESG factors. The statement of investment principles and the implementation statement are key tools that are already in place for disclosing a scheme’s approach to ESG issues, including climate change. Ultimately, the amendment is about disclosures; that is what it aims to achieve. Additionally, large schemes with assets above £1 billion, which in future will be the majority of schemes because of the scale measures that we will come back to, must also report on climate-related risks and opportunities, in line with the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures.

We are looking to strengthen sustainability reporting, exactly as the hon. Member for Torbay wishes to see, through new UK sustainability reporting standards and our transition plan’s commitment, which the Government consulted on this summer. Taken together, our policy initiatives will modernise the UK’s framework for corporate reporting, giving pension schemes vital information about companies’ decarbonisation plans and about whether to escalate their engagement efforts with investee companies on environmental issues. The DWP is contributing to that work and will review the effectiveness of climate reporting requirements later this year, as part of our post-implementation review of the requirements of the Taskforce on Inequality and Social-related Financial Disclosures.

Given the existing reporting requirements, the Government’s position is that we will gently resist the amendments, to avoid duplication.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

To ensure consistency, comparability and transparency of the value that arrangements provide, it is essential that all arrangements undertake the same process in the same way and that there is sufficient oversight of the process by the regulator. That is why clause 17 sets out the range of ways in which the regulator may make provision for ensuring compliance with the value for money framework.

The Pensions Regulator will be able to issue compliance and penalty notices to trustees, managers and third parties in breach of their VFM obligations. These notices enable the regulator to set out the steps that must be taken to ensure compliance with the VFM requirements. Financial penalties can be imposed, to a maximum of £10,000 in the case of an individual and up to £100,000 in other cases. Those figures align with other powers we have taken in part 2. There is also provision for the withdrawal of a penalty notice and for the Pensions Regulator to challenge an incorrect VFM rating.

Clause 18 makes it clear that the provisions in this chapter apply equally to pension schemes run by or on behalf of the Crown and to Crown employees. This is the standard approach in legislation to ensure that Crown-operated schemes are covered by the same rules, unless explicitly excluded. Clause 19 is the interpretation clause, which sets out the meaning of the terms used in the VFM clauses 10 to 17. I commend these clauses to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 19

Interpretation of Chapter

Amendment made: 35, in clause 19, page 20, leave out lines 13 and 14.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 28.

Clause 19, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 20

Small pots regulations

[John Milne]

I beg to move amendment 262, in clause 20, page 21, line 12, leave out “£1,000” and insert “£2,000”.

This amendment changes the value of small pot consolidation from £1,000 to £2,000.

The purpose of this amendment is to accelerate the consolidation of small, dormant pension pots and to enable more pots to be included. In other words, the amendment would support the Government’s intention to simplify retirement savings by reducing the number of scattered small pots and helping members to keep track of their savings and to avoid losing their pensions altogether. It would serve to improve the efficiency of providers, which in turn could reduce costs for savers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

That is for all regulations except for the setting of the threshold number.

[John Milne]

I thank the Minister for his response—

[Torsten Bell]

To being probed.

[John Milne]

Yes, it sounds rather unpleasant. We will think more about this subject, and I am sure we will discuss further, but I thank him for the clarification. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Mark Garnier]

I beg to move amendment 259, clause 20, page 21, line 23, leave out from “procedure” to end of line 29

This amendment would make all regulations on consolidation of small dormant pots in DC schemes to the affirmative procedure all times they were made rather than just after first use.

The hon. Member for Aberdeen North asked an interesting question about the application of the affirmative procedure to regulations on the pot size. Our amendment seeks to address the use of the affirmative procedure in the wider legislation that goes with this.

As we continue to table amendments urging extra parliamentary scrutiny, I feel myself becoming slightly depressed at the prospect of having to see too much of the Minister, even though he is undoubtedly a lovely chap, in Delegated Legislation Committees as we consider every single change. It is important though, because at the end of the day Parliament needs to scrutinise what is going on, so it is a good thing that the size of the pot is subject to the affirmative procedure.

It is okay, but not ideal that for anything that could be to do with the wider legislation, the negative procedure applies. Members having to look for a very material change going through in a written ministerial statement or whatever and then raise it is not necessarily such a good thing, given that this is fixing 13 million of these pots. That is an awful lot of them. If we increased the threshold to £2,000, would that number be 26 million? A lot of people that could be affected by this.

This was largely a probing amendment to see what the Minister has to say. We are unlikely to divide the Committee on it. None the less, I am very interested to hear what the Minister has to say about the affirmative procedure.

Pension Schemes Bill (Third sitting)

John Milne Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 4th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Torsten Bell]

That is a factually accurate description of the situation. The hon. Lady is not the first person to have raised that point with me, and I understand the wish for greater certainty about how funds will be used. My view is that looking for that certainty through legislation is wishful thinking. Funding sitting within companies is fungible. The monitoring and enforcement of those things would not be practical in any sense. I am sure that part of the discussion between trustees and firms will be about exactly the kind of points that the hon. Lady is raising, particularly for open schemes, where there is a large overlap between employees and scheme. Members will be part of the discussion, but I do not think that that is practical for legislation. I am liberal enough, although I am certainly not a Liberal Democrat, to think that that is quite hard for legislation to manage, and that it is the role of trustees and employers to work through that.

On the hon. Lady’s wider point, I offer her some reassurance that the Pensions Regulator is taking very seriously its job of providing guidance for trustees about how they think about the questions of surpluses. I think that will offer her quite a lot of reassurance, particularly about how members benefit—she has focused on how employers benefit—from release.

Amendment 25 agreed to.

Amendments made: 26, in clause 8, page 8, line 2, at end insert—

“(4A) Any power to distribute assets to the employer on a winding up is to be disregarded for the purposes of subsections (2) and (3); and a resolution under subsection (2) may not confer such a power.”.

This amendment ensures that the scope of section 36B is confined to powers to pay surplus otherwise than on the winding up of the scheme.

Amendment 27, in clause 8, page 8, line 6, at end insert—

“(5A) Regulations may provide that this section does not apply, or applies with prescribed modifications, in prescribed circumstances or to schemes of a prescribed description.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment, which inserts provision corresponding to section 37(8), allows for the application of section 36B to be modified in particular cases (for example, in the case of sectionalised schemes).

Clause 8, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9

Restrictions on exercise of power to pay surplus

[John Milne (Horsham) (LD)]

I beg to move amendment 5, in clause 9, page 8, line 18, at end insert—

“(2AA) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (2A), regulations made under that subsection must include provision that takes into account the particular circumstances of occupational pension schemes established before the coming into force of the Pensions Act 1995 which, prior to that Act, possessed or were understood to possess a power to pay surplus to an employer.”.

This amendment would allow schemes where people are affected by pre-97 to offer discretionary indexation where funding allows, with appropriate regulatory oversight.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 6, in clause 9, page 8, line 23, at end insert—

“(aa) prohibiting the making of a payment until annual increases to payments in line with Consumer Prices Index inflation have been awarded to members,”.

This amendment requires that payments in line with CPI inflation are awarded to members before all other considerations.

[John Milne]

The purpose of amendment 5 is to ensure that regulations take account of the particular circumstances of occupational pension schemes that were established before the Pensions Act 1995. There is effective discrimination against certain pre-1997 pension holders. That is a long-standing grievance and has remained unresolved for far too long. This has been reflected considerably in my postbag, as I am sure it has been for pretty much every MP.

In the evidence session on Tuesday, we heard moving testimony from Roger Sainsbury of the Deprived Pensioners Association and Terry Monk of the Pensions Action Group. As they told us, many of those affected are, literally, dying without ever seeing satisfaction. Many of these pensioners are receiving a fraction of what they are entitled to and what somebody who paid the exact same sums is currently receiving. It is causing genuine hardship.

Members of the pre-’97 schemes are often in a different position to those in later schemes. These schemes were designed under a different legal and regulatory framework. Current legislation does not always reflect those historical realities, which creates unintended inequities.

The amendment would require regulations under clause 9 to explicitly consider these older schemes. It would allow such schemes, with appropriate regulatory oversight, to offer discretionary indexation where funding allows. The key impacts would be to provide flexibility while ensuring safeguards are in place, give trustees the ability to improve outcomes for members in a fair and responsible way, and help to address the long-standing issue of members who miss out on indexation simply because of the scheme’s pre-’97 status. It also ensures that members can share in scheme strength where resources permit.

Clearly, safeguards are needed, and the amendment makes it clear that discretionary increases would be possible only where schemes are well funded. Oversight by regulators ensures that employer interests and member protections remain balanced. The intention behind the amendment is to bring fairness and flexibility into the treatment of pre-’97 scheme members and to modernise the system so that it works for today’s savers without undermining scheme stability.

[Mark Garnier]

I will not take up too much of the Committee’s time, but suffice it to say that we all heard the evidence that was presented on Tuesday, and we in the Conservative party agree with the Liberal Democrats’ amendment. We will support it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

I absolutely would. I have been making exactly those points to anyone who will listen.

[John Milne]

I thank the Minister for his comments. Over the coming weeks, as he will be aware, we will be discussing several amendments that relate to the same issue. It will be interesting to see whether we can reach a satisfactory solution. In the meantime, we will press our amendment to a vote, because we feel that the issue has remained unresolved for such a long time that it needs everything we can give it to get it across the line, but we hope that in the next couple of weeks of debate we can find the best possible solution.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Pension Schemes Bill (First sitting)

John Milne Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Sarah Edwards]

Q I am interested in hearing a little more about unlocking surplus and some of the challenges, particularly in the way that it is described or calculated, and what the thresholds might be. Obviously, there is an opportunity, but there is also a balance around conflicts arising when an employer might wish to access the surplus. Perhaps you could comment on your understanding and interpretation of how the Bill deals with that issue.

Rob Yuille: The challenge is aligning it with scheme members’ interests so that they are not put at risk. If a surplus turns to a deficit, which it can do because it is by no means guaranteed, and if an employer then fails, there is actual detriment to those scheme members. As we know, economic conditions can change. It is an opportunity for employers, though—that is the purpose of it—and schemes can and do extract surplus now, often when they enter a buy-out with an insurer.

It does need guardrails, and the Bill includes the provision that it has to be signed off by an actuary and it is the trustees’ decision. That is important, but there is a related challenge about the interaction of the surplus and superfunds. Each of those is okay: you can extract a surplus, for the reasons that we have discussed, and you can go into a superfund if you cannot afford a buy-out. The problem is, if a scheme could afford buy-out, extracts a surplus and then no longer can, and then it enters a superfund, the scheme members are in a weaker position than they would otherwise be. There are a couple of things that could be done about that: either leave the threshold for extracting surplus where it is—which is buy-out level, rather than low dependency—or change the Bill so that the combination of surplus and superfund cannot be gamed to get around that. In any case, as you say, it is important to monitor the market, and for the regulators to be alive to potential conflicts of interest.

Zoe Alexander: Pensions UK is content with the idea of using the low dependency threshold for surplus release. We think the protections are sufficient. Providing that the actuarial certification is in place, the sponsoring employer is in a strong financial position and a strong employer covenant is in place, we think there are real benefits to be had from surplus release. We highlight the fact that some employers and trustees will be looking to move benefits from DB to DC using surplus release, or even to a collective defined-contribution scheme. We are interested in the potential of that to bolster the benefits of those types of scheme, and we would like Government to look at the 25% tax penalty that applies when doing that, because if those funds are kept within the pensions system, that is to the benefit of savers, so perhaps that tax charge need not apply.

[John Milne (Horsham) (LD)]

Q Do you think that the proposed value for money framework could have the unintended effect of causing excess caution or short-termism in investment decisions? If so, what mitigations would you suggest?

Zoe Alexander: There will of course be metrics in the value for money framework that look at the longer term, and looking at longer time horizons is really welcome. One concern at Pensions UK is about the intermediate rankings in the value for money framework meaning that schemes cannot accept new business. That may well result in schemes doing everything they can, at any cost, to ensure they do not drop from the top rating to the intermediate rating. That could cause damaging behaviours in terms of herding. We want to ensure that people in the intermediate ranking, whether that is within a couple of intermediate rankings—perhaps you have a top one and then a bottom one, but somewhere within that intermediate scale—you can continue to take on new business, and the regulator will perhaps put you on a time limit to get back into the green, back into the excellent rating. We think that if it is so binary that as soon as you drop into intermediate, you cannot take on new business, that will heighten the potential downside risks of investment behaviours that you are describing.

Rob Yuille: I agree with that. I strongly support the value for money framework—I think both our organisations do—and the intent to shift the culture away from just focusing on cost and to value for money more generally, but yes, there is that risk. There are multiple trade-offs here: it is about transparency and how much you disclose, versus unintended consequences of that. We want high performers but, for high performance, you need to take risks.

As well as what Zoe says, which we might build on, we do not want a one-year metric. One year is too short a period; pensions are a long-term business. There should be a forward-looking metric, so that firms can say how they expect to perform over the longer term and then regulators and the market can scrutinise it.

On the points that were raised about intermediate ratings, this is another area where there is a potential combination of two bits of the Bill. There is provision for multiple intermediate ratings. It was originally conceived as a traffic light system, so there would be three ratings. If there were four, it would be okay to say to schemes, “You are not performing; you need to close to new employers,” but if there are three, firms will do everything they can to play it safe and make sure they get the green. So the interaction of those is really important.

[John Grady (Glasgow East) (Lab)]

Q This question is for Ms Alexander. A lot of my constituents are driven mad by small pots; they have worked in different jobs and have no idea how much money they have saved for a pension, so please could you outline the benefits of the small pots reforms to people in my constituency, and the practical steps needed to make the small pots regime work—for example, by way of IT?

Zoe Alexander: The small pots reforms are absolutely critical. The problem of small pots was foreseen by the Pensions Commission years ago. We all knew we would face that problem with automatic enrolment, and I think people would agree that it has taken too long to grasp the nettle. We at Pensions UK are really delighted to see the measures in the Bill to deliver the multi-consolidator model. It is really important that the pot size is kept low, as is proposed in the Bill, at least initially, to solve the problem of the smallest pots in the market. Pensions UK has undertaken a feasibility study, working with Government, to look at how that small pots system might be delivered in practice. That work is publicly available. It gets quite technical quite quickly, so I will not go into the details of it, but we believe there is a feasible model of delivering the small pots solution at low cost—one that should not involve Government in a major IT build.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

The question to the witness is to expand a bit more on that point. In reality, this provides a “comply or explain” power. In terms of the point Charlotte was just making there, it is absolutely right about the ability of the trustees to say, “This is not in the interest of our members.” It might be worth talking a bit about how when we move forward the consultation will allow us to set out how that would work in practice.

Charlotte Clark: It is an area that we would need to work through in terms of the road map. At the moment, our focus is very much on getting the value for money framework right. How the mandation would work and the process around it—as the Minister says, first, we would consult on it. We would have to have a look to see what information was given and how we would monitor it in the period from now to 2030 or 2035. We would have to work through all of those aspects of the process. We would do that in conjunction with the industry, making sure that what we were asking for was information that it could readily provide and that we felt confident that we could make a good assessment around.

Patrick Coyne: Our engagement with the marketplace so far already shows that many are considering investment strategies that have significant proportions of diversified investments, so the market is already responding based on some of the Mansion House accord commitments.

[John Milne]

Q Do you think that the finance industry has a clear understanding of how to apply its fiduciary duty? Do you think the Bill makes that clearer or muddies the waters, or somewhere in between?

Patrick Coyne: I think that fiduciary duty is a powerful force for good. Across the Bill, this is about giving those trustees the tools for the job. I think there are a number of areas where that is true. Within the value for money framework, at the moment, it is very difficult for employers or schemes to effectively compare performance. As an anecdote, I was speaking to a provider recently. They were pitching for new business. They came in and pitched their investment data, and the employer said, “You’re the third provider today that has shown us they are the top-performing provider.” That cannot be right.

Then, when you are looking across the Bill towards the DB space, because of the funding reality that many schemes are facing at the moment, there is choice in end game options—so, “How do I enhance member outcomes at the same time as securing benefits?” Actually providing a statutory framework for super-funds as another option is a good first step, as is allowing the release of surplus, if it is in the members’ best interests to do so.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Q I have a question about the balance of decision making. Trustees are obviously required to steward and grow assets on behalf of scheme members. This Bill slightly changes the priorities in relation to value for money. There is potential for future mandation, in that it basically allows the Government, or the regulators, more say in what direction trustees are taking. In practice, it is relatively difficult for scheme members to influence decisions that trustees take. My reading of the Bill is that it does not increase scheme members’ power over the direction. For example, if they wanted to disinvest in something, or if they felt strongly about investing more in UK assets, they will not have any more power to do that. Am I correct in my reading of that? Do you feel that some scheme members feel that they should have more influence over what trustees do and the direction of travel?

Charlotte Clark: It is a good question. It is hard to get over the fact that the vast majority of people are very inert in the pension system. Of course, there are some who are not, specifically around ESG—environmental, social, and governance—investments, but most trustees take those things into account, and there has been clarification about how that aligns with things like the fiduciary duty. Obviously, within the contract-based scheme, there frequently are options, if somebody does not like something that is invested in within the default, to have their own investment strategy, if that is what they choose to do. Do I think this Bill changes that? I do not think so. I think what the Bill is essentially trying to do is use the power of scale and collectivism to get better returns and, really, a better service for most savers.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Pinto-Duschinsky (Hendon) (Lab)]

Q I want to build on the questions that the hon. Member for Mid Leicestershire and my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol North East were raising. Obviously, part of the challenge we face is around the proliferation of small pots; certainly, when I talk to my constituents about issues of long-term retirement planning, that is the consistent theme. The Bill obviously sets out a path to try to deal with some of that proliferation that has been caused since the introduction of auto-enrolment. What are your views on the extent to which the Bill provides the right framework for dealing with that kind of proliferation?

Jack Jones: As Zoe said earlier, we should be here already. It has taken us a long time to get to the point where we have an agreed solution. It looks as if the mechanics of it will work. I think we need to let that bed in and prove that it works. The main concern from our perspective is the £1,000 definition of a small pot. Obviously, from a lot of angles, £1,000 is a lot of money—but as a pension pot it really is not. Looking at this once you have proved the concept and you have a system that works and that hoovers up the smallest pots and those most likely to become orphaned is one thing, but I think if you are looking at helping people to avoid accumulating 10 medium-small pots over their career, we need to look at how to increase that over time.

Christopher Brooks: I agree with Jack. I think the Bill is really strong on small pots and the system that is envisaged will really help. I guess my only comment would be that £1,000 is not a huge amount of money, so maybe over time that amount could be raised, and some kind of indication that that is the intention might be helpful.

[John Milne]

Q Do you think there is evidence that fiduciary duties are not interpreted in a way that optimises outcomes for pensions savers? If so, would you support any change in legislation to help?

Christopher Brooks: Yes; I think a lot of schemes do not interpret it broadly, so they probably take things literally regarding financial materiality—that is obviously very important, but they could probably do more. I think there is a very strong case for reform in fiduciary duties, just to make it clear in the law what it actually means. It is more of an enabling tool for providers, I think, rather than anything restrictive. When there needs to be some direction for schemes to invest in particular ways, I think there is sometimes a bit of reticence. That is true of investing in the UK, maybe with some private finance and maybe with regards to climate change. The larger schemes no doubt do understand it, but all schemes need to understand that they can invest in these things and that that is possible.

I am no expert on this, but, as I understand it the fiduciary duty is all over the place in the law, and sort of hinges on bits of case law and bits of very old legislation, so clarifying that would be a really good move.

Jack Jones: I would agree with that. I think there could be statutory guidance to make it very clear to trustees what their fiduciary duty actually involves, and that it does go beyond that kind of narrow interpretation. As I say, you should take into account your members’ quality of life more generally—for example, investing in ways that support the UK, when that is where your members are, is something that is in their wider interests, and managing systemic risks such as climate change is obviously very material financially, but also has an impact on the kind of world they will be retiring into.

As I said before, we do hear fiduciary duty occasionally being used as a reason not to do the hard stuff and not to think through that. There is nothing inherently problematic there, but clarifying and making sure that trustees are fully aware of the breadth of fiduciary duty would be helpful.

[The Chair]

For the last question, I call Rachel Blake.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Milne]

Q From your perspective, what would be the main obstacles or difficulties in fulfilling the value for money requirement in the Bill?

Dale Critchley: From a practical perspective, producing all the data. We need clarity in the regulations and clear definitions, so that everyone is producing the same data in the same way so that it can be compared.

Setting practical considerations aside, one of the risks is that there is a disjoint between the market and value for money. Value for money is looking at value. We still see lots of evidence in the market in terms of looking at price—“We want the cheapest thing possible”—not necessarily the best value. There is a potential tension there.

Longer term, there is the risk we pointed out around herding: if you set benchmarks, that creates a behaviour which, instead of optimising outcomes for members, produces an average. An example of that is in the metrics around service that are currently being thought about. They are what I have described as 20th-century metrics. Rather than metrics that are looking to engage members to drive decisions through electronic engagement, they are measuring, “How long does it take to change someone’s address? Have you got their national insurance number?” We think we could stretch things further, but that creates some challenges for some providers.

Colin Clarke: One of the other things that the industry as a whole needs to consider is around capacity. The value for money framework, if it is managed and regulated effectively, is going to result, ultimately, in members being moved into things that have the potential to deliver better value. All those kinds of projects take a lot of work and a lot of resource, so it would need to be managed carefully to make sure that the industry has actually got the capacity to manage the high volume of traffic that is going to be going through as funds consolidate.

[The Chair]

Mr Bedford, we do have a little time if you wish to ask a question.

Pension Schemes Bill (Second sitting)

John Milne Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[John Milne (Horsham) (LD)]

Q Earlier, you were touching on possible investments in local matters, such as affordable housing, which have a strong and desirable social benefit. Could it not be argued that there are extra interests for a local investor? Basically a council could both own the houses and effectively supply the customers via its housing lists, so there is an extra reason for investment from a local government pension fund versus other investors. Alongside that, do you think the Government need to help create these investment vehicles so that there is a sufficient pipeline to invest in?

Councillor Phillips: The Government have a responsibility to support the strategic authorities in developing the pipeline and the vehicles for investment. Affordable housing is probably one of the best examples to use. The pensioner receiving a pension or paying into a pension from the local government sector would be quite proud of the fact that some of their pension money is being invested in providing homes for the next generation of key workers. That is probably one of the best examples you can ever get of local investment. There is real potential, but I go back to the fact that it has to provide the necessary returns. Just as you have to be careful about some of those controversial ones, there is one that you can absolutely lap up.

[John Milne]

Q But would you agree that that could have very stable returns—say a 5% return for affordable housing, or for a care home—because effectively the customers are also coming via the local authority?

Councillor Phillips: There is great potential in all the activities that local government can do, but the fiduciary duty is where we need that clearly spelt out and some guardrails put in for that.

Robert McInroy: Where the LGPS can potentially bring an advantage to bear is by tapping into its local connections and local expertise—when it can see local investment opportunities that others potentially cannot. To come back to affordable housing and the fiduciary duty, if you are the asset owner, you have to be looking at the returns, and that is a difficult challenge for LGPS funds, particularly when it is in their local areas. You are talking about, for example, whether you push up rent and potentially displace a family or basically taking a lower return as a result of that. It is a very difficult thing to stack up. It is new to the LGPS. We need to make sure there are guardrails around it. Within the Bill it would be useful to bring fiduciary responsibility into the elements of local investment and how that overrides any of the local considerations.

[David Pinto-Duschinsky (Hendon) (Lab)]

Q The Minister picked up a point that I was going to touch on, but I would like to ask about broader consolidation. Councillor Phillips, you mentioned that often councils are wrestling with multiple pools in a small area. I think there is broad consensus that consolidation is a good idea, and clearly this is the direction of travel being laid out by the Bill. What kind of challenges do you see to successful implementation of consolidation and how will the Bill drive that forward?

Councillor Phillips: Let us be quite clear. I think the Government’s frustration, which is shared by many of us, is that we are talking about what is generally accepted to be the sixth largest pension scheme in the world, and it does not punch its weight, which is what it needs to do. That is what pooling, which began in 2016, was meant to address, and to date, it has been successful, but it needs to be better. That is where I see a very big positive of coming together.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

I was encouraging you to say that; you got there.

Helen Forrest Hall: Apologies; we are very, very supportive of the vast majority. This is basically the one substantive issue from our perspective. As Sophia has said, the value for money and consolidation elements in particular are incredibly helpful in removing some of the barriers that have existed, including for trustees. They technically have the ability to operate within their fiduciary duty, but sometimes the legislation and the structure of the industry get in their way. Things such as value for money and scale will really help with that. This Bill is incredibly enabling in the vast majority of its provisions. There are just a small number—mandation being one of them—where we have a bit of concern.

[John Milne]

Q Pension scheme funding ladders can go up, and they largely have done in recent years, but also they can go down. Do you think that the proposals and the framework in this Bill for surplus extraction have the right balance of risk versus actually achieving the objective?

Helen Forrest Hall: From a principles basis, yes, and just to address the funding point, they absolutely can. I know there will be a number of us in the room who have either experienced or been subject to the outcomes of what has happened when those significant events have taken place. In the context of where we are with DB now, a significant proportion of schemes are employing investment strategies that really do protect them against the kind of volatile market movements you might see.

The provisions in the Bill strike the right balance between, as I said earlier, giving trustees greater flexibility to exercise their fiduciary duty in discussion with employers, while also ensuring that they are considering the best interests of the members. One of the key considerations for trustees in that conversation is: how confident are we that our investment strategy would withstand significant market movements at the point when we might release a surplus? That is a key consideration.

We have seen that a number of pension schemes did not benefit from September 2022 in the way that others did, and that was because they had decided to protect themselves against that kind of market movement. There are things that schemes can deploy to give themselves that level of confidence.

Sophia Singleton: We were very pleased to see the stringent funding safeguards that are in the Bill in order to allow a surplus to be released. One thing I would say is that, as Helen says, it is giving the trustees the tools to properly exercise their discretionary power and, in a sense, fiduciary duty, but it has created an opportunity for trustees to negotiate and agree a win-win situation, in a sense. The conversations we are having with schemes is that they are now more likely to be able to feel comfortable in paying, and be able to pay out, discretionary benefits than they would have been before the Bill was in place. It gives schemes the opportunity to run on and for the employer to access the service, but also for members to have more access to discretionary benefits and to additional benefits.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

Q In relation to investments and some of the stuff that was not invested in historically, if we are talking about renewable projects and affordable housing—things that, historically, pension funds have maybe not invested in—you said that investing in these projects is a problem for smaller companies until they build up that level of scale. Are there other barriers? Are there legislative barriers, or other barriers—maybe finding schemes to invest in—that you or other companies could do with additional help in overcoming?

Ian Cornelius: Having a strong pipeline of investable assets is key. There is no doubt about that. Patrick touched on this earlier: one other inhibitor has been cost. It is actually quite expensive to invest in private assets. One of the things that NEST does successfully is to drive that cost down, but that is a barrier. The focus on cost rather than value in the past made it harder. The Bill shifts the focus towards value, which will be really helpful. There are a number of challenges that the bigger you are, the easier it is to work through. The Bill as a whole will therefore definitely be helpful, but collaboration with Government and across industry should help to unlock more of those attractive private market opportunities.

Patrick Heath-Lay: I have previously discussed this with the Minister. There is a role for Government to play here. It was even acknowledged within the Mansion House accord that this is for the benefit of savers, and there is a role for all of us to play in finding those efficient routes to deploy that investment through. The problem right now is not whether there is investment to come; there is. The Mansion House accord has created that. There is a wall of capital potentially available. The issue is connecting it in the right way with the investable opportunities—not only the planning and whatever is needed to create those investment opportunities in the first place, but the routes of access and the investment vehicles used. There are further conversations to be had about how we can do that as an industry. Efficient deployment is probably the biggest challenge for us as an asset owner in ensuring that we are sharing that benefit back with members.

[John Milne]

Q Auto-enrolment is a great success story. It has certainly got lots more people investing in a pension than would have done otherwise. However, the fact remains that large numbers of them are nowhere near on course to have a reasonable pension in retirement. Small pot consolidation helps, but we have to admit that it is going to be a modest contribution to solving that problem. Do you think we are missing a trick in the Bill? Is there something else that could or should be there to help—or is that a job for another day?

Ian Cornelius: That is where we welcome the Pensions Commission. It has been set up to actively look at adequacy: what is right, and are people saving enough? There is no doubt that many people are not saving enough and there are a lot of people who are still excluded from retirement savings. There is a big issue and challenge with the self-employed. There is a challenge for the industry and the Government to work on, but the Pensions Commission creates the right environment to do that. Auto-enrolment has been a big success, but it is only a job half done. Completing that job through the Pensions Commission is incumbent upon the Government and industry.

[John Milne]

Q Is there anything you think should or could be in this Bill that would help?

Patrick Heath-Lay: I completely agree with what Ian just said. The review is the right way, and we need to look at the interaction between saving rates, state pension and the general economic conditions. One thing that we were concerned about with the Bill is this. There is a lot in here that is trying to create better value in the industry as a result of the transformation, but what we have very much seen over the last few years is the rise of retail consolidators, which encourage people to consolidate their lost pensions towards them and effectively put their pensions on their phone. They have taken control of that future. That is a positive thing in terms of people acting and doing something about the number of small pots they have. The issue is that the Bill ignores the rise of that market.

From our own research, we know people are consistently moving their pensions to these types of vehicles, which are much more expensive and, for an average earner, effectively mean that they will retire three or four years later than they could have done, because the value delivered through those models is not going to be anywhere near the level of the competitive workplace market as it operates today. We would like to see the extension of value for money and those types of issues into that market as soon as possible, as there are some bad outcomes where well-meaning people are trying to do the right things and do not understand the consequences of what they are doing. There is not sufficient obligation on providers in that market to make those people aware of the consequences of their actions.

Ian Cornelius: I wholly welcome the Bill. It will increase and improve standards across the workplace pensions market—but only across the workplace pensions market. The pensions landscape is already pretty complicated with contract-based schemes, trust-based schemes and personal pensions. Consumers do not understand the differences between those—and why should they? The fact that the changes only apply to workplace schemes, and that things such as value for money do not apply across personal pensions, is an issue for consumers. They will be confused and will not necessarily make the right decisions. We need to think about how the landscape can be equalised and made as simple and clear as possible for consumers.

[The Chair]

Thank you very much. That completes the questions from Members. I thank the witnesses for their attendance and evidence this afternoon.

Examination of Witness

Tim Fassam gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Bedford]

Q I am just interested in examples of recent shocks that have happened, where you had to pay out significant sums and what those sums were.

Michelle Ostermann: The biggest example is a macroeconomic shock that would affect the solvency of corporations. The failure of the corporation itself is more likely to have an impact than just a change in interest rates or equity markets. The change in interest rates can affect the fundedness of a scheme, but many of those schemes, over 75% of them now, are actually really well funded. And they have pretty well locked down their interest rate risk because they have put a good chunk of assets against their liabilities in a fairly tight hedge. Although we saw, as a result of the liquidity crisis a few years ago now, that things can change. The degree of risk, specifically leverage risk inside some of those strategies, does make them fallible. I would say the biggest shocks would be massive interest rate movements that are unforeseen, a very significant macroeconomic environment causing failure in many corporations, and technically, even a significant move in equity markets, but we would usually just ride that out. Markets can go down 20% or 30%. We would only go down 10% or 15% and we would be able to recover that in under five years, historically speaking.

[John Milne]

Q It has been a long-standing battle over pre-1997 compensation rights. Would you agree that this Bill is perhaps an opportunity to at last address that issue, perhaps by a judicious amendment or two? Do you think that that is feasible, and what framework might that take?

Michelle Ostermann: We have been progressing on this quite a bit lately. It is one of the most prevalent discussions, both with our board and with our members. We speak very often with the entirety of the industry. Several are very strong advocates for it as well, a few of which are here today, and we have taken quite a bit of humble feedback. We have worked as best we can with the Work and Pensions Committee to estimate a significantly complex set of potential scenarios for making good on historical indexation needs for pre-’97. They range in price, are quite expensive and would require us to incur or crystallise a liability. They are not cheap. It would be difficult for both us and the Government to be able to afford. The taxpayer would have an implication to some of these, depending on how they are formed, and it is beyond our prerogative to make that decision but we have been facilitating and encouraging it to be made. We would welcome progress on that. I understand, in fact, an amendment was tabled earlier today in that regard, so I was warmed by that.

[John Milne]

Q The DWP argues that the funds are on the public balance sheet and therefore they object to using them for this purpose. Do you think that is fair, given that the funds were not acquired by the taxpayer?

Michelle Ostermann: To clarify the word “using”, as I think it is important, the PPF is an arm’s length body and those assets are ringfenced. Our board has independence over those. It was set up that way—arm’s length—20 years ago to make sure that it was a dedicated protection fund for that industry. It so happens that we do fall under some of the fiscal measures, so both our assets and liabilities do show. However, there is a bit of a conflict there in that we manage them in the prudent, almost in a trusteed fashion, on behalf of our members and all of our stakeholders. But the use of them would have to be prescribed by the board, legislated, and then approved by the board for its affordability, so as to not put at risk the rest of the industry that we are backstopping.

The ability for us to be able to afford that and the risk to the organisation is the primary, most sacrosanct thing that our board does. We have very complicated actuarial models to figure out the affordability of all the risks that we take on in the entire industry. That is why we have gone through quite a bit of work to build, just recently, a much more sophisticated model to estimate both the asset and liability implication to us and have even started to form a plan for how we might implement it. So we stand at the ready, but it is beyond our responsibility to be able to legislate the necessary change for it.

[Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)]

Q Given the international experience that both of you have in this realm, I am interested to know whether there is either anything in the Bill that you think is a red flag or anything that you think is a missed opportunity and not in the legislation in front of us today.

Michelle Ostermann: That is fascinating. I came to the UK, and back to the UK, because I have so much enthusiasm for the UK and the pension system. I am very fortunate to be the chair of the global pension industry association, so I study pension systems around the world and am quite familiar with many of them. The UK pension system is the second largest in the world by size if you include underfunded pensions. It is one of the most sophisticated, but it is the second most disaggregated. As I think a few of my peers mentioned before we got up here, it has fallen behind, frankly. I think the motives that are in this Bill are exceptionally important—they are foundational. I love that we are speaking on scale and sophistication. These are absolutely key, in both DB and DC. I want to underscore that; it is really key.

One thing that is not spoken of quite as much is the concept of an asset owner and the importance of governance. In relation to the successful countries that I have seen, which have mastered the art of pensions and the ability to translate pensions into growth, it is not a proven model, but there is a best practice such that countries are able to make growth by leveraging pension systems. I think that right now we are trying to solve a problem of two things: reshaping the pension system and trying to solve the need for a growth initiative. They are one thing in my mind; they really are one thing. It is not a surprise that as we have de-risked the pension system over two decades, it has, I suspect, quite directly, but at least indirectly, affected overall economic growth.

Making members wealthier pensioners in general and less dependent on social services is what many countries are trying to do and use their pension systems for. I see that out of the commission that is being started, so I am most excited about the next phase. I think there is a lot of potential, and we at the PPF are doing quite a bit of research and want to be able to feed some global ideas into that.

Morten Nilsson: I come from Denmark originally and I think, to echo some of what Michelle said, scale just matters in pensions. The Danish pension industry has been fortunate to have few and relatively large schemes. One of the things I saw when I came over to the UK 15 years ago was that the industry here is very fragmented, and that fragmentation means also that there are so many conflicts of interest in the market. That in a way makes it quite hard to get the best outcomes, and that of course leads into the governance models that Michelle talks about. So this Bill is something we very much welcome across what it is covering. I think it is a really good initiative, but I think scale matters, and governance really matters. I would not underestimate how big a change it is, in the defined benefit sector, that we are moving from two decades of worrying about deficit into suddenly worrying about surpluses and having very mature schemes, which is the other thing that is important. Most of the DB schemes are closed.

If I talk about the BT pension scheme, the average age is 71, so they are pretty old members and that means there is a risk level, from an investment perspective, that really matters. We are paying out £2.8 billion a year in member benefits. That means liquidity is really important. It is really important that we have the money to pay the members and that we do not end up being a distressed seller of assets.

So there is quite a lot in that evolution we are on, and when we go into surplus management or excess funds—Michelle was talking about this at macro level; we would be managing at our micro level in each scheme— I think it becomes really critical that we have the right governance to manage what is a new era. I would really recommend that the Pensions Regulator issue guidance as soon as possible on all this, because it will be quite uncomfortable for a lot of trustees. It will be quite difficult also for the advisers in how we manage this new era.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

Q We all have work to do; it is never all over. Chris, this question is mainly for you, as I am conscious that you have done lots of work over an extended period on the dashboard. Obviously, there are elements of the Bill that relate to that—mainly relating to the PPF—but not many. However, is there anything you want to tell the Committee about the lessons from it for when we come to the small pots work, which obviously is a central part of the Bill?

Chris Curry: I listened with interest to some of the earlier witnesses talk about dashboards, and there certainly are some lessons that we can learn from the pensions dashboards programme, as it has been evolving over the past few years, for small pots in particular.

There are two issues that I would pull out. The first is on the technology front. I think someone suggested that the next five years or so could be quite a tight timetable to build a technological solution and get it in place. You have to be very careful—you cannot underestimate just how much complexity there is and how long it takes to do these things—but I would say that the work that we have done on pensions dashboards is giving us a bit of a head start. That is not to say that we necessarily need to build on or use parts of the system that we have already built, but it has helped us understand a lot about, for example, how you can find pensions—the way you can use integrated service providers rather than having to go direct to all the schemes, and use a syndicated model to find where people might have their pensions.

It has helped the industry get a long way down the path to where it needs to be, as well. One of the big challenges for pensions dashboards is the quality of data. Enabling individuals to find their pensions means data quality: it needs not only to exist and be there; it needs to be accurate and it needs to be up to date. When you are thinking about an automatic consolidator or default consolidator for small pots, that is even more important. You are not just transferring information, but transferring money, so it is really important that the data is high quality. The work that is being done on pensions dashboards will get people in the industry a long way to having part of that in place as well.

There are definitely lessons that can be learned from how we progressed on the pensions dashboards programme. It has got us much closer to where we would be if we had had a completely blank page to start from, but there is still a reasonable amount of work to do, because it is working in a slightly different way.

[John Milne]

Q The Bill makes the notion of using pension money for macroeconomic benefit—investment in the UK—an explicit objective. Other countries seem to have done this already. Did they do so explicitly and deliberately, or was it just an accidental outcome of good investment decisions? Did it take a conscious effort to make it happen?

William Wright: I think it is a mix of both. It very much depends on what sort of assets we are talking about. For example, if we are thinking about the UK stock market or domestic equity markets, we tend to see that markets such as Canada and the Netherlands have an even lower allocation to domestic equities, whichever way you look at it, than comparable UK pensions have to the UK market.

Ultimately, this comes down to what you might call the accidental design of the UK system. It has evolved over 20, 30 or 40 years, whereas the systems with which we like to compare the UK system, or large parts of them, were actively designed anything from 30 or 40 to 50 or 60 years ago. We are now seeing the benefits of that active design in those systems. Their focus on scale enables them to invest in a far broader range of assets at a lower unit cost.

Going back to the value for money point, UK pensions have ended up in the worst of both worlds. Fee pressure, particularly in terms of winning and transferring new business between providers, is driving down fees, but the average fees on DC pensions today are very middle of the pack: 45 to 50 basis points a year. That is much higher than much larger schemes in Canada, such as the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, the big Canadian reserve fund, and much higher than large UK schemes, such as the universities superannuation scheme, but they are stuck in the middle: they are actually paying higher fees, but because of the fee pressure they have a very vanilla, almost simple asset allocation. As Tim Fassam from Phoenix pointed out, that tends to steer people towards the lowest cost investment option. Active design, focusing on scale and sophistication, enables pension schemes to take a much longer term and much broader view of what they should invest in and where they should invest in it, whereas in the UK we have tended to accidentally move from one system to another.

[John Milne]

Q So to summarise, you approve of the attempt to take control, as it were.

William Wright: Absolutely. One of the huge challenges in the UK pensions debate over the past 25 or 30 years has been that we sort of knew what was not working and where corporate DB pensions were going to go, and then there was a hiatus and no real active design of what was going to replace them. Auto-enrolment did not start to kick in for a couple of decades, and now we are beginning to see the benefits of that, but the opportunity to actively redesign the structure of the defined-contribution pensions system in this country, and the structure of public sector DB, is long overdue.

[The Chair]

If there are no further questions, I thank the witnesses very much for their evidence this afternoon. Given that the Committee has been sitting for a couple of hours non-stop, I will suspend the sitting for a brief period.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Edwards]

I was contacted by my constituents, so thank you for that.

[John Milne]

I think you have answered all my questions already. We have tabled an amendment, and I would really appreciate your input on whether we could improve it or argue around it between now and when it is raised in Committee.

Roger Sainsbury: Thank you.

[Rachel Blake]

Q Thank you very much for your evidence and your considered responses. There has been a discussion about the £12 billion surplus. Have you done any research on what you estimate would be the extent of the cost of RIPA—the scheme that you have promoted?

Roger Sainsbury: That is a very timely question, because for the past couple of years, we have been working on the basis that the RIPA scheme would cost £5.5 billion. That was the estimate given to us by the PPF. Now—I might almost say hallelujah!—about three days ago, the PPF notified us that they had redone the calculation using a much superior methodology. I think it is a phenomenally difficult calculation to do, but they have redone it, and the answer now is not £5.5 billion, but £3.9 billion, or possibly a bit less. Whereas for two years we have been arguing that £5.5 billion is eminently affordable, £3.5 billion, for example, is obviously even more affordable. We do not get that much good news, but that was definitely a bit of good news we recently received. I am pleased to be able to share it with you, if you did not know it.

Universal Credit and Personal Independence Payment Bill

John Milne Excerpts

Committee of the whole House & 3rd reading
Wednesday 9th July 2025 Commons Chamber

[Graeme Downie]

As my hon. Friend will know, my amendment specifically mentions MS, and she and I have had shared friends who have suffered with that condition. We must ensure that there is a clear understanding of the reality of such conditions on the ground, so that when these provisions are delivered in reality by assessors, people are able to access the additional support that they need.

Welfare reform is undoubtedly needed after the mess of a system that we were left by the previous Government, but wherever possible we must ensure that the wording of the Bill is as clear as possible. We must ensure that those affected are in no doubt about what our intent is, so that that is indisputable and we truly give effect to the intentions behind the Bill. I again thank the Minister for his incredibly helpful intervention, but we will ensure that the reality reflects the Government’s excellent intentions.

[John Milne (Horsham) (LD)]

I rise to speak in support of amendment 36. Over the past weeks, I have met numerous disability organisations, from Parkinson’s UK to Action for ME, and heard directly from those living with complex fluctuating conditions. I have also seen the impact at first hand as an employer of people with long-term invisible disabilities. What I have heard, seen and lived is simple: the current proposals risk unacceptable consequences for those who are already among the most vulnerable. The Government’s redefinition of “severe conditions” hinges on the word “constantly”—a single word that is of dubious clinical value. I appreciate the clarification given to other Members, but it is very late in the day to be getting such important information.

Conditions such as ME/chronic fatigue syndrome, MS, epilepsy and bipolar disorder do not operate on a schedule. They are unpredictable and they fluctuate, yet the Bill would exclude many individuals who have them from vital support, simply because their symptoms do not comply with a Government definition. Amendment 36 would ensure that our assessment system respects the United Kingdom’s obligations under the UN convention on the rights of persons with disabilities. This affirms the principle of non-retrogression so that we do not roll back hard-won rights. It insists that we take invisible and episodic conditions seriously, and it protects people from falling through the cracks.

The Bill has had an extraordinary passage through Parliament, and at this point the most obvious course of action would be simply to pull it altogether and start again. I realise the political difficulties that that may involve, but vulnerable people’s lives are at stake. When the Government come to look again at some of the deleted clauses via the Timms review, it is essential to approach the issue from a “needs first” angle, not a “how much can I save?” angle, because so many Government cuts in the past have ended up costing more than they have saved.

I accept that the Government do not have infinite funds, but the PIP proposal represented an arbitrary change in eligibility—the four-point rule—with the crude objective of making a predetermined saving. It has all been the wrong way around: we should wait to understand needs first, and only then consider to what extent the Government can afford to meet them.

[Anna Dixon]

Does the hon. Gentleman recognise that the concessions that the Government have brought forward and the amendments that are before us today ensure that we are getting it the right way around? It is explicit in the terms of reference that the changes are about a fair and fit-for-the-future assessment, rather than to generate further savings, so does he agree that the Bill allows us to get the Timms review done and to bring forward proposals after that?

[John Milne]

I cannot agree with the hon. Member, and I will partly explain why in a moment.

We need a more honest assessment of the overall financial situation that is being used to justify these drastic cuts, because the wrong diagnosis leads to the wrong solutions. The dramatic rise in PIP claimants is at least partly driven by other Government policy; perhaps one quarter of the rise is simply due to raising the pension age. Large numbers of people who are older, and therefore more likely to be disabled, have been pushed out of pension support into benefit support. The state pension is paid out of current taxation, not past contributions, so the impact is immediate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

The hon. Gentleman mentioned the NHS and waiting lists. Does he share my concerns about the severe conditions criteria and the requirements for the diagnosis to be made by an NHS professional, in the course of NHS duty, when people may not have access to that? There is also a requirement for the condition to be considered “lifelong” by NHS professionals or health professionals, who may be unwilling to say that schizophrenia or bipolar disease, for example, are “lifelong” because they do not want to tie people down to that diagnosis.

[John Milne]

Yes, I agree that that is an additional concern.

The implication has been made, both by this Government and the previous one, that much of the rise in claims is down to benefit chasing and people simply exaggerating their conditions. This is an assumption that needs serious interrogation because it looks to be substantially untrue. For all these reasons and more, the best course of action would be to pull the Bill now and to make a fresh start. Denying adequate support today will only shift the burden tomorrow on to social care, the emergency services and our already overstretched NHS. We have been warned by the UN not once, but three times, that our welfare system is failing disabled people. Amendment 36 is a chance to show that we are listening.

[Neil Coyle]

I am concerned about some of the amendments before us today, in particular those that call for delays to legislation. We are one year into a five-year term—20% of this Parliament is gone—and the public need to see progress, not further delay.

I am mindful that Ministers have already done a huge amount of heavy lifting to rebuild trust with disabled people and disability organisations since the election. We should all recall that in July 2024, the Department for Work and Pensions was under formal investigation by the Equality and Human Rights Commission for unlawful treatment of disabled people. This Government have made considerable progress since then in trying to rebuild trust, including through measures in this Bill and linked to it, such as abolishing the work capability assessment. I have been here for 10 years—some might say it feels like longer—but before entering this place, I campaigned, as the chair of the Disability Benefits Consortium, to abolish the work capability assessment. I know that disabled people and their organisations are grateful and thankful for the inclusion of that measure in the wider package that the Government are bringing forward.

Although it seems to have been lost in some of the debates we have had on the subject, I am also mindful that in my own constituency, the number of claimants for PIP will rise in this Parliament, spending on that will continue to rise in this Parliament, and the 12,700 universal credit claimants in my constituency will get an additional payment under this Government’s plans, which will be the first ever above-inflation rise in universal credit. There is much to gain and much that is supported by disabled people and their organisations in the package that the Government have brought forward.

I particularly welcome the Government’s commitment to support more disabled people into work. We need to challenge ourselves a little more in this place about some of the language of vulnerability. Being seen automatically as vulnerable because of a health condition or impairment is not in line with the social model of disability. Many disabled people find that patronising and offensive, and we need to update our system, just as we updated our system thanks to previous Labour Governments. We had the first ever blind Secretary of State in David Blunkett—now Lord Blunkett—at a time when the benefits system said that blind people were not required to participate in work-related activity. The benefits system is not a static beast: it is an evolving creature that needs to be updated to reflect changes in assistive technology, medication and adaptation and advances in technology.

We must not end up with a system in which people are written off and parked in a system because it is too difficult to get them into work. That is not a Labour solution. We are the party of full employment, which must and should include disabled people if we are committed to disability equality and if we are the party of progress. I will chip in that this party takes no lectures on what is progressive from nationalists, whether it is Scottish nationalists or the populists in Reform. We see the costs to disabled people of parking under the former benefits system and legacy benefits: the longer that somebody is out of work, the more ill health that they experience, including mental health and depression, and the more costs that they incur for the NHS. There are state benefits and individual benefits for getting the right support.

I speak from rather too much personal family experience. My mum has schizophrenia and my dad had a stroke in his 40s. He was told by the jobcentre, “This is what you will get. Now, basically, sod off—we do not want to see you, and we do not expect to provide you with anything.” He found his own way back into work through going to university as a mature student—well, not that mature—at Newcastle University, and he graduated in the same year as me.

We should look at the wider picture of full employment. I particularly welcome the Government’s broader aim of reducing the disability employment gap, which was deeply neglected for 14 years, and transforming jobcentres from benefit administration centres. They had been failing not because of a lack of will or frontline staff, some of whom are absolutely excellent, but simply because the job they were given to do had changed from being about supporting people into work to simply administering a failing system that, as we discussed earlier, had the highest fraud levels ever seen in the UK social security system.

I think most of us believe that disability equality is measured not in the amount of benefits that individuals receive, but in the shared opportunities and access to life chances open to all in our country. I am deeply mindful of that, because while we had a lost generation under the 14 years of the Conservative Government and the Lib Dem coalition Government, we had a previous Government who were deeply committed to those issues. That Government published a report, 20 years ago today, called “Improving the life chances of disabled people” with an implementation and delivery date that was meant to provide those opportunities and equal access by 2025. Sadly, those coalition and Conservative years set back the clock.

The report is still available to all those who want to see it, and it talks about pathways to work and dedicated employment programmes being necessary, such as the new deal for disabled people. Those programmes were largely demolished by the coalition. It talks about the importance of the role of the NHS, GPs, occupational health and rehab. Again, a Labour Government are now fixing the wider NHS problems to make those aims and objectives deliverable today. The then Prime Minister’s strategy in the report committed to changing the system so that it tested functionality and ability to contribute, rather than writing people off. Again, this Government have had to come back to that after a lost decade.

We had a report 20 years ago that talked about the necessity of a better equipment system and the need to improve access to work—something that Ministers are committed to today and are beginning to transform with faster assessment processes and by delivering the kit needed. The report also talks about the importance of engaging with employers and the positive role that Jobcentre Plus could play in engaging employers early in the process. Sadly, we have seen a long delay in delivering those improved life chances, but this is a Labour party back in government and trying to deliver disability equality and improve the life chances of disabled people. The measures in this Bill are integral to that aim.

As I say, I am concerned about some of the amendments before us. I also have some concerns that the Bill needs to go further in tackling barriers to work for disabled people, such as the benefits structure, including for those in supported accommodation. It is great that we have the right to try, but more is necessary. We also need to go a bit further with employers, including around reasonable adjustments and ensuring that employers do not accept resignations based on ill health immediately, but look at the packages of support that might be necessary, as well as working with them to tackle discrimination. The Federation of Small Businesses in particular, which has done work on this issue previously, would be a really useful partner to have going forward.

Universal Credit and Personal Independence Payment Bill

John Milne Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 1st July 2025 Commons Chamber

[John Milne (Horsham) (LD)]

I have great respect for the experience and intelligence of the Ministers behind the Bill, but what we have left in front of us today is no more than a clumsy salvage operation. How on earth did we end up here? The Government say that the cost of disability benefit is spiralling out of control. They say there is no option but to make cuts. However, the premise behind this argument is too simplistic. Overall, the cost of in-work benefits as a percentage of GDP has not changed much, because every time a Government try to cut one benefit, another rises in its place to compensate.

Before any changes were proposed, there should have been a serious analysis of what is driving the surge in PIP claims, but Ministers have made little attempt to understand why—it is just a curve on a spreadsheet that needs to be flattened. We are left with the implicit assumption that the Government believe that hundreds of thousands of people are currently receiving benefits that they do not really need and do not deserve.

However, there are lots of factors driving this increase, some of which are actually a direct knock-on effect of other Government policies. For example, many of the extra claimants are the result of a recent rise in retirement age; the Government have simply shunted one benefit cost—pension payments—into another—PIP. Another big slice of the increase comes from people who are unable to access healthcare in a timely fashion, especially since covid, and have therefore fallen out of the workplace. Perhaps most of all, people are driven towards benefits by the terrific rise in the cost of living—they just cannot get by any more. Fundamentally, life costs more for people who are disabled. Besides the impact on daily living, many treatments and aids are not available on the NHS.

Overall, there are three telltale signs that what we are looking at is a botched compromise. First, we have the new four-point rule for PIP assessments. Any question that scores a one, two or three will not make any difference to the outcome. If someone cannot undress their lower half and needs help to go to the toilet, incredibly, they will not qualify for help. There is literally no point in asking half the questions on the form. The whole four-point rule has been dreamed up not because anyone thinks it is a good way to assess hardship, but to hit an arbitrary cost saving.

Secondly, we have the incomprehensible proposal to change PIP assessments next year, without waiting for the outcome of the Timms review. I quote from the Commission on Social Security, which has written to the DWP:

“The circus around the proposed changes to PIP and universal credit are a classic example of what happens if policy makers do not work with those whose lives are profoundly affected by Government policy.”

Thirdly, we have the decision to give higher benefits to existing claimants than to new claimants, as if someone’s needs were somehow less because they applied after 2026. I do not know how anyone can stand over this as a credible policy.

Even on the most optimistic forecasts, only a relatively small minority of current claimants will be able to find jobs, and no account at all has been taken of regional employment blackspots. For every disabled person who can be helped back into work, there will be others moving in the opposite direction. About a third of ME and MS sufferers who are currently in work will be unable to continue as a direct result of losing PIP support, but they do not figure in the Government’s back to work estimates. We also have the 150,000 people who will lose their carer’s allowance, which is likely to rebound on the health service and wipe out whatever savings the Government had hoped to make.

The Secretary of State has set high standards to be judged by, saying:

“For me, this is a moral mission because I believe that there is a better future for people in so many parts of the country. It is absolutely not cruel.”

Well, it might have been a moral mission, but it is certainly not a moral outcome. This is not fairer and more compassionate, as the Secretary of State has claimed. It is harsher and more chaotic.

The Bill can no longer be considered a serious attempt at welfare reform—it is just a cobbled together scheme to get us through the next 24 hours. I urge all Members to vote against it.

Oral Answers to Questions

John Milne Excerpts

Monday 23rd June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

[John Milne (Horsham) (LD)]

Recently I met Kathryn from my constituency who had to give up a £90,000-a-year job in order to care for her husband. With 150,000 carers set to lose their allowance due to PIP eligibility reforms, some of our country’s most hard-pressed households face losing £8,000 a year. Will the Minister confirm that even if the welfare reforms work out to the most optimistic expectations, there will be far more net losers that net gainers among PIP claimants?

[Sir Stephen Timms]

Among households as a whole, there will be more net gainers than net losers from the package. The reason for that is the increase to the standard allowance of universal credit, which according to the Institute for Fiscal Studies is the biggest increase to the headline rate of benefit since at least 1980. We are consulting on support for those who will lose carer’s allowance because of the changes and considering what additional help they may need, including for health and care needs. The hon. Member will have seen in the Bill we have published that we have committed to a 13-week run-on of benefit after an assessment decision so that people have time to adjust to the new situation.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister for Social Security and Disability (Sir Stephen Timms)]

We are reviewing universal credit to ensure that it makes work pay and tackles poverty, and we are looking at exactly the kind of problem that my hon. Friend highlights. I would be delighted to meet him to discuss it, because Nicola, Steven and all 7,000 households claiming universal credit in his constituency will benefit from the standard allowance increase proposed in the Universal Credit and Personal Independence Payment Bill, which we will be debating next week; it is the biggest increase in the headline rate of benefits since at least 1980.

[John Milne (Horsham) (LD)]

In her March Green Paper, the Secretary of State promised to provide an additional £1 billion in funding to help benefit claimants back into work, but only £400 million has actually been allocated, and even that will not come until 2028-29. We have heard some talk of efficiency savings, which is practically the definition of a magic money tree if ever there was one, so will the Minister confirm that the promised £1 billion for employment support will be all new money, and not cannibalised from other vital DWP services?

[Liz Kendall]

Yes. Already this year, we are rolling out £300 million of support through our Get Britain Working plan and Connect to Work. That will rise to £600 million next year and build to an additional £1 billion. This is the biggest ever investment into employment support for sick and disabled people, because we believe work is the route out of poverty. We want to build dignity and a better life for those who can work, while protecting those who cannot.