Remembrance Day: Armed Forces

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Tuesday 11th November 2025 Commons Chamber

[Al Carns]

The right hon. Member makes an interesting point. I want to be clear and concise: of all days, today is a day of remembrance and is not about political point scoring. There is a debate scheduled on Thursday when we can discuss the issue in detail. I would very much welcome a discussion with the individuals who sent the letter, as would the Defence Secretary and others, to talk through the issues, to provide balance to the argument, to ensure that we protect our country and our armed forces from lawfare, and to ensure that they are represented and their voices heard.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

I want to return to the point about commemoration. Having served before, I remember that when I got elected back in 1992, we were not allowed to wear uniforms in public because of the IRA threat at the time, and bit by bit commemorations were no longer attended. I remember my first commemoration in Chingford; we were lucky if 100 people turned out. May I say that that has been reversed? One good example is that on Sunday at the memorial in Chingford, nearly 2,000 people turned up to commemorate those who have fallen and those who went before. Is that not a very good example of how the next generation sometimes understands commemoration better than my generation did?

[Al Carns]

What a welcome intervention. I was stood with veterans during the Cenotaph march-past; it always astounds me that we stand there with 10,000 people, and as the guns fire, there is complete silence in one of the busiest capitals in the world. It is a sombre but hugely humble experience. It is an absolute pleasure to see and hear all the amazing stories of almost every constituency around this great nation, standing together united to celebrate those individuals who served or are serving, their families and the bereaved.

While we often focus on the individuals who have been lost, we must remember those who have been left behind—the mothers, the fathers, the brothers, the sisters, the partners, the wives and the husbands who, after one of those traumatic events, all need to adapt to a new way of life. We need to remember them all and acknowledge that while their loved ones perhaps paid the ultimate sacrifice, it is not just the individual who serves, but the whole family—and they often suffer in silence long after the event.

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[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

It is a privilege to open this debate for His Majesty’s Opposition on 11 November, Armistice Day—a date on which the nation pauses and gives thanks for the sacrifice of our armed forces so that we can live in a free country.

It is a pleasure to follow the Minister for the Armed Forces, and I endorse his comments about the value of our armed forces and the vital role they play in the nation’s contribution to remembrance. We all thank them for their service. The Minister rightly paid tribute to the operational role of our armed forces, which remain as vigilant as ever around the clock to keep us safe in the 21st century. Nevertheless, perhaps he will forgive me if in my contribution I too take something of a historical perspective on the vital role that our armed forces have played in the defence of our nation down the years.

I was privileged to attend the Royal British Legion festival of remembrance last Saturday evening, which remains as moving an occasion as when I first attended as an MOD Minister over a decade ago. I pay tribute to the extremely valuable role that the Royal British Legion plays in both shaping our whole concept of remembrance and in supporting our veterans, some 2 million or so of whom are still living today. As well as the national commemorations, including those at the Cenotaph, the Royal British Legion, often supported by local armed forces personnel, plays a vital role in organising services at a community level in all our constituencies, up and down the length and breadth of the United Kingdom.

In my experience, every community tends to do remembrance slightly differently to account for local circumstances, but each ceremony has common elements with which we are all familiar: the emotive playing of the “Last Post”, the two-minute silence and, usually, the famous epitaph from the 2nd Infantry Division memorial—universally known as the Kohima epitaph—with those famous and stirring words:

“When you go home, tell them of us and say,

For your tomorrow, we gave our today.”

The battle of Kohima, brilliantly described in Field Marshal the Viscount Slim’s 1956 book, “Defeat into Victory”—arguably one of the best books ever written on the whole concept of generalship—was a classic example of a dogged defence by British and, crucially, Commonwealth forces in stopping the attempted Japanese advance into India in mid-1944. Indeed, the dogged, stubborn defence—often against superior odds—is a recurrent feature of British military tradition: including the English archers at Agincourt; the great siege of Gibraltar; Wellington’s army at Waterloo; the 24th Foot at Rorke’s Drift, which saw 11 Victoria Crosses awarded, the most ever awarded in a single action; “the few” of Fighter Command in the battle of Britain, to whom the Minister also referred; the Royal Navy escorting the Atlantic convoys; the Glorious Glosters at the Imjin river in Korea; and many more besides, including more recently in the middle east.

There are, of course, many comparable examples from the first world war, not least the stand of the British Expeditionary Force at Mons and the subsequent first battle of Ypres. Anyone who has stood at the Menin Gate when the buglers of the Ypres fire brigade play the “Last Post”, as it swirls around that famous arch, knows that it is a truly moving and emotive ceremony to behold.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

My right hon. Friend has mentioned Bill Slim, who many who know history will say was probably the greatest allied general of the war—it was brilliant what he achieved with next to nothing. Does my right hon. Friend agree that there was something very special about the 14th Army, which comes out in other accounts? Apart from just fighting, there were both Indian and British members of the 14th. They served in the same slit trenches and ran to aid each other; regardless of race or anything else, they delivered for each other. The most remarkable bit of the story of the 14th was that it did not matter who they were or where they came from, they were as one against the tyranny of the Japanese.

[Mr Francois]

I completely agree with my right hon. and gallant Friend—the history of the 14th Army is a proud one. It was a marvellous amalgam, under a brilliant leader, of people from countries and races from around the entire Commonwealth who fought with one common aim: freedom. They were sometimes called the forgotten army, but they are not forgotten tonight.

After the horrors of the trenches and an understandable aversion to war in the 1920s, with Britain exhausted—both financially and emotionally—by the horrors of the great war, the Government of the day introduced what came to be known as the 10-year rule. This was not just the policy of the War Office or the Admiralty, as they then were; it was a pan-Whitehall edict, the essence of which was that Britain would not have to fight another major war for at least 10 years. This key planning assumption became the centrepiece of British strategic theory and, with strong endorsement from the Treasury, the 10-year rule soon became a rolling one, extended on an annual basis. Given that no war was expected for at least a decade, this allowed for major economies in the financing of the armed forces and an associated running-down of all three services. As one example of how seriously the 10-year rule was taken and implemented, even Winston Churchill during his time as Chancellor of the Exchequer in the 1920s exerted pressure to cut back on his beloved Royal Navy—the same service he had fought tenaciously to expand as First Lord of the Admiralty barely a decade before.

Indeed, as a mood of pacifism gripped the nation, in 1933—the same year in which Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany—the earnest students of the Oxford Union, who are having their own problems at the moment, passed a motion by a majority of over two to one that

“this House will under no circumstances fight for its King and country”.

The subsequent policy of appeasement from the 1930s British establishment—the blob of their day—was as erroneous then as it would be today. Authoritarian dictators tend to admire strength, particularly their own, and despise weakness—a lesson that any British Government, including this one, would do well to remember. History tells us again and again that the appeasement of dictators does not work, just as it failed to work in the 1930s

The 10-year rule, which by that stage had lasted well over a decade, was eventually rescinded in 1935-36 as Britain began to rearm in response to Hitler’s increasingly bellicose behaviour. Nevertheless, that rearmament, and comparable action by our allies, was ultimately insufficient to deter what then became the second world war—a brutal conflict in which over 50 million people died, far more even than had perished in the supposed war to end all wars some two decades before.

I mention all this not just because I studied history and then military history at university, but because if—as Members of this House believe, and as I have always believed—the ultimate goal of our armed forces is to save lives by deterring war and persuading any potential aggressor that they could not prevail, then even today we all need to ask ourselves, regardless of party, whether we are doing enough to secure the peace by maintaining sufficiently strong armed forces to provide such a vital deterrent effect. It is a historical fact that twice in the last century, this country paid an immense cost in both blood and treasure to defeat militarism.

Today, the threats are somewhat different, with a war on our doorstep in Europe following Russia’s barbaric and illegal invasion of Ukraine. The Ukrainians are in effect now fighting for our freedom too, and we must back them to the hilt as a result. We also see a major rearmament by China; North Korea continues to develop even longer-range intercontinental ballistic missiles, now with support from Russia; and Iran continues to exert malign influence across the middle east, even after the successful American strike on its emerging nuclear capabilities. The circumstances may have changed, but the principle remains exactly the same. We in the western democracies cannot drop our guard against the growing powers of the 21st-century autocracies—something that those who fought in the second world war would instinctively understand only too well.

Bearing in mind the Minister’s caution, I was genuinely concerned to read one passage of the Government’s recent strategic defence review—its seminal defence policy document. On page 43, under the heading “Transforming UK Warfighting”, it states:

“This Review charts a new era for Defence, restoring the UK’s ability to deter, fight, and win—with allies—against states with advanced military forces by 2035.”

I say to the Minister in all sincerity that that seems to contain an echo of the 10-year rule of the 1920s. While there was a great deal of good in the SDR, not least the intention to speed up our highly bureaucratic procurement system—about which I have always held firm views, as the Minister knows—I nevertheless worry, given increasing threats from Russia and now also from China, about whether the Ministry of Defence today displays the genuine sense of urgency that is required to meet the challenges we now all clearly face. Before I am accused of selective quoting, the same paragraph of the SDR goes on to say:

“This vision could be achieved more quickly should circumstances demand it and should more resources be made available.”

Notwithstanding those words, with much of the new money in the SDR unavailable for at least two years and a multibillion-pound programme of in-year efficiency savings now under way, I merely ask whether we have really learned the lessons of the past century as well as we might have.

In conclusion, we in these islands have always ultimately been prepared to make great sacrifices to uphold the freedom of Europe, and indeed of the wider world. That is why, given our history, we should never forget that the first duty of Government remains the defence of the realm. In response to the philosopher Edmund Burke’s famous challenge that all that is necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing, twice in the past century our own good men and women across the nation stood up to and defeated such evil, with our armed forces in the lead. Rightfully, we solemnly remember that sacrifice each and every November, including in this House tonight.

Oral Answers to Questions

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Monday 3rd November 2025 Commons Chamber

[John Healey]

The west midlands has a very proud tradition of being at the heart of British invention and engineering, and it has huge potential for the future of defence engineering and invention. In the last year, the Ministry of Defence has spent £1.7 billion directly into the region, which is the highest level for the last 10 years. The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), met with the Mayor of the West Midlands just last week to discuss what other opportunities there may be for firms such as that and areas such as that of my hon. Friend the Member for Tipton and Wednesbury (Antonia Bance) in the west midlands.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

As the Secretary of State knows, I have brought a company over from Ukraine to show us what it can do with drones. Us getting hold of that technology from Ukraine helps us to supply Ukraine, as well as ourselves. However, the key issue I want to ask about is that of rare earth minerals. They are normally discussed in a business context, but they are critical to the defence of the United Kingdom, and having a supply here in this country, directly owned by us, must surely be a critical issue. Has the Secretary of State looked at this issue, talked to his colleagues in Government and said, “We need a supply that we produce in our own country and use here”?

[John Healey]

The short answer is yes. The slightly longer answer is that that we are doing so with close allies. We are also doing so with Ukraine. The right hon. Gentleman has been one of the voices in this House that has pushed us to do more with Ukrainian industry, and I know he will welcome our groundbreaking agreement with Ukraine, through which it will share for the first time with another country its intellectual property for the critical interceptor drone called Octopus. We will develop that further, manufacture those drones at scale within weeks and months, and return thousands to Ukraine to help its fight against Putin.

Russian Drones: Violation of Polish Airspace

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Wednesday 10th September 2025 Commons Chamber

[Al Carns]

I thank my hon. Friend for his contribution. He will know that I am passionate about the need for us to increase our uncrewed systems portfolio. We have already committed, in the defence industrial strategy and the strategic defence review, to create an uncrewed centre of excellence. That will help us to rewrite our doctrine and concept, but also to integrate drones back into the military and ensure we have a high-low mix of fifth and sixth generation capability, massed with low-end uncrewed systems. Every night, night on night, we have seen an increase in drone attacks on Kyiv and other cities, from Dnipro to Zaporizhzhia and Kherson and back again. They are increasing on an unprecedented scale. Some could argue that Putin has been emboldened recently, but we are seeing an increase and we must do everything we possibly can to support the Ukrainians.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

I commend the hon. Gentleman’s statement on our support for Poland. Of course we have to support Poland; it is quite right that we should do so.

May I return the hon. Gentleman to the main issue here, which is Russia’s intense bombing attacks on Ukraine? I recently came back from Ukraine. Every night in Kyiv, Lviv and other towns, people are being killed by this brute. This is just an example of what is going on across the border on a greater scale. This question remains for us. Have the Government really made overtures to the US President to say that the time is over for constant statements that say that we may do something, we will do something and we will have sanctions? Surely, we now have to get the US to massively up the level of sanctions. That is what Russia fears. Also, European nations must be told that they cannot buy any more oil or gas that has been run through India or wherever. That has to stop. We have to make that work. And we have to make sure that, at the end of it all, Russia pays a penalty right now and understands that. Will the British Government please take the opportunity, when the US President comes over, to say, “Enough is enough. Please act and get this thing done”?

[Al Carns]

I thank the right hon. Member for his contribution and for his stalwart support on both defence and foreign affairs. Our sanctions programme has been pretty impressive to date. I can almost guarantee that when the US President comes over, there will be discussions on a whole range of topics and that Ukraine will probably be central, alongside other issues within the UK.

Imposing a penalty on Russia is exactly what we have done in a bipartisan way. When the previous Government were in office, we led the way on equipment going into Ukraine. We are continuing to do that. We have seen a huge uplift in the amount of resources going to Ukraine, financially and in terms of weapons, but also, importantly, in industrial build across Europe. That is not just in the UK, but across all our European nations. Industry is required to maintain the pace and scale of the conflict, which I think has caught people out in the past.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 9th September 2025 Commons Chamber

[Luke Pollard]

In just one moment.

The treaty provides for control over the movement of all persons and goods on the base, and for control over the electromagnetic spectrum used for communications. It ensures that nothing can be built within a buffer zone of 24 nautical miles without our say so, and it delivers an effective veto on any development in the Chagos archipelago that threatens the base—something that the previous Government failed to secure in their negotiations. It prohibits foreign security forces from establishing a presence on the outer islands.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

I congratulate the Minister on his new position

May I get one little moment of agreement here? The Government say they abide by the law. Given the opt-out that we had, the original judgment was specifically not found in law, because we did not allow the ICJ to rule on Commonwealth issues. The question is a matter of law, so if the Minister is suggesting to the House that other actions would have taken place, they would have been unlawful. In what world was it necessary to block off those by assuming that this was law? It was not lawful.

[Luke Pollard]

The Foreign Office and the Government published the Government’s legal position when the treaty was laid. That assessment says:

“The longstanding legal view of the United Kingdom is that the UK would not have a realistic prospect of successfully defending its legal position on sovereignty”

in any future sovereignty litigation. That important and long-standing view predates this Government. Again, it was one of the reasons why the Conservative Government began the negotiations and held 11 rounds.

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[Priti Patel]

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. I say gently to some Labour Members, who are laughing and sneering at a fellow Member of this House when she is making a very valid point, that they are simply being disrespectful. It says a great deal. The hon. Member for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie) can laugh as much as he wants. The British public see Labour as a party that does not stand up for Britain and British values, and that is not something to be laughed or sneered at.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. Just to settle this whole argument about net present value, the reason it simply cannot be used for a long-term treaty obligation is that it is necessary to make a really heavy estimation of what will happen socially and economically in that area. It is just about possible to use some of that in the UK, where the Government control certain aspects, which they will not control after this treaty is signed. That is why it has been recommended that it not be used for long-term effects when not within the UK. That is why the actuarial department advised going for the total amount, not this net present value.

[Priti Patel]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely correct.

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[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I understand the point that my hon. Friend makes, and it is reinforced by the point made by our hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin) in reading from the agreement as to how any disputes are resolved. But I want to focus on the position now and the legal justification that the Government have already deployed for the arrangement that they seek to make. My hon. Friend is right that there will be further problems down the road, but there are problems already.

It seems to me that if the position the Government take is as I have set it out and as the Minister accepts that it is, that must be right because it would surely be difficult to argue that, were it not for that legal uncertainty, renting Diego Garcia back from someone else would be better than owning it from a security point of view. So for the Government to persuade us in this House, and indeed the country as a whole, that this is a good deal for Britain, everything turns on the question of legal uncertainty, which Ministers have often referred to as the reason why the treaty, and therefore the Bill, are necessary.

Having spent four years as Attorney General, I am quite familiar with legal uncertainty—there is a lot of it about in Government. It is, I am afraid, invariably the case that whenever a decision is made in Government, someone disagrees with it, and some of those who disagree will be prepared to go to a court and challenge the validity of that decision. Until the court—sometimes until the Supreme Court—has resolved the matter, there can fairly be said to be legal uncertainty about it. Legal uncertainty hangs around Government like the clouds, and it cannot be allowed to paralyse a Government. Nor should that sort of atmospheric legal uncertainty be the only cause of a decision as significant as that which this Government are now making to give up sovereignty over a vital military facility.

There must be something more substantive—more tangible—to the legal uncertainty to which Ministers have referred. Many of us have tried to find out what exactly that is, but with very limited success. Given that, as far as I can tell, the legal uncertainty that is being talked about constitutes the entirety of the burning platform on which the Government rely to justify the Bill and the treaty, surely this House, before we approve either, must be given a proper and clear explanation of precisely what legal jeopardy the Government are acting in response to. In pursuit of that, it is worth having a look at the explanations that Ministers have given so far.

Let us start with the former Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), who of course is now the Deputy Prime Minister. He made a statement on the British Indian Ocean Territory negotiations on 7 October last year. He told the House that the issue of contested sovereignty over Diego Garcia was becoming more acute, and that

“A binding judgment against the UK seemed inevitable”.—[Official Report, 7 October 2024; Vol. 754, c. 45.]

Many of us have been asking where that binding judgment might come from. The only court that had by then been mentioned was the International Court of Justice, which had issued an advisory opinion on sovereignty over the Chagos Islands and Diego Garcia. Indeed, on this subject it could only have been an advisory decision, because the UK accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ by declarations dated 22 February 2017—I was Attorney General at the time. Those declarations made it clear that the UK did not, however, accept that compulsory jurisdiction in relation to

“any dispute with a Government of any other country which is or has been a Member of the Commonwealth”.

That involves and includes Mauritius, so any dispute with Mauritius before the ICJ could not result in a binding judgment against the United Kingdom. That point has been put to Ministers and, as far as I know, they have not dissented from that analysis.

If the ICJ could not make the binding judgment that the former Foreign Secretary told us was inevitable, which other court might? On that, again, I am afraid that we have not had clarity. On 13 November last year, the Minister of State at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty)—who I see has the misfortune of having to defend this position once again today—answered an urgent question on the Chagos Islands. He said:

“International courts were reaching judgments on the basis that Mauritius had sovereignty over the Chagos archipelago.”—[Official Report, 13 November 2024; Vol. 756, c. 793.]

The Minister did not at that point say which courts, but I have done some digging, and I think I am supported in my assumption by what the Minister of State, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), said in opening this debate. I think that he may have been referring to a determination made in January 2021 by the special chamber of the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea when considering a dispute between Mauritius and the Maldives. Tragically, I do not have time to go into the fascinating detail of that case, but in essence it was a dispute about the delimitation of maritime territory between those two states. The Maldives argued that the special chamber could not determine the case in question because there was an ongoing dispute about the sovereignty of the Chagos Islands between Mauritius and the UK. The special chamber decided, however, that it could treat Mauritius as the coastal state in the dispute before it, because of the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the matter, which it said had legal effect.

If that ITLOS case is what the Government are relying on, I think there are a few problems: first, the UK was not a party to that case; and secondly, the ITLOS chamber was seemingly basing its decision on that of the ICJ, which, as I have already indicated, could not make a binding ruling on the matter. I am not expecting the House, much less the Government, to accept my opinion on this, but it seems to me that, at the very least, the UK would have the basis of a decent legal argument here. It does not seem to be that this ITLOS decision demonstrates that there was no further hope for UK claims of sovereignty over Diego Garcia.

After a bit more prodding, the Government’s argument moves on and introduces the issue of access to the electromagnetic spectrum. On 5 February this year, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office answered yet another urgent question on the subject.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

Before my right hon. and learned Friend moves on to the spectrum, may I bring him back to UNCLOS? As I understand it, article 298(1)(a) and (b) give us specific exemptions from UNCLOS judgments across all those areas. That is relevant to the UK in

“disputes concerning military activities…by government vessels and aircraft…in non-commercial service, and disputes concerning law enforcement activities”

in those areas. On that, the Government’s argument on UNCLOS falls, surely.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I will give my right hon. Friend a lawyer’s favourite answer to any question: “It’s complicated.” But here is the point: the only legal analysis being offered here—the only explanation—comes from the Opposition Benches. The Government are not giving us anything. If he is wrong in what he says, we need to hear why from the Minister, but we are not and that is what troubles me.

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[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

Just to make a small comment on the previous speech, I have been here a little while, and I have never once stopped regretting taking a Government handout to speak in support of the Government, because more often than not, it rebounded on me. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) and many others have made clear, there are two elements to this issue.

Before I start on that, I want to say something about the Chagossians. They are the last people to have been seriously consulted about any of this. The way that we behaved to them back in the 1960s was appalling. It should never have happened, and there was no need for it to have happened. They should have been able to stay on the archipelago, and we should have supported them in that. They must be a part of this. I know that they are very fearful of this deal as it stands.

My other point is that this arrangement is vague about what happens after 99 years. We are supposed to guess, or believe that we can trust Governments to make the right decisions. The statement on the rights of the Chagossians is completely missing a sense of where they will be, what they want and how we will bring that about. I pay tribute to the Member who made a good intervention on that point.

Let me quickly deal with the legal case, and then I will discuss the cost, and China and Russia. The Government have been peppered with requests non-stop since this process began to explain the legal threat that meant that we would be in real trouble if we did not seal a deal—any deal. Right the way along, they would not exactly explain. There were little suggestions here and there that a judgment would lead to certain things. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam has been absolutely right on that.

Today, I thought that the door slightly opened. I have known the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), for a long time, and his name is a good description of his solidity and purposefulness. The Minister who opened the debate, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), made the point that the legal threat was to do with UNCLOS. I was intrigued by that, because, as I just said to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam, within UNCLOS, clear for all to see, is a complete let-out for the UK Government when it comes to the case that they suggest would be brought against them under UNCLOS. The threat simply does not exist. I repeat that there are two exemptions, under article 298(1)(b) and 298(1)(c). The first has the UK opted out of

“disputes concerning military activities…by government vessels and aircraft engaged in non-commercial service, and disputes concerning law enforcement activities”.

The same applies under 298(1)(c) in relation to matters taken up by the UN Security Council.

The important point is that the threat does not need to be recognised, because ultimately this comes back to the original International Court of Justice ruling. That was an advisory judgment, because the Court cannot make an absolute judgment on anything to do with our relationships with the Commonwealth, either existing or previous; that is an important point. We keep coming back to this check on what would happen. The idea that everybody will dispute with us on that is simply nonsense. From a legal perspective, I think the Government have come unstuck in this debate. I have sat through many debates in this House, and it is rare that a Government completely come unstuck on a case of legalities.

The second bit that the Government have come unstuck on is the money. On the legal side, they will not tell us exactly what the situation is. There have been hints, proposals and suggestions that somehow we were in a desperate situation. On the money, I have never seen a Government as unable or unwilling to tell us exactly how much things cost or are worth. They are normally quick to do so, and to blame the other side, or whatever—it does not really matter. Everybody has been chasing the Government for that information, and now we discover that they have gerrymandered the figures for the overall statement. The total cost is nearly £35 billion, and we need to deal with total cost.

Let me remind the Government of the problem with what they call the GDP deflator and the so-called social time discounting method. The Government Actuary’s Department has dismissed that as a real way of calculating cost for this kind of issue, and it has re-emphasised the fact that understanding the total cost is the only way to look at a long-term treaty. The Government is relying on the cost-benefit analysis used for social projects. There is particular concern about long-term projects, and a real dispute about whether such a method can predict precisely, or even reasonably well, the overall cost in the long term. There is a lot of concern about whether that is the right way to go. Add to that the fact that the Government are trying to predict what will happen in Mauritius, under the Mauritian Government, over the next many years. This is a 99-year deal, and there is no way on earth that we have any control.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I wonder whether my right hon. Friend can help me in giving a prediction. Two families have swapped leadership of Mauritius over the last 60 years. Does he see any reason to doubt that the same two families will swap leadership over the next 60?

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

That is exactly the point. There are serious concerns about the uncertainties surrounding future growth and societal wellbeing. If there are such concerns when it comes to UK predictions about the UK, imagine how difficult it is to predict what will happen in Mauritius, so this should be dismissed.

It is interesting that after not answering the question for so long, suddenly the Government have popped up with a new device. They say that if we do not accept the figures, we are completely dismissing the Green Book, but the overall cost is not a Green Book issue, because this is about paying somebody money outside the UK, not about controlling cost. That is why the Green Book has never been used for this purpose before, and never will. I simply say to the Government that the money side of this has fallen apart again.

I come to the third element. As I said earlier, we have had no real vote or debate on the treaty, as opposed to the Bill. The old CRaG system has been rushed through, without a vote. I have to tell the Minister, for whom I have a huge amount of respect, that that is simply appalling, given that we are dealing with something as strategically important as this treaty.

Clause 5 of the Bill, which is a very flimsy document, is entitled “Further provision: Orders in Council”. Anybody who reads that will have a sudden intake of breath. The whole point of this Bill is negated by clause 5. What is the point of debating the rest of the Bill, given that clause 5 says that at any stage, and under any circumstances, the Government can change it all by Orders in Council? Absolutely everything can be changed by Orders in Council, with no vote and no dispute. If the Government decide to go in a different direction, they do not have to consult Parliament any more.

The sweeping powers in the Bill are ridiculous. When the Minister was in opposition, he used to spend his whole time moaning—quite rightly—about Governments who give themselves such powers. Even by the standards of previous Governments, this Bill is pretty astonishing. It is a massive sweep. This is not really democracy any more; it is monocracy. In other words, we have given up debate and dispute, and we have handed things over to one person—the Prime Minister. I say to the Government that the Bill is appalling, and they really need to rethink it. We simply cannot go through with something as appalling as this. I can remember the Maastricht debates, and various others in which we spent a long time debating clauses on the Floor of the House. That was the right thing to do, because such issues are important. International treaties are vital to our wellbeing, and the Bill simply does not work.

The last thing I want to say is on China. I would say this, because I am sanctioned by China, as are some of my hon. Friends. I suspect that others will be sanctioned as well in due course. If they carry on working with me in the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, they are bound to be sanctioned, and I look forward to their joining us at that table. There is no way on earth that China does not benefit from this Bill. China has its eyes on the very important flow of commercial traffic that runs just below the Chagos islands, which it has always wanted to be able to block, control or interfere with.

The Chinese already have a naval base in Sri Lanka, which they got by default on the back of the belt and road initiative, due to non-payment. For a long time, they have been looking at how, under their arrangements with Mauritius, they will eventually be able to intervene. They are two or three steps further forward as a result of this Bill. It does not secure us against that absolutely, because we gave up absolute security and control when we decided to hand over sovereignty to Mauritius.

[Cameron Thomas]

I am not yet on the Chinese Communist party’s sanctions list, but perhaps I will be shortly. Does the right hon. Member share my concern about the 99-year lease of the islands, given that some of our adversaries across the world plan and strategise over the very long term, and 99 years is actually a short period of time?

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that the Chinese Government have a long-term plan. In fact, they are very clear about what they wish to do. If anybody does not think that China poses a threat on all these issues, what were they doing last week when, on our television screens, we saw President Xi, with the North Korean dictator on one side and the Russian dictator on the other, talking about a new world order? That continues to be the Chinese Government’s purpose. They should have been taken into the upper tier of the foreign influence registration scheme. Why are they not there? My suspicion is that this was not done because it might well have ended the whole negotiation on the Chagos islands, as there would have been huge interventions, and we could not possibly have done aught else but stop the negotiation.

In conclusion, I honestly think that the Government need to pause this, go back to the drawing board, and say, “We got it wrong”, but I say this in answer to the endless briefing they have given Labour Members on what the Conservative party did about the Chagos islands in government. I have reached the conclusion that no matter who is in power, I am in opposition, so I can categorically tell the House that, whatever else happened, this was quite rightly ended by Lord Cameron when he became Foreign Secretary. Some of us made it very clear that this should not have gone ahead for many of the reasons that I have laid out. I end by saying to the Minister that it is no good coming back later and saying, “I wish we hadn’t done this.” Now is the time to stand up and say, as the hon. Member for Crawley (Peter Lamb) did, that this does not work, it must stop, and the Government must think again.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

May I say how much of an honour it is to follow the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn)? Although we do not necessarily agree on a lot of policy, I am always struck by the fact that he puts people at the heart of his speeches. That has never been the case more than during his long campaign on this issue, on which he spoke eloquently. He is putting Chagossians right at the heart of any decision making. He deserves a lot of acclaim for that. He is right to call out some of the rhetoric in this debate, because, at the end of the day, those people really matter. I thank him for putting his points on the record.

There are three broad areas that I would like to cover: sovereignty, costs and some of the scariest parts of the Bill. I listened to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), and I must admit that I am not nearly as learned or experienced as him; I bow to his legal analysis. I am a mere doctor, so I look for an evidence base when trying to understand the process. To that end, I thought it would be useful to write to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, which I duly did. I received a letter on 28 July 2025 from the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), who I see will kindly respond, and is sat in his place. Much to my surprise and pleasure, a lot of what is in the letter was in the Minister’s speech. This debate allows me to walk through some of the letter and pose the questions that hit me as I looked into this case.

I must admit that when I stepped into this House in 2019, this was not a topic that I knew a huge deal about—I think many Members on both sides would say the same—but it very quickly became a topic that I realised we should look into understanding, especially as it deals with security.

The letter states:

“We had to act now because the base was under threat.”

That implies urgency, but the letter is loose on who was under threat, where and how. There is legal uncertainty but, as we have heard, we do not know which court is involved or why. It goes on to say:

“The courts have already made decisions which undermine our position.”

Courts, plural. We know that the ICJ is involved, but as has been stated, its opinion was non-binding, and there is a carve-out relating to the Commonwealth.

The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), said, after being pushed to speak on the matter multiple times, that the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea was the area of concern, but he will know that back in 2015, under annex VII, the tribunal agreed with the UK that sovereignty could not be determined by UNCLOS. This was a marine protection issue. Britons were trying to protect the area, and Mauritius wanted to open it up to farm it, and we were found against, under that treaty, in that court. This raises an important side issue: what protections are there in the Bill for the environment? They seem scant, or just not there.

The letter goes further, stating that

“in 2021…a Special Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea…ruled that Mauritius’ sovereignty was inferred from ICJ”.

So the Government themselves point that out. The letter goes on to say:

“The UK was not party to this case”.

Well, obviously, it would not be, but that means that we have not had our day in court to explain why we do not think that the judgment should apply. Mauritius’ sovereignty was inferred from that non-binding, political judgment.

The letter goes on:

“If Mauritius were to take us to court again, the UK’s longstanding legal view is that we would not have a realistic prospect of successfully defending its legal position on sovereignty in such litigation.”

Well, which court? If this advice is so long-standing, why do we not know about it? How have we got this far, going for year upon year with no agreement, without any urgency? It seems sensible and appropriate to release the advice on this. At the start of that quote, the letter said “If Mauritius”. It states later that it is

“highly likely that further wide-ranging litigation would be brought quickly by Mauritius against the UK.”

What evidence do the Government have to back that up? What is it that they say Mauritius will act so quickly on? We certainly have not seen it, if it was from 2021. The dates 2023 and 2024 have been mentioned, and we are now in 2025. I would be interested to see the Government release the evidence base for their claim about how quickly litigation would come forward, because as they rightly point out, there have been 11 rounds of negotiations, so there has clearly been time to sort things out.

Before someone jumps in and says, “Well, you opened the negotiations”, I would point out that we did that for the Falkland Islands as well. I find it amazing that we have trade unionists who built their whole careers on negotiating suddenly chastising the Conservatives for listening to the other side of a disagreement. That seems bizarre to me, because we want to respect each other and exchange ideas, but not have an agreement. It is rightly pointed out by Conservative Members that the agreement was not there; we did not take it. On the cost of the deal, there is no cost, because we did not have a deal to sign off.

The very next sentence in the letter says:

“This might, for example, include further arbitral proceedings against the UK under Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. A judgment from such a tribunal would be legally binding on the UK.”

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

It is not.

[Dr Evans]

It is. It is true about the legally binding aspect within the area that the tribunal covers, but that does not cover sovereignty, as we learned in 2015 when the tribunal sided with the British Government. Here we have the farcical situation of a House of policy and law shining light on one side and another, but never on the truth. This is where my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam is exactly right. If the Government were to come forward and say exactly which court, where and why, they might get more sympathy from Opposition, but we have been through an entire five-hour debate and we still do not have answers to those questions.

Another court that is often cited is the International Telecommunication Union covering spectre, radio and radar. Article 48.1 states

“Member States retain their entire freedom with regard to military radio installations,”

and the Government know that. Even the written answer from the Minister—it has been hinted at before—states:

“Individual countries have the sovereign right to manage and use the radio spectrum, within their borders, the way they wish, subject to not causing interference with other countries. This right is recognised in the Radio Regulations. The Radio Regulations are the international framework for the use of spectrum by radiocommunication services, defined and managed by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Individual countries, not the ITU, make their own sovereign spectrum assignments in accordance with the Radio Regulations. The ITU has no legal authority over these assignments regardless of the country’s civilian or military classification of spectrum. The ITU cannot challenge the UK’s use of civilian or military spectrum.”

It is clear here—the Government know it in their own answers—that the ITU has no role in sovereignty. It all boils down to where one believes British overseas territories stand.

Now we must talk about the cost, which has been much debated. There have been three figures in the debate: £3.4 billion, £10 billion and £34 billion. The £3.4 billion is the net present value using social time preference rate. The £10 billion is inflation adjusted, and the £34 billion is the nominal value by the Government Actuary’s Department. The question is, why use net present value? I put it earlier in the debate that there is no other precedent in the world for NPV being used in sovereignty matters. The Minister at the time asked whether the Conservatives want to do away with using NPV—of course not.

The Battle of Britain

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd September 2025 Westminster Hall

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

I cannot think of anyone I would rather have chairing this debate, so it is of course a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I congratulate the hon. Member for Tewkesbury (Cameron Thomas) on raising this matter. In the time that I have been in this place, I think this is the first debate we have had about the battle of Britain. I ask myself why we have not had one before—I am rather guilty in that regard myself.

I rise simply to make some comments about the fact that my father was a fighter pilot throughout the second world war. He flew almost constantly in Spitfires and came in during the latter stages of the battle of Britain, so I grew up with stories about what happened. Almost the first story that my father told me was about when he was just finishing off his training—somewhere up near Liverpool, I think—and he and a couple of others were in a pub that night.

This was just after Dunkirk, and a bunch of soldiers who had returned from Dunkirk saw these RAF figures sitting by the bar and immediately came and attacked them under the stupid belief—it was not their fault, because the information was not given to them—that the RAF had not turned up at Dunkirk, because they could not see the aircraft overhead. The truth is somewhat different, because the fighter pilots had gone inland to break up the bombers long before they got anywhere near the beaches. If they got near the beaches, it was too late. He said, “We bore”—how can I put it?—“the imprint of a disgruntled set of pongos, who I remembered all the way through the rest of my life.” But he went on to qualify as a fighter pilot.

Most fighter pilots were not trained massively. There was a rush to get them done, so they had no real combat training. What they had was basic training on the aircraft to go solo, a few fighter runs and feints, and then they would be sent off to their squadrons, so the first time they would understand how to fly the aircraft properly was in combat. My father talked about what he used to say to his pilots when he later became a squadron leader and eventually a group captain. He said, “I used to tell my pilots that you have to abandon all that you have learned and understand only one thing: you don’t get into this aircraft; you strap it on—it becomes an extension of you. If you learn that, this aircraft will never let you down. It can always go as far as you want, and it will test you, but you will always come out of it.” That stayed with him all the time, and his pilots, I think, had very good records as well.

It is worth reminding ourselves that of course it was the pre-war planning that enabled us to have enough time and warning to put the fighters up in the air to take out the bombers. Sir Robert Watson-Watt and others developed the chain of radars. The Germans never understood fully what that was about until too late. And of course there was Dowding’s two-pronged determination. No. 1 was that this home chain should exist, and the system to run it through the tables, with the WAAF—Women’s Auxiliary Air Force—pushing all the details about individual squadrons coming across. The second bit, which was really important, was his argument with Churchill about not sending Spitfires over to France. That was critical because had we done that, we would not have been ready and prepared for what was to come next. That was a very big dispute. I think Churchill never really forgave him for standing up to him on that, but he was right to have done so, because we were ready and prepared with the right squadrons and the right aircraft.

The other side of it was that although, as the hon. Member for Tewkesbury said, the Germans were never going to succeed, there was a period when they were pretty close, and that was when they were bombing the airfields endlessly. That meant that many squadrons were coming back to find their airfields destroyed and were having to be diverted to amateur airfields and everywhere else, where there was no support, no supply, no ammunition waiting for them and often no fuel. It would then take them longer to be ready, and by the time they were ready, it was almost too late.

Dowding was within, I think, two days of ordering his squadrons north of London, because they were pretty much exhausted, as they were not able just to come back and fly again. At that point, Germany switched the bombing to London. That was a critical moment. It gave him breathing space to reconstruct, rebuild, and be ready for them a second time when they came back to the airfields, and that is exactly what happened. His leadership in all this was critical, for which he was not properly rewarded directly afterwards but was later on. As the commanding officer, Dowding was as important to this as Nelson was to Trafalgar or as Wellington was to Waterloo, and we should honour him and others who worked with him.

My father got five gallantry medals during the war—two Distinguished Service Orders and three Distinguished Flying Crosses, which are all combat awards—but like many other pilots who were there, he did not ask questions about this. He became a very good friend of the actor Christopher Lee, who was the godfather to my brother. I remember as a young boy, sitting in a back room with my brother while they had a drink together—that was normal in those days—when he came through and said to me and my brother, “Your father is a man without fear.” This troubled me for some time. When I eventually was in the Army myself, one evening over a drink, I said to my father, “Christopher Lee said you are a man without fear.” He said, “That’s not true. A man without fear is a dangerous man, because he cares not about anybody else. I was scared all through the war, but I controlled it because I could not let those around me down.”

My father said that the toughest thing he ever had to do was to eventually deal with a pilot who had clearly lost it—who had broken. He had to send him down because he was a risk to the others around him. He said that these men would break down in tears in front of them because that was the end of their time—that was it; there were no further chances for them. He said, “That was the toughest thing you had to do; but, for the sake of the others, you made that decision, even though you hated doing it at the time.” Although they have become heroic figures, it is worth reminding ourselves that every day they were fighting for their lives and the lives of the people next door to them in the air. That is important.

I want to finish by saying that the lesson they taught us, from the 1930s all the way through, is one that we are now faced with again. We are faced by the growth of totalitarianism: brutal states like China, Russia and others, who will stop at nothing and who care nothing for human rights, nothing for the rule of law and nothing for freedom. These countries are growing in potency. Russia is invading a nation that is trying to become a democracy and fight for freedom. What we have to understand is that we are now under as big a threat as they were in the 1930s. We must understand that the preparation in the late ’30s is where we have to be today—I say that nodding to the Minister, who has served himself and will understand that fully.

There are three lessons that we draw from this. First, we can never appease dictators. Dictators of brutal totalitarian regimes must be confronted, never appeased. The second is: never trade land for peace. Fight for the souls and the hearts of those who honour freedom. Do not betray them with shabby deals, as we did in 1938, when we sold land of those we had no right to. The third bit, which I will finish on, is very simple: “Si vis pacem, para bellum”—“If you would have peace, prepare for war”—because if we are unready, you can bet that the others will not be. What is it that our fighter pilots taught us, those brave men who went on to fight through the rest of the war like my father and others? They said: “Never again find yourself in a situation where you have to put young men and women under fire because politicians failed to recognise what they had to do early on.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

Good afternoon, Sir Desmond. It is a genuine pleasure to serve under your chairmanship as we debate these momentous events in the run-up to Battle of Britain Day, which commemorates the 85th anniversary of the culmination of the battle on 15 September 1940. I congratulate the hon. Member for Tewkesbury (Cameron Thomas) on securing this very important and timely debate, which he introduced so very admirably. Lest we forget.

On a personal note, I regard it as a genuine privilege, as the son of a world war two veteran—albeit one who fought in the Royal Navy—to be able to sum up for His Majesty’s Opposition this afternoon. I would like to begin by declaring two personal interests, first as an amateur military historian and a battle of Britain buff in particular. Southend airport, which abuts my constituency, was RAF Rochford in 1940, one of Fighter Command’s vital forward airfields. Secondly, several years ago I worked with a former constituent and local historian called Steve Newman on a project to help restore and refurbish our official war memorial at Wickford. Steve is now involved in another ambitious project, this time to restore a world war two Hurricane, serial Z5134. With a dedicated band of helpers, he is attempting to rebuild this historic aircraft almost from the wheels up. I was privileged to view the fruits of their labour during the summer recess. Realistically, it will take them several years to achieve their ambition. I would like to place on record my admiration for what they are attempting, and to wish them every possible success.

Turning to the battle itself, there is no doubt that it was an example of heroism on multiple levels, beginning with the pilots, from some of the well-known aces, such as Peter Townsend, Bob Stanford Tuck, Douglas Bader and Sailor Malan, through to those who only flew in combat once and never returned. Those young men, some of whom had barely 10 hours on type, must have known before they took off that the chances of their returning alive were slim. Nevertheless, they took off anyway. In all, almost 3,000 allied pilots fought with Fighter Command in the officially defined period of the battle of Britain, which runs from 10 July to 31 October 1940.

However, it is important to note that the defence in the battle was by no means solely a British affair—far from it. As well as the RAF squadrons, those from other nations also played a crucial role, perhaps most famously the Polish 303 Squadron, based at RAF Northolt, which shot down more enemy aircraft—126—than any other squadron. It was supplemented by other Polish squadrons, plus the Czechs and Canadians, and indeed the three Eagle squadrons of American pilots who volunteered to fight with the RAF more than a year before Pearl Harbour.

History also owes a great debt to those who kept them flying, not least the ground crew of Fighter Command, but also the Royal Observer Corps, the General Post Office technicians who assisted with communications and those working in the factories to produce the iconic Spitfires and Hurricanes on which the defence so crucially depended. Although Churchill rightly paid tribute to “the few”, in fact there were many who contributed to that critical victory in 1940, the vast majority of whom never flew in combat.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I just wanted to make the small point that I was fortunate enough to sit next to Jock Colville, who was assistant private secretary to Churchill throughout the war. They were visiting Uxbridge on 15 September, when a huge armada gathered. Churchill was watching as, one by one, the lights went up, until everything was up. He said to the air officer commanding, “What are you going to do now? Where are your reserves?” The officer said, “We have no reserves, Prime Minister.” Churchill asked, “What will you do?” The officer said, “I don’t know about you, but I’m going to pray.” Jock Colville told me that, with that, Churchill stayed silent for three hours, something he never did, but that when he got into the car, he turned to him and said, “Never in the field of human conflict has so much been owed by so many to so few.”

[Mr Francois]

The whole House is grateful to my right hon. Friend for that very telling intervention. While I have the opportunity, I pay tribute to his marvellous speech and, more than that, to the wonderful service of his father, of whom he can be immensely proud.

Also fundamental were the RAF commanders, principally Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park, who famously commanded 11 Group, which bore the brunt of the battle. Park, a New Zealander, displayed tactical brilliance in the husbanding of his squadrons, while also fighting a highly aggressive and effective defence.

Overall, however, perhaps the greatest single contribution to victory was that of the leader of Fighter Command throughout the battle, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding. As well as being a pilot, Dowding was keenly interested in scientific development, which he pursued zealously when promoted to the Air Council in 1930, with responsibility for supply and research. That critical appointment was to have profound consequences for the subsequent conduct of the battle a decade later, as several right hon. Members have alluded to.

Dowding had three great attributes that materially contributed to the RAF’s victory. First, he possessed tremendous foresight. Like Churchill, he realised very early on that Nazi Germany and its nascent air force would one day provide a potentially fatal threat to Britain’s security, and he began to plan accordingly.

Secondly, Dowding’s genius—I use the word deliberately —was that he conceptualised years in advance the battle that the RAF would have to fight. He then used his new appointment enthusiastically to pull together multiple strands of scientific development, crucially including Watson-Watt’s experiments with radar, to create a highly resilient defensive system.

In May 1937, Dowding presciently delivered a lecture to the air staff regarding the air defence of Great Britain, in which the scenario he outlined was one of a war with a European dictator—the inference was obvious —attempting to starve Britain into submission by the aggressive use of submarines, but not before the United Kingdom had been subjected to an all-out assault designed to destroy the RAF and cripple the nation’s ability to make war, by remorseless attack from the air.

As head of the newly created Fighter Command from July 1936, Dowding went on to create a command and control network alerted by radar, all feeding into Fighter Command headquarters at RAF Bentley Priory, and supported by an organisation of group and sector headquarters designed to co-ordinate timely fighter interception of incoming German aircraft. That was all interconnected by a system of telephone and, later, teleprinter communications. The historian and operational analyst Stephen Bungay, in his brilliant book, “The Most Dangerous Enemy”, describes that system as “the world’s first intranet”, albeit an analogue version, half a century before Tim Berners-Lee. Critically, the Dowding system, as it became known, allowed the RAF to make best use of its resources in combating an enemy that frequently outnumbered it three, or even four, to one.

Thirdly, Dowding possessed tremendous moral courage in dealing with superiors, up to and including Churchill. The epic 1969 movie “The Battle of Britain”, with its all-star cast, opens with the Dowding letter of 16 May 1940, which my right hon. Friend the Member for Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale (David Mundell) referred to. In it, Dowding famously argued the need to conserve Britain’s fighter strength during the fall of France. As he trenchantly put it,

“if the Home Defence Force is drained away in desperate attempts to remedy the situation in France, defeat in France will involve the final, complete and irremediable defeat of this country.”

In Dowding, Britain possessed a commander with an absolutely single-minded determination to prepare meticulously for, to fight and then to win the battle, for which his pilots, whom he referred to affectionately as “my boys”, held him in particular reverence. His truly was the controlling mind that orchestrated the ultimately successful defence of these islands.

Like many commanders before him, Dowding was a maverick, but he was not an extrovert. He was socially awkward, which led to his nickname “Stuffy”. He never suffered fools gladly, and his manner could be abrupt, even when dealing with superiors, which ultimately led to his downfall. Nevertheless, he was a man utterly dedicated to his task, and one to whom history owes an immense debt. Arguably, had Dowding never been born we might even have lost the battle, as we would undoubtedly have been far less well prepared to fight it.

Ukraine

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Monday 1st September 2025 Commons Chamber

[John Healey]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right; the courage of the Ukrainians is an inspiration to us all, including our own forces, as is their ability to fight and innovate in combat. We tried to capture that in the strategic defence review, which we published in June. It points the way to the sort of radical transformation that we will require in our own armed forces and defence system. I hope that my hon. Friend will see the hallmarks of that very soon when we publish the defence industrial strategy.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

A few weeks ago I returned from Ukraine with some others who had been delivering trucks and medical aid to the Ukrainians for use on the frontline. I have made a number of such trips alongside other Members whom I can see across the Floor, united, as the Government are united, with the Opposition and the other parties. However, having watched the brutality stepped up by President Putin in recent weeks, and following the Alaskan conference in Anchorage, I must say that I am fundamentally still very disappointed. Yes, the Government are right that they are bringing together a coalition of the willing, but the least willing of all at the moment seems to be the White House, and my concern is that without the White House’s commitment to showing Putin that his actions have consequences, this will continue to drag on. The United States is the one country that can really impress upon him that if the Russians carry on with these attacks, they will be sanctioned dramatically and the weapons that the Ukrainians desperately need will flow to them like water. I wonder whether the Government could say to the President, behind closed doors, “It is time to follow your words with actions and not keep on prevaricating.”

[John Healey]

I appreciate the argument that the right hon. Gentleman makes. It is important to recognise that President Trump’s role is essential and central in any opportunity to bring the two sides together. President Tump is playing a role that only he can play, and he has made it clear that the range of further steps, if they become necessary, at his disposal and for his decision include stepping up economic pressure on President Putin. We are ready to respond alongside that, and we are also ready to take our own decisions on economic pressure on President Putin and on Russia. As I said to my hon. Friend the Member for Slough (Mr Dhesi), the Defence Committee Chair, that has got to be part of trying to ensure that the pressure on Putin and the support for Ukraine brings the two sides more rapidly to the negotiating table so that we can get the peace that we all want secured.

Afghanistan

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Tuesday 15th July 2025 Commons Chamber

[John Healey]

I do agree, and this House is doing so this afternoon in response to my statement. The role that my hon. Friend’s local council in Portsmouth and councils across the country are playing in making sure that there is a warm welcome and a unified Afghan resettlement programme in place for those Afghans and their families who we are welcoming into this country is remarkable. We thank them for that. Central Government and this House could not see these schemes operate effectively without our local councils.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

I commend the Secretary of State’s statement. I will not dwell on the past, because I am sure that the Defence Committee and other Select Committees will have a look at that. I want to ask him about where this goes in future. All these schemes are closing, but there are still people out there who do not recognise the statement in the report that there is no longer a widespread campaign of targeting individuals. I have one case in my mind. The Minister for the Armed Forces knows exactly who I am referring to: Sami Atayee, who has fled and is in hiding in Pakistan, and whose brother has been arrested during the pursuit. He was not directly employed by the British Government—he could not have been, for security reasons—but the testament of General Olly Brown and others all say that he saved lives for British servicemen and servicewomen. We surely owe people like that a debt of honour and gratitude for their work, so I simply ask the Secretary of State to look at what might replace the schemes that he has got rid of, which were inflexible, very narrow and often left out those who really did this Government a service. I would be grateful if he came up with some flexible idea that allows some of these people to seek succour here in the United Kingdom.

[John Healey]

I hesitate to be too blunt with the right hon. Gentleman, because I have a great deal of respect for him. If any applicant is not eligible under the criteria of the scheme that this House has approved and the Government have in place and operate, that can really only lead to one decision. He encourages me to look in a creative way at other options. My hon. Friend the Minister for the Armed Forces is very familiar with the case that the right hon. Gentleman raises. We will look at it again, but I do not want to raise false hopes for him, or for the man whom he describes so vividly, and with such concern.

Armed Forces Commissioner Bill

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Consideration of Lords message
Wednesday 2nd July 2025 Commons Chamber

to the Lords.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. The Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 outlawed foreign Government ownership of UK media organisations, setting a limit of 5% on that process. The Government have now moved that from 5% to 15%, which is considerably higher. However, there has been only a marginal debate in a Statutory Instrument Committee. My concern—it has only just been passed—is that that is a major change. It would have been fair if the Government had set about having a proper debate on it here in the Chamber of the House of Commons, because newspaper ownership is a very significant issue. The other place will potentially get a much larger debate, yet we are the elected House. I ask your advice, Madam Deputy Speaker, on how we may raise the issue again?

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)]

I thank the right hon. Member for giving me prior notice of this point of order. It is not a matter for the Chair, but his comments are now on the record.

Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Thursday 5th June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

It is a privilege to rise to move this Adjournment debate about applications to the Afghan relocations and assistance policy, which has come to be known as the ARAP scheme. I intend to raise a deeply troubling case that highlights serious and systemic failings in the operation of ARAP. Those failings have very real and potentially fatal consequences for real human beings who served us, and who are now in fear of their lives. Importantly, I will ask the Minister for the Armed Forces, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), to reconsider the whole process.

The individual to whom I am about to refer played a crucial role in saving British lives during our operations in Afghanistan. He supported our troops and our mission, often at immense personal risk to him and his family, yet it seems that he has been abandoned by us. When we consider that we have given so much to Afghanistan—building a new Government, a new freedom and some democracy—I think the west running away from Afghanistan is an act that shames us all deeply, as is the fact that those who served us and clearly put their lives at risk have been brushed aside. It does not matter who is in power or which Government it is: I say simply that that is—

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Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—(Taiwo Owatemi.)

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

Thank you for that, Madam Deputy Speaker—that has given me a few more minutes.

The ARAP scheme was introduced to provide a lifesaving path to safety for Afghan nationals who directly supported the UK’s mission in Afghanistan. At its core, it is a moral and strategic obligation. These individuals risked their lives working for UK forces, and I believe the UK must duly protect them. The Government were right at the time to introduce the scheme, and it is important to acknowledge that it has achieved something. However, in practice, I believe the scheme has fallen dramatically short both morally and logistically. Many eligible Afghans are still stranded under Taliban rule and fearing for their lives, which highlights the failures in the scheme’s execution.

[Wendy Chamberlain (North East Fife) (LD)]

I am grateful to the right hon. Member for bringing forward this debate. Waiting for more than three years to hear about the outcome must be absolute torture for those who served in Afghanistan and supported us. As the chair of the all-party parliamentary group on Afghan women and girls, I am emailed by people waiting for resettlement through ARAP and the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme who want updates that I cannot give them. Does he agree that the Minister needs to review the communications given to outstanding applicants to ensure that they are given updates in a timely manner?

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[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

Indeed. The hon. Lady is right in raising those points. The fact is that this scheme does not fit the requirement any longer, and I think it is, in many senses, quite brutal and inhumane.

I will deal with a couple of the problems here, then I will deal with a personal case. First, the scheme is utterly slow and bureaucratic. I will say to the Minister from the start that this debate is not party political; it is very much about a scheme that we brought in and that the Government have inherited, and I hope that it can be changed.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

In the spirit of that remark, I do not wish to ambush the Minister when he speaks with a quote from the Defence Secretary when he was the shadow Defence Secretary, so may I put it on the record now? After a major inquiry by The Independent, Lighthouse Reports and Sky News in November 2023, he was quoted as saying:

“It is extremely worrying to hear that Afghan special forces who were trained and funded by the UK are being denied relocation and left in danger. These reports act as a painful reminder that the government’s failures towards Afghans not only leave families in limbo in Pakistan hotels, but also put Afghan lives at serious threat from the Taliban. Britain’s moral duty to assist these Afghans is felt most fiercely by the UK forces they served alongside. There can be no more excuses.”

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I agree with those words the Secretary of State for Defence said previously. I hope he was speaking to highlight problems with the Government, as those in opposition must do; I am afraid that my Government did not resolve that issue. At the end of my speech, as the Minister will know, I will pitch to him how things should be different.

The bureaucracy of the scheme is astonishing. Thousands of applications remain unresolved, some of which were submitted as far back as 2021. Many of these people have had to flee and hide with their families, because they risk death—I will come back to a particular case that highlights all that. The long lack of transparency and the long delays have left these individuals in personal and collective danger.

The scheme has narrow and inconsistent eligibility criteria. Individuals who have served alongside UK forces have been excluded due to narrow definitions and specific eligibility categories that rule them out. Others have been denied protection because they were employed by subcontractors rather than the Ministry of Defence, yet they carried out the same vital work and faced the same risks as others who were directly employed.

Then there are the broken promises. The UK Government assured those who served with the British forces that they would not be left behind, yet lives are still at risk. First-hand reports from Afghanistan show that former allies are now being targeted by the Taliban. I did not serve in Afghanistan—I did serve in the British military, a fact of which I was proud—but there are some in this Chamber today who did serve there and who know from first-hand experience what was going on.

Throughout all of this, as I lay out the individual case, there is a very simple theme: we must stand by those who stood by us, because if we do not, we are not worthy of being British or of the freedoms we uphold and fight for. Those who stood by us fought for those freedoms, too; they supported us in those fights, and we cannot abandon them, given the threats they now face. The fact that they are in hiding, fearful for their lives, is an absolute travesty, and the idea that we could have forgotten them should be a badge of shame for any British Government and for the British establishment.

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

rose—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

Order. The right hon. Gentleman will know that he cannot intervene from the Front Bench in an Adjournment debate.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I hope I can give my right hon. Friend time to get to the Benches behind him, as he may wish to intervene on me. I am sure that he will not be noticed in that movement, swift and ghost-like as he.

I am not going to stretch this out any longer. The individual I will refer to today worked alongside British forces in Afghanistan, providing operational and intelligence support under direct threat from the Taliban. His family and his home were threatened. He served in the national security directorate in Kabul. His work involved sharing critical intelligence with the British special forces and intelligence services in Kabul and, of course, in the wider region. That intelligence undoubtedly saved lives and contributed to the success of key operations. His contributions are simply not in doubt or in question; they are evidenced extensively, including in a powerful testimony from the most senior commander of British forces in Kabul at the time, who is now a general. He personally worked with this individual and has testified to the crucial role he played.

I am not going to name the general at this point, but he says in his letter in support of this individual’s application:

“His daily security briefings covered possible threats and intelligence reports. These reports made a substantive and crucially life-saving contribution not only to the UK’s military and national security objectives with respect to operations in Afghanistan, but also to the day-to-day safety of British troops and civilian British Embassy staff”

and others. He also says that by the very nature of the daily intelligence that this individual was required to share within this high-level forum, the threat to his life and that of his family was unquestionably at an elevated risk from targeted attacks, including a high risk of death or serious injury by the Taliban regime. I would have thought that that alone was powerful enough evidence to say that this individual should be here now, as he is currently in fear for his life in another country nearby.

[Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)]

I did serve in Afghanistan, including with the young major who is now the general that my right hon. and gallant Friend is referring to. He is an outstanding officer with unimpeachable credentials.

My right hon. and gallant Friend is making a compelling moral case. I have seen at first hand the risks that those Afghans who supported us on operations faced alongside us, which only increased exponentially when the Taliban took over. We have a very moral case for doing whatever we have to do to fulfil our obligation, and if that means tearing up someone’s bureaucratic rulebook, so be it.

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[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

It is powerful that my hon. and gallant Friend is here today to support this debate, given his service in Afghanistan. He will understand more than most the threats that were received by these people and how their lives would have been more difficult. He will also know that many would have lost their lives had this sort of intelligence and support not been available from these brave individuals. I am grateful for his intervention.

Despite the overwhelming evidence presented—there was much of it—the application was rejected on all counts and the individual remains at risk. What we got back in the papers that I looked through, which came first to the Minister and then to me, was this:

“the decision maker was unable to satisfy themselves from the evidence provided or that held by the UK Government that his role with National Directorate of Security…was closely supporting or in partnership with a UK Government Department”.

Is that really the best we can do—some bureaucrat stuck away somewhere who does not care, who is not even in the Ministry of Defence and who has no real understanding of what it is like to put one’s life on the line for other people’s safety? All of that evidence is dismissed in the line

“unable to satisfy themselves from the evidence provided”.

I find that astonishing and appalling. I say that not to attack civil servants—many of them are brilliant and do a lot of work—but this process allows someone to make a decision about the life and death of a brave individual without even thinking about the consequences.

This is not just about a bureaucratic error. As I said, the situation is very human; it is literally life and death. We are making a decision today under this scheme to have this individual die. That is pretty much what they are saying. He is a man in hiding, in fear of his life and the lives of his family. I understand that even his closest relation has been arrested and has probably been tortured to find out where he is. We dismiss it with the words that those processing his application were “unable to satisfy themselves”.

By the very nature of the daily intelligence that this individual was required to share, there is a threat to his life and to his family. He has placed himself between us and the Taliban. Records of these meetings were kept and widely publicised, including in public relations-focused photographs showing the individual at meetings attended by the general. This evidence was recorded in Afghan Government systems and in offices now commandeered by the Taliban, who now know what he was doing. It is still easily searchable on the internet today, yet the decision maker was

“unable to satisfy themselves from the evidence provided”

that he was closely supporting or in partnership with the UK. Really?

[John Cooper (Dumfries and Galloway) (Con)]

I thank my right hon. and gallant Friend for giving way on that point. Is this not a case of the old adage that rules are for the guidance of wise men and the obeyance of fools? Are we not seeing a punctilious following of rules here, when a man’s life is at risk?

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

Indeed, we are. We are elected—that is what makes us different—to this Chamber to take that on and to change it. We are not bound by a bureaucratic process. We have the power here to change anything, and I simply ask: why not do that, when human lives and those who served us are at risk? We must recognise and remember that we are not bureaucrats—we are politicians, and we must feel the pain of others and understand when we need to change. I was concerned that my own Government did not make that change before and, in a way, I am begging the Government to see it differently and to try to do something about it.

More and more ex-military and ex-security forces people are being targeted in Afghanistan. We know that; it is a fact. Executions are taking place all the time, but because we are not there and it is not on the television every day, we put it to one side. We forget that dead British servicemen were clapped through the towns because people recognised their bravery in being out there to help people and to support those who did not want that tyranny back in their country. We supported those servicemen, and we feel strongly for their bravery; why do we not feel the same for those who helped them and who helped many others to stay alive? Surely they are just as valuable to us as any British soldier who was saved by them. That is the cost, and that is the equation.

I simply say to the Minister that according to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan’s quarterly human rights update, the Taliban detained at least 23 former Government officials and members of the Afghan national security forces during this period. At least five were subjected to torture or other forms of ill treatment. Many of the arrests took place in Panjshir and Kabul, and were reportedly tied to alleged links to the National Resistance Front.

As I said earlier, I do not believe that this individual case is isolated. It exposes deep systematic failures in the ARAP scheme. The excessive bureaucracy and eligibility criteria are remarkable. The system as it stands is clearly ill equipped to deal with exceptional cases—there are many—such as this one. Most importantly, it fails to offer the necessary protection to those who are now at risk because of their loyalty to the UK and the British forces. As I said earlier, I know there are colleagues on both sides of the House who behave bravely and serve their country, including the Minister’s colleague who sits on the Front Bench.

I will finish my comments with this. Surely we must now change the scheme. We must be generous to those whose generosity with their lives has kept so many British lives safe. I know the restrictions of being at the Dispatch Box, and I know that civil servants will have said to the Minister, “Be very careful. You don’t want to step across this one, and you mustn’t make a pledge that we can’t consider. Don’t let that man put your career in danger.” I think putting our careers in danger is nothing compared with the actions of those who put their lives in danger for us.

I simply ask the Minister to pledge that he will do his utmost, that he will speak to the powers that be, and that he will bang on the door of No. 10 and demand that the Prime Minister take on this case and others personally. While we build up our armed forces, and look to have allies and people who will work with us, they will look back at how we treated those who came before and they will ask themselves, “Why do I serve with people who forget you when the deed is done?” I say to the Minister: let us not forget them. They are as brave and as important to us as the soldiers who were directly employed by us, who served us and who made sure that many were saved as a result.

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[Luke Pollard]

I entirely understand where the right hon. Gentleman is going with that argument. Under the criteria in the scheme we inherited from the previous Government, which we have continued, we have made the decision, with the exception of the Triples, to keep the eligibility decisions the same.

Let me turn to the Triples, which the right hon. Gentleman raised. I believe that the quote of the Secretary of State when in opposition was in relation to the very concerning situation—I believe it was a concern to him and to me when in opposition—that decisions were made in respect of the Afghan special forces, the Triples, that were inconsistent with the evidence that was being provided. We backed and called for the Triples review, which was initiated by my predecessor in the previous Government. Phase 1 of that review has now completed and we have achieved an overturn rate of around 30%. A written ministerial statement on that was published— I think last month—should the right hon. Gentleman want to refer to the full details.

In that work, we interrogated the data that was available. The record-keeping of that period was not good enough, as I have said from the Dispatch Box a number of times since taking office. As part of that trawl, we discovered information in relation to top-up payments, which previously had been excluded from the criteria because they did not constitute the relationship with the UK Government that would have created eligibility. Our belief is that the way those top-up payments were applied may now constitute a relationship that needs to be re-examined, so phase 2 of the Triples review, which will be the final phase of the review, is looking at top-up payments. It was right to do that, because there was a clear point.

In the case raised by the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green, I am very happy to try to see what is available to support it. I feel very deeply that we need to honour our obligations to those people who served alongside our forces, from the Afghan translators and interpreters who live in the constituency I represent, to the people who fought, and in some cases died, alongside our forces. The ARAP scheme is a generous scheme, but it was not intended, at its point of initiation or now, to cover all Afghans who fought in that conflict over 20 years. It was designed to support those who we can evidence had a close connection to UK forces, often defined by a contractual or payment relationship—in blunt plain-English terms—where a sizeable commitment has been made. That draws a line for some individuals who were employed by the Afghan national army, the Afghan Government and elements of the security structures that the Afghan Government had at that time, for which eligibility is not created despite their role. The Taliban regime has created chaos, instability and terror through many communities in Afghanistan since our departure. That is why, as a Government, we are trying to accelerate and deliver the Afghan scheme.

The hon. Member for North East Fife mentioned communications. That is entirely right. It is something I have been raising since becoming a Minister. We will introduce, from the autumn, a new series of communications designed to help people understand where their application is in the process. The new performance indicators will kick in from September time—roughly in the autumn—and that will seek to help people to understand where they are in the process. There is concern around understanding for how long a case will be dealt with. I also hope the performance indicators will have time-bound targets to help people be able to rate the performance of the Ministry of Defence. Certainly, when the Defence Secretary published his statement on the Afghan resettlement scheme at the end of last year, he made the case that we need to complete our obligation and bring the schemes to a close, and it is our objective to do so.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

rose—

[Wendy Chamberlain]

rose—

[Luke Pollard]

I will give way to the right hon. Gentleman; I hope the hon. Lady does not mind.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

We are close to running out of time, I understand that. If I may, I just stress that the failing I am referring relates to the fact that the officer who commanded the garrison met this man regularly and had him at meetings in which they discussed future operations. He was trusted. He fed them intelligence. He helped support them, so that they did not go into areas where they should not have gone. The major who worked with this guy also made a statement about how important he was, even though, officially, there was not some kind of P45 that tied him to our pay structure. The reality is that he served us. All I ask is that the Minister recognises that, goes away and says, “This is not good enough. This individual needs to be saved very soon.” He may be dead. We do not have much time.

[Luke Pollard]

I am happy to continue the conversation with the right hon. Gentleman in the days ahead.

Question put and agreed to.

Strategic Defence Review

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Monday 2nd June 2025 Commons Chamber

[John Healey]

We certainly have to change the procurement system. The Chancellor and I have already announced in the spring statement the way that we will ensure that the sort of innovation my hon. Friend talks about can move to contract far faster than it has done before, and that we can ensure that the sort of spiral development that the shadow Defence Secretary, the hon. Member for South Suffolk (James Cartlidge), first started to look at in Government can be pursued and put in place. We will do that; it is part of the procurement reforms that we are bringing into place. Pace, innovation and the new companies that have so much to offer are part of how we will do this in the future.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

Mark Rutte, the head of NATO, has said in the last few days that all NATO nations must achieve 3.5% of GDP on defence spending. I respect the Secretary of State a lot, and he has known me for a long time in this House. When he said on Saturday that there was “no doubt” that UK defence spending would rise to 3% by 2034, I nodded in approval and thought, “Great, they have a commitment.” By Sunday, however, that appeared not to be the case. Nobody here wants this strategic defence review to succeed more than I do, as I have never agreed with the idea of the peace dividend from start to finish. Russia, China, North Korea and Iran are all seen as threats, so will he now please get to the Dispatch Box as the character that he is and say that to achieve this we will need at least 3%, if not more, and that this Government will be committed to spending it?

[John Healey]

I say to the right hon. Gentleman: do not take it from me at the Dispatch Box—take it from the Prime Minister when he said that we will spend what is needed to deliver this review. He has made that commitment in the House; he has made that commitment today. The vision of this strategic defence review now becomes the mission of this Government to deliver.