Oral Answers to Questions
Joe Robertson Excerpts(2 months, 3 weeks ago)
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Mr Lammy
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for allowing me to pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd (Alex Davies-Jones) for her tremendous work. I think the whole House will recognise that, as a Minister, she was entirely on top of her brief and she commanded the respect of victims groups right across our country. The hon. Gentleman makes an important point and I will look closely at what more we can do for young people who experience domestic violence.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
James Wild (North West Norfolk) (Con)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Jake Richards)
The Government are committed to transparency on this issue. We publish data on releases in error each July in the HM Prison and Probation Service annual digest. On 15 April we also published ad hoc data for April 2025 to March 2026, alongside Dame Lynne Owens’ independent review and the Government’s response, accepting, in principle, all the recommendations.
Joe Robertson
Oh dear. My question was about how many prisoners have been released in error under this Government, and the Minister does not seem to know the answer. That is okay, as I can tell him. It is 441, which over a two-year period is the worst on record. Will he now apologise, or will he provide a convoluted excuse about why it is not his Government’s fault?
Jake Richards
That question is a very good example of someone not listening to my answer but assuming that he had. We will release the data for this very serious and important issue, as we should, in due course. We released the data earlier this year on an ad hoc basis. By the way, in 14 years the Conservative Government never released data on prisoner releases in error, so we will take no lectures from the Opposition Benches on that issue. Fundamentally, Dame Lynne Owens has conducted a review of this important issue and set out a series of recommendations on how to solve it, which we have accepted and will begin to implement, so I will take no lessons from the Opposition Benches on this issue.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Twelfth sitting)
Joe Robertson ExcerptsTuesday 28th April 2026
(3 months, 2 weeks ago)
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Jess Brown-Fuller
Me again. The new clauses would require provision for the training of the judiciary and, under new clause 30, for court staff. Each of these clauses focuses on a different area. New clause 8 focuses on discrimination against ethnic minorities, including racial bias and the impact on judicial decision making. New clause 9 requires the provision of training for the judiciary focused on violence against women and girls. New clause 10 requires the provision of training for the judiciary focused on domestic abuse. New clause 30 requires the Lord Chancellor to ensure that all members of court staff working in the criminal justice system receive mandatory and consistent training on trauma-informed practices, to improve understanding of how trauma affects victims’ experience, behaviour and engagement with court proceedings.
The reasons for the new clauses—they are tabled for basically every part of justice legislation—are that there is real frustration among organisations and charities working in the criminal justice space that Parliament does not have the ability to legislate for the judiciary to have mandatory training. How do we square the circle of all those campaign organisations sounding the alarm and saying that, in order for us to make these very serious changes in moving to judge-alone trials, we must ensure that judges approach them with trauma-informed practices in mind?
That was raised in the evidence session by Farah Nazeer from Women’s Aid. When we asked her, “What would you need to see in order for this Bill to give you the confidence that victims will have a better experience and women will be better supported through the criminal justice system?” she said:
“One is training for the entirety of the court staff, because the stories that we hear and the experiences that we support women and children through are frankly appalling. The staff are not trauma-informed and there is no understanding of what a victim is going through. The courts are weaponised and survivors are brought back to the courts repeatedly. It is an appalling process. No policy area that you work on at Women’s Aid is a picnic, but this is the worst.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 27, Q53.]
In the same evidence session, Claire Waxman, the Victims’ Commissioner, said:
“I have made that point for years, regardless of these reforms. We have to improve and get reassurance around judicial training, including training on cultural competency, on understanding bias and prejudice and on the dynamics of abuse. We still see issues around coercive control, post-separation abuse and stalking. I need to be reassured that judges are being trained to the level that will give assurances to victims and to myself that they understand what is coming in front of them.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 14, Q25.]
I know that there has been significant progress, and that the organisation Fair Hearing has worked closely with the judiciary to do training about violence against women and girls and to make sure that judges are trauma-informed in their practice, but it is not mandatory. One comment that stuck with me from the evidence session was from Charlotte, one of the victims who presented evidence. She noted, of her judge:
“She said that, because I waited eight months to report, I was unreliable, and that I had clearly spoken to other victims of domestic abuse, so I knew what to say. Those comments really stuck by me.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 26, Q51.]
The very concept that a judge looks at somebody who is trying to share their experiences and says, “Well, they’ve just trained for this,” is pretty appalling. It causes me to doubt that all judges are engaging in the judiciary training as effectively as they could be.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
I seek clarity on whether the new clause would apply to all judges or just to those in the criminal courts. In the family court the idea is to bring in expertise around the sort of issues that she talks about from agencies—such as the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service, and even social services—in which there are lots of trained people, but that system does not always ensure that the judge is best placed to make a good decision, as we have seen in evidence. Will the hon. Lady clarify that point?
Jess Brown-Fuller
The feeling of the organisations and charities that I have spoken to is that everybody in the judiciary should have the opportunity to go through trauma-informed training and training around violence against women and girls, around coercive control and around recognising and identifying racial bias so we can make sure that every victim is confident—whether they are going through the criminal or the family justice system—that everybody they will come in contact with understands them and the additional support that they may require.
I am sure that the Minister will say that the Government cannot mandate training because the judiciary are independent. New clause 30 aims to make sure that members of court staff, who are employed by His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, receive mandatory and consistent training on trauma-informed practice because they are the people who will support victims and witnesses through the criminal justice system. We clearly need to change our approach. In the evidence session, witnesses described an environment that is hostile to witnesses; we need one that stands up for their interests. Our new clause 30 should be the bare minimum across the courts estate, and represents a position supported by a number of organisations.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eleventh sitting)
Joe Robertson ExcerptsTuesday 28th April 2026
(3 months, 2 weeks ago)
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Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
Huge apologies for my lateness, Sir John. I wish to speak in support of new clause 2 and lend my support to new clauses 6, 23 and 25, all of which seek to honour the commitment that the Government made in their manifesto at the last election. I have huge admiration for the hon. Member for Warrington North, both for her courageous and clear speech on Second Reading and for tabling new clause 2, which seeks to honour that commitment. I am heartened by how many Labour Members have added their names to the new clause, and I hope that the Government will listen.
New clause 2, which is detailed, would introduce specialist courts. It sets out the different ways in which guidance can deal with the difficulties that courts currently have in dealing with issues such as coercive control and honour-based abuse, and would make sure that the courts deliver justice in a timely and compassionate way. It is so important that we look at the many practical ways of dealing with the cases that we need to hear, for victims of domestic violence and sexual offences, that do not completely remove the right to select a jury trial, as the Minister has admitted the Bill will do, and that do not adjust the thresholds in courts so as to effectively abolish the centuries-old principle of jury equity. That principle is important to our democratic right to protest and to protect our fellow citizens from unjust prosecution, including by authoritarian or tyrannical future Governments.
The new clauses in this group outline how much can be done to make court processes support victims in a practical, kinder and more compassionate way. They would make the processes more trauma-informed, and more effective and just, as they would bring more successful prosecutions in cases of sexual and domestic violence. I also support new clauses 8 to 10, which would mandate training in such matters and which we will discuss later.
A goal of the Government’s reforms is to increase speed, and the new clauses would achieve that by focusing specialist courts on these important cases. We have debated extensively the many other practical measures that could speed up justice more generally and clear the backlog, which is getting in the way of far too many of these cases.
I really hope that the Government are listening and that we can vote on these issues today. I hope they will go away and listen more to the victims groups that are determined to put forward practical measures to deal with these things without affecting our fundamental rights, and introduce clauses that will do that—and remove clauses 1 to 7—on Report. That is the right thing to do. The issues have been laid out clearly during the Committee’s debates, and the Government now have an important choice to make.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
It is, as ever, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir John. I too support the new clauses, and I concur with a lot of what has already been said about the reasons for supporting them. I will make a couple of wider points on the merits of specialist rape courts and courts for sexual offences.
There is nothing wrong with the legal system in this country when it comes to the fundamental principles of trying these crimes—that someone is innocent until proven guilty, that they have a right to be heard in court, and that evidence must be tested rigorously, as is the right of a defendant in any case. The issue is how that is applied in the way our courts operate in respect of a set of crimes that are extremely sensitive because of the impact on the complainant—the victim—who is almost always a live witness. It is trying to deal with the operation of the court that is at issue here.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)
Joe Robertson ExcerptsTuesday 21st April 2026
(3 months, 3 weeks ago)
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Sarah Sackman
I think we are maybe dancing on the head of a pin. Whether it is a concession or not, I accept that there is no right of appeal of the allocation decision. I also accept that there is no obvious route to judicial review, because of the operation of section 29 of the Senior Courts Act. If I might say so, the hon. Member and I are agreeing. Whether he or the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle wants to categorise that as a concession, as a reduction of rights, that is a matter for them; but we are agreeing as to the legal position. What I wanted to do was set that out formally in writing, in response to that and to the various other questions that the Bar Council asked in their letter, because I thought that would be useful. However, we are in agreement, and I think that is why we can proceed to a vote, because we have a shared understanding of the law.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
I intended to intervene on the Minister to ask a question, but I am happy to pose it by way of a speech. She has indicated—in fact, she stated very clearly—that she wants to formally clarify in writing, but she is declining to formally clarify orally. Does she not accept that if we proceed to a vote on clause 3, she is at risk of inadvertently misleading this Committee if she cannot clarify what she says she wants to clarify in writing before we vote?
Sarah Sackman
I think I did clarify; I do not think I have anything more to say. I clarified it in answer to the hon. Member for Wimbledon. I am not going to say anything more; I think we should go to a vote.
Sarah Sackman
In that case I will deal with amendments 30 to 32 once I have addressed amendments 29 and 61, because they all touch on similar issues in relation to clause 4.
Much has been said about the policy rationale behind this provision, and whether juries are somehow incapable of following complex trials involving fraud or financial matters. That is not the Government’s contention, although some of the cases that are routinely dealt with in Southwark Crown court, particularly in a modern environment with crypto and complex financial instruments, are indeed highly complex.
The primary issue is jury burden, which is a theme that emerged from the independent review of criminal courts, and it has long been identified as a significant issue. As long ago as 2001, Lord Justice Robin Auld said that the
“increase in the length of such trials over recent years has become a severe intrusion on jurors’ working and private lives. It cannot be good for them or for justice.”
Sir Brian Leveson picked up that theme in part 1 of his review, in which he said that
“the personal and financial burden placed on jurors, particularly those involved in lengthy trials, is significant.”
He also said that
“serious and complex fraud trials…place more significant burdens on court resources and jurors’ time.”
There is evidence of the financial strain on jurors who sit in lengthy trials, particularly those who are self-employed or who have caring responsibilities.
In addition, under the current system, the companies that jurors work for cannot claim back losses incurred while their employee is on jury service. As I have said before, we commend the participation in jury service of people from across society and from all backgrounds, which is why we are seeking to preserve jury trials for our most serious cases—those pertaining to matters that are not only serious for individuals but are in the public interest.
Sarah Sackman
I will make a bit of progress.
We also need to be mindful of the burden that lengthy trials place on jurors. In this country, between January 2024 and December 2025, almost 3,000 jurors sat in trials that lasted more than six weeks. We should be mindful that trials for fraud and serious financial crime, which are within the purview of this clause, are some of the longest and most demanding in the Crown courts. We also have to be mindful of our argument on the time savings of having judge-only trials for such cases.
Joe Robertson
The Minister talks about the statutory test for complexity, among other things. I cannot identify the statutory test for complexity. Where is the test in the new legislation?
Sarah Sackman
We consider it to be set out in clause 4 as drafted. It is sufficiently flexible and will no doubt be subjected to interpretation. We think that, as drafted—with all the carefully prescribed exceptions to what could be included, in addition to the public interest exclusion—it is sufficiently clear, and that there is a clear understanding of the sorts of offences that would come within the provision.
I am also keen to work together constructively to ensure public confidence, particularly in cases involving loss of life, while still providing the courts with the flexibility they need for the clause to work appropriately. In the case of amendment 31, given the high bar already set in the clause and the cautious way that we expect judges will exercise these powers, we consider the statutory exclusion of these additional offences unnecessary. Again, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden not to press her amendment.
Finally, the placement of amendment 32 in proposed new section 42B(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 means that it would not, in fact, exclude any offences beyond the indictable-only sexual offences that are expressly excluded by proposed new section 42B(2)(b). As I have said previously, we set up the clause so that jury trial is the default. Judges apply the test, and there are safeguards for case suitability and public interest. It would be very rare for sexual offences to be tried alongside the kinds of complex or lengthy fraud and financial cases that clause 4 is designed to capture. For those reasons, once again, I urge my hon. Friend not to press the amendment.
Joe Robertson
I support the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the shadow Minister, which would ensure the right of appeal to a decision whether a trial should be heard by a jury. The Government’s reason for not accepting the amendment, as they have put forward on a number of previous amendments, is the principle of efficiency—that it would slow the system down and would not drive the efficiencies that they hope to secure through the Bill.
The principle of efficiency cannot be an untamed principle that runs roughshod over carefully fought legal principles of fairness and natural justice. Efficiency cannot simply trump everything. If efficiency has no limits, why have trials of more than a few days at all? The arguments have been well made by the shadow Minister, and I do not wish to repeat them, but it is not an inefficient process to allow a right of appeal. I assume that the decision made by the judge in the first instance on how to allocate the trial will not be a particularly lengthy process anyway, so an appeal of that decision will be no lengthier—indeed, less so.
I have never heard the argument that appeals are against efficiency in any other aspect of law. Indeed, appealing the substantive outcome of a case—a claim of wrongful conviction—has not one but many stages of appeal: appeal to the High Court, appeal to the Court of Appeal and appeal to the Supreme Court. I have never heard the argument that someone should not have the right to appeal the outcome of a trial because it is inefficient or might cause delays.
It seems that efficiency is being used to justify a fairly hastily put together Bill, and that the Government do not recognise the possibly unintended consequences of its provisions in order to get their business through. The best way of addressing those issues, and accepting that there might be loopholes and unintended consequences, is to give genuine due regard to amendments tabled in good faith, on this occasion by the shadow Minister, to improve the lawmaking process and the Bill.
The amendment does not seek to drive a coach and horses through what the Government are trying to achieve with the Bill, even though we disagree with some of it; it seeks to improve, to perfect and not to allow unfairness to creep into the Bill. I am sure that the Government do not intend the Bill to be unfair, but time and again they risk allowing it to be so.
Sarah Sackman
The amendment would effectively introduce a new right of appeal against a decision to order a judge-only trial. Once again the Government does not consider that to be necessary in the interests of fairness, or appropriate given the time saving this Bill seeks to achieve. We are seeking, by the process set out in clause 4, to encourage procedural finality and to avoid delay rather than setting up additional procedural layers to add complexity and delay.
Of course, all that should not come at the expense of overall fairness. That guarantee of fairness is expressed in a number of ways: because we consider the different modes of trial that might be afforded to a case to be fair; because a judge sitting alone will be required to give reasons for the allocation itself and then for the substantive verdict, whether a conviction or an acquittal; and because that in itself can be subject to an appeal in the Crown court in the usual way. We regard that as an important safeguard in terms of fairness, but we do not want to encourage mode-of-trial allocations—which we think that judges will do well, transparently, efficiently and having heard from both sides—to be relitigated. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.
Sarah Sackman
I am going to make some progress— I know the hon. Gentleman has raised this with me. Those responsible for drafting the legislation do not need to add further definitions of what we mean by “complex” and “lengthy”. That is well understood. As I said, given the other safeguards and considerations related to the kinds of cases that will be suitable, we think that the discretionary approach that judges will apply will suffice.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I will speak against the inclusion of clause 4. It inserts part 6A in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which will allow complex or lengthy cases to be tried without a jury. My main opposition to the clause is that it is a pointless exercise by the Government that will in no way affect the backlog. The Government’s own impact assessment suggests that the savings will amount to just 200 sitting days per year, which is a tiny fraction—0.18% of the current sitting days. The Government argue that these cases can continue for many months, thereby wasting jurors’ time or putting additional pressure on those called for jury service. However, data from Southwark Crown court, where the majority of fraud and other such cases are heard, shows that only one or two cases per year exceed three months, and only two between 2018 and 2024 went beyond six months.
His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC has argued that jury trials impose discipline, which helps to reduce the length of fraud trials. Without that incentive, judge-alone trials may be as long as or even longer than jury trials. I alluded to this earlier, but jurors decide on issues of dishonesty and fact in these cases, which are not necessarily technical. Twelve jurors are therefore in a much better position to reach a decision.
I also have grave concerns about the terminology of “complex” and “lengthy”. I know the Minister has said that the meaning of complex and lengthy are well understood in the judiciary. I would argue that a lot of people in the legal profession are pushing back against that assertion, and that the Bill does not provide clarity on what they should determine to be complex or lengthy.
Joe Robertson
The hon. Member is making a very good speech, but she is almost being generous. The wording in the Bill is not “complex”; it is “complexity”, which is a description, not even a value. The Bill is even vaguer than what the hon. Member is suggesting in her well-made point.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I thank the hon. Member for his point; he characterises me very well as being generous.
I would also argue that the scope is expanded significantly if one of the offences that a defendant is charged with is fraud, money laundering or any of the offences that sit in that category. There can be 10 charges against a defendant, and if one of them is fraud, money laundering or terrorism funding, that entire case could be heard in a judge-alone trial.
The Minister spoke very clearly about recognising the burden on jurors. She made a legitimate point, and it is certainly reflected in reality. Especially when jury trials do not run as we would expect them to run, the impact on jurors can be huge, especially for those who are self-employed or have caring responsibilities. As I mentioned earlier, I ask the Minister to go away and look at the Maxwell hours, which have been successful for longer cases. For a morning session, it means that those who are self-employed are able to commit to working in the afternoons. In some cases, it means that those with caring responsibilities know that they are going to get home at a reasonable hour. The Maxwell hours are used in lots of different areas, and could be the answer to retaining the key principle of jury trials in fraud cases, while still ensuring a better experience for jurors.
Amendment 51 would prevent
“the Lord Chancellor adding further offences to the list in Schedule 1 by regulations.”
The concern is that it would give unconstrained power over the list of offences that may be heard without a jury on the basis that cases are considered complex or burdensome for jurors. That rationale could easily be extended to lengthy murder, rape, or drug trials.
As the shadow Minister mentioned, if the wording in schedule 1 specified fraud or that particular type of case, it would be a different matter. However, it does not; it just says “complex or lengthy”. The Minister makes the point that this is a complex area, and criminal offences are added all the time, but she also referred to the specific types of fraud cases. If she can include the provision of fraud in clause 1, that would provide a reassurance that there would not be additionality of scope. That is not to suggest that the current Lord Chancellor would be inclined to increase the scope, but a future Lord Chancellor may be able to extend the provision far beyond the huge change that the Government are already proposing.
Trials for things like terrorism, murder, rape and drug offences can last many months. They can be as complex as fraud cases, and they can involve multiple defendants and expert evidence. On that basis, the arguments that the Minister has made do not stand. That is why I will be voting against clause 4.
Joe Robertson
How long is a piece of string? The unanswerable question. I could ask another question: is a 2-metre piece of string a long piece of string? If I asked you that question, Ms Butler, you would have a lot of questions for me before you gave your answer, yet the Minister thinks it is easy to answer the question, “Is a two-week trial a long trial?”. She thinks it is obvious and that a judge will be able to make a decision. She is not willing to put a definition on that, because she says it is evident in the way that the Bill is drafted.
I look at the words in the Bill—which is all that a judge will have to make that decision. On length, it says that the judge will have to decide if the
“likely length of the trial…makes it appropriate for the trial to be conducted without a jury.”
On complexity, they will have to decide whether
“the likely complexity of the trial”
is
“appropriate for the trial to be conducted without a jury.”
It is even hard to decipher from that whether it means complex is good or bad for a jury. Complexity is just a description; it is not a value. This is incredibly unusual, novel and, I would say, badly worded legislation. Ordinarily, a provision of this sort would say something along the lines of: “If the court is satisfied that the length of trial is so long that it would make it unreasonable for a jury”. That would be more normal wording.
The principle of reasonableness, while giving discretion and, some might argue, a vague term in the English language, is a well-tested word in criminal law and the English legal system. We know what reasonableness means; it is an objective test—“What would an ordinary person think is reasonable?” What about appropriateness? Does that mean appropriate to that judge on that day? Does it mean appropriate to a particular, theoretical juror? There is absolutely no guidance in Bill about how this novel word, “appropriate”, should be interpreted. Even when there are words in legislation such as “reasonableness”, which are backed by decades or even centuries of case law, the judge is very often given guidance in the legislation as to what is and is not reasonable.
Rebecca Paul
My hon. Friend is making some powerful points. Hearing him read out what the law says brings home to me just how terrible this Bill is. Surely everyone can see that there is no clarity how it would work. Rather than there being any clear guidance, it essentially feels as though any judge can have their own view on complexity and length. We will end up with inconsistency and disputes and arguments about the approach. Surely, that could do the opposite of address the backlog by adding additional complexity and confusion to our justice system.
Joe Robertson
I agree with my hon. Friend. Indeed, the Bill will basically lead to a complete lottery in decision making, depending on the judge a person gets on the day. I suspect that judges ordinarily do not like vague law or having to provide their own interpretation. They are usually more comfortable if the statute is more precise, or if it is backed by caselaw, but there is no caselaw here.
On the issue of length, we know what the Minister thinks because she has told us in this Bill Committee. I do not criticise her for this opinion, but she thinks a case is long if it is disruptive to the personal or professional life of a juror or their wellbeing. That is her view as to what will make a case lengthy, and I do not criticise her for that, but there is no guidance here for the judge to consider those things—[Interruption.] I paraphrase her—she is welcome to intervene if she disagrees about how I characterise her views on what is lengthy for a juror.
Dr Mullan
I talked before about how judges will look to what Ministers have said around a measure in trying to interpret it, so if a judge is not clear what was meant by this, and pulls up Hansard to read what the Minister has said, surely they will take from the fact that the Minister has talked about the disruption to a juror’s life that they should have that as the test. What is disruptive to one person’s life is very different from what is disruptive to another’s.
Joe Robertson
I agree with my hon. Friend; he actually pre-empts the point I am about to get on to. I thank him for taking me on to that. It should be fairly obvious to most people that there will be a wide range of views as to how much time a person can take out of their ordinary life, bearing in mind that people are not called for jury service at the drop of a hat. They are not told, “You must cancel all your plans next week”; there is a degree of warning.
Most people take quite a wide view on how much time they can afford to give, depending on what is going on in their life. For some people, taking two weeks or even a week out is very disruptive. This theoretical person that the judge has to imagine would make an argument that it is appropriate that the trial should not take place with a jury, because they do not have a week in their busy life to just hand over.
Alternatively, others may say that they see it as a civic duty and a fundamental contribution they make to society to be available for jury trial if called. Perhaps they have never been called and they have reached a ripe old age, and they are happy and prepared to take a month or two out of their life to devote to making a decision on whether someone is guilty.
Dr Mullan
Currently, when a person sits on a jury, it is understood that, outside of the most extreme circumstances, they will be there for as long as the case takes. However, if the public get the sense that they can debate what asks are reasonable or unreasonable, I would not be surprised if jury members, in trials that go on a little bit, start sending notes to the judge to complain. They might say, “This has gone on for a week, and I didn’t think I’d be here for that long. I understand that if a trial goes on for too long, it shouldn’t be heard by a jury. This is going on too long. Judge, will you look at that?” That will open a whole can of worms about something that at the minute is extremely constricted in people’s minds.
Joe Robertson
Indeed. Might a judge, halfway through a trial, decide that it has suddenly become inappropriate, having heard whatever formal or informal representations are made on that point? Even if there is some objective consensus about how long an ordinary person in this country should be prepared to set aside to serve on a jury, does that in itself make it appropriate that a case should not be heard by a jury?
Even if we could agree, for example, that devoting any more than a month to a jury trial is disruptive to a person’s life, does that automatically make it inappropriate for a case to be heard in a jury trial? No, not at all. If it is inconvenient for someone to sit on a jury for a particular length of time, that does not mean the case is inappropriate for a jury trial. Even the Government are not willing to put a specific time value on that.
Rebecca Paul
As my hon. Friend was speaking, it suddenly occurred to me that under our current system, jurors can already make that argument—that if sitting on a jury would be particularly disruptive, they should not have to do so. How does that interact with this measure? It feels like this does not make sense.
Joe Robertson
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. There are a number of personal and professional circumstances that can enable people to make that argument and get exempted from jury trial or, indeed, not have to sit on the jury in the original case but have it deferred to a more convenient time. She is absolutely right that flexibility for ordinary people in this country is already built into the way that juries are selected.
“Length” is probably the easiest of these three difficult terms; “complexity” is even harder to nail down. How is a judge supposed to decide what level of complexity makes it appropriate to have a jury? I would argue that the more complex a case, in certain circumstances, the more it should be heard by a jury, especially if the complexity relates to what is in the mind of the defendant, rather than, for example, complex financial papers.
Does the involvement of complex financial papers, on its own, necessarily make a trial more complex, if the real issue in the case is whether the defendant intended to be dishonest? As we have already heard with fraud cases, as well as most of the cases in schedule 1, the real issue is not whether something happened; it is the mindset—the legal term would be mens rea—of the person who did that thing. If they did something by accident or unintentionally, depending on the crime, that would often be enough for them to be acquitted. If they did something knowingly, dishonestly or recklessly, also depending on the crime, that would normally be enough for them to be convicted.
Dr Mullan
My hon. Friend the Member for Reigate has given one example, but another, with which I expect people will be familiar, is the LIBOR trials. They were very complicated and sophisticated, and the appeals were successful because of a judge. It was the judge’s misdirection to the jury that led to the LIBOR trials becoming another example of cases collapsing. If anything, the evidence shows that it is the judges who are the issue here, not the juries.
Joe Robertson
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Obviously judges are not infallible. That is not a criticism of judges—judges know that they can make mistakes. On the mindset of the person, I am unclear as to whether the Government or indeed anyone on the Committee, regardless of party, thinks that there is anything more complex than what is in a person’s mind—a mind that cannot be unlocked or opened. We can ask this person what was in their mind, but they want to be acquitted, so we must take a value judgment on whether they are telling the truth or not. Surely the most complex thing there can possibly be is what is in the mind of a human being. A very complex set of spreadsheets or cryptocurrency that only half of us understand is complicated, but there is perhaps nothing more complicated than the motivation and mindset of a human being.
That is specifically what juries are for—to make that sort of judgment on whether it was reasonable for someone to do something. That is why we have 12 members, so that they must come to a view unanimously, or certainly as a large majority. A judge is not in a more privileged position—no one would argue that they are—to decide what is and is not reasonable. They are in a more privileged position to make decisions about the law, and indeed they do make decisions about the law in jury trials and direct the jury on matters of law.
It is incredibly uncertain what “complexity” means. I know what the Minister thinks it means, and I do not criticise her. It is a perfectly reasonable view of what it means. My point is that it is not the only view. She thinks—I paraphrase; I do not seek to put words in her mouth—that it is complex financial evidence, presumably written evidence in many cases, in a fraud trial or crimes related to money. It is perfectly possible to have a great volume of evidence but, as the case unfolds, a detailed understanding of that paperwork may no longer be the issue on which the case turns. Does having a large volume of written evidence and a long list of witnesses make a case complex, or does it depend on what the witnesses might say or exactly what is in those papers?
The Minister has spoken about juries moving at the pace of the slowest member. Is her test for complexity the mindset of the slowest member of a random 12 selected from the British public, or is it the average—one might say reasonable—person? She could help judges making this decision by setting that out in the legislation.
This is not merely a theoretical, academic discussion on the criminal law of this country. I can point to another country. The Minister has taken pleasure in using other countries as examples to justify many provisions in the Bill, as though England and Wales can learn from other jurisdictions. I do not disagree with that premise. I will give her the example of New Zealand, another common-law jurisdiction. It has a similar provision, whereby a judge has to exercise a similar sort of decision making about whether a trial is likely to be “long and complex”, rather than its likely complexity. Set out in its legislation is a legal test. The Minister says that there is a test of complexity in the Bill. I tried to intervene on her to say that there is not.
This is what a test looks like. The law of New Zealand directs a judge to consider, in determining whether a case is likely to be long and complex,
“the number and nature of offences with which the defendant is charged”.
We understand what that means. It also directs them to consider
“the nature of the issues likely to be involved…the volume of the evidence likely to be presented”
and
“the imposition on potential jurors of sitting for the likely duration of the trial”.
It has a catch-all, which is not unusual in legal drafting:
“any other matters the court considers relevant.”
The judge in New Zealand has a test to apply: whether the case is likely to be long and complex. There is absolutely no reason why the Government could not have included a test in the Bill—it does not have to be the same test—to assist the court and give certainty, which would help defendants and victims and would improve efficiency.
Joe Robertson
As my hon. Friend the shadow Minister pointed out, there are a number of problems that not only arise with what clauses 3 and 4 try to do, but carry over to clause 5, which tries to replicate aspects of jury trials in trials that will not be heard by a jury because a judge has made an allocation decision.
The problems with juries seem to be, as the Minister and the Government have articulated, time wasted through swearing in, the unpredictable nature of convening 12 people—with people sometimes dropping out—and the fact they can hear evidence only at certain times of the day, which makes the day for hearing evidence shorter. Of course, none of those things are new; they are things that have always existed with jury trials. Citing issues with juries that have existed since juries began, in order to deal with the more recent issue of backlogs, misses the point.
The Government have taken measures to deal with the more recent issues with criminal cases, including the fact that evidence inherently takes longer, although that is the same with evidence that a judge has to consider, and that cases have become more complex because of evidence and technology. That also is true of cases that are heard by a judge only. The Government have made plenty of complaints and shared plenty of views about what they think of the previous Government. They have spoken about under-investment and caps on sitting days, things that they say they have addressed through allocating more sitting days and investing in the legal system. Surely, that is the remedy for their complaints. However, they have not been prepared to spend the time to assess that remedy, to see whether the benefits in reducing the backlog will be felt in the coming months and years.
To take an inherent feature of the jury system—the jury itself—as a justification for doing away with it in certain cases because of more recent pressures for other reasons is neither logical nor fair. The problem with simply transferring all the provisions that would ordinarily happen in a jury trial to a trial that is decided by a judge alone, as clause 5 seeks to do, is that there are features of a jury system that cannot simply be replicated by a judge sitting alone. Let us remember that a jury decides the facts. It decides whether something happened and it decides what was in the mind of the defendant at the time in question. That is the preserve of the jury.
It is for the judge, even in a jury trial, to decide the law, to direct the jury—where appropriate—and to decide issues of procedure. Some of the procedural issues or arguments about evidence, including about whether evidence is admissible or not, are decided by the judge in the absence of the jury. The jury is sent out of the room. Of course, that can make the whole trial last longer, but there is a very good reason for it. It is because sometimes the arguments that are made—for example, arguments about the admissibility of certain evidence—are in themselves prejudicial to the decision maker of the facts, which is the jury, or prejudicial to the way that they might decide the case. A judge might need to hear the contested evidence, or at least hear what it is about to decide whether it is admissible.
A judge might decide that evidence is inadmissible because it is not relevant, or—this is where I go way beyond my legal expertise; I never practised as a criminal lawyer—because it might effectively prejudice the jury. We do not want the jury seeing that evidence, which is why they are out of the room. If the judge rules that the evidence is inadmissible, the jury come back into the room never having seen it, and the trial continues with the jurors’ minds unclouded by inadmissible evidence.
However, when the judge is also deciding the facts—that happens, of course in magistrates courts, where the magistrates decide the facts and are guided on the law by a legal professional sitting in front of them—and indeed when a judge is deciding the facts and the law, and procedural issues and issues of the admissibility of evidence, then, if they take separate arguments or separate submissions from the defence and prosecution on whether an item of evidence is admissible or not, and they decide that it is not admissible because it would cloud the judgment of the jury or confuse the issues of the main trial, they effectively have to pretend that they never heard that prejudicial evidence, having decided that it is prejudicial.
Judges are trained and professional, and have to do all this anyway in certain cases where a judge decides both—
Sarah Sackman
We have already covered a fair amount of the same ground. The example that I gave a couple of sittings ago was in relation to judges considering contempt of court applications, where they themselves would have seen the offending behaviour and have to make a determination about it. Judges are well used to dealing with these issues, both in the criminal context and the civil context. Does the hon. Gentleman accept that?
Joe Robertson
I accept that judges can do all this, and indeed sometimes do all this. Surely, however, the Minister will accept that, given human nature, there is a limit to the extent to which a human being can be so well trained or so professional that they can simply disregard something that they have heard as though they had never heard it. Indeed, that is one reason why we have jury trials. It is also one of the leading reasons why in more complex cases or longer cases—in cases involving murder, or sexual offences, or in all those cases that have to be heard by a jury—we have a jury. It is to separate the decision makers of fact from the decision makers of law and procedure.
Dr Mullan
As we are touching on these issues, those of us on the Opposition Benches are happy to say that we have to work harder on judicial accountability and decision making, and we are not afraid to say that we think it is better that juries do these things, because judges err.
There is an irony really, because at the heart of the Bill is another measure in relation to the powers that we give family court judges. My hon. Friend will know that the impact assessment says that the law at the moment basically says that judges already know—based on the law—that the welfare of the child comes before visitation rights. The Government accept that that is what the law says, but they do not trust judges to understand and accept that law. They want to introduce measures that further restrict judges’ decision making. The Government cannot have it both ways; they cannot introduce measures in the same Bill that are based on the idea that judges are not sufficiently enacting the law as written, and then say that we are wrong to have concerns about judicial decision making in these sorts of scenarios.
Joe Robertson
My hon. Friend the shadow Minister makes a good point, and we will get on to talking about the provisions relating to the family courts.
In relation to this particular provision, the family courts are where we have a judge making a decision on very emotive facts and on procedure. But family courts are far more collaborative in nature. A judge’s role is also about straining to find consensus. That is very different from the criminal courts where, ultimately, a judge or a jury, depending on who is hearing the case, has to make a yes-or-no decision on innocence or guilt. That has wide-ranging and profound impacts, which sometimes turn on a knife edge on hard-to-determine evidence. That is different from the family court, where the intention is to try and find consensus, rather than making those decisions.
Of course, juries are used in civil courts in some defamation cases. Again, it is where the value judgment on intention—why somebody made a statement about someone and whether they knew it to be false or not—of 12 ordinary people selected at random in this country is better than a judge’s decision making alone.
My issue with clause 5 is that it simply sweeps all sorts of provisions in a number of existing clauses of different legislation passed at different times into judge-only trials when those provisions were designed for jury-led trials. Unless I have misunderstood, that seems to have been done through a set of Government amendments and elements of existing law that were not envisaged on the first drafting of the Bill. That possibly demonstrates the slightly rushed and painful nature of how we are having to deal with this legislation, with so many loopholes and gaps in it.
I am happy to be discharging my duties, dissecting and scrutinising the Bill. I do not mind how long it takes because that is my job; it is why I am here and I am pleased to be doing it.
Sarah Sackman
On that final point, we are all delighted to be here and perform the function of Government properly. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] Exactly, and the company of all Members is a delight, as always.
On a serious point, there is some suggestion that the Government are rushing the legislation through. I do not think that is right. Yes, the Government have a sense of urgency about gripping this problem. I make no apologies for that. The depth of the problem and the shameful delays demands that urgency, but it is not true to say that this is rushed legislation. We commissioned a two-part independent review of hundreds of pages. We took our time to consider how we would bring that forward in a pragmatic way that vindicated the evidence base that the IRCC had put together. Now we are scrutinising it in the usual and proper way, and it will take as long as it takes. I do not want the public to think that the integrity of the process is somehow compromised. I know it would not be under your chairship, Ms Butler.
Dr Mullan
Thank you, Ms Jardine, for taking the Chair as we continue this later sitting. Before we suspended, we were debating my amendment 53 to clause 6 in relation to the use of the negative procedure rather than the affirmative procedure to change sentencing powers. I was talking about the importance of considering the nature of the justice delivered in the magistrates court when making changes to the powers of that court. As I have said previously in Committee, the fact that we have some criticisms of elements of the magistrates court does not mean it should be got rid of—we accept that these must be balanced measures—but it is important for us to consider that when expanding its powers.
Critics, including the Criminal Bar Association, warn that extending summary justice to cases carrying two-year sentences is a recipe for what they describe as “rough justice”. The procedures in magistrates courts are streamlined. For example, the Government’s own impact assessment assumes that even these more serious trials will be completed in a matter of hours. Furthermore, there is a significant disparity in access to legal representation. The income threshold for legal aid in magistrates courts is much lower than in the Crown court. That means that a defendant who would have been eligible for a publicly funded lawyer in the Crown court might be forced to represent themselves in the magistrates court, even when facing a two-year prison sentence. If we are to allow a system where unrepresented defendants face longer custodial terms in shorter hearings, that decision must be subject to the highest level of parliamentary debate.
It is also worth noting that the Government’s proposals depart from the recommendations of the very review they claim to follow. Sir Brian Leveson, in his independent review of the criminal courts, recommended that the Government’s ability to amend magistrates’ sentencing powers by statutory instrument of any kind should actually be repealed. He suggested that the current 12-month maximum should be made permanent, rather than leaving it as a “variable” that the Executive can adjust.
Crucially, when we have previously raised the question of the Government varying from Sir Brian’s recommendations, the Minister has prayed in aid Sir Brian saying that the Government could go further in some circumstances. This could not be further from that. He said that the reforms he recommended were “contingent” on the Government also introducing a power to cap the sentences that could be passed by magistrates. The use of Sir Brian as evidence of opinions across the board is reaching farce now. We have the Government disagreeing with Sir Brian on whether there should be a judge and two magistrates, disagreeing with Sir Brian over the maximum sentence for triable either-way cases in the magistrates court, and now they are directly opposing what he wanted them to do in relation to magistrates’ sentencing powers.
It is important that we read what Sir Brian said:
“My strong recommendation is that the maximum should remain at 12 months. Furthermore, I recommend that the legislation be amended so that the Lord Chancellor no longer has the power to reduce the maximum to six months via a Statutory Instrument. The 12-month maximum should be made permanent.”
Here we have another example of the Government wanting us to set aside all our concerns about the erosion of jury trial rights on the basis of Sir Brian’s expertise and experience, at the same time as ignoring it themselves. If the Government intend to move in the opposite direction of expert legal advice, it is only reasonable that they be required to obtain explicit approval from Parliament through the affirmative procedure every time they seek to do so.
We must look at the cumulative impact of the Bill. While clause 6 increases the power of the magistrates courts at the front end, clause 7 restricts the right to appeal those decisions at the back end. The Bill replaces the automatic right of appeal and full rehearing with a permission-based model. That creates a clear and troubling shift: more power is being exercised at the lower level, while the ability to challenge those decisions is being constrained.
With around 40% of appeals against conviction from magistrates courts currently successful, it is clear that the system is correcting a meaningful level of error. Increasing sentencing powers while simultaneously narrowing the mechanisms for correcting those errors is a double blow to the rights of defendants. The combined effect makes it even more imperative that any increase in power is not snuck through via the negative procedure. As we have heard from other Members, there is a backlog in the magistrates courts of 379,000 cases. Anything that increases their workload will potentially have adverse consequences.
In summary, increasing the maximum sentence in magistrates courts is a major constitutional change that affects the liberty of the citizen. It is not a matter of administrative convenience that should be left to the fast track of the negative procedure. If the Government are confident that increasing the maximum to 18 or 24 months is the correct solution to the backlog, they should have no objection to making that case openly and seeking a positive vote of approval from both Houses.
We must ensure that our fundamental rights are not treated as administrative details to be checked off on a spreadsheet. For those reasons, I support the proposal that any future increase to magistrates’ sentencing powers must be subject to the affirmative procedure, as well as other amendments that seek to constrain the Government’s actions in this regard.
Joe Robertson
I support the position of my hon. Friend the shadow Minister. There is a degree of cross-party support on the Opposition Benches; we heard some very good submissions from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, which seems a while ago now.
The Government’s position on many of the contentious issues in Committee has been anchored on Sir Brian Leveson’s report—indeed, why would it not be? It is an independent report that the Government commissioned. But they freely depart from his recommendations, seemingly on a whim, without any substantial justification. This is one of those cases. Sir Brian Leveson was very clear that magistrates should continue to have sentencing powers only up to a year, and the Government are effectively doubling those sentencing powers.
This is about more than just sentencing powers; it fundamentally changes what magistrates courts are for and how our criminal courts are structured. The Crown court, whether sitting with only a judge or with a jury, is for more serious cases, with more serious sanctions, because it is able to deal with levels of complexity, be it in relation to evidence or procedure. We have heard about “rough and ready” justice in the magistrates court. That is not a criticism; it is a way of characterising the absolute foundations of our magistrates courts. They do a huge amount of criminal work in this country, but they are meant to be summary courts; they are meant to be courts that act quickly and do not have the rigour or probity of the Crown courts. That is their particular purpose, and it is therefore right that they have always had limited sentencing powers when it comes to deciding whether to lock someone up. Fines and community orders are the sort of sentences that are far more typical of magistrates courts.
Depriving someone of their liberty is a very serious matter. It is one thing to deprive someone of their liberty for months, especially given that such sentences are often reduced—in practice, a year can be reduced to months—but it is another thing to deprive someone of their liberty for two years. That would suddenly make the magistrates courts’ summary-style justice, or rough justice—call it whatever; I do not mean any of those words as a criticism—incredibly inappropriate for the powers that the Government would like them to exercise. The clause therefore does much more than just fiddle with thresholds, or however the Government might want to characterise it—we will soon find out. It fundamentally alters what magistrates courts are for.
Linsey Farnsworth
I remind the hon. Member that magistrates in the youth court are able to impose sentences of up to two years, and that in its written evidence, the Magistrates’ Association states that it asked for and welcomes the increase to up to 24 months in the sentencing powers of magistrates courts. Does he recognise that?
Joe Robertson
I recognise evidence, but I give greatest weight to Sir Brian Leveson, the author of the independent report commissioned by the Government. As the hon. Lady knows very well, the youth court is a very different beast, because a different set of principles and rules applies to cross-examination, evidence and so on for people who are of the age of minority. Simply to say that if the youth court can do it, then the magistrates court can do it for people over 18 is a slightly off-the-cuff argument, if I may say so; it does not really have any rigour at all.
Allow me to return to my line of argument about magistrates courts. If there is a genuine intention and belief that magistrates should be able to impose sentences of up to two years—as I say, in my view, that fundamentally changes the nature of the court—then that should be met with provisions that make the process in the magistrates court more rigorous. I would not agree with that, but at least it would hang together, show consistency and demonstrate an intention that justice must be delivered in a process that is commensurate with the sanction the state is looking to impose on someone.
There is no greater sanction in this country than depriving someone of their liberty and locking them up. In this case, it is more than a threshold argument; the Bill is fundamentally changing what magistrates courts are for, what Crown courts are for, and the difference in procedure between the two.
Yasmin Qureshi
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Ms Jardine. Amendment 34 would ensure that the negative procedure—what I call the back route—cannot be used to allow magistrates courts to take away people’s rights for up to 24 months; it would require a proper debate and a vote in Parliament.
Yasmin Qureshi
I rise to support the comments made by the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester, about the importance of legal aid. There has already been a real reduction in the number of cases in which legal aid is given. Many defendants turn up at the magistrates court without any legal representation because of the constraints on legal aid. Bearing in mind that such defendants could now, if the Bill goes through, be facing up to 24 months imprisonment, it is important that legal aid provision is given to people facing custodial sentences. Means should not be the only element; an important thing to consider is whether somebody has a real chance of going into custody.
We have found historically—this may be anecdotal evidence—that defendants not getting legal representation at an early stage results in more delays. They often plead guilty right at the last stage, when the matter is set for trial. By then, six or eight months have passed, and they might have been able to save some money; or it has got into their head that they have to have this trial, so they try to raise some money. That causes delays. If people are guided, right at the beginning, as to what the evidence and the likely sentence are, they are more likely to plead guilty at an earlier stage.
The previous Government made significant cuts to legal aid. One of the arguments I remember raising then—this was more than 10 years ago, during the passage of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012—was that restricting legal aid would mean lots of unrepresented people turning up at court, and that that would delay the system. It is also fundamentally unfair. Someone facing a criminal charge should be able to access legal aid. I ask the Government to think about that, and perhaps extend legal aid and make it more generous.
Joe Robertson
This looks like another entirely reasonable amendment, which looks to mitigate some of the harsher provisions in the changes that will allow magistrates to give sentences of up to two years. A moment ago, I talked about the difference between the more rough and ready justice in the magistrates court and the more rigorous, lengthy and developed procedure, practice and ability to operate in the Crown court. When it comes to deciding the income threshold for whether a defendant qualifies for legal aid, surely the most important thing is not the process or procedure as such, but the harshness of the possible sanction that the state is looking to impose on that person.
Rather than looking at the £22,000 income threshold for magistrates courts and £37,500 for Crown courts, we could instead say that, if someone will be sentenced for up to one year, the income threshold is £22,000, and if someone will be sentenced for more than one year, it is £37,500. That is a true statement—that is how it currently stands. We should merely extend that principle, basing the figures on sentencing thresholds rather than on the venue that dishes out that sentence. That would achieve fairness, so that if somebody might be locked up for two years, they have the legal might and can afford the legal advice to defend themselves and articulate a case in a more professional manner. If having a legal professional does not give someone at least the chance of delivering that in a more professional manner, there is plainly little point in the legal profession.
That is the rationale, and the Government do not have to apply a different principle at all if they just see the current threshold as applying to a one-year sentence rather than to venue. This delivers again on other amendments, not only from others on these Benches but from the shadow Minister, and it allows the Government to deliver what they want to deliver. It does not run against the principle of what the Government are trying to do, even though Conservative Members have differences of opinion on that. It merely perfects, improves and cures some of the defects and unintended consequences of the Bill. The entire reason that the Bill Committee sits is to seek to do that, but time and again, the Government would prefer to just vote things down and use their majority rather than taking the time to look at provisions that seem to me objectively reasonable.
Alex McIntyre (Gloucester) (Lab)
Another good thing we can do in Committee is try to clarify the Conservative party’s position. Is the hon. Member’s position now that the almost 40% cuts to legal aid during the last Conservative Government were wrong? If so, would he like to apologise for them?
Joe Robertson
This is a strange venue to ask for an apology for previous Government legislation from an MP who, like me, has been in this place for less than two years. The hon. Gentleman and I were on broadcast media yesterday; that might have been a better venue for him to ask me to apologise, but I would have rejected his invitation at that time, and I will certainly reject it in Committee. This is not about previous Governments’ views or opinions; it is about the views and opinions of this Parliament.
Dr Mullan
This happens all the time. We point out deficiencies in the Government’s position, so Members get their Whips’ handouts with suggestions to “just point out to them what they did on x, y and z.” But the public do not care. That is a zero defence of their position—[Interruption.]
Joe Robertson
Indeed, it is quite interesting that the Government’s benchmark is the previous Government. I do not recall them making that clear at the last election. I will leave it there.
Dr Mullan
I rise to speak in support of amendment 22 tabled by the Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester. This is another element of the Bill that will not survive contact with the Lords. It is quite clearly unfair.
I want to pick up on some of the points that were made. There are key reasons why the amendment is sensible. In other parts of the debate, Government Members have raised the negative impact of cross-examination by defendants, which they do not think is a good thing. They do not think it is a good thing that victims may be cross-examined by defendants, yet they will not support a measure that would reduce the risk of that happening, and it does happen. The context of all the different parts of the clause is important to bear in mind.
Joe Robertson
The central issue here, as with so much of this, is the impact that a single provision, or a single intention—in this case clause 6—has on other areas of the criminal justice system, and indeed provisions in the Bill. There is a lot of interplay between clauses 6 and 7—we are about to discuss clause 7, so I will save my comments on that for a few minutes’ time.
The central issue is the unintended consequence, yes, but also the other provisions that Parliament will not get to debate. In this case, Parliament will not get a proper opportunity to debate the fairness of having magistrates courts sentencing up to two years, because the clause effectively creates a power for the Secretary of State to do that job instead. That is why this Committee is having to debate whether it is right that a summary court should suddenly have the power to sentence someone up to two years.
The Government can argue that at least some of the provisions that the Opposition do not agree with are anchored somewhere in Sir Brian Leveson’s report. I would argue that this provision is specifically argued out by Sir Brian Leveson. Indeed, he talked about it being contingent on the magistrates court continuing to have sentencing powers of up to only one year. When the Government appear, in my view, to be doing something that specifically runs against Sir Brian Leveson’s report, rather than is simply absent from it, they need to explain their position. It is not good enough to run the same old arguments. The central argument in all this seems to be efficiency. How much will the Government sacrifice at the altar of efficiency? Efficiency cannot trump all, and certainly not the justice arguments already made by me and others, which I will not repeat.
If the Government cannot explain where these provisions have come from, when they run counter to Sir Brian Leveson’s report, they should rightly submit these proposals through a proper procedure so that they can be debated by Parliament, rather than just giving a power to the Secretary of State.
As I say, I will restrict my comments to the interplay between clause 6 and clause 7, which restricts the right of appeal. We have already heard some good arguments about legal aid, and it does not do much for the Minister, who is quite exercised by the previous Government’s record on legal aid. This is about not necessarily increased funding for legal aid—she says she is doing that already—but the right to it when the state is trying to lock someone up.
Dr Mullan
If people end up being seen in the magistrates court when under the old measures they would have been in the Crown court, there will be lengthier trials and, potentially, a more expensive legal aid bill. It may not necessarily even be an issue of resource; it is just about making sure that legal aid follows the cases where they are being heard, which may well even save money.
Joe Robertson
That is entirely right but, of course, we do not know, because the assessments in respect of the Bill are so light—there is not one on that point. It may or may not at all mean more spending. So many times, the argument on this issue, and on many others, is, “Oh, it doesn’t affect that many cases,” or, “Don’t worry.” Well, it deeply affects the person whose case it is. If a defendant wants to exercise the right that the Government are pulling away, it is hardly an argument for the Government to say, “Well, we’re not pulling that right away from very many people.” For that defendant, the right has been lost.
The same applies to the argument when it is about victims or complainants. The Government are rightly willing to focus an argument on individual victims; they should be prepared to do that for the individual defendants who will lose rights and, in the case of sentences of up to two years, may suddenly no longer be able to access legal aid because the regime is focused on the venue rather than on sentencing power. That should be adjusted not because of what previous Governments have done, but because this Government are moving the goalposts on sentencing powers in the magistrates court, so they should make the matching adjustment when it comes to qualifying for legal aid. For that reason, I do not agree with clause 6.
Rebecca Paul
It is a pleasure to start the day with you and end the day with you, Ms Jardine. I am sure you are very much enjoying starting your day with me and ending your day with me, too. [Laughter.] I have just realised how that can be interpreted. My apologies, Ms Jardine; I cannot account for the minds of other Members.
To get back to business, I do not support clause 6 standing part of the Bill. It will expand the Government’s existing power to increase the maximum custodial sentence that a magistrates court can impose for a single either-way offence. The current maximum is 12 months, but the clause will permit Ministers, entirely at their own discretion, to increase that to 18 months or even 24 months. That will affect consecutive sentencing for multiple either-way offences.
The Government have justified the change on the basis that the power is needed so that sentencing limits can be adjusted swiftly to rebalance work between the magistrates courts and the Crown court. The Government estimate that increasing the maximum to 18 months would save 8,000 Crown court sitting days. That all sounds rather neat but, in reality, it is another example of the Government trying to force more serious criminal business into a part of the system designed for swift, relatively low-level justice, and doing so before they have properly shown that the courts can absorb it or that the benefits are worth it.
The first and perhaps most important point is that even Sir Brian Leveson did not recommend the change. Sir Brian said that his recommendation on restricting the right to elect trial by jury was
“contingent upon magistrates’ sentencing powers remaining at the current maximum of 12 months.”
He also recommended that the Government’s ability to amend magistrates’ sentencing powers by statutory instrument be repealed, and that the current 12-month maximum be made permanent.
Clause 6 therefore cannot be said to follow Leveson: it goes beyond him and, on this point, directly contradicts him. That is a serious weakness in the Government’s position. Ministers have repeatedly leaned on Leveson when defending the Bill as a whole, but in this instance he gave no endorsement of what clause 6 will usher in. More than that, he warned us directly against it. It is perfectly valid to ask, “If the very review on which the Government say the Bill is based said that 12 months should remain the ceiling, why are Ministers now seeking the power to raise it to two years?”
Let me briefly touch on a second common-sense point. The move from six to 12 months took effect only for offenders convicted on or after 18 November 2024. In other words, the current system has barely had time to bed in and the Government are already asking Parliament to authorise a further jump to 18 or 24 months. The earlier increase to 12 months was justified as a response to court pressures, and the Government said it would save up to 2,000 sitting days. We have not had anything like enough time to assess properly how that change has worked in practice before Ministers seek power to go dramatically further.
If the Government and the Minister wish to make evidence-based law, they should first show Parliament what the 12-month expansion has actually done: what kinds of cases have been retained, what sentencing patterns have changed, what effect there has been on appeals, what impact there has been on magistrates courts and whether the claimed savings have materialised. Instead, they are asking, through clause 6, for a much broader delegated power, and inviting us to trust that this will all somehow work out later. That is not good enough where a question as fundamental as the administration of good justice is concerned.
The Bar Council puts its objection crisply and, I think, rightly. It says:
“Summary trial is designed for the purpose of dispensing swift justice in low-level cases. The extension of summary justice to cases in which a defendant could receive up to 2 years’ imprisonment…particularly when combined with the removal of a right to elect Crown Court trial, and the removal of a right of automatic appeal”
amounts to a
“comprehensive rolling back of safeguards.”
That is blunt language, but it is hard to disagree with.
Clause 6 will change the kind of cases that summary justice is expected to absorb. The Law Society warns that under the clause magistrates will have the power to impose lengthy custodial sentences for serious offences such as actual bodily harm, grievous bodily harm and possession with intent to supply drugs
“in proceedings that are intended to be quicker”
and less formal than than those in the Crown Court. It warns that this raises the likelihood that
“people will receive longer custodial sentences with fewer safeguards or opportunities to rectify wrongful convictions.”
I will dwell on this point for a moment, as it is something that none of us who have been tasked with scrutinising the Bill in detail should forget. A system designed to be faster, simpler and less formal is being asked to shoulder cases in which the consequences are far more severe. Two years in prison is not some trivial matter: a custodial sentence like that can cost a person their job, their home, their family life, their good name and their future. A justice system that is appropriate for low-level offending cannot be assumed fit for cases that carry that sort of lifechanging penalty.
There is then the practical point that clause 6 will not solve the pressure in the system so much as move it around. The change will merely transfer the burden from one overstretched part of the system to another. The Law Society says that the magistrates court already has its own backlog of more than 370,000 cases, and that the Government have shown no convincing plan to deal with the added pressure brought by more serious and complex cases.
JUSTICE makes the same point, and adds an especially telling practical detail drawn from the Institute for Government’s analysis: since magistrates’ sentencing powers were increased from six to 12 months in 2024, only around 30% of sentences in the six-to-12-month band were handed down by magistrates. That suggests a lack of confidence, or a continuing tendency to send more serious cases upwards, which in turn means the Government’s projected savings may not materialise in anything like the way they hope.
If magistrates are already not retaining all the cases that the Government assumed they would after the jump to 12 months, what is the evidence that authorising 18 or 24 months will suddenly transform the position? If cases continue to be sent up, or bounce between jurisdictions, the supposed efficiency gain becomes much more doubtful.
Joe Robertson
The way my hon. Friend articulates the point suggests that the rules are effectively stripping people of the right to legal aid by pushing them down from a court where they currently qualify into a court where they do not. Is that a fair way to characterise it?
Rebecca Paul
I agree with my hon. Friend. Frankly, I am shocked that a Labour Government would do that. It is the last thing I expected of a Labour Government.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Seventh sitting)
Joe Robertson ExcerptsTuesday 21st April 2026
(3 months, 3 weeks ago)
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Paulette Hamilton (Birmingham Erdington) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Jardine. I rise to speak to the new clause that is tabled in my name, which I do not intend to push to a vote. It would require the Lord Chancellor to conduct and lay before Parliament a review of the impact of clause 3 after 12 months, and again after no later than 36 months. At its heart, the new clause is both modest and reasonable. It does not seek to block the Government’s proposals outright, nor does it attempt to rewrite the substance of the Bill. It simply asks that we understand the impact of the changes we are making and that we are accountable for them.
As Members across the House know, clause 3 introduces significant changes to the operation of the courts, particularly through the insertion of the new provisions into the Senior Courts Act 1981. Those provisions mark a clear shift in how justice is delivered. When we make changes of this scale, we have a duty not only to legislate, but to reflect on their impact and remain accountable for the consequences.
The Law Society of England and Wales has raised concerns that reforms to court processes must be carefully monitored to ensure they do not inadvertently undermine access to justice, particularly for those who already face barriers in navigating the legal system. These concerns are drawn from the experience of legal practitioners working day to day in the courts, particularly in cases involving litigants in person who often are trying to navigate complex procedures without legal representation. It has also emphasised the importance of evaluating how such changes operate in practice, including their impact on vulnerable and disadvantaged groups and on the capacity of the courts to deliver justice effectively.
The society has made it clear that such changes can have unintended consequences that are often felt most by the people who already struggle to access justice. That goes directly to public confidence in the justice system. Surely, trust and perception in the justice system are just as important as the legal framework itself. Concerns have also been raised by the Family Services Foundation, which highlights how procedural changes can disproportionately affect vulnerable individuals and families already facing complex challenges. That reflects its work with the families involved in the court system, where even small procedural changes can have a significant impact on people who are already dealing with instability, stress or crisis situations.
New clause 29 would ensure that Parliament receives clear evidence-based assessments of how the provisions are working in practice. Crucially, it would require that the assessments consider the impact on two groups: people from ethnic minority backgrounds and white British individuals living in lower-income households. As highlighted in earlier stages of the scrutiny of the Bill, there is a lack of clear statutory review built into the provisions, in particular in clause 3.
Some may ask, why specify those groups? The answer is simple—because justice is not experienced equally by all. We know all too well through evidence, lived experience and countless testimonies that people from ethnic minority communities often have lower levels of trust in the criminal justice system. That shapes how justice is perceived and whether it is seen as legitimate. For ethnic minority communities, this is fundamentally about trust in the justice system and perception of fairness.
Equally, we must recognise that socioeconomic disadvantage can profoundly affect a person’s experience of the courts. White British individuals from lower-income households are also more likely to feel marginalised by systems that appear distant, complex or unresponsive to their circumstances. If this House is serious about fairness, we must be serious about understanding how reforms affect those who are most at risk of being left behind.
New clause 29 does not assume the outcome. It does not claim that the provisions of clause 3 will necessarily have a negative impact, but it does recognise that without proper review, we simply will not know. That in itself would be a failure of our responsibility as legislators. The timeline set out in the new clause—a review after 12 months and a further review no later than after 36 months—strikes a careful balance. The reviews allow for early identification of any emerging issues, while also ensuring that long-term effects are properly understood. Importantly, the reviews would be laid before Parliament, ensuring transparency and enabling this House to scrutinise the findings. If the changes are working well, a review would demonstrate that; if they are not, a review would give us the opportunity to put things right.
I urge Members across the House to support new clause 29, not as a challenge to the Bill, but as a practical step towards fairness, transparency and accountability in our justice system. This House should be confident in reforms, but it should also be confident in knowing when to pause, assess and reflect. That is all that the new clause asks for.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
I wish to address a number of issues in relation to this grouping. First, I will say something about the figures that have been quoted at length today and in previous sittings. Secondly, I will say something about the reasons given by the Government for curtailing jury trials in this way. Then I want to go on to say something about evidence and procedure, and why jury trials exist at all, because sometimes it is possible to sit here listening, wondering whether the Government’s reasoning would not justify a banning of all jury trials for evermore on any crime. Finally, I will talk about some of the perversities that the hon. Member for Chichester has articulated well.
Linsey Farnsworth
No. I will make some progress; we need to make progress today.
The researchers found that more than 90% of respondents in the survey they conducted believed that discrimination on juries should be reported to trial judges and properly investigated, yet there is no mechanism under current law that allows juries to do so.
Appeal, a not-for-profit organisation, has submitted evidence opposing some elements of the Bill. However, in a paper that it prepared in 2024, Appeal set out concerns relating to majority decisions, as opposed to unanimous jury decisions, and the impact of racial bias. The case of R v. Connor et al was cited, in which questions from the jury suggested that there had been a focus on the defendant’s race and a letter from a juror after conviction confirmed racial bias in the jury’s deliberations.
Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 provides for confidentiality in jury decision making. However section 8A, enacted in Scotland, permits the Lord Justice General to allow information about deliberations from the jury room to be disclosed for the purposes of research. That provides an opportunity for the same to follow in England and Wales. Recent statistics show an increase in hate crime, including crime based on race and religion, rates of which spiked after Brexit and, recently, following the Southport murders. Now more than ever, we must be conscious of the impact that discrimination could have on the fairness, or otherwise, of jury trial.
Linsey Farnsworth
I am about to conclude, so I will not.
I support new clause 29, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington, but I submit that the change and modernisation that the Bill seeks to introduce bring an opportunity to review all aspects of the criminal justice system in relation to ethnicity and socioeconomic background to ensure fairness for all.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting)
Joe Robertson Excerpts(3 months, 4 weeks ago)
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Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Jardine. I am pleased to speak in support of amendments 25 and 12, and particularly in support of amendment 43, tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle.
The amendments all engage with a simple point of fairness. Whatever one’s view of the Government’s wider proposals, it cannot be right to change the rules after a defendant has already elected for a Crown court trial. Such defendants made their choice under the current rules. They did not opt for Crown court for any reason other than the fact they would get a jury trial, so for the court to remove that choice from them without any hearing would frankly be shocking.
Let us keep in mind that some of these people will be innocent, and remember that some may have chosen the magistrates route if they had known that going to the Crown court would not give them the jury trial they seek. The retrospective application of new rules is deeply unfair. Whatever side of the jury trial argument we are on, surely we can all agree that those who have already opted for jury trial should have that decision respected.
The amendments differ slightly in drafting but all try to achieve the same thing: to ensure that where somebody has already elected for jury trial, that choice is respected and the new regime does not operate retrospectively. Amendment 25 would disapply the new allocation rules where a defendant has already elected Crown court trial before commencement. Amendment 12 would strip out the retrospective commencement provisions. Amendment 43 would instead tie the new regime to cases in which the first hearing in the magistrates court takes place after the change in the law. Those are different routes with the same fair and sensible objective.
This should not be controversial. If the state tells a defendant that they have a right to elect for a jury trial and they exercise that right, it is manifestly unfair to turn around later and say that the right has vanished and that their case will now be dealt with under a wholly different system. In fact, to call it unfair fails to make the point seriously enough. It would amount to a violation of one of the most foundational principles of our legal system: that retrospective legislation of this kind runs contrary to basic rule-of-law principles and requires the strongest possible justification.
As JUSTICE, the cross-party law reform and human rights organisation put it in written evidence:
“The retrospective application of the provisions is contrary to the rule of law.”
It went on to state:
“It is deeply unfair for defendants who elected Crown Court trial in expectation of a jury to have their cases heard by a judge alone under a process that did not…exist when they made that choice.”
I always endeavour to see all sides of a given issue, but in this case I honestly struggle to see any argument against those statements. I hope the Minister will agree that retrospective application is fundamentally unfair.
If the Government are not moved by appeals to basic fairness, they should at least be moved by their own stated objective of reducing delay. The Bar Council is unmistakeable in warning us:
“The retrospective provisions may also be subject to numerous legal challenges.”
That is exactly the opposite of what Ministers say they are trying to achieve. If the Government push ahead with retrospective application, they risk drawn-out legal challenge, more hearings and more uncertainty in cases that are already in the system. Measures explicitly brought in to help to reduce the court backlog will, perversely, multiply it. This is exactly the sort of illogical thinking that Committee stage is intended to weed out. I very much hope that the Minister will engage on this point.
Our concern is echoed elsewhere in the written evidence we received. Dr Samantha Fairclough’s detailed submission to the Justice Committee states clearly that the Government’s plan to give the Bill retrospective effect is
“unfair…will create significant additional work in allocating those cases…and likely result in appeals.”
JUSTICE makes a similar point, saying:
“Reallocation of cases already in the Crown Court caseload”
could lead to judicial review challenges, further hearings and additional
“burdens on both defendants and the prosecution”.
Even on a practical level, the amendments are eminently sensible. They seek to diffuse the legal landmine that the Government are in danger of stepping on, and would avoid yet more work for a system that is already under intense strain.
As I have stated, the amendments are nothing other than fair and reasonable—in fact, they are a minimal safeguard. My colleagues and I have been clear that we should not be going ahead with these reforms, but if Ministers insist, the very least they can do is to ensure that they operate prospectively rather than retrospectively. People should be judged and dealt with under the rules in force when they made their election, not have the rug pulled from beneath them halfway through proceedings. That is why I support amendments 25, 12 and 43, and I urge the Government and the Minister to accept at least one of them.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
To the extent that it is necessary, I declare an interest in that I used to be a solicitor regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered with the Law Society. I, too, support amendments 25, 12 and 43. They are not technical or political amendments, but constitutional amendments, and I hope that the Committee will consider them in that spirit.
Let me begin with some facts that I think we can all agree on. There are thousands of defendants who are currently part-way through the criminal justice process having made a formal, consequential and, they thought, irreversible election to be tried by jury in the Crown court. They made that election under the law as it existed when they made it—indeed, as it exists today. If the Bill passes unamended, that election, that choice, that right, which they have already exercised, will be taken away from them before they ever reach trial. It is a bitter irony that they have not yet reached trial because of the situation that the country is in. I accept that it is not this Government’s fault that we are where we are, but the state is the state, and the Government are responsible for it. For those people to be awaiting trial because of the state and then have their rights taken away from them by the state because of this Government’s actions goes far beyond disagreement on the Bill and on the principle of jury trial, no matter how important that is.
Alex McIntyre (Gloucester) (Lab)
I am sure that we are all looking forward to a rather long afternoon listening to the hon. Member’s speech. Does he agree that this is also about the victims, some of whom the Committee heard evidence from, who did not have a right not to have their freedoms taken away, did not have a right not to be attacked, do not have a right to elect, do not have a right to speed up the process, and do not have a right to an earlier trial, before it collapses when other people pull out of the process? While he is making a very important point about ensuring that we have a just system for defendants, does he agree that we must also ensure that victims are centred in this?
Joe Robertson
I look forward to spending the afternoon exchanging ideas with the hon. Member. Let me begin by expanding a little on what I had intended to say. I do not agree with the narrative that it is either the defendant or the victim who wins out, not least because not every defendant is a guilty person. I would also say that victims of the worst crimes, when they are waiting for a guilty person to be found as such, already face the backlog. They will not have a choice to go to the magistrates court, because those are not either-way offences.
The jury system will always take longer, and the people who have suffered the worst will always be subject to the longer jury trial. There is a reason why that is right: a jury is asked to take a decision on whether something happened, and its decision could mean that someone loses their liberty for a very long time. The criminal system in this country is tilted in favour of the defendant, so I am afraid that it is tilted in favour of people who commit heinous crimes. However, in our system we must believe that those who commit heinous crimes will be found out, convicted and serve the very toughest sentences.
Yasmin Qureshi
Does the hon. Member agree that trying to divide our citizens into victims and defendants—the good and the bad—is not the best way forward? Defendants can themselves be victims, and victims can become defendants. It is important that we have a system of principle that applies to everyone. There is an assumption that we should favour of the victim and everything should be stacked against the defendant, but all of us, as individuals, could become defendants.
Joe Robertson
I do. Perhaps I could encourage a Tea Room conversation between the hon. Members for Gloucester and for Bolton South and Walkden, in the hope that her wisdom might rub off on her hon. Friend when it comes to pitching this as a contest between victim and defendant.
Of course, on a technical point, it is not the victim or complainant who brings the case; it is the Crown—the state. Yes, there is a victim who must see justice, but in criminal law, the offence is seen as a crime against the state. In countries where there is not a monarchy, it is the people versus the defendant, because the defendant’s crime is an affront to the people. We have a monarchy in this country, and we know it is the Crown against the defendant.
Dr Mullan
Further to the intervention from the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden, it might be helpful to remind the Committee of the letter written by dozens of organisations representing women and girls. I was very clear that that letter actually represented women and girls as victims, but it absolutely makes the hon. Lady’s point about the criminalisation that is sometimes attached to women and girls as a result of coercion and other circumstances that they might go through, so they have an interest in ensuring that they have access to a fair trial. As she said, the division between the two is not as black and white as some Government Members seem to want to make it.
Joe Robertson
Yes. Let us get back to principles here. I support what the Government are trying to do in reducing the backlog. Of course, that is the right thing to do, and it benefits both those awaiting trial and the victims and complaints who want to see justice.
On amendment 25, my particular issue here the retrospective application of the law. Even if Members agree with the Government that either-way offences should go and that people who commit or are accused of committing a crime in the future should no longer have the right that people used to, the clause will apply that new law to things that have already happened. That is highly controversial and an affront to the common law legal system in this country.
Alex McIntyre
It is refreshing to hear a Conservative Member defending the European convention on human rights. Can he confirm whether it is now the Conservative party’s position to support the ECHR, or is it for withdrawing from it, as it was last year?
Joe Robertson
I continue to be grateful to the hon. Member for hanging on my every word, and I am grateful for the opportunity to expand on that. As I said, it is a basic tenet of English common law, and the ECHR effectively replicates what is already in our legal system. I am very happy to engage in a wide-ranging debate on the ECHR, but I fear that you, Ms Jardine, are also hanging on my every word and may stop me.
Dr Mullan
I absolutely think that we should leave the ECHR, because I do not like the mechanism that it operates under, but I absolutely support some of the rights and protections in principle that it advocates. I am struggling to see why there is a contradiction. There are lots of times when we might support elements of proposals without supporting the manner in which they are handed down.
Joe Robertson
Again, I invite a Tea Room conversation —although we may have to meet somewhere geographically in the middle of the Tea Room.
Any measure that materially and detrimentally alters the regime to which a defendant is subject in a way not foreseeable at the relevant time engages article 7. The Government’s own ECHR memorandum on the Crime and Policing Bill of April this year acknowledged that article 7 is engaged where the defendant could not “reasonably have foreseen” the application of a measure “at the material time”. At least we can agree that article 7 is at least engaged. A defendant who elected Crown court trial under the existing law could not have foreseen that that election would be nullified, not least of all because some such defendants have been waiting rather a long time—and that is the issue this Government are trying to deal with. I say again that I support what they are trying to do, although I disagree with some of the means they are using to achieve those aims. This is precisely the kind of unforeseeable retrospective detriment that article 7 exists to prevent.
While we are on the ECHR, I turn to paragraph 2 of article 6, on the right to a fair trial, and pending proceedings. Paragraph 1 guarantees the right to a “fair and public hearing” before an “independent and impartial tribunal”. The European Court has repeatedly held that the principle of the rule of law and the notion of a fair trial preclude any interference by the legislature—that is, Parliament—other than on “compelling grounds of the general interest”, with the administration of justice designed to influence the judicial determination of a dispute. This principle was established in a number of cases and applied domestically in Reilly (No. 2), 2014.
Where a defendant has an existing elected case in train, the application to them of the new clause 3 regime is precisely the form of retrospective interference with pending proceedings that article 6 prohibits. The Government must demonstrate compelling grounds of the general interest. Processing efficiency—the rationale advanced for these reforms—does not satisfy that threshold, in my view. I say again that we are talking about cases that are already in proceedings.
The Government’s own Criminal Procedure Rules 2025 identify, as part of the overriding objective, the recognition of the rights of a defendant, particularly those under article 6 of the European convention on human rights. Retrospective removal of the elected mode of trial is directly at odds with the overriding objective that the Government have enshrined in their own procedure rules.
I turn to the more recent Reilly litigation that went on between 2013 and 2015, because, although this is a historic principle, it is one that has been repeatedly upheld. The R (on the application of Reilly) v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions litigation provides, in my view, the closest and most instructive domestic parallel.
In 2013, Parliament fast-tracked the Jobseekers (Back to Work Schemes) Act 2013 to retrospectively validate regulations that the Court of Appeal had already found to be unlawful. The Act was introduced before the Supreme Court appeal was complete. That is a direct analogy to the present situation, in which the Bill would alter the mode of trial for defendants who are already part-way through criminal proceedings.
In Reilly (No. 2), Mrs Justice Lang held that the 2013 Act was incompatible with article 6(1) of the ECHR, in that it had interfered with—
The Chair
Order. I gently remind the hon. Member not to stray too far from the subject under discussion. We have a lot to get through.
Joe Robertson
I am grateful for that indication, Ms Jardine, and I understand. It had interfered with ongoing legal proceedings in favour of the state, which is exactly what is happening here: legal proceedings are being interrupted in order to favour the state, removing from appellants what would otherwise have been a conclusive ground of appeal without justification by compelling grounds of the general interest.
The Court of Appeal upheld this conclusion, with Lord Justice Underhill emphasising the importance to be attached to observance of the rule of law. Mrs Justice Lang further held that the absence of consultation with the representative organisations, which I say has happened here too, and the lack of scrutiny by relevant parliamentary Committees may have contributed to some misconceptions about the legal justification for the retrospective legislation. She said that the Government’s ECHR statement to Parliament failed to explain that a departure from the legal norm—exactly what is happening here, in my view—was being sought.
Those observations plainly apply with equal force to this Bill. The parallels are direct: the Government are introducing new legislation that will alter the legal position of defendants who are already engaged. As in Reilly, no compelling grounds of the general interest have been articulated for why existing elected cases must also be captured. Lots of arguments have been made about why either-way offences should no longer exist, but not why that must be the case for people who have already made an election in that way.
Joe Robertson
I will go on to my next bit, which is even more relevant than my previous bit.
The Police (Detention and Bail) Act 2011 is Parliament’s most recent example of retrospective criminal legislation. It reversed the effect of the High Court’s decision in R (on the application of Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police) v. Salford Magistrates’ Court and Hookway on the calculation of detention time under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and did so by deeming the amendments always to have had effect. They had not.
The then Policing Minister described the matter as too urgent to await a Supreme Court appeal. This Government have made no case that the current backlog is so urgent that it must be all shifted to the magistrates court. It wants to tackle the backlog, yes, by changing the right to elect, but removing people who have made that election into a different court is something quite different. The Government have not argued that it is too urgent. That is unsurprising, because it is plainly not. Even in the emergency context of the Police (Detention and Bail) Act, when the Government faced systemic liability for unlawful detentions, the retrospective approach attracted intense criticism, just as I am criticising this Government. It was acknowledged in the explanatory notes that it was deliberately retrospective and it remains subject to potential ECHR challenge.
It is interesting to note that this legislation may also be subject to challenge, even if it leaves this place and passes into law. No equivalent emergency exists here; there is no systemic liability to reverse. The War Crimes Act 1991 is cited as a paradigm case of retrospective criminal legislation, allowing proceedings for war crimes committed in German-occupied territory in the second world war, notwithstanding that the defendants were not British at the time. Parliament considered that the exception was justified by the gravity of the crimes involved—they were heinous crimes—but even then the Act was controversial.
Alex McIntyre
I thank the hon. Member for giving possibly the longest wind-up in the history of wind-ups. I have two questions for him. First, does he recognise that both examples of retrospective legislation that he mentions were made by a Conservative Government? Secondly, what number does the backlog need to hit before he deems it urgent that the Government tackle it?
Joe Robertson
I think it is for the Government to set out the state of emergency. I do not accept that there is one; in fact, I do not think the Government are saying that there is one, when it comes to taking away a right that someone has already elected. We are not talking about getting rid of jury trials for a trial for either-way offences. I disagree with that; we have dealt with that, and we will go back to it. In this clause, we are talking about applying that to a number of people who have already made an election. It is for the Government to set out the emergency. I do not believe that there is one, and I think that they have not set it out because they do not believe that there is one.
Dr Mullan
As I pointed out, at some point in these proceedings, even the Justice Secretary did not think it necessary. When he was considering these matters, the Justice Secretary agreed that it was perfectly reasonable for it not to be retrospective. We are actually making an argument with which, at one point, the Justice Secretary agreed.
Joe Robertson
The shadow Minister is absolutely right. I invite the Minister to address that point head on in her speech. Even the Government themselves do not seem to be saying it is an emergency, whereas when any previous Government, Conservative or Labour, have tried to enact something retrospectively, they have at least made the case for an emergency. Heinous crimes committed during a war, loopholes that have left the state open to repeat, ongoing litigation into perpetuity—those are the sorts of threshold that have been met in previous times.
I hope that that goes some way to answering the question asked by the hon. Member for Gloucester. Let us hear from the Government why retrospective application in this case is so urgent. The answer cannot be about future cases; it must only be about those who have already elected trial.
I draw attention to a post on the UK Constitutional Law Association blog in July last year, which addresses and objects to the idea of using the Crown court backlog crisis to justify this provision. It is not an adequate justification that it is equivalent to wartime. Jury trials were not suspended even in the first world war, the second world war or the covid pandemic, all of which produced a more acute systemic issue than the one we have today. The present difficulties, however real they are—and I say again that they are real—do not plainly reach that threshold.
The Government’s own stated policy is that they must balance conflicting public interests and consider whether the general public interest in the law not being changed retrospectively may be outweighed by any competing public interest with regard to ECHR. The Solicitor General’s answer to a parliamentary question set that out explicitly. For the sake of brevity, I will not repeat that answer. However, whatever views are taken about that balancing exercise, there appears to have been no such exercise on which to take a view. It is apparent in the Bill’s explanatory notes. No compelling justification for retrospectivity is advanced. It should be in the notes, and it should have been done already, but at least the Minister can address it now.
This has not been a case of closing an unforeseeable loophole. It is not an emergency requiring same-day legislation. It is not a response to a systemic injustice in wartime. It is a policy reform that operates perfectly well on a prospective basis if that is what the Government want to do, although I do not agree with abolishing jury trials. But the retrospective reach of clause 3 appears—I hope—to be inadvertent. The amendments would correct it.
The Government’s reform agenda could be delivered even if the amendments are made. Future cases would be fully captured by the new regime applied prospectively. Where defendants have already elected—and there will be relatively few of those over the lifetime of this law, compared with all the crimes that it will capture in future—their cases can be resolved under the existing system. It raises the question of what happens when we take a number of cases and put them straight into the magistrates courts now, rather than allowing the natural wasting away of the election to trial by jury for those who face what, today, are either-way offences.
The cost of honouring the amendments is minimal, even to the Government. The cost of not honouring them is significant. I will not repeat the arguments that I have already made. In my view, the Committee should support amendments 25, 12 and 43. They are constitutionally proper and correct, legally secure and practically proportionate. The Government have offered no principled justification for the retrospective application of clause 3. In the absence of such justification, the presumption against retrospectivity must surely prevail. The Government can still achieve the aims of the Bill, no matter how much I disagree with a number of them.
The Chair
I gently remind Members that we have a lot to get through today. If they could keep their comments succinct and non-repetitive, that would be very helpful to everyone.
Joe Robertson
Evidently, I support the amendment in the name of the shadow Minister. As he set out, this is about confidence in the trial when it gets under way. It is about understanding what a judge, in exercising their procedural decision making, may have seen prior to the trial getting under way and the evidence being heard. As I see it, the amendment would go some way to at least mitigating what is lost in the Government’s abolition of jury trials for certain offences: that is, the objectivity of jury trials, where a jury decide on the conviction—guilt or innocence, effectively—and the judge decides on the sentencing.
In jury trials, there is separation between a judge’s procedural decision making about how the trial runs, including throughout the trial, and the facts of the case—whether someone is guilty or not—being decided on by the jury. When a trial is heard by a judge, the judge makes both those decisions. The disadvantage there, of course, is that when either party to proceedings—the defence or the prosecution—wishes to make representations about the way a trial is being conducted or about the evidence in a jury trial, the jury get sent out of the room. They do not see that argument, and their minds are not clouded by what is discussed in the courtroom on a procedural matter that a judge may rule is inadmissible in the hearing. Frequently in trials, that would be a dispute over evidence, such as whether a certain bit of evidence should be brought before a jury. The jury will not hear that discussion; if a judge says no, the jury come back in and they never see it. In a judge-only trial, where the judge is also deciding innocence or guilt, they have to decide whether a piece of evidence is relevant and, if they decide it is not, they have to effectively pretend that they never saw it and to disregard it.
Our judges are capable of doing that because of their training, career, expertise and experience. I would suggest that judges in this country are among the best in the world; as I have said before, I believe our common law English legal system is the best, and I believe our judiciary is the best. But it is simply the case—it is human nature—that when someone has seen something they cannot unsee it. That is precisely one of the arguments for why we have jury trials in this country.
This is about the arguments a judge hears and assesses when it comes to allocation. They could be fairly contested and, of course, the decision made by a judge could be controversial—not necessarily wrong, but controversial—and against what the defendant is seeking. When a judge chooses a judge-only trial, the defendant’s wishes are not disregarded but considered and set to one side, and the judge then hears the facts of the case. The argument is that the judge may be clouded in their view of a defendant, given the robust, perhaps sometimes controversial, arguments the defendant is making about where they want the trial to be heard. That may then unfairly cloud the judge’s view of the defendant when hearing the case itself. In the vast majority of cases, judges have a professional separation as they move on from an important single decision about where to hear the case to hearing the case itself.
It is not just about whether a judge was clouded by the earlier decision-making process. In truth, in the vast majority of cases we can never know. We do not want to get into philosophy here, but some philosophers may argue that judges themselves do not realise when they are clouded. Probably more relevant in practice, though, is the confidence that the defendant has in the judge’s decision.
If there has been a highly contentious, contested argument about where the trial should be held, if the defendant did not get their way, which in my view they should have, because I do not agree with this legislation, and if the defendant does not believe that their case is being tried properly and sees bias in the judge, that will make the trial harder to run even if it is not a reasonable view to hold. It could lead to defendants, some of whom may be representing themselves and giving evidence, not being able to set aside their disagreement with the judge. There will therefore not be a fair, objective process with a judge and a fair-minded defendant who at least has confidence in the system.
Of course, not every defendant will have objective confidence in the system, but at least we can assist the process by not creating an opportunity for the defendant to disagree with a judge’s allocation decision and then have to face the same judge making a decision on their innocence or guilt in the trial itself. I use the analogy of juries, because that is what we are discussing, albeit not under this amendment.
An important example arises in the family courts, when two people are contesting finances during a divorce. That is an area I am more familiar with, as a former family practitioner, and the principle is similar. I apologise if the language I use to describe the proceedings is slightly out of date; it has been a few years since I practised. A financial dispute resolution hearing is effectively an interim hearing before people get to a final hearing; they are seeking to avoid the final hearing by having a financial dispute resolution hearing. A judge hears the arguments made at that hearing and tries to assist the parties to at least narrow the areas of dispute, or indeed resolve their dispute and come up with an agreement by consent. If consent is not reached at that hearing, the FDR judge will not hear the final hearing, because they have seen things that they cannot unsee and heard things that they cannot unhear. The perception is that the judge has been unable to assist in the settlement, they will be unable to hear an objective final hearing and make a decision.
The principle runs through not just criminal courts and jury trials, but family courts and the civil courts. It is a fundamental principle, in this country, that judge who makes a final decision should be as unclouded as possible by earlier arguments or decisions of a more procedural nature. For those reasons, I support the shadow Minister’s amendment. It would not drive a coach and horses through what the Government want to achieve in the Bill. I have already said that I disagree with a lot of the Government’s intentions, but the Government can still do what they want to do while taking the amendment on board. I hope that they will at least consider accepting some amendments. If not, what is the point of scrutiny of a Bill? What is the point of the process?
Sarah Sackman
Let me begin by making it absolutely clear that the deployment of judicial resource is properly a matter for the independent judiciary. Under proposed new sections 74A to 74D of the Senior Courts Act 1981, judge-alone trials will operate in the existing Crown courts and any judge of the Crown courts will be eligible to sit in the new division. Creating a statutory entitlement to require reassignment following a request of the kind outlined in the amendment would, in the Government’s view, encroach on that judicial responsibility.
Let me be clear that, like the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East, I am firmly of the view that our judiciary are among the best in the world. That is why the Government are prepared to put our faith in them to deliver this reform. They are best placed to determine how and where to deploy their resources.
The amendment implies that, to safeguard fairness and impartiality in our courts, different judges must preside over the allocation decision and the trial. Let me address that concern directly. There is no basis for suggesting that a judge who has made an allocation decision would be unable to approach a trial with full independence and objectivity. We have confidence in our judiciary, who are independent and highly trained, to do so. Judges receive training throughout their careers, including on structured decision making and the fair treatment of court users. They are accustomed to managing complex cases and to ensuring that trials are conducted fairly. That is their job.
What the Bill proposes is consistent with well-established practice. Across our systems in the civil courts, judges routinely make a range of procedural and case management decisions before trial without that depriving them of their impartiality at trial. The Government are committed to upholding the highest standards of justice, which is why we have ensured that the judiciary have the funding that they need to deliver the training and guidance required to support these reforms.
I reassure the Committee, the House at large and the public watching at home that every defendant in the Crown court will receive a fair trial, and that that is not affected by the mode of trial or by the particular judge presiding over the case. In the magistrates court, justices and district judges routinely make decisions about the admissibility of evidence, including bad character evidence, and other preliminary points of law and then go on to determine guilt without any loss of impartiality. In the Crown court, judges already deal with instances of contempt of court that they witness themselves, sometimes those directed at them personally, without being disqualified from continuing to try the case. That position was affirmed by the Court of Appeal only last year.
Requiring a different judge to preside over the trial would encroach on judicial independence and introduce unnecessary complexity and inefficiency to the system without any evidence that such a safeguard is needed. I urge the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I beg to move amendment 19, in clause 3, page 6, line 25, at end insert—
“(4A) A trial conducted without a jury will be heard by one judge and two magistrates.”
This amendment implements the recommendation of the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts to have cases heard in the Crown Court Bench Division by a judge and two magistrates.
Sir Brian Leveson and the Minister, on the many occasions on which we have discussed this issue, have been very clear that the proposals set out in the independent review of the criminal courts were not to be treated as a pick and mix. Sir Brian was clear that it was meant to be a package of reforms, alongside stating that juries are not the cause of the backlog; I want to make sure that that is on the record.
But the Government have indeed chosen to pick and mix from Sir Brian’s recommendations, because he never proposed a judge sitting alone in the Crown court bench division. He proposed including a lay element, with two magistrates sitting with the judge; the magistrates would have equal decision-making authority on matters of fact, evidence and sentencing, while the judge would retain responsibility on rulings of law. The purpose of having two was to enable them to outvote the judge on matters of fact and, importantly, to maintain public participation and legitimacy in the absence of a jury.
Sir Brian referred to that in part 1 of his review. He said:
“In a similar vein, the inclusion of two magistrates in the composition of the bench would also ensure that the CCBD would satisfy the expectation of”
being judged by “one’s peers.” He continued:
“I...will not revisit those arguments here. I do, however want to acknowledge the diversity of the current magistracy, which I believe goes some way to satisfying this expectation and would help ensure a fair and balanced representation in the CCBD.”
The magistracy has done an excellent job of improving its diversity, although one could argue that there is still more work to do. A former Lord Chief Justice, Lord Burnett of Maldon, has said:
“It seems to me that if one is going to reduce the involvement of the general public, as members of a jury, in the relatively low-level cases that go to the Crown court, maintaining public involvement through the magistracy is a good course to follow. It also has the great advantage of simply replicating a constitution and jurisdiction that exists in the Crown court at the moment. When there is an appeal from the magistrates court against conviction or sentence, including an appeal against conviction in an either-way case, it is heard in the Crown court by a judge and two magistrates.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 75, Q159.]
The Government cannot shirk their commitment to fair justice free from bias. If these changes are to be implemented, they should include the safeguard of two magistrates in the Crown court bench division. I would appreciate the Minister’s outlining why the Government have departed from Leveson on the point. Is it because there is a concern about finding enough magistrates to fill the roles? Is it because the magistracy will already be overwhelmed by the additional cases given to it as a result of the new sentencing powers outlined in this Bill? Or is it because the Government believe that having the lay element provides no additional safeguard in the interests of fair justice? Through the amendment, we seek to implement the recommendation of Brian Leveson’s review of the criminal courts.
Joe Robertson
The hon. Member for Chichester has set out the reasoning behind her amendment very well. If the amendment were agreed to, it would not go anywhere near restoring jury trials, but it would plainly be an improvement. The leading argument in its favour is that it is what Sir Brian Leveson recommended. The Government have repeatedly cited Brian Leveson’s review, and rightly so—that is what the Bill flows out of—but as the hon. Member for Chichester says, it cannot be a pick and mix. The Government cannot cite Leveson on the one hand and ignore him on the other.
Quite aside from the fact that the opinion expressed in the independent review has been ignored here, there are objectively good reasons why a trial heard by a judge and two magistrates is preferable to a trial heard by a judge alone. For a start, there would be three decision makers rather than one; with a jury there are 12, but clearly three is better than one. But it is not just a matter of numbers. Magistrates could be viewed, and certainly have been viewed, as a hybrid of jurors and judges. They are not judges, and they are not legally qualified people. They bring the quality that jurors bring—varied life experience—to the decision-making process. Of course, in a magistrates court, they are guided in the law by a legally qualified clerk.
It is fairly obvious that magistrates as a group are less diverse than the population of the United Kingdom, from which jurors are drawn, but at least they represent a greater diversity and variety of experience than judges. Judges all share one thing: they went to law school, they are legally qualified and they have had a career that is privileged—that is not a criticism, but I do not think it is an unfair word to describe a judge’s career. Magistrates have a greater variety of life experience. To bring magistrates into the decision making alongside a judge, as Sir Brian Leveson envisaged, would be to bring at least some element of a jury trial: the quality of being unjaded by a career in law and being unencumbered by the experience of being a well-paid legal professional.
I struggle to support the amendment, because it does not go anywhere near maintaining the system that we have today, but it would at least be a small improvement. It is an obvious point, but judges sit alongside magistrates today; it is a tried, tested and understood approach, not an obscure or novel one. Indeed, appeals are often heard in that way, as I understand it, because there is added rigour in having a magistrate sitting alongside a judge.
Of course, having a judge sitting alongside magistrates is an improvement on having magistrates alone, because judges bring professionalism from their legal training and experience of the law as part of the judiciary. There is a benefit there, although of course the benefit is already delivered by the Government’s own amendment, notwithstanding that it is worse than what we have today.
I commend, or at least understand, what the hon. Member for Chichester is trying to achieve. It comes from a good place, but unfortunately—this is not her fault, but the Government’s—it does not go anywhere near maintaining the status quo, which in my view is plainly greatly preferable both to her amendment and to the Government’s approach.
Dr Mullan
I welcome the opportunity to speak to amendment 19, tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Chichester. As my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East pointed out, this one of those challenging situations; we will not vote for the amendment, because it would indicate that we support or endorse a judge trial with two magistrates as opposed to a jury trial, which is not the case. But it is an extremely helpful probing amendment to point out the broader challenges and weaknesses with the Government’s proposal and the differences we would have seen had they followed the proposal by Sir Brian Leveson.
The amendment also draws close attention to a matter that I have spoken about frequently: the Government’s willingness both to say that great credibility should be placed on the reforms that they are proposing because they have come about as a result of the work of the independent review by Sir Brian Leveson, and at the same time to reject proposals by Sir Brian. When we discussed this matter before, the Minister argued that our concern was not valid because Sir Brian had said in his report that the Government could go further. In my view, it is quite the leap to say of our criticisms that specific proposals lack the authority that Ministers claim because they were not recommended by Sir Brian that the proposals would in fact, in some way, be recommended by him anyway.
While I think it is a weak point, it is probably stronger in relation to the decision by the Government to set the test for removing the jury from a Crown court trial at a sentence length of three years rather than Sir Brian’s recommendation of two years. I do not know whether he would support that—one might think he would have said so if he did—but there are what we might call matters on the continuum, where the prospect of Sir Brian’s suggestion of going further on a continuum of sentence length as the test is somewhat understandable. I do not think that argument is at all viable in relation to the measures relating to amendment 19.
There is a distinct, what we might call, category difference between the recommendation to have a judge sit alone and to have a judge sit with two magistrates. We have discussed a number of the drawbacks of a judge sitting alone compared with having a jury. I will take them in turn. First, there is the question of bias—of concerns raised in relation to different outcomes, for example for women or ethnic minorities. We have discussed this before, but I want to draw attention again to the comments of Geoffrey Robertson KC. He said:
“The determination, by 12 citizens of evidence tested by prosecution and defence, is a surer guide to the right result, reflecting common sense and common values, than the personal view of a judge”.
He also said:
“A diverse jury, usually with a few representatives of ethnic communities, serves as some guarantee of fairness and non-discrimination in dispensing justice.”
We have been leaning very heavily on the Bar, but the Criminal Law Solicitors Association says:
“Jurors, drawn from all elements of society, take jury service very seriously. Our Vice-Chair sat on a jury last year and saw his fellow jurors, without exception, treat the process with the gravity and respect that it deserves. Limiting jury trials reduces public engagement in the process and weakens democratic participation in criminal justice.”
Sir Brian was not the only person tasked to consider in detail proposals for a reform of the courts who has settled on similar views about the decision to reduce jury trials, which, as I have said, we do not support. They have also agreed that a judge with two magistrates is the way to do it. Lord Justice Auld’s 2001 independent review of the criminal courts in England and Wales recommended the creation of a new district division, with a unified criminal court structure designed to handle either-way cases that were too serious for the magistrates but did not require, in his view, a full jury trial. He proposed that the court would consist of a professional judge sitting with two experienced magistrates. He said in his report that there is a
“middle-range of cases that do not warrant the cumbersome and expensive fact-finding exercise of a trial by judge and jury, but which are sufficiently serious or difficult, or their outcome is of such consequence to the public or defendant, to merit a combination of professional and lay judges”.
That was a specific choice to say that there was merit in lay as well as professional judges taking part.
Dr Mullan
This is a great opportunity for me to learn and understand an element of the system that I did not understand—I know about it, rather than understand it.
I will go back to the point that we have made repeatedly. We are designing a system from scratch here. We have the opportunity to do things exactly as we want to. We do not have to be forced into replicating other elements of the wider system; we can design this system as we best think it should operate. I think that the best thing in this scenario, in which we are starting from scratch, would be to say to somebody that they should be able to derive the benefit of having a jury trial if the case is of a nature that the Government themselves agree would typically enjoy the benefits of a jury trial. This is just inherently a fairness question.
That is why we have replicated the process—in a positive way—in a magistrates court. The decision is the decision that has been made; the court cannot go above it. That is because we say that in a magistrates court, if someone seeks to go above that court, that is not the right place to do that; it would not be fair and reasonable. We are making a similar point here in relation to mode of trial, for jury trial.
We think that the amendment is sensible, reasonable, balanced and does not prevent the Government from undertaking their reforms; it is not what could possibly be described as a wrecking amendment. I hope that the Government will reflect on that and accept the amendment.
Joe Robertson
I echo the points made by the shadow Minister. The issue here is where sentences may go above three years. A sentence of three years or more is fairly significant. The crime, of course, will match the sentence; no one is suggesting that the sentence is inappropriate in these cases—someone has been convicted. However, the issue is that the trial—the fact of innocence or guilt—will have been decided by a judge. Without raking over too much old ground, the point in a jury trial is that on more serious offences, jury decides innocence or guilt.
What we have here, without the amendment, is a back-door way for a judge to decide what turns out to be a more serious case than perhaps had originally been thought, because the sentence passed is more than three years. As I understand it, it is not the intention of the Government to capture more cases of that serious nature than they had originally intended would be decided by a judge. They themselves are not arguing that jury trials do not have a place in this country for a great number of cases—unfortunately, not enough after this legislation.
The hon. Member for Rugby made the point in an earlier sitting that other Governments have adjusted the threshold, notwithstanding our disagreement over what is being proposed in this legislation. Clearly, the issue with this provision, if it remains unamended, is that more serious crimes, with a sentence of more than three years, will inadvertently get caught.
I cannot quite understand why the Minister will not accept the amendment, but I am sure she will address that. Once again, it would not, in any material way, move away from what she is trying to achieve with the legislation, which is tackling the backlog of Crown court cases. Again, that intention that is perfectly well meant. The amendment would not, in any way, get rid of her primary intent to get rid of either-way offences so that they are not heard by a jury. Notwithstanding the fact that I do not agree with her on that, the amendment would not defeat what she is trying to do there. Effectively, what it would do is close a loophole.
I invite the Minister to address that point about instances where a judge decides, on their own without a jury, that a case is of significant seriousness—and that may mean complexity that was not apparent at the outset but became apparent during the trial—that he or she wishes to pass a sentence of more than three years. Three years is a serious length of time for someone to be locked up and deprived of their liberty. Wherever we think that the threshold should sit, I think that we all agree that jury trials have a role in this country for more serious crimes.
If the threshold can rise above three years through that avenue, how high a threshold is the Minister willing to tolerate? In how many cases is she willing to tolerate that apparent loophole? Maybe she does not see it as a loophole. Maybe there is purpose behind it. If there is, perhaps she can explain why it is important enough to risk even her principle by having more serious crimes—those with a sentence over three years—potentially being heard without a jury. Again, I reiterate that I disagree with the primary disapplication of jury trials for what are now either-way offences. That is not what this is about; this is about the Bill doing something more than the Government may wish to do. I invite the Minister to address that in some detail.
Sarah Sackman
I will seek, as best I can, to clarify why judges sitting alone should have full Crown court sentencing powers consistent with the recommendations of the independent review of criminal courts. That review made clear that both judge-only trials—where those are prescribed—and a Crown court bench division must operate with the same judicial powers as jury trials if they are to function effectively in practice. As I have said, allocation is an early indicative assessment. It cannot and must not predetermine the sentence, which must be based on the facts proven at trial. The amendment would reverse that principle, effectively allowing an initial assessment allocation to cap the sentence ultimately imposed, or else force a retrial before a jury. That would compound a delay which, as anyone who has listened to victims’ testimonies to the Committee knows, we can ill afford.
Under proposed new section 74A, the allocation decision—whether the case should be tried by a judge alone or by judge and jury—will rely on a structured application of the existing sentencing guidelines. As I have said, we are not introducing an unfamiliar exercise, and we have full confidence that judges will apply the guidelines consistently to determine the appropriate mode of trial based on their assessment of the seriousness of the case.
In practice, the allocation decision in the Crown court will be tied firmly to the facts of the case, in much the same way as in the magistrates court. That means that in the vast majority of cases it is unlikely that a case will result in a sentence far beyond what was anticipated at the point of allocation. However, I recognise that in a small proportion of cases where evidence evolves and a case becomes more serious, appropriate safeguards must be, and will be under the Bill, put in place. That is precisely why the Bill includes provision for a reallocation where circumstances change. Where an indictable-only offence is added to the case, it must always be reallocated as a jury trial.
Where seriousness increases just enough to push the likely sentence in a case above three years, the judges must consider reallocation to jury trail. We have looked at the factors set out in the Bill, including potential delays following reallocation, any disruption to victims or wasted costs, and the effects on other trials. It is therefore essential that judges sitting alone retain the full sentencing powers of the Crown court. Unlimited sentencing powers do not expand the jurisdiction of judge-alone trials, but they ensure that once a case has been properly tried, the sentence imposed reflects the facts as found.
Against that backdrop, amendment 42 would require cases to be retried because the sentence ultimately exceeded the earlier indicative assessment. As I have said, that would introduce significant delay into the system, requiring cases to be heard twice and directly undermining the purpose of these reforms, which is to reduce the dreadful delays. The principle that the sentence must reflect the facts is important, and for that reason it is necessary that judges retain the full sentencing powers. To do otherwise would risk distorting outcomes and create unnecessary duplication and delay in proceedings, thereby undermining confidence in the system. For that reason, the Government cannot support the amendment.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fifth sitting)
Joe Robertson Excerpts(3 months, 4 weeks ago)
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Yasmin Qureshi
I understand that in some of the more simple, routine cases of two or three days, but for trials lasting eight, nine or 10 weeks, I respectfully disagree that judges can come to that judgment in just a few days, because they have to go through a whole load of evidence, comment on it and come to a decision.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
The hon. Member speaks with eloquence and experience. I understand the Minister’s point: she has framed this as simply removing a choice from a defendant, as though this is a benefit that need not exist, but does the hon. Member agree with my analysis that this constitutes the removal of a right rather than a choice—the right to be tried in the Crown court, unless trial in a magistrates court is preferred?
Yasmin Qureshi
I do agree. It is important to remember which offences are kept in the magistrates court. There was discussion on Tuesday about burglaries and other offences making it to a magistrates court. With respect, burglaries have never been reduced to being tried in a magistrates court.
What happened was the way that motor theft offences were tried was tweaked. What used to happen is that people, particularly youngsters, would take away a car and were charged with the theft of a car, but as everybody knows, the definition of theft includes intention to permanently deprive. Those people never had the intention to permanently deprive; they were just taking the car for joyriding, and they were then going to leave it somewhere else.
That is why a new offence was introduced: it was initially called TWOC—taking without owner’s consent—and then it became TDA, or taking and driving away a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner. That offence went down to the magistrates court, because it was seen as a misdemeanour—something that a young person might do—and was not the same as giving someone a theft conviction. We had to make some changes, which were very sensible changes. Look at all the cases being dealt with in magistrates courts at the moment: any charge that goes to the issue of honesty is still either-way or indictable.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting)
Joe Robertson Excerpts(3 months, 4 weeks ago)
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Sarah Sackman
We do think that jury trials are a cornerstone of British justice. It is not inconsistent to say that the most serious cases—all cases in which the likely sentence is above three years—should be heard at a jury trial. If we turn the hon. Gentleman’s argument on its head, everybody should get a jury trial, because otherwise they are not getting a fair trial. We do not think that.
As a society, we have for centuries made a threshold choice about who can access a jury trial. We are having a debate now about where that threshold should be drawn. Our proposals strike the right balance between the rights of the different participants in the system. We think they secure fairness because of the other safeguards in the system—the giving of reasons by a judge in the Crown court bench division and the transparency measures we are bringing in—but we also think they are proportionate use of court resources. The hon. Members for Reigate and for Bexhill and Battle both made the point that somebody getting a criminal conviction in the magistrates court, which may attract a six-month custodial sentence or less, is a pretty serious thing in itself. For some people, that may mean, reputationally, that they can no longer pursue their career. These things are serious.
I do not think any of us is saying that the status quo, whereby magistrates and district judges hear those cases, is not inherently fair. It is fair. What is not fair is the status quo whereby the scale of the delays is detrimental to the quality of justice we are able to provide to the public, whether in jury trials, judge-only trials or magistrates trials. The delays are such that they are undermining law enforcement, the quality and recency of the evidence, and people’s memories. It is undermining the calibre of the justice that the system is able to mete out. Dealing with the delays is not just an efficiency question; it is inherent to the question of fairness itself.
We keep repeating the old adage that justice delayed is justice denied. It is a powerful one because there is truth in it: the older the vintage of the cases, the less fair they become. That is not fair on anybody. It is not fair on the defendant on remand or fair on the complainant. It is not fair on the witness, who may have just had the misfortune of passing by a criminal incident, and is being asked to recall what happened a year or two years ago, when they would like to move on with their lives. When it comes to fairness, timeliness is critical.
Sarah Sackman
I have to make a little progress.
Let me turn to the detail of clause 1. Part of its function is to ensure consistency across the statute book. To ensure consistency in that way, the clause makes a series of consequential amendments to remove references to a defendant electing for a Crown court trial. That includes amendments to the uncommenced written plea and allocations provision inserted by the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022. Those uncommenced written procedures would allow defendants to indicate a plea without attending court. Their inclusion does not signify that the Government are intending to commence them. The clause ensures that if those provisions were brought into force in future, they would operate consistently with the removal of the defendant’s ability to choose the mode of trial. Defendants will still be able to indicate a plea in writing, and both parties may still make representations on venue. That decision on mode of trial would rest with the court.
The clause also updates the remittal power in section 46ZA of the Senior Courts Act 1981. Currently, where a case is already in the court, a judge may remit to the magistrates court only with a defendant’s consent. Clause 1 removes the requirement to obtain that consent, ensuring that remittal decisions, like allocation decisions, are made on the basis of the court’s assessment of suitability.
Joe Robertson
I am not sure to what extent it is relevant, but I should probably declare that I used to be a practising solicitor, regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered with the Law Society.
The Committee dealt with similar issues on the implications for the right of election at some length during the debate on clause 1. Of course, proper time should be devoted to relevant issues in clause 2, but there is a significant overlap. If clause 1 is the constitutional sword that strikes down the right to choose a jury, clause 2 is the mechanism, or at least part of the mechanism, that replaces it. It is the mechanism, its operation in practice and its real-world consequences that I want to examine in some detail.
Clause 2 establishes an allocation framework where there is a written indication of a guilty plea. Under it, courts—acting alone and without the defendant’s consent—decide on a venue. That is made obvious by the substitution of wording, with “objecting” replaced by “make representations”. I have some distinct arguments against clause 2. I will take them in order, and I make no apology for the time that may require. The Committee is being asked to make a decision of constitutional significance without, I will argue, adequate evidence, safeguards, honesty or straightforwardness about its consequences and the extent to which it has been properly examined. That deserves serious scrutiny.
The gateway itself is poorly designed. Let me begin with the mechanism itself; before one can assess the consequences, it is necessary to understand the structure. Under the current law, albeit not yet implemented, the allocation works in two stages: there is a role for the court, a role for the prosecution and a role for the defendants. However, under clause 2, the role for defendants disappears, or perhaps it is more properly described as being watered down until it is no longer a right. The magistrate or the court decide, and that decision is final.
The criteria applied may, and will, take into consideration any representations made by the defendant, but that is not the same as the defendant’s being able to object. The assessment is made on the papers available at the outset; while it is probably not fair to call it an educated guess about how a case will unfold or, in the case of clause 2, how a guilty plea may be pleaded, every experienced practitioner knows that the true seriousness of a case or sentencing becomes apparent as it develops. How a matter looks on the papers can become very different when oral representations are made.
Indeed, the Criminal Bar Association has noted—particularly in reference to clause 1, but it applies to the combined effect of clauses 1 and 2—that the Government’s own impact assessment assumes that cases heard in the magistrates courts under extended sentencing powers will average just four hours, for cases where the likely sentences are approaching 18 months. That is not a serious assumption. Critically, there is also no right of appeal against the allocation decision. Of course, the Government have chosen not to provide one—unfairly, but in my view understandably—because an appeal route would undermine what they are trying to achieve.
We are treating a symptom as though it were the disease itself. Before I turn to the specific failings of the approach in clause 2, I want to spend a moment on context. I think the Government have framed this debate—maybe not deliberately—in a way that obscures the actual problem. The Lord Chancellor has repeatedly said that the Crown court is in a state of emergency, and he is certainly right that it is under very significant pressure; the backlog stood at just under 80,000 cases at the end of September 2025. He has also repeatedly said that a jury trial is a major driver of that emergency. However, at the same time, he has said that, if the backlog is brought under control and reduced, he will not restore the right to elect a jury trial that is being abolished, and the same goes for the complementary provisions in clause 2. Plainly, whether he is right or wrong, he is inconsistent, and it makes no sense.
Alex McIntyre
As a former solicitor, I appreciate the hon. Member’s commitment to being paid at an hourly rate, given the speed of his contribution his afternoon.
One of the points the Secretary of State made in support of this measure at the Dispatch Box was that the changing nature of our criminal justice system and the added demand that will flow through the system in the future, added to the increasing complexity of cases, mean that jury trials are taking longer through the very nature of the additional evidence that is being gathered. That means that even if the immediate backlog is brought under control, there will still be a need for system reform in the long term, because otherwise we will not be able to keep it under control in perpetuity. Why does the hon. Member disagree with that?
Joe Robertson
I should clarify that I no longer get paid on an hourly rate—I am paid by the taxpayer, as the hon. Gentleman is, on the same terms.
I do not reject the argument about reform. I accept that. Sir Brian Leveson was very clear that the complexity of cases, including cases heard in the Crown court by a jury, has increased over the years, but he also said that he does not blame jury trials for the backlog. That is the difference between us. I do not see that the only option available to the Government is to end the election opportunity or the powers and rights of a defendant to select trial by jury or by magistrate.
Dr Mullan
The point was made very powerfully in the evidence sessions that we have this idea that we have to take a lot of time to explain all this complex stuff to a jury, and that we can just skip through it in a rapid way with a judge.
I visited courts and spoke to judges when I was on the Justice Committee. They themselves admit that they are not exactly whizz-kids when it comes to things like artificial intelligence or IT and the sort of things that might be over-complicating cases now. They are not going to be able to just whizz through stuff. They are going to need the same level of detail, explanation and time that a jury would need. Do we think defendants will be satisfied with a prosecution case that does not go through the same level of detail with a judge that it would have to go through with a jury?
We will end up with a whole new world of criminal appeals based on the idea that the judge did not adequately hear the evidence and that his summing up did not adequately address the reasons for his decisions. That could end up taking more time for judges. I am open to the idea that, potentially, we may possibly get some savings, but the case is so flimsy and weak that we cannot be expected to move forward on that basis when there are other things we could do.
Joe Robertson
I agree with my hon. Friend. There is a slightly strange implication that while jury trials have become more complex over time, due to technology and techniques for examining evidence—obviously a good thing—that somehow does not apply if the trial is in the magistrates court. That is the alarm bell, is it not? Magistrates courts are more capable of dealing with things in summary and they will not examine a case in as much detail and may miss things. That is not a criticism of magistrates and of the magistrates court—that is the system we have designed. When the consequences are less serious and the crime is less serious, the examination and process may be naturally less thorough.
That is not a reason to bring cases that today would be heard in the Crown court into the magistrates court without the defendant’s having the right to choose. My hon. Friend articulates that point exactly and represents the concerns that most people have.
In the evidence session, we heard that the current court backlog is the result of many things, including lack of investment—the Minister talked today about the lack of investment, and the issues with recruitment and retention, and criticised the previous Government for caps on sitting days—and the effect of the covid pandemic. The Minister and I might disagree on the extent to which that is true, but none of those things should be cured by abolishing jury trials.
Sarah Sackman
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the 1% to 2% refers to the time savings achieved by the Crown court bench division? The IFG recognised that the totality of the package achieved a 10% saving. The Ministry of Justice’s modelling—externally verified—shows a 20% saving, which is highly material.
Joe Robertson
I accept the Minister’s statement to the extent that it is a statement of fact of people’s evidence. To address the issue of taking cases out of one court to give to another, however: that is a small minority of cases. Indeed, that is the argument that the Government make, certainly to their own Back Benchers when they are worried about the Back-Bench view of their proposals: “Don’t worry. Most cases are heard in the magistrates court anyway, and only a tiny percentage are being taken out of the Crown court.” The Government cannot have the argument both ways: when speaking to their own Back Benchers, “Don’t worry, this is not going to be meaningful,” and when speaking to the rest of the world about tackling backlogs, saying that that in itself is a meaningful change.
Dr Mullan
What does not bear up to much scrutiny is for the Minister to say, “Actually, the package as a whole will deliver these major reforms,” because we do not object to the whole package. We can say, “Go ahead and do the things that we do not object to, and we will have violent agreement at later stages in the Bill.” The Government cannot hold over us the fact that we agree with some of the package, because that is not a reason for us to go along with the things that we do not like. That is part of the whole process of parliamentary scrutiny of a Bill—the bits that we do or do not like. We are not removed from commenting positively about the good stuff because we disagree with other things.
Joe Robertson
Once again, I agree with the shadow Minister. If the Government genuinely want to address the backlog, the answer lies in the other 179 recommendations that Sir Brian Leveson made: increasing sitting days, which the Government have now done in a modest way; improving case management; removing unnecessary adjournments; rebuilding or restructuring the legal profession; sustainable legal aid; and a whole list of recommendations. None of that requires the—in my view—brutal axe taken against the right of election to jury trial. In fact, it is more than a brutal axe; jury trial is just being denied for an either-way offence That is being restricted to the magistrates court.
I now turn to what I consider the most serious argument against the clause, which is an uncomfortable one. It has been referred to already in debate on clause 1, but it is relevant to clause 2 as well. The venue to which all relevant cases we are discussing will be diverted is the magistrates court, which produces—measurably, consistently and substantially—worse outcomes for defendants from ethnic minority backgrounds than the Crown court does. That is not a theoretical proposition or a position of advocacy; it is the statistical evidence and the documented finding of researchers, legal practitioners and analysis drawing on Government data. Magistrates courts convict people from ethnic minority backgrounds at rates up to 40% higher than non-ethnic minority defendants. That is not a small or debatable margin; it is a significant consideration.
Albeit to make a slightly different point, the hon. Member for Chichester mentioned that if someone has a clean record they would be tried in the magistrates court, but if they had a list of previous offences they may be tried on the same facts in the Crown court, where conviction rates are lower. Having previous convictions therefore puts someone into a venue with lower conviction rates. I am not suggesting that the Government have designed the measure in that way, but it is plainly nonsense and unacceptable for that to come about. The Government need to look at that and amend it.
Charities have responded to Sir Brian’s proposals and have provided further granular data. In Crown court jury trials, people of colour are convicted at broadly similar rates to their white counterparts. It is not hard to see why: the principle—the whole idea—behind a decision being made by someone’s peers is that juries reflect the country in which we live. Magistrates and professional judges are predominantly whiter, more educated and more male than the population at large. It is interesting to note, but is not a criticism, that this Committee itself is evidently less diverse not only than juries, but than the population at large. A defendant from an ethnic minority background charged with an either-way offence this week has a right to elect. They can look at the data—thank goodness we have that data—take advice from their legal representatives and make a considered choice about the venue in which they believe they are most likely to receive fair treatment. I would suggest, without quoting evidence, that a number of them elect the Crown court because they believe they will get a fairer trial—because they are more likely to have their fate at least partly decided by someone who shares something of their own background and lived experience.
Let me address the Government’s response to this evidence, which has been inadequate. The Lord Chancellor—who, as he has reminded this House, knows the experience of racial disparity personally and profoundly, and has long spoken about it throughout and before his time in this place—has argued that progress is being made. He has cited the figure that 21% of judges now come from an ethnic minority background. I welcome the progress that has been made, particularly in the judicial system, but that still does not compare to the fairness and legal principle of trial by jury.
I want to put the constitutional point more plainly. Parliament is being asked to pass a provision that it knows, on the basis of evidence submitted to its own Committee, will produce racially differentiated outcomes. The Government have seen that evidence. Ministers have been questioned on it at length, and the Bill has not been amended to address it, but it must be. If a different Government Department proposed a policy that its own evidence showed would increase adverse outcomes for ethnic minority applicants by, in this case, up to 40%, what would we say? We would say it is discriminatory and grossly unacceptable. We would demand it be withdrawn pending a full equality impact assessment. We would not pass it on a Government Whip. This is the standard I invite the Committee to apply here. The fact that the discrimination operates through an allocation mechanism in the criminal courts, or in some cases through an administrative form, does not change its nature or its effect. The test is the outcome, not the intention. No one is suggesting the Government intend this, but it is the outcome and the outcome is documented.
The racial disparity in outcomes does not exist in a vacuum. It is connected causally, not merely coincidentally, to a documented and persistent deficit in judicial diversity. In 2019, 12% of magistrates were from a BME background, which compares to an 18% share of the general population. The magistrates do not reflect the country that they are being asked to judge in the same way as a jury do.
I turn to the argument that the legal aid threshold will leave defendants unrepresented when making their plea in sentencing. That is a further systemic consequence of clause 2. The means test for legal aid differs, of course, between the two tiers of court, as we have heard. In the Crown court the threshold is more generous. Defendants in a wider income range qualify for representation at public expense. In the magistrates court the threshold is lower and less generous. Many defendants who would qualify for legal aid in the Crown court may not qualify for it in the magistrates court. Under clause 2, a significant cohort of defendants who previously had a right to elect, and with it the more generous legal aid provision, will find themselves in the magistrates court facing charges and sentencing that could result in a sentence of 18 months, or ultimately 24 months, without adequate legal representation. The Institute for Government has flagged this explicitly. Because of the low-income threshold to qualify for legal aid in the magistrates court, many more defendants are likely to go unrepresented or under-represented, and an unrepresented defendant in serious criminal proceedings is not a defendant receiving fair justice.
There is a cruel irony in the Government’s framing of the issue. Ministers argue that one problem with the current system is that defendants elect a Crown court to delay proceedings and therefore game the system. But why would a defendant in a serious case choose the Crown court? Often precisely because they know that in the Crown court they are more likely to have or to be able to afford a lawyer, and in the magistrates court they may not. The election is not a game. It is part of a system that has stood for a very long time. It is a rational response, in this case, to a legal aid system that is itself under severe pressure.
Alex McIntyre
The hon. Member is giving a rather elongated speech this afternoon, which we are all enjoying. On the subject of the Criminal Bar Association, I seem to recall it rallying against the removal of the ancient right of double jeopardy, which it said would deny people a fair trial and ruin our criminal justice system. I am pretty sure his party was in favour of that removal back in the noughties. Those predictions have not transpired; it actually led to justice, for example, for Stephen Lawrence. Does he agree that the CBA may be wrong in some of its views?
Joe Robertson
I thank the hon. Member for paying attention to my speech and staying with me on this. Fairly obviously, I do not think that the Criminal Bar Association is always right, but I do in this case.
The Institute for Government published “Beyond reasonable doubt?” on the day of Second Reading. Its conclusions were stark: the reforms risk prioritising speed over fair justice; the projected savings remain highly uncertain; a 10% to 15% increase in demand on the magistrates court will be difficult to manage in practice; and the structural reforms are likely to impede attempts to improve productivity and could make the situation worse in the short to medium term. That is not the view of lawyers protecting their professional interests; it is the view of independent public governance researchers.
The Law Society has raised concerns about the retrospective application of the provisions, the fundamental unfairness of removing trial rights from defendants who have already elected under existing rules, and the prospects for those with cases already listed. It has also raised concerns about the legal aid means test misalignment, proportionality and cases involving children, as well as the potential unworkability of fraud provisions.
I submit that the burden of proof in this debate does not lie with those opposing the Bill, when the entire criminal law profession, leading independent think-tanks, retired judges and KCs have come out so united in their strength of opposition. Indeed, when the Government are looking to tear up centuries-old principles, whether in whole or in part—depending on how we analyse the crimes that will no longer be allowed to proceed to the Crown court—the burden of proof must surely be on the Government to explain why they are all wrong. That explanation, in my view, has not been provided.
John Slinger (Rugby) (Lab)
Does the hon. Gentleman acknowledge that previous Governments of all political colours have changed the threshold for jury trials, including those of Jim Callaghan and Margaret Thatcher? It is not entirely accurate to say, in the way that he did, that it is the tearing up of centuries-old rights; Governments periodically look at the threshold for access to jury trial.
Joe Robertson
Of course, the Minister made that point—in her view, this is about thresholds. Whether we want to call it an argument about thresholds, and whichever part of history we want to look at, the Opposition’s fundamental point remains. There is a distinct lack of evidence for this Government’s plans today, set against the range of other provisions that could be, and in some cases have been, introduced. In our view, they have not been given the time to bed in and potentially deliver the savings that the Government want. I accept the hon. Member for Rugby does not accept that, but I think that is the point of contention here.
Dr Mullan
I covered all the statistics on the reforms that the hon. Member for Rugby mentioned this morning. The scale of these changes, compared with the scale of those changes, is absolutely unprecedented. There has never been a reduction in jury trials of the scale before us today. In support of the point being made by my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East, the burden of proof must become higher and higher as the change being made gets bigger and bigger. This change is unprecedented, so let us have an unprecedented level of evidence to support it before asking us to consider it.
Joe Robertson
I agree with the shadow Minister, and I really have nothing to add—his words stand for themselves.
John Slinger
The shadow Minister states that the reforms proposed by this Government are unprecedented. Actually, the reforms of the Callaghan Government removed jury trials for theft, burglary, actual bodily harm and certain drug offences in 1977, and the Thatcher Government did the same in 1988 for criminal damage. Those are quite substantial changes, so I object to what I believe is hyperbolic language that some Opposition Members have used not only in Committee today but more widely. It undermines public confidence in the judicial system.
Joe Robertson
In an attempt to resolve a debate that is not immediately mine, I will give way to the shadow Minister.
Dr Mullan
It would assist the Committee to know why we are making these comparisons. I have figures on the effect of the reclassification of criminal offences in the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which is one of the examples that the hon. Member for Rugby used in order to say that we are unfairly comparing the categorisations.
Let us bear in mind that the changes before us today will result in a 50% reduction in jury trials. According to the Home Office statistics bulletin, which provides a summary of the effect of those changes for comparison, that legislation resulted in a 5% decline. The Government are asking us to support something that will lead to a 50% decline, yet the hon. Gentleman says that we are being hyperbolic in comparing the two and saying that one is insignificant and the other is significant. I think the difference between 5% and 50% is pretty significant.
Joe Robertson
I thank the shadow Minister. I am probably not in a position to arbitrate between the two arguments; the hon. Member for Rugby will have to forgive me, as I come from the starting position that I back the shadow Minister, not least because he was wielding a particularly substantial file when he just spoke.
I want to address a provision that is not the immediate subject of this grouping, but which fundamentally determines the significance of clause 2—the reform of appeal rights from the magistrates court contained in clause 7. Currently, a defendant convicted in the magistrates court has an automatic right of appeal to the Crown court. That right is exercised in approximately—
Linsey Farnsworth
On a point of order, Ms Butler. I seek guidance on how we get back to clause 2, because we have veered off significantly from it. Clause 2 relates to provisions that have not yet come into force but could well come into force in the future, specifically in relation to how cases could proceed from the magistrates court to the Crown court by way of written submissions. The idea behind that provision was to avoid the need for a court hearing if everybody agreed. How can we get back on to clause 2, because I fear we are veering significantly away from what it is trying to do?
Joe Robertson
Thank you, Ms Butler, and I will of course stick to clause 2. I welcome any challenge that a specific point that I have made does not relate to clause 2. There is possibly a slight lack of clarity across the whole Committee, and I do not profess to be the only expert in the room; indeed, I am not an expert. However, I echo the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate that there seems to be a distinct lack of clarity about what clause 2 does. I am not suggesting that the Minister does not know, and I welcome an intervention if she feels that I need to be brought back into scope in this part of the debate.
Clause 2 specifically replaces automatic rights with a permission stage. When clauses 2 and 7 are combined, a defendant who believes they have been wrongly convicted must first persuade a Crown court judge that their appeal has sufficient merit before it is even heard. The Government argue that the 41% success rate shows that meritorious appeals will get through, but in my view, that misses the point.
The Law Society has identified precisely why the current simple route matters. A significant proportion of defendants in the magistrates court do not have a lawyer. As I have argued, under clause 2 more of them are likely to be unrepresented. Owing to the misalignment of legal aid means testing, an unrepresented defendant who has been wrongly convicted will surely be less likely to know how to draft grounds of appeal. They will not be able to identify legal errors that may appear in magistrates’ reasoning or decisions in the same way. As I understand it, they will also not be able to commission a transcript of proceedings in the same way and construct a submission that meets the permissions test. The permission stage is, in practice, a barrier that falls disproportionately on those least equipped to overcome it.
The opposition to the clause is broad and has not been answered. In some cases, the opposition is expert; in others, it comes through lived experience. I will briefly look at the range and weight of expert opposition to the provisions, some of which I have referred to already, because the Committee should understand— I am sure it does—what it is seeking to perhaps have regard to but set aside if it passes clause 2.
As we have heard, the Criminal Bar Association represents more than 4,000 practising criminal barristers. In answer to an earlier intervention, I do not say that the Criminal Bar Association’s word must be final, but it is clearly heavily persuasive, especially on this issue, which has already faced much scrutiny and disagreement from people with particular expertise in the field of criminal justice. As we have heard, its snap survey—so that is individual members, rather than the association—found that around 90% of members are against the proposals.
Sarah Sackman
I do not want to interrupt the hon. Gentleman because he is making important points, but the point was well made a moment ago that in line-by-line scrutiny the intent is to go line by line. Clause 2 deals with making what were uncommenced online procedures consistent with the changes made in clause 1 to the current ability of a defendant to choose venue. The hon. Gentleman is making a wide-ranging speech on whether one can appeal the mode of trial decision, and the permission to appeal. That will come later when we get to clause 7. I venture that these are all valid points that we will want to debate, but that might be the appropriate place to discuss those matters, because right now we are looking at clause 2. I am happy to reclarify the points I made in relation to clause 2, but if we range on to clause 7 in the scope of clause 2, we are not going to get the line-by-line scrutiny that we all want to achieve.
Joe Robertson
I thank the Minister for rather politely encouraging me to come towards the end of my speech. I will finish by addressing the idea that somehow, because something does not happen in Scotland, it must be okay not to happen in England. That plainly has nothing to do with politics or even football—not that I am suggesting the Minister thought it did. I am happy to say, as a proud citizen of the United Kingdom, that I think the English and Welsh legal system is the best in the world. The common-law system is the foundation, it has been adopted all around the world, and is by far the most widely-used legal system. It is possibly our greatest export, along with the English language.
Sarah Sackman
While I am very proud of our legal system, I do not necessarily take the view that ours is best and we cannot learn from other systems. Indeed, some of the places that we have exported to, such as Canada, are the places that we are looking to learn from when seeking to ameliorate our own system. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that, with its strong foundations, one of the strengths of our system is our fiercely independent judiciary? Much has been said about the judiciary, but does he agree that it is a fundamental pillar of our outstanding legal system and we should seek to defend it—and when judges are called enemies of the people, we should call it out?
Joe Robertson
I am very happy to say that I agree with all the things the Minister said. I also agree with learning from other systems. Plainly, the English legal system, like the English language, has been successful in its ability to adapt and evolve. Without going back to the beginning of my speech, started just a few minutes ago, for the reasons I have set out, I believe that this is an evolution—or arguably a revolution. [Interruption.] Was that another intervention? I think these measures are a stage too far.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I would like to briefly refer the Committee to some remarks that Sir Brian Leveson made during the evidence session we had before the recess. He said:
“We need people to confront what they have done. I do not want anybody to plead guilty who is not guilty and has seen the evidence. I am not asking to change the guilty plea rate, but in the early days, you pleaded guilty on the first or the second occasion you appeared at the Crown court—now there are many examples of that happening on the fifth or the sixth occasion you are in the Crown court. Each one of those takes a considerable amount of time. That is what is sucking up part of the time.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 8, Q9.]
Sir Brian tried to explain that a lot of people look at the evidence and say, “Yes, I will plead guilty, but I will do so after Christmas”—that was his example. He said that now, because of the Crown court backlogs, people know that their case will not be heard until 2028.
The point that Sir Brian was trying to make is that we need to incentivise those who look at the evidence of their case, and recognise that a guilty verdict is probably going to be arrived at, to put in a guilty plea. Does clause 2 not risk having the reverse effect? People will see that if they put in a guilty plea, the one opportunity they have to argue whether the case should be heard in a magistrates court or a Crown court—although I imagine the majority of them would argue that it should be heard in the magistrates court in this specific example—is taken away from them. Are we not then disincentivising people to put in a guilty plea at an early stage, when we want to see the Crown court backlog come down?
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting)
Joe Robertson Excerpts(3 months, 4 weeks ago)
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Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
If the situation the courts find themselves in is so obviously caused by the previous Government, why on earth is the hon. Member’s Government scrapping jury trials as a response?
Yasmin Qureshi
The restriction on some cases not being tried in jury trials is because the Government feel that that will help to bring down the delay in court listing. I say to the Government that the problem is not the jury system, but the fact that other provisions need to be made sufficient. I am afraid that the problem was 14 years of Conservative cuts—I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman was a Member then. The Conservative Government did not take the Ministry of Justice seriously. There was a Lord Chancellor virtually every year—in 14 years, I think we had 10 Lord Chancellors, which tells us how important the criminal justice system was to the now Opposition.
To go back to my point about clause 1, and all the other clauses that follow, I urge my colleagues and the Minister to please rethink this whole thing. Juries are not the cause of the delay in our system.
Rebecca Paul
My hon. Friend makes a very good point. I completely agree with him, and I remind the Committee that most people in this country are against these changes. Most people who know about the justice system are against the changes—[Interruption.] I know it is really hard for Labour Members to hear that they are not on the side of the people on this one. How has it all gone wrong? They have forgotten who they are and who they represent. It is a sad day.
Joe Robertson
This is an extraordinary exchange. I accept that the hon. Member for Amber Valley is not the official voice of the CPS or of the Labour Government, but her sense of “officialdom knows best” will give ordinary men and women in this country great concerns about these changes. Of course, there are some cases in which there is no victim. There are some cases in which the victim is a person who has been falsely accused. That is why we have a legal system in which the ordinary men and women of this country are judged by their peers. That is the principle that is up for debate here—not some wider official view from a prosecuting organisation, rather than the courts.
Rebecca Paul
I thank my hon. Friend for that point; he makes it eloquently, as always.
I really enjoyed going through the groups that do not support these proposals. Obviously, the Government like to rely heavily on Sir Brian Leveson’s findings and recommendations, but when my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East questioned him in the oral evidence session, he did not blame jury trials.
Fundamentally, jury trials are not the problem. They are not creating the delays, so limiting them will not address the backlog. In fact, their curtailment will likely bring a whole host of other issues to the table that were not there before. The Bar Council believes that the changes
“will produce serious adverse consequences that have not properly been considered by the Government.”
In the light of such uncertain outcomes, I find it difficult to understand why the Government will not perform a pilot first to test the proposal or put in place a time limitation more generally. To plough ahead in this way, with no way back in the event of failure, is reckless by any measure. A more cautious approach might have been more positively received.
As we heard from Kirsty Brimelow KC, the chair of the Bar Council, it is vital that we approach the backlog problem logically, look at where the delays are occurring and target them. For rape cases, the majority of the delay is actually at the investigation and charge point, which takes an average of two years. Although the one-year delay at court stage is too long, the lion’s share of the problem is pre-court—perhaps the CPS can help with that one—so let us deal with that.
The Government should open all the courts so that they can hear cases every day. Yesterday, 11% of Crown courts were not sitting, and I am sure we will find out later what the percentage is today. Revising the contract with Prisoner Escort and Custody Services to ensure that defendants are delivered to the dock on time would also help. Giving proper consideration to specialist rape and serious sexual offences courts to deal with sexual offence cases and addressing the many inefficiencies and delays in the system through a better use of technology would no doubt greatly reduce the backlog.
It is also important that we give the steps that the Government have already taken to address the backlog an adequate chance to filter through. One example is increased sitting days: in February 2026, the Justice Secretary announced that there would be no cap on sitting days for ’26-27, which will undoubtedly help.
In addition, last month, powers were granted to suspend custodial sentences of up to three years, a change from the previous two years. Putting aside whether that is a sensible measure, it will undoubtedly increase the number of guilty pleas. That means fewer trials and a decrease in the backlog. The Government should properly model the impact of those significant changes on the backlog before imposing such a draconian limitation on jury trials. I would be grateful if the Minister could share any projections of the impact of those two changes on the backlog and clarify whether they have been factored into the “do nothing” option of the impact assessment. It looks as though they might not have been included, because they are not referenced.
If clause 1 is accepted, there are several types of serious cases where the defendant might now lose their right to elect for trial by jury. It has been suggested by the Justice Secretary that only cases involving minor offences, such as stealing a bottle of whisky, will be impacted, but that is not the case. Let us start with causing death by careless driving. That is a serious offence—rightly so, given that a life has been lost—and it carries a maximum five-year sentence and driving disqualification. Currently, the defendant has the right to elect for trial by jury. That is especially important in such cases, where the difference between careless and unfortunate is not entirely clear.
It is exactly that type of case where we see the benefit of 12 individuals, all with different experiences, using their judgment to decide whether the defendant crossed the line into “careless”. Under clause 1, that right is no longer available; the judge will decide on their own. Imagine a defendant who is innocent. Their whole life, and that of their family, is to be decided by one person—their bad day can destroy the defendant’s entire life. Their case might not even make it to a judge; it could remain in the magistrates court. Surely the intention was never for our magistrates courts to hear cases involving the loss of a life.
Sexual assault is another serious offence. It carries a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment and inclusion on the sex offenders register. It is also completely life-changing for everyone involved. Under clause 1, the defendant’s right to choose a jury trial will be removed. Many of those cases could end up in the magistrates courts, but they are nothing like the normal cases seen in magistrates courts day to day: they are highly sensitive and complex, involving third-party disclosure, and video recorded and forensic evidence. They are not simple add-ons to what those courts already do. With the best will in the world, they do not currently have the capability or skillset to handle such specialist cases involving traumatised victims.
Sarah Sackman
I am not sure who to give way to, but I will give way first to the hon. Lady—I will try to be as fair as I can.
Sarah Sackman
Let me just finish the point on clause 1, if I may. As I was saying in answer to a colleague’s question, the approach here on clause 1 and the approach to these structural reforms is pragmatic, driven by the necessity to bring down these backlogs, following the central insight of the IRCC; but the approach in clause 1 to remove the ability of the defendant to insist on their choice is also a principled one. We heard in Committee from crime victims—I think I am using that word appropriately in that context—that the ability of the defendant to insist on their mode of trial, notwithstanding the seriousness of the offence, in their view tilted the balance excessively towards defendants’ rights to drive the criminal justice process. In a criminal court, the Crown is on one side, represented by the prosecution, and the defendant is on the other. The complainant, who may turn out to be a victim of crime, is not represented. In this scenario—in keeping with other jurisdictions such as Scotland—it seems that the right to have the defendant drive the process, irrespective of the proportionality or the suitability of that mode of trial, is in principle an odd design choice.
Joe Robertson
It seems that the Minister has perhaps momentarily forgotten that the entire legal system in this country is tilted in favour of the defendant. The defendant is innocent until the prosecution makes its case, and it cannot just make a good case, because the case has to be beyond reasonable doubt. The whole system is tilted in favour of the defendant, and rightly so. It is slightly strange to hear her use the argument that the defendant should not have freedom and liberty to elect when they are innocent people until convicted—and many of them are never convicted.
Sarah Sackman
I am well versed in how our legal system works. I am well versed in the principle of the idea of innocent until proven guilty, and the criminal standard of proof. That is all important, as are the other safeguards that this reform system would retain. However, I make no apologies for the approach that we take in reforming this system, which, as I have said, is not just driven by necessity and pragmatism but by principle, and for the case repeated by myself and the Deputy Prime Minister—that we are a Government who will centre victims of crime. I also make no apologies for the investment we make in victim support services, or for the recalibration we are making in terms of how mode of trial is determined. Determining mode of trial is driven not just by the severity of cases, by creating an objective test to be applied by the courts, but the pursuit of timeliness. Timeliness, by the way, helps not only complainants and victims of crime but those accused of crime. If I were accused of a crime, I would want to clear my name as quickly as possible, so timeliness helps everybody across the criminal justice system.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Second sitting)
Joe Robertson ExcerptsWednesday 25th March 2026
(4 months, 2 weeks ago)
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Linsey Farnsworth
Having been a Crown prosecutor for 21 years, I find it very disturbing that you take that view.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
Q
Samantha Hillas: I have not made the arrangements for who is attending, so I do not find it odd. Whoever has been asked to attend is attending. I can talk a little bit about the repeal of the presumption—
Joe Robertson
Q
Samantha Hillas: I am not quite sure I understand the question, so I will answer it like this. From the practitioner perspective, we have always found the insertion of the presumption fairly odd, because it goes without saying that it is usually in children’s best interest to have a relationship with both parents. Where there are circumstances in which it is not safe for a child to have a relationship with both parents, the child’s welfare is protected and is paramount under section 1(1) of the Children Act 1989.
The insertion of section 1(2A) into that Act in 2014 came on the back of quite a lot of protest and demonstration by certain pressure groups for the amendment to be made, to try to promote a presumption of involvement that really is tacitly always there. For practitioners, it was probably something of an otiose insertion. The difficulty with it is that even though a review has demonstrated that it has not been the basis for judgments—the welfare principle has not been subordinate to it; the welfare principle has still been paramount—it has created a sort of pro-contact culture.
You have to remember that when it came in, that coincided with basically the eradication of legal aid in family cases. Even though lawyers would advise that the welfare principle is paramount, if you are a litigant in person without the funds to afford legal fees, you might read that presumption and read a pro-contact culture into it, and might then be agreeing to situations that are not safe for a child.
I have not answered your question, but—I am sorry that this is taking quite a long time—practitioners thought that it was a fairly redundant insertion, and it is sensible for it to be repealed.
Joe Robertson
Q
Samantha Hillas: Yes. Well, there is a presumption that a child’s best interests would be served, as I said in the first place, by having a relationship with both parents. It is only where there would be a risk to that child that there would not be involvement.
John Slinger (Rugby) (Lab)
Q
Claire Davies: Of course they are going to view it with concern—it is common sense that anyone would be concerned—but we need to have the opportunity, which we have not been given, to demonstrate that in fact it will not reach that high with the measures that we support.
Efficiency in our system has long been lacking, despite repeated efforts, and this Government have shown that they will invest, and substantial investment is what is needed. We are not afraid of change—we make that absolutely clear. A lot more use could be made of technology in our courts; remote courtrooms could take the shorter hearings away from the trial courts so that they can concentrate on what they should be doing and have the full use of a court day to maximise that.
It is a combination of features in the trial, but the matters that we have proposed—you heard this morning, as well, that we encourage the use of specialised courts—would have a dramatic impact. You have to remember that new sentencing provisions came into force on 22 March, and we believe that they will also have a dramatic impact on the current caseload. The ability to give suspended sentences for a longer period of up to three years will have an impact, as will efficiency measures and, most importantly, the investment that the Government have made in relation to uncapped sitting days. All of that, combined, will have a dramatic impact, to the point that losing, or curtailing, the right to jury trial—because we are not losing it completely. We make that clear and accept it. We say that it is not necessary to lose the legitimacy that juries bring to our court system.
The judiciary have made great strides in their diversity, but they are still not representative of the communities they serve. The equalities statement makes clear the way that people elect those of different ethnic backgrounds. Given all of that combined, we would urge that clauses 1 to 7, which deal with repealing or restricting the right to a jury trial under certain circumstances, are not brought into force. There are many more ways in which action can be taken.