(10 months, 1 week ago)
Written StatementsPosition, navigation and timing services are vital for the UK economy, Critical national infrastructure sectors and wider society. Nearly all PNT services in the UK are provided by global navigation satellite systems, including the US global positioning system (GPS).
In the 2021 integrated review of security, defence, development and foreign policy the Government committed to strengthen the resilience of the PNT services on which our CNI and economy depend. The loss of PNT services also features in the 2023 national risk register, the external version of the national security risk assessment (NSRA), which is the Government’s assessment of the most serious risks facing the UK.
I can today announce a Government policy framework for greater PNT resilience to meet this commitment in the Integrated Review.
National PNT Office: establish a National PNT Office in the Department of Science, Innovation and Technology—to improve resilience and drive growth with responsibility for PNT policy, co-ordination, and delivery.
PNT crisis plan: retain and update a cross-Government PNT crisis plan to be activated if GNSS-provided PNT is lost and identify and implement short term mitigations.
National timing centre: develop a proposal for a national timing centre—to provide resilient, terrestrial, sovereign, and high-quality timing for the UK (UTC(NPL)), including sovereign components and optical clocks.
“MOD Time”: develop a proposal for “MOD time” creating deeper resilience through a system of last resort and use NTC-provided timing to support MOD.
eLORAN: develop a proposal for a resilient, terrestrial, and sovereign enhanced long-range navigation (eLORAN) system to provide back-up position and navigation.
Infrastructure resilience: roll out resilient GNSS receiver chips, develop holdover clocks, and consider options for legislation on CNI sectors to require minimum resilient PNT.
UK SBAS: develop a proposal for a UK precise point positioning satellite-based augmentation system (SBAS-PPP) to replace the UK’s use of the European geostationary navigation overlay service (EGNOS), monitor GNSS and enable GNSS-dependent high accuracy position for autonomous and precision uses.
PNT skills: explore options for centres for doctoral training in timing and PNT and review PNT skills, education, and training for long term sovereign PNT capability.
Growth policy: develop a PNT growth policy, including R and D programmes, standards and testing, to drive innovation for PNT based productivity.
Next generation PNT: deploy existing R and D funding into a UK quantum navigator and investigate possible options for a UK sovereign regional satellite system.
This policy framework builds on the previous work in Government on PNT, including the 2018 Blackett report, “Satellite-derived Time and Position: A Study of Critical Dependencies” and the work of the UK Space Agency’s space-based PNT programme, which started in October 2020. The policy framework was produced by the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, which worked with the lead Government Departments responsible for the CNI sectors in the UK to develop this agreed cross-Government position on national PNT resilience. Experts on PNT, both within and outside Government, and representatives of the PNT industry were involved with and consulted as part of the work to develop this policy framework.
This policy framework sets out, for the first time, what Government plan to do to improve the resilience of PNT services and support the economic opportunities that they enable. For those actions that require additional spending commitments, the newly established National PNT Office in the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, point 1 of the policy framework, will work with other Government Departments over the coming months to develop business cases for this extra resource for consideration at the next spending round.
This PNT policy framework also supports the March 2023 UK science and technology framework and the UK becoming a science and technology superpower by 2030. It will lead to strategic advantage for the UK, create opportunities for greater international collaboration on PNT resilience, lead to greater investment in R and D and build PNT skills in the UK workforce.
As a first step to taking forward this policy framework I can also announce today that the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology reallocated £14 million of existing funding at the end of the last financial year to the National Physical Laboratory’s national timing centre research and development programme, which will now run until March 2025. This programme is the precursor to, and key building block of, developing a national timing centre, as outlined at point 3 of the policy framework.
The deployment of existing R and D funding into UK quantum navigation, in point 10 of the policy framework, is part of funding announced previously. This includes £8 million to fund 12 projects exploring quantum technologies for PNT that I announced during London Tech Week in June 2023, and a further £8.8 million for a specific quantum navigation project.
The UK Space Agency has also published today two documents from their space-based PNT programme: a summary of the technical concepts developed under the programme and an updated report on the economic impact to the UK of a disruption to global navigation satellite systems. I am placing a copy of both documents in the Libraries of both Houses.
[HCWS1073]
(11 months, 2 weeks ago)
General CommitteesI beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure (Security Requirements for Relevant Connectable Products) Regulations 2023.
It is a great pleasure, Mr Hollobone, to serve under your direction and leadership this afternoon.
Consumers have a right to assume that if a product is for sale, it is safe and secure; too often, that is not always the case. Government must act to ensure that when UK consumers and business customers are purchasing consumer connectable products, they are not putting themselves at risk of cyber-attack, theft or even physical danger. Through the draft regulations, the Government are ensuring that protections are implemented for our commonly used items such as smart phones, smart watches and smart baby monitors, and for the UK citizens and businesses that use them.
Cyber-crime is thought to cost the UK billions of pounds—the total cost is estimated at about £27 billion a year—and it is on the rise, in particular cyber-crime that targets the internet of things. Vulnerable IOT products are a key attack vector for criminals, allowing them to compromise not only the device, but potentially the user’s network and the broader connected technology ecosystem. This draft statutory instrument is an essential step in fighting the dangers of such cyber-risks.
The draft regulations are made under powers provided by the Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Act 2022 and the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020. The regulations will mandate the manufacturers of consumer connectable products made available to customers in the UK to meet minimum security requirements, unless excepted. The instrument completes the introduction of the UK’s world-first product security regime established by part 1 of the 2022 Act.
Subject to the approval of the Committee here gathered, the regime will afford UK citizens and businesses world-leading protections from the threats of cyber-crime. Research covering the first two months of this year shows that cyber-attacks targeting IOT devices have tripled since 2021, so the need for action has never been greater. The regime will also equip the Government with the tools to ensure the long-term security of a vital component of the broader UK technology ecosystem. That is especially important as frontier technologies, from artificial intelligence to quantum, allow technology to become more embedded in our economy and society than ever before.
I very much welcome the Government’s efforts to make consumer goods in the so-called internet of things safer and more secure and resilient against cyber-attack, but how confident is the Minister that the regime will work against a determined attack by a hostile state? Recently, the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament produced a report saying that China targets UK industry and technology “prolifically and aggressively”. Will the draft instrument be effective in protecting us from that kind of attack?
My right hon. Friend makes an important point. Perhaps I can come back to it in a bit more detail at the end of my comments, but I will make this point now: as I described, the measures will give a minimum level of security assurance to customers. This draft instrument is not the frontline, the arrowhead, of UK international counter-espionage; this is about ensuring that when people buy an iPhone or some such device, they can be confident that basic minimum standards have been met. It is not the basis on which we can all go to bed at night safe and secure, with the whole of UK critical national infrastructure secure. That work is being led by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Deputy Prime Minister.
I turn briefly to the basics of the draft instrument. First, on security requirements, the regulations mandate that manufacturers comply with the security arrangements that Parliament has set out in schedule 1. The security requirements are backed by security experts and have been consulted on extensively. In the view of the National Cyber Security Centre, which has been very involved, they will make the most fundamental difference to the vulnerability of consumer connectable products through the guidelines in the UK’s code of practice for consumer IOT security.
The first requirement bans businesses from selling to UK customers consumer smart products with universal defaults or easily guessable default passwords. Such passwords expose users to unacceptable risk of cyber-attack and allow malicious actors to compromise products at scale, equipping them with the computing power to launch significantly disruptive cyber-attacks.
Secondly, manufacturers will be required to publish, in an accessible, clear and transparent manner, the details of a point of contact for the reporting of security vulnerabilities. Despite previous Government interventions and the increasing threat of cyber-crime targeted at these products, less than a third of global manufacturers had any policy for how they can be made aware of vulnerabilities as of 2022.
The final security requirement will ensure that the minimum length of time for which a product will receive security updates is not just published, but published in an accessible, clear and transparent manner. Consumers value security and consider it when purchasing products. Equipped with the vital information mandated by this requirement, UK customers and their intermediaries will be able to drive manufacturers to improve the security protections that they offer through market forces.
I will turn to the conditions for deemed compliance. Where the security outcomes that we are seeking to achieve are entirely or partially delivered through broader international standards, the regime allows manufacturers compliant with those standards to more readily demonstrate their compliance with our security requirements. That is the intent of regulation 4, and schedule 2 sets out conditions based on analogous provisions in two leading international standards. Where those conditions are met, a manufacturer is to be treated as having complied with a particular security requirement. Colleagues will be pleased to know that we have tried to take the opportunity to reduce process-driven bureaucracy and make it easy for proper compliance to be demonstrated in the interest of consumer protection.
The excepted products protocol in the instrument sets out a list of products that we have exempted from the scope of the product security regime. First, select product categories made available for supply in Northern Ireland are exempted. That exemption ensures that the regime upholds the UK’s international commitments under the EU withdrawal agreement while extending the protections and benefits offered by the regime to consumers and businesses across the UK. Additionally, smart charge points, medical devices and smart metering devices are exempted to avoid double regulation and to ensure that those products are secured with the measures most appropriate to the particulars of their functions. To answer the point raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet, we would not want to rely on these regulations alone for the safety of medical devices; they are covered, quite rightly, by far more extensive regulations through the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency.
I welcome the instrument in general terms, but I have a couple of quick questions. The Minister mentioned that Northern Ireland is outwith the scope of this regime because of its interaction with the European Union as it stands today. In effect, that treats Northern Ireland as not part of the United Kingdom for these purposes. Am I correct in thinking that?
Secondly, I completely agree with the cut-outs for medical devices, smart meters and so on. The Minister may need some inspiration on this, but are vehicles included in the minimum standards, given that lots of them now have autopilot systems and software updates to undertake week in, week out, and passcodes included in the software?
Those are two excellent questions. On Northern Ireland, basically the answer is no. This goes with the grain of the Windsor framework that the Prime Minister has negotiated, and it recognises that for the purposes of consumer standards, Northern Ireland is governed by the EU proposals in this space. I am delighted to say that the UK proposals are a little quicker, more agile and fleet of foot, and to some extent that might give Northern Ireland manufacturers an advantage. Perhaps I could come back to the point about vehicles; it is an important point to which the internet of things is very relevant.
The instrument also exempts laptops, desktop computers and tablets without a cellular connection from the regime scope. Engagement with industry highlighted that the manufacturers of those products would face completely unique challenges in complying with the regime. On many occasions where those products are in use, they are already subject to extensive cyber-protection standards. It is therefore not clear at this stage that including those products in the regime scope would be proportionate. However, as with so many of these things, I am happy and keen to keep a watching eye on that to ensure that we are keeping up with technology.
The administrative provisions in the SI, including those relating to statements of compliance, are uncontroversial. The regime will require that those documents are company products serving as an audit trail to enable compliance across the supply chain and to facilitate effective enforcement. We do not expect every single consumer to read all of that every time they buy a pair of speakers or any digital device, but the active intermediaries on behalf of consumers will be able to access it, and we foresee an active enforcement culture, not least online.
The product security regime, including these regulations, is the first in the world to recognise that the public has a right to expect that the products available for them to purchase are secure, and that the Government have a duty to enforce that. The measures will cement the UK as a world leader in responsibly embracing the enormous potential of emerging technology. They are a first step in the development of a framework that will keep pace with technology. I commend the regulations to the Committee.
The Committee will be delighted to know that the debate can continue until half past seven.
Tempted though I am to delay the Committee with long, exhaustive answers to all those points, which were well made, perhaps I could reassure colleagues on both sides of the House that we have thought about them. Some important points were made for the record, and I will try to keep my speech as short as possible. I thank you, Mr Hollobone, and the Committee: the feedback is incredibly helpful. I would value a chance to continue this discussion with those who have spoken today, many of whom have taken an interest in this subject for a long time.
Let me start with the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central, speaking for the Opposition. I congratulate her on returning to the position that I like to think of as my shadow. It has been a pleasure working with her. I also congratulate her on being the first to mention the internet of things in this House if indeed that is verifiable—I am sure it is, digitally as well as in many other ways. On the accusation that the Government were a bit slow to move in 2021, I will just gently point out that there were some other things going on, not least the pandemic, and that we are in fact, with this, quicker than the EU that we have just left. This is an example of us being more agile and more forward-leaning.
I will also make this point. Many of us have sat through and nodded through European legislation, knowing that there is really nothing we can do to change it. This is a good example of Members of Parliament, from both sides of the House, raising important points and the Minister listening, to ensure that we get our own legislation right. I think that if we had done that a bit more, we would not have had the frustrations that we did.
On the point about the hackers having a head start, I think the truth is that technology is moving at such a pace that of course those who want to harness technology for ill generally tend to move much more quickly than the Government. That would be true were the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central in my position. What we are doing today is moving to shut down that head start. There are genuine questions about how quickly we move and how we get it right. I make the commitment to all colleagues that this is a start and we intend to have an annual process of listening to colleagues in the House, listening to the industry and asking whether we should not be going further faster to keep up with technology. The Opposition, I know, have the monopoly on hindsight, led as they are by the extremely able Leader of the Opposition, often referred to as Captain Hindsight. I will just point out that none of us quite foresaw the pace at which this would all move. I know that Government are often not the fastest mover, but we are, here, moving more quickly than partners in Europe.
I am on a roll. I have to say that no one cheered more loudly than when I heard the hon. Member talk about business certainty. As the right hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington is a member of the Committee, I cannot help but point out that the biggest business certainty was making sure that he never became Chancellor, with his agenda of radical socialism and neo-communism. I notice—for the record—that he is no longer in his place, which is probably a good thing for business certainty.
Let me turn to the points that were raised. Perhaps, with your permission, Mr Hollobone, I can write to everyone with an update on our thinking about the timetable. We are looking to get the regulations in place as quickly as we possibly can. Perhaps I can come back to the point about the timetable, because it requires a detailed answer.
As I said, I will deal with the various points that were made. On the question of exemptions, this is a start. The Government are initially mandating security requirements that, in the opinion of the National Cyber Security Centre—this is not just my whim; it has been consulted on deeply—will have the most fundamental impact on the risks posed today by insecure consumer connectable products. We are confident that the requirements are robustly evidenced, are proportionate and are appropriate to mandate in law at this time. That is not a step we take lightly. The real key is to change the culture and to create a culture in which distributors and all those involved in the supply chains know that they are required by law to do this; they have a responsibility to consumers. However, should the Government deem it appropriate, the parent Act empowers Ministers to introduce further measures in the future, to keep pace with the changes in technology and the threat landscape. Those are powers that we intend to use, in consultation with the House.
Let me turn to the point about security updates, which a number of colleagues raised. The Government do not yet consider it appropriate to mandate and specify minimum security update periods for relevant connectable products, before the impact of the initial security requirements is known. Our mandating necessarily broad regulation across a sector as inherently complex as technology security will always run the risk of imposing obligations on businesses that are disproportionate to the associated security benefits, or leaving citizens exposed to cyber-threats. There is no consensus yet in the industry. One of the things that we hope this measure will do is trigger a broader conversation, on the timescale that we need—each year—to talk to industry about what is happening and ensure that we are keeping up to date.
Let me pick up the point about digital exclusions. A number of people asked, through the consultation, why conventional computers and non-cellular tablets were exempt. We do not have evidence at the moment that including them in the scope of the regime would significantly reduce risk. There is a mature anti-virus-software market that empowers customers to secure their own devices and, alongside this, mainstream operating system vendors already include security features in their services. As ever, we legislate in a way that we think is timely, appropriate and proportionate, trying to deal not with every single risk that one might envisage, but with those that are faced by consumers today. The result is that those devices are not subject to the same level of risk as others.
Let me turn to the point about Northern Ireland made by my hon. Friend the Member for Windsor and others. Customers across the UK will be able to benefit from the security protections that the regime aims to deliver. For selected product categories, honouring the UK’s international commitments has necessitated that the regime will apply differently in Northern Ireland. I stress that, in practice, the exemption applies to limited types of products, such as lifts, pyrotechnic articles and personal watercraft, which are regulated already under legislation contained in the Windsor framework.
We are required to ensure the smooth flow of trade under the United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020. The Prime Minister has also committed to ensuring smooth-flowing trade within the UK. The House should be reassured that the Government’s position on that is unchanged. My hon. Friend the Member for South Thanet made another, equally important point that we need to ensure that that does not inadvertently allow in a flow of products that would not be compliant.
My hon. Friend the Member for Windsor asked about how we are dealing with automotive vehicles and the internet of things in cars. As we indicated in the April 2021 call for views on the regime, the Government intend to introduce separate regulation to cover the cyber-security of connectable automotive vehicles. To minimise an unnecessarily duplicative regulatory burden on industry, our position remains that cars should be exempted from these draft regulations, because we will be introducing a different framework. Developments in the legislative landscape have precluded the Government from including an exemption for connectable automotive vehicles in this, but we intend to bring forward that legislation as quickly as possible.
I will finish these points, if I may.
On enforcement, astute colleagues have observed that it falls under the Department for Business and Trade. The previous Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, the Minister for Small Business Consumers and Labour Markets, approved the recommendation for the OPSS to adopt the enforcement role for part 1 of the 2022 Act. The OPSS is part of the DBT and will therefore simply be enforcing the product security regime as the Secretary of State. It will begin enforcement functions as soon as the draft regulations come into force. To the question, I am reassured that the OPSS is properly resourced.
I have some final points. On the international aspect of the IOT security measures, the proportionality of implementing a given cyber-security measure for a product depends on a huge range of factors, from the product’s technical architecture to the settings in which it is ultimately deployed in. The Government are therefore mindful of the risk of imposing obligations on businesses that may in many cases be disproportionate. The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Deputy Prime Minister, and the National Cyber Security Centre are keeping an active watch on the importance of updating that.
On SME information, I am absolutely delighted to undertake that we will provide tailored information and guidance to assist small and micro-businesses. As colleagues have observed, they do not always have the relevant bandwidth to keep abreast of technology.
My hon. Friend the Member for South Thanet asked whether the self-certification and compliance mechanism—the duty placed on manufacturers—is sufficient to cover the risk. My answer to that would be that the draft statutory instrument is in our judgment the right place to start, but it is a start. We did not want to introduce heavy-handed legislation on day one, which would undermine business confidence and trigger huge fears in the industry. We wanted to start with something that everyone could at least acknowledge—our very important basic standards—then develop that, through consultation with the House, in a proportionate and agile way. I reinforce my comments on how that is a rather different approach from the EU one.
The hon. Member for Walthamstow made an important point about consumers. On the point about SMEs, we are actively engaging with consumer groups and we will ensure that any of their concerns are also reflected in our ongoing updates.
Will the Minister clarify a simple point? Would a consumer’s guarantee be voided were they to use one of the items overseas, or if they brought an item here and used it on their connection, because there are now two different regimes?
The hon. Member makes an important point. Perhaps I could clarify that in my written note to all Members to follow up. I think everyone would be interested in the enforceability of consumer rights.
I am sure the Committee will be pleased to know that I will not take up the Minister’s provocation as to whether waiting 14 years to address security on the internet of things is a question of hindsight. Can the Minister clarify two points that I may have misunderstood? I heard him say that distributors did have a requirement on them to publicise the information about software upgrades. I may have misunderstood that because I thought it was only manufacturers who did.
More importantly, on cars, I think the Minister is saying that autonomous vehicles are exempted. I may have missed exactly where autonomous vehicles are exempted—it was not in the list of exemptions that I had. I am happy to take a clarification on that. Obviously, not all cars are autonomous vehicles, but is the assumption that any car that has an internet connection is in some way an autonomous vehicle?
All distributors already have a duty to ensure that the goods they are selling and distributing are legal. What we are doing is placing the onus on manufacturers. Distributors take their responsibility to consumers very seriously, and the vast majority will be very concerned and actively move to ensure they are not distributing illegal goods. It is not that there is not an onus on distributors; it is that we are implementing it via the mechanism.
On the point about cars, I did not want to mislead the House—I say this as the previous Minister for the future of transport—but we are in the process of putting together legislation on the digital vehicle and the internet of things in not just autonomous vehicles but smart and intelligent vehicles generally. It is to that process that we are deferring; this SI is not focused on that.
With that, I think I have addressed the points raised. I will happily write to the Committee, and if there are any points that I have not raised, Members should feel free to collar me between now and the picking up of my pen.
We await the Minister’s letter with huge anticipation and great excitement.
Question put and agree to.
Resolved,
That the Committee has considered the draft Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure (Security Requirements for Relevant Connectable Products) Regulations 2023.
(1 year, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberBetter commercialising our UK research is completely key to our global science superpower and domestic innovation nation missions, and a key component of our science and technology framework and this Department’s work. I am delighted to report that spin-outs from universities have gone up sixfold in the past nine years, to £2.5 billion last year, and in the life sciences sector that has gone up 1000% since we took office. We are creating jobs and opportunities for innovation clusters all around the UK, including in west London.
We have just heard about uncertainty about Horizon. In addition, there are no more European structural funds and under-investment in R&D. We are hurtling down the global rankings for clinical research trials. The Minister just mentioned life sciences, but last week Novartis, the Swiss pharma giant, pulled out of a major trial for cardiovascular drugs in this country for those very reasons. When will the Government admit that, rather than an example of confidence in the world-beating, post-Brexit life sciences sector that the ex-Health Secretary who went to the jungle claimed at the time it would be, that decision shows what an unmitigated disaster Brexit has been? When will they fix this mess?
Here we go—Labour talking Britain down again. The truth is that I am not at all complacent about the clinical trials numbers. At the Life Sciences Council, in the next few weeks, we will be setting out a very clear plan to reverse the decline since the pandemic in the NHS.
The hon. Lady might have mentioned the major investment coming into west London—her part of the world—including the MedTech SuperConnector, the spin-outs there and SynbiCITE, the synthetic biology hub. She might at least acknowledge the major investment —billions of pounds—from Moderna and BioNTech into this country, laying the foundation for a next phase of science innovation. With the life sciences sector, we are in a global race, but we are still leading in the technologies of tomorrow.
Can my hon. Friend comment on the Department’s 10-point science and technology framework, which will help provide the long-term funding needed to turn the start-ups he has mentioned into sustainable, successful, globally leading businesses?
I thank my hon. Friend, who has been a strong champion of that agenda. In the new Department’s science and technology framework we have set out a long-term, 10-year view of the serious reforms that we need to make to procurement, regulation and skills across the whole of Government if we are to drive our science superpower agenda. A fundamental part of that is converting the health of our start-up ecosystem into scale-ups. That is why the Treasury is leading on the re-regulation of pension funds—so that we can unlock some of our pension trillions and put it into supporting our companies to grow here rather than go to NASDAQ.
Having worked on coalfield regeneration in the north-east, I am delighted to report that it is becoming a science and technology powerhouse economy in the UK. I have been up three times since taking on this role, particularly to see NETPark, the extraordinary north-east technology park, whose third phase of expansion has now been announced. We put £5 million into helping it grow, and world-class companies such as Kromek are now there. We have also put £5 million into the Northern Accelerator in collaboration with six north-east universities, and we have nine Catapult hubs in the north-east. Let us say it loud and clear: the north-east is building the new economy of tomorrow.
Led by Durham University, the Northern Accelerator has invested more than £100 million in partner university spin-outs in the past five years, bringing skilled jobs and opportunities to my constituents and across the region, but if the Minister is really serious about levelling up Durham, can he explain why the north-east receives just 4% of Research England’s budget and six times less money than London?
I pay tribute to the hon. Lady’s leadership on this issue, because it is really important. Traditionally, our research funding follows excellence, and that is why, say, Northumbria University has shot up the league tables in the last few years from 42nd to 16th—it is knocking on the door of the Russell Group—and the northern universities are delivering increasingly excellent science. But there is something else. Last year there was £50 billion-worth of private investment in research and development, which is matching the public investment, and as we go to £20 billion of public R&D, a wave of private money will start to come into the north-east. The answer to her question is that this is about building the applied science into the industries of tomorrow, which the north-east is doing.
Does the Minister agree that the Catapult centres in the north-east, as well as the manufacturing technology centre in my constituency, are the way forward in commercialising some of the great ideas that are coming from the academic world?
Yes, I absolutely agree. That is why we have put £1.9 billion into the Catapult network—our network for deep industrial collaboration with our universities. In the north-east, we have the offshore renewables Catapult in Blyth, the digital Catapult in Sunderland and the satellite applications Catapult in Durham. This is a deep investment in the north-east economy of tomorrow.
One of the companies based in NETPark is Pragmatic Semiconductor, which is innovating chip production. It has indicated that it would consider moving its operations overseas if the UK fails to produce a semiconductor strategy that funds and supports chip production. We have been asking for this strategy for years now, so can the Minister assure the House not only that the strategy is imminent and will be published very shortly, but that it will properly fund and support companies such as Pragmatic?
Yes. The Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, my hon. Friend the Member for Sutton and Cheam (Paul Scully), has already met the company concerned, and in a matter of days we will be setting out the semiconductor strategy, which will answer exactly the question that the hon. Lady has raised.
Last month, Sir Patrick Vallance stepped down as the Government’s chief scientific adviser after five years in the role, in which Government investment in science has doubled. Most of all, he became a household name through his handling of covid and the leadership that he showed then. Will the Secretary of State join me in thanking Sir Patrick for all his service to the country and in welcoming his successor, Dame Angela McLean, and wishing her all the best in the role?
May I, as Science Minister on behalf of the Government, pay tribute to Sir Patrick and thank Dame Angela for taking on the role? Sir Patrick has been a stalwart servant for science and for this country during difficult times.
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt is a great privilege to open the batting for the new Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. Not since the white heat of technology under Harold Wilson have a Government put more money into research. I know the Opposition will welcome this Department.
No sector embodies the opportunity more than space. That is why, in the past 10 years, we are proud to have doubled the size of the sector to £16 billion. We set out a £10 billion plan for the next decade. Through regulatory leadership, insurance and finance in the City, £400 million in earth observation and our cluster programme, we intend to grow this economy all around the country.
As a science geek, I love this new Department. The Chelmsford-based company Teledyne e2v is the world leader in space imaging. When the earthquake hit Turkey and Syria, its technology from way up there in space pinpointed the exact location of collapsed businesses, sent rescuers to the spot and saved lives. It also provides crucial monitoring of our planet’s air, oceans and volcanos via the Copernicus programme. The European Space Agency wants to continue to use e2v tech for the next generation of Copernicus satellites, so will the UK continue to participate in Copernicus post-2024 so that companies like e2v can continue to sell to—
Order. The right hon. Lady, as much as she might be a science geek, ought to know that questions need to be shorter to give somebody else a chance. Put in for an urgent question. Come on in, Minister.
I pay tribute to Teledyne, which is a great company. That is why we have put £1.8 billion through the European Space Agency, so that little companies like that here in the UK can benefit. On Friday, I visited Space East. We support the cluster it is a part of. Following the Northern Ireland protocol agreement, the Windsor framework, we are actively discussing with the EU the membership of Horizon, Copernicus and Euratom, and funding earth observation programmes in any case.
I welcome anything that focuses on science and technology. It has to be good for our country. On the domestic space industry, I very much welcome what the Minister has just said. However, if we are to grow the sector, we need the next generation of mathematicians, scientists, engineers and computer programmers. What is he doing to ensure that the education and training system brings forward the workforce for tomorrow?
That is an excellent question because skills are key. All around the country we are growing space clusters. Just yesterday we launched Leicester Space East, which is part of the national network. We prioritised skills in the science and technology framework, published last Monday. The UK Space Agency has an active skills programme and we are working with UKspace to set out a map of the jobs that are being created—380,000 in this economy over the next 10 years. We intend to ensure that our higher education and further education sector is supplying them.
The Westcott Space Cluster in my constituency is a tour de force of innovative excellence, with a particular focus on ensuring small and medium-sized enterprises can use open access testing facilities, such as through the satellite applications catapult DISC. Does my hon. Friend agree that that open access support is essential? Will he visit Westcott to see it for himself?
Next month, I will be joining the team from HyImpulse at the SaxaFord spaceport in Shetland to see the hot fire test of its new HyPLOX75 motor. Like many companies in the sector, it is very keen to know when we will get an announcement regarding the space flight phase 2 programme. When will we get that announcement? If we are not going to go ahead with that programme, what will the Government be doing to encourage companies like HyImpulse to do their business in Scotland?
I was in Scotland just a few weeks ago meeting the team behind the Shetland and Sutherland launch. We are committed to launch in both Cornwall and Scotland. We are providing funding to support those two spaceports. I will happily come and visit when I am next up. In Scotland, Buckinghamshire and all around the country, we are growing space clusters to give jobs and opportunities to a new generation.
We should all be incredibly proud that nowhere is driving the science and technology revolution more than the north-east economy. It was a powerhouse of the previous industrial revolution and is that again now. I was recently in Newcastle visiting the University of Newcastle and Northumbria University. Spinouts from Newcastle raised £47 million, which is a record. The NETPark North East Technology Park, home to 65 growing companies, has just announced its third phase. It is home to Kromek, one of our top sensor companies. We put £5 million into the Northern Accelerator, a collaboration between six universities, and we have nine catapult centres in the north-east. We are driving the north-east economic renaissance.
The north-east is a centre of science excellence in offshore wind, life sciences, batteries and much more. We are home to 3,500 tech firms, which bring £2 billion to our local economy. European structural funds provide support to small and medium-sized enterprises to start up, innovate and grow, but all that stops at the end of this month. What will the Minister do to ensure that that support for development continues?
That is an excellent question. We have set out the shared prosperity fund, which is now fully deployed around the country. We have made the commitment to increase domestic research and development outside the greater south-east by 40% between now and 2030, and 50% of Government R&D in the old Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy was outside the greater south-east. I do not want to pre-empt the Chancellor, but this afternoon there will be announcements about how we support regional science and technology growth.
Nissan in Sunderland is one of the most productive plants in the whole Nissan network. What meetings has the Minister had with Nissan about its work?
Since arriving in this new portfolio I have not had any meetings with Nissan, but as a Department we are actively picking up the clean tech piece and the future energy technologies piece, and we are working with a range of companies, as well as with the Department for Business and Trade and the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero.
Across the country, our regions are home to thousands of brilliant science start-ups and spin-outs, but they are being hit by a Tory quadruple whammy: slashing R&D tax credits, leaving with them an average of £100,000 less to spend on research a year; a £120-million cliff-edge loss of European regional development funding; lack of access to capital—the UK has the lowest business investment in the G7; and continuing uncertainty over association with the £95-billion Horizon Europe, the biggest science fund in the world. Which of those barriers to growth for our innovative businesses will the Minister sort out today?
It is a great shame that the shadow spokeswoman is so determined to talk the UK down. The truth is that in the last 10 years, the life sciences sector has grown 1,000%. The north-east, where she is from, is driving that. I do not recognise that the UK sector is being held back in the way that she says, but the Chancellor will say more this afternoon about the tax and business environment. The reason that R&D tax credits are up so much is that our innovation economy has gone from 1.7% of GDP to 2.8%. That is a huge success over the last 10 years, and we are responsible for it.
Over the last two years, not only have we continued to negotiate in good faith to see through the agreement that we made to join Horizon, Copernicus and Euratom, but we have continued to fund the sector—with just over £1.2 billion, including £370 million this week and £480 million before Christmas—and we look forward to discussing the European associations shortly.
My right hon. Friend has made an excellent point. It is a very exciting facility, which will see this country lead in the industrial deployment of fusion connectivity to the grid.
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Ministerial CorrectionsWe have set up RCAT as a specialist advisory group in the Cabinet Office, connected to our intelligence agencies, so that it can check quickly whether a partner is benign, hostile or dangerous.
[Official Report, 8 March 2023, Vol. 729, c. 119WH.]
Letter of correction from the Minister of State, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, the hon. Member for Mid Norfolk (George Freeman):
An error has been identified in my response to the debate.
The correct response should have been:
We have set up RCAT as a specialist advisory group in the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, connected to our intelligence agencies, so that it can check quickly whether a partner is benign, hostile or dangerous.
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Ministerial CorrectionsLet me start, as the right hon. Gentleman did, by reminding listeners and viewers of what a success story British genomics has been, going right back to Watson and Crick’s famous pint in the Eagle in Cambridge—and, in this International Women’s Week and week of women’s science, let us not forget the third discoverer of DNA, the great Mary Black at King’s College London.
[Official Report, 8 March 2023, Vol. 729, c. 117WH.]
Letter of correction from the Minister of State, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, the hon. Member for Mid Norfolk (George Freeman):
An error has been identified in my response to the debate.
The correct response should have been:
Let me start, as the right hon. Gentleman did, by reminding listeners and viewers of what a success story British genomics has been, going right back to Watson and Crick’s famous pint in the Eagle in Cambridge—and, in this International Women’s Week and week of women’s science, let us not forget the third discoverer of DNA, the great Rosalind Franklin at King’s College London.
I had been prepared to pay tribute to the work of BGI when my officials pointed out that at that point Genomics England was suffering several hack attacks from BGI each week.
[Official Report, 8 March 2023, Vol. 729, c. 120WH.]
Letter of correction from the Minister of State, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, the hon. Member for Mid Norfolk (George Freeman):
An error has been identified in my response to the debate.
The correct response should have been:
There is no evidence of attempted hacking of Genomics England in 2014 from BGI.
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Davies. I thank the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) for bringing this important issue to the House. He and I both know how important the subject is and that the Chamber is not full because of the business going on elsewhere. I reassure him that we take this issue very seriously. Some of things that we are doing are not in the public domain, for obvious reasons, but I will answer his questions. I agree with just about everything that he said, so we are very much on the same page.
Let me start, as the right hon. Gentleman did, by reminding listeners and viewers of what a success story British genomics has been, going right back to Watson and Crick’s famous pint in the Eagle in Cambridge—and, in this International Women’s Week and week of women’s science, let us not forget the third discoverer of DNA, the great Mary Black at King’s College London, who often gets left out of the story—through the work that Fred Sanger and his team did at the University of Cambridge on the structure of DNA and how it works, and right up to our leadership in genetic research and medicine in the UK.
It is worth saying that that leadership is not just in human genomics but in animal and plant genomics. I was recently up in Scotland visiting the Roslin Institute and the James Hutton Institute. Across the UK, we have such an understanding of not only genomics across humans, animals and plants, and their diseases, but the application of those genomics to help to develop drought-resistant crops for Africa and disease-resistant crops that do not need to be sprayed with highly carbon-intensive pesticides. The underpinning technology is fundamental to net zero and global sustainability, to allowing agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa and to improving nutrition and health around the world. The front end now is cancer and rare disease, but the revolution in technology will drive sustainability and prosperity around the world over the coming decades.
I am delighted to respond to this debate, not least because, when I was the Minister for Life Science in the coalition Government, I had the great privilege of setting up Genomics England, which was our first big move to capture our leadership in this global race. I remind the House that we set up Genomics England very carefully as a reference library, not a lending library. Some 100,000 NHS volunteers and patients offered to be sequenced—it was not just the snip, which is the bit of DNA segment that we know is implicated in disease, but the whole of their genome. We could then look at whole-genome analysis at scale and link it to someone’s phenotype, life cycle and hospital records, and start to shine a light on the real insights into the mechanisms of disease. We might discover that men over the age of 55 with red hair, a beard and early-onset diabetes are more likely to respond to a particular drug than others. The work transforms not only the business of drug discovery but diagnosis, and it accelerates access for patients to treatments.
We originally focused GEL—Genomics England—on cancer and rare disease, which is where the appliance of genomics is most urgent and transformational, but we were clear that it was never going to be a lending library, so nobody would ever have access to an individual patient genome or an individual patient record. Researchers could interact with the database for the basis of research, but they would never be able to take out of the library any of the core data. I pay tribute to all the people at GEL, because in the 10 years since it was launched there have not been huge debates in Parliament or any scandals. People have not been marching up and down. In fact, thousands of NHS patients have happily enrolled and, through Biobank, we have taken the number of NHS volunteers to half a million. I pay tribute to the team behind that work. It is possible to build these datasets. We were absolutely clear that it was embedded in the values of the NHS: one for all, all for one, and shared data for national as well as personal good.
Alongside GEL, there is the UK Biobank, the National Institute for Health and Care Research BioResource, and now Our Future Health, which is looking at longitudinal datasets. We have not just done the deep science; we are building an ecosystem of genomically informed medical research and medicine in the NHS. I was particularly proud that we launched the NHS genomic medicine service. It is about not just science but research to drive better medicine in the NHS. In the NHS around the country, genomic medicine clinics are now accelerating access for researchers and patients.
The right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland is right, as was the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon), that we are in a global race in so many of these technologies, and particularly in genomics. In my recent speeches, I have set out what we mean by being a science superpower. It is not just a glib phrase. I define it not just as, first, world-class science—and with two of the world’s top three universities, we are a world-class research centre. To be a science superpower we need, secondly, to go out and solve some of the problems in the world, not just study them; thirdly, to recognise that science is conducted in international, global career paths and put the UK at the hub of those networks; fourthly, to insist on attracting much more industrial research and development, to help to drive this country out of post-pandemic recession and get long-term investment; and fifthly, and crucially, to insist on and stand up for the values on which science is conducted: free speech, critical thinking, respect for intellectual property and respect for law, in a collaborative setting. That is true on our own campuses—we will never be a science superpower if we have a cancel culture calling out and preventing free speech—and is equally true internationally. We will not be a superpower unless we take a stand against other countries that aggressively use science and steal intellectual property.
I have put the research security agenda right at the heart of our definition. Here in the UK, in 2020 we set out the Genome UK 10-year genetic healthcare strategy, with £175 million for life-saving programmes around cancer and rare diseases. We have set out the UK biological security strategy, recognising exactly the points made by the right hon. Gentleman about biosecurity in an interconnected world. In the pandemic, we saw the cost of disease to the global economy, as well as to our own, and we glimpsed the value of health and strong health resilience. That is biosecurity in terms of human health, but we are also in a world in which more and more food products and animal products are transported, and where climate change is driving new patterns of migration in insects and animals. There is a growing threat of infectious disease—pathogen biosecurity—which is one of the issues that our new economic security cabinet has looked at. We have now refreshed our biological security strategy.
Research security is at the heart of our international collaborations. Last year, I signed an agreement with Sweden, and there is a similar one with Thailand. In my work internationally, at the G7 Science Ministers summit in Japan this year and at the G20, we have led in putting research security on the table internationally as a key issue that we must all work on.
I want to bring the Minister on to the point about BGI. I think we are aggressively agreeing with each other here, essentially because we are talking on parallel lines. Will he address the point about BGI and similar companies, and their need to comply or else be treated differently?
Absolutely; it is as if the right hon. Gentleman has read my notes.
Here in the UK, we are toughening up our regime. The National Institute for Health and Care Research has a set of very clear principles, as does UK Research and Innovation. We have set up the research collaboration advice team—RCAT—which is a new system to help all our researchers across the UK ecosystem with advice and support. We insist that they exercise due diligence if they sign a collaboration with, say, the “South China Sea research collaboration company”. We do not expect all our researchers to be policemen and women, but we do expect them—and they are now required—to show due diligence before they sign some lucrative research agreement.
We have set up RCAT as a specialist advisory group in the Cabinet Office, connected to our intelligence agencies, so that it can check quickly whether a partner is benign, hostile or dangerous. That system has been working well since we set it up a year ago. The team is in the Cabinet Office, 350 queries have been handled, and we are getting international visits from people who congratulate us on getting it right, although a lot more remains to be done.
I reassure the right hon. Gentleman that we have an economic security cabinet, which I joined three weeks ago. It looks much more strategically and in granular detail across exposure to hostile actors in the UK economy. That includes everything from genomics to the biosecurity piece that I have discussed, along with semiconductors, space and cyber-security—the whole piece. We are now in a global race not just with our benign competitors but with hostile actors who wish to use science and technology to hold us back and undermine us, or to steal our science and technology for their own use.
BGI is clearly one of those danger points in the ecosystem. I share with the House the fact that, in 2014, I was wheeled out to give a speech on the occasion of the visit of President Xi to the Guildhall. When President Xi and then Prime Minister Cameron were wheeled in, I was speaking to around 1,000 Chinese delegates about Genomics England. I had been prepared to pay tribute to the work of BGI when my officials pointed out that at that point Genomics England was suffering several hack attacks from BGI each week. That was a wake-up call for all of us.
We are well aware that we have to manage such risks properly. On that point, I commissioned and have literally just received from UKRI a detailed assessment of all the China research and innovation links across our system—we did the same last year for Russia. I have passed that through to my right hon. Friend the Minister for Security. He and I, and our officials, will go through it shortly in detail, looking in particular at some of the actors such as BGI that we know to be aggressive in their international acquisition of intellectual property.
I reassure the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland that we have put research security at the heart of discussions at the G7 and G20. If we are to harness science and technology for global good and to deliver that extraordinary opportunity of helping to feed, fuel and heal emerging populations safely, international collaboration will be required. However, we have to ensure that we defend not only the values of good and open science but our own economic security, and that we get the balance right. We do not want to conduct research only with our strong, strategic, military partners, but we want to defend our values.
The right hon. Gentleman made an interesting point about critical national infrastructure that I will pick up in the economic security cabinet. It is a point that I have made in connection with another bit of our science infrastructure. We all recognise that the threats now mean that we need to think about the value of other infrastructure. I will come back to him on that.
The right hon. Gentleman made an important broader point about how the Government handle data. It is fair to say that the pandemic revealed the best and the worst, in a way. The NHS put together the world’s biggest clinical trial—not just bigger than the next one but bigger than the next 10, and faster than any of them—which was an incredible operation, embedded in the values of the NHS, and it worked brilliantly. Equally, the clunkiness of some testing data feedback from different towns and regions held back some decisions. I think the role of data will be rightly highlighted in the covid review.
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for bringing this subject to the House. I will come back to him on the CPNI point. I look forward to pursuing the subject with him in future.
Question put and agreed to.