Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-eighth sitting)

Danny Kruger Excerpts
None Portrait The Chair
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Would everyone ensure that all electronic devices are turned off or switched to silent mode? Tea and coffee are not allowed in the Committee Room. I remind Members that interventions should be short, and raise points of clarification or questions; they should not be speeches in and of themselves. Members who do wish to give a speech should bob and continue to do so throughout the debate that they wish to speak in, until they are called. When Members say “you”, they are referring to the Chair. “You” should not be used to refer to each other. Debate should come through the Chair.

Clause 32

Secretary of State’s powers to ensure assistance is available

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger (East Wiltshire) (Con)
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I beg to move amendment 525, in clause 32, page 19, line 26, leave out subsection (2).

None Portrait The Chair
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With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 537, in clause 32, page 19, line 27, after “assistance” insert

“by a registered charity but not”.

This amendment would limit the provision of an assisted death to charitable providers and not permit provision as part of the National Health Service.

Amendment 528, in clause 32, page 19, line 27, at end insert—

“(2A) Regulations under subsection (1) cannot authorise a body other than a public authority from providing such assistance even if that body is to be contracted by a public authority to do so.”

Amendment 529, in clause 32, page 19, line 28, leave out subsection (3).

Amendment 530, in clause 32, page 19, line 31, at end insert—

“(5) The Secretary of State may not lay a draft statutory instrument before either House of Parliament that makes provision containing (whether alone or with other provision) regulations under subsection (1) unless they also lay before both Houses an impact assessment on such regulations.

(6) The impact assessment under subsection (5) must include an assessment of the impact of such regulations on the workforce of health professionals and on the National Health Service.”

Clause stand part.

Amendment 545, in clause 39, page 23, line 6, leave out subsections (3) to (5) and insert—

“(3) The Secretary of State may not make a statutory instrument containing (whether alone or with other provision) regulations under section 5(3A), 8(6A),30(3), (Voluntary assisted dying services: England) or (Voluntary assisted dying services: Wales) unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.

(4) Any other statutory instrument made by the Secretary of State containing regulations under this Act is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.

(5) The Welsh Ministers may not make a statutory instrument containing regulations under section (Voluntary assisted dying services: Wales) unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, Senedd Cymru.”

This amendment brings together the various provisions about the procedure for regulations. It also makes regulations under clauses 5 and 8 about training, qualifications and experience, and regulations under NC36 and NC37, subject to the draft affirmative procedure.

New clause 36—Voluntary assisted dying services: England—

“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision securing that arrangements are made for the provision of voluntary assisted dying services in England.

(2) In this section ‘commissioned VAD services’ means services provided by virtue of regulations under subsection (1).

(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations make other provision about voluntary assisted dying services in England (whether or not the services are commissioned VAD services).

(4) Regulations under this section may for example provide that specified references in the National Health Service Act 2006 to the health service continued under section 1(1) of that Act include references to commissioned VAD services.

(5) Regulations under this section must provide that section 1(4) of that Act (services to be provided free of charge except where charging expressly provided for) applies in relation to commissioned VAD services.

(6) Regulations under this section may make any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament; but they may not amend this Act.

(7) In this section ‘voluntary assisted dying services’ means—

(a) services for or in connection with the provision of assistance to a person to end their own life in accordance with this Act, and

(b) any other services provided by health professionals for the purposes of any of sections 4 to 22 except section (Determination by panel of eligibility for assistance).”

This new clause imposes a duty on the Secretary of State to make regulations securing that arrangements are made for the provision of voluntary assisted dying services in England. It also confers a power to make other provision about voluntary assisted dying services in England.

Amendment (a) to new clause 36, after subsection (1) insert—

“(1A) Regulations under subsection (1) cannot authorise the National Health Service in England to provide voluntary assisted dying services.”

Amendment (c) to new clause 36, after subsection (1) insert—

“(1A) Regulations under subsection (1) cannot authorise a body other than a public authority to provide voluntary assisted dying services if that body is to be contracted by a public authority to do so.”

Amendment (b) to new clause 36, leave out subsections (4) and (5) and insert—

“(4) Regulations under subsection (1) may not amend, modify or repeal section 1 of the National Health Service Act 2006.”

Amendment (d) to new clause 36, leave out subsection (6).

Amendment (e) to new clause 36, after subsection (6) insert—

“(6A) The Secretary of State may not lay a draft statutory instrument before either House of Parliament that makes provision containing (whether alone or with other provision) regulations under subsection (1) unless they also lay before both Houses an impact assessment on such regulations.

(6B) The impact assessment under subsection (6A) must include an assessment of the impact of such regulations on the workforce of health professionals and on the National Health Service.”

New clause 37—Voluntary assisted dying services: Wales—

“(1) The Welsh Ministers may by regulations make provision about voluntary assisted dying services in Wales, including provision securing that arrangements are made for the provision of such services.

(2) Regulations under subsection (1) may make any provision that—

(a) could be made by an Act of Senedd Cymru, and

(b) would be within the legislative competence of the Senedd if it were contained in such an Act.

(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about voluntary assisted dying services in Wales.

(4) Regulations under subsection (3) may make any provision that—

(a) could be made by an Act of Parliament, and

(b) would not be within the legislative competence of the Senedd if it were contained in an Act of the Senedd.

(5) Regulations under this section may not amend this Act.

(6) In this section ‘voluntary assisted dying services’ has the meaning given by section (Voluntary assisted dying services: England).”

This new clause confers a power on the Welsh Ministers to make provision about voluntary assisted dying services in Wales, including provision securing that arrangements are made for the provision of such services. It also confers a power on the Secretary of State to make provision about such services, where the provision would be outside the legislative competence of Senedd Cymru.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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It is very good to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McVey, on what is probably our last day in Committee. I fully expect that we will reject clause 32 in due course, so although I want to move my amendment, I have no intention of pushing it or any of the other amendments in this group to a vote, but I do want to take the opportunity to address the clause and to speak to the amendment in my name.

Clause 32 was always going to be an important one, because it would have allowed the Government to provide money to fund the assistance to die; it would have allowed the Secretary of State to make financial arrangements to secure the provision of assistance under the Bill. What we might have been debating if we were sticking with this clause—I think it is still worth inviting the hon. Member for Spen Valley and people who support the Bill to speak to this point—is that the Bill will require the Government to fund the provision of assisted suicide services, but it makes no provision to fund the supply of palliative care. I think everyone in this Committee recognises the absolute imperative of a properly supported palliative care sector, and I deeply regret that although the Government are supporting a resourcing of this new service, there is no balancing commitment to provide what we have all acknowledged is the essential corollary of any assisted dying service. What is worse, in clause 32 and in new clause 36, which will replace it, we have something different.

Last Wednesday night, just as the Committee rose, the hon. Member for Spen Valley tabled amendment 538, which would remove clause 32 from the Bill. This is the clause that committed the Secretary of State to make the financial commitments—commitments that were debated in principle when the House debated the money resolution on 22 January. Once again, I regret that important undertakings that were made by the Government and by the hon. Lady have, in the course of the debate subsequent to Second Reading and now subsequent to the money resolution, been superseded by further provisions.

Amendment 538 is consequential on two new clauses, one of which is new clause 37, which will allow Welsh Ministers to set up a system to implement the Bill in Wales. This will give very wide powers to Welsh Ministers, including the powers to make provision about the service that would be outside the legislative competence of Welsh Ministers. That is significant. Unlike clause 32 and new clause 36, which will replace it, new clause 37 does not make any reference to the health service in Wales. I think it is worth us teasing out the challenge to the devolution settlement that these new clauses represent; I am sure the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd will speak to that.

I want to speak briefly, but I hope clearly and powerfully, to the essential challenge. Without getting too involved in the party politics, we all talk about “our NHS”, and in a sense it is our NHS: this nation’s great domestic institution, created in the 20th century in response to the shamefully inequitable provision of healthcare that preceded 1946. Labour rightly claims the credit for having introduced the NHS under the Attlee Government and in fact the Liberals also have a good claim to it—it was a Liberal, Beveridge, who first advocated the provision of a national health service—but what is not enough recognised is that, as I am sure my hon. Friends are proud to say, it was a Conservative Health Secretary who first put before the House of Commons a plan for a national health service: Henry Willink, Health Secretary in the wartime coalition Government. Unfortunately, the public voted us out of power in 1945 and it fell to Labour to implement a slightly different plan. Nevertheless, we can all claim some parentage of this great institution, the NHS. That is why it is so significant that in the new clauses we are debating, a fundamental change to the NHS in England is proposed.

The duty on the Secretary of State under the National Health Service Act 1946, as updated in 2006, is to promote

“a comprehensive health service designed to secure improvement in the physical and mental health of the people of England…and the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of illness”—

that is, physical and mental illness. That has been the purpose of the NHS since 1946.

I find it curious that a linguistic sleight of hand is being practised in new clause 36. The new phrase, “voluntary assisted dying services” or “VAD services”, is introduced, and it is used to avoid having to spell out that section 1(1) of the NHS Act 2006 will now include references to “assistance to end” the lives of people in England and Wales—that is the language of the Bill as introduced, in the long title and in nearly every clause up to this point. The explicit language that this is about ending people’s lives is avoided in the new clause. Why? I put it to the Committee that it is a hard thing to do: to take a red pen to Bevan’s legacy, to fundamentally change the NHS from one that is

“designed to secure improvement…in the physical and mental health”

of the people of England and Wales, and dedicated to

“the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of…illness”,

and to add to that founding clause “to end” the lives of terminally ill people.

I will be blunter than the drafters have been. New clause 36 changes the NHS from being the national health service to the national health and assisted suicide service. That is its direct implication. Furthermore, the new clause is also designed not only to alter fundamentally the national health service, but to enable the private sector to be paid from NHS funds to end the lives of terminally ill people—and not only that, but to do so with a Henry VIII power so broad as to enable any changes in the NHS or any law to facilitate that goal.

Simon Opher Portrait Dr Simon Opher (Stroud) (Lab)
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Does the hon. Gentleman accept that end-of-life care is also part of the NHS? That has always been part of the NHS, and it is not promoting health but enabling a good death.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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No, I fundamentally disagree: end-of-life care is healthcare. It is addresses symptoms and conditions, and it is designed in a way that is completely compatible with the founding principle of the NHS, whereas the Bill—I appreciate the honesty of the drafters in recognising this, even if they do not quite spell it out—and its proposal of an assisted suicide service is not compatible with the founding principle of the NHS. That is why adapting that founding subsection as in the original NHS Act is required. Of course I recognise that end-of-life care is healthcare and completely compatible with what the NHS does. I wish it were more part of the NHS—that is another debate. Palliative care should have been more closely integrated into NHS provision, and it still should be.

I want to tease out a tension among the drafters and advocates of the Bill about exactly how the assisted suicide service will be facilitated and provided. We have got a bit closer to it, but some questions remain, which is regrettable when here we are on the very last day of the Committee’s debate. Last month, the hon. Member for Spen Valley told the Committee:

“This is not assisted suicide by the state. The state is not involved.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 11 February 2025; c. 318.]

I am perplexed by that. I think many members of the public would not agree with that analysis of how the Bill has evolved in Committee. If involving the state in the provision of this service was not intended, then that is not the Bill we have.

In contradiction to that, and I think more accurately, the Minister for Care told us that the promoter’s intent—speaking for the hon. Member for Spen Valley—is

“to ensure that the assisted dying service is available as an integral part of the NHS. Officials are working on amendments to later clauses to establish the operating model for her consideration.” [Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 5 March 2025; c. 802.]

That is clearly what has happened, and it is where we are now. However, I am sorry to say that I do not feel that the operating model is now clear. We still do not have an impact assessment, we do not know how the Government envisage it working in practice, and important information is still lacking for the debate today. We do not know the possible impact on general practice or medical specialists, nor how it might impact money that is available for palliative care. I hope the Minister can tell us more today about how he envisages the service being implemented, especially in the light of the British Medical Association conference earlier this month, which supported the motion that

“Assisted dying is not a health activity and it must not take place in NHS or other health facilities”.

That is a principle I agree with.

On 5 March, the hon. Member for Spen Valley said:

“there is no expectation that assisted dying would be set up as a private enterprise or service. It would be delivered within the provision of the NHS.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 5 March 2025; c. 799.]

That now agrees with the Minister—fine, interesting; it is to be an NHS service not to be provided privately. But the new clauses do not rule out private provision, nor any profit making by providers or remuneration of people outside the NHS. Indeed, the new clauses refer to “voluntary assisted dying services”, which suggests the hon. Member for Spen Valley is supportive of services outside those that are NHS commissioned, which will be possible under subsections (1), (3) and (7)(a). That will be in line with comments made by my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire, who made a very coherent case for private provision of assisted suicide if that is what Parliament chooses to legalise; he said that nothing should prevent someone from opting for private provision. In response, the hon. Member for Spen Valley said:

“This service, like many others, will be delivered through a range of providers”.––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 5 March 2025; c. 800.]

I remain unclear about the extent to which this is an NHS monopoly, as it were, or whether there will be private provision that is privately paid for, or private provision that is publicly paid for. I would be grateful for the hon. Member’s clarification.

Lastly, on the question of profit, in an article in The Times that appeared to have some briefing behind it, there was a suggestion that there would be a cap on the profit of private companies providing the service, limiting them to “making a reasonable profit”. Again, there is nothing in the new clauses about limitations on providers’ profits. If the hon. Member could clarify how she envisages the private provision of the service, I would be grateful.

Sean Woodcock Portrait Sean Woodcock (Banbury) (Lab)
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It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McVey. I rise to speak to amendment (b) to new clause 36, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Anna Dixon). The amendment states:

“Regulations under subsection (1) may not amend, modify or repeal section 1 of the National Health Service Act 2006.”

For clarity, I will read out the relevant part of section 1 of the 2006 Act:

“The Secretary of State must continue the promotion in England of a comprehensive health service designed to secure improvement—

(a)in the physical and mental health of the people of England, and

(b)in the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of physical and mental illness.”

Those core principles have remained the same since the National Health Service Act 1946. As the hon. Member for East Wiltshire stated, in a Britian that was devasted by war, Clement Attlee and Nye Bevan together promised a better future, one where healthcare should be available to all, regardless of wealth. It enshrined a principle that as a society we will care for the ill and we will do that together. No one’s health should be left behind, especially that of the vulnerable.

The NHS stands as the greatest legacy of a Labour Government—despite the input of Opposition parties referred to by the hon. Member for East Wiltshire—and perhaps of any Government since the second world war. The establishment of the NHS lives on in section 1 of the NHS Act. It is why at the height of the pandemic NHS staff courageously put themselves on the frontline to protect us. It is their mission to secure improvement in the physical and mental health of all, free at the point of service. As we consider assisted dying, we must not lose the values at the heart of the NHS.

Section 1 of the 2006 Act has changed little from the corresponding first section of the 1946 Act. It is not just a line in legislation; it has become part of our national story and our national identity, and amendment (b) to new clause 36 is about continuing that. It seeks to preserve the legacy of Attlee and Bevan, and that of Labour Governments committed to the betterment of the people.

Twenty-five senior doctors and pharmacists from Shetland and Orkney spoke of that legacy in their written evidence:

“We note with pride the founding principles of the NHS, with the 1946 National Health Service Act stating, ‘It shall be the duty of the Minister of Health…to promote the establishment in England and Wales of a comprehensive health service designed to secure improvement in the physical and mental health of the people of England and Wales and the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of illness.’ We believe that Parliament must reflect the lasting ethos of our founding document.”

There are very few lines in legislation that come to represent an institution in this way. It is a testament to the ideal of those founding principles in section 1 that they guide doctors to this very day. This is the thread that runs through the 1946 Act to the 2006 Act—two Labour Governments, 60 years apart, united by this mission to improve the physical and mental health of the people. This Committee should continue the thread of those principles.

Of course, I understand that previous legislation may need to be amended to provide assisted dying services, and that may include the 2006 Act. New clause 36(4) clarifies that specified references to commission voluntary dying services may be included in that Act. I note with regret that the new clause gives us so little information elsewhere about the use of these powers, which are commonly known as Henry VIII powers or clauses. This is not a term that I was familiar with until very recently. I am sure other Members are much more familiar with it than I am, but on the off-chance that there are one or two Members who need a reminder, I will read Parliament’s own official definition of the term:

“‘Henry VIII clauses’ are clauses in a bill that enable ministers to amend or repeal provisions in an Act of Parliament using secondary legislation, which is subject to varying degrees of parliamentary scrutiny.”

Helpfully, it adds:

“The expression is a reference to King Henry VIII’s supposed preference for legislating directly by proclamation rather than through Parliament.”

I accept that it might be rather odd to talk about Henry VIII in this debate, but we should not let that distract us from the serious question of this new clause, which could result in a significant transfer of power from Members of this House to the Secretary of State, and it is not clear what that power will be used for.

The Hansard Society has noted that there is little indication about what role or nature these powers will take, saying:

“A key principle that the House of Lords Constitution Committee has applied to delegated powers is that they ‘should not be framed in such a way that gives little indication of how they should be used.’ The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee’s guidance to Departments states that the Delegated Powers Memorandum should set out how it is proposed that a power should be exercised.”

I would be grateful if my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley and Ministers could provide clarity on those questions. New clause 36(1) does not specify that voluntary assisted dying be provided on the NHS, but subsection (4) allows for the National Health Service Act 2006 to be amended. What is the intention of these powers? What will the structure of the voluntary assisted dying service be? How will it be funded and who will be responsible for the provision of the services? The answer to those questions will inform which legislation needs to be amended, and that information should be in the Bill.

To be clear, as I have said, I accept that changes to previous legislation may be required. However, the provision of assisted dying should not amend the foundational principles of the national health service. It should not break with the legacy of Attlee, of Bevan and of Labour. That is why I support amendment (b) to new clause 36.

--- Later in debate ---
Sarah Olney Portrait Sarah Olney (Richmond Park) (LD)
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It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McVey.

In Richmond Park, a Henry VIII power has traditionally meant the right of the monarch to hunt the deer in the large open space that gives my constituency its name—something that I am sorry to say he has in common with the dog of the hon. Member for East Wiltshire—

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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I didn’t know it was illegal. [Laughter.]

Sarah Olney Portrait Sarah Olney
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He paid a hefty fine, I think.

The efforts of Henry VIII’s descendants to try to enclose the park and maintain the powers for the exclusive benefit of the royal family were defeated by a popular and somewhat genteel uprising of the residents of Richmond. I stand here today as the Member for Richmond Park to do a similar job: to assert the rights of the House of Commons and the Houses of Parliament to determine what legislation is, and not to allow it to be delegated under Henry VIII powers.

The normal approach is that legislation made by Ministers is delegated legislation, and such legislation is therefore of subsidiary character to primary legislation. However, there is a type of power, known as a Henry VIII power, that gives Ministers the power to amend even primary legislation. The glossary on Parliament’s website says:

“The expression is a reference to King Henry VIII’s supposed preference for legislating directly by proclamation rather than through Parliament.”

We may in the course of time start to refer to them as President Trump powers—who knows?—but that is the precedent we act on.

The Hansard Society, a non-partisan organisation that is neutral on assisted dying, issued a report that was critical of the power in the Bill. It said this:

“little can be deduced about how it is thought this power will be used in practice, beyond the fact that it may, in particular, be used to enable the provision of assisted deaths through the National Health Service.

But as the DPRRC”—

the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee—

“has previously stated, where a power provides that delegated legislation may ‘in particular’ include a specified matter, it implies the legislation may deal with matters beyond that specified matter. The explanatory notes shed little more light, except to clarify that the power could be used to make arrangements for the funding of any provision made by the regulations. Could the regulations thus be used to enable the provision of assistance through the private sector on behalf of the health service in England and in Wales? If the intention is that the regulations will be used only to establish an assisted dying service, either within or separately to the NHS, would they require that the service be free at the point of access to the person requesting assistance?

A key principle that the House of Lords Constitution Committee has applied to delegated powers is that they ‘should not be framed in such a way that gives little indication of how they should be used.’ The DPRRC’s Guidance to Departments states that the Delegated Powers Memorandum should set out how it is proposed that a power should be exercised.

In the current absence of the DPM, MPs may therefore wish to seek clarification from the sponsor of the Bill, Kim Leadbeater, about how she envisages the power being used, and similarly from Ministers how they expect to use this power if it were granted to them.”

The drafter of the Bill, Dame Elizabeth Gardiner, appeared on the Hansard Society podcast and gave some further detail on this power and how it arose:

“In other areas, like, is it going to be delivered through the National Health Service or in some other way, indeed the regulation of any substances that might be involved, in the time available, we didn’t have time to go into all the detail of how those regimes work and to make the provision on the face of the Bill, and so there are regulation making powers there, which enable that provision to be set out in detail, as you say, when the Government has looked at it and decided how it would implement it.”

Given the time available and the constraints of the private Member’s Bill process, the hon. Member for Spen Valley can be forgiven for not including the detail of how assisted dying will be provided on the NHS in the Bill on its introduction, but she and the Government have now had months to think about it. Many people had hoped that clause 32 would be replaced with detailed arrangements for the delivery of the service, to be put on the face of the Bill by way of an amendment, which the Committee could properly scrutinise.

On 5 March, the hon. Member for Spen Valley repeatedly said that it would be made clear by clause 32. When the hon. Member for East Wiltshire called for clarity in the Bill as to how the service would be delivered, the hon. Member for Spen Valley said: “It will be.” The Minister said:

“Officials are working on amendments to later clauses to establish the operating model for her consideration.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 5 March 2025; c. 802.]

This does not appear to have happened, which means Parliament will be limited to a 90-minute debate on this issue when the regulations are eventually made, and such a motion will be unamendable. Surely the issue of how the service is to be delivered is much more important than that and deserves greater scrutiny.

It is disappointing to see new clauses 36 and 37 as the replacement clauses. Ideally, instead of the new clauses we would have had a detailed set of amendments to specify exactly how assisted dying is to be delivered. We do not have that; instead, we have a Henry VIII power that provides even more power than the one in clause 32, because the new one includes a power to modify Acts of Parliament passed subsequent to this legislation.

New clause 36 provides very little guidance on how the Henry VIII power would be exercised. Will assisted dying be provided by the state? If so, would that be on the NHS or through another body? Subsection (1) one does not specify that it must be on the NHS. Subsection (4) gives the power, but not the duty, to change section 1 of the National Health Service Act 2006—a foundational piece of Labour legislation if there ever was one, as the hon. Member for Banbury said—but subsection (5) requires it to be free at the point of use.

The question of whether assisted dying should be provided as part of normal NHS services, or in a parallel service, as requested by both the BMA and the Royal College of General Practitioners, is not answered by new clause 36, although hopefully it can be fleshed out in the debate on the amendments in the name of the hon. Member for East Wiltshire. Alternatively, it would seem that the power can be used to commission private providers to deliver the service on behalf of the state. Instead of deciding between the various models, new clause 36 simply leaves it open. It therefore gives very little indication about how it should be used.

When giving the Gray’s Inn reading at Gresham College last year, Lord Falconer said:

“The wider the power—because there is less material in primary legislation to define how it should be exercised—the greater the reduction in parliamentary scrutiny, but also the harder”—

it would be—

“to identify any legal basis of challenge.”

He went as far as to suggest that such wide Henry VIII powers were “unconstitutional”. Given his great support for the Bill, it would be interesting to hear the response of the hon. Member for Spen Valley and the Minister to Lord Falconer’s remarks.

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Sarah Olney Portrait Sarah Olney
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I think I said very clearly to the hon. Member for Stroud that it is not about the doctors. It is about the people who are commissioning them. I absolutely do not believe that about doctors operating in the private sector, who in my experience are often the same doctors as the ones in the NHS. It is about who is commissioning them and who is asking them to carry out this work, and whether those commissioners are motivated by a profit incentive as opposed to the incentive in the NHS to provide the best possible care.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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I entirely agree with the hon. Lady. We are all equally ethical and unethical—the point is that we respond to incentives, and incentives have their effect. Does she agree that there is a further concern? If we had a tariff system, which we probably would, that would by definition create a market, if there was the opportunity for private provision, to earn tariffs—to make more money the more assisted deaths one provides. Furthermore, to the point made by the hon. Member for Stroud that this is all perfectly fine and normal, what about the opportunity to top up the public provision—the tariff one gets from the NHS—with one’s own money, therefore definitely creating the opportunity for some sort of upmarket arrangement through the additional fees and services that might be provided? As the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford said, we could see expos dedicated to providing the most luxury or glamorous forms of assisted death through private providers with NHS funding.

Sarah Olney Portrait Sarah Olney
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

That is not a prospect I particularly want to reflect on, but it is worth noting that the particular risk in assisted dying services is that, as we heard in oral evidence from the chief medical officer, it is really hard to define, first, whether an illness is going to be terminal and, secondly, that somebody has only six months to live. There is an element of subjective judgment in assessing who is going to be eligible for assisted dying. Aligning subjective judgment to a profit incentive could create a serious ethical minefield.

I want to state absolutely clearly for the record that I am not questioning the ethics of doctors or the ethical standards of doctors or of any of the bodies that represent them in any way at all. My question is merely about introducing a profit incentive to this issue. As I said, this process could be contrasted with something like the provision of abortion services. Abortion services are clearly available only to pregnant women. The fact that the qualification, as it were, for this service is on a rather more subjective basis creates a risk.

Without this amendment, I am concerned that the Bill commodifies the end-of-life process and pushes what should be a sensitive, careful process towards being a transactional one. It also increases the risk that everything becomes focused on facilitating ending the patient’s life rather than supporting the holistic ethos of the NHS in addressing all the patient’s needs. Without the amendment, I worry that the Bill opens a door to the commodification of death, as the hon. Member for East Wiltshire has so graphically anticipated. What should be a careful, compassionate process could slide into something more transactional: a service that is marketed, packaged and sold.

We need look only to the parallel of care homes to see that danger writ large. In England, social care has been quietly overtaken by for-profit providers. Today, 75% of adult care homes, and over 80% of children’s homes, are run for profit—not by design or explicit policy, but by the slow creep of market forces. The Economics Observatory, drawing on studies such as Patwardhan et al. 2022, Barron and West 2017 and Bach-Mortensen et al. 2022, reveals a stark truth: for-profit care, particularly where private equity is involved, consistently delivers worse outcomes.

Similarly, a 2019 BMJ study found that private providers running NHS-funded services had higher rates of complications in procedures such as hip replacements compared with NHS trusts. The focus on cost efficiency can lead to skimping on follow-up care or using less experienced staff. Why does that happen? Profit-seeking behaviour drives cuts to staff, to resources and to time. Now, if we transpose that to assisted dying, let us imagine the pressures on a private provider to trim costs and the pressures on the quality of assessments. How thoroughly are mental health conditions, or the risk that something else might be going on, explored? How great is the depth of attention to medical records? Is what is relevant to the doctor influenced by the ticking clock? Will they tick a box rather than a safeguard?

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Sarah Olney Portrait Sarah Olney
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention, but those incentives are not about creating profits that make money for individuals. They are about directing the way that resources are allocated to ensure that a broader range of health outcomes are achieved. When I talk about a profit incentive, it is an entirely different kind of incentive from the one he has just raised.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

This is a very important debate, and my concern is that there is a naive assumption that the innate goodness of doctors will render them impervious to all the incentives in the system. As the hon. Lady suggests, if it were possible, as I think it is under the Bill, for a profit-making organisation—a company—to set itself up to provide an assisted suicide conveyer belt as a pathway through this process, and to earn money publicly or privately according to the volume of the provision it enables, we are setting up incentives that would corrupt the doctors who would be required to sign it off.

I regret that my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire has such an optimistic view of human nature that he thinks that no doctor would respond to the incentives in the way that is clearly enabled through the Bill. There are other medical professionals—ethical doctors—who do respond to incentives, such as those in the cosmetic surgery industry.

Simon Opher Portrait Dr Opher
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Will the hon. Member give way?

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I would, but actually I am making an intervention. It may appear that I am making a speech, so I will soon sit down, but I would be interested in the hon. Gentleman’s response to the suggestion that even he —the paragon of virtue that he is—might not be entirely resistant to the economic incentives in the system. That is why we have an NHS that explicitly tries to exclude profit making from the provision of healthcare.

Sarah Olney Portrait Sarah Olney
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention, but I do not associate myself with his use of the word “corrupt”; I am absolutely not implying that in any way, and I want to be very clear about that. However, there is a grave risk—even for the most ethical person, if they are offered money to carry out an action that they are inclined to carry out anyway as part of their professional practice—that those incentives drive behaviour that leads to worse outcomes for patients, specifically in relation to assisted dying.

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Sarah Olney Portrait Sarah Olney
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

But the Bill does not say that. It does not say that the payment to the doctor should not include any consideration of profit. Regarding hip operations, someone would have one only if they needed it. My point is that assisted dying is one of a range of options at the end of life being presented here. The concern is that people motivated by profit would be incentivised to push for assisted dying at the expense of other options for the patient that do not attract the same level of reward. That is the issue. It is not a binary decision in the way that most treatments are.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

In response to the hon. Member for Spen Valley, the scenario that she mentions is exactly the problem in many healthcare systems around the world, particularly in America, where doctors are incentivised to deliver volumes of treatments and procedures that are often not strictly necessary. We do have a problem even in our own system with the over-prescription of certain medical treatments, particularly pharmaceuticals, so incentives do apply. Doctors are subject to them, and we do our best to regulate them out of the system. One of the great advantages of the NHS compared with other healthcare systems is that we manage to prevent the over-provision of services in response to economic incentives. That is a founding principle of the NHS that we are overriding with this process.

Sarah Olney Portrait Sarah Olney
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I will conclude my remarks by observing that the only reason that we are looking at contracting out assisted dying services to a private provider is that the country is simply not ready for assisted dying. We know how overstretched and under-resourced our NHS is, and we are looking at cutting corners in the Bill, in our policymaking, in our scrutiny of this legislation, and in how this legislation and the service is delivered.

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Rebecca Paul Portrait Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McVey. I rise to speak on clause stand part and new clause 36, and in support of amendment 525 and amendment (a) to new clause 36, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire. This is a really important debate. The NHS is the greatest achievement of any Labour Government, and maybe even of any Government.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

Steady on!

Rebecca Paul Portrait Rebecca Paul
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It transformed the quality of life of British citizens at a time of mass unemployment and widespread slums, ensuring free healthcare, in the words of Beveridge, from cradle to grave. The provision of healthcare free at the point of delivery was life-changing and life-prolonging. Although it is far from perfect, we have seen time and time again that as a country we can be very proud of the NHS.

The National Health Service Act 1946 came into effect on 5 July 1948, as a direct consequence of the Beveridge report. Section 1 of the Act states:

“It shall be the duty of the Minister of Health…to promote the establishment in England and Wales of a comprehensive health service designed to secure improvement in the physical and mental health of the people of England and Wales and the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of illness”.

It was set up to help people to get better and live healthy lives, and to give hope in situations where otherwise there would be despair. It was lifesaving and life-changing. New clause 36 turns all that on its head. Subsection (4) states that:

“Regulations under this section may for example provide that specified references in the National Health Service Act 2006 to the health service continued under section 1(1) of that Act include references to commissioned VAD services.”

If this new clause passes, the founding principles of the NHS will be monumentally changed to include helping eligible people to commit suicide. That is what it does.

I want to be really clear that it is entirely possible to support assisted dying—to want to ensure that a small group of people, whom palliative care cannot help, have that assisted dying option—but not to support this new clause, which forces provision of the service through the same channels as normal healthcare. Assisted dying is not a medical treatment or a healthcare service and accordingly there should be a degree of separation.

We should be incredibly cautious about incorporating the service into the NHS. It will forever change the relationship between doctor and patient, breed mistrust and fear, discourage vulnerable groups from seeking the healthcare they need and fundamentally violate the Hippocratic oath. Dr Catherine Day, a senior partner of a large GP practice in Coventry, states:

“Trust lies at the heart of the doctor patient relationship. I believe this trust will be shattered if patients consider that their GP…may think that they should end their life and stop being a drain on our NHS.”

Siwan Seaman, a palliative care consultant said:

“How could a terminally ill patient trust a doctor if they know that the doctor was prescribing medication to the patient in the next bed in a bay or cubicle with the intention of ending their life. Letting these assessments take place alongside other NHS services will irreversibly impact on patients’ trust in healthcare professionals and negatively impact our therapeutic relationship with patients as doctors.”

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Lewis Atkinson Portrait Lewis Atkinson
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

No, it will not, in the same way that G4S does not suddenly appear and provide treatment through a new cancer service that the Secretary of State decides to commission under specialist powers.

I am afraid that some opponents of the Bill are trying to scaremonger about potential provision as a way of altering the way people voted on Second Reading. A number of amendments clearly deal with whether potential providers should be public sector, voluntary or, indeed, private organisations. I emphasise that the overwhelming majority of GP services in this country are private contractors. It is inconsistent for Members to argue that we should maximise continuity of care and have the best safeguards around coercion and capacity by having someone who has known the individual for a long time, while also arguing that the Secretary of State should not be permitted to commission that individual’s GP to play any role. I challenge opponents on that matter.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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As ever, the hon. Gentleman is speaking very coherently in support of the Bill and the principles behind it. I think he does regard assisted suicide as another form of healthcare that, as he says, should therefore be completely consistent with the normal duties of every medical professional. I would genuinely like him to help me to understand this. Does he envisage the service being provided by bespoke clinics in the NHS? Would established professionals set themselves up with the purpose of delivering it, or would it genuinely just be something that any general practitioner would provide as part of their services? Does he imagine that there will be specialists in the NHS whose sole job, or most of whose job, would be to provide this service?

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Lewis Atkinson Portrait Lewis Atkinson
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The right hon. Gentleman is entirely right. These powers need to provide for that patient-centric nature, in a service that is explicitly commissioned by the Secretary of State, which will vary in different parts of the country, and not just in the provision landscape. The services provided in rural North Northumberland will, by their nature, probably be different from those provided in London, and that is entirely appropriate.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

And yet the irony of this measure is that it is not specific to the patient. Genuine healthcare treats the symptoms and condition of the individual patient. This proposed treatment has nothing to do with the individual symptoms or the condition of the patient; it just kills them. It is totally unrelated to the condition, which is why it is not healthcare.

The hon. Gentleman suggested earlier that the Bill somehow ensures that the provision and the pathway are deliberately fragmented because the second doctor needs to be independent of the first. Does he agree that, with that single exception, it would be perfectly possible for an independent provider to set up to provide for the whole pathway of assisted death, with the single requirement that the co-ordinating doctor, who would manage the whole process from beginning to end, must get a second opinion from outside their organisation to sign the paperwork for the second assessment? With that single exception, the whole process could be managed by an independent, profit-making provider—commissioned by the NHS or otherwise—entirely on its own.

Lewis Atkinson Portrait Lewis Atkinson
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The hon. Gentleman is providing a masterclass in scaremongering. I know he needs Labour votes to switch before Third Reading, but this service must be explicitly commissioned by the Secretary of State, and it is inconceivable that they would commission that in the way that the hon. Gentleman describes. The co-ordinating doctor is of course one person, and they would be involved in the first assessment and the provision of assistance. Whether that is a doctor employed by the NHS or somebody else, it can only be one individual, but there are the other safeguards we have talked about, such as the panel, which the hon. Gentleman has spoken against. It is absolutely appropriate that the Secretary of State has the powers and the duty to commission the service, and that they will do so from range of providers, reflecting the differences.

On the other point that some hon. Members have made about regulation, I remind the Committee that any provider will be regulated not only under this Act, but by the Care Quality Commission, in entirely uniform manner. I am therefore confused by the points made by opponents of the Bill. Some have said there should be no provision of this by the NHS or any public body, some say there should be no provision by charities—including, presumably, local hospices, should they make that decision—while others say there should be no provision by local GP practices to provide continuity of care.

Perhaps those different points reflect different ideologies within the Committee that are deeper than this issue, but they perhaps also reflect the fact that opponents of the Bill simply do not want this service to be provided at all.

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Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. I am not sure that anything in the Bill would preclude a private provider—“Virgin Health” or some such organisation—from providing the whole pathway of the assisted death, including employing, albeit in separate clinics or separate practices, the two doctors who would provide the two assessments. The provider would comply with the Bill, but the doctors might be part of the same organisation even if they work in different practices.

Naz Shah Portrait Naz Shah
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention. I have observed two things this morning. First, the reality has really hit home. Are we going to look at the amendment regarding local authorities providing the service? Are we excluding private providers? Are we excluding big firms? A new service has to be designed. Will it be two organisations or one? How will the Bill be delivered? We do not even have that before us, and that concerns me deeply.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting)

Danny Kruger Excerpts
None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Amendment 483, in clause 23, page 15, line 5, after “assistance” insert

“, or in any activity closely related to the provision of assistance,”.

This amendment would widen the range of activities which medical practitioners and other healthcare providers are not under an obligation to provide to include activities closely related to the provision of assistance under the Act.

Amendment 484, in clause 23, page 15, line 8, after “Act” insert

“, or in any activity closely related to the provision of assistance under this Act,”.

Amendment 441, in clause 23, page 15, line 9, at end insert—

“(3) There is no obligation on any care home or hospice regulated by the Care Quality Commission or the Care Inspectorate Wales to permit the provision of assistance under this Act on their premises.”

This amendment prevents there being any obligation on a care home or hospice which is regulated in England or Wales to permit the provision of assistance under the Act on their premises.

Amendment 481, in clause 23, page 15, line 9, at end insert—

“(3) Nothing in subsection (2)—

(a) prevents an employer who has chosen not to participate in the provision of assistance in accordance with this Act from prohibiting their employees from providing such assistance in the course of their employment with that employer, or

(b) prevents an employer from specifying occupational requirements in relation to the provision of assistance in accordance with this Act in accordance with Schedule 9 of the Equality Act when hiring employees.”

This amendment ensures that employees cannot provide assisted dying against the wishes of their employers and that employers can still rely, in appropriate cases, on the occupational requirements of the Equality Act to either require employees to provide or not to provide assisted dying.

New clause 22—No obligation for occupiers and operators of premises

“(1) Any individual, business, organisation, or association who occupies or operates premises has the right to refuse to permit the self-administration of an approved substance on their premises.

(2) Nothing in subsection (1) confers any right on anyone with an interest in the land but who is not occupying or operating those premises.”

This new clause would mean that the owners or occupiers of premises — but not landlords not currently in occupation — are not obliged to permit the self-administration of approved substances on their premises.

New clause 23—No detriment for care home or hospice not providing assistance

“(1) No regulated care home or hospice shall be subject to any detriment by a public authority as a result of not—

(a) providing assistance in accordance with this Act, or

(b) permitting such assistance to take place on their premises.

(2) No funding given by a public authority to a regulated care home or hospice can be conditional on that care home or hospice—

(a) providing assistance in accordance with this Act, or

(b) permitting such assistance to take place on their premises.”

This new clause would mean that regulated care homes and hospices cannot be subject to any detriment for not providing or permitting assistance in accordance with this Act, and that their funding cannot be conditional on them providing or permitting such assistance.

Clause stand part.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger (East Wiltshire) (Con)
- Hansard - -

I was just concluding my remarks on the amendment. I will quickly finish responding to the hon. Member for Spen Valley and others, who suggested that it would be improper to deny people living in a care home, hospice setting or other communal environment the right and opportunity to request assisted dying. I was suggesting that that right needs to be tempered by an acknowledgment that they do not live there alone, and that there are also rights, properly held, by the occupier of the premises, the individual’s neighbours and others.

My concern is that, just as suicide itself is contagious, so the practice of assisted suicide will have social ramifications. We fully recognise that, if the Bill is passed, people will have the absolute right to request the service in their own home, but when someone is living among others, that right needs to be tempered by the consideration that the occupier should ultimately decide whether he or she is prepared to allow the practice to take place on his or her premises.

Some hon. Members suggested that, if an institution receives public funding, it would be appropriate for it to be obligated to deliver the service. I am concerned about the implication of that, which might be that institutions that did not wish to provide or facilitate assisted suicide but did receive public money, for instance care homes or hospices, would be at risk of losing that money—essentially being defunded—on the grounds of their conscientious objection to participating in assisted dying. I would be grateful if the hon. Member for Spen Valley or Ministers would confirm that it is not their intention to penalise bodies that do not deliver assisted dying by withdrawing public money.

On the impact on staff, I am grateful to the hon. Lady for acknowledging that we might need to tighten the Bill to ensure that it is clear that people will not be required to participate in any stage of the process of assisted dying, and not just in the actual provision of assistance towards the final act. Nevertheless, my concern is that if we do not give institutions the right to opt out of provision, there will be an exodus of staff who object to being involved in any way with, or working for an institution that facilitates, assisted dying, as has happened in other jurisdictions where assisted suicide is legal.

I point particularly to evidence we heard from Australia. We were told that, in consequence of assisted dying being legalised in Australian states, there was an exodus of workers from the healthcare system—nurses and others—and the social care system. It was therefore no coincidence when one of the Australian witnesses who supports assisted suicide declared breezily that, although there were significant objections among the care workforce to the introduction of assisted dying when the law was first debated, five years later there was overwhelming support for assisted dying among them. Well, that is no surprise, because all the objectors had left, and I am afraid that is what we will see here.

A comparison would be the exodus of care workers that we saw after the last Government mandated covid vaccination. Some 40,000 care workers left their jobs rather than accept compulsory vaccination. If they were prepared to do that on those grounds, I fear we might see a similar phenomenon if we mandate that institutions facilitate assisted dying.

Lewis Atkinson Portrait Lewis Atkinson (Sunderland Central) (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

May I check that the hon. Member’s understanding is the same as mine—that nothing in the Bill compels an organisation to participate in the way that he describes?

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

No, I am afraid I do not concede that. At the moment, it is not apparent from the Bill or the amendments that have been accepted that an organisation would be enabled to decline to facilitate the provision of assisted dying. No organisation will be compelled to do so, but if a resident were to request assisted dying in their care home, my understanding is that the care home would be obliged to facilitate it.

It might well not be the intention behind the Bill, because I know that the hon. Member for Spen Valley and Members who agree with her recognise the importance of a conscience exception; they have been very clear on that, and I am grateful to them. Nevertheless, my concern is that on human rights grounds, as we have heard from the Minister, the likelihood is that there would be a claim on behalf of an applicant against the institution they reside in that assisted suicide must be provided to them in that place. I am afraid the Bill at the moment does not give an adequate exemption to institutions.

Lewis Atkinson Portrait Lewis Atkinson
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Does the hon. Member accept the distinction that I made between an organisation choosing to provide assisted dying services and the instance he outlined of this being done in someone’s home that happens to be a care home? They are entirely different points, and I fear that, particularly with regard to hospices, he is conflating the two.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I am conflating the two because they are conflated in reality. A care home where somebody lives is a residence, but it is also a community, a facility and a place where professionals work to support that individual. A clear demarcation between their living arrangements and the support they receive from the institution they live in does not exist in reality. That is why they are living there—because that distinction does not apply in their particular case. They require the support and help of the workers in the place where they live.

I am afraid it is not enough simply to say, “This is their home, and they should have exactly the same rights and freedoms as they would have if they were living alone in their own flat or house.” We have to recognise the reality of the situation, which is that they are living in a community, and what happens in the community affects them all. That is the nature of communal living. This is not individualised healthcare in the way that the hon. Gentleman imagines it is, and that is fundamentally our point of difference. This is separate or adjacent to healthcare, and it is delivered, by definition, by somebody else. By virtue of the Bill, it would have a separate regulatory environment to other healthcare treatments. Of necessity, it should have an appropriate legal framework to protect other people who are impacted by assisted death in a communal setting. That is my crucial point: if someone is living in a communal setting, what they do affects their neighbours.

Jake Richards Portrait Jake Richards (Rother Valley) (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Does the hon. Gentleman appreciate that, although this is different from the healthcare services we currently have, we have a legal framework that deals with many of these conflicting issues as and when they arise in lots of different circumstances that are not completely adjacent to these?

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I do not know what those might be, but I would be interested to hear. That might well be the case. I am afraid that no hard-and-fast rules can be clearly applied here; or, rather, we have to apply hard-and-fast rules in the knowledge of the grey areas, the exceptions and the situations in which we might feel that the law is unjust in particular cases. We have heard examples of that, such as the evidence about the lady in Australia cited earlier by the hon. Member for Spen Valley. I can well imagine the distress involved if someone suddenly finds themselves in an institution that does not permit an assisted death, but they want one and are in their last days.

The alternative, however, is a different blanket rule. If we were to have a blanket rule that we can do an assisted death anywhere—that is one situation—there would be significant knock-on effects. Serious moral injury would be suffered by other professionals and residents. I recognise that my amendment could lead to someone having to relocate if they want to have an assisted death—I am sorry for that—but I think that we have to draw the line in a way that makes most sense.

Kit Malthouse Portrait Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It would be interesting, if my hon. Friend’s amendments go through, to see the series of plebiscites taking place in care homes and communal situations across the country as to what the residents do and do not want, presumably by a majority. He asserted that there had been a mass exodus of healthcare workers when VAD came in, but I am struggling to find any evidence to support that claim. In fact, the evidence seems to say that that is not the case. Although there have been some resignations, that has largely been because of pay and conditions, as one might expect.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

My right hon. Friend seems hung up on this suggestion that there needs to be a plebiscite or communal decision making—some kind of citizens’ jury. I am not suggesting that for one moment. In fact, I am sure that I have said explicitly that what I want, and what the amendment would enable, is that the owner or occupier, who would probably be an individual or a board of directors, would decide what happens. If they are a decent, compassionate organisation, they might well consult residents—in fact, I would very much expect that to happen if they are doing their job properly—but I am talking about the importance of communal living; and the fact is that a communal living arrangement has leadership. The residents have signed terms and conditions, in a contract, under which they have agreed to abide by certain rules of the house. My suggestion is that if the charity, company or organisation that is managing a care home wants to stipulate that there shall be no provision of assisted dying in that care home, they should have the right to do so. I hope my right hon. Friend would acknowledge that that is consistent with English property rights.

On my right hon. Friend’s second point, I am grateful to him and he might well be right. I am happy to consult my evidence pack, which I do not have at my fingertips, about the effect on the Australian workforce in consequence of the introduction of assisted dying. My memory is that we heard such evidence, or had it submitted to us in written form—his knowledge of the 500 submissions might be better than mine. Let us check and we will have it out, perhaps on social media; I know how much he enjoys those forums.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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Under clause 26, coercing or pressuring a person into an assisted death is a criminal offence, and rightly so. There has, however, been much debate on whether undue influence and encouragement are also covered. The Minister advised previously that undue influence is covered, and I seem to recall that encouragement could be covered as well. If that is correct, we would have the sloppy situation in which encouragement could be a criminal offence both under the Bill and under the Suicide Act. It would be really helpful if the Minister set out the position clearly on the point, to make sure that we do not inadvertently end up in that situation. I imagine that best practice is to have only one criminal liability in one Act or the other, if it is appropriate at all.
Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

It is an honour to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate; I very much agree with the points that she made, and I hope that Ministers will respond. I will try not to repeat her arguments.

The hon. Member for Spen Valley says that clause 24 is, in a sense, the heart of the Bill. I agree. Without the clause the Bill would be ineffective, because the service that we are proposing to legalise would be illegal. We have heard many objections to the term “assisted suicide”, but the necessity of the clause exposes the fact that what is being legalised, at least in part, is assisted suicide. Calling it assisted suicide is therefore not improper; it is simply using the correct terminology, as I believe we should in this place. That is particularly important because the use of the euphemism “assisted dying” masks what this is really about and what the Bill would actually legalise: that somebody could help somebody else to commit suicide.

It is no surprise that the euphemism is deployed, because support for what is called assisted dying is driven in part by a failure to realise what it actually is and what the words mean. I cite a 2024 Nuffield Council on Bioethics survey of the public, which found that 39% of people think that assisted dying means withdrawing life support, 19% think that it means providing people who are dying with drugs that relieve symptoms of pain or suffering, and 13% think that it means providing hospice care, all of which is legal currently and is good medical practice.

Lewis Atkinson Portrait Lewis Atkinson
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The hon. Gentleman says that he is clear that those actions are assisting suicide and that he thinks that they are illegal. Is it right that members of the public, in the instance to which my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley referred, be investigated by the police on their return from trips to Switzerland?

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

Let me come to the question of investigation by the police in due course, but I am not sure that the hon. Gentleman heard me clearly. I was not talking about offences that I think are rightly criminal; I was talking about offences that are not offences at all. Providing hospice care, helping people to relieve symptoms of pain or suffering and withdrawing life support are all perfectly permitted and legal in our system. The issue is that a significant proportion of the public think that those activities are what assisted dying entails. I do, however, recognise the point and the power of the testimony recited by the hon. Member for Spen Valley, to which I will come on in due course.

I understand that in order to make the Bill effective, an exception must be made to section 2 of the Suicide Act. Section 1 says that someone is allowed to commit suicide; section 2 says that one cannot help somebody else to do so. I agree that such an exception is necessary if we are to pass the Bill, but I cannot follow why clause 24(1) is needed. I will be grateful if the hon. Member for Spen Valley or the Minister can explain which other offences would necessarily be committed by a doctor properly carrying out his or her functions under the Bill. What other offences might be caught that require clause 24(1)?

Clause 18 will forbid a doctor from engaging in euthanasia. One criminal law from which an exemption is not necessary is the law on murder, yet ostensibly subsection (1) has no such limitation. I would be grateful for the Minister’s confirmation that subsection (1) will not afford a defence when the charge is murder. I presume that that is not the intention.

What about manslaughter, and particularly gross negligence manslaughter? Under the Bill, a pharmacist performing the function of prescribing or dispensing the legal drugs would be, to use the wording of amendment 504, “performing” a “function under this Act”. If a pharmacist makes a grossly negligent mistake and mislabels a drug, which is then sent to another patient who takes it and dies, that would quite clearly be gross negligence manslaughter. Can the Minister explain why clause 24(1), as amended by amendment 504, would not allow someone to benefit from an immunity in respect of gross negligence manslaughter? To be clear, I agree that if the pharmacist intentionally mislabelled the drug, he could not be described as

“performing any other function under this Act”,

so he would not have that defence. However, in a case where, in good faith, he had made a fatal and grossly negligent mistake, surely he would have been performing such a function, albeit performing it very badly.

Can the Minister clearly set out the reasoning to explain why there is no chance of such a defence under the clause? Of course the hon. Member for Spen Valley does not intend to exempt from criminal liability a pharmacist acting in that grossly negligent way, but I am trying to make sense of the drafting of the amendment. If there is any criminal offence, other than in the Suicide Act, that requires an exemption, it would be best to say so clearly in the Bill rather than relying on a catch-all term, as subsection (1) does.

I concur with the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate and will not repeat them, but I do find it interesting that the hon. Member for Spen Valley has chosen to retain the offence of assisting and encouraging suicide. This is because two arguments made by proponents of the Bill lead to the logical conclusion that the offence should either be repealed entirely or limited to self-conduct, as is the case in Switzerland. Let us look at the two arguments in turn.

The first argument relates to autonomy. If an autonomous individual with capacity decides to end their own life and requests the assistance of another person, why should that other person be criminalised? After all, that person is simply helping another person to do something to their own body that the law has not prohibited since 1961, so surely it is a violation of autonomy to criminalise such conduct of assisting in suicide.

Lord Mance, a former justice of the Supreme Court, put the matter as follows on Second Reading of the Meacher Bill in the other place:

“Suicide is decriminalised, yet assisting suicide remains criminal—probably a unique exception to the principle that you can only be an accomplice to an act that is itself criminal.”

It is bizarre that the act is not itself criminal but being an accomplice to it is. Lord Mance went on to say:

“If a person may choose freely to commit suicide, what justifies a refusal to allow them to obtain willing assistance?”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 22 October 2021; Vol. 815, c. 408.]

I believe in the value of a prohibition on assistance, but the logic of the argument from autonomy—that someone should be allowed to request assistance to help them to die—surely obviates the distinction. I do not see why we have kept section 2 at all, and I would be interested in hearing from the supporters of the Bill what the limiting principle is. Why do they think assisted suicide should remain a crime, despite its being a limitation on autonomy, outside the scheme created by the Bill? Why are we simply creating a scheme within the Bill?

The second argument given, which I think relates to the intervention from the hon. Member for Sunderland Central and to the point made by the hon. Member for Spen Valley, is based on the fact that the current law requires people to travel to Switzerland. The argument against the current system comes in three forms. One stresses the toll that it places on families to know that the people who assist have committed a criminal offence and could be investigated by the police, even though the chances of prosecution are remote. I fully recognise and share all the concerns among Members about the terrible distress faced by people who may in any way have assisted their loved one to take their own life.

The second objection to the status quo makes the point about the unfairness that the situation creates. The hon. Member for Liverpool Wavertree (Paula Barker) said on Second Reading:

“I do not want choice to be available only to those who can afford to pay. That is not just or equitable.”—[Official Report, 29 November 2024; Vol. 797, c. 1073.]

The suggestion is that to have to pay to go to Switzerland is a violation of equality.

The third is a constitutional argument. It is said that it is constitutionally improper for the Director of Public Prosecutions to have effectively decriminalised assisted suicide for people who travel to Switzerland. But the point I am trying to make is that under the Bill, anyone helping their relative to travel to Switzerland, or any other country, would still be committing an offence under section 2 of the Suicide Act.

Research from My Death, My Decision, a campaign group pushing for a wider Bill than the current one—it supports the Bill but clearly wants it to go further—has found that 50% of cases going to Dignitas would not be eligible under the Bill. It helps to make my point, which is that I am afraid that if the Bill were passed we would still have stories like the very moving testimony read out by the hon. Member for Spen Valley. In fact, as my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate said, there is a significant likelihood that there would be more prosecutions. If the Bill were enacted, the conclusion of the Crown Prosecution Service and the police might well be that, given the existence of an assisted dying regime within the UK, assisting one’s relative to go to Switzerland should be subject to a greater likelihood of prosecution. That is a legitimate concern.

Tom Gordon Portrait Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The point that the hon. Gentleman is making is actually one that I made yesterday. I appreciate that we are on entirely different sides of the debate, but that is exactly why I was talking about ensuring wider eligibility—the point he makes in relation to My Death, My Decision—and ensuring the provision of assistance for people who might have illnesses such as motor neurone disease. We have had to put a cut-off somewhere, and some people fall outside it, but does he accept that fundamentally this is about making sure that there are safeguards? That is the key point: that we should ensure safeguards. What the hon. Gentleman is talking about is exactly that.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I am grateful. With great respect to other members of the Committee, I think the hon. Gentleman is the most honest advocate of assisted dying among us, because he genuinely recognises that autonomy demands the widest possible range of eligibility. It might be that other Members feel that we have the balance exactly right. I recognise the force of his argument that if we are going to introduce a new human right, it is very difficult to circumscribe its boundaries. He himself thinks that there should be some boundaries: he proposed an amendment that specified 12 months, and he thinks that only certain people should be able to ask someone else to perform assisted death to them. Nevertheless, he is acknowledging that if we believe in autonomy, the Bill would not satisfy some people.

I think it would be intellectually coherent and more logical for proponents of the Bill to want to repeal section 2 of the Suicide Act, and I do not understand why they are not doing so. We could certainly continue to insist on prohibitions against any form of coercion, persuasion or inducement to take one’s own life, but if somebody is clearly in their right mind and wants to receive assistance to kill themselves, that is the principle of the Bill. It would be neater if we amended the Suicide Act accordingly.

The fact that proponents do not want to do so suggests that they see some value in the law and that they consider that that value trumps concerns about autonomy and the impact of the law on family members of someone who wishes to travel to Switzerland to end their life. I agree that there are such principles—namely, the intrinsic value of life and the protection of the vulnerable—but I do not see why proponents of the Bill consider that such principles trump autonomy when it comes to terminally ill adults in England.

Sarah Sackman Portrait The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Sarah Sackman)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Dowd. My remarks, as ever, will focus on the legal and practical impact of the amendments to assist Members in undertaking line-by-line scrutiny. In exercising our duties to ensure that legislation that is passed is legally robust and workable, the Government have worked closely with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley to reflect her intent.

Clause 24, as amended by amendments 504 and 505, will mean that individuals who assist a person to end their life in accordance with the terms of the Bill are not subject to criminal prosecution. Currently, it is a criminal offence under section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 for a person to do an act that is

“capable of encouraging or assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of another person”

and intended

“to encourage or assist suicide or an attempt at suicide.”

That offence attracts a maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment. Amendment 504 would amend clause 24(1) to ensure that a person is not guilty of an offence—[Interruption.]

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Sarah Sackman Portrait Sarah Sackman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I was introducing amendment 504, which amends clause 24(1) to ensure that a person is not guilty of an offence by virtue of providing assistance in accordance with, or performing a function under, the Bill—for example, by undertaking the first or second assessment or providing the approved substance. The effect of the amendment is to ensure that a person is not guilty of an offence by virtue of assisting a person seeking to end their own life in accordance with the Bill. The phrase “in accordance with” the Bill is key. For example, where someone accompanies a person to the appointment at which they will self-administer the substance, the amendment would carve out any criminal liability for the accompanying person.

As originally drafted, the wording would have limited the protection offered by subsection (1) to the far narrower situation of the medical professionals providing assistance under clause 18. The amendment will give effect to the policy intent of the hon. Member for Spen Valley of applying that protection to all those who provide assistance in accordance with, or by performing a function under, the Bill. Subsection (2) clarifies that the clause does not override other ways in which a court may find that a person is not guilty of an offence.

Clause 24(3) inserts proposed new section 2AA into the Suicide Act 1961. As amended by amendment 505, that new section ensures that it is not an offence under the Suicide Act to perform a function under the Bill, or to assist a person seeking to end their own life by doing anything under the Bill. That is for the same reasons that I set out in relation to subsection (1). The new section also provides a defence to the offence of encouraging or assisting suicide, where a person reasonably believes that they were acting in accordance with the Bill, and that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid committing the offence.

Taken as a package, the effect of these amendments is to make the Bill legally workable. To do that, it is necessary to ensure that those who assist a person to use the lawful route are not then subject to criminal liability for doing so. Clause 24 clause, taken together with amendments 504 and 505, gives effect to that.

Let me address some of the issues raised by Opposition Members. There was a question as to whether there is any overlap between offences under the Bill—we will come to some of those offences in due course with clauses 26 and 27—and offences that remain on the statute book under the Suicide Act. The short answer to the question from the hon. Member for Reigate, although I know she has written to my Department, and I will ensure that she receives a full written answer, is that it would remain an offence under the Suicide Act 1961 to encourage suicide, including an assisted death under this Bill.

To the extent that any overlapping offences remain, that is not an unusual approach to drafting in the criminal law. However, the effect of the clause is that it would remain an offence under the 1961 Act to encourage someone to commit suicide. Where a person’s “encouragement”—the hon. Member focused on that term—is such that it amounts to what the courts would understand to be pressure or coercion, that could be an offence under clause 26, which we will come to. As I said, it is not unusual to have a degree of overlap in criminal offences. Again, what someone is charged and prosecuted with falls to the prosecutor, depending on the specific circumstances of the case and what would be most appropriate in that scenario.

I also want to address the scenario that the hon. Member for East Wiltshire posited, about whether a pharmacist who acted in a way that amounted to gross negligence manslaughter would benefit from immunity under clause 24(1) as amended. Again, with the important caveat that it will depend on the particular facts of the case, the offence of gross negligence manslaughter is committed where a death is the result of gross negligence in what would otherwise be a lawful act or omission on the part of the defendant, and where the defendant owes a duty of care to the victim—there are a number of actors within the Bill’s process who owe a duty of care to the person applying for assisted dying.

Let us assume for a moment that, in the hon. Member’s scenario, we do have gross negligence manslaughter on the particular facts; in those circumstances, the Government are content that the pharmacist could not be properly said to be performing a function under the Bill, or in accordance with the Bill, so clause 24(1)—the carve-out from criminal liability—would not apply. I think that that covers most of the questions that were posited earlier.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

It may well be that the Minister has clarified the case sufficiently, but will she explain something for my sake? She is suggesting that the pharmacist inadvertently but negligently caused the death of a patient, having performed the duties under the Bill and believing that they were doing so. Surely, they were performing duties under the Bill, so they would potentially be captured by the carve-out.

Sarah Sackman Portrait Sarah Sackman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Again, it would depend on the actual facts. However, if they were attempting to perform duties under the Bill, it is highly unlikely that, in circumstances where the facts establish and meet the threshold of gross negligence manslaughter, they could be said to have carried out those duties in accordance with the Bill. They might have been carrying out duties that they thought were what the Bill prescribed, but if they have done that in such a way that it amounts to gross negligence manslaughter, then clause 24(1) would not apply.

The hon. Gentleman makes the point about what the pharmacist in that scenario believes they are doing; that belief has to be reasonable, and that is a test that our courts are well used to applying. That is why the amendments introduce the belief that someone is acting in accordance with the Bill. It is not enough that they think they are doing it; it has to be a reasonable belief. That is an objective standard.

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Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The amendments ensure that the exclusion from civil liability applies in relation to persons performing functions under the Bill and persons assisting a person seeking to end their own life in connection with the doing of things under the Bill. Importantly, they also rightly exempt from the exclusion from civil liability things done dishonestly or not in good faith, and any liability arising from negligence.

Proposed new subsection (1) in amendment 501 makes it clear that anyone providing assistance to a person to end their own life in accordance with the Bill will not face civil liability simply for doing so. That is crucial in offering clarity and confidence for healthcare professionals, family members or others who might otherwise hesitate due to fear of being sued for assisting a loved one or patient who wishes to end their life as a result of their terminal illness.

However, although we are providing protection, amendment 501 does not allow for unfettered actions without any accountability. Proposed new subsection (1A) ensures that any actions that are dishonest or done in bad faith are not protected from civil liability. Additionally, it states that breaches of a duty of care, such as negligence, are also not exempt from liability. This provision is a critical safeguard. It ensures that, although we provide legal protection for those acting with compassion and integrity, we also prevent exploitation or irresponsible actions, by making it clear that there is no immunity for actions that are dishonest or negligent. That strikes the right balance between compassionate assistance and legal accountability.

The amendment particularly reassures doctors, nurses, and healthcare workers—those who are most likely to be involved in the process. Often, they are deeply committed to palliative care and to supporting patients through their end of life journey, and the amendment ensures that they will not face legal risk if they provide assistance to eligible individuals under the Bill.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I rise to speak to clause 25 as a whole. First, though, I welcome the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Spen Valley, because I recognise that she is attempting to fix a problem with the Bill.

However, I am afraid that my objection remains: the fact is that no other assisted suicide law in the world—including in common law jurisdictions similar to our own, such as Australia or New Zealand—has such a clause. There can be no justification for it. If, in the course of providing assistance under this Bill, a doctor commits a civil wrong, they ought to be liable for it in the usual way.

I am glad the hon. Lady has realised that a total exclusion of civil liability is not justifiable, but her change does not go far enough. Her amendments would preserve civil liability where an act was done dishonestly—not in good faith—or for liability in tort, based on the breach of a duty of care, or in other words the tort of negligence. However, it is worth noting that that still excludes civil liability in other respects, and we should ask whether that is justifiable.

First, the clause would still exclude civil liability under a contract, so a patient who has received improper care in breach of contract would not fall within either of the exceptions of proposed new subsection (1A). I take the point that, in the case of negligent care, there would often be a concurrent liability under the tort of negligence, and that that is preserved by new subsection (1A)(b), but that is not the case for other forms of contractual arrangements.

That might be particularly relevant in the situation of subcontracting. An example would be where an outsourcing company is tasked with transporting the lethal substance. Given the risks involved, the contract specifies strict rules that must be complied with, but the company does not comply with those rules. Under clause 25, even as amended, my concern is that they could not be sued for that breach of contract. What is the justification for excluding civil liability in contracts?

Secondly, there is the tort of trespass to the person, which is commonly relevant to medical practice, as it is under such torts that cases where there was no consent or capacity are handled. Those torts can be committed recklessly, but recklessness is not the same as bad faith or dishonesty, so liability could not be established under new subsection (1A)(a). Such torts are also different from negligence—they do not involve a duty of care—so they would not be covered by new subsection (1A)(b). I appreciate that, in many cases, liability could also be established under the tort of negligence, but that would not be the case in all cases. So I ask again: what is the justification for this exclusion?

Finally, and most concerning, we were told in previous debates that if it turned out that the criteria for an assisted death were not met, one could always apply for an injunction. Leaving aside the practical and financial obstacles involved in seeking an injunction at the last minute, which we have discussed before, my concern is that a private law injunction requires that a civil wrong either has been committed or is about to be committed. However, in a case where the doctors consider, in good faith and without negligence, that the criteria have been met, but the family has new evidence to show that that is not the case, the effect of clause 25, even as amended, would be that no civil wrong has been, or would be, committed in that instance, so the test for a private law injunction would not be met.

I might be wrong, so I would be interested to hear whether the Minister or the hon. Member for Spen Valley disagree with that analysis. I would be grateful if they could point out how the private law test for an interim injunction is met in such an instance.

All this could be much simpler if clause 25 were left out of the Bill entirely. Australia and New Zealand do not have such a clause or a civil liability exemption for practitioners of assisted suicide, and I am not aware of that having caused problems for practitioners, so I would be interested to understand why we need such a measure here.

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Rebecca Paul Portrait Rebecca Paul
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Thank you, Mr Dowd. In that case, I will stop there. I was just making the point that this is important.

Amendment 509 states:

“Proceedings for an offence under this section may be instituted only by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.”

I would find it useful to have more clarity around how the offence is used currently, why it is used and why it is appropriate to use it in this instance. Those are all genuine questions. I simply do not know, so I would be grateful for some input. I will leave it there.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I will be grateful if the Minister or the hon. Member for Spen Valley can explain the situations in which behaviour criminalised by clause 26(2) would not also amount to an offence under section 2 of the Suicide Act, as amended, or indeed to murder. What behaviour would be criminalised here that is not already criminal? Can the hon. Lady think of any instance in which there would be no crime under section 2 of the Suicide Act, but there would be an offence under clause 26(2)? If there is no such instance—I cannot think of one—it strikes me that, at least in respect of coercion and pressure, the offence being created here is redundant and duplicative.

Ministers have rightly stressed the importance of their duty to the statute book. My understanding is that having redundant or duplicative legislation, or indeed duplicative offences, would be inconsistent with our duty to the statute book. One might ask, “What does it matter? Wouldn’t it be helpful to have additional belt-and-braces safeguards in the Bill?” I agree in principle, but I note that when other Members have deployed that argument in relation to adding terms such as “undue influence”, the neutral Ministers have rebuked them by appealing to the duty that we are supposed to have to the statute book. I think the point cuts both ways. Why are we embroidering the statute book with duplicative offences?

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I would have thought, given the hon. Gentleman’s views on the Bill, that he would welcome having an actual offence for the purposes of the Bill. Surely that is something that we should all support.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I support the principle of insisting that inducing people by dishonesty, coercion or pressure to kill themselves should be illegal, but my understanding is that it already is. If it is not illegal, or if there are circumstances in which we need this additional offence that are not already captured by the Suicide Act or the law on murder, I would like to understand what they are. As I say, while it might be helpful to duplicate the offence, I understand that the very sensible convention in our law is that it is not helpful to have two offences relating to the same act because of the opportunity for offenders to play off one offence against the other.

Having duplicative criminal offences can make prosecuting cases harder because the defendant can raise abuse-of-process arguments about whether they have been charged with the most appropriate offence. I understand that the Attorney General’s Office and the Ministry of Justice are therefore usually very keen to avoid duplicative offences.

Let me give an example of the difference in the treatment of the offence. It is proposed that this offence would be subject to a life sentence, which requires the consent of the DPP. But at least in the one case where it overlaps with murder, this would provide a more favourable treatment for the accused than the other obvious charge. Can that be justified?

Duplicating criminal liability by introducing new offences has far-reaching implications that can disturb the coherence and certainty of criminal law. If one introduces a law that gives prosecutors two criminal offences to choose from to cover one act, some prosecutors will choose one and some will choose the other. This is generally undesirable; indeed, it is unprecedented in the case of homicide, where there is every reason to suspect that it could cause chaos for grieving families in search of justice. Such chaos is all too predictable, for a number of reasons.

Let me give an example. A defendant proven to have procured a suicide by deception will be well advised to plead guilty to the offence contrary to section 26(2) and then contest any attempt to introduce murder proceedings. This matters profoundly. A decision to prosecute is an administrative decision and is subject to judicial review. This is not an academic point; it could cause real distress for bereaved families in deep turmoil seeking justice.

Let us imagine that a person, A, is a new coercive and controlling partner of person B and procures by deception their suicide in order to profit from a will. The family of person B grow suspicious and provide the police with a convincing case for a murder prosecution. The CPS agrees and charges A with murder. A accepts that he procured the suicide by deception. On that basis, he appeals, seeking a remedy in judicial review, saying that the CPS should have charged him with a clause 26(2) offence, not murder. The JR is backed by wealthy pressure groups and is beset with administrative adjournments and so on. From the filing of the claim form to the final judgment of the administrative court within the High Court, the case takes 24 gruelling, painful, awful months for the bereaved family.

Throughout this time, the lawyers for A, the defendant, tell him to stay the course and continue to offer the plea to section 26(2), because the family will be exhausted by the reality of litigation. The family have no legal aid, no support, no charity backing and no one interested in their case. The war of attrition in litigation finally defeats them. They advise the CPS that they will accept a plea under the section 26(2) offence, and not the murder that actually occurred. That is the reality of duplicating criminal liability. In that example, A has got away with murder by judicial review.

We must be clear about what we are being asked to do. It is not simple. We are being asked to innovate in the law of murder. We are being asked to do so without the assistance of the Law Commission, without the careful eye of legal or judicial bodies alive to the difficulties of duplicating liability and without the input of any bodies that represent the victims of crime on how this might affect them. There are no Government consultations with such bodies before us. There is no expert assistance from judicial or legal figures on how the good intentions around clause 26(2) might unintentionally lead to serious and undesirable consequences such as those that I have described.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-sixth sitting)

Danny Kruger Excerpts
Lewis Atkinson Portrait Lewis Atkinson
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am afraid I cannot agree. The situation that I set out, in which a hospice makes an organisational decision that it does not wish to provide assisted dying services, is entirely legitimate under the Bill, as drafted. I do not, however, think it should screen which applicants have a certain view, which would be legal under the amendment. The example that the hon. Lady gives is rather different, because it relates to a particular protected characteristic. I am not an expert in the area, so maybe colleagues can help me, but this relates to specific services.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger (East Wiltshire) (Con)
- Hansard - -

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Lewis Atkinson Portrait Lewis Atkinson
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I will move on, because we have started slightly late and I am not sure that we are going to add anything on this point.

There is a fundamental distinction between providing assistance and being the location in which people may self-administer an assisted death. In his speech on new clause 22, the hon. Member for East Wiltshire somewhat overlapped those two things, if I may say so. Having established that a hospice would be under no obligation to provide, an individual would clearly not be able to turn up and say, “Your staff must help me to do this.” However, that is different from a situation in which someone living in their own private home— that might include a room in a care home or sheltered accommodation—decides that they want their healthcare team to carry out entirely lawful and appropriate activities under the Bill.

I therefore cannot agree with new clause 22. People are legally resident in these premises. They are registered to vote. In some cases, such as in warden-provided accommodation, they have a lease. It is not a landlord in absentia. I know that the hon. Gentleman has provided an opt-out for some situations, but what about warden and supported housing situations? We would not accept operators or owners policing what lawful activities should happen in someone’s own home within that environment. That is entirely different from the situation that the hon. Gentleman sketched out, in which everyone has to be involved. There would be no obligation whatever on any staff of that establishment to participate in an ancillary manner or otherwise, but in a private residence, such as someone’s room in a care home, we cannot allow that to be prohibited.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

As always, the hon. Gentleman is making a helpful and intelligent speech, and I appreciate the distinction that he is trying to draw. There is a lot to say, and I will respond more when I wind up, but does he think that it would be an acceptable condition of a lease—or whatever the living arrangement is for residents of sheltered accommodation or shared places—for the operator to specify that no assisted dying shall be performed in those premises, and for that to be a condition of coming to live there?

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Naz Shah Portrait Naz Shah
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

If we are talking about employers and employees, not people who are accessing the service as service users, I hope the scenario to which my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge referred would not happen.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

There is much to get into, and I will try to respond a bit more when I speak again. I do not want to revisit the whole question of palliative care but, on the scenario set out by the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge, the strong advice that I have received from palliative care professionals is that it is not accurate to say that somebody’s pain cannot be palliated. It might well be that there is a difficulty with particular opioids, but there are other palliative care options available to everybody. No palliative care doctor ever says that there is nothing they can do.

Kit Malthouse Portrait Kit Malthouse
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

She said exactly that.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

Well, we have been over the whole question of palliative care and alternatives to assisted suicide; nevertheless, I wanted to challenge that scenario.

On the suggestion that there is a comparison with an abortion service no one is suggesting that a woman who goes into a refuge, discovers she is pregnant and wants to have a termination is somehow obliged to have it on the premises of the refuge, which does not believe in abortion. That is not a scenario that could happen, because that is not how abortion operates. What we are suggesting is that somebody who arrives in a care home or hospice that does not want to facilitate assisted suicide would not be able to receive such assistance there. There is no objection to their believing in or desiring an assisted suicide; the point is to protect the institution.

I recognise the difficulty with the specific case the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge raised. Nevertheless, the alternative is to have blanket permission for any resident of any care home or hospice to insist that they can receive an assisted death in that home or hospice, despite what the rest of that community and the management might want. Indeed, the patient might have signed a contract specifying that they will not seek an assisted death in that home or hospice. There is much more to discuss, but I hope that that is helpful for the hon. Lady.

Naz Shah Portrait Naz Shah
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the hon. Member. What he said is really helpful.

I want to come back to the issue of opioids. As someone who suffers from chronic pain, my understanding is that I have a choice over whether I take opioids or other medication. So when people are allergic to opioids, they can potentially access other medication for pain relief.

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Stephen Kinnock Portrait Stephen Kinnock
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

As I was saying, the scope of the term “premises” is unclear. Is it residential property, care home, hospice or indeed hospital? That is one of the challenges with the drafting of the amendment: the scope and definition of the term is not clear.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

We are going to get to the question of the NHS provision, but, surely, if it is the decision of Parliament and the Secretary of State that assisted suicide should be provided through the NHS, then that is what will happen. It might be that there are some trusts that will have some sort of autonomy—to the extent that they can decline to deliver certain services—but, if this is a healthcare treatment that is regulated in that way and if it is to be set out as something that shall be provided by the NHS, surely hospitals will not be in a position to decline to deliver, if they are indeed NHS hospitals. The purpose of these amendments is to protect private and charitable providers. Does the Minister agree?

Stephen Kinnock Portrait Stephen Kinnock
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I agree with the sentiment of the hon. Gentleman’s intervention. The challenge is that the way in which the amendment is drafted could well lead to unintended consequences, because the scope is not clear. If we are not clear what the scope is, it could potentially be exponential.

New clause 23 would prevent regulated care homes and hospices from facing any detrimental consequences for not providing or permitting assistance in accordance with the Bill. This also means that their funding must not be conditional on them providing or permitting such assistance to take place on their premises. As a result, a person who is terminally ill and is residing in a care home or hospice could be asked or required to leave that care home or hospice in order to receive assistance under the Bill, if that care home or hospice provider does not wish to allow assisted dying on their premises.

In such circumstances, the care home or hospice provider would not be able to be placed in any detriment as a result of any action or decision taken. This could engage a person’s right under article 8 of the ECHR. Further, public authorities would not be able to persuade care homes or hospices to provide or permit assistance to take place on their premises by offering additional funding if they agreed to do so. Equally, if a public authority gave funding to care homes or hospice providers in recognition of their agreement to provide or permit assisted dying on their premises, and that provider later decided not to provide or permit the assistance, and spent the funding on other matters, the public authority would not be able to recover the funding if it were given unconditionally.

Clause 23 sets out that no registered medical practitioner or other health professional would be under any duty to participate in the provision of assistance in accordance with the Bill. It also sets out that employees cannot be subject to any detriment by their employer for exercising their right to either participate or not participate in the provision of assistance in accordance with the Bill. Further amendment to the clause will be required on Report to ensure that the opt-out in clause 23(1) and the employment protections in clause 23(2) work effectively alongside the duties imposed on health professionals in other provisions of the Bill as amended in Committee.

I hope those observations were helpful.

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These are sensitive issues, and there is a range of views across the various professions involved in end of life care. Hospice UK recognises that, which is why, representing its members’ different views, its formal position is that it has no collective view. It recognises that staff, volunteers and hospice trustees will look at the Bill’s implications in a variety of ways, and we should give them the time and space to do so, rather than the Bill’s dictating what they should or should not do. We probably all have hospices in our constituencies and local areas, which we visit and have good relationships with, and we probably all have family and friends who have benefited from the care of those amazing places—I know I have. That local dialogue is important—almost as important as what goes into this legislation.
Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

Obviously, the sentiment that we should work with hospices and let them set their own policy is absolutely right—that is the purpose of the amendment—but does the hon. Lady acknowledge that the Minister just said that if any hospice attempts to prevent assisted dying from taking place on their premises, there will be human rights claims? They can have all the consultations and conversations they want, but unless the Bill specifies that they are allowed to opt out, they will be forced to do it.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point, and I am aware of the Minister’s comments. This will be part of the discussion as we take it forward. That is why this debate is really powerful.

In their written evidence, the trustees at Willow Burn hospice, based in the UK, told us:

“Our Mission is to deliver hospice care of the highest standard to our patients and those important to them...We also believe that we should support and enable people to make the choices that matter to them.”

They said they had not decided their position on assisted dying and remained

“open minded about possible future actions. We believe this stance is in the best interests of patients and their families and reflects the wishes of our community.”

I welcome that open-minded approach and their commitment

“to put care, compassion and dignity at the heart of everything”

they do. Contrary to what the hon. Member East Wiltshire has said, the picture is not black and white. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich in that regard.

Colleagues may remember the evidence given to the Committee by the CEO of Hospice UK, Toby Porter. He clarified for us that institutions do not function in the same way as individuals when it comes to conscience-influencing decisions. He told us:

“There is this idea that your individual opinion guides everything, but with a hospice charity the opposite is true. As many Members will know because of their own work as trustees, the trustees and leadership of a hospice team are required to put personal opinion and interest to one side and always act in the best interest of the charity’s beneficiaries, who are the population.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 195, Q255.]

It is also important to remember that international experience shows that up to 30% to 40% of patients who sign up to the assisted dying process ultimately do not access it. Palliative care may meet their needs, or they may simply change their mind. However, we also know that the reassurance and comfort that the choice of an assisted death provides alongside other treatment and care is really important to them, and I do not believe that reassurance should be denied to some people because of the institution they happen to be in.

--- Later in debate ---
Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is a good point. My understanding—the Minister might correct me—is that pharmacists currently are within the definition of health professionals, but if they are not, that is an important point, which would be covered by making the change to ensure that no one is under any duty. However, I will definitely check that.

Mr Porter also said:

“hospices evolved out of the community. They exist because communities wanted better deaths. In the end, it is the job of institutions to evolve to fit the values and laws of society as they evolve, rather than vice versa.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 202, Q264.]

The polling on assisted dying shows significant public support for a change in the law, which is one of the main reasons we are here discussing the issue today. The latest figures from the British social attitudes survey, published just this week by the National Centre for Social Research, show that support at 79%, which is unchanged or slightly up on a decade ago. Although I cannot support these amendments, this is an important debate. I think we have conducted ourselves extremely well over the past 24 hours. I think it is important that we continue the debate respectfully and sensitively.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I, too, am very grateful to you for rescuing us, Ms McVey; thank you. I also thank the hon. Member for Spen Valley: it is nice to be commended for our good conduct, so I am grateful for that. This has been a very interesting debate, and I thank all hon. Members for participating. I appreciate the fact that we have made some progress in understanding each other and potentially improving the Bill, although I regret the lack of support from the Government Front Bench for the amendments that I have tabled.

Let me just refresh memories on the purpose of my amendments. The Bill promoter has tabled amendments to clauses 24 and 25, which we will come to and which keep the phrase

“providing assistance to a person in accordance with this Act”,

but add to it these two other phrases:

“performing any other function under that Act”

and

“assisting a person seeking to end their own life in accordance with that Act”.

Those amendments expand the protection from criminal and civil liability. They mean that performing any other function under the Act and assisting a person seeking to end their own life, in connection with the doing of anything under the Act, are both protected from criminal and civil liability. But the hon. Lady has not tabled a similar amendment to clause 23, and there is a real risk. The British Medical Association, the Royal Pharmaceutical Society and the Royal College of Nursing, as I mentioned yesterday, have all warned that the protection of conscience clause is limited solely to the final act, rather than applying to all functions under the Act. I appreciate that the hon. Lady expresses a commitment to trying to ensure that we do cover everybody and all appropriate actions and activities that take place, but I suggest that that is what my amendment would do.

In response to the objections to the amendment, I appreciate the sudden interest in precision in drafting.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is not sudden!

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

Well, every time that those on my side of the debate raise detailed, particular points we are told, “Oh, the spirit of the text is clear. We’ll sort that out later. It’ll come in guidance.” We are told that we should not be nitpicking, embroidering and so on. Anyway, I appreciate the attention to detail, and I want to respond to some of the points.

With respect, the Minister made a pretty tendentious suggestion that a doctor could opt in to assisted dying and take part in some of the procedures but then suddenly decide to neglect performing others, and that that would not be negligent. I cannot conceive of any court or tribunal conceding that it would not be negligent not to fulfil the obligations under the Act once the procedure has begun—once the doctor has made commitments and already undertaken activities to progress an assisted dying case.

The hon. Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire objected on the grounds that the amendment might give a gardener or cleaner the right to opt out. Proposed new subsection (1B)(b) of clause 23 actually makes it clear that “ancillary” activities are not protected by the conscience clause, so the gardener would not be off the hook—under the amendment, the gardener would still have to mow the lawn.

I recognise that the drafting might not be perfect, but I emphasise that the PBL “Guide to Making Legislation”—by the secretariat to the Parliamentary Business and Legislation Cabinet Committee—makes it clear that Government should not object to Back-Bench amendments on drafting grounds. If there are issues with particular phrasing that cause the Government or the promoter concern, that can be addressed subsequently, so I regret it if the Minister is using drafting issues to justify a refusal to support these amendments.

On new clause 22 and the issue of premises, which we have discussed very interestingly, a couple of objections have been raised. The first relates to shared ownership schemes, which we are all familiar with, particularly for elderly people. The answer is simple. The corporate owner under a shared ownership scheme is not in occupation. Being in occupation has a particular meaning in land law, and it is not the case here that a tenant genuinely in occupation of their own premises could somehow be denied their right to have an assisted death in their own home because of the freehold arrangement of the premises they occupy.

I am grateful for the indication given by Members, particularly my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire, that there may well be circumstances in which it is appropriate for particular premises to opt out of the obligation to facilitate assisted dying, so that a particular institution would have the right to deny permission for assisted death.

Kit Malthouse Portrait Kit Malthouse
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

To clarify my remarks, I was not necessarily saying that they should have the right to deny, but by default they would if they were, in effect, a closed community that was discriminating in favour of like-minded individuals—a home for retired Catholic priests, for example. By default it would be someone who was unlikely to offer those services. The other point to ask is: if I am in a hospice, in my bed at the last with visitors coming to see me, and one of those visitors is the doctor who is coming to administer to me, I am not quite sure how that would be prevented, unless people are willing for there to be a wrestling match at the door of my room.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

Under the terms of amendment 441, the owners of the premises would be entitled to deny access to anyone who is seeking to deliver an assisted dying service on their premises. They would be entitled to prevent that from happening, yes. Obviously, that is an extremely unlikely scenario; nevertheless, it is one that I think we need to contemplate.

I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire for his clarification. I had understood that he had acknowledged that it would be appropriate for the management of a Catholic care home to specify that there shall be no assisted dying on the premises, but he is suggesting that it would be illegal or inappropriate for the management to make that stipulation; it just would not happen organically, because no one would want that in that place. I regret that, because I think it should be appropriate for the management of a place—not in some sort of vindictive mission to deny people a particular right or service—to convey to everyone else who lives there that this is, as it were, a safe space in which there will not be state-assisted suicide. I think that is a reasonable hope and expectation that many residents will want when they live in a certain place.

Once this becomes normalised, once it becomes 5% or 10% of deaths, as happens in parts of Canada—if this becomes a normal and standard way to die—I think many people will not want to live in communities in which that practice takes place. I am afraid that we will find a demarcation, a bifurcation in society, for those who do not want to live in an assisted suicide community. It would be appropriate for them to have the option of going to live in a place where they know that will not be taking place.

I concede, by the way, that for many of the institutions that we are imagining here, these shared communities, it would be perfectly appropriate and understandable for it to be an option for residents. Let us think about the different sorts of places we are talking about. The Duchess of Somerset almshouse in my constituency—the sort of place we have in Wiltshire—is a lovely place, beautiful. It has lots of Liberal Democrat voters in it, which I know because I knocked on all their doors—unfortunately, the wrong sort of Liberal Democrat. I can imagine many of them supporting the right in their home, behind their own front door—which they have there—to have an assisted death, and I am sure that the other residents of that place would concede that that is appropriate.

In other places in my constituency, however, a hospice being the most obvious one, neither the management nor the other residents would be comfortable—in fact, they would be extremely uncomfortable—with the sense that assisted suicide might be practised in the next-door room. Whether it is performed, as it were, by the hospice staff, or merely facilitated by them—it would be extraordinary were it somehow to take place without the facilitation of the staff who managed the facility and look after the patients—for it to take place on some sort of parallel track would be an extreme imposition on that hospice and its management. It would be extremely disquieting for everyone else who lives and works in that place. I therefore think it is an appropriate consideration to give such places the right, at a management level, to opt out.

I also want to express my deep concern about what we heard from the Minister—his suggestion that we should not give either individuals or institutions the absolute right to opt out of the facilitation of assisted suicide because we think the European convention on human rights might challenge that. He suggested that a court in this country or Strasbourg would overrule a decision or would negate this law, or challenge it, if we passed it with these amendments to protect hospices and individuals. We would then have a court citing international law in an attempt to overturn this law. I am very concerned about that in terms of both parliamentary sovereignty and the Government’s position. Surely, if the Government think this is the right thing to do, we should do it even if we fear an ECHR challenge. This is a craven submission to a lawmaking body that is not sovereign in our country and would be only advisory. I regret what the Minister for Care said and hope that the Justice Minister can clarify that the Government would not concede an ECHR challenge if Parliament decides to insist on individuals’ rights to decline to participate in assisted suicide.

In response to my challenges on that point, the hon. Member for Spen Valley suggested that it would be an interesting topic for a future conversation. This is the moment to have that conversation. We are deciding on amendments now that will insist on people’s right to decline to take part in assisted death. There will be no further opportunity to insist that people have that right to opt out except on Report, which will be a limited opportunity.

Yesterday, the hon. Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire made an interesting point that had not occurred to me—whether a husband living with his wife in their own shared home could legitimately deny her the right to assisted suicide in their home. It is a very good challenge. It is certainly not the policy intention, as I am sure the hon. Lady appreciates, to enable one partner to deny the other the right to assisted suicide in their shared home. I ask her to accept that that is not the intention. The purpose of the amendment is to give an occupier the right to refuse assisted dying.

With the hon. Lady’s permission, given that this clause will be voted on only next week, I propose tabling an amendment that would address her concern. I am happy to work with her or the Government to get to the point where we are satisfied that that concern has been addressed, because she is absolutely right: in someone’s own home, their partner or the person who shares the home with them should not be allowed to deny them.

We have hashed out the question about protected beliefs in relation to amendment 481, so I will move on.

Kit Malthouse Portrait Kit Malthouse
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am wondering about the difference between my own home with my partner, and my care home with lots of people that may or may not be strangers, and why I should have the right in one but not in the other.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I hope my right hon. Friend will understand that there is a difference between occupying one’s own home and living in a community under conditions set by somebody else, which is what happens if someone lives in a care home. There are terms and conditions. People have to comply with the rules of the place and have obligations to their fellow residents. In someone’s own home, whether they are living with a partner or not, they have absolute rights. That is the difference. If someone signs up to live in a care home, they have to follow the rules of the place, just like in a hotel. In someone’s own home, they can do what they like, as I am sure my right hon. Friend does.

Liz Saville Roberts Portrait Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

We should acknowledge the reasons that people go into residential and nursing care homes. They go into them because they need day-to-day help to live. Would the hon. Gentleman reconsider what he has just said? It seems to fundamentally discriminate between people who are able to live at home, have families or carers around them and can operate in that way and people who need to go into residential, and particularly nursing, homes.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

The right hon. Lady clarifies the point very well. I concede—that is right. When someone goes to live in a care home, they yield, by necessity, a whole set of freedoms that one has in one’s own home. That is the consequence of the stage of life they are at, the conditions they have, and indeed their own choice to live in that particular care home.

Liz Saville Roberts Portrait Liz Saville Roberts
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

They might not have one.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I appreciate that—there might be very little choice or no alternative. I am speaking in terms of the reality of life. We can do everything we can through the law to obviate reality—to give people as much autonomy as possible, even though they are very dependent on other people. That is why it is so important to consider the autonomy of the elderly, the frail and people with disabilities or who are ill. They require other people to give them what fully healthy and able-bodied people are able to do for themselves. I recognise that I am suggesting that somebody who lives in a care home would not have the same freedom of action as somebody living in their own home.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-third sitting)

Danny Kruger Excerpts
Jack Abbott Portrait Jack Abbott (Ipswich) (Lab/Co-op)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I feel huge responsibility for my “EastEnders”-style ending, Ms McVey. Unfortunately, my speech is not going to be as radical as some may have hoped.

I was discussing the bandwidth or capacity of the professionals involved in the process. We have been very good at leaving party politics at the door, but Opposition Members have mentioned the state of the NHS and the wider healthcare system on a couple of occasions. I could probably go further and mention the huge backlogs in the courts and wider criminal justice system. It is fair enough to consider the Bill in that wider context; I have considered that point deeply, as I know Members from across the Committee have.

We asked earlier whether there is capacity in the system to support the panels—that is, are there enough psychiatrists and social workers? However, it is inconsistent to then also say that we need more psychiatrists and social workers in other areas of the process. I am not sure that we can have it both ways. This is something to consider—the Committee has discussed it—but ultimately it is a matter for Members of the House.

The Committee is not here to debate whether the systems in place can deal with an assisted dying Bill. Whether or not assisted dying is introduced into our healthcare and judicial systems, it will not fundamentally change the challenges that the country faces in these areas. We are here to ensure that we present back to the House a Bill that has the safeguards and balances that I mentioned this morning, so that it can progress. I certainly would not want to produce anything that paralyses the system, but new clause 21 would not do so. In fact, in the long run, the panel approach would help the process along. For that reason, I am not sure that the capacity of professionals provides a valid argument against the panel—if anything, quite the reverse. As I said, that point really was not worthy of an “EastEnders” cliffhanger.

We have had positive murmurings and acknowledgments about amendment (e) to new clause 21. The panel approach represents a huge leap forward. I appreciate that Members in the room and across the House may say that the approach does not go far enough. I go back to my earlier point: for some Members, no amendment, change or safeguard will ever be enough for them to support the Bill. As a Committee, we have to come out with a strong, robust process that puts the patient first, and ensure that we are acting in their interests. We must make sure patients are safe and have the capacity to make these decisions, but I do not want any individual looking to go down this route to be stuck in endless meetings or courtrooms, when they should be spending time with their loved ones. I think this strikes the right balance between safeguarding—bringing in all of the professional expertise that we have been looking to do as a Committee—and making sure this process is fair and equitable. I urge Members to support amendment (e) to new clause 21, but I will also be supporting the new clauses today.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger (East Wiltshire) (Con)
- Hansard - -

On Second Reading on 29 November, the hon. Member for Spen Valley said:

“Under the Bill, any terminally ill person who wants to be considered for an assisted death would have to undertake a thorough and robust process involving two doctors and a High Court judge. No other jurisdiction in the world has those layers of safeguarding.”—[Official Report, 29 November 2024; Vol. 757, c. 1019.]

There can be no doubt that the High Court judge safeguard was presented to the House as globally exceptional, unusually thorough and robust, as compared to other jurisdictions. It was also a prominent feature of the public campaign around the Bill. We were told it was a Bill designed for exceptional circumstances, with robust safeguards—the High Court judge being the pre-eminent one. It was not a trivial detail; it was the centrepiece of a safeguarding regime arranged around a small number of vulnerable people. Over 60 Members of Parliament are on the record as saying that it was this safeguard that helped persuade them to vote in favour on Second Reading.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I will stand corrected if this is not true, but my understanding is that Hansard will show a very different story. I do not think that 60 people got up and said on record that this element was why they were voting for the Bill.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

To be clear, I was not suggesting that they all said so on Second Reading, because not everybody spoke in that debate—nor am I saying that it is only because of this safeguard that MPs voted for the Bill, but there are 60 colleagues of ours who have cited the judicial safeguard as a reason for supporting the Bill. Indeed, I hope the Committee will agree that this was always presented as a very significant aspect of the safeguarding regime, if not the most significant aspect. I suggest it was the most significant, because it enabled people to argue that this was the strongest Bill in the world, given that other regimes do not have a judicial element.

I opposed the Bill on Second Reading and I expect that I will oppose it on Third Reading, but I respect the Committee process enough to accept that the House wanted the Bill debated. Because I respect the process, I have not opposed clauses that concern the heart of the Bill, but we are now going to see the hon. Member for Spen Valley, Government Ministers and their supporters vote against this clause—the essential safeguard in the Bill, and the principal element used to persuade the House that the Bill was safe—standing part of the Bill. It is an extraordinary thing that we are going to see the Bill’s promoter and the Government oppose the centrepiece of this Bill.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I understand the hon. Member’s framing of this and it might very well be his perspective, but there were 650 MPs who voted on Second Reading that day, so I think it is unfair to represent colleagues who did not have the view that this is the central component of the Bill. There are lots of other components to the Bill that colleagues have certainly spoken to me about, and it is important to acknowledge that.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I am happy to acknowledge that there are many other components of the Bill, but many Members, including the hon. Lady, cited this safeguard as an essential element of the safeguarding regime—if not the most essential. Crucially, it was presented to the House of Commons as such, and it is a central clause of the Bill, and the hon. Lady is now proposing to vote against that element. My view is that a change this substantial—a fundamental and radical change to the structure of the process that is being designed—should be presented on Report. The whole House should have the opportunity to discuss and debate properly whether that element should be changed. Every Member should have the opportunity to have a say on this central point.

Tom Gordon Portrait Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The hon. Gentleman will have to forgive me, because I am a relatively new MP and there are still bits of parliamentary procedure that I have not yet got my head round, but is it not the case that MPs will have a say on Report, when they can table amendments to take the Bill back to how it was? That point could therefore be debated on Report.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

Of course that is correct: a small number of amendments will be selected for debate and vote on Report, and if somebody wants to table an amendment on this issue it might indeed make it through Mr Speaker’s selection, but the point of the Committee process is to consider the Bill that was passed on Second Reading and come back to the House with the Bill either unamended or amended. This is a very substantial change to the Bill that was presented and voted for on Second Reading. As I say, many Members supported this clause, no doubt including the hon. Gentleman.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The hon. Gentleman is making a point that we hopefully all agree with. The job of the Committee is to take evidence and look at ways of improving the Bill on that basis. This is a really good example of where we have actually done our job and done it very, very well.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I do not think the hon. Lady can say she has done her job very, very well if, after presenting a Bill, and after months and months of work and debate, including many hours’ debate on Second Reading, she suddenly decides that its central part is deficient. She talks about the opportunity for the Committee to take and debate evidence, but we have not had evidence on this new element—these new clauses and the panel process. There were vague suggestions from some of the people we heard evidence from that it might be appropriate, but although we heard evidence on the High Court stage and the deficiencies therein, we have not had the opportunity to properly examine the panel element that is now being introduced.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Will the hon. Gentleman give way one more time?

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

With great pleasure.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way again; I will sit down after this. I will not take it too personally that he thinks I have done a very poor job, but the point is that we heard a broad range of evidence from professionals including legal experts, medical experts, psychiatrists and social workers—lots of different people. We have also had evidence come in over recent weeks and months that has added to that and has talked about these changes. It is important to acknowledge that.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

The hon. Lady must not apologise for intervening on me. I can hardly be one to object to people intervening. This is a very good forum for the kind of exchanges we are having, so I am very happy to take interventions. She is absolutely right that lots of evidence has been presented. I cite it myself all the time. Further evidence is coming in, and much of it is very critical of the new proposals. That is an absolutely fair point, but my point remains that we invited witnesses and had three days of evidence on a Bill whose core safeguard has now fundamentally changed—well, it has not changed yet, but I suspect it is about to.

Marie Tidball Portrait Dr Marie Tidball (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I supported the Bill on Second Reading on the basis of the High Court proposal, but then read very closely the evidence from Justice Munby on the need for a strengthened evidentiary process so that this is not just a rubber-stamping exercise. He said, secondly, that it would be better to replace the High Court with another system because of the position that it would place judges in. Having listened to 50 witnesses, I am satisfied with this proposal; I was persuaded through this cross-party process, which is an incredible example of deliberative decision making. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that our ability to amend the Bill where the evidence shows that we must do so demonstrates the strength of this process, and has enabled us to produce something much better and more in alignment with public opinion?

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I greatly respect the position that the hon. Lady has come to. She has been persuaded that this is an improvement on the Bill, and I respect that. I recognise that that is what the hon. Member for Spen Valley and others think, but I am afraid I do not accept that the process has been adequate. The hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge cites Justice Munby and others who criticised the High Court proposals. I also have my criticisms of them—I think they were inadequate—but the response to that is not to scrap them all together, but to strengthen them, as Justice Munby suggested. The hon. Lady will know that Justice Munby is not supportive of the new proposals either; he thinks they also fail the essential test of being an effective safeguard. Nor does the new proposal—the panel—provide the opportunity for evidentiary investigation, which would indeed be appropriate if we were to have a proper safeguard at this stage. I respect the hon. Lady’s position, but I am not persuaded.

--- Later in debate ---
Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I am about to come to that. I am going to suggest how we could have done it better. I take the hon. Member’s point. I do need to answer that question.

Kit Malthouse Portrait Kit Malthouse
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am just intrigued. My hon. Friend is talking a lot about the evidence. Did any evidence on anything in the Bill change his mind on any aspect of it?

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

Was there any evidence that changed my mind?

None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

That is out of scope of the group, but you carry on and think, Mr Kruger.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

Thank you, Ms McVey. I do not want to be facetious because it is a serious point, but lots of new points were made in evidence to the Committee, including some in favour of the Bill as it is and some of the amendments that I have opposed. We have had some helpful evidence that has helped to shore up the case made by the Bill’s promoter, as well as evidence that suggested otherwise, and some points in debate have been very well made. I was nearly floored by an intervention by the hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham yesterday, for instance. I do respect the points that have been made in Committee, including at the evidence stage.

My suggestion is that we should be doing this on Report, if we do it at all, because that would reflect the seriousness of the proposal and the fact that the House voted for the clause on Second Reading. There were problems with the High Court stage, as has been acknowledged, and others have referred to it in support of the change. I want to quickly acknowledge, perhaps in response to my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire, the points made by Lord Sumption, Max Hill, Alex Ruck Keene and Nicholas Mostyn—all senior barristers and judges. It became obvious that there were significant issues, particularly around the power of the court to investigate applications or to hear evidence on them, and about the capacity of the judicial system to cope with the demand.

It was clear that further thought was needed on the High Court stage. Indeed it was apparent that further thought was already under way. There is an interesting exchange in the record of the evidence sessions between the Justice Minister, the hon. Member for Finchley and Golders Green, and those witnesses, particularly Max Hill, who said that he was quite close to the construction of the Bill. That clearly shows, in my view, that there already was thinking under way behind the scenes that have led to these changes.

My view is that, rather than ditching clause 12, we should be seeking to make it work in ways that many hon. Members have proposed. I am afraid we just skipped over those proposals in earlier groupings on the clause because there was no point—we were obviously proceeding to the stand part debate and to eliminate the involvement of the court all together.

There were things the Committee could have set itself to address, but we have not done that. I hope you will excuse me, Ms McVey, for making what might be a cynical observation: I think the High Court stage was recognised as popular and as useful to the campaign to get the Bill through the House of Commons. It was predicated specifically on the point, which was clearly communicated and understood by the public, that this measure of assisted dying is intended for very few people. It is for the most exceptional cases: people at the very end of their life, in desperate circumstances, in desperate pain and suffering. Very few people need it. However, I believe this change is predicated on the real intent of the Bill: far wider eligibility than just that tiny group.

We have seen that through the rejection of a series of amendments that would have restricted eligibility specifically to that group—a group for whom we all understand the case for an assisted death; again, the public support it in those specific cases of people at the very end of their life, who are suffering intolerably. The Bill is not restricted to that group only, and that is why we need to redesign the system to enable this larger group to make use of it.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The hon. Gentleman is been very generous with his time. I am interested in how he can conclude that the eligibility criteria have somehow been expanded by adding an expert panel with a psychiatrist and a social worker.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I am sorry; I did not intend to give that impression. That is not what I am suggesting. What I am saying is that we have seen the rejection of a series of amendments that would have restricted eligibility, or ensured that only certain people would be eligible: those for whom we all understand the reason for the case for assisted death. Whether our amendments related to the burden, the pain, or questions around capacity and coercion, our amendments would have restricted access to only the most desperate people.

On that basis, it would have been appropriate to have a High Court stage, because the High Court could have accommodated that lower demand. Given the opportunity that the Bill affords to a larger group of people to gain access to assisted death, it has become obvious—I presume, in the mind of Government and others—that there is insufficient capacity in the court system to accommodate the regime being instituted here.

I think the question of High Court capacity has been driven by the desire for a system that can cope with many thousands of deaths per year. I have seen ranges suggesting between 6,000 and 17,000 deaths per year. If Members have other calculations or estimates, I would be grateful to hear them. In fact, it would be good to know whether the Government have done any estimation of the numbers we are looking at.

It is not simply a case of averting those desperate cases of people who help their relatives to die by going to Switzerland or who assist them in committing suicide in other ways—we heard from Max Hill that only a handful of cases cross his desk every year. It is clearly the intention to greatly widen the scope beyond that desperate group. It is unclear what the overall number is, but my strong sense is that we are looking at many thousands, and for that reason, it has been decided that the High Court would not have the capacity to cope with this.

Jack Abbott Portrait Jack Abbott
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

We go back to the inconsistency argument. On the one hand, we are saying that we must have more psychiatrists, social workers and palliative care experts in the process. This change is now being proposed, and the hon. Gentleman is using that as a reason to say that there is bad faith here and the sponsors of the Bill just want to widen the scope. I do not think he can have it both ways.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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I am not suggesting bad faith here. I think there is a genuine view, and it might well come from the Government’s official advice, that the Bill, as drafted and as amended, will allow many thousands of people to gain access to assisted death every year. On that basis, we will need a system that can cope with them. The judiciary clearly communicated that it could not cope, and I understand why it would do so.

Jack Abbott Portrait Jack Abbott
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I appreciate that, but just this morning we heard from the hon. Member for Reigate that, because there are not enough psychiatrists and social workers, this panel is not workable either. Again, there is an inconsistency here. There is either enough capacity in the system or there is not—which is it?

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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I am sorry to disappoint the hon. Member, but I am afraid I am going to have it both ways. I think the Bill is profoundly flawed, particularly if large numbers of people will be going through this system. Whether they are going through a judicial system or a panel system, there will be huge capacity constraints on the professionals involved, and we have transferred that responsibility and that problem from the judiciary to psychiatry and social work—unless, of course, it is a rubber-stamp exercise, which I fear it might be, but even then, we are still involving psychiatrists and social workers in a rubber-stamp exercise.

Jack Abbott Portrait Jack Abbott
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

But that demolishes the central argument that the hon. Gentleman is making. On the one hand, he says that we are expanding access, but on the other, he says that the panel system will not be able to expand it. If the motive of the promoter of the Bill was to expand the system to make more people eligible, the hon. Gentleman has just said that the constraints of the panel will mean that that does not happen anyway. He is conflating different things and being totally inconsistent.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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All right. I regret my failure to assuage the anxieties of the hon. Member.

Let me explain why it was so important that we had a judicial stage. My complaints were never against the principle, but always against the practicalities, for the reasons I have just given and will go on to say more about. The value of a judicial stage is that it gave the doctors certainty and, indeed, protection for the process they were responsible for.

I want to cite the evidence from the Medical Defence Union, which provides doctors with insurance against claims of medical negligence. Responding to the suggestion that judicial involvement could be replaced by some other decision-making body, it stated:

“The MDU strongly rejects this assertion. The involvement of the judiciary is essential. Its absence leaves doctors unduly exposed. Media reports suggest that an alternative safeguard is being mooted. No ‘independent panel’, however so constituted, can replace the legal authority of a course of action sealed and ratified by a judge. Doctors deserve that certainty when relying upon this Bill to provide the very best for their patients at the most delicate moment of their duty of care.”

I will also cite the evidence that we received from Ruth Hughes, a senior barrister with 17 years of experience in mental capacity law. I cannot say that she is a King’s counsel because she does not become one until later this month—congratulations to her. She stated in her written evidence that

“if there is no judicial declaration because the judicial safeguard is not enacted, then there is a risk that the estates of persons who have been assisted to die will be sent into turmoil. This is due to the possibility of arguments being made that beneficiaries of the estate have ‘influenced’ the person into obtaining the assisted death.”

She said that

“even if there is no conviction but another person asserts there was ‘influence’…not undue influence”—

and certainly not coercion, which is banned by the Bill—

“but a lower standard of ‘influence’ by a beneficiary of the estate…then the personal representatives will be advised to obtain directions from the Court as to how to administer the estate.”

Her point is that, even if the bar for the assisted death is met, in terms of influence, coercion and so on, the testamentary or probate challenges that the estates will then go into are considerable.

The fact is that somebody has to be the judge—somebody has to take legal responsibility for the decision that is made. In the common law system, we do not give powers of life and death to panels; we give them to legally constituted bodies with judicial authority. To cite the MDU again:

“To put it plainly, without judicial involvement someone will have to take responsibility for the legality of the action.”

Simon Opher Portrait Dr Simon Opher (Stroud) (Lab)
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Again, I thank the hon. Member for quoting all this, but does it mean that he supports the original clause 12?

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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I will be voting for clause 12 to stand part, because I think it is an essential safeguard, but it is not strong enough. There are all sorts of problems with it around capacity and the way it is constituted, and I will come on now to how I think it can be improved.

Simon Opher Portrait Dr Opher
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indicated dissent.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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The hon. Gentleman does not seem impressed by my straight answer to his straight question. Yes, I do support clause 12. I think we should strengthen it, in the ways that I will now explain. We do need a court, and I think Parliament was right to demand this, or to support it. We have a comparable model in the Court of Protection, which applies when there are disputed decisions about whether to withdraw life support. By the way, I mention to hon. Members who have referred to this—just to go back to an earlier debate—that, with the Court of Protection, one is obliged to notify the family. So even there, when there is a decision to withdraw life support, the family is notified, but we have decided not to notify the family under this Bill. But anyway, the Court of Protection does provide an appropriate comparison.

Whether we are talking about the Court of Protection or the High Court, either would work if the system was set up right. The crucial thing, in my view, is that it needs a proper adversarial arrangement so that the judge can actually judge. The way that judges work in this country, under the common law system, is that they hear arguments and then make decisions. It has been suggested that there could be a role for the official solicitor in acting “for the state”, as it were—or indeed “for society”, perhaps, or however we would want to put it—to perform the role of challenging the application and taking responsibility for presenting any alternative pieces of information that the judge should consider.

Jack Abbott Portrait Jack Abbott
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I do not want to make implications about what the hon. Gentleman might be saying, but am I correct that, with the adversarial position that he is supporting, a person coming to the end of their life, who had gone through this process, would essentially have to argue their case in front of a judge?

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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No, I do not think it is necessary for the applicant to come to court and present their case—that might be completely impossible or inappropriate—but a case does need to be made to the judge about why it should proceed, which is part of the original proposal. Indeed, that is what is proposed under the panel system as well: the case is made for whether it should go ahead.

My suggestion is that there needs to be representatives of the applicant—who may want to appear themselves—but there also needs to be somebody who is putting the other side of the story: “Maybe this isn’t the right thing to do. Has the judge considered these parts of the evidence, or this aspect of the report from the assessing doctors?” That would be an appropriate procedure, which is completely consistent with how these important decisions are taken in other aspects of our system.

Jack Abbott Portrait Jack Abbott
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There is a difference between an adversarial system and an inquisitorial system, which is what I believe is proposed for this panel. The panel would take not an adversarial but an inquisitive position. I do not think that is a million miles away from what the hon. Gentleman is saying, but there is a distinct difference. If he is arguing for the panel to take an adversarial position, that is very different from where the panel currently is.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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Yes; it would be inappropriate to ask a panel to operate in an adversarial system. It would be inappropriate to ask a psychiatrist and a social worker to act as a judge. We need a proper court system, as we always do with other important decisions in which two sides make arguments. Let me try to explain. I agree that what is being proposed is an inquisitorial system through a panel, which is completely alien to the British common law model of making important decisions. That is what is being suggested, but I do not think it is appropriate.

I do not believe in assisted dying; I think it is the wrong thing to do. But if we were to do it, we should have a proper multidisciplinary team at the outset—I sort of feel that that is where we have got to through these debates, and if the debates had happened properly and prior to the Bill being drafted, something more like this system might have been proposed. Perhaps a doctor does the first declaration as proposed, but we then go into a proper multidisciplinary team, rather than just having the options to refer to psychiatrists if appropriate or to maybe consult palliative care specialists.

The involvement of all the appropriate specialists in assessing capacity and coercion, making clear the alternatives that the patient has, making a proper diagnosis, and hearing from family members—all the appropriate processes that should be followed in a case like this—should happen at the very beginning of the process. There is no need for a lawyer at that stage on the multidisciplinary team that we have created; it will be a proper combination of clinical and social work professionals. Their reports would then feed into the judicial process, which would be the second or third stage, if we have a doctor at the beginning. The judge would then hear arguments from, as it were, both sides. That need not be a distressing or time-consuming process, but it would be an appropriate one under British law to make decisions of life and death. That court would clearly hear arguments made by both sides.

Kit Malthouse Portrait Kit Malthouse
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To be clear, does my hon. Friend envisage that I would either be in the hearing, or lying in my bed listening to the hearing—the fungating tumours in my neck restricting my ability to breathe—having gone through all the eligibility criteria, but having to listen to someone argue that I should go through a death that I am trying to avoid, by arguing that I do not have capacity? Does he not see that that could be profoundly distressing to someone who is in the closing moments of their life? In many ways, it might actually be cruel and traumatic for me to hear somebody arguing, frankly, that I should endure the pain, in their opinion.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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I regret that my right hon. Friend is making that argument. The fact is that the panel is already going to consider whether it is appropriate. There might not be some professional who is there with the purpose of suggesting that there are other things that the panel should consider, but the patient is already lying there waiting for powerful people in another room to make a decision about whether they are going to get an assisted suicide or not. That process is already going on.

On my right hon. Friend’s point that it is intolerable for somebody to hear the case made against their assisted death, let me put to him an alternative hypothesis. Rather than somebody in the situation that he describes, let us imagine somebody who is the victim of years of coercive control, who has undiagnosed mental health conditions, who is feeling a burden on their family and whose relatives want their money. None of that has yet been fully identified through the initial doctor’s stage of the process, but it has been commented on in some of the evidence that the multidisciplinary team heard. That person might hope that somebody is there making the case for them, as might their family.

It is totally appropriate for a court to hear that this procedure should not go ahead because of those other factors, which are only now being properly understood by the decision maker. That decision maker is doing so openly, not in a private session. The decision is being made not by people who are committed to the procedure and process of assisted suicide, but by an independent judge, sitting in their judicial capacity in open court, with all the safeguards and accountability that the judicial system has. That feels to me like a perfectly appropriate safeguard, and I suggest that it is, in principle, what the House of Commons thought they were getting when they supported this.

Sarah Olney Portrait Sarah Olney (Richmond Park) (LD)
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I am just reflecting on the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire’s intervention. Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that the purpose either of the panel or the High Court judge is to establish beyond all doubt that if a person is assisted in their death, no crime is being committed, and that in order to establish that, we need to apply the highest standards of evidence? Whether an adversarial or an inquisitorial process is used to collect that evidence, there must be some sort of process. That may be uncomfortable for the patient but it is necessary for their friends, relatives and the doctors being asked to assist. That is really what we are trying to achieve.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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I am grateful to the hon. Lady for making that absolutely central point. This is a judicial process, and a decision is being made. I recognise that the hon. Member for Spen Valley has correctly abandoned the claim that this is a judge-led process—because it is not—but the function of this panel will be essentially judicial, not least because the decision to proceed with an assisted death entails the people involved in administering it being exempt from criminal law and not being liable to prosecution under the Suicide Act 1961. We have made an exemption for what is otherwise a crime, and if they do not get the go-ahead from this panel, they will be committing a crime if they proceed. So in all essence, a judicial decision is being made, and it is right that we have the protections of a court.

Let me make a couple of brief points about the practicalities, and they have partly been made by others. The central point is that we do not know whether the professionals who will be required to take part in this panel have the capacity to do so. We know that the judges do not have the capacity under the current design of the law, which is an essential flaw—or we think they do not, because that point has been comprehensively argued by the judiciary and I suspect by officials at the Ministry of Justice. What we do not know is whether the psychiatry and social work professions have adequate capacity. There has been no impact assessment, and we have had a lot of comments from representative bodies expressing anxiety about the capacity of these professions to supply the panels.

The point I am trying to make is that we cannot, and should not, legislate in the dark. We should not draft laws in ignorance of these basic facts. We need to know whether the law before us is workable in the real world, and I would be grateful for clarification on that from Ministers when they speak to this clause. In my view, we need robust and clear data on how many professionals might take up the posts, and more importantly, we need the clearest and earliest warning of where there might be deficits that would compromise the entire system, particularly around the capacity of psychiatrists. We have a central problem with ignorance around capacity, but my strong view is that we do have a problem with capacity.

An important point was made by Alex Ruck Keene in evidence around the judge-led process, which we discussed earlier. His point was that it would not be possible for the judge to decline an assisted death on the basis of what he calls service denial—that is, there is not enough social care treatment or medical treatment available for the patient. If the reason why the patient were to receive an assisted death was that the local authority would not provide them with improvements to their home or funding, or that they could not get the medical treatment they wanted early enough, that would be a legitimate reason, or would not be a reason not to proceed with an assisted death. That is a very grave concern to us, and it is what happens in other countries. We heard this morning about evidence that when a patient is denied the medical or social care that they need to carry on living and living well, they are offered an assisted death. In those circumstances, I would really hope that the decision maker would conclude that it is wrong that we offer an assisted death, and that we in fact need to insist that they get the support they need to live well. I reference that because, as I understand it, there is no opportunity in the new clauses for the panel to decline an assisted death on grounds that it is being sought only because of the inadequacy of the wider care system.

It has been suggested that the judicial option remains, through the judicial review system. Other hon. Members have responded to that point, so I will not labour it. However, I want to make the point that new clause 17 makes judicial review less likely because it offers the opportunity for a sort of appeal. It is an appeal only in one direction—against a refusal—but there is a sort of appeal process in the system. As my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate said, if there is a JR, it is likely to take a long time. There is nothing about whether legal aid will be arranged. The state has proposed to pay for people to go through the assisted dying process, but is not prepared to pay anybody to challenge it, so they would have to raise their own money. It would also take a long time. It would be much simpler and better, whether it is a panel or a judge, to set up the system in a way that allows both sides to be told and that does not rely on a cumbersome judicial review system.

I reiterate that I support the multidisciplinary team. It is a very good thing that the hon. Member for Spen Valley has decided to introduce a proper stage at which a psychiatrist and a social worker will have to consider the application properly. I have concerns about how it would actually work, which I will come on to, but having a multidisciplinary team is in principle the right system. I stress that the professionals who made the case for multidisciplinary teams as part of the assessment process have not endorsed the new clauses. They are not saying that we have adequately met their concerns about the process.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
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I am not entirely sure who the hon. Gentleman is referring to, but it is fair to say that there is a range of views across a range of professions. It is important to acknowledge that.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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I apologise; the hon. Lady is absolutely right. No doubt there are representative bodies, whether it is patients’ groups or bodies representing professionals, that are satisfied with the new proposal. I do not know which—genuinely, I just have not come across them—but I have no doubt that there are some.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
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To clarify, the point that I am making is that there is a range of views across a range of organisations—many of which are neutral on the issue of assisted dying, full stop—and a range of views within each profession. We heard evidence from people working in palliative care with different views, and from medical people with different views. It is important to acknowledge that.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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Yes, a number are neutral. I will be grateful if the hon. Lady can tell the Committee if there are any representative bodies working with the professionals who administer end-of-life care that have endorsed either the Bill as it was or the Bill as it is. I do not believe there are.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
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I will check.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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The hon. Lady is going to check. My understanding is that all the bodies that represent palliative care professionals and end-of-life specialists are opposed to the Bill as it was and as it is. I think there are straightforward reasons for that.

Everybody agrees that there is value in the multidisciplinary team approach. The British Association of Social Workers provided evidence setting out what it thought was needed, namely an MDT working at the assessment stage. This is not that. It is very important that we do not confuse the provisions made under the new clauses with a multidisciplinary team operating at the appropriate moment in the process. We have to have public confidence in the process. It is very important that the composition of the new proposed panels is not conflated with the separate matter of a multidisciplinary team model. It would be very unfortunate if that confusion obtained.

The Bill, as drafted, rejects the involvement of a multi-professional team model for the conduct of the assessments, preferring two doctors working alone without input from a multidisciplinary team. I recognise that there are opportunities for them to hear from other professionals, but it is not a multidisciplinary team in any recognisable sense of the term.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Will the hon. Gentleman give way on that point?

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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I will in a moment. I was going to finish by saying that it is not correct or accurate to give the impression that Dr Cox or the Association for Palliative Medicine supports the proposed approach.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is really important to be clear about this. I do not think anyone is suggesting that what is in the Bill will replace existing good practice. That is really important. We probably all have family and friends who are being treated for cancer now, and they are looked after and cared for by a multidisciplinary team. That team does not suddenly disappear, to be replaced by what is in the Bill; it can continue. The assisted dying option involves the two doctors, and I struggle to envisage any situation in which they would not work with the multidisciplinary team and add on, where appropriate and necessary, psychiatric intervention, social care and healthcare professionals. I always come back to the point that I do not think the two things will operate independently.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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The hon. Lady does always come back to that point, and I respect it. She imagines that the good practice that is prevalent in the system will obtain automatically, in all cases, under the assisted dying regime, even though that regime is completely new. She says that she cannot envisage a scenario in which the doctors would not hear from all the professionals we all think should be consulted at this stage of the process. I have two points to make on that. First, why not make it explicit that that is required? Secondly, I am afraid that I can envisage scenarios in which for doctors—perhaps some years down the line, once this model of death has become normalised, as it has in Canada and elsewhere, with up to 10% of deaths coming through assisted dying—it just becomes a procedure.

Again, we have not ruled out the possibility—the likelihood, in fact—of independent clinics establishing themselves with a business that is about providing the support for people who want to end their life. There will be doctors who are happy to conduct the assessments; to take at face value what they hear from the patient; not to involve a wider multidisciplinary team in their consultations; and to expedite the process as the Bill, as drafted and amended, allows. I am afraid I do foresee a scenario in which the good practice in which all believe does not happen. My concern, and I expect the hon. Lady’s is the same, is to prevent that.

Rebecca Paul Portrait Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)
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My hon. Friend is making a powerful point. One of my concerns is about what happens if someone seeks assisted dying privately through a clinic. I see risks with multidisciplinary teams involving social workers continuing in that instance. Does my hon. Friend share my concern?

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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I certainly do. That is exactly the scenario that I fear, and I fear it within the NHS too. Let us not imagine that every NHS doctor has all the time and the access to the wider specialisms that they would wish. Under the Bill in its current form, there will be a very strong incentive and a very strong personal instinct for compassionate doctors, who believe in the autonomy of patients and in respecting the patient’s wishes, to take at face value what they are told and not to seek the expertise that would happen automatically if there were a proper multidisciplinary team at that stage of the process.

My point is that we do need a multidisciplinary team, but what is in the Bill is not it. At best, it is half a multidisciplinary team. There is no doctor on it. There is a lawyer, pointlessly. There is a sort of quasi-MDT—a duo-disciplinary team—but it is in the wrong place, and it will not assess, which is the job it should do, but judge. It will not diagnose or advise in the way that a clinician should; it will simply decide whether the criteria have been met for an assisted death. That job was rightly given to judges in the Bill that the House of Commons voted for, but this Bill does not have the powers, the safeguards, the accountability or the independence of a tribunal, let alone that of a court.

As the hon. Member for Spen Valley candidly says, the panel is not a judicial entity in any sense. It is a weird creature, neither one thing nor the other: a quasi-multidisciplinary team, at the wrong stage in the process, for the wrong purpose. I have said that it is not a multidisciplinary team, but it is not really a judicial entity either, as the hon. Lady has mentioned. It is certainly not “judge-plus”, as was originally suggested. There is no judge, just a legal member—not a judicial member but a legal member, who might be a lawyer.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

There is a judge—it may be a retired judge—who is the commissioner, who heads up the entire assisted dying commission, and there is a legal expert on the panel as well, as the hon. Gentleman said. That could be a retired judge, so there is legal expertise there. I think the hon. Gentleman also made the point that there is not a doctor on the panel. My understanding is that psychiatrists are doctors, but I will stand corrected if that is not true.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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The hon. Lady is absolutely right; I do apologise. There is indeed a doctor—a psychiatrist—but not a doctor specialising in their condition.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
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We have had two of them already.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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No, we have had a couple of GPs. We have not had a doctor who is a specialist in their condition.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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If needed, there is the opportunity to refer to one. It is perfectly possible that the whole process of an assisted death could be done very well under the Bill—that is good news—but there is a very great risk that the process will not be done well, because there are huge gaps through which bad practice can creep. My specific concern about this stage is that we do not have the appropriate expertise on the panel.

On the hon. Lady’s point about there being a judge in the process, there is a distant judge who sits above a quango that appoints the panels. They take a view on a specific case only if there is an appeal against a refusal. They are not directly judging on the case, as the House of Commons was told would happen.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The reports for the case would go to the commissioner, so he or she would see the reports.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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Yes, but he or she will consider a reconsideration only on the basis of an application to reconsider made by the applicant. There is only one opportunity for an appeal and it can happen in only one direction: against a refusal. I will come on to the role of the commissioner in a moment, but in the great majority of cases there will not be a judge involved in the decision. There might be a retired judge on the panel, but that is extremely unlikely; it is more likely to be a lawyer. It is a judicial exercise that is being conducted, so it would be appropriate for it to be a judge sitting properly in a court.

Naz Shah Portrait Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Does the hon. Member share my concern that the Bill does not say that the panel can call people and ask them to swear under oath, unlike a mental health tribunal?

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. Having said that the panel is not a proper multidisciplinary team, I agree that it is not a proper judicial entity either. It is a panel with judicial power to approve life-or-death decisions, but it is without a judge or the normal judicial processes that would happen in a tribunal or court. There is no oath being taken by members of the panel or by witnesses; there is no independent appointment process, so the members of the panel will be appointed by the commissioner; there is no power to order the disclosure of information to the panel; there is no power to investigate wills, financial records or anything like that; and there is no requirement to meet the doctors or even to discuss the case with the patient themselves, if the panel considers that appropriate.

There is also no appeal against an approval, just a one-way appeal against a refusal. That appeal goes not to an independent judge sitting in a court, but to a commissioner—an appointee of the Government, who has been set up to facilitate the whole system.

Let me turn to the role of the VAD commissioner, or the Vader as I think of it; I will not labour the point. They can be a sitting judge, which is good, but I suggest to the Committee that it is highly unusual for sitting judges to be appointed to other public functions that are unrelated to a judicial role. I would be interested in the Minister’s view on that. Judges can be appointed to a second judicial job, such as chairing the Sentencing Council, but I am not aware of many examples in which a sitting judge sits in a non-judicial function.

Having looked into it, I discovered that there are three exceptions to the rule. First, the Master of the Rolls holds a number of sinecures in relation to the keeping of the public archives and the payment of the national debt, so that is a non-judicial function that a judge carries. Secondly, the chair of the Law Commission is a sitting High Court or Court of Appeal judge. Thirdly, and exceptionally, with permission of the senior judiciary, sitting judges can be asked to conduct public inquiries. A singular public inquiry, which is time-limited and essentially judicial in its purpose of determining what happened, and which will of course operate in an adversarial way, hearing proper evidence from counsel, is the only exception. However, that is not comparable to the model being set out here, in which a sitting judge is being asked to chair a permanent quango—a Government body.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that that is exactly the point? This is a unique situation, and therefore we need a unique system. That is the perfect opportunity to use the skills that a judge or retired judge has.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

Throughout this debate, the hon. Lady and others have frequently made the case that we should stick with the existing systems, such as the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the use of doctors to make decisions about healthcare. Now the opposite point is being made: that we have a unique system and we therefore need to tear up the current way of working. In this one case, I think we need to stick with the current way of working: in the British judiciary, the High Court of England is the appropriate body to make decisions about life and death. That is how it works in other major decisions of life and death. These are questions that go to court.

On the point about the VAD commissioner being a sitting judge, even when it comes to inquiries that judges conduct outside their role as sitting judges in court, my understanding is that the Executive do not pick whichever sitting judge they want for the role. Instead, they request that the Lady Chief Justice make a judge available, and the Lady Chief Justice will select the appointee. What is proposed here is that the Prime Minister should pick from the bench of judges his or her preferred candidate. That feels like the use of a judge simply to fulfil a role that, frankly, does not need to be carried out by a judge.

For clarity, I emphasise that I am very much in favour of judges deciding on cases, but I do not see why a judge should fulfil the role of chief quangocrat for the administration of the regime. When we look at the functions the commissioner will have, it is quite right that, under the previous version of the Bill, most of those functions were given to the chief medical officer, because most of the required functions have to do with the administration of the medical aspects of the Bill. The collection of data and the monitoring of the operation of the Act are best left to a medic with experience of our healthcare system, rather than to a judge. These are not judicial functions.

The only function carried out by the commissioner that would require one to be a judge, or that is in a sense judicial, is the review of panel decisions, because a judicial decision is being made. Under new clause 17(2), the test is limited to an error of law, irrationality or procedural unfairness; those are the grounds for judicial review. If we did not have new clause 17, the ability for judicial review of panel decisions would remain. It could be argued that the new clause would actually limit judicial review by only allowing the person concerned to apply for reconsideration.

I understand that some courts in Canada, which has a comparable judicial and common law system to ours, have held that family members do not have standing to judicially review decisions to authorise medical assistance in dying. The suggestion has been made that families who are concerned that an error has been made in a decision to approve a death should be able to quickly get an injunction through a JR. I hope that that will be the case, if this law passes as proposed, but it certainly is not the experience elsewhere and I fear it might not be the experience here.

I am afraid that we have a dog’s breakfast of a system: all the problems of the High Court system that have been aired, but without any of the benefits. I will finish by quoting Sir James Munby. I know he has been cited regularly, but the hon. Member for Spen Valley said yesterday that, having listened to Sir James, she set herself the task of designing a system that would satisfy a former president of the family division. I am afraid to say that she has not succeeded in her task. I will quote a few points that Sir James made in response to the proposals in these new clauses. He stated:

“The process…is simply not apt to enable the panel to perform its function…The panel is given an extraordinary degree of discretion in relation to the process it is to adopt”.

He suggested that the panel is

“little more than a rubber stamp providing a veneer of judicial approbation”—

I do not think that rubber stamps provide veneers, but his point is well made and I respect it—

“and that is fundamentally unacceptable”.

Finally, he said:

“If the panel is to perform its function effectively and do more than just ‘check the paperwork’—if it is to be the real safeguard intended by its proponents—then its processes must be much more thorough than is currently proposed…All in all, in relation to the involvement of the panel in the process, the Bill still falls lamentably short of providing adequate safeguards.”

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Many of us have quoted Sir James Munby, for whom I have a huge amount of respect, but there are a number of other views from ex-judges and very highly-regarded legal professionals that conflict with what Sir James says.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

It would be very helpful if the hon. Lady could—not now; it need not be in the course of these deliberations—publish the evidence of that assertion. Which senior judicial figures have endorsed the new plan? It would be very helpful to hear from them.

We heard many criticisms of the previous regime. In my view, those objections prompted the change of heart that the new clauses derive from. From what I have seen, the weight of evidence indicates that we still have many of the problems that the High Court system had: a lack of effective powers and questions around capacity. We also have a whole new load of problems to do with the essential illegitimacy of a quasi-medical panel of people making an essentially judicial decision without the opportunity to hear in a meaningful way from all the different stakeholders who should be consulted.

Naz Shah Portrait Naz Shah
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I want to understand and clarify something. The hon. Gentleman said earlier that the commissioner is sitting as a judge, but my understanding is that the commissioner is not sitting as a judge. What did he mean?

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I think the hon. Member for Spen Valley said yesterday that we had to grapple with this confusion, which is that there is a judge not sitting as a judge. It is slightly like a Minister not sitting as a Minister; the Bill has provided all sorts of interesting hybrid creations of people who inhabit split personalities and dual roles.

The hon. Member for Bradford West is, I think, right. From the evidence we have heard from the hon. Member for Spen Valley, although there will be a judge, which satisfies the cosmetic need to present this as some sort of continuation of the High Court stage that the House of Commons voted for, they will not sit as a judge. It is rather like having a hobby or a second job. I am not sure judges do that, but it is like chairing a football club on the side. Their status derives from their judicial role, but they are sitting as the commissioner in a lay capacity—I think I have that right.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

We have already talked about this, and I think the hon. Gentleman mentioned it himself: there is a similar situation with public inquiries, on which a judge sits because of their skillset and who they are, but not necessarily in a traditional judicial capacity.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

It will be interesting to hear from the Minister, who is more equipped than the rest of us to opine on this. My understanding is that a judge sitting as chair of a judicial inquiry might not be sitting in court, but they are there because they are a judge; their function, as the chair of the inquiry, is essentially judicial. That is the only comparison and it is essentially different, because the exercise of a public inquiry is time-limited and specific to a particular case, which is to determine the truth or otherwise of what happened in whatever situation it is being asked to inquire into.

Here, we are setting up a quango—an arm’s length body of Government—that will sit in perpetuity and oversee a bureaucracy of state. That is something that no judge does in our system and, in my view, would be completely inappropriate for a sitting judge to do, even if we could find a sitting judge prepared to fulfil that function, which I think might be challenging.

The other key difference is that a judge chairing a public inquiry is appointed by the Lady Chief Justice; they are essentially judicial in their appointment and work. The judiciary appoints one of its own to fulfil a judicial function as the chair of an inquiry. It is being proposed here that the Government—the Executive, not the judiciary—appoint the chair of the commission from the Bench of judges.

Naz Shah Portrait Naz Shah
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

What the hon. Gentleman has said creates another concern for me. If we do have a judge, and if the expectation is that they sit in a judicial capacity, does that not raise concerns that an appeal is allowed one way—if an assisted death is refused—but not the other way, if someone wants to appeal against an assisted death? By definition, does that position not become compromised?

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I am afraid that that is absolutely right. There is an essential problem with the role of the commissioner as the backstop—the Court of Appeal, as it were—for what are effectively judicial decisions made by the non-judicial panel. The fact that appeals can be heard only against a refusal and not an approval confuses the whole question of appeal and judicial review. It is plainly unjust, and does indeed compromise the idea that the judicial figure has the independence that a judge should properly have. I agree with the hon. Member for Bradford West.

Naz Shah Portrait Naz Shah
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I want to speak to amendment (c) to new schedule 2, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft. The amendment requires members of the panel to have undertaken training in respect of domestic abuse, including coercive control, and financial abuse. It extends the principle of amendments 20, 21, and 22, also tabled in the name of my hon. Friend, which require the medical practitioners involved in the assisted dying process to have undertaken similar training.

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Kit Malthouse Portrait Kit Malthouse
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I rise briefly to amplify a couple of points from the excellent speeches by the hon. Members for Rother Valley and for Ipswich. First, in clarification, I understand that there are situations where judges can sit in essentially supervisory positions—not least, for example, on the BBC board—and they can of course be Cross Benchers in the House of Lords. They are allowed to undertake other charitable trustee roles, although they are restricted in their activities.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I think this is important. Those roles are what those judges do in their spare time—they could also chair a football club or something as well. The point is that they are being asked here to fulfil a function on behalf of the Government in their working hours, explicitly because they are a judge—yet they are not sitting as one. Surely my right hon. Friend acknowledges that that is essentially unprecedented.

Kit Malthouse Portrait Kit Malthouse
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

No, I do not acknowledge that at all. Over the years we have started to use judges relatively flexibly—even, for example, for non-statutory inquiries; my hon. Friend has referred only to statutory inquiries—and that is so much the better. I am not a lawyer myself but I believe in the rule of law, so I think that having judges opining on our freedoms or otherwise is generally good for the country.

I want to amplify a couple of points. On Second Reading, I made the case for the High Court to be involved. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire: at that stage, I was very happy for there to be effectively a scrutiny and authorisation third layer to the Bill. My understanding of judicial opinion was that, certainly in Lord Sumption’s view, that level was unnecessary; I think he referred to it being a profoundly intimate conversation that really should just be between the patient and the doctor. However, I think my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire is right that the weight of the moment and opinion in the House then was that there should be that third layer of scrutiny and opinion.

I also dismiss the argument about the capacity of the judiciary to absorb this. I fear that if we start to accept that argument, we go down a very difficult road for Parliament—not least, for example, because we should then have opposed the Bill that went through the House on Monday night, because of its greater impositions. As many will know, the Crime and Policing Bill went through without a vote. It will impose new burdens on the judiciary and the police, as will the new offence of spiking. No doubt the immigration Bill coming through will also put significant extra burdens on the police and the courts.

There are two separate questions here: one is what Parliament does, and the other is the capacity of the public sector to absorb that. The answer is not to say, “Well, I am afraid all you people have to go through a death you do not want to go through”; it is to say that we do not have enough judges and to recruit more judges, if that is required. In my personal view it is not, but at the time my view was that if as a footballer I could show up in the middle of the night and get an injunction to stop The Daily Mirror from publishing unpleasant stories about me, then the judges should be able to find time in their schedule to accommodate the requirements of my death.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. If Parliament decides that we should proceed, then we should, and the public sector will be obliged to make accommodation and provide the necessary resources. Does he agree that, on that basis, it would be appropriate for the Government to have clarified by this stage what the resource requirements of the new system would be, to make clear that there is the capacity in the system to do it? Does he share my regret that that has not been done?

Kit Malthouse Portrait Kit Malthouse
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

No, I do not share that regret, because until today, and until we all vote on it, the Government do not actually know what they are facing. They have undertaken that they will produce exactly the assessment that my hon. Friend is talking about between the end of this process and Report, so we can all have a look at what it will be.

At that point, Members can put a price on other people’s death and other people’s pain if they want to, but there are lots of situations where the House of Commons decides about things on the basis of moral principle and public interest, and then we ask the public sector to absorb it. If that causes operational problems, then we solve those separately. In my 10 years in the House, I cannot remember anybody ever standing up and saying, “We shouldn’t do this because the public sector can’t cope.”

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Lewis Atkinson Portrait Lewis Atkinson
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I rise to respond to some of the points made by the hon. Member for East Wiltshire. I looked back on the Hansard report of the Second Reading debate and his position there, and I am somewhat confused. In his speech in that debate, he was entirely dismissive of the judge as a safeguard, but now, in Committee, he seems to have had a Damascene conversion in favour. That gets to the question of whether, as others have asked, there are any safeguards that would satisfy opponents of the Bill in principle.

I entirely respect the position of principled opponents to the Bill.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I look forward to hearing the hon. Member’s substantive remarks, but in explanation I should say that there are no safeguards that I think will make an assisted dying Bill adequate. I will oppose the Bill whatever happens because I think it would be dangerous for people however we do it. But if we are going to do it, let us do it as safely as we can. There are definitely ways in which we could improve the safety of the Bill, which have been suggested in the many amendments I have supported.

On the point about the judicial stage, I am very critical of clause 12 as it stands because it does not provide sufficient rigour and there are major questions about the capacity of the judiciary, as has been discussed. But the principle is absolutely right. It is important that, if we are going to do this, we have a judge to make the final decision. I was not satisfied with the Bill as presented, but I think we should be building on it, rather than reducing the judicial safeguard.

Lewis Atkinson Portrait Lewis Atkinson
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the hon. Member for that point, but when someone cannot describe any version of safeguards that would be possible, and in the light of some of the other conversations we have had, one is led to believe, entirely respectfully, that some people are opposed to the Bill in principle in any instance.

The point that my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley made on Second Reading that this was the safest model in the world was not just about the fact that there was a judge, but about the fact that there was a third tier. That is not something that is in place in Oregon, or even in Australia, as we heard in evidence. Now, not only are we going to have a third tier of scrutiny, but we are going to have three professionals who must unanimously accept that the strict conditions for eligibility have been reached. I absolutely refute the suggestion that amending away from a High Court model and towards a panel model means that we have to recant any suggestion that this is the strongest model in the world.

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Lewis Atkinson Portrait Lewis Atkinson
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

No, I am in a flow, so I am just going to keep going. I am mainly rebutting at this point, and I do not want to open the debate that much wider.

Invariably, we already have individuals at the end of their lives with multidisciplinary input that is appropriate to them, and we have heard already how the independent doctors and the panels will rightly seek input from all those involved in care.

It has been some time since the hon. Member for East Wiltshire and I had an exchange on our difference on the ventilator test, but I know that we have a fundamental, philosophical difference on that. I believe that a dying person saying, “Please, doctor, turn off my ventilator; I want to die,” is not fundamentally different from that person saying, “Please, doctor, let me take that medicine; I want to die.” I assert that the person in the street is closer to my view of that situation than to his, although I respect that people have different philosophical opinions about it. However, let us not forget that we sometimes conduct this debate about the correct oversight of the third tier in a theoretical manner, as if these people were not dying anyway, and as if deaths relating to refusal of treatment, and suicide, were not happening anyway.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

Let us not rehash the argument about whether there is a difference between withdrawing treatment and actively killing somebody or giving them the opportunity to kill themselves. On the point about withdrawal of treatment, does the hon. Member acknowledge that when there is dispute over whether somebody should have their treatment withdrawn, it goes to a court and there is representation from both sides of that argument about whether the treatment should be withdrawn? If he is saying that these measures are essentially identical in principle, surely we should have the same mechanism to resolve disputes.

Lewis Atkinson Portrait Lewis Atkinson
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention, but I am afraid he is confused. It goes to the Court of Protection when the individual is not capable of making that decision and there is a dispute about what the best-interests decision may be for that individual. That is entirely different from the dying person saying, “Please turn off my ventilator.” In that case, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 applies, as we have discussed at length in the Committee, but there are no further checks for coercion, capacity or motivation in the way that has been described. With the three panel members, we will now have at least five professionals, who must all be satisfied that there is no coercion. How many individuals should there be?

I see speculation, including on social media, about the number of people who might seek an assisted death and who may be subject to coercion. How many people who refuse treatment at the moment, without any of those checks, are subject to coercion? How many people who go to Switzerland, or who end their own lives, are subject to those checks? We do not know because we have no robust oversight of those instances. While I have absolute sympathy with the points raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, who made a very thoughtful and personal speech, as he always does, the exact same instances that he described would be permissible right here and now.

The hon. Member for Reigate shared some upsetting stories, I think from Canada, about the impact on family in speaking to the amendments on that subject. First, I point out that Canada’s system is nothing akin to the one that we are proposing, because it does not have the third-tier protections that my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley proposes in the Bill.

However, it is also important that we bring the debate back to talking about dying people here in the UK, and that we have some of their voices and experiences, and their families, in the room. We know that already, 650 terminally ill people end their own lives each year in the UK. Anil Douglas’s dad, Ian, took his life the day before his 60th birthday. He was in the terminal stages of multiple sclerosis, and he ended his own life without notifying his family, because he felt he had to protect them, due to the state of the current law. He managed to obtain opioids from the dark web and subsequently overdosed. In his final note, he wrote:

“I would like to have to put on record that had we had more sympathetic assisted-dying laws in this country, in all probability I would still be alive today.”

I will give one more example. On returning home from a trip to London, Peter Wilson discovered his wife, Beverly, dead in their home. She had terminal oesophageal cancer and had taken her own life, alone at their home in Nottinghamshire, when she knew that Peter would be 120 miles away. Even though Peter could prove that he was not present at the time of death, he was questioned by police for seven hours, and he was fingerprinted and photographed within hours of her death. That is the current situation that families—those we have discussed maximising care for—are facing in the UK. That is why we need a change in the law that includes robust, third-tier oversight.

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Sean Woodcock Portrait Sean Woodcock
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

That is my next point—and it is a good question. As I said, the panel is done with the right intention and would improve the process in many ways. My view is similar to that of the hon. Member for East Wiltshire—it is possibly one aspect on which we are in agreement—in that I think it comes at the wrong part of the process. If it was earlier in the process, it would improve things. Court capacity is an issue, but I take the point made by the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire that if we want the courts to do it, they need to get on and do it.

I keep coming back to the issue of what we are asking the state to do. Implementing the wishes and autonomy of the patient is important, but we also need to take very seriously what we are asking the state to allow to be done in its name. There is also the crucial matter of public trust, the condition of the national health service and the issue of capacity in the courts. As my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich touched on, there is considerable disquiet and concern about how robust this process is going to be. Even though I think having the panel at the start of the process would improve what was put to the House on Second Reading, having judicial oversight at the very end would provide reassurance to the vast swathes of the public who are concerned about this, as well as to Members.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

The hon. Gentleman is making an important point and I completely agree. Does he agree that the hon. Member for Spen Valley recognised the problems with the lack of a multidisciplinary team in the process and the problems of court capacity, and through her attempt to address both those problems we now have a multidisciplinary team instead of the judicial role? What we really need is both: we need a properly constituted multidisciplinary assessment at the beginning, and then we need the final process to be an approval by a judge. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that that would be a better process?

Sean Woodcock Portrait Sean Woodcock
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Having thought about it, that would be my preference. I am in a difficult position in that there is a lot to be said for the panel, and it would improve the process in many ways, but I cannot get around the fact that the judicial aspect was put strongly before Parliament, and ensuring that we would have those safeguards provided reassurance to Members. When I have been out on the doorstep talking to people who are in favour of the Bill—people who wanted me to vote in favour of it—they have said to me that they think the proposal is safe because it includes two doctors and judicial oversight. That does come up, which is why I think we need to keep judicial oversight in the Bill. I do, though, I recognise the very genuine attempt by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley to introduce the panel to improve on some aspects and address the concerns expressed in the witness testimony.

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Sarah Sackman Portrait Sarah Sackman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is a majority vote for the other decisions that a panel may make, but in respect of certification, the decision is unanimous. Paragraph 5(2) of new schedule 2 states:

“Decisions of a panel may be taken by a majority vote”.

Such decisions include whether to hear from an additional expert, or whether further investigation is required in respect of an aspect that the panel may be concerned about, such as coercion or capacity. While those decisions can be taken by a majority vote, in respect of certification and granting a certificate of eligibility, I refer my hon. Friend to paragraph 5(3), which states:

“The panel is to be treated as having decided to refuse to grant a certificate of eligibility if any member votes against a decision to grant such a certificate.”

That is a slightly mealy-mouthed way of saying that if any member of the panel resists the grant of the certificate, no certificate can be issued.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I just want to support the hon. Member for Bradford West. She is absolutely right. It is clearly intended that there should be a unanimous decision but, in fact, as the hon. Lady pointed out, if one of the members decides effectively to abstain, the procedure does go ahead. It is not that they all have to actively support the decision; only two of them have to do that. One of them could have their doubts and sit on their hands, and it would still go ahead.

Sarah Sackman Portrait Sarah Sackman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

That might be something that other hon. Members wish to take away with them, whatever the policy intent may have been. In fairness, I do not think that the question of whether there is a requirement to give a positive indication of a decision either way is on the face of the Bill. However, I think that clearly the intention behind paragraph 5(3) of new schedule 2 is that there is unanimity in relation to the grant of an eligibility certificate.

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Sarah Sackman Portrait Sarah Sackman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

There is no doubt that, as we will see later, the panel would be subject in all its decisions to public law principles, including procedural propriety. The absence of any suggestion of bias—even of the appearance of bias—is an important public law principle. In any event, given the recruitment process, the interviews that would be undertaken and the professional standards to which all these people would be held, I think that they would apply their independent and impartial skills and judgment to the decision making and the assessment of eligibility in a manner appropriate to the task set out in the Bill.

One would expect professionals on the panel to adhere to their professional standards and act with impartiality in ascertaining whether the eligibility criteria have been met. Speaking as the Minister—indeed, even speaking for myself—I have no reason to doubt the independence, impartiality and professionalism of the panel or see any suggestion of bias.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I appreciate that an impact assessment is due to come later, after we have debated whether we should have this system or not. Nevertheless, will the Minister tell the Committee whether officials in her Department or in the Department of Health and Social Care have informed the hon. Member for Spen Valley whether the workforce will have sufficient capacity to provide the professionals required? Has any estimate been made of the number of people who will be required to step forward to take part in these panels?

I note the point that the reason why the proposed High Court stage was dropped was not that Ministry of Justice officials had informed the hon. Member for Spen Valley that the family court system would be overwhelmed. Can the Minister confirm that there was no communication to the hon. Member that the courts would not be able to cope with the demand? That was clearly reported in the media at the time, but can she confirm that it was not the case?

Sarah Sackman Portrait Sarah Sackman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The hon. Gentleman’s first point is a matter for the impact assessment itself. Clearly both Departments have data on the state of the professions, on how many KCs there are in the country and on how many people will be needed to provide the service. As I say, if Parliament wishes it and legislates for it, the state will work to deliver it, but the detail will come in the impact assessment.

On the hon. Gentleman’s second question, as I made clear earlier, the effective shift away from the High Court model in clause 12 to the model in the new clauses has been driven by the policy intent of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. I will not get into the precise chronology of when the matter was raised, but it came from my hon. Friend.

Yesterday, I hotfooted it from the Committee to Justice questions, where I was delighted to see the hon. Member for Reigate. We discussed capacity issues in our Crown courts and civil courts. Those issues are well reported in the media, but there is no connection between them and the policy shift here. If this is what Parliament chooses to legislate, the state will work to deliver it.

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Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I appreciate the Minister’s point about the Parole Board. Does she acknowledge that in the Parole Board example there is the essence of an adversarial system, because the victim is invited to give a statement? The board therefore hears opinions from, as it were, both sides of the case. Who will fulfil that second role in the proposals before the Committee?

Sarah Sackman Portrait Sarah Sackman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I drew the comparison for the purpose of showing where judges and legal experts are deployed in a multidisciplinary forum that is not a court or tribunal. I was not suggesting that there is a straight-line analogy. After all, a Parole Board panel is performing a different function to make a global assessment of risk. That is what it is ultimately doing; it is not strictly speaking an adversarial process in that sense.

The situation that the Bill addresses is that of an individual seeking to establish their eligibility for a right that—if the Act is passed—Parliament will have conferred on those who meet the criteria. It is not an adjudication. It is the panel’s function to assess, through the various conversations and provisions and by interrogating the information that has been provided, whether it is properly satisfied that the eligibility of the person’s election to avail themselves of that right is sound.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-second sitting)

Danny Kruger Excerpts
Rebecca Paul Portrait Rebecca Paul
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the hon. Member for that confirmation. Now that I have that clarity, I will skip on.

One aspect of the panel that gives me cause for concern is that the panel would not hear from the patient themselves where there are “exceptional circumstances”. What are exceptional circumstances? The Bill does not say or provide any guidance. Many people with a terminal diagnosis who are seeking assisted dying could consider their circumstances exceptional; many undoubtedly will be too unwell to attend. That means that such panels could be making these decisions based on testimony from only one doctor. I am not for one second suggesting that people on their deathbeds should have to attend a panel—that is the point of exceptional circumstances—but I urge the promoter and Ministers to ensure that the much-need clarity around the meaning of the term is set out in order to reduce ambiguity in this area.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger (East Wiltshire) (Con)
- Hansard - -

It was helpful to hear the Bill’s promoter suggest that the system will be inquisitorial—that is not sufficiently apparent in the new clause, as my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate says. Does she agree that the panel must therefore have proper inquisitorial powers and authority? At the moment, there is a lack of genuine power to investigate the circumstances. If it not going to be adversarial but inquisitorial, it should have proper powers to make an investigation.

Rebecca Paul Portrait Rebecca Paul
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My hon. Friend makes a good point; I completely agree with him on that front. This goes back to being clear on the face of the Bill about what the panel does and the powers it has in order to avoid ambiguity. It is important that we set that out now, during this process, rather than finding ourselves in a position in two years where it is all starting to happen, if the Bill is approved, and the questions starting at that point. Let us try to answer them now and be really clear about it.

Where a panel does not hear directly from a patient, it may be forced to rely on second-hand accounts. In law, second-hand evidence is known as hearsay and is always handled with a lot of provisions and warnings across our criminal and civil legal systems, because it can be inaccurate or of lower quality than evidence directly from a source. However, the panel is open to depending on such evidence. We must be clear-eyed about the risks that come with that.

In summary, I do not believe that new clause 21 gives sufficient clarity on how the panel will perform its role and what evidential standard it would apply. We do not know if it is an administrative task or a judicial one. We do now know that the panel is inquisitorial—I thank the Bill’s promoter for that—but we do not know how much it will rely on hearsay evidence in practice. I will say this again, because it is really important: the panel is required to hear from only one doctor and does not need to question them. Under the Bill, would it be legally acceptable for the doctor to turn up, say, “No concerns”—and that’s the end of that? I am here to tell Committee members who think that that will not happen if the Bill allows it: somewhere, with some panel, it absolutely will—particularly as our society gets desensitised and more comfortable with the concept of assisted dying.

I urge the Committee to be precise with the legislation it is passing for the sake of the statute book and, more importantly, for the sake of all the people who may find themselves being assessed by such a panel.

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Rebecca Paul Portrait Rebecca Paul
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that important point. My point is that the family should be listened to and should have a route to legally provide information to the panel. Right now, they have no right to do that. In reality, I think most panels would take that information. I would like to think that, 99 times out of 100, if a family member contacted the panel saying, “I have really important information,” it would listen to that. But I am legislating for the one case in 100 or 1,000 in which, for whatever reason, the panel refuses to engage with a family member who has a relevant bit of information, and not having the right information leads to someone’s death.

The amendment is about protecting panel members too. If I were a panel member, I would want this process in place, because it would protect me when I make a decision. I would take great comfort from knowing that a family member with relevant information has a legal right at least to communicate it to the panel.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

This is a very helpful exchange, for which I am grateful to my hon. Friend. In response to the hon. Member for Rother Valley, does my hon. Friend agree that although there should be an obligation to help the decision maker to conclude as to whether the eligibility criteria have been properly met, there is no best-interest consideration, as there might be if some of us were designing the Bill? Nevertheless, the role of the family is to enable the decision maker to conclude as to whether there have been issues of coercion or lack of capacity, to ensure the decision is properly informed. We are concerned that the Bill as drafted does not do that.

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Rebecca Paul Portrait Rebecca Paul
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank my right hon. Friend for that alternative perspective. The appeal process is valid only if there is new and relevant information that the panel did not have. For someone who is absolutely eligible, nothing has been excluded from the process that would change their eligibility. There is nothing to worry about here, so I am not sure that I concur that my amendment would prevent sharing information. However, it would provide important protection when a bit of relevant information has not been shared with the panel, which I think is the greater harm. We are trying to weigh up the harms to make sure that they do not outweigh the benefits; I honestly believe that the amendment would help to balance the scales a little better.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

The scenario that my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire suggests implies that the patient has no faith in the panel. The patient would be concluding that they did not want to go through the formal process for an assisted death and explain it to their relatives, because they fear that the panel’s decision might be overturned on application by their relative. That objection is predicated on a lack of faith in the process that is being decided. If we are to have confidence in the process, we should trust that people will expect it to work properly. There is nothing wrong with giving a family member the right to make an application to the panel or the commissioner, because they would have every right to reject that family member’s application if they concluded that the original decision was valid.

Rebecca Paul Portrait Rebecca Paul
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I completely agree. While I was preparing my speech, as is often the way, I found myself wishing that I had tabled an amendment to add a legal requirement that the family be able to feed into the panel and share information. Perhaps that is something that can be picked up at a later stage. The nature of the process is that as we debate these things and think about them in detail, other ideas come through.

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I now turn to some queries and concerns about what is before us.
Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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Before the hon. Gentleman moves on, I want to reiterate the value of his point. This is an enormous change to the Bill and totally transforms it, but we did not have the opportunity to hear evidence on it. Is he also aware that many of the distinguished people who gave evidence against the traditional stage, which has now been scrapped, have not endorsed the proposal to change it? In fact, some of them are equally opposed to the new proposal. We have not had confirmation that this is the right system, and we did not get the opportunity to hear proper evidence on it.

Daniel Francis Portrait Daniel Francis
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Yes, I am aware of some of those submissions from those individuals. I will come to this, but clearly even some people who were in support of making changes did not recommend the ones that we have now incorporated.

First, I would argue that people giving evidence to the panels should be doing so under oath. In my 20 long years as a local councillor, I gave evidence under oath to an investigation by a health and safety executive into the demolition of a building. I would say that the demolition of a building and this matter are very different, and therefore I query why this evidence is not being given under oath.

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Daniel Francis Portrait Daniel Francis
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I think that is the case. As the hon. Member said yesterday, people from those professional fields—in their written evidence, particularly—asked to be included in the process, but I do not think they were asking to be included at the end of the process; I think they were asking to be included earlier.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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The hon. Gentleman has explained clearly in personal terms why it is important to involve the family, and I concur with the hon. Member for Richmond Park. I want to take the hon. Gentleman back to the rather abstract question of whether there are two sides to these cases. In contradiction to the hon. Member for Spen Valley, I think there are two sides to these cases, as she herself recognises whenever she says that this is a finely balanced judgment. The fact is that a decision can go either way, and it is very important that the decision makers are considering two sides. It is not just the immediate stated wish of the applicant that is the only consideration, as the Bill acknowledges. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that it is important to have the widest possible input into the decision, so that both options—to proceed or not—can be properly considered?

Daniel Francis Portrait Daniel Francis
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I hear what the hon. Member says. My concern has always been the scenario that I described. If this legislation is passed and we push it forward, one death that occurs where somebody has concerns about the process would be one too many. I said that clearly when we debated clause 3, and that remains my principal concern. It is not necessarily about two sides, but in cases where there are concerns, we need to do everything we can to ensure that that does not happen.

I have a query about the resourcing of the panel. Part of the reason why we ended up here was the queries about the resourcing of the judicial role in the process. We would need to find skilled professionals, especially consultant psychiatrists and social workers, to sit on the panel. If we look at the per capita rates in the Australian and American states that have assisted dying, we can estimate that the number of cases of assisted dying each year in England and Wales would be in the low thousands. Any consultant psychiatrist or senior social worker who sits on these panels will have to spend hours on each case. We do not yet know how many hours it would be on average, but for complicated cases, it could be many hours. What analysis has been undertaken of the capacity of consultant psychiatrists and senior social workers? Their professional bodies are beginning to look at that, but again, we were not able to ask them that during oral evidence, and because the written evidence was submitted so heavily in advance of these amendments and new clauses being tabled, we do not have that information in front of us.

We hear about the resourcing of our NHS mental health services and the fact that we do not have enough psychiatrists, so I query whether we have enough senior social workers. A senior social worker visits my house every year, but I have never seen the same social worker twice, because of the turnover issues, capacity issues and the lack of staff.

What will the Government do to ensure that the panels fulfil their responsibilities? We would be dealing with applicants who have very little time left, and being able to properly staff the panels must be a priority. We must not take psychiatrists and social workers away from their other work, while ensuring that people seeking an assisted death do not wait a long time. That is another matter on which we would have benefited from oral evidence from expert witnesses. We would also have benefited from the normal consultation that there would have been on a Government Bill, because we would have been looking at that matter for several months.

In summary, I accept that this set of new clauses and amendments is an effort to fix problems with the Bill, but problems remain, and there are probably some new ones as well. I will therefore not support a number of the provisions.

Jack Abbott Portrait Jack Abbott (Ipswich) (Lab/Co-op)
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It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Roger. I rise to speak to several new clauses and to amendment (e) to new clause 21.

There were many comments yesterday about the fact that a number of Members across the House had cited the judicial stage as an important reason why they supported the Bill. I challenge the notion that they voted for it exclusively for that reason, but I recognise the strength of feeling. To be frank, I was not one of them. I was not persuaded, not least because of a number of points made yesterday by my hon. Friend the Member for Rother Valley, that the judicial stage would be anything other than a rubber-stamping exercise. I am certainly not going to go into “good judge, bad judge”. I hugely respect the legal profession, of which there are many representatives present.

The legal profession has a huge range of expertise and experience, but it could not be expected to cover in depth the psychiatric and social care aspects of the process, about which we have being raising concerns for weeks. For that reason, and especially given that we are retaining legal experience on the panel alongside social workers and psychiatrists—a triple-threat approach, as it were—I fail to see how anyone could reasonably argue that this approach is weaker. In my eyes, it is much stronger.

Of course, some people will always say that it does not go far enough; we have heard that several times. As has been acknowledged, we will never convince everybody that an amendment is safe or good enough. An uncomfortable truth that is rarely recognised but is worth mentioning—I am sure that I will shortly be misrepresented on social media for saying it—is that no safeguard that we could put in any Bill, on any subject, will 100% ensure that there will never be any mistakes.

We have to do our level best to ensure that the probability is reduced to an absolute minimum. However, when someone goes into surgery, there may always be complications that cannot be foreseen, and we know that there have been awful miscarriages of justice; as a new Government, we have spoken about them, from the Post Office scandal to infected blood. We also have to rely on the fact that we are entrusting experienced, trained professionals with carrying out this work. Not only more often than not, but in nearly every situation, bar the awful cases of which we are all aware, they do their work to the best of their ability, and we have to be absolutely honest about that.

We should not look at the new clauses in isolation. They are part of a package. A number of amendments have been agreed to, about coercion and about ensuring that medical professionals are trained to the right standard. Like my hon. Friend, I hope we will see further amendments on special educational needs and learning disabilities. Those things are really important, so it is worth recognising that in addition to the new clauses, which in my view ensure a much stronger approach to the final judgment, we have agreed to a number of other amendments.

I want to pick up the issue of whether the process should be adversarial or inquisitive. I am sure that hon. Friends who have served at the Bar will tell me if I am wrong, but in my view an adversarial process is one of competition: it pits someone trying to prosecute an argument against someone trying to defend it. In contrast, an inquisitive approach is about asserting the truth. In my view, people who are not only going through agonising pain but making agonising decisions about what to do with the remaining days of their life should not be on trial. We should approach them from a position not of suspicion, but of support. Of course, that is caveated by all the things we have talked about, particularly on things like coercion. If there is any idea that a person has been coerced into the decision, of course we should investigate that, but the process should not be adversarial.

The connecting element is that we should ensure that we get the balance right between safeguards and safety. We should not add so many barriers and layers that a person can never access the process because it is too cumbersome. I do not want people to spend the remaining days of their life sitting in endless meetings, consultations and an adversarial court process, or whatever it might be. But we absolutely have to have all the right safeguards: as we have said, if there is any suspicion that someone may have been coerced or does not have mental capacity, of course we should go down the relevant routes to ensure that that is not the case.

Part of the reason why people will make the decision is that they want the autonomy to go out on their own terms, plan their remaining months and enjoy experiences with their family. We must ensure that those precious days are spent with their family, not in endless meeting rooms, so we absolutely have to get the balance right. As has been acknowledged, the diagnosis is a really important part of it. We regularly talk about the six-month point in the diagnosis, but we know when many people receive their diagnosis, their final days will be much shorter, so in the main people do not have time to go through a lengthy, difficult process.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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Is the hon. Gentleman not making a case against a third stage altogether?

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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I would be grateful if the hon. Gentleman could explain that. If his concern is about asking patients to go through a third stage, after the doctor’s assessment—

Jack Abbott Portrait Jack Abbott
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indicated dissent.

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Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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In that case, what is the difference? It is not necessarily the case that the judicial stage has to be incredibly time-consuming, onerous or distressing for the patient. It is about the legitimacy of the process and the rigour that is applied to it. If the hon. Gentleman wants people to be sped through the process without going through the distress of further explanations, surely he should be objecting to the panel too.

Jack Abbott Portrait Jack Abbott
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I thank the hon. Gentleman for that question, but he is entirely misrepresenting my position. I have said that there should be a balance between safeguarding and ensuring that the process works for people. I have just spoken in support of the panel stage, and I think it is important that it is robust. We are including social care workers and psychiatrists alongside legal professionals. I have not for a moment used any language that suggests that I am not in favour of that. I am talking about the idea that it does not go far enough. We have spoken a number of times about adding additional layers beyond the processes that are already in the Bill, which we are debating today.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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I was not suggesting that the hon. Gentleman opposed the panel. I recognise that he is speaking in support of it. My concern was that he was suggesting that there was a problem with the High Court stage. I now appreciate that he is objecting to some sort of fourth stage that some people might be suggesting on top of the panel. I personally am not proposing that; I think that there should be a multidisciplinary team as part of the assessment process and then a judicial stage, as originally planned.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Danny Kruger Excerpts
Simon Opher Portrait Dr Opher
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Well, that was disputed by other psychiatrists. We are asking questions about whether the Mental Capacity Act is safe and correct for the Bill. This whole Committee is about making the Bill safe. None of us would dispute that. However, I think that if we accept the amendment, the Bill will become less safe because the amendment would change a massive piece of legislation and therefore have a number of repercussions that we do not understand.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger (East Wiltshire) (Con)
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Chris Whitty made the same point that the hon. Gentleman has just made: that there would be knock-on effects and that the Mental Capacity Act works very well currently. Does the hon. Gentleman acknowledge that Chris Whitty himself misrepresented the Mental Capacity Act in the evidence he gave to the Committee? He had to write to us subsequently to clarify his comment, and his clarification contradicted the hon. Gentleman’s implication that the Mental Capacity Act has different thresholds for different levels of decision. Does the hon. Gentleman acknowledge that it does not? The Act has one threshold: capacity as it defines it. Some doctors may have longer conversations than others depending on the severity of the case, but the threshold is the same—Chris Whitty misrepresented it.

Simon Opher Portrait Dr Opher
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I agree that the threshold is the same: does the patient have capacity or not? That is the single threshold. We often do mental capacity assessments for inheritance, control of bank accounts and that sort of thing; sometimes we do a very quick mental capacity assessment about the refusal of treatment. How long we take depends on how important the decision is. I suggest that a doctor assessing someone’s capacity to make a decision to end their life would have a serious, long discussion—up to 90 minutes, or possibly even two hours—to make sure that the doctor is convinced that the patient has capacity. The threshold is the same—it is about whether they have capacity—but that does not mean that the conversation is the same. In clinical terms, it is very clear that a conversation on those grounds would be much more involved than, for example, whether a person sees a dentist or not, or other conversations like that.

I totally understand the concerns that the amendment has been tabled to cover; however, my main point is that if we accept the amendment, it will make the Bill less safe. The reason for that is that, as I have said before, if we change something that is well used, and repeatedly used, it will make the interpretation much more complicated. We will have to re-train all the doctors and, I think, it will not protect patients.

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Rebecca Paul Portrait Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)
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I rise to speak to my amendment 398. I recognise that much debate about capacity has already taken place, so I will do my best not to be too repetitive, but it is an important topic and I want to cover a few things.

Fundamentally, I consider the bar for the capacity to make a decision to seek an assisted death to be far too low if, as we have already discussed, the approach currently proposed in the Bill is adopted. The Committee has received powerful written evidence that the Mental Capacity Act, as it stands, is not suitable for assisted dying. The Royal College of Psychiatrists says in its written evidence:

“It is the RCPsych’s view that the MCA is not sufficient for the purposes of this Bill.”

The former president of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, Baroness Hollins, says:

“The Mental Capacity Act has proved very difficult to implement and doctors have not been found to be good judges of capacity.”

The eating disorders expert Chelsea Roff says:

“The MCA is not fit for purpose for determinations of capacity in life-ending decisions.”

I do not think it is contentious to say that there should be a higher standard for ending one’s own life than for other courses of action. Baroness Hale has called the Mental Capacity Act threshold “not a demanding one.” The Royal College of Psychiatrists says in its written evidence:

“While we are of the view that a person’s capacity to decide treatment can be reliably assessed, an assessment of a person’s mental capacity to decide to end their own life is an entirely different and more complex determination requiring a higher level of understanding.”

Even if the Mental Capacity Act is working well in some other contexts, it does not necessarily translate well to assisted dying. Professor Gareth Owen told the Committee in oral evidence that although the Mental Capacity Act is quite reliable in current practice,

“in areas of decision making where the decision itself is unsettled or conceptually much more profound or novel—I would suggest that the decision to end one’s own life has those characteristics—you cannot expect there to be such levels of reliability.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 239, Q303.]

The Mental Capacity Act definition of capacity was not created with such a monumental decision with respect to assisted dying in mind. Although I note Chris Whitty’s recommendation that it is the starting point, I do not think it can be the end point. Further provisions are needed to ensure that it is fit for purpose, given the significance of the decision being made. Professor Owen said:

“I have looked at mental capacity a lot in research, and there is no experience of the decision to end one’s own life. It is outside the experience of the Mental Capacity Act, the Court of Protection, the associated research and practitioners on the ground. The reference to the Mental Capacity Act in clause 3 puts you into an area where there is no experience of the central capacity question under consideration. It is very important that Parliament be clear-eyed about that.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 226, Q287.]

Dr Sarah Hooper, a retired oncologist, says that

“the patient in question may undoubtedly have ‘capacity’ for most important decisions. However, in the early days after a cancer diagnosis their ability to make clear judgements is nevertheless likely to be impacted. This kind of decision (for assisted suicide), once acted upon, is plainly irreversible. It is a very bad time to make that kind of decision.”

It is true that the Mental Capacity Act is used for decisions to stop life-sustaining treatment, but, as Professor Owen said, we should not simply equate that with assisted dying. As he pointed out:

“One is a refusal; one is a request. One is traditionally considered to be about bodily integrity—it is the so-called shield of the person, or the patient, against the intervention on the body that is being made by the medical profession. You are giving the patient an important right, which is a shield-like right. That contrasts with a request for assisted dying, which is a request. You are involving other people in an act that is an act of ending one’s life. That is not something that the medical profession has been comfortable with, going back thousands of years.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 236, Q288.]

I also draw attention to a great deal of written evidence making the point that the current Mental Capacity Act is not as well understood by medical practitioners as we hope or expect. Alexander Elphinston, a retired solicitor, says,

“from my experience doctors and other medical practitioners often applied the test of mental (in)capacity incorrectly.”

Victoria Wheatley, a palliative medicine consultant, says,

“I have observed a tendency to overestimate a person’s mental capacity in the absence of obvious features to the contrary.”

Alan Thomas, a professor of old age psychiatry at Newcastle University, says:

“The preferences of the assessor bias the capacity decision towards the assessor’s preference.”

I will move on to the specific issues with the current definition of people who lack capacity under the Mental Capacity Act when applied to assisted dying, all of which my amendment 398 attempts to address. Part of my amendment does exactly the same as amendment 322, tabled and already eloquently spoken to by the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, so I will be brief on those overlapping bits.

Under the Mental Capacity Act, there is a starting presumption of capacity. That is too lax a standard, as the Royal College of Psychiatrists says in written evidence. I quote:

“The presumption of capacity may be problematic in the context”

of assisted dying, given that the consequence would be the person’s death. This is literally a matter of life and death, and the presumption of capacity must not apply; the work must be done to assess capacity properly and thoroughly. Professor Preston said during the evidence session:

“I think the aim is to have that bit of extra concern, so that we do not presume capacity, but instead almost presume that there is not capacity.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 241, Q307.]

I think those are wise words, and my amendment and amendment 322 seek to give that protection.

Both amendments also disapply section 1(3) of the Mental Capacity Act on helping a person to make a decision. The hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford has already made his point powerfully about that, so I will not add anything further.

There are some differences where my amendment 398 goes further than amendment 322. First, given the uniqueness and irreversibility of the decision, there should also be a higher threshold of probability. As it stands, a person should be treated as having capacity if that is more likely than not, which is sometimes referred to as the “51% sure” approach. It would be much safer if doctors and judges had to establish beyond reasonable doubt that an applicant has capacity, given the significance of the decision. In my view, 51% sure is just not good enough for such a monumental decision, and amending this part of the Bill would ensure a more rigorous and comprehensive assessment.

Secondly—for me, this is one of the biggest issues with the current approach—the Mental Capacity Act requires an impairment of, or a disturbance to, the mind or brain for someone to be considered not to have capacity, irrespective of whether they can make a decision. Under the Bill currently, even if someone cannot understand, retain or use the information to make a decision—they cannot communicate that decision—they will still be deemed capacitous in the absence of an impairment, or a disturbance, of the mind or brain. In the real world, a doctor could assess a patient who gives the impression of being confused, illogical, erratic or inconsistent—everything about them could scream that they are not in a good place to make the decision—but they will still be considered to have capacity if there is no identifiable impairment of, or disturbance in, the function of the mind or brain at that point in time. That potentially puts those with depression, anxiety, learning disabilities or eating disorders, or even those in physical pain, in danger of being considered capacitous.

In oral evidence, Professor Alex Ruck Keene said,

“If I doubt that you have capacity to make the decision to take your own life, or end your life, but I cannot prove it, is it logical or are we required to proceed on the basis that you do?...In other words, I think you cannot understand the information, but I cannot prove the reason that you cannot understand it is that you have an impairment or disturbance.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 90, Q120.]

According to his written evidence to the Committee, this means that someone could be approved for assisted dying even if they did not understand the relevant information, as long as they do not have an identifiable impairment of, or disturbance in, the mind or brain. He wrote,

“the Committee may well feel that it would be problematic that such a person should be considered to be eligible for the receipt of assistance in dying.”

In a letter to the hon. Member for Richmond Park, Professor Alex Ruck Keene KC said,

“no matter how intensive the scrutiny of the person’s capacity, this would not address the issue of the situation where the person appears not to be able to understand, retain, use and weigh the relevant information but that is not caused by an impairment of, or disturbance in, the functioning of their mind or brain.”

That is why my amendment seeks to remove this diagnostic element, so that section 2(1) of the Mental Capacity Act for the purposes of this Bill only would read as,

“a person lacks capacity in relation to a matter if at the material time he is unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter.”

That would provide better protections for this life and death decision, and I hope it addresses the issue raised so powerfully by Professor Alex Ruck Keene KC.

As I close, I would like to make reference to amendment 49, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, which sets out starkly the deficiencies of the current capacity test if it remains unamended for the purposes of this Bill. If autonomy is what counts, and we are using the Mental Capacity Act as gatekeeper for assisted death, then the Bill in its current form means that: a person is assumed to have a capacity as a starting point; a clinician only needs to be just over 50% sure that a person has capacity; unwise decision making is not taken into account in determining capacity; and supported decision making is acceptable—for example, for those with learning disabilities.

I ask the Committee members whether they are comfortable with that. If not, then as a minimum, amendment 322 should be accepted, but ideally my amendment 398 should also be, as it goes even further to increase the threshold for capacity and it addresses the significant issue with the diagnostic leg of the test. I am pleased to say that Baroness Finlay, who established and chaired the National Mental Capacity Forum, supports my amendment. Unlike the current drafting of the Bill, my amendment requires that a person is not assumed to have capacity in the first instance. It requires capacity to be proven beyond reasonable doubt, that unwise decision making is considered in assessing, and that a person is not helped to make a decision. I hope the Committee will support it.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I am pleased to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate, who set out with incredible clarity the challenges here and the opportunity we have to build on the Mental Capacity Act, and to fulfil its purposes and the purposes of the Bill to ensure that capacity is properly assessed. I will speak to all the amendments in the group very briefly; I certainly will not repeat material points that have been made already. To clarify, I do not propose to push amendment 49 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge to a vote, although I will speak to it briefly. I hope we will vote on the other amendments.

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Simon Opher Portrait Dr Opher
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

On tightening capacity assessments, which is what the amendment is trying to do, I would point out that there are a number of amendments coming up that would mandate training for doctors who are registered to assess capacity—for example, amendment 186. In addition, amendment 6 would mandate psychiatric referral if there was any doubt of capacity. Does that not satisfy the hon. Member?

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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It pleases me but it does not satisfy me. I am encouraged by it, but I am not fully satisfied. Obviously, it is insufficient. The hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Spen Valley put great faith in the training that we are going to introduce. Well, I hope they are right. Let us certainly do as much training as we can— likewise, let us get as much data as we can—but the provision set out is not sufficient, not least because the training will be in the application of the Mental Capacity Act, which we are saying, even if properly applied, has all sorts of problems with it, as my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate explained.

Yes to training and yes to the option of the referral—that should be mandatory, and I think there is a proposal to effect that. Every additional safeguard is welcome. It goes back to my point about whether we are being thorough or simplistic. I am not sure. If I think there are four assessments, but the hon. Member for Stroud thinks there are eight, does that not fail Chris Whitty’s test of being simple? If eight is in fact thorough, would nine not be even more thorough? The suggestion that we have hit it at the perfect sweet spot and that to veer one side is to introduce all sorts of bureaucratic hurdles seems unrealistic. Surely we can apply a little more rigour to this exercise.

Lewis Atkinson Portrait Lewis Atkinson
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I know that we have interacted before about our fundamental difference on the ventilator test: someone saying, “I want to die, please turn off my ventilator” as opposed to, “I want to die, please let me take this substance.” Although we may have a fundamental disagreement on whether those things are the same or different, if he still thinks it is appropriate for the Mental Capacity Act to be used as a one-off test, with no other safeguards, for turning off a ventilator, then why is it appropriate in that situation but not when tested multiple times in this instance?

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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I recognise that this is a vital point; I am not surprised that we keep returning to this important distinction. I do think that there is a vital distinction between accepting treatment and declining a treatment. In fact, the treatment proposed here is not a treatment at all—the British Medical Association specifies that it is not a medical treatment. The termination of life deliberately does not apply to a particular condition, whereas a ventilator, or any treatment that one might decline or withdraw, is specific to a particular condition or illness. There is a difference in purpose, even if the effect—which is death—is the same.

To the hon. Member’s point on whether the MCA is appropriate in cases of withdrawal of treatment; well, there we do seem to have a substantial body of clinical practice over many years, to which I am not aware of many objections. My non-expert view is that it is probably appropriate to continue with the MCA in those cases. I do not have an objection there and I am certainly not making that argument. It may well be that it is appropriate, and I am sure we will constantly review the applicability of that particular test in those circumstances. It might well be that some of the problems that I am identifying with the proposed law may also apply in cases of withdrawal of treatment—but I am not aware of that, because I do think they are substantially different. Even if it were perfectly acceptable to apply the MCA in cases of withdrawal of treatment, that does not mean it is appropriate in this case, because they are fundamentally different scenarios. I do not detect that I have satisfied the hon. Member, but it is always good to have the exchange.

I will conclude my challenge to the suggestion that the MCA is universally understood and properly applied. The Court of Protection case of Patricia, a patient with anorexia nervosa, has been referred to a number of times in the course of our debate. We heard evidence from a group of anorexia sufferers who wrote to the Committee to say:

“The judge in the Court of Protection case of Patricia…stated that he had changed his mind several times while considering the evidence. He then came to a different view on capacity from the treatment team. This single case exemplifies how complex the processes described under Clauses 7, 8 and 12 of the Bill in relation to assessment of capacity are likely to be”.

We are not talking about a straightforward process. It is clear from all the evidence we have had that there is a real problem with the way that the MCA would apply.

I want to make a rather obvious point, which is that when the MCA was debated and passed 20 years ago, assisted dying, or assisted suicide, was not on the table; it was not part of those considerations, as far as I am aware. It turns out that Dignity in Dying was on the case back in those days, although I think it was still called the Voluntary Euthanasia Society then. That group was conscious of what would come—I do not think that others were—and I detect that it is quite pleased now with the influence applied then to ensure that the presumption of capacity would be very useful one day when it came to passing an assisted dying law. It was not the intention of the House of Commons or of the Committee that considered that Bill that in fact they were establishing a test that would be applied in the case of assisting suicide and changing the terms of the Suicide Act. I am sure that if that had been the case, it would have been commented on, and I daresay the Mental Capacity Act would not be in its current form, or there would have been some addendum to that effect.

My hon. Friend the Member for Reigate referred to the very powerful evidence from lawyers, Baroness Hale and the Royal College of Psychiatrists about the challenge here. I want to quickly say, in support of amendment 322 in the name of the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, that my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate made a powerful argument about impairment; it is striking that the MCA only applies when there are cases of impairment of, or disturbance in, the functioning of the mind or brain—I will not repeat the point she made, but I urge Members to reflect on it.

I will quote Ruth Hughes, a barrister specialising in mental capacity law and inheritance. This refers back to the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate and I discussed in an earlier sitting about the clear opportunity that the Bill affords people to seek an assisted death for the sole purpose of saving their family money. Ruth Hughes says:

“If the…Bill is passed, then this will lead to some of the most vulnerable people dying for others’ financial gain. That is certain…Although in general I would, of course, accept the importance of the presumption of capacity, in relation to assisted dying, I consider that, the burden of proof for capacity should be reversed so that it is necessary to establish capacity to decide to die positively.”

Amendment 322 is tabled for that very obvious reason: there is a clear financial advantage for family members, and, I am afraid to say, there are many other distressing motivations that people might have that are not intended by the Bill’s promoter, the hon. Member for Spen Valley. It feels absolutely appropriate that we reverse the burden and have a much higher test of eligibility than that afforded by the Mental Capacity Act.

I want to make another point, although I do not know how hon. Members will feel about it because a lot of people do not accept that we are talking about suicide, even though it is in the terms in the Bill that we are amending the Suicide Act. The assumption of capacity in somebody taking their own life is what is proposed if we adopt clause 3: we are proposing that somebody has capacity if they end their own life. That implies directly that somebody who is standing on a window ledge or a bridge, about to commit suicide, is assumed to have capacity and to be making a rational decision, which other people should support. I say that directly, because there is a direct read-across with the whole topic of suicide prevention, which obviously we all strongly believe in. How can we say that somebody who is about to take their own life, unassisted, does not have capacity and is not making a settled and informed wish? In which case, why should we stop them or try to wrestle them back from the edge?

Tom Gordon Portrait Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

When people are in what is often termed a “crisis”, that would indicate that they are not in a situation where they have capacity. I do not see how the hon. Gentleman can think that it is reasonable to make a comparison between these two things; they are entirely different, and I am sure everyone here would broadly agree with that—I think, on this one, he is sort of on his own. Would the hon. Gentleman be able to offer any further insight into why he thinks that two wildly different situations are analogous—one is in a medical context where people have all the safeguards, and that layer of security and checking, and the other is someone who might be doing something in a moment of desperation?

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

The connection is explicitly in terms of the Bill. The Bill disapplies section 2 of the Suicide Act, which makes it illegal to assist somebody to commit suicide. It says that that section no longer applies. This Bill assists people to take their own life—I will not use the word “suicide” if people do not like it. There are other eligibility criteria: I totally acknowledge the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough pointing out that someone has to have a diagnosis of terminal illness, but that is not the point I am making. I am making the point that, under clause 3, we are saying that somebody who wants to take their own life has capacity, according to the very low bar of having a settled and informed wish. We are assuming capacity in the person who wants to end their own life. I suggest that that presents a real challenge to our national suicide prevention strategy—I will leave that point there, but I welcome any challenges to it.

Liz Saville Roberts Portrait Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I question whether the hon. Gentleman is making a false equivalence here in the very title of this Bill relating to terminally ill adults.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

There are huge challenges around the definition of terminal illness, as we have already acknowledged—but if the right hon. Lady thinks that somebody who is terminally ill should be allowed to jump off a bridge or out of a window without anybody saying, “Wrestle them back,” she should say so. We think that, whether someone has capacity or is in their right mind or not, they should not end their own life. That is the settled view of this country. That is what the law determines. Currently, it is illegal to help someone to do that. We are proposing to change that, to enable people to help somebody to do that in a medical setting.

The implication of clause 3 is very clear: if one has a settled wish, ending one’s own life is something that we regard as acceptable. It will be very difficult to apply the principles of national suicide prevention when we have acknowledged that suicidal people have capacity. I will leave that point—it is not receiving a great echo of affirmation—but I have not heard any objection to it, other than a lot of head shaking.

--- Later in debate ---
Jack Abbott Portrait Jack Abbott (Ipswich) (Lab/Co-op)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Upcoming amendment 339 to clause 4 addresses that specific point. The hon. Gentleman has been asked this a number of times today, but would he be satisfied if that amendment was passed?

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

Sorry—remind me of the detail of the amendment.

Jack Abbott Portrait Jack Abbott
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Essentially, the amendment would require that if a person is autistic or has a learning disability, they must be given accessible information and sufficient time to consider it. Additionally, there must be at least either a supporter or an independent advocate there. That amendment was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford and will be discussed later.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I would indeed support that amendment; it would go a long way to addressing the concerns that we have here. When we discuss clause 4, I will come on to some suggestions for how we can make sure that people with learning disabilities are properly supported, particularly people with Down’s syndrome.

To finish, I will speak to amendment 50, also tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge. If we are going to proceed with the MCA, we need to have it on the face of the Bill, to ensure standardisation —hon. Members have confidently asserted that it happens anyway, although the evidence we have been presented with demonstrates that it does not in all cases. Let us be much more explicit about the requirements that are needed. We should specify the minimum of what needs to be understood for capacity, including understanding the likely process of all treatment options, including non-treatment, and prognostic uncertainty. It is not acceptable, in my view, to have all of that worked out later by clinicians. Parliament must clearly say at this stage what is important.

While Members are looking at the quite extensive terms of amendment 50, it would be good to know what in that list they would object to and why any of it should not be included. It does not change the Mental Capacity Act; it preserves the integrity of the Act. It simply specifies more precisely and gives clear guidance to doctors to ensure that they do the best job they can. Lastly, it states that the patient must have full understanding of the consequences of

“requesting assistance in ending their own life”.

That includes the potential for medical complications at the end. That is a point that has been touched on a little in debate, but I will quickly say a word on that.

It is very important, in my view, that we are clear about what the patient should do, what the doctor should do, what the patient is entitled to do and what the doctor will do, in the event of complications at the end. This is not an abstract question. The Association for Palliative Medicine of Great Britain and Ireland gave evidence to us, stating:

“It is important to highlight the lack of scientific evidence for the effectiveness, failure rates or complications of any ‘approved substance’”,

and pointing out that the proposals in the Bill fall quite short of

“the usual practice of approving treatments in the UK, which mandates careful assessment of drugs and their combinations.”

We do not know how that will be applied in this case. It is a point for later in the Bill how we consider which drugs should be used, but it is relevant at this stage to insist that patients are made fully aware of the drugs that will be used and their potential complications. We often refer to Oregon as an inspiration for the Bill, and the law in Oregon requires the applicant to be fully informed by the attending physician of the

“potential risks associated with taking the medication to be prescribed”.

It might be worth considering that.

Professor House, in evidence to us, pointed out that informed consent—which is obviously a principle of the Bill—

“is not really specified properly. The doctor is required to ask the person what they want to happen in the event of complications without having previously explained to them what all the complications might be.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 169, Q216.]

So I think it is important that we specify that those complications are explained to them clearly at the outset.

This is not an abstract point. Sarah Wootton, chief executive of Dignity in Dying—my least favourite organisation—wrote in her book “Last Rights”:

“We have to move away from idealised, sanitised, nursery-rhyme accounts of what death can be…towards truthful, no bullshit, plain-spoken explanations of what could happen.”

I do not think Dignity in Dying applied that test when putting those disgraceful adverts in the tube, showing people dancing round their kitchens anticipating their lovely death, but she is right that we need to be very clear about what actual death can be like with these drugs.

I want to end with a reference to the work of Dr Joel Zivot, an American academic. The only proper study that can be done into people who have been given lethal drugs to die, using any of the drugs that will be used in this case, is of people who have been executed in the United States. Of course it is not possible to do many studies into the after-effects on people who have had an assisted death, but there have been some studies of people on death row. Dr Zivot’s point is that there is real evidence of what looked like trauma, distress and pain suffered by people as they died. Even if they themselves look peaceful—because often the first drug that is administered is a paralytic, so they are rendered immobile, and they may look very peaceful—it is evident that in some cases there is real distress going on beneath that peaceful exterior. We need to do a lot more work on understanding which drugs would be used and what their effects would be, and that needs to be properly explained to patients. All of that would be captured in amendment 50.

Simon Opher Portrait Dr Opher
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

We are talking about a whole different area now, but I would say that, as a medical professional, if someone is gaining consent to a treatment it is in their code of practice under the General Medical Council that they explain all these things. We do not need to write it into the Act; that is already in existence. A more general point is that there is a lot of stuff already in the public domain on doctors’ behaviour that does not need to be restated in the Bill. The more we write, the more likely it is that it will be less safe for patients. I would keep it very simple.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I really want someone to explain this point to me: how can it make it more unsafe for patients to state the safeguards explicitly? How can it possibly make it harder, or more dangerous, if we specify what—as the hon. Gentleman said—is good practice currently, which the best doctors already do? I greatly respect him and his medical practice, but is he really saying that every doctor conforms perfectly to the GMC guidance? There are obviously clear problems with the way in which some doctors operate, and this is uncharted territory. Surely for the sake of doctors, as well as patients, it would be appropriate to specify explicitly how they should conduct these assessments, what communications they should make and what patients should be properly informed of. I cannot see how that makes it more dangerous.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I want to concur briefly with my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud; I have done a lot of research into this, believe me. We have the GMC, the British Medical Association and organisations that represent medical practitioners. They have very lengthy codes of conduct and behaviour codes. What we cannot do—and I have tried—is to include all that in the Bill, and we have to be cognisant of that in some of the amendments that we make.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I challenge the hon. Lady, and I would welcome her response to this: we clearly can specify some things that can be done, which is what my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge has done in half a page with amendment 50, which clarifies explicitly what information the patient should receive and what they should properly understand. How does including this list of pieces of information make the Bill more dangerous for patients?

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am not saying that this amendment would make it more dangerous, but it would overcomplicate things. That is the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud was making. We need to have a very clear piece of good law, and I think the Bill already covers the points in amendment 50 and others, which I fully appreciate have been put forward in good faith. It is the clarity of the law that sometimes has to be the focus. I absolutely concur with the hon. Member for East Wiltshire on safeguards, but unfortunately I feel that we will probably never get to a point with the Bill where he is happy with the level of safeguards, and maybe he is prepared to acknowledge that.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

It is unlikely that I would ever vote for an assisted dying law but, if we are going to have one, I want to make it as safe as possible, which we all want. On those terms, in the spirit of a Bill that is going to pass, why not include these specific pieces of information? The hon. Lady says that, while it would not make the Bill more dangerous, it would overcomplicate it. Again, how does it overcomplicate it to add a few clauses specifying information that must be clearly communicated?

Kit Malthouse Portrait Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Amendment 50 requires that whoever is medically assessing capacity is also able to understand the legal implications. The final point of the amendment says that they have to understand what the insurance implications are likely to be, which would mean that they would have to inquire into the individual’s financial circumstances. They possibly might need to understand what provision they have made for their family.

It also references what the designation of death is likely to be, which again requires them to decide there and then what they will write on the death certificate, when it happens. As the hon. Member for Stroud said, much of what is in amendment 50 is already either in the Bill or implied by it. As Ministers have said before, we have a duty to the statute book not to embroider it to the extent that it becomes overcomplicated and unworkable. I do not think that any of us would necessarily argue with the points in amendment 50, other than perhaps the last one about legal expertise, but clarity leads to certainty, which leads to safety.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

By that logic, the safest, clearest Bill would be one that simply authorised an assisted death without any of these checks whatsoever. My right hon. Friend made the point that this amendment requires the doctor to discuss with a patient all the implications of their death. That is perfectly appropriate—in fact, if that is not being done at some stage in the process, and if that is not clear in the Bill, it absolutely should be. Otherwise, how can we be sure that the person is making a settled, informed decision, with all considerations taken on board?

I am sorry if that imposes a little extra burden on the doctor. One of the great challenges of the Bill is that, if we are to do it properly and genuinely make it a Bill that is strong in its safeguards, a whole lot of people will have to do a whole lot of work. There will be a huge demand on all parts of the public sector. This is required, I am afraid. I do not accept that the content of the amendment is either already in the Bill or implied in it. There might be some remote piece of GMC guidance that touches on this, which we would hope is properly applied, and I appreciate the point about embroidery. Nevertheless, this is not embroidery; this is upholstery—it is necessary for the Bill to be strong.

Sarah Olney Portrait Sarah Olney
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I want to pick up on a point that the hon. Member made before the previous intervention about the rights of the doctors themselves. This is an important point that we do not consider enough. We talk a lot about the rights of the patient, quite rightly, but this Bill will provide the means by which another person can get involved in someone’s death. It is really important that the legislation protects the rights of that person—the doctor involved—as well. Does he agree that providing greater clarity about the standard required to assess capacity will help the doctor to protect their own rights, perhaps in response to legal challenge from families, and that it is important that we consider the rights of the doctor as well as the patient?

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. It is an interesting irony of the Bill that it is presented as the free choice of individuals, but actually it imposes all sorts of obligations and repercussions on other people—the very term “assisted” conveys that. Many other people will be affected by the decision to take an assisted death. She is right that it would be very helpful for the doctors to be confident that they have done their job properly because they have a clear list of communications they are expected to make.

My understanding is that doctors are indemnified against legal challenge in consequence of decisions they make around this; that is an interesting point and one that I am uncomfortable with, but we will come to that later in the Bill. Leaving lawsuits out of it, from the point of view of the doctor’s professional conduct and their peace of mind, it would be very helpful for them to have it clearly specified what information they are required to convey.

I am grateful for Members’ interventions, and I appreciate the good faith and good sense that has been spoken, but I have not yet heard any reason for objecting to this amendment, other than the possible question of its being otiose and not necessary. That is not a sufficient reason to object to an amendment. We should not be objecting simply on drafting grounds. There can be tidying-up exercises later if there is repetition. I have not heard objections to the content of the amendment, and I would very much welcome Members’ support.

Naz Shah Portrait Naz Shah
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Does the hon. Member agree that the amendment ultimately aims to provide clarity, and that clarity ultimately leads to safety?

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

Exactly. A few more words of clarification should not be regarded as burdening the Bill or creating bureaucratic obstacles for doctors and patients; the amendment actually specifies more explicitly what is going on. It is almost akin to the debate we had on amendment 181 and those dangerous words “for the avoidance of doubt”; that is essentially what this amendment does, but it goes further, because it imposes clearer obligations on doctors to do their job properly.

Jake Richards Portrait Jake Richards (Rother Valley) (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Much has been covered today, and the issue of capacity was debated at length when the Committee considered clause 1, but I do have some observations.

I am sympathetic to the assertion that there should be changes to presumption and burden. Those are things that I have considered and spoken about with the promoter of the Bill and, outside the Committee, with experts who gave evidence to the Committee. I have spoken about them publicly as well; I am very sympathetic.

At the heart of this, we have two options. We could change the burden and presumption in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 for the purposes of assisted dying, rewriting 20 years of case law and medical practice. There is certainly some value to that, but that would be a radical departure from current medical practice, and there are other concerns. The alternative is to put in place rigorous processes and training around the Mental Capacity Act to ensure that it is implemented properly. After some reflection, I err on the side of the latter option, for a number of reasons.

First, I accept that there is debate among psychiatrists about this issue. We heard evidence from some who deem the Act not to be suitable for this new realm—I accept that we are entering new grounds, and I will come back to that point—but many psychiatrists and lawyers working in this area would deem it uncomfortable and unnecessary to depart from the Act.

Secondly, there is an oddity in changing presumption. There is an oddity in someone having to prove that they have capacity to fulfil their own desire. That oddity is one of the reasons that the Act is drafted as it is. It is partly—there are two sides to this coin—to ensure that there is no discrimination, partly to comply with the Human Rights Act 1998 and human rights more generally, and partly to ensure that we do not end up in a medical situation that is patrician, whereby medical doctors take an intrusive view of capacity rather than meeting the individual as they are.

Thirdly, the Bill, when amended—I will come on to the amendments that give me some comfort—will offer more safeguards than the Mental Capacity Act. Amendment 5 to clause 9(3) would ensure a further level of assessment. My hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has indicated that she will support that important amendment, as have all members of the Committee. If there is any doubt, there will be a further assessment by a psychiatrist. That goes some way to reassuring me that it is not necessary to rip up the burden or change the presumption in this area.

I want to make an observation about burden of proof, presumption and the nature of the assessment. Professor Whitty clarified his evidence. It is right that the burden and the presumption do not change, but of course the nature of the assessment rightly changes according to the circumstances. Every assessment of capacity is somewhat different, which is why amendment 50 is too prescriptive, in my view.

Of course, we can consider incredibly serious cases involving deprivation of liberty or the ability to conduct litigation. I have worked with parents whose children are being removed and looked at whether they have the capacity to make decisions about how they present their case. It is very dangerous to compare the severity and the profound nature of different circumstances, but let us not pretend that the Mental Capacity Act is not used to assess the most complex issues of capacity every day.

I am very sympathetic to amendment 50. I have met the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, who tabled it, and the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley to discuss it, but I stress that such a prescriptive provision is not appropriate for primary legislation when we are entering new ground. I accept, as hon. Members with different views have said, that we are entering new territory and that this is difficult. I accept that psychiatrists and medical practitioners will have to think long and hard about the nature of the capacity assessments, especially under clause 9(3), when that is activated. That work will have to be done. It has been set out in primary legislation through some of the training clauses, which have already been referred to.

There is no doubt that there will be a lot of work and consideration, but I do not deem it appropriate to have a clause drafted by one psychiatrist, albeit an undoubtedly esteemed and experienced one: the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, who tabled the amendment. Rather, the work needs to be done as the Bill is implemented over a two-year period. It needs to be done as part of a full consultation with psychiatrists, once the Bill has been passed, and that should be set out in guidance. That is what would usually happen with deprivation of liberty. I do not think it appropriate for primary legislation to set out the factors for a capacity assessment.

--- Later in debate ---
Jake Richards Portrait Jake Richards
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

We are debating lots of different things now, rather than just clause 3. There is an issue as to whether in those cases the individuals were found to have capacity, but we are talking about the process by which someone is found to have capacity, rather than what happens thereafter. We have had that debate, and I am happy to have it, but we are talking now about the process by which people are found to have capacity.

This is the problem with interventions: I have lost my train of thought. This is why people do not take them.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

rose—

Jake Richards Portrait Jake Richards
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

But I am happy to take another, although I may come to regret it.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I have a simple point to make; the hon. Gentleman can work out what he is going to say next while I make my brief intervention.

The point is that the referral to a psychiatrist will happen if the doctor has doubts in their mind. There is not an obligation on the doctor to refer; there is only an opportunity for them to do so, if they conclude that there is a reason. May I put a scenario to the hon. Gentleman? It is not clear whether this could happen under the Bill; well, it could happen, because it is not prohibited. A private practice might establish itself to provide assisted death, with the medical assessments and the support right through to the end—to the final act.

In those circumstances, if a patient goes to one of those clinics, does the hon. Gentleman not see that there might be a risk that the whole incentive of the business, even if it is a charity, will be to expedite the process, tick the boxes and pass people through? Does he not consider it dangerous that there is not an absolute obligation to refer to a psychiatrist and in fact, an obligation to pass a higher capacity test than the one that is currently in the MCA?

None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

A handy household hint: Members do not have to take interventions if they do not wish to do so. If a Member wants to keep their train of thought, they should feel free not to take an intervention.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Danny Kruger Excerpts
Naz Shah Portrait Naz Shah
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Amendment 281 would ensure that the patient receives advice on palliative care options from a specialist in the field. Medicine is fast-paced, with innovative and new medicines becoming available in quick succession. Although those in the profession try to keep abreast of developments, it is hard to maintain the depth of knowledge necessary in all specialties. A co-ordinating doctor may or may not have specialist knowledge in palliative medicine. Some courses may provide the opportunity to learn more, but others only touch on palliative medicine—covering it in less than a day of a five-year medical degree. Specialists who are leading in this field of medicine, innovating advances and working to palliate a patient’s symptoms at the end of life will have far greater knowledge of the specialism. Even in this wider debate, many who work in a different field of medicine or in general practice have simply got their facts wrong when speaking about palliative medicine—not through intent but because they have drawn on their own, perhaps out-of-date, experience or simply do not have the competencies to understand all that palliative care can provide.

Pain and symptom control techniques are advancing; in our debates on this Bill, people have articulated instances of poor care rather than what clinical experts are able to achieve. It is therefore essential that a patient has a consultation with an expert in the field of palliative medicine, who can alleviate a patient’s fear, support them with a plan for the end of their life, and discuss how pain and symptoms can be managed. Hearing an alternative approach to the end of life can be life-affirming, help people discuss their fears and concerns about dying, and provide a patient with what they are seeking physically, psychologically, emotionally, socially and perhaps spiritually. Specialists in palliative medicine are trained to home in on the challenges that people naturally have on receiving a diagnosis of terminal illness and are skilled at supporting a patient to explore what end of life could look like for them.

If the Committee does not pass this amendment, it would be placing itself above palliative care specialists when talking about such matters. It would undermine the need for such a specialty in medicine, like a GP who may not know the breadth of palliative medicine options for their patients. The Committee must not assume that it knows those options. Rather, it should enable those with a specialist understanding of palliative medicine to deploy their skills in this process by working through palliative care options with patients before the consideration of a path that will end with an assisted suicide.

Amendment 299 is consequential on amendment 298, which would ensure that a person has a consultation or consultations with a palliative care specialist. Amendment 298 would further embed this into the practice of managing the end-of-life process to provide the patient real choice over their options at the end of life, as what can be achieved through the practice of high-quality palliative care is often significantly different from people’s perceptions—even those of clinicians. Palliative care, like so many fields of medicine, continues to advance in its application and in the steps that can be made available to palliate a person’s pain and symptoms. When pain is difficult to control using oral or intravenous pharmacology, other interventions, such as a nerve block, can result in the absence of pain. A specialist is required to provide such a procedure, but for most people who are in receipt of palliative care, this option is rarely made available. Palliative care is about not just pain and symptom control, but the holistic journey of a patient at the end of life.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger (East Wiltshire) (Con)
- Hansard - -

The hon. Member mentions the principle that palliative care is a holistic service. Does she agree that, given that the Bill’s advocates—including the promoter, the hon. Lady for Spen Valley—emphasise the need for a holistic range of opportunities for end-of-life care, palliative care needs to be central to that? Rather than suggesting that there is an either/or between palliative care and assisted dying, the advocates of the Bill have often stressed the importance of having both options. Does the hon. Member for Bradford West agree that it is strange that the Bill does not require palliative care consultation as part of the range of services that are offered to patients when they are having their consultation?

Naz Shah Portrait Naz Shah
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I completely agree, which is why the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell) is very important. I urge the Committee to accept it, as it would ensure the provision of a palliative care consultation. As my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has always said, it is about having a holistic approach—we need to get back to that.

In the evidence sessions, we heard that palliative care social workers can play a pivotal role in supporting patients. Those from other professions—psychological services, chaplaincy services, physiotherapists, occupational therapists and speech therapists—along with specialist nurses and medics can all contribute to the care of a patient at the end of life. In discussions with palliative care specialists who listened to the debate on 29 November, they were perplexed by the symptoms that were graphically described in the case studies, and cited poor care as the reason for them. Many such symptoms can be controlled, and they were shocked that such examples of poor care were presented as a reason for assisted death, rather than for making good quality palliative care available to all patients.

We further heard evidence, especially from Dr Jamilla Hussain, that access to palliative care is inequitable. We know that those from minoritised communities and from low socioeconomic backgrounds have poorer access to good palliative care, and that people can have poor access depending on where they live, and on the day of the week or the hour of the day. Through this amendment, we want to ensure that everyone who is seeking an assisted death, or who has it suggested to them, as this Bill allows, is able to access a consultation or consultations with a palliative care specialist, who can dispel the myths while supporting them with their end-of-life plan.

--- Later in debate ---
Naz Shah Portrait Naz Shah
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I completely agree. It is imperative that those options—pain options and care options, including with the family—are explored in detail. The last time that I spent time in a hospice was when my brother-in-law was dying of cancer, and I remember that, as a family, we were very much involved in those conversations. Having such expertise empowers not just the patient but the family. Losing somebody who has a life-threatening condition is a difficult time for families and loved ones. When the wraparound model of palliative care, with specialist nurses and doctors, is good, it can be amazing. I have heard plenty of stories about when it is good. Last week, I mentioned a friend of mine who lost her husband last year, and she said that the palliative care nurses and doctors could not do enough. That gives the family confidence to explore the options. In that instance, that person would have benefited from this Bill—she encouraged me to support it.

As Dr Jamilla said, some people would absolutely benefit from the Bill, and they cannot be dismissed, but how do we legislate to cover people who do not have equal access to palliative care or to healthcare? There is discrimination. The covid experience that we went through recently showed the impact of inequalities. Disabled people, people with mental health conditions, elderly people, and people from black and minority ethnic communities, say that they were DNR-ed—subject to “do not resuscitate” orders. There is already a lack of trust in services, so we need to strengthen palliative care.

There is a fear among these communities that they will be pushed towards assisted dying. A consultation with participants from Pakistani, Roma, Nigerian, black Caribbean and Indian backgrounds revealed overwhelming mistrust, which is deeply rooted in the experience of discrimination and the disproportionate impact of covid-19. As one participant put it,

“They are doing this to save money…to kill us off.”

To get confidence among communities back, we need specialists people can rely on. That is what the amendment speaks to, and I hope that the Committee will support it.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I rise to briefly speak in support of amendment 281, moved by the hon. Lady and tabled by the hon. Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell).

At the moment that somebody seeks assisted death through a consultation with a doctor, they stand at a fork in the road: they can either proceed towards the assisted death about which they are inquiring, or turn towards other treatment options. On Second Reading, almost every Member on both sides of this debate stated that we need more palliative care, and everybody emphasised the value of providing good palliative care to all who need it. The amendments in this group would simply give force and power to the clear call of the House of Commons for a strong, realistic palliative care option as an alternative to assisted death, and I would be astonished if members of this Committee chose to vote them down. They give clear expression to the will of the House: that palliative care should be offered, and that it should be apparent that a patient has clearly understood their palliative care options.

I implore members of the Committee to consider what they would be communicating if they rejected the amendments. They would be saying that this is not a fork in the road, but a one-way street: there is only one way that someone is likely to go, and that is onwards to an assisted death. If that is the will of the Committee, it should vote the amendment down. If it thinks, as so many people said on Second Reading, that there should be real choice, and that palliative care should be explained and properly available, then I implore the Committee to support the amendment.

Simon Opher Portrait Dr Simon Opher (Stroud) (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West and the hon. Member for East Wiltshire for their speeches. I also thank my hon. Friend the Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell), who is a fantastic campaigner for excellent palliative care, for tabling the amendment.

I cannot disagree with almost everything that has been said: people need to be given real choice, and they certainly need to be given the choice of palliative care. As the hon. Member for East Wiltshire said, people need to be offered palliative care. That is absolutely crucial to the Bill. However, the amendment would make it a requirement that a patient has met someone in palliative care. What would happen to a patient’s autonomy if they did not wish to see a palliative care doctor? Would they be excluded from the process? It is incredibly important that people have real choices with respect to palliative care in this process.

I note to the Committee the fact that clause 4(4) states:

“If a registered medical practitioner conducts…a preliminary discussion”

with a person, they have to also discuss with that person

“any available palliative, hospice or other care, including symptom management and psychological support.”

That is in the Bill. It needs to be offered.

I have had patients who have not wished to see a palliative care consultant. It is their autonomy to make that choice. I do not think that it is a wise choice—I think almost every doctor would try to push them towards palliative care—but we must not exclude those patients from accessing an assisted death if that is what they want. That does not mean that people should face a fork in the road, as the hon. Member for East Wiltshire just mentioned. This is not an either/or: sometimes people can receive excellent palliative care and still request an assisted death, as my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley said.

I absolutely agree with many of the things you have been saying. I totally agree that we need better palliative care—although, actually, we have pretty good palliative care. In 2017, palliative care in this country was the best in the world, and we need to rebuild back to that again. But having a requirement that someone has to have seen a palliative care consultant will weaken the Bill. I urge the Committee to reject the amendment.

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Neil Shastri-Hurst Portrait Dr Shastri-Hurst
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am grateful for the hon. Member’s intervention, which leads on to the point I was going to make. We are getting bogged down in nomenclature about what speciality is involved when this is actually about training. It is about whether the individual having the conversation has the requisite skills to have a meaningful conversation. Clauses 5(3)(a) and 8(6)(a) stipulate that the co-ordinating doctor or independent doctor

“has such training, qualifications and experience as the Secretary of State may specify by regulations”.

That is the key part. This is about ensuring that people having incredibly sensitive, challenging and difficult conversations with patients about choices available to them at the end of life have the requisite skills and knowledge to do so. That may not be applicable to each and every general practitioner, but those having those conversations should have that knowledge.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

My hon. Friend is making a thoughtful speech, but I am concerned that he suggests that the skills required are simply the skills of conversation. The skills required are the skills to understand the patient’s condition and lay out very clearly to them their prognosis and the treatment options available to them.

With all respect to my hon. Friend’s father and other GPs, I cannot accept that every GP is fully qualified to understand the dying trajectory of the patient before them—perhaps my hon. Friend will confirm his belief that that is so. If that is true, what is the point of the palliative care profession? We have GPs already and are now introducing psychiatrists and social workers into the mix; I do not understand why on earth it should be regarded as unnecessary to include professionals in palliative care—the key skill that we all recognise as so important in this space. Why not?

Neil Shastri-Hurst Portrait Dr Shastri-Hurst
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I fear that my hon. Friend may be oversimplifying what I was saying. Perhaps I was not clear enough, so I will elucidate. I was certainly not suggesting that the required skills were merely those of being able to have a consultation and a conversation. I was talking about having the skills to have the information that needs to be imparted and the knowledge that underpins that and being able to articulate that within a consultation. It is a much wider picture than just having the communication skills—it is having the knowledge that underpins that. I am saying that that is not necessarily the domain only of someone who works in palliative care. There are a number of specialists who work within this field—it is a multidisciplinary field—and they all bring their expertise. The issue is about ensuring that anybody having these conversations has the knowledge base to conduct them properly.

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Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford. I will address the amendments in two different ways. I will start by looking at the technical issues around amendment 281, and then I will look at why I believe, as other colleagues have said, that the amendments are not necessary given what already exists both in the Bill and in terms of good practice in our health service.

First, I worry that amendment 281 will not have the effect that my hon. Friend the Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell) intends. Clause 1(2), to which the amendment relates, provides an overview of the other clauses in the Bill, and therefore cross-refers to sections 5 to 22. Clause 1(2) does not impose duties on persons in and of itself. The duties are set out in the later clauses to which it refers. Adding an additional subsection to clause 1, as proposed by the amendment, would not result in a requirement that the person must meet a palliative care specialist. That is a technical detail to reflect on.

In addition, the term “palliative care specialist” is not a defined term. Palliative medicine is a designated speciality of the General Medical Council, and a doctor can apply to be entered on to the GMC specialist register for the speciality provided that they have the specialist medical qualification, training or experience. However, the current wording of the amendment means that it is not clear whether it is seeking to require the person concerned to meet with one of those specialist doctors, or whether a meeting with another medical professional specialising in palliative care—for example, a specialist palliative care nurse—would suffice. There is no equivalent specialist register for specialist palliative care nurses. It is a technical issue, but an important one.

I also point out that my hon. Friend the Member for York Central has put an incorrect explanatory note with the amendment, which refers to terminal illness. That might just be an error, but I wanted to point that out.

Coming on to the broader grouping of the provisions: as has been said by colleagues, the amendments are tabled with really good intentions by someone who cares passionately about the palliative care sector. But they are not necessary given the process that is already set out by the Bill. Both doctors already have to discuss all treatment options, and must make a referral if they have any doubt about the diagnosis. It is very clear from clauses 4 and 9 that both the co-ordinating doctor and the independent doctor must discuss all treatment options with the patient, so they will have all the options laid out before them. That is really important because we have to think about what happens in reality. This initial discussion, in many cases, may actually take place with a palliative care doctor, and in many cases it will be highly likely, given the nature of the conditions we are talking about, that the patient may already be receiving treatment or advice from a palliative care team.

We seem to have created a narrative where this conversation is happening in isolation. Actually, as other colleagues have alluded to, we have a patient-centred approach in our healthcare. This person does not just suddenly arrive and have this one random conversation. I am sure medical colleagues will correct me if I am wrong, but if a doctor is dealing with a condition of which they have very limited knowledge, one of the first things they would do would be to refer to a specialist.

As is covered in clause 9(3)(a), if the doctor has any

“doubt as to whether the person being assessed is terminally ill,”

they must

“refer the person for assessment by a registered medical practitioner who holds qualifications in or has experience of the diagnosis and management of the illness, disease or condition in question;”

Clause 9(2)(a) also states that both doctors must assess the patient’s

“medical records and make such other enquiries as the assessing doctor considers appropriate;”

They can speak to anyone they want to, and they would in reality—of course that is what they would do. They would not sit there and think, “Oh, I don’t know enough about this condition so I will just keep going.” They would refer to specialists.

It is also really important to acknowledge what goes on at the moment. I was looking at some research last night: NHS England also has comprehensive guidance on personalised palliative and end-of-life care through a comprehensive personalised care model. None of this stops with the introduction of assisted dying as a choice for people. It would continue to happen. Patients are already getting that really good level of care.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

The hon. Lady is making a very good speech about how things should work and how things do work, in many cases, when the NHS does its job brilliantly. First, I want to correct the hon. Lady: subsequent amendments do impose the duty that is consequent to these amendments to clause 1, so it would be an obligation. Surely that is the point to make: what if the doctors are not as brilliant as she suggests? What if there is not an expectation that they should definitely seek expertise that they do not have themselves? To the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate, what if this service is provided outside the NHS by an independent charity or private provider set up explicitly to facilitate people’s assisted death requests, and has no intention of referring people to palliative care if they do not ask for it themselves? Would she be content for a private provider to refer somebody for an assisted death without a palliative care referral?

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I do worry about the lack of faith in our professionals. We have medical practitioners on the Committee and we have heard stories of the very good practice that happens, so it concerns me that we are so cynical about our system. Ultimately, we have to put faith in our professionals to do their job and to take that patient-centred approach, as I firmly believe they do. Dr Sarah Cox from the Association for Palliative Medicine said in her evidence to the Committee:

“In clinical practice, we make all these decisions in multi-professional teams…shared decisions are much better quality, much more robust and much safer.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 74, Q90.]

I absolutely agree with her, and that would continue to be the case.

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Naz Shah Portrait Naz Shah
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I have a few concerns about what we have just heard in relation to the amendment. One of them is in relation to Dr Cox’s evidence. What Dr Cox actually said was:

“The second difference, I would say, is that you are absolutely right that we do make those decisions with patients—with their families, if they wish—but in a multi-professional team. I would almost never make those decisions as an individual doctor without the support of my colleagues, for several reasons. First, as I have said already, that makes for much better decisions”. ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 74, Q91.]

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

To pick up on that point about Dr Cox, I think it is critical that the hon. Member for Spen Valley cited Dr Cox in support of the hon. Lady’s contention that the Bill is adequate. Dr Cox, in her evidence, was saying that there is a problem with the Bill because it does not require the multidisciplinary consultation that we all think needs to happen. Dr Cox was suggesting that the Bill should be amended in order to ensure that the NHS does its job properly, and that multidisciplinary consultations are held. Her evidence was not in support of the Bill as it stands.

Naz Shah Portrait Naz Shah
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention.

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None Portrait The Chair
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I point out that this is an opportunity to discuss clause stand part, not to cover the ground of amendments that have already been debated.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I will be quick, Mr Efford. I appreciate that we have been exhaustively over the detail of the amendments. I deeply regret that none of the amendments that were tabled to introduce stronger safeguards has been accepted. I want to take this opportunity to explain briefly what the Committee has done by rejecting those amendments and what we will be doing by agreeing to the clause without the amendments. I will not seek to divide the Committee on the clause, because I recognise that it enables the whole Bill to proceed, as the House wished on Second Reading, so I recognise that the principle of the Bill is represented in the clause. We wanted to tighten it, but have failed to do so.

Jack Abbott Portrait Jack Abbott (Ipswich) (Lab/Co-op)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I say gently to the hon. Member that—particularly on the previous clause—I have been very sympathetic to several of the amendments. Candidly, however, with due respect to all the hon. Members across the House who submitted this, I do not think that they have been particularly well written. I think that they leave quite a lot of ambiguity in a lot of areas. We had a discussion in the week before the recess, on a number of areas, about the word “only”. I heard it suggested earlier that the principle is about the spirit in which things are taken.

The reality is that I am very sympathetic to a lot of what is proposed, but a number of the amendments leave quite a lot of open ends. That has been a particular issue. I have been very open and have said that in principle I am supportive of assisted dying, but that I could not support it because the Bill was not strong enough in its current state. I do not think that the amendments tabled so far will strengthen the Bill; in fact, they might leave a lot of open ends, despite the very good intentions behind a lot of them.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for explaining why, having opposed the Bill on Second Reading, he now seems to be supporting it. I wish I had heard, during our debates in the past two weeks, his specific objections to the amendments. If he felt, as he says, that the Bill is not strong enough, we would have welcomed his own amendments to strengthen the Bill in a form of words that he would find adequate. Perhaps that is what we will hear from him.

Jack Abbott Portrait Jack Abbott
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I did articulate a number of times where I felt that some of the amendments were not tight enough in those areas.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

The hon. Gentleman has been on his feet; I appreciate that and am very grateful for his contribution to the debates that we have had.

I simply want to make the point that what the House voted for on Second Reading was the principle of assisted dying. What many members of the public who support the Bill think they are getting is a Bill that is safe—a Bill that is restricted explicitly to people at the very end of their life, who face extreme pain and suffering as they die; who are fully informed of what they are doing; who face no questions of external or indeed internal coercion; who have the absolute ability to understand what they are doing. Those are the things that people want to see in the Bill; those are the things that we have sought to effect through the amendments that we have tabled, and which the Committee has rejected.

Very explicitly, as a result of the rejection of these, I believe, very plainly written amendments, the fact is that under this Bill you can be depressed and suicidal and still regarded as having capacity to have an assisted death. You can be very marginalised—you can be a prisoner, you can be homeless—and still be regarded as eligible. You can have been influenced or encouraged by others and still be eligible. You can do it because you feel a burden. You do not need to be in any kind of pain. You do not need to be in the tiny proportion of cases that palliative care cannot help. As the hon. Member for Spen Valley accepted in the previous sitting, you can seek an assisted death for the sole reason of saving your family money, and you would be granted an assisted death on those grounds. The fact is that in rejecting these amendments, the Committee has decided and has demonstrated that the Bill is much wider than the campaigners portray.

I want to end with this point. I think there are two ways of approaching assisted dying—two essential framings of a Bill to legalise it. One is an autonomy Bill, which simply says that if people seek help to commit suicide, within certain broad parameters they should be able to do so, and there is no question of other people interfering with that choice; if they sign the requisite paperwork, they should be able to have an assisted death. The alternative is what we might call a safeguarding Bill—one where eligibility for the procedure is strictly limited and there are very strong, robust safeguards in place to protect the most vulnerable people.

The hon. Lady, and Members speaking in support of the Bill, have repeatedly emphasised that this is a safeguarding Bill. They want this Bill to be built around safeguards for the vulnerable. They respect the arguments that we make about the dangers that an open-ended assisted dying Bill would create. But the fact is that, as we have seen in the course of the debates on this clause, this is not a safeguarding Bill; it is an autonomy Bill. It is one that allows people to proceed to an assisted death because they want one, if they meet certain very loosely drawn criteria.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The reality is that this Bill is both. Of course it is about personal autonomy, choice and dignity for people who are coming towards the end of their life, but it has to be safeguarded as well. It is both. If I may say so, I think that the hon. Member makes quite an unfair characterisation of the robust, powerful debate that has taken place in Committee during the time that we have spent together. I think it has been extremely well informed. People have listened intently to other points of view and opinions, and it does the Committee a disservice to suggest otherwise.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

We are all being very courteous, and it is absolutely right that we should be. I have absolute respect for the good faith of every Member here, but let us not use cotton wool in these debates. I am sorry to say that I do not accept that the Committee has listened—well, it might have listened closely, but it has not accepted a single amendment, including amendment 281, which would have put into law the principle in which the hon. Member for Bradford West believes, which is that palliative care should be an option. Why was that not accepted? The Committee has decided that it will proceed with the Bill as it is.

The fact is that the Bill will give maximum autotomy, within very broad parameters, to patients, many of whom will be very vulnerable. It is an autonomy Bill masquerading as a safeguarding Bill. When we attempt to strengthen the safeguards, they are described as bureaucratic hurdles. If the Bill becomes law, I worry about what will happen to the very limited safeguards that do exist. What we see elsewhere will happen, which is that the safeguards that do exist are treated as bureaucratic hurdles. They are in fact treated, and explicitly described, as we heard from the Australian witnesses, as barriers to a human right. What were safeguards become discrimination. I am afraid that that is the road we are going down.

The point about autonomy is often made. As I say, I think that this Bill actually has autonomy at its heart. The hon. Member for Spen Valley is right to make that point. That is really what is going on here. She wants people to be able to request help to commit suicide—to end their lives. The fact is that for the most vulnerable people, creating this option, especially when we have now switched off the obligation to seek a palliative care pathway and directed people straight down the road towards an assisted death—

Kit Malthouse Portrait Kit Malthouse
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

That is a misrepresentation.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I am sorry if it offends Members, but the fact is that the Bill in its present form, with the amendments rejected, will place no obligation on doctors to refer people to palliative care or to seek a palliative care consultation. Many will do so, of course—many good doctors will do exactly that—but they will not be obliged to. If we are imagining that every doctor will be as brilliant as the best doctors, I am afraid that I will have to talk about the Liverpool care pathway and the many tragic scandals that we are constantly dealing with. It is simply not the case that the option of a palliative care consultation equates to the absolute expectation that it will happen.

None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

Order. We have debated that issue.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

We have debated that issue; I apologise.

My concern is that the Bill, which is masquerading as a safeguarding Bill but is actually an autonomy Bill, will end in less autonomy for the most vulnerable patients, who will find themselves on this conveyor belt, internally pressured and encouraged to seek an assisted death when it is not in their interests. I invite the Committee to reflect on what we have done, but as I have said, I do not propose to divide the Committee on clause 1 stand part.

Rebecca Paul Portrait Rebecca Paul
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Under our current law, assisting someone to commit suicide is a criminal act. Clause 1 of this Bill is where we cross the Rubicon, moving away from well-established principles into a new era in which the state is empowered to help individuals to die.

This monumental decision is one for Parliament in the coming months. However, what we must do on this Committee is bolster the safeguards so that the Bill is truly as safe as it can be. Our priority must always be the vulnerable: those who could be coerced into something that is not in their best interests, and those with no one to advocate for them or protect them, who could end upbeing pushed into a process because that is the easiest and cheapest option for everyone. This law must work for everyone, not just the privileged few.

That is why I am so disappointed that at the end of nearly three days of debate, there has been not one improvement to the safeguards—not one. We asked for amendments to exclude people with impaired judgment and the depressed and suicidal; this Committee said no. We asked to protect those who are unduly influenced or encouraged by others to seek assisted dying—

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Stephen Kinnock Portrait Stephen Kinnock
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I will make some brief remarks on the legal and practical effect of clause 1, as amended, to assist hon. Members in making their own assessment. Clause 1 sets out the eligibility criteria that a person must meet in order to request to be provided with lawful assistance to end their own life under the provisions of this Bill. A person must be terminally ill; this term is defined in more detail in clause 2.

Clause 1(1) sets out a further four requirements, which require that a person must also have the necessary capacity to make the decision, which is to be read in accordance with the Mental Capacity Act 2005; be aged 18 or over; be ordinarily resident in England and Wales and have been resident for at least 12 months; and be registered as a patient with a GP practice in England or Wales. This clause provides that, in particular, clauses 5 to 22 of the Bill require steps to be taken to establish that the person has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life and has made the decision that they wish to end their own life voluntarily and has not been coerced or pressured by any other person in making that decision.

The clause, as amended by the insertion of new subsection (3), will ensure that the service can be accessed only by an individual ordinarily resident in England and Wales. That amendment, amendment 180, has been drafted to give effect to the policy intent of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley for this legislation: that it is to apply only to those in England or Wales and is not to be accessed via medical tourism.

As I have said, the Government remain neutral on the substantive policy questions relevant to how the law in this area would be changed. The clause is a matter for the Committee and Parliament to consider, but the Government’s assessment is that the clause, as amended, is workable, effective and enforceable.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2

Terminal illness

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I beg to move amendment 399, in clause 2, page 1, line 22, leave out “, disease or medical condition” and insert “or disease”.

This amendment ensures that a terminal illness under the Bill can only be an illness or a disease and not a medical condition.

None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 400, in clause 2, page 2, line 1, leave out “, disease or medical condition” and insert “or disease”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 399.

Amendment 401, in clause 2, page 2, line 5, leave out “, disease or medical condition” and insert “or disease”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 399.

Amendment 11, in clause 2, page 2, line 7, leave out from beginning to first “of” in line 8 and insert—

“(3) A person is not to be considered to be terminally ill by reason”.

This amendment amends clause 2 to say that a person cannot be considered terminally ill by reason of having mental illness or a disability.

Amendment 181, in clause 2, page 2, line 8, leave out from “ill” to end of line 10 and insert—

“only because they are a person with a disability or mental disorder (or both).

Nothing in this subsection results in a person not being regarded as terminally ill for the purposes of this Act if (disregarding this subsection) the person meets the conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1).”

This amendment clarifies that the purpose of subsection (3) is to emphasise that only having a disability or mental order does not make a person “terminally ill” and therefore eligible for assistance.

Amendment 283, in clause 2, page 2, line 10, at end insert—

“or one or more comorbidities alongside a mental disorder within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 1983”.

This amendment would set out that a person who has a co-morbidity with one or both of a mental disorder or a disability is not considered terminally ill by virtue of those comorbidities alone.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I said in the last debate that this is either a safeguarding Bill or an autonomy Bill. [Interruption.] Or that it is both, but the claim has been that it is a safeguarding Bill and that there are very strong safeguards. If so, and if we are going to stress the safeguards, as I think we should, that means being very clear about who is eligible. It means having proper, meaningful guardrails showing who is inside and who is outside the scope of the Bill. I suggest that the Bill’s guardrails are not strong, safe or impermeable; they are broken fences. We need to mend those fences in this Committee in order to make the Bill safe.

This group of amendments includes a set in my name that would restrict eligibility to people with terminal diseases or illnesses, and another set that would build stronger safeguards explicitly for disabled people and people with mental disorders. The purpose of the two sets of amendments is the same, but they approach the challenge from opposite ends. I will speak first to the amendments in my name.

Quite simply, I want to remove the words “medical condition” from the definition of terminal illness. The reason for that is straightforward: some medical conditions are likely to also amount to a disability. As Fazilet Hadi, the head of policy at Disability Rights UK, told the Committee in evidence, there is a “huge overlap” between disability and terminal illness. The distinction between the two is notoriously blurred, and there is a reason why no disability rights organisation backs this Bill: it is here in this innocuous phrase “medical condition”. Removing that phrase will provide an additional degree of protection for some disabled people, which I think is a good enough reason to do it.

There is another group of people whom we do not hear from much in these discussions, but about whom we should perhaps be most concerned, because there are so many of them—they are almost all of us. I am talking about the frail. Frailty is an important word in this debate. I refer hon. Members to the briefing submitted in recent days by the British Geriatrics Society; it is a powerful document that highlights an essential challenge for this Bill. What is frailty? Is it a disability? Is it a terminal illness? Is it both? Is it neither? It can be noted on a death certificate as a cause of death and, even if it is not listed as a cause of death—this is a crucial point—it is the most common dying trajectory for people in the UK. More people are frail as they approach the end of life than are not.

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Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am interested to know where the hon. Member has got the idea that someone is going to scrap the six-month prognosis from.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

Well, if the hon. Lady will say that she will never, at any stage, support a proposal to extend it beyond six months, I will be very glad to hear it. My concern is that we already have amendments tabled to do exactly that, which we will be debating shortly. I hope they will be rejected, but my confident expectation, on the basis of other countries, including the Australians who gave evidence to this Committee, is that the six-month safeguard will soon be seen as a barrier to a human right, because there is indeed no logical basis for such an arbitrary date.

The people who currently deal with the six-month prognosis, in the context of benefits and pensions, campaign that it is arbitrary and unworkable—rightly, I think—so I am afraid that I confidently expect the six-month barrier to be challenged in due course. If the hon. Lady is prepared to say that she would never do that, however, I would be very reassured.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Would the hon. Member agree that the purpose of the Committee is to look at the Bill before us? That is why we are here. I understand his concerns, his reservations and his nervousness about what might happen in future, and that is an important conversation to have, but the purpose of the Committee is to look at the Bill as it stands today; that should be the focus of our deliberations.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

Yes, but I simply state on the record that I believe that this is not the end, but the beginning of a wider Bill that would follow if we passed this one. I am encouraged by what the hon. Lady says, or implies: that she does not want to go further than this Bill.

My plea to the Committee is straightforward. Let us confine eligibility to the people who the campaigners talk about: those with diseases or illnesses that are genuinely terminal. We can do more to strengthen that definition with later amendments, but, first, we have to remove the gaping hole in the fence that is this term “medical condition”. Let us remove that term.

Tom Gordon Portrait Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Marie Curie’s definition of a terminal illness is

“an illness or condition which cannot be cured and is likely to lead to someone’s death”.

It is obviously one of the best-known end of life charities, so how does the hon. Member reconcile the differences he has with its professional expertise?

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Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I am very happy to use the word “condition”—we all use it quite casually, including me—but we are concerned about legislation here. As I explained, if we include the term “medical condition”, courts could interpret that as a development—an addition—to the existing law on terminal illness, which refers only to illness and disease. The courts would be right to conclude that Parliament meant more than illness or disease, which is why it is important to be explicit about what we are talking about: illness or disease.

I think we should remove that term, but if other Members do not, I would like to understand why. The hon. Members for Harrogate and Knaresborough or for Spen Valley might have some suggestions, but I would be grateful if somebody could clarify, explicitly, what is meant by “medical condition” that is not caught by the terms “illness” or “disease”. What are the meanings of the three terms, and why do we have to have “medical condition”? It might well be that there are conditions that would not be captured by “illness” or “disease” that would be appropriate.

Lewis Atkinson Portrait Lewis Atkinson (Sunderland Central) (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

On that point, I will quote directly from Chris Whitty’s evidence to the Committee:

“there are people who may not have a single disease that is going to lead to the path to death, but they have multiple diseases interacting, so they are highly frail; it is therefore not the one disease that is the cause, but the constellation that is clearly leading them on a path inexorably to…death”.––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 32, Q5.]

From my perspective, it is about that “constellation” where death is clearly going to happen as a result of a combination of different conditions, illnesses or diseases. That it is where that is very clear, and, because of the six-month eligibility in the Bill, we have that nailed down. That is the importance of including the term, because it is not one disease that leads to death; it is the constellation of diseases and illnesses that will inexorably lead to death.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. I thought that might be the case too, and I was wondering about that, but I am very concerned about some of the evidence that Professor Whitty gave. I regret that the hon. Member for Spen Valley has removed the role of the chief medical officer from the process that she is designing by introducing the new commissioner, but I will not be sorry to see that particular chief medical officer excluded from the process. He has made significant mistakes; he had to write to the Committee to explain that he had misrepresented the Mental Capacity Act, and, on his evidence, the Committee voted to reject certain amendments.

I am concerned about what Professor Whitty said, but if the reason for including “medical condition” is to reflect the fact that there might be multiple diseases or illnesses that, together, mean that somebody is terminally ill, that is what should be stated in the Bill. It could very well include “a combination of illnesses or diseases that amount to terminal illness”. My concern is about this new concept of a medical condition, which, as I have said, implies something different from a disease or illness.

The Bill would say “the person’s death in consequence of illness or disease”—if we remove “medical condition” —so that would be the qualification or eligibility. If there is a number of illnesses or diseases that amount to a fatal prognosis, that would be captured in the clause, even once we have excluded medical condition, because the singular “illness” or “disease” would, as I understand it from our guidance on statutory interpretation, include the plural. If it is about there being a number of illnesses or diseases that add up to a fatality, the Bill as I propose to amend it would be adequate to the scenario that the hon. Member for Sunderland Central described and that Professor Whitty accounted for. The question is, what is additional illness or disease, or illnesses or diseases, that are captured by the term “medical condition”?

Kit Malthouse Portrait Kit Malthouse
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Let me give a quick example. Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis is described as a condition rather than a disease or an illness. ALS is not dissimilar to motor neurone disease, but nevertheless people regard themselves as having a condition rather than a disease.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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Again, I am interested in that, because I would be surprised if that condition were not adequately captured by the term “illness” or “disease”. If not, we should seek further clarification, because we need to be very specific. Illness or disease has been adequate; it is adequate in the current law on terminal illness for eligibility for benefits and pensions. I await clarification on what is added by the term “medical condition”, because my concern is that it opens the door to frailty. Going back to Chris Whitty’s evidence, I am concerned at his suggestion that frailty should be an eligible condition for an assisted death.

I will wrap up shortly so that hon. Members have time to speak to other amendments, but I will quickly refer to amendment 181 tabled by the hon. Member for Spen Valley and amendment 11 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire (Sarah Bool), which attempt to do the same thing as my amendments. They seek to protect disabled or mentally ill people, but they do so explicitly by disapplying the provisions of the Bill for those groups, or they attempt to do so. Only amendment 11 actually does, while amendment 181 fails to do so, in my view.

Let us look at subsection (3), which attempts to protect disabled people and those with mental disorders, but which, on closer inspection, is ineffective or even meaningless. In statutory interpretation, the first phrase,

“For the avoidance of doubt.”

indicates that the subsection does not add anything to the Bill except clarity. It is intended not to change the law that is being enacted by the Bill, but to clarify the meaning of the Bill. My point is that it does not add anything—in fact, it signals that the clause can be disregarded. It is like an explanatory note and not actually relevant to the Bill. Its effect therefore negates the point that it tries to make. In including it, the hon. Lady protests too much and exposes the weakness that the clause fails to overcome. It invites a court to disregard the protection it pretends to offer by stating that that protection has no force except what is elsewhere in the Bill.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I agree with the hon. Member to some degree in terms of the legal drafting. I have been advised that the expression “for the avoidance of doubt” is not generally used in a Bill if the Bill is already clear, which this is—I have been reassured by parliamentary counsel about that—but I was keen, having met disabled people and disability rights activists, to have it very clearly in the Bill that by virtue of having a disability, a mental health condition or a mental disorder, someone would not be in scope of the Bill. It was a very clear drafting decision and I stand by that decision; I think it is the right thing to do so that we are clear who is not covered by the Bill.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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I am grateful to the hon. Lady; it is helpful to understand her thinking. Her amendment is an attempt to further clarify her purpose, which is to communicate that we cannot have an assisted death only because of a mental disorder or a disability. I know that other colleagues will speak to that point more explicitly.

My point is that

“For the avoidance of doubt”

is a massive signal to the courts that the subsection is meaningless. The advice was right that it is not usual to include that phrase, as it signals that nothing is being added. My concern is that it does not add anything, and the inclusion of the word “only” further demonstrates the hollowness of the protection that it purports to offer. The fact is that someone will still be able to get an assisted death because of a physical illness that derives from a mental disorder or disability. That is my concern with the later parts of the clause, but I will leave other Members to make that point.

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Naz Shah Portrait Naz Shah
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I appreciate that cancer does come under disability, and that people with cancer can identify as a disabled person, but my initial thought is that that weakens the Bill.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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The fact that cancer is included in the Equality Act definition does expose a concern about the Bill. It suggests that there is a real connection there, which is of concern. I think the solution is to accept the amendment 11 and ensure that disabled people and those with mental health conditions would not be eligible for assisted dying, and then to introduce a further amendment—either now, as a manuscript amendment, or later—to exclude cancer from the definition. That is a tidying-up exercise that could be done in light of the point that the hon. Member for Spen Valley made about the reference in the Equality Act. The most important thing is that we tighten the clause to protect disabled people.

Naz Shah Portrait Naz Shah
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I wonder whether my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has considered whether she would tighten the clause. Have any options been explored, and what have the Government said about her removal of the Equality Act—

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting)

Danny Kruger Excerpts
Rebecca Paul Portrait Rebecca Paul
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I completely agree. The hon. Member has made some powerful points over the course of this Committee. The reality of the matter is, like the hon. Lady said, this has not really been considered fully until recent times. I think we are now all much more aware of the coercion and pressure that goes on. It is only right, when we are making this decision now, to be fully aware of that and have our eyes wide open to the realities.

At the end of the day, we are not legislating for when it works perfectly for that ideal candidate who absolutely wants to do this for all the right reasons and they are in pain, which is exactly what the Bill is designed for. We are legislating for that big group of people who are vulnerable, and who it may not work for. That is a much bigger group. We heard compelling evidence from Dr Jamilla Hussain, which really impacted me, about this big group of vulnerable people who could be detrimentally impacted. We must make legislation for the group that could be negatively impacted. They should be our focus.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger (East Wiltshire) (Con)
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I am very struck by that last point. Does my hon. Friend agree that the purposes of these amendments build on the principle of the Bill? The Bill recognises the existence of vulnerable groups and attempts to introduce safeguards. It is not a free-for-all. The absolute purpose of the Bill is to ensure that vulnerable groups are protected.

My hon. Friend’s amendments support the principle of the Bill, which says that encouraging suicide remains illegal. By implication of the Bill, to encourage people to take an assisted suicide should be illegal too. My hon. Friend is actually building on the principle of the hon. Member for Spen Valley’s Bill, and I hope the Committee will not regard these amendments as in any way harmful to its purpose or as an attempt to make it more impractical in operation. They would make the Bill clearer. To the point made by the hon. Member for Spen Valley about overcomplicating things—I think the complications exist in the current text of the Bill, whereas my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate would be clarifying its purpose.

Rebecca Paul Portrait Rebecca Paul
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My hon. Friend makes the point powerfully. I say to everyone in this Committee—we had this discussion yesterday—that I am not opposed in principle to the concept of assisted dying, but I see my role here as to protect the vulnerable. That is what I am trying to do, and I know everyone here wants to do exactly that. I cannot really see any downside to these amendments. Why would the Committee not want them included, if we want to protect the most vulnerable? Yes, it may put a bit more onus on clinicians, because they would need to look for a lower level of coercion. But that is absolutely right—of course they should have to do that. We are talking about assisted death. It is really important that we have a higher level of consideration.

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Rebecca Paul Portrait Rebecca Paul
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My interpretation is that it would not.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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What the hon. Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire said is not the case at all. What the Bill would do is to exempt people who go under this new procedure from the operation of the Suicide Act. It would not create some new category of person; the law would just operate in a different way. I recognise that she is saying that, in her mind, there is a difference between somebody who is dying who has an assisted death and somebody who is healthy who commits suicide, but that is a completely arbitrary distinction in reality. Many people who have terrible diagnoses kill themselves, even though one might say that they are not actually dying and they could be treated. Should that person qualify?

Entering into the mind of someone who wants to take their own life is an absolute impossibility, and that is the whole problem with this Bill: we are trying to create distinctions that are impossible to police properly. It goes to the point of my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire about trying to police private conversations. That is what this Bill entails. We are inviting the state to intrude, in an absolutely impossible way, on what is going on in people’s minds. To go back to the point made by the hon. Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire, there is no clear distinction between somebody who would choose assisted dying through a doctor’s prescription and one who would choose to take their own life without assistance. It is not possible to draw that distinction. In fact, we have seen so many times that people who might want to kill themselves one month change their mind a month later. I am afraid that this is the challenge with the whole Bill.

Rebecca Paul Portrait Rebecca Paul
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I support my hon. Friend’s comments. Outside of this place, I speak about this topic in a manner that is as sensitive as possible. When we are talking about the legislative changes that are needed to this Bill and how it interacts with other legislation, I will use the correct legal terminology, because I think it is really important that we do that.

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Rebecca Paul Portrait Rebecca Paul
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I thank the hon. Member for that intervention. I think the point on probate is right; it is commonly used there, but it is not just used in that situation. My understanding is that, when it comes to decisions by clinicians with regard to withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, undue influence is one of the considerations.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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Just to amplify that point, my hon. Friend is absolutely right. In the “Re T” case, the Court of Appeal judged that undue influence should be taken into account in medical decisions, so that is an existing principle in law. It feels totally appropriate to bring that in here, seeing as, as we have discussed, the principle already exists that it is wrong to encourage suicide, and that it is possible to have undue influence without coercion or pressure being present. To address the point made by the hon. Member for Spen Valley, I do not think those terms are adequate to include undue influence; undue influence can exist even when there is no evidence of coercion.

Rebecca Paul Portrait Rebecca Paul
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. The point that I would make is about an example that we talked about a lot yesterday, so I know that it resonates for many on the Committee. If someone is making a decision and a treatment is being withdrawn, or life support is being turned off, undue influence is already one of the things they consider, so when we are considering assisted death, surely, in order to be consistent, we would apply undue influence to that as well, rather than having a lower level. Why would we have a lower threshold for assisted dying compared with withdrawal of treatment?

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Rebecca Paul Portrait Rebecca Paul
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It is reassuring to hear that I am not the only one worried about this, so I thank the hon. Lady for that.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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I understood the Minister to say that the judge needs clarity when they come to adjudicate on a case. We have heard through the media, although an amendment has not yet been tabled, that a judge will not oversee the process. Does my hon. Friend share my concern that we are setting up a legal system that will not provide proper legal oversight of the proposed measures?

Rebecca Paul Portrait Rebecca Paul
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My hon. Friend’s point goes to the heart of the case, and to the point that I made earlier: it is extremely difficult when the Bill is a moving feast. We are tabling amendments to the Bill as drafted, but if substantial changes are made, that will impact some of what we did earlier.

Rebecca Paul Portrait Rebecca Paul
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I thank the hon. Member for sharing her view on that.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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This is a very helpful conversation, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend for allowing all these interventions. It is right that there would be a judge in the event of a criminal offence. We are trying to ensure that we do not get to that point by insisting that in the early stages of the process, when a doctor makes their assessment—indeed, when a judge makes their assessment, if there is still that judicial stage, as we hope there will be—they are required to ensure that there has not been undue influence. It is important that, at that early stage, they are asked to check not just whether there has been coercion. I hear what the Minister says about the concept of undue influence hopefully somehow being incorporated in the definition of coercion or pressure, but we need to ensure that that test is applied at a very early stage. The first people who discuss the matter with the patient should ensure that there has been no undue influence, which by the way is about much more than outright coercion; it is about an imbalance of power in the relational dynamics within families, which as we all know can be very complicated. That is what necessitates the amendment.

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Jake Richards Portrait Jake Richards
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The issue I have is that if we open the door to all different types of terminology, it will never end. The law is best served when it is clear, simple and straightforward.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Jake Richards Portrait Jake Richards
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Let me just make this key point. Members have raised the case of Re T. I must admit that I do not know that case, but I believe it is a 1992 Court of Appeal case about a refusal of treatment, so it is 33 years old. The law has moved on. As the Minister said earlier, the terminology of coercion and pressure is much more modern, and is used in legislation that has been drafted in the last decade, rather than the Suicide Act drafted in the 1950s and that Court of Appeal case from the early 1990s.

Last night, I briefly went back to my law books—I sound like I am really missing my old job—and looked into where the concept of coercion is used across different jurisdictions and areas. This is what I read: “Coercion is a phenomenon the courts have experience of handling. Generally, coercion as a concept in our law involves applying pressure, whether physical, psychological or moral, to force someone to act against their free will or better judgment. This pressure can manifest in various forms, such as threats of intimidation and undue influence, and is recognised across criminal, family, consumer and contract law.” It is used in forced marriage legislation. It is used in criminal legislation. Case law has made it very clear that coercion is used interchangeably with duress, defined as a constraint on a person’s choice.

I feel that we are dancing on the head of a pin. The law has been drafted by one of the most senior parliamentary draftspeople. The Government Minister has confirmed that the Ministry of Justice deems this to be a sensible course of action if this legislation is to proceed.

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Jake Richards Portrait Jake Richards
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Yes. As I say, the amendments are perfectly reasonable; it is sensible to raise them and it is good that we are having this conversation. I have looked into this carefully and I take it seriously. I feel that the square is squared—or the circle goes all the way round, to mix my metaphors—but that does not mean that we should not look into this further when we get to the relevant clauses.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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I am worried about the constant suggestion that we look at these issues later. The fact is that we do not know what the Bill will look like later. We do not know what amendments will be tabled or what will be agreed. It is always possible to revisit amendments that have been passed in the earlier stages if subsequent amendments make them otiose. The point is that we should not pass this opportunity to strengthen the Bill if we can.

On the point that the hon. Member for Rother Valley was discussing with my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate about the Suicide Act explicitly referring to pressure as a subset, as it were, of encouragement, that Act specifies that encouragement is the general, catch-all term and includes pressure. I think the hon. Gentleman is suggesting, and other hon. Members have suggested, that it is the other way round: that coercion or pressure somehow include encouragement. Surely encouragement is the broader term—it exists in the current law on suicide. What is the problem with using that term in addition to coercion and pressure, consistent with existing law? It is a broader and more sufficient term.

Jake Richards Portrait Jake Richards
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

On the first point, in fairness, the hon. Member for Reigate was talking about a clause that we are going to consider and the link between two different criminal offences in the 1961 Act and clause 26 of the Bill.

On the second point, the Bill—to coin a political phrase—needs to be fit for the future. The language used in legislation over the last decade when we are considering coercion—I use that word automatically because that is the language we use now—is much more appropriate than “encouragement”, which is slightly archaic, to be honest. Perhaps we need to look at the Suicide Act as well—although not in this parliamentary term; that is for the second term. [Laughter.] I have nothing further to add.

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Juliet Campbell Portrait Juliet Campbell
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I absolutely agree that we do not want people not to understand what the Bill allows them to do or not do. We spoke earlier about making the Bill simple enough for professionals to understand so that they know how to deal with particular instances, but it is not here to make life easy for professionals; it is here to ensure that anyone who is vulnerable—anyone who has six months to live, or for whatever other reason—is protected.

A continuous theme of our debates and all our conversations is that we must make safeguarding as tight as possible so that people are protected. I believe it is not too much to ask to include those additional words to ensure that the wording is as tight as possible and protects the people who need our protection every single day.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Lady. May I say how much I agree with what she has been saying and the purpose of her amendments, which I will be supporting if we get the chance, as I will the amendments in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate?

I do not want to repeat what I said yesterday, but my general point is that we make decisions in a context. We are directly influenced by the people around us. I want to highlight the very powerful phrase that my hon. Friend used. She said that love can shroud decision making, and the influence and pressure that is applied to us can be shrouded in love.

Professor House, who gave evidence to us, talked about the enmeshment of people’s decision making with the influence of their loved ones and people around them. The fact is—hon. Members have made this point—that power dynamics in families are complicated, and where there is an imbalance of power, there is risk. The Bill implicitly acknowledges that through the safeguards that it attempts to create, but I do not think they are strong enough.

I know that my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire is concerned that strengthening the Bill in this way will create an opposite risk, which is that a family member who was behaving perfectly properly could somehow be dragged into a prosecution, or that the application would be denied on the basis of a reasonable conversation that had taken place between loved ones—“My darling, do you think I should do this?” It is a lovely fictional conversation, a sweet exchange between a loving couple, but saying to somebody that you agree with the decision they have made and that you would support it, or that you are content with it or understand it, is not the same as undue influence—it is not even the same as encouragement. It is similar to the debate we will be having in due course about the role of the doctor making an overt suggestion of an assisted death, rather than consenting to a suggestion that has been made by the patient.

Kit Malthouse Portrait Kit Malthouse
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My hon. Friend is asserting that those two things are different, but obviously, those assertions would be tested in court. If a person were to appear in front of the co-ordinating doctor and say, “Doctor, I want an assisted death and my husband thinks I should do it,” is that interpreted as encouragement? Is it support? Under the current legal framework, that would be interpretable and inquirable. However, as I said to my hon. Friend, I am not necessarily nervous that families would be dragged into some kind of legal conflict. I am concerned that they would seek to not get there at all, because the insertion of those words would make them so nervous about the conversation that they would become guarded.

We know from other jurisdictions that over time, people will come to understand this process. As I will refer to during our debate on the next grouping, they will also start to understand what they should not say, if we put into the Bill that there are things that will play negatively if they are revealed to the relevant authorities. My concern is that unless we keep the Bill simple and clear, and leave families and medics the space to have free, frank and open conversations that—from the medical point of view—cover the full range of options, we will start to restrict and police the conversation, and therefore make it that much more difficult.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

The risk of gaming—of patients playing the game, and doctors seeking out words to say or not say—is an issue throughout the Bill. That is a general problem with the Bill; thankfully, it is not just a free-for-all. However, in the scenario that my right hon. Friend suggests, that is exactly my concern: if the patient says that their spouse agrees with them or encourages them, that should be a red flag. Under the current Bill, it is not clear that it would be. There is no obligation on the doctor to record that there has been undue influence or to push back, because at the moment, the doctor is looking only for evidence of coercion. As I will come to later, that bar is too low to use, so if the doctor hears those words, I would like him or her to start asking questions, to push back, and to satisfy himself or herself that there has been no overt encouragement or undue influence. That is the point of what we are trying to do.

Naz Shah Portrait Naz Shah
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

To come back to an earlier point—I want to make these points, simply because it is really important that we get them on the record—my hon. Friend the Member for Rother Valley talked about undue influence and encouragement perhaps being archaic terminology. However, just last year, the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 cited undue influence, as did the Anatomy Act 1984. Acts passed by Parliament in the last few years have used that terminology, so does the hon. Member for East Wiltshire share my concern about the resistance to having those words added to this Bill?

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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The hon. Member is absolutely right—undue influence does exist in law, including in laws that have been passed very recently. I recognise that the hon. Member for Rother Valley is not impressed by laws that are more than 10 years old, but I hope he might be satisfied that a law passed last year is sufficiently up to date and modern for him to regard as morally valid. Undue influence is an existing term, and we should apply it in this case.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

On that point, and in response to the comment made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West, although I stand to be corrected by my hon. Friend the Member for Rother Valley, I do not think that he said that undue influence was an archaic term. I think it was the word “encouraged”.

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Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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If we are going to rule out the word “encouraged” on the basis of archaism, I do not know what we are going to do with the language. It is a perfectly acceptable term. We are still governed by the Suicide Act, to which the Bill refers and in which context it is framed, so it is appropriate to remember that the Act specifically prohibits encouragement and includes pressure within that concept. The two terms co-exist in the same section of the Suicide Act, so the idea that we cannot have more than one word, and that that is somehow confusing, is wrong.

Rebecca Paul Portrait Rebecca Paul
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

In the light of my hon. Friend’s points, I have an interesting fact that he might enjoy: “encourage” was added to the Suicide Act by the last Labour Government in 2009, and replaced “aids” and “abets”, so it is not that archaic.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

My goodness, 2009 might be in the mists of history for the hon. Member for Rother Valley, but it was the last Labour Government. That is very good to know, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend.

The hon. Member for Spen Valley made the point, which is quite often made in defence of the Bill, that there is currently no framework to spot coercion, therefore the Bill creates greater protections for people. The fact is that, as the hon. Member for Bradford West said, there is no law that currently allows assisted dying, so no framework is necessary to prohibit encouragement or inducement to an assisted death—the opportunity does not exist. I think everyone must acknowledge that, if we pass the Bill, we may open up a new avenue for abuse, and it is necessary that the Bill close it off. That is right and appropriate.

Coercion and abuse no doubt go on and are tragically common, but the answer to that problem is not to legalise assisted suicide and put a regulatory framework around it with limited protections against coercion and influence. We have to deal with the terrible cancer of abuse and coercion that exists in our society, as the hon. Member for Bradford West said. If we are concerned about undue pressure in families, that should be our social mission. If we are to have an assisted dying law, let us make it as strong as possible. As I say, we are potentially opening up a new avenue for abuse within families.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

For me, the law needs to change for a number of reasons, and we will talk about some of them as Committee proceedings continue: autonomy, dignity, personal choice and bodily autonomy. In terms of this issue, we heard from families who faced police investigations as a result of a loved one taking their own life. Not only were they dealing with the trauma, grief and loss of their bereavement, but they faced often months and months of police investigation. In the oral evidence sessions, we heard from Pat Malone, who was in that situation after his brother took his own life. Surely the hon. Member has to acknowledge that that is a problem. It is not the only problem, and it is not the only reason for the Bill, but he has to acknowledge that we as legislators have a duty to correct it.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I am sure that the hon. Lady will acknowledge that those investigations will still happen, because not everybody who commits suicide will be subject to the Bill; not everybody who is terminally ill and wants to take their life with the assistance of their loved ones will be caught under it. I am sure she acknowledges that it is therefore still appropriate to have safeguards against assisted suicide outside the law—in fact, the Bill strengthens those safeguards. Those will still continue. I also regard it as appropriate and necessary to have a law against assisted suicide, for all the reasons that we have been discussing.

The hon. Lady is right that it is appropriate for Parliament or the authorities in general to ensure that cases such as those we have discussed, and that have been powerfully testified to us, are handled sensitively. In an overwhelming number of cases, the police do handle them well and sensitively. It might be that we need to improve the guidance around prosecution, and that is an important question. I certainly do not want the families of people who have taken their own lives to be harassed and chased through the courts, and I think we would all agree on that. In that respect, the guidance for the CPS and the police will always evolve.

Naz Shah Portrait Naz Shah
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The hon. Member may recall that we heard from the former head of the CPS in the oral evidence sessions, and I asked him whether the Bill would address concerns about such prosecutions. I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley that we want to address that. However, this Bill is not the route to address those issues unless they fall into that six-month bracket.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I think that is right. I do not accept the claim that this Bill is somehow a response to the problem of abuse, coercion or the pressure to end life in families. Tragically, in jurisdictions that have an assisted dying law, the number of unassisted suicides—suicides that happen outside of the law—go up, because no law can catch all the people who might want to take their own lives. Thankfully, there is no blanket support for any assisted suicide; all the jurisdictions have some restrictions.

More significantly, if the state said that some people’s lives are not worth living and that it is an acceptable choice for them to end their own life—which is not what the current law says; we have legalised suicide, not actually endorsed it—by passing a law that endorsed the choice of some people to take their own life, we would be sending a signal that we agree that some people’s lives are not worth living. The social consequence of that is clear in the evidence from other jurisdictions: suicide in the general population goes up as a result of an assisted dying law.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

On that point, the evidence does not clearly show that there is a direct relationship between those two things; there are other factors and no way of knowing that. On the concept of ending one’s own life and giving people the choice under the provisions of the Bill, what would the hon. Gentleman say to people who frame that concept very differently—as a way to shorten their death? Those terminally ill people, in my experience—I have met many of them now—do not view this as a way of ending their life, because they want to live, but the reality is that they are dying and want to take control of what their death looks like. How would he respond to that?

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Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

First, there might not be a causal link between assisted suicide laws and the increase in unassisted suicides in those places, but there is such a clear correlation that it is difficult to understand what else might be going on—unless there is something in the water in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Netherlands that is not there in other countries. It might be that those countries have such a disrespect for the frail, elderly and ill that they are taking their lives. However, I think there would be a direct social impact from the signal that this law would send into our culture, which is very concerning.

I hear the hon. Lady use that phrase quite often about people wanting to shorten their death rather than their life, but I am afraid to say that it is absolutely meaningless. We are here to make law. Death happens: you are either alive or you are dead. People might want to shorten their death, and might use that phrase, but what they are doing is shortening their life. There is no conceptual difference and certainly no legal difference between those two things. Trying to say that some people’s motivation for suicide is legitimate and some people’s is not makes no sense. This law will allow them to shorten their life and have assistance in committing suicide, and there is no other way to describe it in any terms that make sense. I do not regard the distinction that the hon. Lady makes as valid.

Our obligation to ensure that the Bill sets out what it is claimed that we all want it to do, which is to ensure that people are not pressured unduly into taking an assisted death, means that we should put that in black and white. The hon. Member for Rother Valley said that the current term is more than enough, and we had a bit of an exchange about that. I emphasise that it is a clear principle of the statutory interpretation of law that courts will look at not just the words that are in the Bill, but the words that are not. The decision to include some words and not others is regarded as significant by courts. If the term coercion is there but not influence, it is appropriate for the courts to conclude that influence was not intended by Parliament. It might be the case that the term coercion is interpreted to include influence, but if so, let us make that clear.

Sean Woodcock Portrait Sean Woodcock
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way while he is in full flow. One of the areas that I have been confused about in this debate is that the Minister said—I have no reason to dispute it—that coercion is a clear term, so the courts know where they are with it, because they are already dealing with it. However, we have also heard from proponents of the Bill that it is about making life easier for the professionals who are involved. I mention that because, overhanging all of this is the fact that the Bill as it stands—as it passed Second Reading—has a High Court judge intervention. We are told that an amendment is coming that will remove that for a potential panel of professionals—

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eighth sitting)

Danny Kruger Excerpts
None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

As I expressed before, it is for the Committee to decide. Should Members feel they have not had enough time, it is for the Committee to raise a point on that. Should people wish to have an adjourn, they could move that and the Committee would vote on it.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger (East Wiltshire) (Con)
- Hansard - -

Further to those points of order, Ms McVey. I am grateful for your guidance, and I acknowledge your point that normal process is being followed in this Committee.

Nevertheless, further to the points made by hon. Members, last night we heard through the media that a very substantial change to the Bill will be introduced. We have not yet seen those amendments proposed by the hon. Member for Spen Valley, but we look forward to doing so. This goes to the same point: we are being asked to start line-by-line scrutiny today of a Bill with a huge amount of evidence that we have not yet been able to digest. Furthermore, substantial changes to the Bill that we voted on at Second Reading are being tabled. I appreciate that the process allows amendments to be tabled at any time through the course of the Bill as long as the clause is still ahead. Nevertheless, I value your guidance on whether it might be appropriate to seek an Adjournment so that we can consider the additional evidence, but also allow the hon. Member for Spen Valley to table her amendments, which change the whole scope of the Bill as voted on at Second Reading.

None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

I thank the hon. Member for his point of order. As I said, the Committee would have to move and vote on an Adjournment. These are significant points of concern and alteration for the Bill, but that is for the Committee to decide.

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Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McVey, in this very important stage in the consideration and detailed scrutiny of the Bill.

We are discussing assisted dying for terminally ill adults who have a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life, and who have not been subjected to coercion or pressure from anybody else to do so. These are very serious matters and deserve serious consideration, which is why I was determined that this Bill should have an unprecedented level of scrutiny. We have heard from a range of over 50 witnesses with differing views on the Bill and have received written evidence from many, many more.

I am grateful to everyone who has contributed in such a thoughtful and constructive way. It has been widely remarked—and I wholeheartedly agree—that the Second Reading debate on 29 November last year, when the House approved the principle of the Bill by a majority of 55, showed Parliament at its best. I hope and believe that this Committee, as it goes through the Bill line by line, will do so in the same considered, respectful and measured manner.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I completely endorse that last point made by the hon. Lady. Does she remember how many Members on Second Reading—including, I think, herself—made reference to the judicial stage of the process and specifically to the High Court judge? Over 60 colleagues have stated on the record that they voted for the Bill on Second Reading because of that safeguard. Does she acknowledge that point?

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I do acknowledge that point—absolutely, as I have acknowledged, the role of a High Court judge is really important in this process. That role will remain with the amendment I have tabled. It will also take account of the very clear evidence we received during the oral evidence sessions from psychiatrists, social workers and other professionals who feel that they have an important role to play in this process. Indeed, I heard the hon. Gentleman say he agreed with that on the radio this morning. It is very important that we hear from those experts. There is no point in having witnesses if we do not listen to what they have to say.

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Sarah Olney Portrait Sarah Olney
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

That is an absolutely relevant point. The Mental Capacity Act was not drafted in anticipation of it ever being used for this kind of scenario. Therefore, it is really incumbent upon us to weigh very carefully whether the Mental Capacity Act is the right way of assessing people’s ability to make this decision. As I was saying, it includes the presumption of capacity, and for a decision to end one’s life, an assumption of capacity to make that decision is a low bar, and we have lots of evidence.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I am interested in that point about the Mental Capacity Act not having been written with the Bill in mind. That is absolutely true for the minds of its framers and the Parliament that passed it at the time. It is worth noting, however, that we can see from the accounts and records of the Voluntary Euthanasia Society, which became Dignity in Dying a few years later, that it was lobbying at the time covertly—or behind the scenes—for the Mental Capacity Act to be framed in exactly that way. The Voluntary Euthanasia Society was very conscious that, when the time came to pass the law for assisted suicide, it would be very helpful to have a capacity Act on the statute book that had this very low bar. The society was delighted when the Act was passed in the way that it was, and it boasted at the time of the influence it had had on the Act.

Sarah Olney Portrait Sarah Olney
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

That is a very interesting intervention. I cannot comment on that because I have no knowledge of how the Mental Capacity Act was drafted or the evidence that was taken.

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Sarah Olney Portrait Sarah Olney
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

If I may say so, the hon. Gentleman’s intervention precisely illustrates what other hon. Members were raising as points of order earlier. How can we properly scrutinise the legislation when new amendments are being tabled at the last minute that potentially change the entire nature of the legislation that we are attempting to scrutinise? It is very difficult then to speak about the amendments that have already been tabled.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

Further to that point, the hon. Lady responded to the hon. Member for Stroud, who suggested that a doctor must refer to a psychiatrist in the event of concern over capacity. There is no such obligation in the Bill. There is the opportunity to do so—the second doctor may do so, if they choose—but there is no such obligation. That is something that we could definitely improve.

The hon. Member for Stroud, who is a GP, says that it is always obvious to him when there are issues about capacity. I assume he might think the same about coercion. I wonder if the hon. Lady is aware that one in six older people are subject to abuse—elder abuse. Does she think that the hon. Member for Stroud always spots the one in six of his older patients who are subject to abuse?

None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

Order. I remind everybody to stay within the scope of what we are talking about, which is capacity.

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Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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Will the hon. Lady give way?

Marie Tidball Portrait Dr Tidball
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I will give way to the hon. Member for Richmond Park, who asked first.

Marie Tidball Portrait Dr Tidball
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for making that statement. That is not the assumption. As I will say later, the term “ableism” is very much grounded in a deficit model of disability, which assumes that somebody is not capable of doing something themselves—for instance, making important decisions—whereas the Mental Capacity Act starts from a different perspective: it presumes that the person will have the ability to do something until proven otherwise. That is why I feel that the concept of ability does not align well with what is needed in understanding and providing autonomy to people making very difficult decisions at the end of their lives.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

The hon. Lady accurately quoted clause 2(3) about a person not being considered to be terminally ill “by reason only” of having a mental disorder or a disability. That word “only” is very important, as she acknowledged. Does she recognise that that explicitly allows for somebody whose judgment might be impaired by a mental disorder still to be eligible for an assisted death, because they would still be judged to have capacity under the terms of the Mental Capacity Act? That term “only” is in fact not a safeguard; it is an access to an assisted death for somebody with impaired judgment.

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Neil Shastri-Hurst Portrait Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the hon. Member for Richmond Park for tabling the amendments. Fundamentally, I do not agree with them, but I am grateful for her good intentions. I understand the concerns that she has raised, and she makes an eloquent argument, but I fundamentally disagree.

In my view, the amendments would only lead to abandoning the well-established principles codified within the Mental Capacity Act. They would introduce a degree of woolliness and legal uncertainty by introducing of a new term that is, as yet, undefined. That would make the operability of the Bill so much harder and would move us away from the Mental Capacity Act, which has a heritage of some 20 years and is already well established in the use of advance directives around organ transplantation, the withdrawal of treatment and the decision to undergo major operations that can have life-changing or life-limiting consequences.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

My hon. Friend says that the term “ability” is not yet defined, but it is set out quite clearly in new clause 1, tabled by the hon. Member for Richmond Park. It simply says:

“The person is to be considered as having the ability to make a decision to request assistance to end their life if they can fully understand, use and weigh the relevant information”.

It uses the language of the Mental Capacity Act on understanding and weighing information. The key distinction is that it does not allow for impaired judgment; it requires somebody fully to understand the information in front of them. It is very straightforward, and I do not think that it would be difficult to apply. Does my hon. Friend recognise that the terms are pretty clearly laid out?

Neil Shastri-Hurst Portrait Dr Shastri-Hurst
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My hon. Friend makes incisive points clearly and concisely, as always, but I cannot agree. This is a short clause that is dealing with a hugely complicated issue that is presently codified within the Mental Capacity Act, which runs to some 183 pages. I do not think that it is as simple as saying that the new clause deals with the issue.

There is also the two-stage test, which determines both the functional ability to make the decision and whether that decision is impaired in any way. It would be an oversimplification to suggest that the provision as drafted would deal with those issues in a satisfactory way that would provide confidence not only—although most importantly—to those who are making a decision around an assisted death, but to the medical practitioners who are part of the process and the courts, which will have to grapple with the issues that will inevitably arise from a new definition.

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Neil Shastri-Hurst Portrait Dr Shastri-Hurst
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The hon. Member makes an interesting point, which I had already considered; in fact, I have tabled a new clause that would address it. It is not grouped with the amendments now before the Committee, but I will touch on it, if I may.

There is an argument that, if an individual with an advance directive has gone through the two-stage test in the Bill and then loses capacity, the advance directive should hold weight. My new clause 6 would deal with that point. Sections 27 to 29 of the Mental Capacity Act deal with exclusions from advance directives, including issues around voting rights, marriage rights and Mental Health Act implications. There may be a mechanism, for example, to exclude an advance directive that deals with assisted death, either through the Bill or through an amendment to the Mental Capacity Act. But I do not disagree with the hon. Lady; she raises an interesting point.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

Is my hon. Friend suggesting—I think his new clause makes it clear, and I think my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire is making the same point—that it is inappropriate for an advance directive to authorise an assisted death? The Mental Capacity Act authorises somebody to decline treatment at a future point, so my hon. Friend is acknowledging that there is a difference between the principle of declining treatment and the principle of requesting an assisted death. Given his new clause, I do not imagine that my hon. Friend thinks that we should have advance directives that authorise an assisted death. If he acknowledges that, he must recognise that there is a distinction between declining treatment and requesting an assisted death.

Neil Shastri-Hurst Portrait Dr Shastri-Hurst
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My hon. Friend makes a valid point. I have concerns about public confidence in the Bill without that additional safeguard, as this is such a consequential decision, but of course any advance directive would be predicated on having gone through those two stages first before capacity is lost. I feel that on this occasion additional tightening is necessary so that the public can be confident that a robust process has been gone through.

The MCA is a tried and tested piece of legislation used by practitioners up and down the country. The hon. Member for Stroud uses it every day in his practice; I have to say that I did not, but I was not consenting patients for surgery every day. Every time I did so, however, I had those conversations. Capacity lies on a spectrum: if I am doing major abdominal surgery, the level of capacity required to make a decision will be much greater than if I am removing a small bump or lump on an arm.

As well as having been tried and tested by medical practitioners, the MCA has been tested in the courts, as the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge said. It has been right up to the highest court in this land, it has been robustly tested and it has been found to be good legislation. The risk we now face is that it will be replaced not only with a new legal concept, but with an entirely different process for assessing capacity in this setting. Although there may be good intentions to improve the system, that will only add to the folly of it and overcomplicate the issue.

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Neil Shastri-Hurst Portrait Dr Shastri-Hurst
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The hon. Member is right: there is a huge spectrum of patients when dealing with these complex issues, and it would be absolute nonsense to arbitrarily say that anybody with depression is unable to make an informed decision on any issue. There are individuals who have mild depression—indeed, I suspect that most people with a terminal diagnosis would have some form of depression or reactive disorder, whether formally diagnosed or not, because of their circumstances. That does not mean that they are unable to make a rational, informed decision; we have to look at each patient individually. The Act is a tried and tested piece of legislation that doctors up and down the country use every day. Doctors over the road in St Tommy’s will be using it at this very moment, and they are adept at knowing and sensing when they need to escalate, whether by getting the opinion of a psychologist or a psychiatrist, because they have concerns about underlying issues. The Act is a robust piece of legislation, and we should be using it to enhance this Bill, not introducing further complexity, which will only put us into a quagmire of uncertainty.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

My hon. Friend does not want uncertainty, so perhaps he could answer this question very directly: would he be content to see somebody who is depressed, and indeed suicidal, successfully apply for an assisted death?

Neil Shastri-Hurst Portrait Dr Shastri-Hurst
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My hon. Friend puts it with his usual candour. He asked a straight question, so I will give him a straight answer: I think there is a difference between somebody who is depressed and somebody who is depressed and suicidal. I have no personal moral objections if someone who has a terminal illness, who suffers from depression and who has capacity as set out through the two-stage test in the Mental Capacity Act, ultimately wishes to end their life because of their terminal diagnosis. If they are doing it because they are suicidal as a consequence of their depression, that is a different and distinct issue. We are talking about individuals who want to end their life because of their terminal diagnosis, not because of their mental disorder.

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Daniel Francis Portrait Daniel Francis
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I welcome that commitment and look forward to that discussion in due course.

Dr Hussain went on to say:

“Ultimately, I do not think the Mental Capacity Act and safeguarding training are fit for purpose.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 199, Q260.]

Professor Owen said:

“That conveys questionable confidence in the consent processes, of which mental capacity is part, in relation to the decision to end one’s life. It is significant evidence about the confidence that is out there among experienced practitioners.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 228, Q290.]

Dr Price said:

“I…refer back to Professor Gareth Owen’s oral submission, thinking about the purpose that the Mental Capacity Act was drawn up for and the fact that decisions about the ending of life were not one of the originally designed functions of it. We would need to think carefully about how that would then translate into a decision that was specifically about the capacity to end one’s life.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 268, Q349.]

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I note the point about training, and of course we would all welcome the strongest possible training. As the hon. Gentleman implies, nobody has yet used the Mental Capacity Act to assess somebody for an assisted death; it would be completely uncharted territory for the whole system, including anybody providing training. How does he imagine that training might be designed to allow for the Mental Capacity Act to be applied in this case, when it would be completely novel?

Daniel Francis Portrait Daniel Francis
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

As I say, I am not an expert on this matter from a legal or medical background, but those are the concerns that have driven me to the place that I am in.

Dan Scorer, from Mencap—as my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley knows, I was adamant that Mencap would give evidence to us—said:

“building on the previous question about the adequacy of the Mental Capacity Act, there is a question about the adequacy of training, awareness and compliance with that Act now.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 269, Q350.]

He clearly cited what many people know occurred during covid, with “do not resuscitate” orders and decisions being made on people’s behalf. That is what has driven me to this place, and that is why I will support the amendment. I also have further amendments on this issue later on down the line.

I completely understand what my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley said about training in relation to these decisions and scenarios. At the end of life, people should have autonomy and choice, but if that comes at the price of one person, in a borderline capacity decision that is made on their behalf, it will be one death too many.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

It is a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, and I pay tribute to his powerful speech. I wish more people on our side of the debate and on the Committee had medical backgrounds, but I am glad that we have someone who has such direct personal experience of supporting people with learning disabilities. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for everything he said and I entirely agree with it.

I want to speak in support of new clause 1, tabled by the hon. Member for Richmond Park, to replace the use of the Mental Capacity Act with a new ability test. This goes to the heart of the Bill: it is absolutely crucial. Clause 3, which her new clause would replace, is in a sense the essence of the Bill. It is the shortest clause, but perhaps the most important one, because it determines the means by which somebody will be assessed to be capable of making this decision. It is a very important protection—and, at its simplest, this is a very confusing and complicated area. I will no doubt confuse myself in the course of my speech, but I have a simple observation to make, which the hon. Lady also made very well. We are dealing with the issue of impaired judgment; currently, under the Mental Capacity Act, it will be possible, through the terms of this Bill, for somebody whose judgment is impaired by virtue of a mental disability or mental illness to successfully apply for an assisted death. I do not think that is what the public want and I do not think it is what the House of Commons voted for. I think it is a misunderstanding of the principle of the Bill, which did win support on Second Reading.

The simple fact is that somebody’s judgment can be impaired under the Mental Capacity Act, but they could still have capacity. We have repeatedly heard points made about how the Mental Capacity Act applies in the normal conduct of life for disabled people—for people with mental disabilities. For instance, people can be anorexic, depressed or suicidal, and of course they can still consent to all sorts of decisions that affect their life, including medical treatments. A person can consent to have surgery on a broken leg while depressed; there is no difficulty whatever with that and of course that is appropriate. That is rightly the basis on which we currently judge capacity.

New clause 1 would build on the terms of the Mental Capacity Act. It would add to the principles of autonomy and of people being able to understand, use and weigh the relevant information. As I said in an intervention, the key point is that using this new test of ability would ensure that the person was fully able to do those things—fully able to understand, use and weigh the relevant information. In the case of impaired ability, they would not be considered to pass the test.

We hear a lot that this is the toughest Bill in the world, with the highest safeguards. It is worth pointing out that in Oregon, which this Bill is largely inspired by, there is an impaired judgment test. There is a capacity test similar to that in the Mental Capacity Act, but people are also required to demonstrate that there is no impaired judgment, and that is exactly what the hon. Lady is seeking to achieve. Her new clause would build on the terms of the Mental Capacity Act with these key principles about understanding information, but would ensure that it was a full understanding, with no impairment. It would strengthen the Bill without complicating it. In fact, it would significantly simplify it, because at the moment—this is the substantial issue with the application of the Mental Capacity Act—a huge complication is involved when we go into the forest of the MCA and try to apply it in these terms. When we try to navigate our way through the MCA in pursuit of an assisted dying application, there is a whole series of complications.

I will cite some of the evidence that we received. The Royal College of Psychiatrists, which we heard from, stated in its written evidence:

“It is the RCPsych’s view that the MCA is not sufficient for the purposes of this Bill.”

We also had evidence from King’s College London’s Complex Life and Death Decisions group, which is a group of world-leading professionals working on issues relating to the end of life. They say that use of the MCA for assisted suicide would be “an entirely novel test”. I note that the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge—and I think my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley—made the point that an “ability” test would be a novel term. I acknowledge that the term “ability” is not currently set out or recognised in law in the same way that capacity is, but as I said, it is clearly defined in new clause 1, as tabled by the hon. Member for Richmond Park. Of course it is going to be novel—we are talking about something that is entirely novel. Assisted suicide is a new measure that is being introduced, so of course we have to have a new measure by which we define who is appropriate.

Bambos Charalambous Portrait Bambos Charalambous (Southgate and Wood Green) (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am reading the text of new clause 1, and it is remarkably similar to the text of section 3(1) of the Mental Capacity Act, which says,

“For the purposes of section 2, a person is unable to make a decision for himself if he is unable—

to understand the information relevant to the decision,

to retain that information,

to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision”.

It is not a novel concept—that wording is virtually the same as in new clause 1. I do not see why we need to have the new clause or the new definition, as it is already present in the Mental Capacity Act.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

The hon. Gentleman’s intervention helps me to explain my point more clearly, which is that the new clause tabled by the hon. Member for Richmond Park builds on the terms of the Mental Capacity Act. It recognises the value of the terms, which have been well established in case law through the MCA—the ability to understand, use and weigh the relevant information.

The key difference is the word “fully”. The case law around the MCA allows for somebody to be deemed capacitous even though their judgment might be impaired. What is proposed in the new clause is the closing of that lacuna, so that it would not be possible for someone to get an assisted death if their judgment was impaired. That is the key difference.

It is also important to exclude the MCA because of the thicket of complications that it would entail. We have heard about the importance of simplification. A much simpler and better way to do the entirely novel thing that we are proposing, which is to authorise assisted suicide by the state, is to have a new definition.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

The hon. Lady does not like my terminology.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I do struggle with that terminology. This is not assisted suicide by the state. The state is not involved. It is the person making an autonomous decision based on their choice at the end of life. I will say on the record that the term “suicide” is not accurate for the cases we are talking about. The people we are dealing with are not suicidal. They very much want to live; they do not want to die, but they are dying. It is important that we have that on the record.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I think it is totally valid for us to have this argument about terminology periodically. I will repeat the point that we have made before, which is that we are actually amending the Suicide Act 1961—or rather, we are disapplying that Act—in the process set out in the hon. Lady’s Bill. There is no getting away from the fact that we are talking about assisting suicide. I am afraid that I will continue to use the term, and I hope the hon. Lady will forgive me for that.

I am arguing that the MCA is a complicating factor in the process that is being proposed for the Bill; it makes things much more difficult and complicated. The point has already been made—the hon. Member for Richmond Park put it very well—that, in the case for the MCA, a lot of weight is being put on the evidence from Sir Chris Whitty, suggesting that the MCA works very well. I point out that Sir Chris made a significant mistake in his evidence, when he said that

“the more serious the decision, the greater the level of capacity that someone needs to have.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 30, Q3.]

There is no such requirement in the Mental Capacity Act. Of course, we would hope that doctors would take a serious decision more seriously than a trivial one, but there is no such requirement. I cite Alex Ruck Keene KC, who wrote to the hon. Member for Richmond Park after his evidence session; with the greatest of respect to Chris Whitty, the fact that he got that wrong does not inspire confidence in his comments that the Mental Capacity Act is well understood by doctors throughout the country. I very much echo that. We have had so much evidence on how the Mental Capacity Act does not work well in practice that I think it was regrettable for the chief medical to have made the Panglossian observation that every doctor interprets it in exactly the same way and it works perfectly everywhere.

The Mental Capacity Act does not detect coercion. We will discuss coercion more in subsequent debates, but that Act is certainly not the safeguard against it. Professor House made some comments to us about Down’s syndrome and about diagnostic overshadowing. That is a very important concept. I am afraid to say that it is frequently the case, regarding people with severe disabilities, that capacity—or, indeed, incapacity—is not correctly observed because the medical professional will not see beyond the more presenting of their conditions. Observing capacity in someone who does have disabilities is often mistaken; it is harder than it is regarding other people.

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Lewis Atkinson Portrait Lewis Atkinson (Sunderland Central) (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Can I clarify what the hon. Member is proposing by introducing a separate test for people accessing assisted dying? Say an individual is on a respirator at the end of their life. Under what the hon. Member is proposing, if they said, “Please turn this respirator off; I want to die”, he thinks that it is appropriate for capacity to be assessed under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, but somehow he thinks that that person should have a different legal test if they said, “I want to take a drug to end my life,” knowing full well that they would have exactly the same result.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

The simple answer is yes, I do. I think it is a causatively different decision. In fact, this whole Bill entails causative differences between those decisions. I will come to that point more in a moment.

Professor Owen made an important point to us regarding capacity. He said:

“You might be talking about a kind of cognitive impairment that has not reached the threshold for a diagnosis of dementia; you might be talking about a kind of mood problem or an anxiety problem that is sub-clinical; or you might be talking about a level of intelligence that is not clinically a learning disability.”

He talked about

“pressure within a family, let us say, which is often not malign in its intentions, but it exists.”

and about situations

“where there is an impairment and also an interpersonal pressure”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 234, Q297.]

Although we are not talking at this point explicitly about coercion and family pressure, the issues around capacity and coercion are nevertheless intertwined, and it is often very difficult for doctors to determine what is really going on. Again, the challenges around capacity are intense.

The point has been made by hon. Members that under clause 9(3)(b), if the second doctor in the process is in doubt about capacity, they “may” refer the person to a psychiatrist, but the clause in fact refers to “a registered medical practitioner” who “has experience of” the assessment of capacity—so not a psychiatrist, but just someone who has experience, whatever that means, of the assessment of capacity. It is not totally obvious what that means. Amendment 365 has been tabled overnight by the hon. Member for Bath (Wera Hobhouse) which would mean that both the first and second doctor, and indeed the court, if we are allowed to have a court process, “must”—not “may”— refer the person to a psychiatrist. That is not just if they are concerned about capacity, by the way. The court, or whoever it is, must conclude that there is no

“impairment of judgment arising from a mental disorder or other condition”.

I very much welcome that amendment and I hope that we will pass that in due course.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

On that point about clause 9(3)(b), as I think was mentioned earlier, an amendment has been tabled by the hon. Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper)—an amendment that I would support and I hope the Committee will—that would indeed turn the “may” to a “must”, so that there has to be a referral to a psychiatrist if there is any doubt from either of those doctors.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

That is excellent news. For the first time so far in the course of this debate, we have a strengthening of the Bill from the hon. Member. That is great news—we can chalk that up as a victory, and as good sense breaking out. I am grateful for that. Let’s see what more we can achieve.

The point that I want to make is that we are in the foothills of understanding the effects of depression, cognitive impairment and social pressure on the decision to end life. That is a point made strongly by a series of witnesses to us in both oral and written evidence: we are still very much in the early stages of understanding how capacity interacts with mental illness, disability and coercion. Then, into the mists of vagueness, we are proposing to insert this single clunking, clumsy question: “Is there evidence of incapacity?” I strongly suggest that the abuse of the Mental Capacity Act that we are seeing here is not a way of simplifying the process of ensuring that there are a small number of strong safeguards; it is a great complication of the process and introduces more complexity, as we see from the many additional things that clinicians should consider. That is in direct contradiction to the principle of the Mental Capacity Act, which simply asks the question: “Is there capacity?”

The point has been made that there is more to the Mental Capacity Act than simply the question of capacity. There are concepts of best interests and supporting decision making. As the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge suggested, it is a cumulative process. The Mental Capacity Act entails not only the question of capacity but the consideration of best interests and whether we are supporting the decision making of an individual. I am not sure how those terms apply in a situation of assisted dying. It is not similar or comparable to the sorts of decisions that the MCA is intended to apply to.

Lewis Atkinson Portrait Lewis Atkinson
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

This touches on some of the evidence given by Mr Ruck Keene, particularly around the best interests decision. From my reading of this legislation, it is very clear that there is no possibility for someone to make a decision on behalf of or in the best interests of anyone else. As the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley mentioned earlier, there are a number of exclusions in the Mental Capacity Act. For example, someone is not able to make a best interests decision on someone getting married or adopting. Does the hon. Member agree that in order to have a guarantee, without any doubt, on the best interests point, an amendment could be included to clarify that nothing in the MCA would allow a best interests decision under this legislation?

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

That is absolutely right. I do not think best interests can apply in this case. That is why the Mental Capacity Act is being abused. As the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge said, it is supposed to be cumulative. We are supposed to consider all aspects of the Mental Capacity Act, and best interests should be part of a consideration—but how on earth does one make a best interests decision about somebody deciding to commit suicide? The hon. Gentleman is right that best interests are excluded in the Bill, so the Mental Capacity Act is not being used, except for this most basic, low-level bar to cross, which is the capacity decision.

Marie Tidball Portrait Dr Tidball
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

For clarity, I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central on what would strengthen the Bill. The exceptions only apply where the right and proper Mental Capacity Act process has been gone through and the person doing that assessment has arrived at the point that that person does not have capacity. It is only in that very narrow set of circumstances where they have determined that the person before them does not have capacity to make the decision at hand that they then go to the second look at whether making such a decision would be in the individual’s best interest. The specific exclusions listed in the MCA only apply in that stage.

What my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central is suggesting is that we table an amendment that would add to the list of specific exclusions; that would further strengthen the two stages. First, there would be the full Mental Capacity Act tests that may determine that the person does not have capacity. Such an amendment would give us belt and braces in circumstances where the person does not have capacity. Under the Bill currently, the person would fall out of scope and not be able to seek assistance if it had been determined that they did not have capacity. A belt-and-braces approach would make sure that there is no circumstance in which it could be determined by a medical practitioner or any other that it was in their best interests to follow this course of action.

Under the Bill as currently drafted, those people who have not got capacity as a result of the Mental Capacity Act would not be able to have access to the provisions in the Bill. My hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central suggests that we augment that even further so that there can be no doubt that, where it has been determined that the person does not have capacity, following the Mental Capacity Act, we should also add a very clear exception—

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Ninth sitting)

Danny Kruger Excerpts
Tuesday 11th February 2025

(1 month, 3 weeks ago)

Public Bill Committees
Read Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

Members may remove their jackets if they wish to do so. I reiterate the instruction—you will note that it is an instruction, not a request—that Members address one another through the Chair and do not, therefore, use the expression “you” when speaking. I understand we had a slight problem with that this morning.

I remind the Committee that with amendment 34 we are discussing the following:

Amendment 36, in clause 7, page 4, line 7, leave out “capacity” and insert “the ability”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1.

Amendment 37, in clause 8, page 4, line 34, leave out “capacity” and insert “the ability”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1.

Amendment 38, in clause 9, page 6, line 27, leave out “capacity” and insert “ability”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1.

Amendment 202, in clause 9, page 6, line 31, leave out “capability” and insert “capacity”.

This amendment corrects a typographical error.

Amendment 39, in clause 9, page 6, line 31, leave out “capability” and insert “ability”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1.

Amendment 40, in clause 12, page 8, line 2, leave out “capacity” and insert “the ability”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1.

Amendment 41, in clause 13, page 9, line 31, leave out “capacity” and insert “ability”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1.

Amendment 42, in clause 18, page 12, line 23, leave out “capacity” and insert “the ability”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1.

Amendment 43, in clause 30, page 18, line 16, leave out “capacity” and insert “the ability”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1.

Amendment 44, in clause 40, page 23, line 26, leave out from “capacity” and insert “ability”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1.

New clause 1—Ability to make decision

“The person is to be considered as having the ability to make a decision to request assistance to end their life if they can fully understand, use and weigh the relevant information in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State under affirmative resolution.”

This new clause defines the concept of ability which is intended to replace the concept of capacity. This new clause is intended to replace Clause 3.

Amendment 45, in schedule 2, page 26, line 36, leave out “capacity” and insert

“the ability to make a decision”.

Amendment 46, in schedule 3, page 28, line 1, leave out “capacity” and insert

“the ability to make a decision”.

Amendment 47, in schedule 5, page 30, line 14, leave out “capacity” and insert

“the ability to make a decision”.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger (East Wiltshire) (Con)
- Hansard - -

Before the break, the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge gave a helpful account of the operation of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, with particular reference to the concept of “best interests” that applies in that Act. She explained that the best interests consideration kicks in only once the capacity test has been failed—once it has been concluded that someone does not have capacity. Therefore, there would be no best interests consideration in the case of assisted dying. Either a person has capacity and that is that—a rather low bar, which is, as we have discussed, appropriate for buying a cup of coffee, is got over, and they are off to the assisted dying commission, or whatever process we eventually try to set up—or they do not have capacity and are ejected from the system, and there is no best interests consideration.

I reference that because my whole point is that the Bill does not use the Mental Capacity Act; it just uses the definition of capacity that is in it, and that definition is very weak. It is designed to assume capacity in the patient and, as we discussed earlier today, it can include somebody who has impaired judgment—they could be depressed or even suicidal. Indeed, my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley said earlier, very honestly, that he would be content with somebody who had depression accessing assisted suicide, as would be possible under the legislation.

The point is that once the test of capacity has been passed, there is no best interests consideration. It is a great abuse of the Mental Capacity Act, the whole purpose of which is concern for the vulnerable, for that purpose to be ignored once the usefulness of the Act has been fulfilled. This Bill does violence to the Mental Capacity Act in using it for this purpose. The fact is that that Act was designed for the opposite situation: to protect people from having things done to them.

I will conclude shortly, Sir Roger, but that brings me to the point we have discussed at length already today: the crucial question of whether the decision to have an assisted death is different from the decision to decline or to cease treatment. I start by pointing out that case law specifies that to decline treatment is not to commit suicide —I recognise that the hon. Member for Spen Valley does not like the term suicide, and I apologise, but we are using legal terms here. The fact is that there is a distinction in law between the act of suicide and the decision to decline treatment.

I refer in particular to the famous case of Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland in 1993, and quote Lord Goff, of the House of Lords, who said that

“in cases of this kind, there is no question of the patient having committed suicide, nor therefore of the doctor having aided or abetted him in doing so. It is simply that the patient has, as he is entitled to do, declined to consent to treatment which might or would have the effect of prolonging his life, and the doctor has, in accordance with his duty, complied with his patient’s wishes.”

I also quote Sir Thomas Bingham, as he then was, who said that in the case of Tony Bland it was plainly not suicide, and that

“it was not the discontinuance of artificial feeding but the patient’s condition and its underlying cause which caused his death”.

In the withdrawal of treatment, it is not the act of withdrawing treatment that kills someone, but their disease, or the condition they have, whereas in assisted suicide it is the act that kills them. That is a crucial distinction, and that distinction is apparent. We heard it this morning in remarks from my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley and my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire, and I think from the hon. Member for Spen Valley, who pointed out that there is a difference between the two cases, as is evident with respect to advanced directives that allow for the withdrawal of treatment. They do not allow for the active administration of treatment; they allow for the withdrawal of treatment. They would not allow for assisted dying, as the hon. Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire accurately said.

This goes to the heart of the matter. There is a difference between being left alone and demanding that something is done to us. The state protects our right to be left alone. It does not yet give us the right to have something done to us simply because we asked for it.

Rachel Hopkins Portrait Rachel Hopkins (Luton South and South Bedfordshire) (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The proposal in the Bill is not about someone doing something to someone: it is about self-administration and someone being able to do something to themselves. The point is about the choice to do that.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I recognise that, and that the Bill makes a distinction in respect of euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide, which would be the doctor doing it to us. The Bill specifies that the drugs must be self-administered. I do not understand the logic of that distinction, but I recognise that there is an attempt to make the Bill more palatable and that the distinction has been preserved. Nevertheless, the Bill would enable a doctor to prescribe lethal drugs with the purpose of ending a life. That is an act that is performed: a person is prescribed drugs to end their life. Whether they take the pills or press the syringe themselves, the act has been performed, and the prescribed drugs kill the person.

Kit Malthouse Portrait Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My hon. Friend will recall the evidence from Professor Hoyano, who said she could not legally see the distinction between a doctor handing the pills to somebody to take themselves and the doctor pulling the plug out of the wall to turn off the ventilator or whatever machine might be keeping the person alive. Both of them are an act by a doctor at the request of the patient to foreshorten their death and avoid whatever they contemplate at the end.

I realise we are dealing with semantics here. We might have an irreconcilable difference about such an act, but I have to say that from the point of view of a patient—the person approaching their death—those two acts seem to be broadly the same. In both circumstances I am requesting that a doctor do something to hasten my death, because I do not wish to continue living in the circumstances presented to me.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

My right hon. Friend articulates the point well. I do not think it is a semantic decision: there is a real distinction. The fact is that unplugging the ventilator leads to death, but what kills the patient is not the administration of any treatment or drugs that have been provided. The patient dies naturally, whereas the administration of drugs designed to kill them is a qualitatively different event. I agree that of course the ultimate effect is the same, but the act that is performed is qualitatively different, and indeed the intention of the doctor is different.

Kit Malthouse Portrait Kit Malthouse
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Forgive me, but surely the whole point of what we are trying to do here is to give people the opportunity to avoid the natural death that is presented to them. We hear again and again, and we heard it from the families who gave evidence, that people profoundly wished to avoid their natural end because it was going to be degrading, unpleasant and profoundly painful on every level. That is the whole purpose of the act. To say that we should avoid that issue seems to me to negate our whole reason for being here.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

We are trying to avoid suffering, pain and bad deaths. We all share that view. Indeed, later amendments look explicitly at the purpose of an assisted death and the question of the avoidance of pain. I am simply making the important distinction between the decision to withdraw treatment and the decision to administer fatal drugs, which, as I say, are qualitatively different—different in principle and different in practice.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

To build on the point made by the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire, this is the heart of the issue. You are right that they are slightly different things.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Sorry, Sir Roger. The hon. Member is correct. It gets to the heart of whether we think this is the right thing to do. The Bill Committee’s job is to put that decision back to the House. It is not for us to decide today; it is for us to have the discussion about how we can improve the Bill and send it back to the House.

The hon. Member is absolutely right to say that it gets to the heart of the issue. I think dying people should be given that choice. In the same way that they are given the choice to have treatment withdrawn or the machine turned off, they should be given the choice to take control and to have the autonomy and dignity that assisted death will provide.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

The hon. Lady has expressed very well her whole purpose for the Bill. In a sense, all the debates we are having about safeguards, protections, process and eligibility are secondary to her purpose, which is to give autonomy to patients. One has to ask about the purpose of the safeguards, particularly the one on people having to administer the drugs themselves. In all jurisdictions where physician-assisted suicide is legal, that is the option that people overwhelmingly opt for—I certainly would if I were in that situation.

The hon. Lady is right, and that is what she is trying to do: she simply wants the Bill to go through. I take strong issue with her implied point that our purpose here is simply to work out the Bill’s implementation. We are looking at each clause, line by line, to decide whether it is safe or not. As she said herself at the time, the decision on Second Reading was a vote in principle to continue the discussion, which is what we are doing now. We are closely and minutely examining whether every clause is safe.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

On that point, it is not an either/or. It is not just about passing legislation that improves choice and gives autonomy and dignity to dying people, and indeed fixes the current failings of the law as it stands, as we have discussed in great detail. It is about providing safeguards that make sure that is done safely, securely and robustly, and that address the issues and concerns we are discussing. It is not an either/or and it is important to make that distinction.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I am happy to give way to the hon. Lady.

None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

Order. You cannot intervene on an intervention. Let us be absolutely clear about that. The hon. Lady was intervening on the hon. Gentleman who has the floor. If he now wishes to give way, he may do so.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

If the hon. Lady would like to intervene on me, I would be happy to give way.

Juliet Campbell Portrait Juliet Campbell
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

To go back to the amendment, we were talking about the Mental Capacity Act. The use of that Act must be drawn into question, because it was never intended as legislation for assisted dying. Much of what has been said in favour of using the MCA relates to it being tried and tested, and people understanding it, and the idea that to use anything else would make life complicated for professionals who use it as part of their day-to-day activities when assessing capacity.

On the surface, those reasons seem reasonable, and it is an easy option. However, if the MCA does not meet the threshold of meeting the needs of everyone, convenience should not be the deciding factor. Convenience cannot be considered as a sufficient reason to use the MCA as a fundamental element of the Bill. The assisted dying Bill in itself is enough reason to have an alternative measure to determine an individual’s eligibility to be considered for assisted dying.

None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

Order. I am going to have to draw the hon. Lady to order. An intervention is an intervention. I accept that we have slightly more flexibility in Committee than we do on the Floor of the House, but the hon Lady, and indeed all hon. Members, have to understand that speeches are speeches and interventions are interventions. That said, it is the job of the Chair to make absolutely certain that every Member has the right and the opportunity to speak. If the hon. Lady wishes to make a speech, that is entirely within her right: all she has to do is indicate to the Chair that she would like to be called and she will get called.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I am grateful to the hon. Lady; her points are absolutely right. Even if the House concludes that the overall principle is right, as the hon. Member for Spen Valley suggested, if it is not possible to do it safely, we should not do it at all. My great concern is that proceeding with the use of the Mental Capacity Act as it currently stands in the Bill will make the Bill dangerous.

Let me conclude my point about the difference between assisted dying and the withdrawing of treatment. To decline treatment is to assent to nature; it is to let one’s body do what it will. To commit suicide is to contradict nature; it is to do something to one’s body that interrupts its own plans. I recognise that the outcome is the same —it is death—but we are considering the process of decision making in the clause, and the decision is fundamentally different.

--- Later in debate ---
Naz Shah Portrait Naz Shah
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My hon. Friend is not wrong, in so far as there can be two truths. There is a truth, for me, that the Mental Capacity Act does not deliver what we need it to deliver, and that is the concern we have heard from people who have given us evidence. We have not talked about the word “ability”—as hon. Members have pointed out, it is not set out in law—so there is a conversation to be had.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, the promoter of the Bill, clearly stated, this is about strengthening the Bill and bringing the best Bill to Parliament to give people a choice. That is what this is about.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

The hon. Member is making such an important speech, and I am very grateful to her. This is a crucial discussion. The hon. Member for Ipswich suggested that the amendment would make things worse because it would apply a new test.

Jack Abbott Portrait Jack Abbott
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I was just following the argument.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I respect that. The hon. Gentleman is suggesting that there would be a new test, but it is for a new situation. I want to alert the Committee to the purpose behind this amendment. I understand that we are in a slightly polarised discussion. The hon. Member for Bradford West and I both voted against the Bill on Second Reading, and it is not likely that we will ever support it. Nevertheless, I encourage hon. Members to consider that the amendment, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Richmond Park, who is not opposed to assisted dying in principle, is genuinely trying to ensure that the Bill is as safe as it can be. All that has been proposed, as the hon. Member for Bradford West suggests, is a strengthening and a recognition of the importance of the principles of the Mental Capacity Act, without the—

--- Later in debate ---
On resuming
Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I will conclude my intervention very quickly. I fear that I may have mischaracterised the hon. Member for Bradford West when I said that she is opposed to the Bill in principle; in fact, I do not think that is the case. I am not sure what the difference is between opposition in principle and opposition to the detail, but I recognise that she is certainly not opposed to the Bill in principle, so I apologise to her.

Does the hon. Lady agree that the Bill would take a great leap in the dark by legalising assisted dying? At the moment, that leap lands on the uneven ground of the Mental Capacity Act. Does she agree that, if we want to do this properly, we should prepare a solid, cushioned, safe landing space that is appropriate for the Bill, rather than the inappropriate mess that the Mental Capacity Act would induce?

Naz Shah Portrait Naz Shah
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his correction. To clarify, I do not think anybody in this House disagrees in principle with the idea of not letting people suffer. I am very much about principle, and I came to this Committee very much in that spirit. When I was asked to join this Committee, I had to sleep on it, and I now realise why.

I am grateful for the interventions from my hon. Friends the Members for Rother Valley and for Ipswich. There are a couple of things that are important for us to understand. The Mental Capacity Act has not been tried in any of the other jurisdictions across the world on which we are basing this law, so we cannot make a comparison.

On the issue of whether it is either/or—whether it is the Mental Capacity Act or the word “ability”—the Secretary of State has the power to change that. If we are to be true to the spirit in which we have come to this debate to make the Bill as safe as possible, given that so many psychiatrists and experts have said that they are not convinced that the Mental Capacity Act is fit for purpose in this regard, surely it is incumbent on us to make that case.

--- Later in debate ---
Kit Malthouse Portrait Kit Malthouse
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

If the hon. Lady goes to column 277 of Hansard from that oral evidence session, Dr Price said:

“You are equating a refusal of treatment, in capacity terms, to hastening death by assisted dying. If those two things are equated, in terms of the gravity and the quality of the decision, the Mental Capacity Act may well be sufficient, but there are differences. There are differences in the information that the person would need and what they would need to understand.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 277, Q361.]

It is clear what Dr Price said. To be honest, the question was partly prompted as we had become a little confused, because the whole practice of psychiatry in the UK is founded on the Act at the moment. She seemed to be implying that somehow the entire practice of psychiatry in the UK was on unstable ground—and I do not think anybody is claiming that.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

rose—

Naz Shah Portrait Naz Shah
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I will take this intervention and then address both points.

--- Later in debate ---
Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

It is interesting that my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire has cited that, and I will look at Hansard. However, what I just heard him say, quoting the doctor from the Royal College, was that if we equate the gravity of the cases, it would be appropriate. That is the equivalent of saying that if the two cases are the same, the mechanism can be the same.

Crucially, I do not believe that the Royal College does equate the gravity of the two cases. Its written evidence states that while

“a person’s capacity to decide treatment can be reliably assessed, an assessment of a person’s mental capacity to decide to end their own life is an entirely different and more complex determination requiring a higher level of understanding.”

It regards the two cases as different in principle and therefore requiring different tests.

--- Later in debate ---
Stephen Kinnock Portrait Stephen Kinnock
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the right hon. Member for her intervention. We have had a conversation about the need to ensure that the impact assessment has a clear and specific focus on the impact in Wales. I can absolutely assure her that either there will be a separate impact assessment for Wales, or we will ensure that the impact assessment that we produce is absolutely clear in terms of the impact that it will have in Wales; it will be one of those two.

Personally, I am agnostic as to which of those it is. It is simply a question of what works best given the highly integrated nature of the conversation because the criminal justice aspects of it are a reserved competence, while health and care are a devolved competence. What is the best way to present that—having a single document or two separate documents? I am not entirely clear, but I have undertaken to check the matter with officials. I will get back to the right hon. Lady as soon as possible on that point.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I am very puzzled, on two grounds. The first is about the impact assessment. I simply do not understand the argument that the Government have to wait until the end of the Committee stage before they can have a view on the Bill and present it for Report. The fact is that the Bill could change again on Report, and the impact assessment would have to be updated further. Why on earth do we not have an impact assessment, which could advise the members of the Committee and the Government themselves on the appropriateness of the measures?

That brings me to my second point of confusion: I simply do not understand what on earth the Minister means when he says that he is neutral about the clauses. He has just given the view, from his position, that he objects to the amendment and that he supports the use of the Mental Capacity Act. He is basing his view— I had understood that, as a neutral member of the Committee, he was not going to express one—on something. What is he basing it on? Secondly, how can he express a view when he is supposed to be neutral?

--- Later in debate ---

Division 2

Ayes: 8

Noes: 15

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

On a point of order, Sir Roger. I wonder whether you can advise me. I am perplexed about the position of the Government Ministers. It is an absolute pleasure to have them here, but I am confused by this Jekyll and Hyde character. They seem to have two personalities on the Committee, voting as private Members but speaking as Ministers. I wonder whether there is any precedent for that in any private Member’s Bill, or indeed any Bill, and whether Parliament admits the split personas that they have.

I totally understand the rationale for having Government Ministers here. It makes me query the whole concept of this being entirely a private Member’s Bill, but I recognise the role of the Government in it. However, if the Government want Ministers present at this Committee, there are Standing Orders that enable Law Officers to attend in their official capacity but not vote. That seems to me to be the appropriate way in which Ministers should be represented here. If they want to speak on the appropriateness of particular measures in terms of Government policy and applicability, that is perfectly appropriate, but I do not understand why they are also voting on this amendment in their capacity as private Members. I wonder whether you can advise me, Sir Roger.

None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

Happily, that is not a matter for the Chair. However, let me make it clear that the two Ministers present are members of the Committee in their own right as Members of Parliament and are therefore permitted to speak and vote, as are all other Committee members. Were any Minister to feel that there was a conflict between their personal view and the view that the Government wish to express, my understanding is that that would be a matter for discussion between that Minister and the Government. More than that I am afraid I cannot offer.

--- Later in debate ---
None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

We will take it when we get to it. Thank you for raising that point, because this is a learning process for a lot of people. We decide on the amendment that is moved; we will then decide on any further amendments, if any Member wishes to propose them, in the order in which they appear in the Bill. In this case, that is not yet.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I beg to move amendment 353, in clause 1, page 1, line 12, at end insert

“, and

(e) is not a prisoner”.

This amendment makes prisoners ineligible for assisted dying.

None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 356, in clause 1, page 1, line 12, at end insert

“, and

(e) is not homeless within the meaning of section 175 of the Housing Act 1996 (Homelessness and threatened homelessness).”

Amendment 354, in clause 7, page 4, line 12, at end insert—

“(ea) is not a prisoner,”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 353.

Amendment 357, in clause 7, page 4, line 12, at end insert—

“(ea) is not homeless within the meaning of section 175 of the Housing Act 1996 (Homelessness and threatened homelessness).”

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 356.

Amendment 355, in clause 12, page 8, line 9, at end insert—

“(fa) the person is not a prisoner”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 353.

Amendment 358, in clause 12, page 8, line 9, at end insert—

“(fa) the person is not homeless within the meaning of section 175 of the Housing Act 1996 (Homelessness and threatened homelessness).”

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 356.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

Me again, I’m afraid. The amendments in my name would exclude from eligibility people who are in prison and people who are classified as homeless. In this debate and in our evidence sessions, we have heard it said quite a lot that most people who opt for an assisted death in countries that have it are advantaged—they are middle-class, in our idiom—but the plan is to offer it to everybody; it would be a universal right. My amendments would address some of the most disadvantaged people in our country.

I have had a very privileged life, but for 20 years I have run a charity working in London prisons; I spent about 10 years as full-time chief executive and have spent another 10 years as chairman. I have known hundreds of prisoners and ex-offenders, and I still do. Although I firmly believe in criminal justice—indeed, I think we need to be tougher on certain categories of offender—I recognise from my personal experience the dignity in all prisoners and the absolute necessity of respecting their dignity. In fact, I once wrote a speech for a Conservative leader of yesteryear that made some of those points and got headlined “Hug a hoodie”.

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Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Did the polling ask people’s view on whether terminally ill homeless people should have access to assisted dying, or on whether it should be offered to homeless people just for being homeless? That would seem very strange.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

The hon. Lady might well be right. I totally take that point. I dare say it is people who are homeless. I think the question put was, “Should those who are homeless simply be able to ask for assisted dying?” People in this country say no. In Canada, asked the same question, a quarter of people say yes. The effect of the law has been to institute this principle of assisted dying being an acceptable choice under any circumstances, which is indeed, I am afraid, what happens.

I will end with a powerful quote from Fazilet Hadi, who spoke to us representing disabled people. She said:

“This Bill is not an abstract exercise; it will land in a society that is rife with inequality.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 185, Q242.]

She said that the society the Bill will land in is the thing that needs to change, not the Bill. She thinks we need to change our society before we do anything like introducing assisted dying. I agree.

Kit Malthouse Portrait Kit Malthouse
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I should start by recognising that my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire, who is my constituency neighbour, has devoted much of his adult life to public service. He should know that I have always admired him for that, and particularly for his work with the vulnerable and underprivileged in prisons. As he knows, I have spent much of my time in politics working with a similar population, so, like him, I understand their particular vulnerabilities. However, I oppose his amendments, and I hope he will bear with me while I enumerate why.

I believe that there are some definitional problems with the amendments, as well as some quite serious moral and ethical problems, and they compound into a practical difficulty. The first definitional one is who exactly my hon. Friend means by “prisoners”. As he knows, not all prisoners are the same. Would he seek to deny assisted dying to prisoners on remand who have yet to be found guilty of a crime but are being held in advance of the criminal justice process? Would he deny assisted dying—which will be available to everybody else if the Bill passes—to people who are held in prison for not paying their council tax, for example, or for contempt of court? There is a variety of vulnerability in the criminal justice system, and prisoners are inside for different lengths of time and in different institutions. Quite a lot of white-collar criminals go to open prisons, for example. Would he seek to deny them?

To me, if my hon. Friend’s objective is to protect vulnerable prisoners, the definition that he is using is far too wide. There are many people who may well find themselves in extremis while they are in prison and are likely to be released at some point, after a short sentence or because of the nature of their sentence, who would therefore have their ability to access assisted dying foreshortened.

Similarly, when my hon. Friend speaks of homeless people and uses the definition in the Housing Act 1996, I think he actually means rough sleepers. The definition of homelessness that he referred to includes people who are staying with friends, people who are moving between homes and people who are likely to become homeless at some point in the future. It is a very wide definition, which covers a large number of people, some of whom would not necessarily be classified as vulnerable and may well be assessed as perfectly capable and have the capacity to make this decision. So my first point is that there is a definitional problem with the broad terms that my hon. Friend has chosen.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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I accept those points. Nevertheless, the Bill itself has broad definitions and large exclusions—people who have more than a six-month prognosis, and so on. The Bill, I am afraid, operates in pretty broad brush strokes in order to try to defend large categories of people, so I think it is appropriate to exclude all people who are currently incarcerated—people who are in prison—whatever the reason or the length of their sentence, until they are released, and then they can start the process if they wish to and if they qualify.

On homelessness, yes, we should use the official definition of homelessness, which basically means “in precarious housing”. The purpose of the Bill is to enable people who have full autonomy to make a decision in their own best interest. I think it is legitimate to ask whether people who are living in insecure accommodation, whose lives are in flux, who are experiencing extreme precariousness in their lives, should meet the appropriate criteria for autonomy that we wish to set out.

Kit Malthouse Portrait Kit Malthouse
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I was about to come on to the fact that those questions would indeed be asked through the assessment that takes place. As my hon. Friend knows—we have had a long discussion about it—the Mental Capacity Act relies to a certain extent on context to assess capacity.

Turning to my hon. Friend’s point on prisoners, this may come as a surprise to him, but some people who are held on remand are found innocent and are released from prison. During their period on remand, which could be quite lengthy, they would be denied access to something they would not otherwise be denied access to.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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My objection is not on the basis of criminality, innocence or guilt. I would not deny criminals this right because they are criminals. I would deny them what I regard as a dangerous opportunity because they are vulnerable. Whether guilty or not, whether they are on remand or not, they are in an equally precarious position and equally vulnerable, and that is why they should be excluded.

Kit Malthouse Portrait Kit Malthouse
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I understand my hon. Friend’s point, but we are talking about people who do not have much time. We have to remember throughout this debate that we are talking about people who have limited time; they have been diagnosed, and their prognosis is six months or less. In fact, the experience from overseas is that quite a lot of people come to assisted dying beyond six months. We are operating on the basis that suddenly everybody at six months decides they are going to apply for it. Quite a lot apply with just days or weeks to go; time is therefore important to them, and so it should be to us. I am concerned that the definitions interfere with that.

Secondly, there is a distinct moral issue about the denial of services, particularly medical services, to groups of individuals based on their circumstances. We do not currently do that. We do not deny medical services to prisoners because they are prisoners. We believe it is a sign of a civilised society that they access the same healthcare as everybody else through our national health service. The same is true of those homeless groups. That includes allowing them to make the kind of decisions that we have talked about in the previous debate: decisions about life-threatening surgery and about the continuation of their life. It is certainly the case, as my hon. Friend will know from his work in prisons, that a number of prisons have developed hospice facilities within the prison to deal with end-of-life issues. Indeed those that do not have hospice care work closely with NHS palliative care outside and very often bring in specialists to deal with end-of-life issues in the prison.

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Kit Malthouse Portrait Kit Malthouse
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I would certainly concede that; absolutely, I agree. The whole purpose of the safeguards in the Bill is to protect those who would be vulnerable, to ensure they have the capacity to make the decisions they want to make, and to ensure that they are making them for the right reasons. However, I think a lot of people would find it unfair and immoral that they were excluded not because of their own sense of themselves and their ability and capacity but simply because of their circumstances. As I am trying to point out, those who are homeless or prisoners in the widest definition of those words can find their circumstances changing quite significantly within the timeframe of six months. Given that they have only got six months under this Bill, we should not interfere with that and say, “Well, you are in; you are out.”

This may seem like a narrow example, but imagine that somebody diagnosed with a progressive disease were to commit a criminal act and end up going to prison, and during their time in prison, they reach the six-month period. Are they to be denied assisted dying if it is available to everybody else in the population? To me, that would not seem morally right, particularly given that we have a duty to deliver, and we do deliver, end-of-life services to them in the prison to help them cope with those circumstances. As my hon. Friend will know, there are charities which provide end-of-life care in prison as well.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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In the circumstances my right hon. Friend is describing, the prisoner would be eligible for the compassionate release scheme.

Kit Malthouse Portrait Kit Malthouse
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

They would, yes.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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That is what I hope would happen if it was necessary for the prisoner to be released in order to avail himself of opportunities on the outside. If he is terminally ill, that is what should happen.

Kit Malthouse Portrait Kit Malthouse
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am very pleased my hon. Friend raised that issue, because I was about to come to the practical difficulties that this presents, for exactly that reason. As he rightly pointed out, for a large number of prisoners, subject to assessment of the safety of the public, if they contract a terminal disease in prison, as they reach the end of their life, they qualify for compassionate early release. Often, that is within weeks of their death—naturally, as one would expect. It is carefully reviewed by prison governors and, I think, has to be signed off by the Secretary of State, as a final control. The problem with denying them the services while they are in prison is that if they are eventually compassionately released, they may have only a matter of weeks or days to go through what will be quite an onerous process to avoid a horrible death.

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Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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rose

Naz Shah Portrait Naz Shah
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I give way to the hon. Gentleman first.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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On the point of legality, of course a law could be challenged under the European convention on human rights, but Parliament is sovereign. If Parliament decides to exclude a particular category, we in this place have to take this enormous responsibility—we make the law in this country.

Naz Shah Portrait Naz Shah
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I give way to my hon. Friend.

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Naz Shah Portrait Naz Shah
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I do not have any comparable situations; this is uncharted territory.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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Prisoners are denied their liberty, not just their vote. They are treated as a single class of people who the state has specific responsibilities for, because it essentially owns them for the time that they are incarcerated. Prisoners have particular protections, but they are also denied a whole range of human rights and opportunities that the rest of society can have. It is not inappropriate to treat prisoners as a distinct class of people to whom the state has a specific responsibility.

Naz Shah Portrait Naz Shah
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The hon. Gentleman clearly has more recent experience of prisons than I have—thankfully. In closing, I will be supporting his amendments to protect people who are vulnerable in prison and people who are homeless.

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Stephen Kinnock Portrait Stephen Kinnock
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I apologise; I think I misunderstood the intervention of my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West, so my comments were not clear. I meant the treatment of this matter under the law. As I said, the justification test requires that the treatment in question is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. That means the way in which the matter is treated under the law. That is what I meant; I think we got our wires crossed.

Finally, let me address amendments 356, 357 and 358, whose purpose is to exclude those who are homeless within the meaning of section 175 of the Housing Act 1996 from the definition of a “terminally ill person”. The effect of amendment 356 would be to amend the definition of a “terminally ill person”, as set out in clause 1 of the Bill, to expressly exclude a person who, notwithstanding that they met all the other requirements set out in paragraphs (a) to (d) of subsection (1), was homeless within the meaning of section 175 of the Housing Act 1996.

Amendments 357 and 358 seek to make consequential amendments to clause 7 on the first doctor’s assessment and clause 12 on court approval. These amendments would require the co-ordinating doctor and the court to be satisfied that, in their opinion, the person was not homeless within the meaning of section 175 of the Housing Act 1996 before making their statement or declaration to allow the person to proceed to the next stage of the assisted dying process.

Article 14 states that the rights set out in the ECHR should be secured for everyone without discrimination on any ground. This amendment engages article 8 on the right to respect for private and family life. Making those who are homeless ineligible for assisted dying would lead to a difference in treatment that will need to be objectively and reasonably justified. The justification test requires that the treatment in question is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.

I hope these observations may be helpful to Members in considering these amendments and making a determination about who should be eligible for accessing assisted dying services, should the Bill pass.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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What an interesting debate—I am grateful to all hon. Members who participated.

I am interested in what the Minister was saying about the ECHR. Notwithstanding my general point about the sovereignty of Parliament, when Lord Sumption gave evidence to the Committee two weeks ago, he stressed the wide margin of appreciation given to member states on the ECHR. Does the Minister think that that will apply in this case to ensure that the British Parliament could vote to exclude these categories of people? If his view is that the Bill could be subject to challenges on discrimination grounds, however, particularly under article 14, I think we will have a lot of problems in applying the Bill. I wonder whether, in due course, we will be able to tease out how the ECHR will intersect with the Bill.

As the Minister says, the crucial point is that any discrimination must be justified on the basis of achieving a legitimate and proportionate aim. My suggestion is that there is an absolutely legitimate aim, and that this is a proportionate means of achieving it.

The debate got quite philosophical, which I found very interesting. I observe that my constituency neighbour, esteemed colleague and great Conservative, my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire, has a vision of our particular political creed that is entirely individualistic. He stresses the absolute importance of individual autonomy, treating everybody as an individual without reference to the context in which they live. I suggest to him, and to the Committee, that our freedom and autonomy depend on our relationships. Our autonomy proceeds from our socialisation. We do not emerge fully formed into the world with all our values and attributes; we acquire them by virtue of the people around us.

The crucial thing about the prison experience is that it disrupts the relationships that can make an individual genuinely free. Homelessness does likewise, and it sets up all sorts of new relationships and new socialisations that can often be very negative.

Kit Malthouse Portrait Kit Malthouse
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s kind words, but he will know that the foundation of our beliefs stretches from Magna Carta through to Mill and is based on a legal notion that I am to a certain extent my own island—that I have autonomy over myself. From habeas corpus to making decisions about my own medical treatment, I should have rights. That is not to say that my decision-making capacity should not be assessed within the context in which I live.

What I was trying to communicate to my hon. Friend and his supporters in respect of this amendment is that I think it profoundly wrong to paint all prisoners with the same brush and see them as a homogeneous whole, rather than seeing them for the individuals they are, specifically when they are taking a very individual, personal and private decision about their own life and death.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
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I trace our liberties to an evolution of British law, and of English law, that recognises the essential nature of our individuality as being socialised. We belong to one another and we derive our freedom from other people. Our autonomy, Magna Carta and all the liberties of the individual proceed from that. None of us, no man, is an island. That is what I suggest to my right hon. Friend. His point was about treating everybody as solitary individuals, making independent private decisions. That is not the way any of us operate; it is certainly not the way people in the most vulnerable circumstances operate. What actually happens is that we are heavily influenced by the people around us, by our circumstances and by the choices before us.

To descend from the abstract, let us consider an actual case, albeit a hypothetical one. Someone is in prison. They have committed some crime, or they have not committed a crime but have been remanded. Their whole family life has been smashed to pieces over the years, or just recently. They then get the terrible diagnosis of a terminal illness. A doctor says to them, because they are allowed to do so under the Bill, “You know, one of your options is an assisted death.” I think that that would be incredibly influential, to the point of serious concern, for those of us who know how vulnerable people in prison are. The same applies to people living on the streets, the people my right hon. Friend was describing.

Sean Woodcock Portrait Sean Woodcock
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I believe that what the hon. Member has just espoused, and what has prompted this amendment, is the sort of thing that would have come out if we had had an impact assessment. If this were a Government Bill, some sort of consultation would have flagged up the potential issues ahead of the next stage. I believe that that is the exercise in which he is engaged. We have been promised a Bill with the strongest possible safeguards. He comes from a position similar to mine, which is that there is no stronger safeguard than preventing people from having assisted dying. I believe—I am happy to be corrected—that what he is trying to do in the absence of that is flag up potential issues that mean that more safeguards are needed than are being offered in this Bill. Is he prepared to comment on that?

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. Once again, it is a shame that we are feeling our way in the absence of that assessment. Nevertheless, I think we all have experience and we can draw on the evidence. The hon. Member for Bradford West made a very powerful point, and she was absolutely right. I spoke earlier about the evidence on suicide among the male prison population; I have experience of working with women in prison as well. There is a genuine danger of chronic, almost epidemic, self-harm among the female prison population. Likewise—this is a fact that we need to bear in mind throughout the debate—suicide is itself contagious. That is why it is so important to discuss it in a responsible way. The option—I use the term advisedly—of assisted suicide is itself dangerous in the context of a prison population in which these ideas are contagious.

My right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire talks about the need to assess each case on its own merits, individually. I recognise that, and in principle of course that is what we should be doing. Nevertheless, that assumes that the safeguards in the Bill are adequate to the challenge of dealing with people in such particularly vulnerable circumstances. I am concerned that they are not adequate anyway. I believe very strongly that they are not appropriate to people in these circumstances and that therefore it is appropriate to have what he calls a blanket ban.

As I said in an intervention earlier, we have to treat particular classes of people in the same way. We do that all the time, with respect specifically to the prison population. The fact is that we have to draw the line somewhere. We are drawing the line in all sorts of places in this Bill—around the age limit and around diagnosis and prognosis. I think it would be very appropriate, given the extreme vulnerability of these populations, to draw it around them and protect them from the vulnerabilities and dangers that I think all Members recognise might apply in certain circumstances. They will apply in heightened likelihood to these populations.

I do not propose to press these amendments to a vote, but I am grateful to hon. Members for the points that they have made, and I hope that the concerns have been noted. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: 179, in clause 1, page 1, line 13, after “provided” insert “in England or Wales”.—(Kim Leadbeater.)

This amendment limits the assistance that may be provided in accordance with the Bill to assistance in England or Wales.

Juliet Campbell Portrait Juliet Campbell
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 109, in clause 1, page 1, line 17, after first “and” insert “demonstrably”.

This amendment reflects the changes in Amendments 110 to 112 that change the requirement from having to establish that a person who wishes to end their own life under the Act has clear, settled and informed wish, to a clear, settled and demonstrably informed wish.

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Stephen Kinnock Portrait Stephen Kinnock
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The amendments in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe relate to an individual who seeks to access assisted dying services demonstrating their wish to end their own life and demonstrating their understanding of the process by which that happens. To support the Committee’s deliberations, I will briefly summarise the Government’s analysis of the effect of the amendments.

Amendments 109, 110 and 111 would modify the requirement that the co-ordinating doctor and the independent doctor must undertake an assessment to ascertain whether, in their opinion, the person has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life. That would be amended to require the person to have a clear, settled and demonstrably informed wish. The term “demonstrably” would not provide further practical guidance beyond the words already in the Bill and could create uncertainty as to what constitutes being demonstrably informed.

I turn to amendment 112. Clause 9 currently provides that the co-ordinating and independent doctors must explain and discuss a number of matters with the person being assessed. These matters are set out in clause 9(2)(b), (c) and (d). In the interests of time, I will not go through each of those matters, but they include an explanation and discussion of the person’s diagnosis and prognosis, any treatment available and the likely effect of it, and the further steps that must be taken before assistance can lawfully be provided to the person under the Act.

The amendment would create an additional requirement for the co-ordinating and independent doctors. It would require them both to be satisfied that, in their opinion, the person seeking assistance has demonstrated their understanding of the matters that have been discussed under clause 9(2)(b), (c) and (d). The amendment does not specify in any further detail what the doctors would be required to look for to satisfy themselves that a person has demonstrated their understanding. That would be left to their professional judgment, with training, support and guidance, as with other concepts in the Bill. The amendment would leave it to the co-ordinating and independent doctor’s professional judgment to determine what “demonstrated their understanding” looked like in respect of each individual person.

I hope that those observations are helpful to the Committee.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I have just a few points to make. I very much applaud the hon. Member for Broxtowe for her amendment, which would genuinely—demonstrably, I might say—strengthen the Bill. It does not seem in any sense hostile to the principle or purpose of the Bill; it supports it.

To make a gentle criticism, I think that there is a concern about the lack, throughout the Bill, of a proper trail of documentary evidence following the applicant through the process. For example, the two conversations with the doctor would take place behind closed doors, and no record of their discussion would be made. I do not think that conducive to trust. There is no way to assess whether the safeguards are actually in operation.

Kit Malthouse Portrait Kit Malthouse
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am afraid that that is not actually correct. If my hon. Friend is willing to look at my amendments—I appreciate that he might not have got to them yet—he will see that one of them would require the doctor to produce a report on their assessment of the patient. Obviously a two-way declaration would also be required that the conversation pursuant to clause 4(4) has taken place and that in the doctor’s view the person is in possession of all the facts that they need in order to make the judgment that we are asking them to make. That detail and documentation will be inserted into the Bill if my amendment is agreed to.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. I particularly applaud his amendment’s aspiration to ensure that the doctors’ conversations are properly recorded.

Kim Leadbeater Portrait Kim Leadbeater
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Further to the comment from the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire, all of that will obviously be recorded on the patient’s medical records as well. The idea that it is not being recorded is just not correct.

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

The decisions will be recorded, but the conversations that the hon. Lady stipulates should take place under the Bill need further recording, in my view, with further evidence of what was discussed in order to ensure that the safeguards have been properly applied. I also point out that for the chief medical officer to effectively carry out the review under clause 34, they must have evidence available, not just a few schedules that have been signed off.

Likewise, I am glad to say that the opportunity remains for a legal appeal, in so far as we still have a judicial process, but I am concerned that the lack of any documentary evidence makes the application difficult for any external party or the Court of Appeal to review. Currently, there is a great paucity of information that the High Court judge considering the application can request. I think it is important that the High Court judge—or, indeed, the panel, if we move to that approach—should have access to a much fuller range of documentation to ensure that the process has been properly followed.

Tom Gordon Portrait Tom Gordon
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The hon. Member makes a valid point about ensuring that there is documentary evidence. Does he not feel that that will be covered at a later point in the Bill when we debate the amendments on training, and specifically on ensuring a coherent way in which all the doctors and people in the process set about recording?

Danny Kruger Portrait Danny Kruger
- Hansard - -

The hon. Gentleman is a great stickler for doing things in the right order. I am grateful to him for calling us to order on that point again. I dare say that he is absolutely right. All these issues are rather interwoven through the Bill.

I will finish on a point about the role of the Court of Appeal. A rejected application—although not an approved application, I am sorry to say—can be appealed under clause 12. For the Court of Appeal’s review to be substantive, it must surely be able to review the evidence as fully as possible on what happened throughout the terminally ill person’s application.

Juliet Campbell Portrait Juliet Campbell
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I still think that it is important to add “demonstrably”. The word should be included; I do not see that it would create any additional confusion. The right hon. Member for North West Hampshire said that he had tabled some amendments later on in the Bill. However, that is later on. Putting in “demonstrably” here would strengthen his proposal.