Football Governance Bill [HL]

Baroness Brady Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 13th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I declare an interest: for more than 30 years, I have lived and breathed English football. As detailed on my entry in the register, I am currently the vice-chair of West Ham United. Throughout my 30 years of working in this industry, I have experienced both the magic and the harsh realities of the football pyramid. I have sat in EFL and Premier League boardrooms, making difficult decisions about finances. I have celebrated with supporters through promotions and trophy wins, and consoled staff when relegation meant jeopardy and job losses. So, when I speak about the dangers lurking in this Bill, I do so not from ideology or theory but from practical, real, lived experience. I also speak, like so many millions in our country, out of a love of, and real passion for, the game.

The Bill’s intentions came from a good place. Who would not want to protect their club’s historic heritage assets, prevent breakaway leagues or strengthen fan engagement? But aspects of this legislation risk suffocating the very thing that makes English football unique: the aspiration that allows clubs to rise and succeed in our pyramid system; the ambition that means fans can dream.

I want to focus my remarks on one specific area: the backstop power on financial distributions. Premier League clubs would have no fear of the regulator making an independent determination about whether the funding we voluntarily provide to the EFL—in addition to our own substantial revenues—is sufficient to deliver financial stability for well-run clubs. This is because, by any objective measure, it is. For example, every single Championship club receives £7.8 million from the Premier League, amounting to between 20% and 40% of that club’s typical annual revenue. I will not dwell on the fact that the EFL has just signed a near-£1 billion domestic broadcast deal, helping to increase its own revenues by 50%, or £100 million, a year from next season; or that the Championship is already the sixth-richest league in all of European football.

However, a regulatory determination is not what the Bill delivers. Instead, it outlines a legally untested “pendulum arbitration” mechanism related to funding, conditions, financial system and term. The regulator can only choose the Premier League’s final proposal in its entirety, or that of the EFL; it has no ability to compromise between the two. In other words, the Bill has designed a mechanism that throws all the pieces of the pyramid up into the air, with huge uncertainty as to where they may land, and it does so every five years.

The Government have now added parachute payments, which is a competitive tool that provides the scaffolding and incentives for strategic investment in both the Championship and the Premier League, into the scope of these powers. This hugely expands the likelihood of the regulator becoming directly involved in competition tools and structures. UEFA and FIFA have already warned the Government against doing that.

The Government appear, wittingly or unwittingly, to be enabling the radical redesign of the pyramid that the EFL executive has been openly promoting. This would involve extreme redistribution from the bottom-half clubs in the Premier League to competitor clubs in the Championship; large reductions in parachute payments; and the levelling down of the Premier League to bring the Championship much closer to it.

Some advocates for this—on a frankly comical basis—think it can be done without any impact on the Premier League’s world-leading status. The vision is for a German-style system where most clubs in the top two divisions can become essentially interchangeable, just going round and round in a washing machine, while a few privileged clubs are allowed to float away and entrench their financial dominance. It would replace our brutal but brilliant meritocracy with the likelihood of a closed shop, where survival—not aspiration—becomes the ceiling. It would make it harder for stories such as Leicester winning the title, Brighton’s journey from League 1 to Europe, Aston Villa beating Bayern in the Champions League and West Ham United winning a European trophy, to ever happen again. A less exciting and unpredictable league would disappoint and turn off fans, meaning reduced broadcast interest and, in turn, diminished revenues.

The Premier League shares our success—to the tune of £1.6 billion, or 16% of our total revenue—with the whole pyramid. If we stunt the ability of the Premier League to maintain its growth and revenues, ultimately there will be far less investment in the whole of football, including the grass roots and the women’s game. That would be a very bad outcome.

I struggle to believe that Ministers would deliberately put at risk the continued success of the world’s most-watched league: what our Prime Minister recently called “our greatest cultural export”. I urge the Minister to improve the backstop mechanism so that it incentivises football-led solutions, recognises the contractual and property rights of the Premier League clubs and, above all, eliminates the possibility of extreme outcomes that would damage the success of the Premier League.

Let us protect our clubs without suffocating them. Let us regulate the game without removing its aspiration and ambition. Let us ensure that English football remains not just financially stable but vibrant, competitive and full of possibility.

Football Governance Bill [HL]

Baroness Brady Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 27th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mann (Lab)]

My Lords, I declare an interest in the Register of Lords’ Interests, as the elected chair of a football supporters’ group with 13,000 members. On Sunday, the weather advice was that nobody should travel in south Wales. I and 3,000 others did travel in south Wales. On Sunday afternoon, we travelled, not of our choice but because football fixtures are being changed to all sorts of obscure times. We went, and returned very late, very happily. That will not be the case at all fixtures if I wish to attend this House. In the new year, we have three fixtures that have been shifted to 8 pm on a Monday, and that does not quite balance with the sitting times of the House. I am just one fan, but there are many thousands who face that.

Imagine trying to get to Plymouth by 12.30 pm on a Sunday. That is what we had to do. It is not an easy way of life, and it is not just the bishops who are losing custom by this odd scheduling. It affects people’s ability. If there were to be an added word in here, it should be “enjoyment”—enjoyment of the game. Yesterday, one club, Manchester United, announced its new prices for this season. For a child, the minimum price is £66. That was my first away fixture, supporting Leeds United, aged five. I was lifted over the barriers—in for free—as I was at Leeds until the age of eight or nine, because that was how children were welcomed then. I did not pay to go in for the very many hundreds of matches I went to in that age span, and now it is £66. Well, it is a business.

The noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, who has good football taste, was none the less slightly awry with the example he gave in terms of liquidation, insolvency and the problems. If we take where I live—I will take Lincoln City and Notts County at random—both were about to disappear. The only reason they survived is that the supporters saved them. That is the difference between this industry and other industries. There are countless examples. If they were private sector businesses, they would have vanished.

In some cases, the fans could not do it. In 1987, as a Leeds United fan living in London with a few friends, I got a season ticket for a club called Wimbledon. It was a good choice; we got to the cup final with Wimbledon. I had a young daughter and I could not get to Leeds all the time, so a group of us went to Wimbledon in our spare time. If you are a fan of Wimbledon and your club wins the cup after coming from nowhere, you see what that does for the area and the fans, and people in south London. Then, a few years later, your club is extinguished, gone, shifted to Milton Keynes—vanished. The fans had the wherewithal to set it up again as AFC Wimbledon, and build from the bottom up, which is what they are having to do at Bury.

I almost thought that one or two noble Lords were suggesting that the state should not intervene in successful business, and I will end on this point. If we combine Scottish and English football, the most successful moment in terms of success on the pitch was around 1971. England had won the World Cup; Manchester United were the first English team to win the European Cup. Celtic had won the European Cup in 1967; Rangers were about to win the European Cup Winners’ Cup. We had the Cup Winners’ cup and the Fairs cup, and a whole succession of English teams about to take on the European Cup through the 1970s and dominate world football. It was the one moment when both Scottish and English football were at their height.

On the 2 January 1971, at a high moment, 66 people died at Ibrox football stadium. The state did very little intervening then. Then there was the fire at Bradford— I knew people who were there—when the state had not intervened sufficiently in the industry, and people died. Then there was Hillsborough, where people died. The state has intervened in the sport and the interventions, when they have been hard and focused, have been transformative. It was not the owners of the clubs who brought in the model of football with all-seater stadiums, revenue generation and corporate hospitality. I shall tell you the first club that did it. It was Glasgow Rangers. After 1971, their manager, Willie Waddell, went to see how others across the world did it. They rebuilt the stadium before anyone else did because of his experience of seeing people dying in front of him—that is state intervention.

In the balance between the fans, the state, the entrepreneurship and people’s ability to put in money—if anyone wants to put money into our club, we would be delighted because we are not trying to stop that—we want to see a slight tilt so that the fans are listened to. If we end up shifted to the bottom like the fans of Bury—I do not think we will, but you never know—the state should allow us to do something that they were not able to do; that is, for more to be done along the lines of what was done by the genius of those Wimbledon fans. It took them years to get back up. Wimbledon Football Club, having beaten Liverpool in the cup final in 1988, should have been able to survive seamlessly with their fans. That is the point of this regulation, and it is why I hope the Opposition Front Bench will be reluctant to further push this line of argument.

There are interesting issues that should be explored in getting that balance right. It will be legitimate to go into them and hold the Government to account, to question and even amend. Sustainability means that I, as a fan, will have my club in the future, whether it is badly or well run. That is what is critical about this legislation, and I commend the Government for bringing it forward.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I refer the Committee to my interests, which are declared in the register. I want to give the noble Lord, Lord Mann, a bit of comfort in that had he been going to a Premier League away game, he would have paid only £30, because there has been a cap on the price of away tickets for the past five years.

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[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

I am told that EFL clubs are likely to lose around £450 million in this current football season, and I think the noble Baroness said something similar. The regulator in this Bill, which is focused primarily on financial sustainability, is surely a good thing for football regulation because it is trying to make sure that those clubs—yes, involved in the business of risk and jeopardy—are financially sustainable and have a duty to their communities, and that their activities do not risk the future of those clubs. The point of the legislation, from the previous Government and our Government, is to make sure those clubs can be sustained and not have undue financial risk.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord; he made his point very well. The Bill does not say “financial sustainability”. Sustainability is not defined. If you put sustainability above overall success, growth and the competitive nature of the game, you might have a safer league, but you will have one that no one wants to watch. You might, notionally, have a more sustainable ecosystem, but it will also be smaller, more boring and poorer. If sustainability is the number one aim of the regulator, can the Minister explain to us what she and the Government consider to be the definition of the “sustainability” of English football? Can she also explain why sustainability does not include supporting the sustainability of the success and growth of the Premier League?

[Lord Londesborough (CB)]

My Lords, I intervene briefly as an impartial Cross-Bencher. In the interest of productivity, I am aware that we are still on the amendment to:

“Clause 1, page 1, line 4”—


although many of us are still discussing line 1. I will suggest a compromise. The word “sustainability” on its own is too undefined; I suggest that it should be “financial sustainability and success”—thereby combining Amendments 1, 2 and 3.

However, I do not agree with Amendment 4. On growth, I would go back to the banking sector. I know that football is a very different industry, but banking and the financial services in the noughties had the most phenomenal growth rates and we are still all picking up the tab as taxpayers. That was not financially sustainable. So my suggestion is that the words should be “financial sustainable” and “success”—those two together.

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[Lord Watson of Invergowrie (Lab)]

I thought that the noble Lord had indicated that he had finished. On success, which the two noble Lords that I mentioned talked about, the whole question seems to me to be totally subjective. As the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, said, what is success for one club is not success for another. I suggest that for at least half the clubs in the Premier League, success is not being relegated rather than winning anything.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

Just to clarify, I said that what sustainability is for one club is different from what it is for another, not success.

[Lord Watson of Invergowrie (Lab)]

That is interesting. Someone in the debate said that we should have financial sustainability and success. I think that in this setting the two, if not interchangeable, mean very similar things.

The noble Baroness, Lady Brady, and others, talked about the competitiveness and the jeopardy. As you can hear, although I am an AFC Wimbledon season ticket holder, I do not come from south London. When I lived in Scotland, my club was Dundee United. They were Scottish champions in 1983. Next season, Aberdeen were Scottish champions. There has been no team but Rangers or Celtic as Scottish champions in the 40 years since. That is a low bar, perhaps, but in fact only two clubs have won the Premier League more than twice in the 32 years of its existence. It is all very well to talk, as the noble Lord, Lord Markham, did, about Bournemouth beating Manchester City. Yes, it is always possible, but a club such as Bournemouth could never aspire to winning the Premier League. Only a very small number of clubs could realistically—

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[Lord Watson of Invergowrie (Lab)]

We will have to see how that comes out in debate. I am not quite sure what the import of that amendment is. That is one of the issues about the role of the regulator. Noble Lords, particularly on the other side of the Chamber, are seeking to give him or her greater powers or influence than intended in the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, said at one point that we do not need a regulator because nothing is wrong. There is something wrong, because the Premier League and the English Football League have been unable to reach agreement on the disbursement of the funds from the top level to levels below. That is one of the problems in the system at the moment.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

There is a deal in place agreed by all parties on how funds are distributed; 16% or £1.6 billion is distributed. It is also important to note that the Premier League has more title winners in the last 15 seasons than La Liga, the Bundesliga and Serie A, and the fewest number of titles won by one club than any other top European league over the same period, which shows it is competitive. That is why it is the best league in the world and the most valuable, and that is what we have to protect, because without that broadcast revenue the whole pyramid suffers.

[Lord Watson of Invergowrie (Lab)]

I know the noble Baroness has experience with one of the major Premier League clubs but, in a sense, she has made my argument for me. The other leagues are less competitive, but I am just saying that if only four clubs can win the championship twice in 32 years, it is not spread very wide, and I would like to see it spread more widely, as many other people would—no doubt including those at her own club.

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[Lord Addington (LD)]

My Lords, when trying to sum up these several hours of debate, I felt at times that we were dancing on the head of a pin. Sustainability —what actually does it mean? What do the Government think it means? That is the one question I would give to the Minister. Does it mean sustaining a successful Premier League? Well, I would hope so. Is sustainability making sure—remember, this Bill encapsulates it—that those five tiers of professional football are functioning? That is what is in this Bill—five tiers of professional football. That is what has allowed the resurrection of teams which got it wrong—there was somewhere to go.

Making sure that that is sustainable means that the fans want something. I hope I never cross the noble Lord, Lord Mann, on this subject because there was a great deal of fire in the belly there; my noble friend Lord Goddard might have got close at times, but I think we will give the noble Lord that one on points. The fans want something and are hugely emotionally and physically invested in this structure. That is what is behind the Bill. Football is not another business; it is not even another sports business. It is not—and may all that is holy be thanked—WWE. It is not something that we will throw away; it is embedded in the identity of much of our society. I say that as a rugby player. The noble Lord, Lord Hayward, is my friend—I will say yes to him and “sir” when he is refereeing, but only then.

So it is that that comes through. The question here is about the word “sustainability”. What do the Government envisage it is? Let us get it out here now. Where will this be backed up? Where will it be shown so that we can know what is going on? Pepper v Hart is clearly not enough here. If we can get that, we can move on, but we must remember that we do not want the Premier League to be damaged, because it provides the money for the other good things to happen. That is the balance we must achieve—or at least get close to.

We cannot guarantee that it will be the best league in the world for ever. Will there be government intervention to make sure that it is successful? That would be a strange position for many noble Lords who have spoken.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

The point is that the government regulator should not make it less successful by over- regulating, mission creep and making it so difficult to keep it competitive that it ends up having a detrimental effect.

[Lord Addington (LD)]

My Lords, we come back to semantics, definition and interpretation. How do you interpret success? Is it by lack of regulation or by intervention? I do not think FIFA and UEFA would be terribly happy if it was felt that it was possible for a regulator to interpret success.

I hope that the Minister, who will have better access to this information than anybody else here—at least, I really hope she will—will be able to say what sustainability is, where does it go and what is the Government’s vision? That is what has happened here.

The Bill is about keeping five tiers of professional football functioning, with an escape route when it goes wrong, if we want to be terribly mercenary, for the top clubs. It gives a chance to rebuild and come back. That is difficult—Leeds have done it briefly; the noble Lord, Lord Mann, is smiling at me—but that is what is behind the Bill. It is not just about the Premier League, it is about the whole thing. I hope that the Minister will be able to correct—or rather, clarify—these points.

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[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I will briefly respond to the noble Lord, Lord Bassam. I take on board the Maude doctrine, which is that, had we had the opportunity to have scrutiny and oversight of the Bill at the appropriate moment, I would have made exactly the same points to my own Government when they were in power. So, with all due respect to the noble Lord, he is flogging a dead horse by keeping on saying that this was a Tory Bill. We are today considering a Labour government Bill on its merits and its efficacy, which is why we are debating it.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 6. I clarify for the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, and the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, that there is no state regulator in France or Germany—all the regulation there is football-led—so this is something completely different.

I will raise with the Minister the alarming letter that UEFA sent the Secretary of State. In it, the warnings are spelled out very clearly, as are the concerns about “governance interference” in football. It points out that it has very “specific rules” that guard against state interference in order to

“guarantee the autonomy of sport and fairness of sporting competition”.

It states:

“If every country established its own regulator with similarly broad powers, this could lead to a fragmented, inefficient and inconsistent approach to football governance across the continent and in essence hinder the ability of UEFA and other bodies to maintain cohesive and effective governance standards across Europe”.


It goes on to say that

“it is imperative to protect and preserve the independence of the FA in accordance with UEFA and FIFA statutes”.

It warns against anything that could compromise

“the FA’s autonomy as the primary regulator of football in England”

or the ability of domestic leagues to set

“their own season-to-season financial sustainability rules”.

As the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, said, it gives stark warnings about the backstop power and licensing. UEFA expresses significant concerns about the backstop and stresses the importance of preserving collaboration and voluntary agreements in football governance, while cautioning against overreliance on regulatory backstop powers that could disrupt the sport’s balance and stability.

It says that the backstop threatens

“the balance of power within football governance”

and that

“mandating redistribution which affects the competitive balance in the game and wider European competition would be of concern to us”

and would

“prevent amicable solutions being found”.

UEFA says that the backstop in the current Bill should be “carefully reconsidered”.

However, despite those warnings from UEFA, the Government have made the backstop even wider and broader in scope, to now include parachute payments, which are fundamental to competitive balance. They have removed the incentives for a football-led deal, which goes specifically against the advice of UEFA. So it appears that the Government have ignored that letter and its warnings. UEFA spells out that

“the ultimate sanction would be excluding the federation from UEFA and teams from competition”.

No matter how small the Minister may say the risk is, the inclusion of this amendment will help to ensure that the IFR does not act in a way that enables such unintended consequences for football fans. That would be a huge relief.

We should be careful not to empower this regulator without fully addressing the concerns of the international governing bodies in advance. If we create even a small but ever-present risk of intervention in the future, that could put the Government, the regulator and our competitions in an invidious position down the track, especially in circumstances where the interests of English football may not align with UEFA or FIFA—for example, in the event of future disagreements on the football calendar. I therefore urge the Minister to give assurances that every single issue raised in the letter has now been dealt with to UEFA’s satisfaction, including its concerns on financial distributions and independence from government. This leverage, once granted, cannot be taken back.

It is imperative that nothing in the Bill gives the regulator powers to interfere with the rules that already govern football—which, by the way, is one of the most governed and regulated industries around. We have to comply with FIFA rules, UEFA rules, Football Association rules, Premier League rules and EFL rules—and now we have the IFR rules. We will be tied up in more red tape than a company applying for a post-Brexit import licence.

So will the Minister ask the Secretary of State to allow a full copy of the letter she received from UEFA to be put in the House of Lords Library and the Commons Library for every single Peer and MP to be able to see it, read it and be aware of its nature and tone and of the consequences it spells out, so that every Peer in this House can take that into account when they consider why this amendment is so important and so necessary?

[Lord Watson of Wyre Forest (Lab)]

My Lords, I continue to be humbled by the gentle kindness and grace with which Members of this House help relatively new Members understand the list of amendments in Committee on Bills. I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, for helping to steer me back on course. To reciprocate the kindness, I say that I enthusiastically support his amendment and that of the noble Lord, Lord Maude.

I apologise to my noble friend the Minister for adding to her confusion. She withheld comfort on that first debate in relation to the clarity I was seeking on whether English football teams and England will be able to play in European and international competitions at the end of the Bill. I say to her that now is the time: she can end my confusion, give the clarity that this Committee deserves and end the ambiguity by saying that England and English football clubs will be playing in international tournaments, because these important amendments are trying to get that reassurance to every football fan in England tonight.

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[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

There is nothing in the Bill that conflicts with English clubs or the English national side competing in international games, as the rules of the international bodies stand currently.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

Have UEFA told the Minister that, or is that her understanding?

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

As I said, UEFA had a meeting with the Minister for Sport. My understanding from that meeting, at which I was not present, is that this was confirmed. It has not raised other concerns. If any noble Lord knows of other concerns that it has raised directly with them, please get in touch afterwards.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I can only repeat that I know that the Minister for Sport is clear that she had a positive and constructive meeting with UEFA, and that we will continue to work with it. The only other point I was aiming to make on this matter, rather than repeating what I had already said, was that when the Government say that we want to keep the Bill within its current scope, this is clearly partly to avoid mission creep, with the unintended consequence that we might then stray into areas that are problematic. When we debate subsequent groups, please note that it is front and centre of our minds that we are very clear that this Government will do nothing to jeopardise the ability of English clubs or the England team to play in international competitions, whether they are European, world-level or at the Olympics. I hope that noble Lords accept that there is no intention to do anything that will jeopardise that. The advice we have had is that this will not be the case. The engagement with UEFA is essential, and it is aimed at ensuring that there are not any unintended consequences that would damage the ability of English clubs or national teams to compete in UEFA, FIFA or Olympic competitions.

This legislation does not impose undue third-party influence on the FA, and therefore does not breach FIFA or UEFA statutes, which the FA has confirmed. In any case, there is an additional safeguard already in place in the Bill, in that the regulator must have regard to its duty to avoid any effect on sporting competitiveness of regulated clubs. For the avoidance of any doubt, and to ensure that there is no possibility of any clauses that may concern these sporting bodies, we have already taken action. As previously noted during the debate, we have removed a clause from the previous Bill which allowed government foreign policy and trade considerations to be considered when approving takeovers. The regulator will be fully independent from Government and tightly focused on the financial sustainability of the game.

On Amendment 24 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, I say that we are extremely confident that no powers or potential actions taken by the regulator would be in breach of the rules, and thus preclude England’s national teams from competing in international competitions. We are mindful of UEFA’s governing principles around undue third-party influence, and this has shaped how we are setting up the regulator.

I am proud that this is a Labour Government Bill that we are taking through this House, as was noted, with agreement from the previous Government. This legislation will not impact the intention for our teams to play in UEFA competitions. For the reasons I have set out, I am unable to accept the noble Lords’ amendments and hope that they will not press them.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

Just before the Minister sits down, can she confirm if she could, and would, place in the Library the letter that the Secretary of State received from UEFA, so all Peers have a chance to read it? I know the Minister stated that this was not alarming, but I think the majority of people would find it alarming.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

The noble Baroness refers to my point about this not being alarming. I do not want fans to be alarmed by our discussion. It was a private letter from UEFA; there is no intention for it to be published. I assure noble Lords that this Government will not do anything to jeopardise the FA’s membership of UEFA or the participation of English teams in UEFA competitions.

Football Governance Bill [HL]

Baroness Brady Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 2nd December 2024 Lords Chamber

That aside, I ask the Minister to look very carefully at these amendments. They are designed to be helpful and to make sure that the independent football regulator can do its work in a most efficacious and efficient way.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I refer the Committee to my interests, which are declared on the register. I support Amendment 12 in the name of my noble friend Lord Maude, especially proposed new Clause 1(3)(f). This would set a clear success metric for the IFR that it should incentivise

“industry-led agreements on the distribution of”

the Premier League’s broadcast revenue. This is absolutely critical for the future collective success of the football industry.

We already know that UEFA has written an alarming letter to the Government which said, among other things:

“Mandating redistribution which affects the competitive balance in the game and wider European competition would be of concern to us”


and

“would … prevent amicable solutions being found”.

This is why UEFA says that the backstop should be “carefully reconsidered”. I understand and respect that this is what Ministers genuinely believe they have done in relation to the backstop powers, which we will discuss in much greater detail later. However, I profoundly disagree that the backstop provides any such incentives.

I draw noble Lords’ attention to the fact that earlier this year Dame Tracey Crouch, the chair of the fan-led review, called the backstop powers “nuclear … coding” never to be reached for. However, the Football League chair disagreed, and said he fully intends to use the mechanism and that it is entirely logical. To extend the analogy, in the Bill the Government are doling out nuclear weapons to football authorities. They are doing so in the belief that these weapons will somehow create space for diplomacy. However, the evidence is already very clear. In the real world, one side is ready to press the button and launch its missiles. The powers clearly do not place the incentives in the right place. If they did, we would already have a new agreement and the football bodies would not have been driven so far apart.

This is why I have tabled amendments to rebalance the backstop, so it can create proper incentives and space for good-faith negotiations and diplomacy. The fact that the Bill has led one party to believe it can launch a successful first strike is proof that these powers have manifestly failed in their purpose already. That is why I am so supportive of my noble friend’s amendment.

[Lord Watson of Invergowrie (Lab)]

I have a couple of questions for the noble Lord, Lord Maude, but first, the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, said that the amendments provide clear metrics. I do not think they do; they are very subjective, particularly Amendment 12. What is

“globally competitive in relation to audience and quality”?

Regarding the phrase

“continues to attract significant domestic and foreign investment”,

what is “significant”? I do not think it is helpful to include words like that.

For what it is worth—my noble friend the Minister probably will not like this—I think paragraphs (e) and (f) of Amendment 12, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Maude, make sense, because we can clearly see what they mean. I would say the same of the Amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson. Amendment 7 is rather rambling and unclear and is not suitable for inclusion the Bill. We need something clear that can be measured, rather than words like “substantial”, which could mean anything or nothing.

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[Lord Watson of Invergowrie (Lab)]

It is absolutely worrying. These countries have the right to do what they like with their money, but we have a right to say, “I don’t really wish to engage with that”, because we become tainted if we do that to an unlimited extent. That is a slightly different argument from that of playing competitive matches in other countries. That surely is something that we all agree would be bad for the future of English football. There are plenty of ways of bringing money in from all sources—if clubs want to do that, it is up to them—but playing matches outwith this country is surely not where we want to go.

That impacts on the whole question of fans and my amendment, which is: what is a fan? I do not know whether my amendment is the way we should define it, but I think it is the narrowest definition of a fan that I have heard so far in relation to this Bill. How do you define the Liverpool fan in San Diego? What does she or she have to say about what is happening in the Premier League? They may watch it on television and that is fine. They may express a very definite preference for one club, and they are entitled to do so. But they do not have a vested interest in the club in the way that someone who pays their money to go and see a match does.

I will repeat the point that I made last week. Some people are unable to afford the price of tickets, particularly in the Premier League—although I have to say in all honesty that I bought a theatre ticket last week, which cannot really be equated with the cost of a Premier League football ticket. But the other question is whether some people are physically unable to go. It may be somebody who has been going since they were 10 years old; they reach the age of 70 and find they are no longer able to go. I would sympathise with that.

However, we have been talking in the Bill about the regulator ensuring consultation with fans. You cannot consult somebody if you do not know where he or she lives. There has to be a list somewhere of the people you are going to consult. You cannot just open it up online and say, “Anybody with an interest, let us have your view by email”. That is not consulting—or at least consulting properly. So people who have bought into the club by having a season ticket: that is a reasonable way of saying, “These are the only fans we can genuinely define”. You can put them in a box and say, when it comes to consultation, “That’s the group of people because they have put their names in”.

They do not go to every match, of course. I often laugh when I read the football results and they show the attendance. I do not mean any disrespect to Arsenal, but I will use them as an example. They are going rather well at the moment, but they were not going well five years ago in the latter days of the Arsène Wenger period. You would see a match the Emirates Stadium and it was perfectly clear that there were almost as many empty seats as filled seats, yet the next day the papers would say the attendance was 100 short of capacity. That means the club is saying, “Ah, now, but we’ve sold those seats. Season ticket holders have bought them but they’re not very happy at the moment so they haven’t come”. My argument is, “Okay, that’s fine, but the key to the attendance is the word ‘attend’. If people don’t go, there’s not an attendance”. Still, the point is that these people have made a financial commitment to the club, and that is a basis on which to go forward.

That is why I disagree with the other amendments in this group, particularly Amendment 26 from the noble Lord, Lord Addington, and Amendment 17 from the noble Lords, Lord Markham and Lord Parkinson, which refers to those

“who have an interest in seeing the club succeed”.

That is so vague; we have to have some way of pinning it down. If there is a better way of doing that than through season ticket holders, I am open to that suggestion and I will consider it. But, until then, I believe that is the only basis on which we can do it. I also want to see it in the Bill.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

Suppose we base it on season ticket holders. If you take a club such as Bournemouth, whose capacity is 11,000-ish, it will probably have 4,000 season ticket holders—but they would not represent all the views of every Bournemouth supporter in the whole world.

In relation to supporters around the world, if a supporter gets on a plane from Sweden to watch Bournemouth play, are they a supporter or not? Some 5% of inbound flights to the UK involve taking in a Premier League game—I mean, the Premier League could run a successful airline. Putting that point to one side, though, it would be impossible for a regulator to try to rank supporters of the club in order of priority. We all know, respect and love our season ticket holders, but not everyone is lucky enough to get a season ticket—particularly if you are a Bournemouth supporter, because the capacity is only 11,000-odd.

[Lord Watson of Invergowrie (Lab)]

On the noble Baroness’s last point, I do not want the regulator to be doing this. That is why I want it in the Bill. This is not an issue where there can be any subjectivity. There has to be something tight.

Bournemouth may have season ticket holders in Sweden, I do not know, and if they come, they come. If they do not come, though, they are still a season ticket holder, so they are entitled to be consulted. But, if there is no financial commitment, I just do not understand how you can possibly meaningfully take the opinion of someone who just says, “Yeah, I’ve been at a couple of Liverpool games, I always watch them on TV and I’ve bought a scarf”. I am open to suggestions as to how we might pin this down better, but pin it down in the Bill we must.

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[Lord Addington (LD)]

My Lords, I have the last amendment in the group, which seems to be where my amendments are occurring today. I think we should have somebody at each club who addresses this issue. I am with the noble Lord, Lord Deben, on this; it is an undeniable thing. You could probably quote one person who has said, “No, it isn’t”, but you cannot list everyone else who says that climate change is real without being here all week. They will then disagree about its extent, but they will not disagree on the fact that it is real.

There should be somebody at each club doing exactly these things to make sure that the business is sustainable, and to address the various problems. If it is just one person, as was suggested, it is simply a question of saying, “Please pay attention: can we raise the issue and see what is going on?” This could be someone who is managing the flood risk; the fact that grounds are being flooded is unarguable. Someone should be saying things such as, “What is the least damaging type of cup?” All of these issues will be important at different levels to different groups, but they are important. If other regulations are coming up to deal with this, you would be an absolute fool not to bring them into your plan.

The noble Lord, Lord Deben, is probably right on this, and it is nice to see him on the Bill.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, like the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, I rise to strongly oppose the idea of adding environmental sustainability to the regulator’s remit, as this group of amendments seeks to do. I do so not because this issue is unimportant: of course, it could not be more significant for us all. My objection is both practical and principled, because barely has the ink dried on this revised Bill, and already we are seeing a litany of attempts to extend the regulator’s scope. This, I am afraid, is what many of us who work in football are so worried about. We are the first major country to introduce a government regulator for football, and immediately there is pressure to have it solve every challenge on the spectrum.

Let me remind noble Lords: this Bill already gives enormous power to the regulator. It can decide who can own a football club; how the club can spend its money; how it should organise itself as a business; how it must engage with its supporters; in what circumstances it can move location; the approach it should take to equality, diversity and inclusion; the overall flow of money; and even the continued existence of key competition tools throughout the ecosystem. However, even that does not seem to be enough. Today it is environmental sustainability; tomorrow it will be something else. We already have amendments tabled to mandate specific kinds of corporate social responsibility; to add the women’s game to the IFR’s scope; to meddle with free-to-air listed events; to require regulator consultation on political statements made by clubs; and even to govern football clubs’ relationships with sports betting.

It is a well-known phenomenon that all regulators significantly expand their scope and size over time but, if we start before it has even begun, imagine what this regulator would look like in a decade. Where will it end? I do not expect it to be anywhere positive for our currently world-leading football pyramid.

The Premier League and its clubs, as well as many EFL clubs, are already taking substantial action on environmental issues, as all responsible businesses should do. We already have comprehensive environmental regulations that apply to all businesses, as well as the aggressive targets of a country reaching net zero. In addition to serious and often innovative action to reduce their own carbon footprints, many clubs also campaign and donate substantial resources to environmental campaigns.

Premier League clubs also do a huge amount to help other clubs in this regard. Let me give one example: the Premier League has put in place a brilliant programme to provide grants of up to 70% of the costs associated with installing modern LED floodlights at stadiums across the National League system and women’s football pyramid. This has already helped dozens of community clubs both to lower their running costs and to minimise the impact they have on the environment, but it is fair to point out that Premier League clubs make these sorts of voluntary contributions while facing already unprecedented financial demands. Again, I will give one example.

The Budget increases to employers’ national insurance contributions will cost Premier League clubs an additional £56 million annually. That is an extraordinary new burden—more than £0.25 billion over the rest of this Parliament. This new bill also comes on top of the £1.6 billion in pyramid support that we already provide, as well as our significant investment in youth development and community programmes, and the constant need to maintain expensive infrastructure and build new facilities. The Government want us to spend even more on grass-roots pitches and, through the Bill, they may force us to give even more to the well-funded Football League.

All of this is before Premier League clubs can focus on their most basic and fundamental requirement—of which the Bill takes so little account—to keep their own teams strong and competitive on the pitch. Let us remember that that is what the fans really care about. It is our ability to do that which underpins the overall health and sustainability of English football.

We must not compel this regulator to interfere in areas far beyond its core purpose, adding yet more cost and complexity to what is already a set of implementation challenges. Every additional requirement we add dilutes its focus and risks its effectiveness, so this group of amendments surely cannot adhere to the basic principles of good regulatory design. Effective regulators need clear, focused remits. They need to do specific things very well, not everything poorly. Let us not undermine this regulator’s clarity of purpose before its work even begins.

[Lord Evans of Rainow (Con)]

My noble friend Lady Brady makes some very powerful points. Any business sector would not argue against or disagree with best practice in terms of the sustainable aspects of their business. In football, you need only look at the quality of the hospitality element and the work that goes on there or the maintenance of the grounds and pitches.

Carlisle United has been mentioned several times. The river is in the centre of town and it floods regularly, but that is a matter to do with the location of the club and the river in that city. This comes to my other point about the historic nature of football clubs and their grounds. Many of them were built in the Victorian period in the centre of cities. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, talks about sustainability and transport, but it is very difficult for many clubs—Premier League and other league clubs that are located in the centre of towns—to do the things that the noble Baroness is proposing to insert into the Bill.

I will just give a quick example of sustainability, and that is Old Trafford. It is situated between Manchester docks and a railway line, in Trafford Park. The carbon footprint of Trafford Park has significantly reduced over recent decades, and Manchester United and other clubs throughout the league have reduced their carbon footprint, because that is the right thing to do. It is good business practice and therefore we do not need these amendments, because the football clubs themselves know the benefits of offering good-quality hospitality and good performances on pitches.

Some of your Lordships will remember the summer of 1976. It was a sign of global warming, perhaps, but the quality of football pitches in 1976 was terrible. The grass did not grow and the technology of the day did not enable pitches to survive that drought. The technology is there now and it is sustainable. Football clubs have the power, technology and wherewithal to cope with climate change but, if they are located close to a river in the centre of town, there is really only one solution, which is to move that football club.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Grey-Thompson (CB)]

My Lords, I speak to Amendment 165 to which my name is attached. I declare my interests; I am chair of Sport Wales, I sit on UK Sport and I am a trustee of the Foundation of Light.

I start by thanking the Minister for answering my question from Second Reading on what would happen between the Privy Council and Senedd regulations with this Bill. I am not a season ticket holder, although I do spend a lot of time watching the Welsh women’s football team—good luck to them tomorrow night—and Thornaby FC women’s team.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Addington, I believe in the power of football to change lives. I realise that most of the amendments that I have my name to in this Bill will be considered out of scope, but I do share the noble Lord’s concern over academies. My 2017 duty of care report, commissioned by the then Sports Minister Tracey Crouch, has some answers on that which have not yet been taken up.

This is important in relation to understanding the communities of which football clubs are part. We have talked a lot about the big clubs tonight. Thornaby Football Club, which is very low down in the leagues, decided earlier this year to cancel the women’s and girls’ team. The community came together, people stepped in—partly due to the Women’s Sport Collective—and the team was saved.

This, to me, is the power of football at its best. There is a lovely interview online with a young girl called Lily, aged seven, who was asked what she thought about women’s football being cancelled. She indignantly said, “If girls want to play football, you can’t just not let them”. For me, the impact that these amendments would have all through the game is important; it sets an important tone.

In the original review, Dame Tracey Crouch said that equality standards were a non-negotiable part of the regulator. We have seen this in other sports. The code for sports governance, launched in 2016 by the sports councils, which covers over 4,000 organisations, has made a materially positive impact on the world of sport.

I believe that club governance should include these equality standards, because they link back to accountability and integrity. I can speak only for the Foundation of Light. I am biased, but it runs incredible programmes in communities as lots of foundations do. We are lucky that we have a good link to, and support from, the club. The aim of the foundation is to involve, educate and bring people together through football in Sunderland, south Tyneside and County Durham, and to improve education, health and well-being

This has a significant impact on the community. It is important that we can measure this impact in relation to the community it represents, to help develop and refine these programmes and get to those who they can have the most impact on. This is an important part of what we should be looking for in relation to football, to be able to make a real difference at the grass-roots level.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak against this set of amendments, which would add corporate responsibility requirements to the Bill. Before I do so, I want to say how much I respect and understand where the noble Lord, Lord Addington, is coming from. As a shareholder in the Premier League, I commit to him that we will meet with him to think about ways in which we can work together to deliver some of the aims that he spoke so passionately about, because we are all in agreement that they are important.

I want to make sure there is no misunderstanding in this House of the extraordinary social impact that football clubs already have in their communities and what drives this activity. Let me share some perspective on what football clubs already deliver. The Premier League provides over £500 million annually to support lower league clubs, fund youth development and invest in community facilities. We support every single football league club to provide its own community programmes, too. This is not a peripheral activity; it represents the most comprehensive community investment of any business sector in Britain. I cannot think of any other sector that voluntarily shares such a huge proportion—over 16%—of its central revenues in such a way.

The Premier League Charitable Fund’s £110 million three-year budget supports half a million people annually through targeted community programmes. Significantly, 45% of this activity takes place in our country’s most deprived communities. This April, the Premier League announced additional funding of £33 million per season from 2025-26 to further enhance this work.

The scale of impact that this work has is remarkable. Through the Football Foundation, Premier League funding has enabled over 70,000 grants to improve grass-roots facilities, supporting nearly 70,000 community teams last season alone. The Premier League Primary Stars programme reaches 84% of primary schools across England and Wales; that is 19,000 schools and over 18 million student interactions since 2017.

These are not isolated initiatives. More than 100 club-connected charities work daily in their communities. Programmes such as Premier League Kicks create opportunities for young people at risk of anti-social behaviour. Premier League Inspires develops personal skills and positive attitudes in young people aged 11 to 25. This work touches every aspect of community development.

Football has naturally evolved its social contribution without regulatory compulsion or diktats. What other business sector can demonstrate this level of sustained community investment? What other industry has built social responsibility so fundamentally into its operating model? Premier League clubs—indeed, all football clubs—understand their role as community institutions and deliver accordingly.

The Bill’s purpose is to address specific issues around what I think the Government mean by financial sustainability and governance. Adding layers of corporate responsibility requirements would not only duplicate existing good work but risk distracting the regulator from its core purpose. We have seen in other sectors how regulatory mission creep can undermine effectiveness. We must not let that happen here again.

Football clubs are not just businesses that happen to do some good work in their communities. They are the beating heart of those communities, woven into their very fabric across generations. When a child steps on to a Premier League-funded pitch in a deprived area, when a struggling student finds inspiration through Premier League Inspires, and when a disabled young person discovers the joy of playing football through a club foundation, these moments represent something profound about football’s role in our society.

Premier League clubs understand their power and their responsibility deeply. They live it every day through their actions, their investment and their commitment to their communities. I do not believe any regulation could ever mandate or compel this level of social impact; it comes from an authentic and deeply felt understanding of football’s unique place in our national life.

Let us keep the regulator focused on its vital purpose and trust instead in football’s consistent commitment to social good: not because rules demand it but because it is already so fundamental to what makes English football so special.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, that eloquent and passionate explanation of football at the heart of community sums up for me the tension when we are talking about this Bill. Football exists as a positive force in society and in communities. We do not want to kick the life out of it by turning it into a box-ticking exercise that imagines the only way football clubs will help a community is if they have a regulator breathing down their neck, saying, “You must be corporately socially responsible”. Noble Lords must not make me repeat that.

I had concerns in general when I read the details of all these amendments. For example, Amendment 165 calls for environmental sustainability requirements and increasing diversity and inclusion requirements. I will not repeat the points that I made earlier and will make more fully when I speak to my Amendment 155, opposing the imposed duties of EDI and so on. I want to look at one aspect of discrimination that I think is hidden. It is focused on in Amendment 247, which says that regulated clubs

“must facilitate football training for young women and girls”,

and Amendment 90, which says that the independent football regulator

“must include facilitation for both sexes and separate development pathways”.

Football Governance Bill [HL]

Baroness Brady Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 2nd December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak in support of Amendment 16, tabled by my noble friend Lord Jackson. The amendment would require the regulator to take into account the economic risks of overregulation and report against this risk. I am sure this is an approach that will interest all parts of the Committee, especially, as my noble friend Lord Jackson reminded us, as the Prime Minister himself recently made such a high priority of reducing the impact of regulatory burden on British investment and growth.

We should consider the Prime Minister’s words carefully. He spoke of breaking free from the trap of excessive regulation, of removing needless barriers to investment, and of ensuring that regulators take growth far more seriously. Yet, here we are again, at risk of creating a new regulator without proper safeguards against exactly these risks. Indeed, the Department for Business and Trade this year published a report on smarter regulation, which described the problem in stark terms:

“Good regulation allows our markets and societies to function. However, there is strong evidence that points to our regulatory culture acting as a drag on our ability to generate economic activity, innovation and to attract investment. The regulatory environment is often confusing and sometimes features of it appear to exist for the benefit of the regulators, rather than the industries who they regulate, consumers or Britain as a whole”.


We must take care to guard against our regulatory culture having a similarly damaging impact on British football.

As other noble Lords have pointed out, the Premier League represents one of Britain’s most successful exports, contributing £8.2 billion annually to our economy and more than £4 billion to the Exchequer, while supporting more than 90,000 jobs. Already, we are seeing concerning signs in the Bill: undefined ownership tests: parallel regulatory requirements; unproven intervention powers; and sweeping powers to redistribute Premier League revenue. Each adds complexity and risks that could deter the very investment that we need.

The Premier League competes globally for capital, for talent and for attention. Excessive regulation could quickly diminish its appeal to serious investors, with knock-on impacts for the pyramid which relies on the Premier League. As the chief executive of the Premier League has said in relation to this Bill, we must not wound the goose that lays English football’s golden egg. It is that egg that supports so much of the good work that we discussed earlier and the football pyramid as a whole.

The Prime Minister pledged to “march through the institutions”, ensuring regulators take growth seriously. Yet this Bill creates a regulator with no equal duty to consider success, economic impact or growth alongside the very vague notions of soundness and resilience, which, as I said earlier in this Committee, have no clear end state. We can have both effective regulation and economic dynamism, but only if we build in appropriate safeguards from the start. Without them, we risk creating exactly the kind of bureaucratic barriers to investment that the Prime Minister has correctly identified as holding Britain back.

[Lord Hayward (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to support the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Jackson. I will concentrate particularly on both the impact assessment and what my noble friend Lord Maude was referring to: the impact on small businesses. Following on from the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Birt, when I made my comments at Second Reading, I emphasised that my concerns are not that there are no problems; the question is how we actually tackle the problems that exist in the industry while not damaging the success.

I have made a number of references to the impact assessment, and I quoted from it earlier today. On page 8, paragraph 17, it states:

“This Impact Assessment (IA) provides evidence and analysis to support the government’s case for intervention”.

I am concerned after reading the impact assessment that, as my noble friends Lord Jackson and Lord Maude identified, the impact is not on the big companies. Anybody who has sat on the side of an industry, as I did when changes were made to licensing law, for example, knows that it is not the big companies that are affected by such changes. They have the resources. It is the small companies that are confused, concerned and lost. They do not have a specialist to deal with the minutiae of a clause. I was the chief executive of the British Beer and Pub Association at the time, and it was an enormous task to guide smaller companies through the issues they faced. For me, the impact assessment dramatically underestimates the impact that small companies face in these circumstances.

I will come back to other elements later, but I am particularly concerned—and am referring to page 53 onwards—about the identified benefits that are supposed to accrue to the industry. The costs are dealt with, but I must admit that I am not convinced. On the indirect benefits, paragraph 225 comes up with a wonderful sentence:

“These indirect benefits are extremely difficult to quantify, given the range of variables that will affect the profitability of individual football clubs. Therefore, these are not quantified in the appraisal”.


Paragraph 227 says:

“These benefits are extremely difficult and speculative to quantify and therefore are not quantified in the appraisal”.


The noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, will no doubt be relieved that I have not entered into any word counts on this occasion.

On accruing benefits for the community, paragraph 233, on page 54, states:

“The model states that the results of this contingent valuation survey of football users and non-users shows that people positively value the club they support/their local club and would be willing to pay an annual subscription to support it”.


I find myself at a loss to believe that my noble friend went round the streets of Wycombe or any other community and asked, “Would you be willing to pay X sum to support the club?” The suggestion that large parts of any population are

“willing to pay … to support”

their local club is really stretching credibility far.

This comment was made as a result of some work undertaken by Ipsos, an organisation for which I have high regard and with which I deal on polling. But the next paragraph, 235, refers to the following:

“DCMS guidance states that a lower bound”—


I am not sure whether the authors intend “bound” or “band”—

“95% confidence interval of willingness to pay (WTP)”.

That is rather like talking about turnout at a general election by asking people whether they are going to vote. I checked with a pollster this morning, and the mean answer given is 80%. The turnout at the last election was 60%, so there was an error of a quarter or a third, depending on whether you go upwards or downwards. To suggest that you can quantify the willingness of a community and people in the street to pay to support their local club stretches the bounds of credibility.

But on page 56 we have a breakdown, in detail, of the willingness of each region of the country to pay a sum to support its local club. There has been infinite reference to the fact that the support for clubs crosses from one place to another. Therefore, if you are contributing in the north-east or in London you may not be willing to pay to support a specific club. It is not surprising that London is identified as the place where people are most willing to supply most money, but it does not say whether the sums involved include a season ticket. Many of the people who answered the question will have thought, “Well, I actually pay in the form of a season ticket already and therefore I am contributing”.

What is depressing about the impact assessment is that it goes into such detail in relation to the benefits that will be gained from this legislation, but there is no attempt to identify what the clubs will have to pay. I am not talking here about the Premier League clubs; I am talking about the small clubs. In her response to the points that I and others raised at Second Reading, the Minister said that the costs would be proportionate. But no figures are given. I find it barely credible that such detail can be provided to identify how much people from each different area of the country are willing to pay, but there is no calculation of the cost for a small club.

That is where the important issue—the questions raised by my noble friend Lord Jackson—arises. People can concentrate on Premier League clubs, but we are talking here about regulating over 100 clubs. People do not realise that the impact will be on the small clubs. The Government need to be honest before this legislation passes, and to identify the probable burden for each of the small clubs, because without that information it is not appropriate to pass into law a football regulation Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Markham (Con)]

I genuinely thank noble Lords for their interventions. We are trying to unpack and fix a tricky problem. I completely agree with the suggestion from the noble Lord, Lord Birt, about better boards; of course that is a good idea, but how does the regulator make that happen? Will it be given the powers to force people off boards? I have not heard that; I have not seen that anywhere in the Bill. I fully support recommending a stronger board, but how do you make it happen? The only remedy I see for this in the Bill, and which I keep coming back to, is that clubs have to deposit more money as a sort of punishment.

On the visionary business plan at Brighton, which really was visionary, a regulator at the time could have thought, “That looks a bit risky”—and it probably was a bit risky—“so how do I guard against that?” They could have wondered, “How much does this chairman know about football? He is a poker champion; that is brilliant. He believes in the stats. But he is probably not your conventional person, who you would be going to and asking for more money as a deposit”.

This is what we all keep coming back to. If the only remedy is that the clubs put more money aside—

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for allowing me to intervene. My understanding of the Bill is that the ultimate sanction the regulator can have is to withdraw the licence from the football club. If a football club loses its licence, it ceases to be able to play. It is put in a very difficult situation whatever the remedy: it either complies wholeheartedly with whatever remedy it is told by the regulator to put in place, or it loses its licence and cannot play in the league. Surely that cannot be right.

[Lord Markham (Con)]

Again, I hope the Minister will answer this point. This is what the shadow regulator was explaining to us last week. What is the one thing you can do short of that? You can look to de-risk the situation, particularly if your only criterion is sustainability at that club; in other words, it survives by you saying, “You have to put money on deposit”. That is exactly the model they were taking from the financial regulator and the banks; that is what I see as the whole problem.

It is fundamental. As my noble friend Lord Jackson’s amendment suggests, we could make sure that it is aware of the burdens of regulation, or, as some of the earlier amendments proposed, it could be about broadening the definition and objectives of the regulator so that it has other criteria at stake. I truly believe that, unless we widen it out—it is only one-dimensional—we really are going to harm the great game.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Culture, Media and Sport (Baroness Twycross) (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, for tabling this amendment. I also particularly welcomed the personal account of the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan. I thank all those who contributed, including the noble Lord, Lord Maude of Horsham, who has considerable expertise in regulation. The description from the noble Lord, Lord Birt, of the benefits of regulation, including a strong board and what advantage that might bring, was particularly helpful.

In response to the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, we will cover the scope of specified competition in the next group, so your Lordships’ Committee will come to that shortly.

The amendment seeks to add an explicit requirement for the regulator to have “due regard” to the potential economic harms of overregulation and to report on this. It is an important point to be aired, and I welcome the opportunity to respond to the concerns the noble Lord has. I absolutely agree that overregulation is something to be avoided. It is why the regulator’s general duties and regulatory principles provide sufficient safeguards to prevent this.

The regulation ensures that the regime is proportionate. In particular, Clauses 7 and 8 emphasise the need for the regulator to act in a way that avoids, as far as reasonably possible, adverse effects on investment and competitiveness, and that it should act proportionately.

The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, asked about overregulation and was echoed by the noble Baroness, Lady Brady. The regulator’s general duties require it to have regard to how regulation might affect, among other things, financial investment in English football. Its regulatory principles clearly state the importance of advocacy and the need for the regulator to engage with stakeholders. It must act, as I said, in a proportionate manner. All these measures provide a safeguard against overregulation.

The noble Lords, Lord Hayward and Lord Maude, asked about burdens or potential costs on small clubs and the risk of disproportionate burdens. In addition to the explicit regulatory principle guiding the regulator to be proportionate, the entire system has been designed with this proportionality in mind. For example, the licence conditions placed on clubs will vary depending on their unique circumstances. Where clubs are smaller or lower-risk, the regulator’s requirements will reflect this. This means that the regulator will not impose unnecessary burdens on smaller or already well-run clubs.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

A comment was made about there being no concern for costs outside the Premier League. However, Mark Ives, the general manager of National League, said:

“We are concerned about the costs … The expectation of how much it is going to cost clubs at a National League level is a huge concern—it may be a small amount of money, but it is a lot to the clubs. We are worried about mission creep within the Bill and the additional bureaucracy. There is a lot of duplication of work, such as the licensing system—there’s an expectation for clubs to do two lots of licensing”.


Dagenham & Redbridge chief executive officer, Steve Thompson, said:

“We are worried that the Bill will be so onerous. Some National League clubs work on two or three people and some volunteers … It does really worry me that some of our small clubs will not survive with the regulation and the reporting that is required”.


There may be a proportionate cost, with clubs in the Premier League from the top down paying proportionately but, whatever the cost, there is concern throughout the leagues.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

The noble Baroness raises a particular concern. I am not suggesting by any means that people will not need time to get used to and understand the burdens or costs on smaller clubs but, as I felt I had outlined, I hope that, with enough clarity, the licence conditions—that includes the costs placed on clubs— will vary depending on their unique circumstances. I am sure we will have further opportunities to discuss that as we go forward. Hopefully we can give your Lordships’ Committee and the clubs some reassurance on that point.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

I am very grateful to my noble friend for giving way. Was it not said at some stage during the consideration of the predecessor Bill before the election that it would be a good idea if the regulator was up and running and got some experience of the regime being introduced before considering extending it?

A few minutes ago, we heard that Members opposite thought that this would be too great a burden on smaller clubs. So perhaps it is a good idea to consider when the time is right and what experience the new regulator will have.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

It was the smaller clubs, as well as us, that said it would be a burden to them. I read out what the National League’s general manager said about his clubs and their concerns.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I will address the issue of why the regulatory regime is currently intended to be limited to the top five tiers of football and not to include the National League North and the National League South. The issues we are concerned with arise most typically and markedly in the professional game where the financialisation of clubs is greatest. We recognise that the top five tiers is not necessarily a perfect proxy for the professional game, since some semi-professional and professional clubs can move between these leagues. However, we consider it the most appropriate and proportionate place to draw the line and the place where it would not result in some clubs in the league being subject to regulation and others not. We do not currently believe that extending the scope beyond the top five tiers would be proportionate to the burden on smaller clubs below the National League.

On Amendment 19—and apologies if I am repeating parts of my speech, because it is some time ago that I was actually on my script—in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, I understand his desire to have upfront clarity on the face of the Bill.

Turning to Amendment 21, I thank my noble friend Lady Taylor for putting forward this amendment. As I am sure my noble friend is aware, the Secretary of State would have the ability to specify competitions that are in scope of the regulator and we believe that the top five tiers is a sensible and proportionate place to draw the line.

In relation to the points on hybridity, questions of hybridity are for the examiners, not for the Government. If the amendment is made, there will be a process to be followed that will decide whether the Bill is hybrid and needs to go through the hybrid procedures. Initial advice is that the Bill would be thought to be hybrid and I understand that, following the tabling of Amendment 19 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, and Amendment 21 in the name of my noble friend Lady Taylor, issues have been raised about their hybridity.

The noble Lord, Lord Goodman, asked whether we had discussed with the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee ahead of the process. We would not discuss committee reports with clerks before they draw them up.

I know that noble Lords want to continue to work constructively on the Bill—

Football Governance Bill [HL]

Baroness Brady Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 4th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I refer the Committee to my interests, which are declared in the register. I defer to other noble Lords who have experience of the technicalities of hybridity and parliamentary procedure, but I hope it is helpful and illuminating in this context to raise the issue of consultation with clubs. We are creating legislation that will profoundly affect 116 unique institutions, from Premier League clubs through to the National League community clubs. But it is important for everyone to understand that the consultation with these affected businesses by the current Government has been remarkably limited—almost unbelievably so.

Just seven Premier League clubs—mine was one of them—were granted a brief half-hour meeting with the Secretary of State over the summer. Following this cursory engagement, significant decisions were made that could fundamentally affect the future of English football, most notably with the inclusion of parachute payments within the backstop mechanism. I say again: seven clubs out of 20 have been seen for just half an hour since the Government took office and before they made that seismic decision.

This is particularly concerning given that fundamental issues still remained unresolved. We still lack any clarity on UEFA’s position regarding state interference, for example. This clearly creates profound uncertainty for clubs competing in, or aspiring to, European competition, as well as our national teams. We do not know what the ownership test will look like. This causes significant uncertainty for potential investors as to whether they are able to own a club.

I have listened with real interest to this debate on hybridity. Can the Minister help my understanding here? Can she confirm that, if my noble friends are correct and hybridity is a live question for the Bill, this would give clubs at all levels a real opportunity to present their specific circumstances to Parliament? For example, would it mean that National League clubs could explain their concerns about the regulatory burden and the concerns of the many that they say “would not survive” this regulation? Would it mean that Premier League clubs could have more than half an hour to detail the very serious implications for them, and the risk that we may harm the competitive balance of the Premier League, which we have all agreed that none of us wants to do?

That would be especially important, given that the impact on Premier League clubs is very different from that on other stakeholders in the Bill, as the Premier League is the only party that provides funding to any other part of the football pyramid. The backstop is clearly designed as a mechanism to gain direct access to, and apportion, Premier League revenue and no one else’s. It would allow the IFR to do this even if it was against the Premier League clubs’ will, or even without the clubs’ agreement, even if it was to have a detrimental effect on the clubs and the overall competition that it removes revenue from.

I have spoken to many of my colleagues across the whole football pyramid. We are all alarmed about, and puzzled by, the lack of discussion on the Bill with Ministers. Does the Minister agree that we all want to get the detail of the Bill right, and can she see any downsides to providing meaningful opportunities to hear from all clubs across the football pyramid affected by the legislation?

[Lord Markham (Con)]

I must admit that, probably like other noble Lords, I am scratching my head over this. As the Minister said earlier, it is very clear that the leagues know who we are talking about here and that a large section of the Bill is talking about the whole arrangement, and in Clause 6 about the distribution agreement, the pyramid, the parachute payments and all that. There are only two instances where that counts, in the payments from the Premier League to the other leagues, so it is very clear that we are referring to Premier League and English Football League clubs. I do not think there is any doubt about that at all. As I was taught as a kid, if it walks like a duck, looks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it is probably a duck.

I am pretty sure that this is a hybrid Bill already. I am not an expert, but I cannot see why it is not a hybrid Bill because, as the Minister just said, it is very clear to everyone which leagues we are referring to. The argument that somehow we could not change things if things changed, or if league structures changed, just does not stand up. Just as we are going to nominate which competitions we are talking about under secondary legislation, we could do exactly the same if there was any change in the format of the leagues. The Minister wrote in her letter about trying to stop people gaming the system, but we have a very easy way to stop them gaming the system. It is set up there already—you can change it in secondary legislation, just as the Government intend to do in defining the competitions involved in the first place.

I cannot see any reason why we would not call it as it is. It is as if we were somehow trying to stop the clubs having the proper amount of consultation. As my noble friend Lady Brady just said, it is clear that there has been very little consultation to date. The clubs themselves have said that there was very little consultation. The people here who are members of those clubs probably know more than anyone else about this.

I believe that we are all united in this Committee in wanting the best for football. That comes through very clearly in every conversation we have had. I know that colleagues from right across the spectrum want what is right for football, and I know that the Minister wants what is right for football—so why not give clubs the opportunity to be properly consulted and have proper input on something that is going to profoundly affect the whole game?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

I can confirm to the noble Lord that only seven were invited. They were selected.

[Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)]

To be helpful to the Committee, could the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, give us the names of the seven clubs? That might shed some light on what is going on here. There seems to be an illusion that the Premier League was suddenly born out of the ether, and then provides for all. Players such as Ryan Giggs, Phil Foden and Alan Shearer do not just suddenly materialise; they come up from the other divisions. I get what the noble Baroness is trying to do, and I respect her position, but you have to look at this in a holistic way. This is about a regulator regulating for the five divisions, and if it is not blindingly obvious to anybody what those five divisions are, they may be sat in the wrong place.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. It has been worth while having it again, painful and irritating though it may be. I am sorry if that upset the Minister—it certainly was not my intention to do so. I did it because this issue matters.

By the Minister’s own admission on Monday, she did not know about the issue of hybridity until it was raised with her on Monday. Does she think that a few hours’ consideration, along with all the other matters we gave attention to in Committee on Monday, and a few minutes’ debate in Committee late on Monday evening, is sufficient to dispose of an issue as fundamental as this?

As I said in my opening remarks, the Government Chief Whip knew about this issue at the same time I was alerted by the clerks, on 26 November, almost a week earlier. I am grateful that he stayed to listen to our debate on this group. Maybe he, if not the noble Baroness, can tell us what discussions he had in light of that issue being raised with the usual channels on 26 November. This is about engagement with the people, organisations and businesses that this new law will profoundly affect. I was shocked to hear what my noble friend Lady Brady said about only seven hand-picked clubs being given just half an hour of—

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

As requested, I will clarify who the seven invited clubs were: West Ham, Crystal Palace, Brighton, Liverpool, Spurs, Everton and Brentford.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for providing that information to the Committee. As I am not the world’s greatest aficionado of football, I will leave it to others judge whether that is a representative spread of the beautiful game, but I am interested to hear from the Minister the rationale by which those clubs were selected. I would like to know whether she was present at the half-hour meeting with those clubs and, if she was not, how much time she has given to engaging with clubs before bringing this legislation before your Lordships’ House and asking us to pass it.

As my noble friend Lord Markham set out, the changes the Government have made to the Bill since the last Parliament—on backstops and parachute payments—make this a substantively different Bill. I disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton: this is not a virtually identical Bill; there are some substantial differences in policy terms, to do with parachute payments and so on. I think she would agree that those affect certain leagues and clubs more than others, and engage the question of hybridity and to what extent this Bill is targeting certain groups differently from others.

As with the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, and the noble Baroness, my Amendment 19 was a probing one to see whether we could provide clarity in the Bill for those whom it will regulate, so they know from the outset what they must do and that they must comply with it. Like the noble Baroness, the first I knew was when we received the advice from the Clerk of Legislation explaining that this would make the Bill a hybrid one.

It is worth saying that I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, that the previous Bill, when it was in Committee in another place, was not a hybrid Bill and it was right to conclude that. The question is, if we give that explicit information to the English Football League, the Premier League and the National League, so they know that they are going to be covered by this law—which the Government, in their Explanatory Notes, say they will: something they are happy to say outside the House but are not happy to say in the Bill, because that would afford them the right to come and speak directly to Parliament—then it is a question well worth pausing on, and I make no apology for returning to it today.

I am proud of the way your Lordships’ House scrutinises legislation; we go through things sometimes slowly, more slowly than Governments would wish— I have stood on the other side of these Dispatch Boxes and share the pain the Government Chief Whip and the noble Baroness are feeling today. This is a shining example of the importance of your Lordships’ House and the excellent advice we receive from its clerks. Thanks to that advice, two successive Lords’ Ministers for this Bill have been alerted to the fact that it could become a hybrid Bill if it is said in it what it is trying to do. That is an important point to have returned to in Committee, and I would like to understand from the Minister why, when we pass this law, we should not tell the people it is going to affect that it is going to affect them.

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[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, in the debate on an earlier group we heard some dilemmas around the fact that, for example, Welsh teams such as Wrexham might not be in scope of the Bill. It is possible that Rob McElhenney and Ryan Reynolds will be relieved to discover that they might not be. Those following Wrexham’s progress will know that they spend a great deal of time complaining about the ridiculous regulatory framework that the football club has to negotiate. It is not football regulation but every other—as they say—bonkers regulation that means they cannot build. There are many hoops that they have to jump through.

This is slightly important because, when we have this discussion about suitability and fitness, we constantly see it as scrutiny because we are wary of charlatans. Everybody that has ever been involved in football is anxious about types of owner who might not have football at their heart, but the reality is that many owners of football clubs and many people with influence over them love the game and are nothing but great influences on the clubs. That is obviously why Rob McElhenney and Ryan are well-known heroes worldwide now. But there are also corporate interests that can be just as beneficial and important.

One reason why this is so tricky, why it needs to be clarified and why I am glad to see these amendments in this group is that any discussion about suitability and fitness that gives so much intrusive and overbearing power to a regulator has to be queried to understand exactly what it will mean. The last question from the noble Baroness, Lady Evans, was important: what happens if there is a clash?

Outside of football, the debates on who is suitable to run what are subject to all sorts of subjective and sometimes malicious trouble, caused by people who do not have the best interests of the clubs at heart. If noble Lords have ever spent any time with football fans, they will know that many do not think that their club’s owners are suitable or would pass any suitability test—as I will tell you over a pint. It might well be the gripe of the day.

My point is that the Bill has to be reined in, in terms of how much power has been given to make decisions that are not straightforward or scientific. Until we recognise that there is a danger of unintended consequences, the Minister might—not through any desire to—open a can of worms that will be damaging to many football teams.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak about ownership definitions and tests proposed in the Bill, and particularly to support Amendments 27 to 29 tabled by my noble friend Lord Moynihan.

Although everyone can support proper scrutiny of football club ownership, I have concerns that the current provisions create unnecessary complexity and uncertainty. It is important that we are clear about the purpose of the Bill in this respect. As my noble friend’s amendments demonstrate, the Bill proposes a new definition of ownership that goes beyond current football tests, introducing the concept of influence. This goes beyond the football authority definitions, which focus only on control. Yet the Bill provides little detail about how this extended scope will work in practice or what problems it aims to solve. It will apparently be for the Secretary of State to decide what is meant by “influence”.

Equally concerning is the lack of clarity regarding existing owners. As has already been asked, do the Government envisage using these new powers to retrospectively challenge current ownership arrangements? If not, why create a broader definition than the existing tests? If they do, this represents an extraordinary intervention into private property rights that demands much greater scrutiny.

The Premier League has significantly strengthened its owners tests, including in relation to the Abramovich case, and sanctioned individuals. What evidence suggests that parallel tests, with differing criteria, would improve outcomes, rather than creating uncertainty and potential legal conflict? Without such clarity, we risk creating a framework that deters responsible investment, while failing to address any real problems in football governance.

Let me be clear about another point. As my noble friend Lady Evans pointed out, the EFL is, I believe, very happy to give up its own ownership test to the regulator because it views the exercise as costly and time consuming—that is its right. But the Premier League fully intends to maintain its own ownership tests—why should it not? It is a fundamental right of a members’ organisation to determine its own composition, and the Premier League really is a membership body. We have only 20 clubs, not 72, and it is a fundamental part of how we drive forward the Premier League, grow in international markets and make collective decisions about the future of the game, together with the FA.

Determining who can come into the group is therefore a key part of how we collectively run the Premier League as equal shareholders. I would argue that we have one of the most sophisticated ownership tests in world sport. Yet the Bill would introduce a parallel test, and it would do so without defining its contents. Naturally, this creates immediate uncertainty.

The Bill is troubling, too, on detail. The planned test, which will be for the regulator to create and define at some stage in future, would appear to include more subjective elements than the Premier League’s existing criteria. That would be very strange. Surely it would be quite a good idea if prospective investors and owners could know with confidence, from the outside, whether they qualified to buy a football club. I would be grateful if the Minister could answer a simple question: is the test provided for in the Bill going to be a subjective or an objective test? It obviously cannot be both. As my noble friend Lady Evans said, the practical implications run deeper. What happens when the regulator approves an owner, but the Premier League does not, or vice versa? Can the IFR force the Premier League to take in an owner that it does not want? The Bill makes no provision for resolving such conflicts. Instead, I worry that it creates the perfect conditions for prolonged litigation—exactly what proper regulation should avoid.

Of course, all this uncertainty is likely to be very damaging to investment. Put yourself in the shoes of an investor examining Premier League football as a potential opportunity. They now face not one ownership test but two, both with different criteria. One test is not even defined in legislation. Either could result in rejection. Both could trigger lengthy legal challenges. What serious investor would begin spending the millions of pounds required to explore a transaction in football —on the investment bankers, the lawyers, the due diligence, the regulatory compliance, the tax advisers and the rest of it? Why would we want to introduce such fundamental uncertainty?

I worry that, without far more clarity in the Bill, we risk deterring the very kind of responsible, long-term investors that football needs and wants. I urge the Minister to carefully consider these points. At a minimum, we need clarity on: how conflicts between tests will be resolved; exactly how and why the IFR’s test is intended to be materially different from the existing tests; what provisions exist for managing litigation; why the definition of ownership is wider than that used by the football authorities today, and what the implications are; and, above all, how investment confidence will be maintained.

The goal of proper ownership scrutiny is, of course, completely correct, but we must achieve it through clear, workable mechanisms and not parallel systems that create uncertainty and confusion.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, as well as moving my Amendment 37, I will speak to my further amendments in this group, Amendments 38 and 123. In the letter which she kindly sent to the Committee earlier today, the Minister displayed her familiarity with and affinity for Erskine May and, even if I did not have unbridled delight as to the contents of the letter, I was pleased to see this reference to one of our great constitutional experts and authorities on legislative procedure.

In that spirit, I would like to quote another revered expert on constitution matters, the great AV Dicey, who expounded that:

“The principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty means neither more nor less than this, namely, that Parliament … has, under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament”.


In more recent times, the Constitution Unit at University College London has set out particularly relevant arguments for the importance of parliamentary accountability. In its 2023 briefing Parliamentary Scrutiny: What is it and why does it matter? the unit rightly said that:

“Government accountability to parliament is central to our democratic system”.


I think this all demonstrates that the right of Parliament to oversee and hold public bodies to account must be upheld dearly as well.

This new regulator, which we are bringing about through this Bill, will at the start of its existence have recourse to public funds. It is crucial that any body which has funding streams derived from the taxpayer at any point should be accountable to and scrutinised by Parliament. That is what Amendment 123 requires.

Amendment 37 seeks to ensure that any person who is appointed to the board of the regulator must be approved by a parliamentary committee, and Amendment 38 requires the chief executive to appear before a parliamentary committee at least once a year if they have been so invited. This ensures that anyone who is going to be holding any formal position in this new regulator can be scrutinised by parliamentarians before they can be appointed.

Following on from the debates in the two groups that we have just had about conflicts of interest, it may be that rather than setting it out in the Bill, as the probing amendments sought to do, the parliamentary oversight that we could bring about this way might be able to give us the reassurances we seek that the people who are given these awesome new responsibilities are doing so without conflicts of interest or the pressures on them that we wish to resist. I beg to move.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I support this group of amendments, which I think are very helpful because they will help to tease out one of the real challenges at the heart of this Bill—how to achieve the right balance of proper oversight with the absolute necessity of delivering regulatory independence. We should, of course, acknowledge the natural instinct to ensure democratic accountability of any new regulator. Given the cultural and economic importance of football to our nation, Parliament should rightly maintain some oversight of how this new body exercises its considerable powers.

The question “Who regulates the regulator?” is beginning to be asked more and more often, not least in relation to the many clear failings of UK regulators, and rightly so. However, I believe we must also tread with real care here. Football’s international governing bodies, UEFA and FIFA, have clear provisions against state interference in the game. While their primary concern has historically been direct government control of national associations, they could well choose to interpret these provisions more broadly. We have already seen their willingness to act even in response to the mere creation of this regulator, and we have seen the Government’s instant removal of a clause in this Bill relating to foreign and trade policy. This tension means we must achieve a delicate balancing act: too little accountability and we clearly risk regulatory overreach; too much involvement of the state and our democratic institutions and we risk creating leverage that could be used against English football’s interest.

I have already spoken about some of the risks here. If Select Committee oversight and IFR responsibility to both bodies was seen as political interference, it could feasibly create that leverage we have warned about whereby clubs participating in European competition, or even England’s tournament participation, is put in jeopardy. We have already seen concerning signs of how these tensions might play out. In just a short time since this Bill’s introduction, we have witnessed numerous attempts to expand the regulator’s scope from environmental sustainability to ticketing prices and kick-off times to corporate responsibility requirements. I am concerned about how this pressure might intensify with direct parliamentary oversight.

Members of the other place, responding quite correctly to constituents’ concerns, might press the regulator to intervene in broadcast arrangements or ticket allocations, or elements that go to the heart of competition tools that should be reserved for the leagues. Select Committees could demand action on issues far beyond the regulator’s core financial sustainability purpose. Each intervention, however well intentioned, risks creating exactly the kind of state interference that could threaten English football’s international position.

We have seen this pattern in other sectors: regulatory mission creep that is driven by political pressure and external events. Football’s unique international framework makes this dynamic particularly dangerous. Every expansion of scope and political intervention creates new vulnerability to UEFA and FIFA leverage. I would be grateful if the Minister, when she responds, could explain how the Government intend to manage these competing demands. How will they maintain appropriate accountability while preventing political pressure from expanding the regulator’s remit? How will they ensure that parliamentary oversight does not become a backdoor for state intervention in football’s affairs? What safeguards will protect against the regulator being drawn into issues that should remain matters for the football authorities only?

Finally, I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm whether this issue has been directly discussed with UEFA and, if so, what its view is on how the IFR’s independence should be preserved in this respect. It seems clear that without comprehensive assurances on every single aspect of the IFR and how it will operate, we risk inadvertently subjecting English football to permanent external control. The irony of creating this leverage will be quite incredible. In seeking to protect our game through regulation, we must not end up permanently compromising its independence and losing control of English football for ever.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

My Lords, when the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, started speaking, I thought that we were going to have a first. She started off by agreeing with the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, on some points that I would agree with him on. Then she went totally against that and said that a Select Committee might be too interfering. I point out to her that the Select Committee that covers DCMS has, for many years, talked about the problems in football such as ticket pricing and the timing of matches. That has not impinged in any way on any international arrangements.

We have to make a clear distinction between Parliament and the Executive, because we are not talking about state control or government control. What we are talking about in this amendment is a proper accountability for any regulator. As I mentioned at Second Reading, I have the privilege of chairing the Industry and Regulators Committee of this House. We had a report about who regulates the regulator, so it is strange that the noble Baroness should use those words. This is not about regulating the regulator; it is actually about holding regulators to account. Both Houses have a very important role to play in making sure that regulators are held to account by Parliament.

I go further: if some of the regulators had been held to account more closely by Parliament in recent years, we would not, for example, have the crisis that we have today in the water industry. There has been a failure of Parliament to hold regulators to account.

My Amendment 89 is not grouped with these amendments but covers very similar points and the same principle. I hope that the Minister will give us an assurance that Parliament will have a role to play in holding all regulators to account, including the independent football regulator.

Football Governance Bill [HL]

Baroness Brady Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 4th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Addington (LD)]

My Lords, I will make some brief comments. As I read the Bill, the Secretary of State providing some finance might be necessary, particularly in starting up. One of the things we do not want is an underresourced regulator blundering around making mistakes. A bad regulator is the worst outcome you can have, and that is usually because it lacks resources. When the Minister responds, can she give us some idea about when the power to give extra money would be used? This being done badly would be the worst result.

When the noble Lord, Lord Markham, talked about regulation, I am afraid I kept thinking about Fulham and Al Fayed. Are your internal control structures right? Are you doing something wrong? The damage that could be done by bad organisation immediately catches in the back of my throat. The regulation will not be straightforwardly financial; it is also about reporting structures, the care of your workforce, et cetera. Surely that should be covered by the Bill. These are questions about where you draw the line. If we have a regulator, does it regulate the whole thing? I think it has to; it cannot be just financial. If these are socially important structures—this is what we keep coming back to—we have to look at this question.

The noble Lord, Lord Hayward, has a point about the costs involved. I hope that we will get an answer when the Minister responds—at least a rough ballpark figure—because it will clarify what we will do. Those of us who approved the idea of a regulator think that it has to be properly resourced and that it has to cover the whole thing. I hope that the Minister can give us a little more guidance about what will happen and what the Government’s thinking is at this point, because they should have an answer by now.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, my understanding from the Premier League is that the Government’s estimated cost of the regulator is £10 million a year, and the Premier League considers that to be very low. We have heard a lot about how the regulator has been based on banking regulation, but the FCA costs £762 million a year and Ofcom costs £127 million a year.

It is worth noting that there are two critical but unrealistic assumptions in the impact assessment. First, it assumes perfect compliance, and, secondly, it focuses solely on ongoing compliance costs, such as information-gathering and engagement with the regulator and supporters. It does not account for the potential costs associated with, for example, licence conditions enforcement action that may arise through the commitments procedures. I completely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hayward.

In earlier debates in Committee, I read out what Mark Ives, the general manager of the National League, said:

“We are concerned about the costs … The expectation of how much it is going to cost clubs at a National League level is a huge concern—it may be a small amount of money, but it is a lot to the clubs”.


He went on to say that many clubs in the National League are run by volunteers. We should give the clubs an idea of what it will cost, so they can work that into the budget. Each club should know whether it will be fully funded and fully staffed, so it can do the right job.

We have heard throughout Committee that the powers will be extended. The more that the powers are extended then the more complicated the Bill will be, the more staff they will need and the more costs there will be. Each club has to pay that cost because it has to have a licence. The way that you discharge the cost of the regulator is to add it to the licence. All 116 clubs, even though they are not listed in the Bill, will need to obtain one of those licences to operate.

Cost is a huge concern. It appears from what has been said that the Premier League would be picking up the majority of that cost. There is a big difference in the Premier League between those at the very top and those at the very bottom; they have very different pressures on their finances. I can only endorse what my noble friend Lord Hayward said and urge the Minister to give us an indication.

[Lord Mann (Lab)]

I am curious. There have been a lot of detailed discussions over the last three years with the Premier League and with Premier League clubs—I was involved in many of them. The Premier League was suggesting—it was not the only one—that for people in the Premier League, and the Premier League as an institution, a model of self-regulation would be a lot better. It would be helpful to know what costing the Premier League has built into its model of self-regulation, as it was certainly thrown around as an alternative for quite some time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Mann (Lab)]

There have been extraordinarily levels of dialogue between the Premier League and the Government over a long period on this. The suggestion that the Premier League does not have some idea of the likely potential cost and has not spoken to clubs in relation to that is simply nonsense. I have spoken to clubs which have given specific estimates of what they anticipate it will be. Whether that is accurate or not, the idea that those figures have not been discussed at length is something of a fantasy.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

I am sorry to intervene on the intervention, but I have not seen the noble Lord at any Premier League meetings; I have been to them all. I can assure him that we have never had a discussion about the potential costs, because we have never known what the potential costs are; no one has told them to us. We have looked at the impact assessment and that has given us a vague estimation, but to suggest that we have had a long, detailed discussion and debate, and that we understand and know what the costs are, is not correct.

[Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, and the noble Lord, Lord Mann, for his intervention. He seemed to think I was talking about Premier League clubs. I was not. I was saying that the Minister had said that she did not want to specify in the Bill which clubs were going to be regulated, so the club does not know whether it will be regulated, and it certainly does not know how much it will cost it. The noble Lord might shake his head, but that is a fairly obvious point. We do not know who will pay. We also do not know what it will cost. I believe the noble Lord, Lord Hayward, talked about an estimate of £10 million—I beg your pardon; it was the noble Lord, Lord Markham.

Football Governance Bill [HL]

Baroness Brady Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 9th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 57 in this first group. I am delighted to see the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, in his place and I appreciate his cameo role in this Committee. I had not noticed him here for most of the deliberations of the Committee, but we welcome him anyway.

This is a probing amendment to press the Government on how much intervention they envisage the regulator pursuing in the internal financial affairs of clubs. It is a probing amendment because we on this side seek to solicit from the Minister more precise details, which are not in the Bill, about how much she and the Government envisage the independent football regulator having a part to play in the technical minutiae of the finances of each club.

Because of the nature of the Bill and the wide-ranging powers under its Henry VIII clauses, we simply do not know the degree of interference in those 116 clubs. For instance, will a club be required periodically to enunciate its liquidity requirements on a quarterly, half-yearly or annual basis? What debt cap rules will they have? What player acquisition and sales issues will the regulator become involved in?

Importantly, there are also the decisions taken by the boards of the 116 football clubs around land and property, which are covered elsewhere in the Bill but relate to this amendment—where they play and what contractual arrangements they may have with landowners on a rental, leasehold or freehold basis. Will the regulator be prescriptive about which banking arrangements, and with which organisations, each club is free to enter into?

These are important issues. This Committee’s effective scrutiny requires more insight from the Government into the regulator’s intentions regarding financial regulation, not least because other non-departmental public bodies already have significant powers and the capacity to intervene directly in what are, in effect, small and medium-sized enterprises and significant, big businesses turning over large amounts of money. There are the Financial Conduct Authority, the Competition and Markets Authority and His Majesty’s Revenue & Customs, and local authorities have widespread powers to intervene in the everyday activities of the clubs contained within their local government areas. There are also various companies Acts, such as the Companies Act 2006 and that of 2016, that are within the bailiwick of the interface between government and football clubs.

As we asked on the sweeping powers over raising finance, and since the Bill does not expand on this, is Parliament not being asked to write a blank cheque to allow the Government to regulate as they wish? Not just the Premier League but clubs in other leagues are most concerned about this because of the nature of this legislation. Will the Minister address the concerns of each of those clubs about the powers of the regulator potentially to interfere in each club’s everyday financial affairs?

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I refer the Committee to my interests declared in the register. I support Amendment 71 tabled by my noble friend Lord Markham, which raises a crucial point regarding the backstop mechanism. We must be clear at the outset about what this mechanism governs and, critically, what it does not.

First, it is vital to understand that the backstop is categorically not about the fair apportionment of collective football revenues. Each party—the Premier League and the EFL—has its own central broadcast revenues. Indeed, the EFL has just secured a landmark five-year domestic broadcasting deal worth nearly £1 billion, increasing its central revenues by 50% from next season. This is testament to the Championship’s growing competitiveness and appeal.

I will not dwell on the fact that many of its recipients are incredibly wealthy—I believe there are nine billionaire owners in the Championship, along with many other extremely well-funded ownership groups—but I will dwell on the fact that, despite its very healthy income, the EFL does not give any money to the National League. It gives no funding to the leagues directly below it. It is the Premier League that supports the National League. Far from some sort of neutral arbitration to allow all parties to share with each other, the backstop is in fact a mechanism for the forcible redirection of billions of pounds of Premier League revenue only. In other words, this is one set of private businesses handing over money to another competing set, even if they do not want to give more than the £1.6 billion they already do and it damages their ability to compete.

The critical point, therefore, is that this backstop mechanism represents a completely unprecedented and untested intervention in what are the private commercial rights of Premier League clubs only. It impacts uniquely on Premier League clubs. The gravity and novelty of such an intervention demands the most careful consideration. Crucially, the backstop introduces a major and radical change in the Bill: the inclusion of parachute payments. This decision was taken without adequate consultation with Premier League clubs.

I mentioned earlier in Committee that just seven out of 20 clubs were invited to a 30-minute meeting on the Bill with the Secretary of State between the Government taking office in July and the decision, which was taken in October. It is no surprise that this lack of consultation has produced such a reckless decision. There simply cannot have been an appropriate understanding by the Government of its potential consequences.

Parachute payments are not a financial convenience; they are a cornerstone of the Premier League’s competitive balance. Without them, clubs cannot plan for long-term investment, or the stability required to maintain the intense competitiveness that is the hallmark of the Premier League and a significant driver of its global appeal. Parachutes are also—this is an often-overlooked point—a key part of the financial incentives for Championship clubs to invest in that league, knowing that if they reach the promised land, it will not all be undone with one bad year.

To fundamentally alter this system risks undermining the very factors that have made the Premier League such a global success and one of the UK’s greatest soft power assets. Potentially harming the magic ingredient of the Premier League’s competitive balance threatens to destabilise long-term commitments, jeopardising investment in lower-league stadiums, academies and community programmes. I believe it would fundamentally undermine the Championship, too.

We should also consider the concerns raised by UEFA. It has warned that the backstop mechanism could disrupt the balance of power in football governance and negatively affect the competitive equilibrium in both domestic and European competitions. UEFA has urged the Government to carefully reconsider their approach, emphasising that mandating redistribution in this way risks deterring amicable solutions and the very investments that underpin the success of English football.

This unprecedented intervention into private commercial rights must be carefully scrutinised. It very obviously has a differential and disproportionate impact on the clubs within the Premier League. It is also clear that the consequences of this seismic and deeply flawed intervention have not been fully understood. We do, as UEFA has said, need to reconsider this critical issue.

[Lord Markham (Con)]

I rise to speak to my amendment to Clause 71 on financial redistribution, and to add to the very valuable points made by my noble friend Lady Brady.

What the Bill seeks to do—which I have not seen in relation to any other regulator in the UK—is to give the regulator unprecedented powers to take money from one part of the sector or certain companies and give it to another. In any other field, this would be unheard of. Can you imagine the FCA saying, “I think HSBC should give some money to Barclays”? Can you imagine Ofwat saying to Severn Trent, “Thames Water is having a bit of a hard time, can you help it out”? Can you imagine Ofcom saying that Sky should help ITV out where advertising revenues are going down? That is unheard of among regulators.

I value the days in Committee as there is such knowledge around the House, so I would love it if any noble Lord could come up with an example of where a regulator has got the power to take away money from a part of the sector or company and give it to another. I would love to hear it.

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[Lord Reay (Con)]

My Lords, I wish to speak briefly to Amendment 249, laid down by the noble Lord, Lord Mann, and Amendment 156 from the noble Lord, Lord Bassam. Regrettably, I was not able to participate at Second Reading, for which I apologise. I declare an interest as an enthusiastic football fan and supporter of West Ham United since the days of Bobby Moore and Geoff Hurst—which dates me a bit.

Clause 20 of this Bill introduces corporate governance duties with regard to equality, diversity and inclusion. Amendment 249 from the noble Lord, Lord Mann, would create an additional duty on football clubs to produce an annual report detailing the club’s diversity and inclusion strategy. This sounds in theory like a good thing. The problem here is that the Football Association’s idea of diversity and inclusion seems to be to promote some forms of diversity while silencing—even excluding—others.

The current approach at the FA punishes and excludes one particular group: women who object to male inclusion in the women’s game. Noble Lords have previously spoken in this House about the 17 year-old girl who was disciplined and suspended for asking a male player on the pitch in a women’s game, “Are you a bloke—a male player in a women’s game?” She was suspended. That is not inclusion.

Amendment 156, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, proposes that the corporate government statement must include a club’s plan to improve the diversity of season ticket holders, staff and senior managers. The FA’s investigations unit helped Newcastle United Football Club collect personal information about a lesbian fan which resulted in her suspension by the club from attending matches because someone at her club did not like her social media posts. This behaviour by the FA and the club is not inclusion.

Both examples show intolerance of what are called gender-critical views—that is, the ordinary scientific and common-sense understanding that there are two sexes, that human beings cannot change sex and that sex matters. Those are mainstream views and they are critical to ensuring fairness and safety in sport. People who hold and express them are protected against discrimination and harassment on the basis of belief by the Equality Act 2010, but the FA is punishing female players and fans for expressing these views.

Through its partnership with Stonewall, the FA has made its campaign one of intolerance, disallowing the expression of any views other than the mantra of “trans women are women”. When diversity and inclusion is defined by more tolerance, I shall welcome it. If we compel English football to pursue more of this so-called diversity and inclusion, it will be at the further expense of women and girls.

What is the solution? The solution is to stop talking in vague terms about diversity and inclusion and have the courage to talk about the groups who need to be included: women and girls, gay men and those who are disabled. Let us have less of the thought-policing and more genuine inclusion. Until we can do that, we must oppose the further imposition of vague diversity and inclusion requirements, because they are anything but inclusive.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, before I speak to Amendment 156 in particular, I want to address a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett. There have been 51 clubs in the Premier League since its inception, and there are no permanent members of the Premier League. The Premier League is responsible. It works in a way that looks after the entire pyramid, with its £1.6 billion voluntary redistribution, and it is that money that powers the entire Premier League.

I have spent 32 years—almost all my career—working in professional football across the Football League and the Premier League. My suggestions for amendments are, in a way, to assist the Government to make the Bill work better and avoid the unintended consequences that we all fear and keep warning about.

Amendment 156, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, concerns inclusion and diversity among season ticket holders in the corporate governance statement. I want to say at the outset that diversity is undoubtedly a critical issue in any industry, and football is no exception. Clubs across the pyramid should and do strive to be welcoming and inclusive spaces for all. However, with respect to the noble Lord, the amendment makes a profound and dangerous error. It proposes to involve the regulator in micromanaging some of the most fiercely prized and deeply personal relationships that football clubs hold: their connection with their season ticket holders.

Season ticket holders are the beating heart of football clubs. They are not just customers; they are custodians of the club’s heritage and identity. They represent generations of loyalty, support and community spirit. To suggest that the club should be required to actively manage and engineer the diversity of this group fundamentally misunderstands the organic and deeply embedded nature of these relationships. It risks turning something sacred and delicate into a crude tick-box exercise. For what purpose? To satisfy an external regulator’s misguided notion of progress. I cannot stress enough how risky that would be. It is yet another sign of the scope creep and dangers that lurk in the Bill.

I am not saying that football does not have a role to play in promoting diversity and inclusion—it absolutely does, and clubs up and down the country are already leading by example in the brilliant work that they do every day in this regard. But these initiatives arise from the clubs themselves, born out of genuine commitment and not fear of regulatory overreach. That is how to foster real, lasting change—not by imposing quotas or forcing clubs to meet arbitrary targets but by working with them to build on the good will and trust that they already share with their communities.

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[Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)]

I hear what the noble Baroness says about diversity. This weekend, a West Ham player, Antonio, had a terrible car accident and is in hospital now. If you had seen some of the vile and disgusting comments on social media about the player and the club, you would begin to understand why we need diversity.

I have just looked it up, and the dictionary says that diversity is

“the practice or quality of including or involving people from a range of different social and ethnic backgrounds and of different genders, sexual orientations”,

and that

“equality and diversity should be supported for their own sake”.

I do not have that rosy picture of football supporters. I lived through the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s and heard the chants at various football grounds, which we cannot now repeat in this Chamber. Things are getting better and more acceptable, but it has not gone away. We need diversity to be brought to the fore.

As for the idea that we can just let the clubs do nothing and let this evolve, that just will not happen. We need to make statements. We need, via the regulator and via some of these amendments, to enshrine things in a regulator’s role. What is wrong with having a diversity report that a football club would produce once a year? It is not a tick-box exercise; it stops comments being made about certain footballers about gender, colour, creed or whatever. The more we can introduce that and embed it into football, the less vitriolic nonsense we will get. You still hear it, even on Sky, when they then say, “If you heard anything you shouldn’t have heard, we apologise for that”. That is what you get as an answer—but it needs stopping. These kinds of amendments are needed to enshrine in the regulator the ability to say to clubs, “You will give that report and commit to doing all those things around what diversity means”.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for his comments about the West Ham player, Michail Antonio. It was a real shock to me on Saturday when I received a call from the police about his car accident, but I am pleased to report that he has had an operation and is recovering well. I take the opportunity to thank all the NHS staff and all the emergency services, including the air ambulance and the firefighters who cut him free from his car.

I agree with the noble Lord that the comments footballers are subject to is a terrible shame. It is absolutely horrific and that is a problem with social media. Clubs themselves do everything they can. At West Ham, we have the highest standard of equality and diversity; you cannot be awarded any higher standard than we have. We take it very seriously and that feeds down through our entire club. I thank him for making those comments. Football is trying to deal with those things, but there could be help from other places. We know about the Online Safety Act and that could really help.

[Baroness Young of Hornsey (CB)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 157. I declare an interest as a Premier League season ticket holder. I apologise to the Committee for not having been present during previous debates on the Bill, but I have endeavoured to keep up with its progress.

This part of our discussion seems to overlay lots of different and very complex issues, piling them all into one or two amendments. As I speak to Amendment 157, I will try to focus on governance and having independent, non-executive directors on boards, which is absolutely essential when looking at this issue. As the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, has pointed out, there is this idea of football clubs being not just a business or a commercial entity, as other commercial entities are. They are also considered to be community assets, so there is a wide range of stakeholders involved in the promotion, adoration, despair and all the other emotions that go with being a football fan. As has been rightly pointed out, it almost defines something about England.

It is therefore important to try to ensure, as far as possible without being too prescriptive, that we have independent non-executive directors on boards because of the accountability. At the moment, I think many fans feel that there is no accountability. I take on board a lot of the points made about how progressive and determined clubs are to counter the horrible things that happen online and elsewhere, but clubs have also not been terribly successful in changing the faces that sit around those boardroom tables. If we look at reviews such as Sir John Parker’s review of ethnic diversity on boards, there has been some improvement in some sectors. I would gladly be persuaded by those who know better if it is the case that diversity has been increased around those tables.

That is just one part of it. To me, this feels like a move for basic good practice. We have the Nolan principles and we have guidance from the Institute of Directors. All those kinds of guidelines need transparency and people to speak up for them who do not have an interest in a particular way on those boards.

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[Lord Markham (Con)]

I hope that this proves to be a quicker debate, because I would hope that what we are talking about here are not controversial measures but measures that go to the heart of the regulatory framework we are trying to establish. It is a shame that the noble Lord, Lord Addington, is not in his place. Although we are supportive of the principles of regulation, as my noble friend Lord Hayward said, we are trying to make sure that that regulation is set up in the right way.

Our debates in Committee stage so far have all been about the first few pages of the Bill, which are about the regulatory framework and objectives; the point of my Amendment 56 is that if you only have an objective of sustainability, it is one-dimensional and that is not good for the game. I will freely admit that I have spoken to a Premier League club which wrote to me about that—Brentford—and I hope that noble Lords would agree that Brentford is exactly the sort of club we should listen to in this sort of debate, because it is a club that has come through the divisions and is seen as a well-run model club—and one definitely not guaranteed its place in the Premier League. So it has an important contribution to make to this debate.

The letter that Brentford wrote to me and to local MPs says: “a regulatory framework that prioritises stability above all else would be disproportionate. It could mean the regulator financially constraining some Premier League clubs more than others. For Brentford, a club that has risen against the odds to the Premier League, such restrictions risk stifling our ability to grow and compete with larger, established clubs”. That is why I tabled this amendment, to expand the regulator objectives. Otherwise, there is the danger exactly as written in the letter, which I am happy to share with all Members here and which has also been sent to local MPs.

The exact concern of Brentford’s chairman is that, if the regulatory framework is just based on financial sustainability, it risks entrenching the closed-shop nature of the top clubs and will restrict the ability of the Brentfords of the world to compete. From its point of view, having an objective that promotes the growth of all English football, protects financial investment in the game and means that you know you can reap the rewards from investing in a club is very important. Amendment 56 seeks to add this, and is, I hope, uncontroversial, because who would not want to promote growth? We know that that is the Government’s number one objective, and it is fundamental to the Bank of England’s remit and a lot of other regulators also have growth objectives.

In the new clause proposed in my Amendment 58, subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) refer to the “financial soundness” and “resilience” of clubs and aim to ensure that the regulator takes into account the whole financial picture of clubs, looking at their assets and liabilities—their whole balance sheet—and their ability to meet any future liabilities. In other words, we want a holistic picture of their sustainability. Funnily enough, that is akin to what the Chancellor announced in the Budget about government spending and so-called “persnuffle”—or PSNFL—which looks at assets and liabilities to make sure you have a rounded picture of the health of the Government’s, or the country’s, finances. Amendment 58 tries to encourage a similar approach to looking at the overall wealth of a club and its overall balance sheet strengths.

Proposed new subsection (1)(c) looks to make sure that the heritage of English football, which we all agree is vital to all this, is rounded out in its definition, while proposed new subsection (1)(d) looks at all the things that are key to the health of the overall game. It would make sure that the regulator, when it looks at how it acts in this space, looks at the overall health of the game—the growth of football in terms of TV viewership, matchday audience, fan engagement, number of clubs and number of fans. I shall not repeat the arguments that we made earlier, but noble Lords will be aware that these are the key things—that media rights go to the heart of the value and TV stations around the world pay to back those media rights, for the health of those sorts of objectives that we would like to see it have.

That is why, in introducing this amendment, I am trying to make sure that we have a much more rounded definition, going to the heart of the framework of what we hope the regulator would look to do and have in place. I hope that noble Lords will be able to support what I hope is a very sensible objective and will take on board the concerns of the Brentford chair—if it was only one-dimensional and looking at financial sustainability alone. I hope that the Minister will be able to take those points away for further consideration. I beg to move.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

I support Amendments 56 and 58, tabled by my noble friend Lord Markham, which together propose critical enhancements to the objectives of the regulator. These amendments seek to establish clear and ambitious goals for the regulator, while ensuring that its powers remain proportionate and carefully defined.

Amendment 56 introduces two new objectives for the regulator: to promote the growth of English football and to promote and protect financial investment in the game. These objectives are not just desirable; they seem to me to be essential, if we are to preserve the vibrancy, competitiveness and international appeal of English football.

The Premier League is the crown jewel of global football. Its growth and success have been driven by significant financial investments, made in good faith and with the legitimate expectation of stable and predictable regulatory conditions. Without that certainty, clubs would not have been able to commit to the infrastructure, youth development or community programmes that are now the pillars of our game. Yet, as currently framed, the regulator’s remit is heavily focused on constraints, restrictions and redistribution. While these may be important, without taking growth into account, they risk creating a chilling effect on the investment that has driven English football to its current heights. To constrain without also providing balance is to risk stagnation or, worse, managed decline.

Amendment 58 complements this by providing detailed definitions of these new objectives. It outlines what growth means in practical terms: increasing TV viewership, matchday attendance, fan engagement, the number of clubs and the number of fans. These are good proxies, in my view, for the growth of football and ensuring that the regulator’s actions are aligned with the long-term health of the game. Although promoting growth and protecting investment are vital, I listened carefully to the Minister’s argument that a growth duty or purpose could in fact be scope-widening. I believe that she indicated that it could place the regulator in conflict with the broader European framework of football governance. This would risk significant repercussions—but only, of course, for those clubs competing in European competitions.

This is one of the tensions at the heart of the Bill. You could have proper balance in the regulatory regime’s design, so that it is de-risked, light-touch, pro-growth and business-friendly and protects this highly successful industry—but, in doing so, you potentially risk the future of a smaller number of clubs which may, one day, be barred from European competition. Alternatively, you could do what the Government have done, and you therefore risk setting up the regulator to be harmful to growth, overly intrusive, risk-averse and dampening to investment—but, in doing so, you are more likely to be compliant with UEFA, although no one has been able to provide a cast-iron guarantee on that.

In supporting these amendments, I urge Ministers to take this opportunity to refine the objectives of the IFR to set it firmly on the path to success. We need to create objectives that support football’s future without overextending the regulator’s reach or compromising the autonomy of competition tools, which must rightly remain the domain of the competitions themselves. I hope that, as we deepen our scrutiny of the Bill, we can find a better balance.

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[Lord Moynihan (Con)]

I will pick up on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, and refer to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Mann. My understanding is that the regulator cannot take the women’s game into account, even where, in theory, the accounts may relate to both. Indeed, on the face of the Bill, as I read it—I look forward to the Minister’s clarification—it would be possible for clever accounting to move money and, indeed, even financial exposure, across to the women’s game and therefore exclude it from the consideration of the regulator. I hope I am wrong in that. I can see that there would be ample opportunity for approaches to the accounts and the financial strength of clubs to be manipulated in a way that I am sure was not the intention of the Government or the regulator. The Minister will no doubt clarify that when she comes to respond.

This goes back to the possibility of amending the scope of the Bill in the future. In other words, as the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, said, this is exclusively a men’s regulator. I was a bit concerned about the language in the report to Parliament and to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which was prepared by the department, recommending that women’s football be “given a chance” to self-regulate. That is rather a condescending phrase to the sport. Therefore, it is not surprising that a number of people in the sport have been rather concerned that the women’s game has not been given equal opportunity. UEFA has brought in solidarity payments for the Women’s Champions League clubs to support the growth of the women’s game. That is not the case in the UK. I can completely see the arguments that people like Kelly Simmons have made: if the benefits of the regulator are as strong as the Minister has expressed to the Committee, then it could enhance and expand club licensing criteria to raise standards in women’s football—the performance of women’s football as well as medical and welfare provision.

If the Bill offers so strong a benefit to the sport as the Minister makes out, it is unfortunate that the women’s game should be put to one side and simply told it is being given a chance to prove itself and, in due course, might see the benefits that the Minister says exist in this Bill for football. That is my biggest concern. I think it is a concern felt by many in women’s football; I see the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, nodding in assent.

It is important for the Minister to address both the role of the regulator in relation to what a football club does to promote women’s football and the wider implication that many in women’s football feel: that they are being somehow excluded from the great benefits we have regularly heard about in Committee from the Minister about the game as a whole.

I hope the Minister will respond to both those points; that would be helpful to the Committee. If they are not positive responses, then this will perhaps be something we should return to at a later stage, to make sure that the women’s game is not disadvantaged by the introduction of the regulator.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak on Amendments 65, 70 and 72, which focus on ensuring financial support for the women’s game and protecting it from many adverse impacts resulting from the Bill.

While I respect the intention behind these amendments, I believe that they are not strictly necessary. I want to underline the significant commitment that many Premier League clubs already have to the women’s game. A vast majority of Premier League clubs operate women’s teams—including West Ham, which had a fantastic 5-2 win yesterday. We do that not as an obligation but as a genuine commitment to growing and professionalising women’s football. We all want our women’s teams to succeed, thrive and contribute to the broader success story of English football.

The truth is that not one WSL team makes any money—actually, not one even breaks even. They all lose between £1.5 million and £5 million a year, so they are currently wholly reliant on the men’s teams playing in the Premier League for their funding. The Premier League’s commitment is not just rhetorical; it is backed by meaningful action. Premier League clubs have provided substantial financial support and shared their expertise, facilities and resources. A recent example of that is a £20 million interest-free loan, which was made available to the women’s NewCo to help build a robust foundation for future growth, alongside a co-operation agreement with the Premier League to assist with growing, commercialising and attracting investment to the women’s game. The Premier League also invests £6 million in over 70 emerging talent centres across the country, to bring brilliant and diverse talent into the women’s and girls’ game from the widest possible range of backgrounds.

Football Governance Bill [HL]

Baroness Brady Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 9th December 2024 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Brady]

67A: Clause 7, page 5, line 26, at end insert—
“(d) differential impact on regulated clubs participating in, or seeking to qualify for, competitions organised by international football bodies.”

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 67A in my name addresses a critical oversight in the Bill. It is intended to properly recognise the clearly differential impact of regulation on certain clubs, specifically those participating in or seeking to qualify for competitions organised by international governing bodies. This amendment is essential to ensuring that the unique challenges faced by Premier League clubs, especially in the context of UEFA and FIFA, are properly understood and accounted for.

I begin with the elephant in the room: UEFA’s refusal to endorse this regulatory regime. We know that UEFA has explicitly raised objections to the Bill’s provisions, warning that mandatory redistributions and other aspects of state interference risk breaching its rules on the autonomy of sport. This is no small matter. UEFA and FIFA hold significant leverage over clubs competing in their competitions, and they have made it clear that this leverage could be exercised if the Bill’s provisions conflict with their frameworks. Premier League clubs that qualify for European competition—clubs that have spent years building their competitiveness and investing in their success—are now being placed in an unenviable and unique position. They face the very real risk that this regulatory framework could put them in conflict with UEFA and FIFA, creating ongoing uncertainty and jeopardising their ability to compete on the European stage.

The consequences of such a conflict are potentially catastrophic, not just for the clubs involved, although it affects them uniquely, but for the reputation and stability of English football as a whole. The differential impact of the Bill in this respect is stark. Premier League clubs, particularly those involved in UEFA competitions, are the only entities at risk of disqualification due to regulatory conflicts. They are also the only clubs that must navigate both domestic regulation and the additional compliance burdens imposed by UEFA licensing. This small class of clubs is being asked to shoulder very specific, disproportionate burdens and risks that directly affect their operations, financial stability and competitive standing. Let us not forget that these clubs are the financial engine of the football pyramid. They generate billions in revenue, attract international investment and support grass-roots football through solidarity payments. Yet the Bill places them in a uniquely precarious position, where their ability to operate and succeed could be undermined by regulatory uncertainty and conflict with international governing bodies.

Unlike lower league clubs, Premier League clubs that aspire to European success operate under the shadow of UEFA’s and FIFA’s leverage. This is not a temporary issue; it is a permanent dynamic. UEFA has already made it clear in correspondence, which the Government has refused to publish, that certain provisions in the Bill could jeopardise compliance with its framework. This gives UEFA and FIFA ongoing leverage over Premier League clubs, creating a regulatory environment that could become fundamentally unstable.

The Bill compounds this problem by failing to address how the regulator would navigate these international conflicts. While it empowers the regulator to impose unprecedented interventions, such as backstop powers over financial distributions, it does so without requiring the regulator to consult or co-ordinate with UEFA or FIFA. This omission leaves clubs caught between competing regulatory demands with no clear resolution mechanism.

The potential consequences of these conflicts go beyond individual clubs. If Premier League clubs are disqualified from European competitions, or face ongoing regulatory uncertainty, it would damage the Premier League’s reputation, diminish its global competitiveness and, ultimately, reduce the revenues that flow down the pyramid. This is not scaremongering. It is a very real risk, uncovered by this Committee, which this the amendment addresses.

The amendment also speaks to a broader issue of fairness. Premier League clubs are being disproportionately impacted by the Bill, including the backstop, because they are the only funder of other leagues in the pyramid. Yet their unique position and vulnerabilities are not adequately reflected in the legislation. By explicitly recognising the different impacts on clubs participating in international competitions, we can at least begin to address this imbalance and ensure that the Bill does not inadvertently harm the clubs but helps drive the success of English football. If we are to create a regulatory framework that commands trust and confidence, we must acknowledge these differential impacts openly and honestly. The amendment is a vital step towards that goal.

This amendment is not about special treatment for Premier League clubs. It is about recognising the unique challenges they face, ensuring that regulation does not create more problems than it solves. By acknowledging the differential impacts on clubs participating in international competitions, we can create a regulatory framework that is fair, proportionate and fit for purpose. I urge noble Lords to support this amendment, to ensure that the Bill reflects the realities of modern football and the global stage on which our clubs operate. I beg to move.

[Baroness Evans of Bowes Park (Con)]

My Lords, I want briefly to support my noble friend’s comments and amendment. We have already set out our concerns about UEFA and FIFA’s objections. The Minister has suggested that our concerns are somewhat misplaced. Given the comments that have just been made, our concerns have unfortunately not been allayed. The fundamental issue is that, rightly or wrongly, the letter from UEFA and FIFA was in the papers; we have seen concerns that were raised.

Unfortunately, for whatever reason, the Minister has not been able to fully explain to the Committee exactly what has been said. She said that constructive conversations have happened. That is great news and we are all pleased to hear it but, up to this point, she has not been able to give us any detail to match the concerns that we have seen in this letter. Does she feel able today to give us a bit more detail and some categorical examples of where FIFA and UEFA have said that they are now happy with the Government’s position and happy with the Bill as it is? We could balance that with what we have seen in the papers and the press from the letter, and what we have heard in some—I am sure—well-intentioned comments from the Minister about what has been said, but with nothing tangible to back it up.

Does she have any correspondence with UEFA or FIFA, or any more tangible evidence that she can give us, to help us with the words she has been saying, which, I am sure, reflect conversations she may have had in meetings? This would give us some more tangible evidence that the issues that my noble friend has raised will not come to pass. Until we have that, we will have to return to this and, I am afraid, press the Minister for any more information she can give us.

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[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I understand that the FA’s position on this point has not changed.

We completely agree that, in the course of regulating, the regulator should not unduly harm the ability of regulated English clubs to compete against their rivals and to succeed in those competitions. This is why Clause 7(2)(a) already relates to avoiding effects on the sporting competitiveness of one regulated club against another. This would cover the “differential impact” to which the noble Baroness’s amendment refers.

Clause 7(2)(b) also relates to avoiding

“adverse effects on the competitiveness of regulated clubs against other clubs”.

This includes against international competitors, as the Explanatory Notes clarify. These provisions already achieve the aims of the noble Baroness’s amendment to minimise impacts on competitiveness, and in fact do so more holistically, recognising that competitiveness matters beyond just the relatively small proportion of clubs competing in, or vying for, European football.

On the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, while I remain confident that nothing in the Bill as drafted would jeopardise the participation of English clubs in international competitions, I do understand his concerns. On UEFA and FIFA, we are speaking to the relevant authorities and will give noble Lords the reassurance on the specific points raised by the noble Lord in the coming weeks before Report.

For the reasons I have set out, I am unable to accept the noble Baroness’s amendment and hope that she will withdraw it.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response and other noble Lords for their contributions. However, I am deeply concerned about the assurances offered. While the Minister again claims that UEFA is comfortable with the Bill, the assertion is at odds with what we know. UEFA has explicitly raised objections to aspects of the Bill, including the risk of state interference breaching its rules. The correspondence exists, yet the Government refuse to publish it. If UEFA is so comfortable with the Bill, why the lack of transparency? Why not share its position openly with the House?

The Minister may be interested to know that, a couple of days ago, I spoke to Mark Bullingham, the CEO of the FA. He told me that only UEFA itself, not the FA, can confirm whether the Bill breaches its statutes, and that he believes that it will not give that confirmation because it will not want to give up its leverage. That is deeply worrying.

This amendment does not create complexity; it adds clarity. It ensures that the regulator considers the unique and unavoidable fact that Premier League clubs operate under dual compliance requirements—domestic regulation and UEFA licensing. Ignoring this reality risks leaving clubs exposed to significant conflicts with the governing bodies, which creates confusion and the instability that the Minister says the Bill seeks to avoid.

The claim that Premier League clubs are not disproportionately impacted is demonstrably incorrect. Only Premier League clubs are subject to UEFA licensing requirements, only they face the prospect of disqualification from European competitions, and only they are exposed to the dual pressures of domestic regulation and international oversight. They also fund the competition and the pyramid. This is not about prioritising one group of clubs over others; it is about recognising that their unique position requires tailored consideration.

The Premier League is not just a league; it is global powerhouse and the financial engine of our football pyramid. The risks of conflict with UEFA and FIFA are real, and they are uniquely borne by Premier League clubs. This amendment does not create division; it addresses it. It ensures that the regulator has the tools and the mandate to navigate these challenges fairly and effectively. I urge the Minister to reconsider her position as we progress towards Report and to reflect on the broader consequences of dismissing these concerns. But, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 67A withdrawn.

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I am calling for a six-month report to the Secretary of State from the independent regulator, but I am really politely asking the Minister what the regulator will be reporting on. Will it have to forensically detach the revenue streams relating to non-footballing activities which are on the clubs’ balance sheets to give us a pure footballing revenue view so that it can be compared and contrasted on a footballing-pure basis? How will the criteria for reporting on the impact on the clubs’ finances be established? Will the regulator be expected to take a full 360-degree view of club finances both now and in the near future, or will it relate to revenues only generated by football-related activities?

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendments 68, 89, 120 and 121, which focus on ensuring accountability and transparency and are critical to protecting the Premier League and safeguarding its unique role in the football pyramid.

This Bill introduces a radical new framework for the governance of football, one that includes significant regulatory oversight and redistribution mechanisms. We are the first country ever to do this, and I am worried that we may well suffer from first-mover disadvantage. There are profound changes in this Bill that will impact every level of the game, and it is essential that the Government and the regulator are held to account for the consequences of these measures. Regular reporting is not just a bureaucratic necessity; it is a vital safeguard to ensure that the interests of all stakeholders, particularly those of the Premier League, are protected.

If we are to introduce a regulator with such extensive powers, it must be held accountable for the full range of consequences its decisions may have. The competitive balance of the Premier League—its very dynamism and unpredictability—is central to its global appeal. This, in turn, drives its ability to attract world-class players, managers and investment, generating revenues that flow down the football pyramid. Yet, without baselining these measures or requiring the regulator to report on its impact in these areas, we risk implementing a system that could inadvertently undermine the Premier League’s success.

Similarly, international competitiveness is a crucial factor for the Premier League. It is the most watched and admired league in the world, representing a unique soft power asset for the UK. The ability of Premier League clubs to compete at the highest level in Europe has been a driving force behind their commercial success, as well as their capacity to support the wider game through solidarity payments and grass-roots initiatives, all of which are voluntary. However well-meaning, if the regulator’s interventions dampen investment or create uncertainty, this international competitiveness could be severely compromised, and yet somewhat incredibly there is no requirement in the Bill for the regulator to monitor or report on this.

Investment is another area where the absence of reporting requirements is deeply concerning. Premier League clubs operate in a highly competitive global market for players, sponsorship and broadcasting rights. Long-term investment decisions, whether in infrastructure, youth academies or community programs, depend on regulatory certainty and stability. If the regulator’s actions lead to a chilling effect on investment, it would have profound consequences not only for the Premier League but for the whole football ecosystem. Again, there is no provision in the Bill to track or report on this impact, leaving us blind to the unintended consequences that could arise.

The amendments before us, particularly Amendment 68, in the name of my noble friend Lord Maude, seek to address these gaps. They recognise that we cannot introduce such a transformative regulatory framework without ensuring that it is judged against the metrics that matter most: competitive balance, international competitiveness and the ability to attract investment. Unless we retain these qualities, we will end up with a much smaller, less well-funded and far less successful football pyramid. The question of stability in a rapidly declining ecosystem becomes somewhat irrelevant.

We must ensure that we have a clear understanding of whether this legislation is achieving its aims or instead introducing unintended and potentially harmful consequences. For example, if the redistribution mechanisms introduced by the regulator begin to destabilise clubs’ financial planning or deter investment, we must know about it quickly and transparently. If the regulator’s powers are being applied unevenly or disproportionately, we need to be able to challenge and rectify that. If the Premier League’s unique role in funding the pyramid is being undermined by these changes, we surely need a mechanism to address that impact.

I encourage the Minister to consider the spirit of these amendments and, between now and Report, consider ways that the accountability and transparency mechanisms can be considerably strengthened.

[Lord Markham (Con)]

My Lords, in speaking to Amendment 120 and following on from the point that my noble friend Lady Brady made, I hope to put some meat on the bones of what we would be asking the regulator to produce in its annual report.

Right now, all that the Bill says is that we are asking it to produce a summary of the activities undertaken during the year and for any other information that the Secretary of State sees fit. The whole purpose of our debates over the last few days is to make sure the regulator is fit for purpose in its objectives and that its performance is then measured against those objectives. My amendment—non-controversial, I hope—is about trying to hold the regulator to account. It seeks to add that the regulator should look at and report on clubs’ compliance against directed action, regulator finances, enforcement action, their performance against their own objectives, how much time it has taken to grant licences to clubs and any salaries above £100,000. It is quite a simple list that seeks to hold the regulator to account and get clarity on what its performance has been for the year, so it can then improve performance going forward.

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[Lord Addington (LD)]

My Lords, I have had my name down as a supporting figure on three occasions. I just cannot resist, with this talk of “should” and “must”. It does sound awfully like “may” and “shall”, which is something steady to go back to. My question for the Minister is: is there any difference legally between the two words? If there is not—in certain circumstances, there is not—can we just hear that?

On the amendments, I start with the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Watson, which I supported. Yes, you should consult your players. They are your primary asset; they are what the fans come to watch. It would seem sensible; that is why I am in support. I realise that I might be backing two horses in the same race by putting my name to these two amendments, but the fact is that various fan groups need some interaction with the regulator. How that is done is incredibly important.

To return to the players, without them you have no product. You have no financial resource; you have nothing to come behind. Not consulting them is ridiculous, to be perfectly honest. Many people will tell me that they are overpaid namby-pambies or whatever. I do not agree, but people will tell you that. The fact is that every time you run around as a professional athlete, you are risking your career, or risking it being shortened. Every time you are told to play that extra game when you are not quite ready for it yet, or you are a little bit tired, you are risking your career and your professional value. You may be playing injured, for instance. We should hear from this group. They have short, often very productive careers.

Often, though, they do not. What we tend to do in this debate is think about the Premiership, but we are talking about the entire structure, going down. Many people are just making a living—sometimes a good living—for a short period of time. We must make sure that they are consulted as well. The entire structure going down is something that we are in danger of forgetting repeatedly in this Bill. So I hope that the Minister will give us some clarification here. Players must be consulted and there must be a way of talking to the fans. Is this just another one of the hardy perennials of Parliament going down the “may” or “shall” route? Does the wording change in the lead amendment make any difference?

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Watson. I wholeheartedly agree that footballers are at the heart of football. Without them, we certainly could not achieve anything at all. The relationship with players is absolutely vital to football clubs. West Ham was one of the very few clubs during the pandemic where I and my footballers took a 30% pay cut to ensure that all other staff were paid in full and that nobody lost their job; that is part of the spirit and it is why footballers really must be consulted.

I also support Amendment 86, which would introduce vital principles to guide the regulator’s approach. These principles reflect a sophisticated understanding of how football actually works and what makes it successful. The existing principles in Clause 8 of the Bill appear largely defensive and process focused. In essence, they tell us that the regulator should use resources efficiently, co-operate with stakeholders and act proportionately. With respect, I would argue that these are descriptions of basic administrative competence, not meaningful regulatory philosophy. No one would argue for inefficiency or disproportionality, and that is really the test of whether these are real, consequential principles.

More concerning is what these principles admit. They say nothing about preserving what makes English football successful; nothing about maintaining the competitive tension that drives our game’s appeal; and nothing about enabling the responsible ambition that has created the world’s most watched sporting competition.

Let me begin with the fundamental point that I believe is captured by this excellent amendment: the need for clearly identified harm and least-intrusive measures. Football thrives on calculated risk taking and sporting ambition. A regulator consistently intervening without clear necessity will suffocate the very qualities that make our game exciting. This is not about weakening regulation; it is about making it effective.

Consider how successful football regulation actually works. The Premier League has developed sophisticated mechanisms for maintaining financial sustainability while preserving competitive tension. When issues arise, they are typically best addressed through existing structures that understand football’s unique dynamics. This amendment would ensure that the regulator works with those proven systems rather than creating unnecessary parallel requirements.

The principles around competitive tension and ambitious ownership are particularly crucial. The Premier League’s success rests on maintaining genuine competition, where any club can succeed through good management and investment. Aspiration can happen because clubs are empowered and incentivised to take measured risks in pursuit of sporting achievement. The amendments focus on commercial autonomy and innovation, reflecting another vital truth: football’s success comes from constant evolution. The Premier League leads the world precisely because it enables responsible innovation in everything from broadcasting arrangements to community engagement. Overly prescriptive regulation risks spoiling this competitive advantage that we have developed.

Most importantly, these principles would ensure that the regulator maintains proper focus by requiring clear evidence of harm and demonstration that the existing structures cannot address issues. We would avoid unnecessary intervention while maintaining proper oversight. This would help us enhance, rather than inhibit, what makes English football successful.

[Lord Wrottesley (Con)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to seek clarity on a key point that does not seem clear in some of noble Lords’ amendments, in particular Amendment 79 from this group. From what I can tell in reviewing the Bill and debates around it—I beg your Lordships’ and particularly the Minister’s indulgence if I have missed something and this has been adequately addressed—we have not yet defined a fan. I make my sincere apologies, but I need to point out this abundantly obvious fact. Amendment 79 is a one-word amendment.

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[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

My Lords, in introducing this amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Addington, used the phrase “hiding behind a paywall”. I wonder whether that is really a fair description of paying for something. When I got my phone, it was hiding behind a paywall: it was not given to me free; I had to shell out for it. I need a new car at the moment; my heap of junk of a Nissan has collapsed. The new one is hiding behind a paywall, and I have to pay for it. I had to pay for my dinner tonight; it was hiding behind a paywall.

There is an assumption here that there is no such thing as private property or free contract and that everything ought to be somehow at the disposition of regulators or of state officials. That is not how we got here. If you do not respect the fundamental ability of sporting clubs or indeed broadcasters to do what they think is in their best interests, you end up with suboptimal outcomes. This is a very neat demonstration of why, once you create these regulatory structures, they expand and expand—because people airily demand things and feel very virtuous in demanding them without any thought for the practicalities of the people who have to implement them.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I oppose Amendments 91 and 92 because they try to make the regulator a consultee on listed events and would place a duty on it to have regard to the desirability of making more domestic games free to air. I have huge respect for the noble Lords, Lord Addington and Lord Goddard, and their colleagues, and I know that these amendments relate to a manifesto commitment made by their party, but I hope it is helpful to talk a little about how football’s broadcast economy works in practice.

The Premier League’s domestic broadcasting rights are contracted through to 2029. Of course, they represent far more than a simple commercial arrangement: they form the foundation of English football’s entire economic model, and their thoughtful and innovative packaging is a hugely important part of the Premier League’s success. The substantial revenues they generate enable the Premier League to provide £1.6 billion of support to the wider pyramid, representing 16% of central revenues, of which—I think the noble Lord, Lord Watson, may like to know—£25 million goes to funding the PFA. That is why it keeps its joining fee at £20 and its subs at £150.

The sophistication and complexity of broadcasting arrangements is enormous and a huge source of competitive advantage for English football. Each broadcasting slot and each package of rights exists within an intricate ecosystem where values are fundamentally interdependent. These are not discrete assets that can be easily separated; they form a carefully balanced whole that has taken decades to develop to create value and appeal. Forcing certain matches to be free to air would not just affect those specific fixtures; it would fundamentally undermine the value proposition of every broadcasting package.

Premium broadcasters invest based on exclusive content that attracts subscribers. Remove that exclusivity—even partially—and decouple certain packages from each other and the entire model becomes unsustainable. The consequences that would cascade throughout football are significant. A significant reduction in broadcast values would not just affect Premier League clubs but immediately impact the entire pyramid through reduced solidarity payments, youth development funding and grass-roots investment. The damage to football’s economic ecosystem would be profound and potentially irreversible.

Of course, this sort of intervention would create exactly the kind of seismic instability the regulator is meant to prevent. In an attempt to increase access to certain matches, it would risk destabilising the very mechanism that funds football’s broader development and sustainability. The Premier League’s success in maintaining the growing broadcast revenues, which benefit the entire game, comes through very careful and innovative management of these arrangements. While I respect my noble friend’s motivations and good intentions here, I must strongly oppose the expansion of the scope of the IFR in the way proposed.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, my Amendment 265 falls in this group. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, who has tabled it with me. I know he shares my gratitude to the public service broadcasters with which we have discussed this matter.

Our amendment and the two in the name of the noble Lord, Lord McNally, to which the noble Lord, Lord Addington, spoke, all attempt to bring protections for the listed events regime into the scope of the Bill, or at least to give us the opportunity to have the debate that my noble friend Lord Moynihan rightly says is needed and perhaps even overdue. In saying that, I am very mindful that we were likely to have had that debate in the exchanges on the now Media Act earlier this year, had the general election not intervened and had the then Bill not gone through the abbreviated processes in wash-up. I think my noble friend is right and that the noble Lord, Lord McNally, would have agreed, had he been here, that these issues deserve some consideration.

The amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, and I have brought forward is intended to probe the Government about how they plan to protect digital on-demand rights for the listed events regime. While live television viewing of events is currently included in the regime, there is nothing to stop clipped videos of digital on-demand rights from going behind a paywall. My noble friend Lord Hannan of Kingsclere would certainly have enthusiastically taken part and would have made some very interesting points in the debate we could have had on the listed events regime. This is in the context of public service broadcasters that are broadcasting things that have been deemed particularly important for the public to see in a way that is different from the commercial suppliers, which can provide so many other things to people in the differing ways that they do.

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[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I support this amendment, which seeks to address one of the most significant and unresolved issues in football governance: the regulation of football agents. The amendment is not just about imposing stricter rules on agents; it is about protecting the financial stability of English football and ensuring that the resources within the game are directed towards its growth and long-term health.

In the last five years, Premier League clubs alone have spent a staggering £1.65 billion on agents’ fees. This represents an extraordinary extraction of wealth from the game. It is money that could otherwise be invested in stadiums, academies, community projects, et cetera. The agent market is riddled with dysfunction. The incentive structures are fundamentally misaligned, with practices such as dual representation creating inflationary pressures on transfer market fees and wages. Without reform, the unchecked escalation of agent fees will continue to threaten the financial stability of clubs, and limit the growth and potential of the industry.

While the amendment addresses a critical issue, it also highlights a broader concern: the lack of meaningful engagement from the Government on how to support English football beyond the confines of the Bill. The Bill creates significant new regulatory obligations and risks for damage within football, particularly for Premier League clubs, without addressing the areas where government action could help the game thrive. Let me be clear: the amendment provides an opportunity to have that conversation. It forces us to ask why the Government have not engaged with clubs on how to help clubs grow and succeed while addressing the inefficiencies in football or the opportunities we have to grow with government assistance.

For example, on access to talent, since Brexit English clubs have faced significantly restricted access to international talent compared with competitor leagues. Reforming these laws could reduce player acquisition costs, improve competitiveness and enhance the financial health of the pyramid. On tax incentives for investment, football infrastructure is a national asset. Other countries, such as France and the US, recognise this through targeted tax incentives for stadium development and training facilities. Yet here in the UK we have no similar framework to support clubs to make these long-term investments. These are areas where constructive government engagement could make a real difference. Yet, instead of addressing these opportunities, the Bill focuses on imposing new obligations without offering the tools to support growth or mitigate the unintended consequences. Premier League clubs would really welcome engagement on these potential growth opportunities.

Turning back to agents, the lack of effective regulation has been an ongoing issue for decades. The Premier League has already attempted to address this through initiatives such as its 2017 review into intermediaries, which identified serious problems, including the lack of qualifications, excessive influence, and weak enforcement mechanisms. While clubs are willing to take bold unilateral steps, including banning dual representation, these measures were ultimately not implemented, because FIFA launched its own reform process. However, FIFA’s efforts have stalled due to the legal challenges my noble friend mentioned, and its proposed cap on agents’ fees has been deemed unlawful in the UK. Without primary legislation, meaningful reform remains out of reach.

The amendment is therefore timely. It provides a legislative framework to ensure that agents act in the best interest of their clients, comply with FIFA regulations and disclose key information about their activities. These measures would not only bring transparency but reduce the inflationary pressures caused by the current dysfunctional system. Whether the Bill is deemed the appropriate place for action or not, I hope the Government will engage with clubs and leagues on how to pursue much-needed reform in a way that safeguards competitiveness.

In this respect, this amendment also serves a broader purpose: it highlights the imbalance in how the Government are approaching the Bill. Clubs are being asked to shoulder significant new regulatory burdens, yet there is little or no discussion about how the Government could support them in other critical areas. Whether it is addressing the dysfunction in the agent market, widening access to talent or incentivising infrastructure investment, so much more could be done to help English football grow and succeed.

This amendment addresses a pressing issue that has gone unregulated for far too long. The influence of agents on the game and the resources extracted through their fees cannot be ignored. At the same time, this amendment is a reminder of the broader need for the Government to engage with football on how to support growth and sustainability, not just impose new obligations. I urge the Minister to take this opportunity to engage meaningfully with clubs and leagues, not just on the regulation of agents but on the wider opportunities I have mentioned, to ensure that English football remains the most dynamic and competitive league in the world.

[Lord Moynihan (Con)]

My Lords, I support both my noble friends who have spoken to this amendment.

We spoke earlier about the importance of taking into account the players—the noble Lord, Lord Watson, raised that. Agents push, not least to increase the opportunities for the players to earn money, and one of the biggest problems and the reason why we should engage with players—for example, with the Club World Cup coming up—is that further strain is placed on the elite players. Agents are directly involved in that market; they go right to the heart of the financial stability of the game.

The agent market is central to the infrastructure of professional football. If we are to have a regulator, it is inconceivable that it should not consider the impact of agents, which some see as heavily dysfunctional and others see as beneficial if regulated—FIFA has gone through huge challenges recently in terms of the overall regulation of that market.

The regulation is difficult enough, but it is impossible not to regulate football as is proposed under this legislation without the regulator taking into account the impact of agents on the financial stability of the clubs. That is the key point. To a great extent, the financial stability of clubs relies on the good working of the agent market.

I hope that when the Minister comes to respond, she will reflect on that and on the importance of this amendment, and that she will look to see whether advice, even, can be given to the regulator to ensure that this is fully taken into account, to ensure a smooth functioning of the professional football market and, above all, the financial stability of the clubs.

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[Lord Moynihan (Con)]

I support many of the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, has raised under Amendment 94. I see that the Chief Whip is in his place; he will be pleased to note that nine of the amendments that we are considering now came from the Labour Benches, and that we have reached page 6 of the Bill.

The noble Baroness made the important point that Parliament should receive and debate the “state of the game” report. I am perfectly happy for the regulator, if we are going to have one, to present the report. However, in presenting the report, full attention needs to be paid to factors relating to the community and social impacts of regulated clubs and the women’s game. It is impossible when looking at this overall—and the Bill says that:

“A state of the game report must include … an overview of the main issues that the IFR considers to be affecting English football”,


—not to consider the development in the women’s game. It is a central part of English football, as cited in the Bill.

There is one other area at which we need to look at a later stage, on which I have no intention of detaining the Committee this evening. The regulator is looking at English football clubs and the game in England, but 14 Premier League clubs are in multi-club ownership, which stretches far beyond our shores. That is much more than in any other league in Europe. That has significant impacts on the financial regulation of the game. It provides greater bargaining power in commercial contracts and increases significantly the brand reach of those clubs, while allowing for the pooling of resources. There is flexibility with player transfers and loans. Certainly, within the English game, there is prohibition control over the management of more than one club, and UEFA states that you cannot have one controller covering two or more clubs in the same European competition. All these are actually central financial issues, and they have to be considered in any assessment of the health of the game in England.

I am concerned—I hope the Minister can respond and help me with this—that, if the regulator is prohibited from looking at the impact of multi-club ownership, there is a huge amount of important material when it comes to understanding the financial health of the game in England that would be outside the remit of the regulator. If I am wrong on that, no doubt the Minister will say that the regulator is absolutely entitled to look at each and every aspect of the multi-club ownership that takes place, principally in the Premier League. I will not detain the Committee by going further, but I simply table the fact that I think it is an essential and central point in any state of the game report and of the work of the regulator moving forward, and I would appreciate any clarity that the Minister can throw on that this evening.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 101 in my name. It seeks to address a fundamental imbalance in how we will assess the health of English football under this new regulatory framework. The Premier League has become the world’s most successful sporting competition through a sophisticated balance of sporting merit and commercial innovation. Every weekend, millions watch matches where any team can beat any other, where promoted clubs can dream of European football and where calculated ambition is rewarded. This competitive drama has created extraordinary value that benefits the entire football pyramid, yet this Bill creates a concerning issue in how we will measure success. While the regulator must produce a state of the game report, its content focuses almost entirely on identifying problems and assessing risks. There is no requirement to evaluate how a regulatory intervention might affect the very qualities that have made English football successful.

This amendment would require the regulator to assess and report on three areas: first, competitive balance and sporting merit, the foundation of football’s appeal; secondly, our international position, crucial given the growing competition from other leagues and competitions around the world; and, thirdly, our ability to attract investment, which is essential for maintaining the quality that drives broadcast value and pyramid funding.

Without proper assessment of the competitive matrix, how would we know whether regulation was inadvertently creating barriers to sporting achievement? Without tracking our international position, how could we identify whether intervention was damaging our ability to attract global talent? Without measuring investment impact, how would we spot whether regulation was deterring the responsible ambition that drives football growth? If the state of the game report is to be as Ministers have described it—the definitive evidence base of football’s health that will drive the regulator’s whole agenda—it is crucial that the report considers both the risks and the success factors. We cannot protect what we do not measure. We must not allow these protective regulatory principles to become completely meaningless.

The amendment would create crucial feedback loops. It would allow Parliament and stakeholders to identify early-warning signs if regulation begins to damage football’s essential qualities. It would provide evidence to enable the regulator to adjust its regulatory approach if unintended consequences emerge. Most importantly, it would ensure that we protect proper oversight while preserving what makes English football so special. Without this amendment, we risk creating a regulator focused solely on managing decline rather than protecting success.

I would be grateful therefore if the Minister could explain why, in her view, the state of the game report should not assess regulatory impact. Will she also explain how Parliament will otherwise be in a position to judge whether this world-first and intrinsically risky regulatory approach is going to be able to maintain English football’s success, growth and vitality?

Football Governance Bill [HL]

Baroness Brady Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 16th December 2024 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Brady]

110: Clause 11, page 7, line 26, leave out “three” and insert “five”

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I refer the Committee to my interests as declared in the register. This group of amendments includes Amendment 110 in my name which addresses a concern about potential political interference in football’s new regulatory framework.

The Bill creates an unusual—and, I believe, likely to be unnecessary—requirement for football governance statements every three years from the Secretary of State. This is not merely a question of frequency; I believe that the expectation created for this statement may raise questions about regulatory independence and broader international implications, which we have discussed in this Committee a number of times.

As I and other noble Lords have pointed out, UEFA and FIFA maintain strict provisions against state interference in football. We have already seen UEFA’s general secretary express serious concerns about various aspects of this Bill. In that context, we are obliged to ask whether creating a requirement, or even an expectation, for regular political statements about football governance risks providing these bodies with an additional point of leverage over English football’s development. UEFA has been clear that it is watching the implementation of this framework very closely, including in relation to possible scope creep and stepping over the line, so it behoves us to consider carefully the possible practical implications of such a mechanism and to question its necessity.

Every three years, the Secretary of State may make a statement about football governance. The Minister may say that there is no obligation here, and that it is just providing for the possibility. However, it seems inevitable that putting this expectation into statute creates a very strong likelihood that these statements will then be made. What will they say—that everything is fine, or are they more likely to look at more areas that the regulator can examine and then expand into, as we have seen with this Bill so far?

As the general secretary of UEFA spelled out in a letter sent to me last week:

“UEFA has previously shared its concerns about the creation of an Independent Football Regulator … as normally football regulation should be managed by the national federation. It is essential to ensure that the establishment of this structure fully adheres to the principle of sports autonomy, thus preventing any risk of political or governmental interference in the legitimate and appropriate functioning of recognised sports governing bodies. The IFR’s mandate must be clearly defined and strictly limited to the long-term financial sustainability of clubs and heritage assets”.


Despite these repeated warnings, it seems reasonable to assume that the expectation of a football governance statement will create not just inevitable domestic pressure for political intervention but opportunities for international bodies to question the regulator’s independence. There may be a whole range of wider issues going on with international governing bodies at the time of the football governance statement—for example, negotiations on the football calendar or the future of competition formats. With these football governance statements, we seem to be creating an unnecessary risk that the statements, almost irrespective of their content, may be deemed to constitute political interference. English football will not be served well by such a dynamic.

My amendment would align the statement cycle with the other five-year regulatory timeframes in the Bill, reducing the frequency of these potential pressure points. However, this is about not just timing but protecting football’s independence while maintaining proper oversight. I look forward to hearing from the Minister on how necessary these statements are.

Professional football requires long-term certainty for investment. In my long experience, stadium development can take up to 10 years to plan and execute. Academy investment needs at least a five-year horizon. Infrastructure projects require stable planning frameworks. Yet we seem to be risking the creation of a system where policy could shift every three years in response to short-term political steers, with each statement also potentially triggering questions about regulatory independence. I worry that these regular political statements could create permanent pressure for intervention beyond the regulator’s core purpose.

I would be very grateful if the Minister could give us the Government’s perspective on these important questions. What is the rationale for creating this unique pressure point for political intervention? How does the Minister believe that it will support long-term investment, especially given the international oversight concerns? What protections exist or could exist against scope creep through these regular statements? How will the Government manage UEFA and FIFA concerns about state interference in relation to this? I beg to move.

[Lord Maude of Horsham (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to support my noble friend’s amendment, and to question whether it is wise for the Government to include this clause in the Bill. It says:

“The Secretary of State may prepare a statement”,


and then it goes on. A Secretary of State can prepare a statement of anything at any time. It requires no statutory permission in a Bill to enable this to happen, but the effect of putting this in the Bill is, precisely as my noble friend has explained, to raise the spectre that UEFA, in particular, will see this as further evidence of political and government interference in football, which is a big concern for it. The Government have so far tiptoed around the edge of the concerns that UEFA has, but we know that the consequences for English football, if they go on to the wrong side of that line, will be severe.

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As I set out in the debate last week, we are speaking to the relevant authorities, and we will give noble Lords the reassurances they seek on their specific concerns regarding UEFA and FIFA statutes ahead of Report. I hope I have reassured the noble Baroness and that she will withdraw her amendment. However, I am sure that this is an issue we will return to, and I welcome further debate at future stages.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

I thank the Minister for her response and assurances about the purpose and scope of the football governance statements, and I thank other noble Lords for their contributions. I remain concerned about the potential for these statements to introduce unnecessary political pressure points and raise questions about regulatory independence. I appreciate the intent to use them as an optional tool for accountability and transparency. However, I respectfully request that the Minister and the Government reflect on the points raised in the debate, particularly regarding the implications for long-term investment and the risk of creating permanent leverage for international bodies, such as UEFA and FIFA, that will disproportionately affect Premier League clubs playing or aspiring to play in European competitions.

I want to pick up on the comment about Spain made by the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, which the Minister mentioned. That legislation concerns a very specific clause which was due to the dominance of Barcelona and Real Madrid. They sold their own rights and retained all the money, which collapsed the entire Spanish football system. That legislation is very different from the binary process of the backstop and allows for 10% of the revenues to be redistributed—as an aside, the Premier League is already distributing 16%. The clause is very specific and very different from this first-ever government intervention into British sport. The interaction between the statements and the broader regulatory framework must be very carefully managed to ensure that English football is not placed at a disadvantage in global competitions and subjected to unnecessary uncertainty and potentially harmful leverage.

I am also grateful for the Minister’s reassurance about scope creep and the need to respect the regulator’s independence. The Minister mentioned the FA’s appearance in front of the Select Committee; she will know that that was before this Bill was published. I suggest that it would be good for the Minister to speak to the FA again. There is room for further clarity on how these statements, if they are necessary at all, will be framed to avoid triggering concerns about state interference, particularly in light of UEFA’s clear reservations. I again ask the Minister to publish the letter UEFA sent to her, which, by all accounts, was very alarming.

With those points noted, I will withdraw my amendment, but I hope the Minister will continue to engage with stakeholders on these important issues. I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 110 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Brady]

112: Clause 12, page 7, line 37, leave out from ‘under’ to end of line 38 and insert ‘this Act.’

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 12 I will also speak to Amendments 113 to 115 in my name and Amendments 116 to 119 in the name of my noble friend Lord Parkinson. These amendments address what is in my view a weakness in the Bill’s approach to regulatory guidance and consultation. They are important amendments because they go to the heart of how this new regulator will operate in practice.

The Minister has reassured us that this will be a collaborative regulator working closely with football; that is very welcome. Yet, unfortunately, the Bill requires the production of guidance only for the imposition of discretionary licence conditions. For every other major regulatory function, including some of the most significant interventions ever proposed in British sport, there is no obligation for the regulator to explain how it will act via guidance. Nor, indeed, is there any requirement to consult those affected as it produces that guidance.

I welcome my noble friend Lord Parkinson’s suggestion of a code of practice to guide the regulator’s approach in a number of important areas. Perhaps I can highlight just three crucial areas where I believe we need more clarity. The first is financial sustainability, the regulator’s core purpose. Despite extensive debates in this Committee about what financial sustainability means, or should mean, in practice, the regulator would have no obligation to define how it will assess soundness or resilience in guidance or what system it will use to make it work.

That means that a club such as my own, West Ham United, seeking to make long-term investment decisions, would have no clarity on how they might be judged. Worse than that, there is no requirement to consult with the industry on what these vital definitions should look like. Ministers have described the regulatory model as light touch. One of my amendments seeks to ensure that this is indeed the case when it comes to financial regulation, asking the regulator to publish guidance on the financial outcomes it wishes to see from clubs.

Secondly, there is the owners’ and directors’ test. This vital mechanism, critical to attracting responsible investment, is not written into the legislation. It is left—albeit with some considerations in the Bill—to the regulator to develop. Again, there is no requirement to consult clubs, leagues or potential investors on its design. I do not think it unreasonable to ask: how can English football expect to attract responsible, long-term investment without requirements for regulatory transparency or co-operation that would undoubtedly result in higher-quality and better-informed regulation?

Thirdly, and perhaps most concerning, is the backstop power over financial distributions. This unprecedented mechanism could fundamentally alter football’s financial flows, yet the regulator does not need to explain how it will approach such decisions or consult on its methodology. Billions of pounds are at stake, along with the very existence of the key competitive measures, tools, structures and incentives that currently underpin the English pyramid’s success. It is the most extraordinary of interventions, yet there is no requirement for even the most ordinary of procedural safeguards.

This absence of guidance risks creating real uncertainty. The Premier League recently agreed a new domestic broadcasting deal running through to 2029. Clubs are making infrastructure investments over similar timelines. As I have already said, academy and stadium developments require five to 10-year horizons. I must emphasise that it puts football clubs in a really difficult position to be able to make major commitments without any real clarity on how they will be regulated.

We have a real lack of a clarity on a range of areas in the Bill, compounded by uncertainty as to how the regulator will go about regulating in practice. My amendments in this group do not seek to constrain the regulator’s authority in any way. They seek only to ensure that its powers are exercised transparently and intelligently. They would simply require the regulator to provide guidance across all its functions and consult appropriately on its development. This is a minimal yet clearly critical requirement.

I hope and expect the Minister to say that it is her clear intention that this regulator will be collaborative. If that is the case, I think it is fair to ask: why not go the extra step and enshrine that approach in the Bill? What justification exists for allowing such significant powers to be exercised without clear guidance or consultation?

In conclusion, I encourage the Minister to examine these vital improvements and consider them clearly. Transparency and collaboration should not be optional extras. They should instead be the cornerstones of this new framework. I beg to move.

[Baroness Evans of Bowes Park (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly in favour of this group of amendments. I particularly support those that would introduce a requirement for the IFR to consult those affected as it produces guidance. Consultation with key interested and impacted parties, particularly the leagues, is critical.

The IFR is an entirely new regulator operating in an entirely new regulated space with no real international experience to draw on. As I highlighted at Second Reading:

“The Explanatory Notes themselves acknowledge that football ‘was previously not regulated by statutory provisions’, and explicitly state that ‘the new regime and the distributions provisions in particular are unique and unprecedented’”.—[Official Report, 13/11/24; col. 1850.]


A duty to consult on key areas, such as those set out by my noble friend Lady Brady, to ensure that unintended and potentially damaging consequences are avoided as the regulator begins its work and develops its guidance, is surely a no-brainer.

At our recent meeting with the shadow regulator, and in various responses from the Minister during Committee, the desire and expectation of the regulator to work in a collaborative and proportionate way have been repeatedly reiterated. Several amendments in this group simply put that consultative approach firmly and squarely on the face of the Bill. I hope the Minister can look favourably on them.

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[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response and for the points raised. I note her desire not to put any major burdens on the regulator, but I worry about the major burdens that that in turn puts on the 116 football clubs that this regulation affects.

I respectfully push back on the notion that the amendments are not necessary or that the IFR’s flexibility would be somehow unduly constrained by requiring proper guidance and consultation. Perhaps the Government could look at it another way: amendments of this sort could actually enhance the regulator’s ability to act effectively by building trust and clarity from the outset. That is really what the football clubs want: clarity.

The Minister points to collaboration, yet the Bill imposes no duty to consult on key areas such as financial sustainability, the owners’ and directors’ tests or the backstop powers. Without clear consultative frameworks, football will face uncertainty and investment decisions could stall. Football is a global business and investors require regulatory predictability. These amendments are not about adding bureaucracy but about ensuring that clubs, leagues and investors understand how regulatory powers will apply—that is what this is about.

Instead of creating unnecessary delays, the amendments, or amendments like them, would prevent regulatory uncertainty, providing everyone with a clear framework for guidance. Reactive and unclear regulation is likely to create much greater delays and generate a higher workload for the regulator and the clubs. I remain concerned that the existing provisions do not address the scale of the regulatory powers that the Bill is creating. The regulator will oversee billions of pounds in football revenue, critical tests of ownership and sustainability of the entire pyramid. We are the first country to do this and, in my view, these very wide-ranging powers demand the highest levels of transparency and consultation. Football deserves a regulator that collaborates in practice, not just in promise.

That said, I am somewhat—I repeat somewhat—encouraged by the Minister’s recognition of the importance of these issues, as reflected from all sides of the Committee. I hope that we might continue to engage on how best to embed these principles within the framework of the regulator. I will reflect further on her response and I hope we can consider how these concerns might be addressed as the Bill progresses. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 112 withdrawn.

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[Lord Hayward (Con)]

My Lords, in relation to consultation, on which several comments have been made during the discussions on this and previous groups, it is worth bearing in mind, when the Minister tells us that there will be wide consultation in whatever circumstances, what my noble friend Lady Brady said on day one of Committee. She said that the Government had consulted seven Premier League clubs, which did not include Manchester City. They consulted those seven clubs for about as long as it took Spurs to score four goals against Southampton yesterday. It was hardly serious communication and consideration. That is what worries so many of us: we are listening to a series of comments that sound reasonable in themselves—and I have sympathy with what the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, said—but I would believe it if there had been a very clear indication at previous stages of the Bill that there had been consultation with the interested parties.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 124. I think it introduces a sensible and proportionate idea: that the independent football regulator should have the power to delegate certain functions to competition organisers, such as the Premier League, the EFL and the National League, where it is appropriate. First, I want to consider the position of the leagues themselves, especially the Premier League and the EFL, both of which already play central roles in the regulation and operation of English football. These organisations are not merely administrative bodies; they are sophisticated, well-sourced entities with established systems for financial monitoring, licensing and governance.

For example, the Premier League currently performs all the UEFA licensing for clubs on behalf of the FA, demonstrating its capability to operate efficiently and effectively under stringent regulatory frameworks. It also has robust financial monitoring mechanisms in place, which ensure that clubs comply with obligations relating to profitability, sustainability and long-term planning. As I mentioned earlier in Committee, the Premier League also invests significant resources and time in performing its owners’ and directors’ tests to a very high standard, and intends to continue to do so.

Simply duplicating all these existing structures within the IFR would be inefficient and burdensome, as the White Paper that led to the Bill rightly acknowledged:

“The Regulator may wish to allow concurrent systems, or delegate responsibilities to industry bodies, in certain circumstances. It would manage this in a way that is coherent and simple for all involved, especially clubs”.


Unfortunately, however, no sensible delegation power currently exists in the Bill, so I commend my noble friends Lord Markham and Lord Parkinson for addressing this issue and allowing for this conversation. This amendment would align perfectly with that principle expressed in the White Paper. It would be a smart, almost unarguable step to take: delegation would allow the regulator to focus its resources, especially in the early years of its life, on areas where independent oversight is essential, such as addressing market failures and managing systemic risks. At the same time, it would give the regulator the option of leaning on existing processes or information systems where they are already successfully implemented.

Delegation would also address an important practical reality. The workload facing the IFR will be immense. I am not surprised that the EFL wishes to offload some of its costs to the regulator, and that is its right. In its early years, this regulator will have to establish itself, build capacity and gain the trust of stakeholders across the ecosystem. That is a big burden. Allowing it to delegate certain functions, with appropriate safeguards, ensures that it can deliver its objectives without being overwhelmed by administrative tasks that others are well placed to manage.

However, this clearly cannot be done on blind trust. The amendment includes what seem to be important safeguards: the IFR must ensure that any competition organiser meets the same degree of stringency, aligns with its objectives, and adheres to its regulatory principles. This would seem to protect the integrity of the regulatory framework, while avoiding unnecessary duplication and, therefore, unnecessary cost.

More broadly still, this amendment raises an important question that we must address about the future role of the Football Association. While the fan-led review’s position was that the FA’s current governance arrangements make it unsuitable to house the IFR at present, it also envisaged a scenario where one day this might change. As the review noted,

“the FA might at some point be a suitable location for IREF … However, the Review has concluded that this is not appropriate at this time”.

This amendment raises the possibility of the delegation of certain functions to the FA, as part of its reform journey. If the FA continues to modernise its governance structures and demonstrate the capability to take on certain functions, it could play a much larger role in football’s regulatory framework.

Indeed, I encourage the Government to consider including the FA in the scope of this clause as such, because it should meet the same rigorous criteria that the leagues have to. Delegation to football bodies could be tied to a broad review of football governance a few years into this regime. This review could assess not only the progress of the IFR but the readiness of the FA and other football bodies to take on greater responsibilities. This will ensure that the IFR can be a dynamic institution, evolving in response to the needs of the game and empowering existing bodies to step up, where it makes sense. I believe that all stakeholders, including the most ardent supporters of the fan-led review, as well as those worried about the unintended consequences of this delegation, could support this kind of sensible amendment.

Finally, but most importantly, in a letter sent to me by the general-secretary of UEFA only last week, he said:

“UEFA appreciate the background of the Football Governance Bill discussions and proposals, and we were encouraged by the intent of the original Fan Led Review which stated that this regulatory area should be returned to The FA in time. UEFA supports The FA and UK policymakers in ensuring that this is still the case”.


The FA told me, also last week, that it has recently told DCMS that

“the FA is willing to take on delegated powers from the IFR, if there are services that the regulator believes we can operate and deliver effectively”.

I ask the Minister: is it still the case, as UEFA and the FA seem to believe, that the Government intend the future delegation of powers to be handed back to the FA at some point? If it is, surely this is an amendment that the Government could and should support.

[Lord Sentamu (CB)]

My Lords, I have spoken only once—about my little club, York City—but I have attended all the Committee debates. First, I think that York City will find it puzzling if, for the first time that there is an independent regulator, the same Act will say that some functions will be delegated. That is a confusion. Down the road, that might be thought about, but we want to see this person—man or woman—who will be the independent regulator doing the job. If it becomes an impossibility or too burdensome, it is at that stage that you delegate. But to say in the Bill, right at the beginning, that certain functions will be delegated, maybe to some powerful clubs, will be a confusion.

Secondly, no one would want to be an independent regulator. If I had the ability to do so, I would tie down the job, because, otherwise, it muddies the water. What we have not teased out a bit more, unfortunately, are the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, on consultation—that is the key bit. I hope that the Government will think through those amendments, because, without consultation, the little club of York City would think that somebody wants to swallow it up.

Remember that all football clubs are like tribes. They will defend their colours and their game. The only way to deal with tribes is to make sure that they are consulted. I think this amendment is unhelpful at this stage. Let us see what happens with the kind of regulatory power that is created. This independent person must actually be independent.

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[Lord Wood of Anfield (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 168 and 169, which connect with some of the themes raised by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Moynihan. One of the most sensitive areas of this regime is the imposition of discretionary licence conditions on clubs. The purpose of my Amendment 169 is to say that the regulator can introduce such conditions only after being satisfied that the conditions would

“not be met by the club complying with all rules, requirements and restrictions which … will be imposed by a competition organiser”.

Essentially, this does not go as far as full delegation to leagues such as the Premier League—I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, on the broad criticism of that—but would introduce in one specific area what might be thought of as a limited principle of subsidiarity for the imposition of discretionary licence conditions.

The main purpose is to ensure that the regulator observes the norm of good regulatory co-operation—with not just the Premier League but all the leagues—by looking first to the adequacy of league arrangements in response to specific problems that will be the most politically and competitively sensitive, before stepping in and intervening with club-specific conditions attached. Why? It is because subsidiarity is a good principle of regulation where it is not inconsistent with the application of the intent of the law; also, I believe that it will foster the habit of regulatory co-operation more generally—not just on discretionary licence conditions. It will avoid duplication and confusion in regimes, and it will equip the regulator with a bit more political protection when it comes to the charge of political interference, because it can say, “We’ve looked to the leagues to step in first before stepping in”.

In the case of the Premier League specifically—let us face it, that is where the rubber hits the road on this issue most of all—it gives it, first, a chance to maintain system-wide and league-wide governance integrity before club-specific rules arrive, rather than risking the intervention of the regulator, leading to fragmentation between clubs. Secondly, it allows differences in application, inside the Premier League, of the general IFR rules in ways that account for differences in risk, finance and strategy, which we have heard discussed many times in Committee.

An example is capital buffers. The regulator will want to require cash reserves, and in the case of the Premier League, you want to take account of those areas where there are genuine differences from lower league clubs—differences in player registration rights, meaning players are more liquid assets, for example. The Premier League could design league-wide rules that are sensitive to these different conditions. The amendment does not say that Premier League rules would trump regulator rules, but where there are concerns, the regulator would look first to the Premier League to modify league-wide rules that respond to the concerns before the regulator directly intervenes.

Another scenario might be an issue of liquidity management inside a Premier League club. This amendment would point to the regulator first looking to the Premier League to take steps such as enhancing its monitoring systems, developing new metrics, et cetera, before it goes to individual licence conditions. This, again, would ensure that the league could retain the integrity of league-wide rules, rather than Premier League clubs having individual regimes as and when they trip up over certain rules.

What if the regulator wanted to intervene with a specific club as a matter of urgency? It could still do this. What if the regulator thought Premier League rules were inadequate to the task and insisted on imposing a licence condition that cut across and undermined league rules? Ultimately, it could still do that too; in fact, it may think that was the right thing to do. But what the amendment would do is introduce a prior stage that looks to the leagues to make league-wide governance adjustment first. In the name of good regulation, that seems to me a sensible, limited amendment.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to offer my support to the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wood, and by my noble friend Lord Moynihan. These amendments take quite different approaches, but they seem to be driving at the same thing: a desire to clarify and improve the financial licensing section of the Bill. In my view, they highlight a really important principle—that the IFR should adopt an outcomes-focused, light-touch approach to developing its regulatory framework, and that it should work closely with football to do that.

These amendments would, in my view, be a vital step towards achieving a good balance in football regulation, one that safeguards financial sustainability by targeting clubs that have problems, which are clearly critical, while also respecting the unique responsibilities and expertise of the competition organisers. The current drafting of the Bill leaves critical questions unanswered about the regulators’ approach to financial regulation.

It is currently unclear whether the IFR will take a blanket, rule-driven approach that imposes granular financial requirements such as specific liquidity ratios or debt-to-equity thresholds across all clubs or, alternatively, whether it will adopt an entirely bespoke approach, applying discretionary licence conditions to every single club—all 116 of them—according to their unique circumstances and business models. If the IFR did the latter—it is entirely open to the IFR, because that is how ambiguous the Bill is—it would significantly undermine competition organisers’ ability to maintain a level playing field. Those licence conditions would necessarily need to be confidential to protect commercially sensitive information. For example, my club, West Ham United, would have no idea whether other comparable clubs were operating under similar conditions or not. That is a recipe for competitive chaos.

These amendments would mean that the IFR would need to take a far more balanced path to an outcomes-based approach, setting high-level principles and objectives while allowing leagues to implement their own rules to achieve those outcomes. Of course, they would be able, and must be able, to take a targeted approach to clubs getting into difficulties, stepping in at any time if those rules were deemed systemically not to be working, or if there was urgent concern about a single club or group of clubs. A more outcomes-based approach would ensure that the IFR focuses on the “what” rather than the “how”. By defining clear financial outcomes such as on balance sheet health, resilience, transitionary finance and asset protection, the IFR could establish a framework that addresses financial risks while avoiding unnecessary micro-management of clubs.

There is no reason why financial licensing should not follow this proportionate, targeted model, particularly as competition organisers such as the Premier League and the EFL already have sophisticated financial sustainability rules in place. If another competition organiser, perhaps one that has had less success in enforcing financial rules, wishes to give up this area completely to the IFR, that would be its right, but let us not forget that competition organisers have a deep understanding of their clubs’ financial dynamics. They already operate robust systems to monitor and enforce financial sustainability; for example, the Premier League has detailed profitability and sustainability rules, which are strictly adhered to, while the EFL has its own financial monitoring requirements tailored to the unique challenges faced by its clubs.

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[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

My Lords, I hope I can deal with this group of amendments fairly quickly. It is again a disparate group, but the main theme is fan consultation and the requirements on a club. The amendments seek to alter the fan engagement threshold requirement by requiring a club to have structures and processes for effective engagement with their fans.

It is vital that there are proper requirements to ensure that a club applying for a licence, for instance, has a suitable home ground for a minimum period of 20 years. This would help prevent owners using much-adored home grounds as bargaining chips and collateral to strengthen their financial muscle against the wishes of fans. The clauses that we seek to insert would incentivise clubs to protect their home grounds as part of their heritage and their history.

Amendment 142 concerns ticket prices. This is important because we are in a situation where clubs pretty much have a free hand in raising ticket prices. Let us take the recent example of Manchester United, which has, in effect, doubled the price of some tickets and removed discretionary or reduced ticket prices for younger supporters—my noble friend Lord Shamash could say more about that than me. The amendment would insert ticketing prices as a relevant matter for consideration in the process of regulation.

That is the spirit and intent of the amendments. I am looking for some reassurance from the Minister that fans will be properly engaged in clubs’ consideration of these issues, that there will be proper processes and ways of ensuring that their voices are heard and that issues such as ticket pricing in particular, and playing in prohibited competitions and so on, will be something the IFR can look at, comment on and, in some situations, determine.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak in response to these important amendments, all of which seek to strengthen the Bill’s provisions for consulting fans. We should pay tribute to noble Lords who have long championed the role of supporters in football, particularly those who have been involved in supporter trusts and similar bodies for many years. Their passion and their advocacy are no doubt one of the reasons that fan voices are becoming even more central to the governance of our national game.

I support the intent behind these amendments. Fans are the lifeblood of football. They invest not just their money and time but their hearts and identities into their clubs. Ensuring that their voices are properly heard, and heard with respect, is not just a moral imperative but essential for the long-term sustainability and integrity of football. The Premier League clubs recognise this too. In recent years, they have made significant progress in embedding fan engagement into their governance structures. Through its fan engagement standard—the first of any league to introduce such a standard—clubs are held to account for how they involve their supporters in decisions that matter to them. Fan advisory boards are now mandatory at every Premier League club and provide supporters with direct access to senior executives, enabling meaningful input on issues such as ticketing, matchday operations, club identity and community programmes. These initiatives represent a significant cultural shift. They create a platform for genuine dialogue between clubs and their supporters, ensuring that fans’ perspectives are considered at the highest levels of decision-making.

While I support the principles underpinning many of these amendments, I also feel it is important to raise a note of caution. Specifically, I want to raise the risks of the IFR being overly prescriptive when it comes to fan engagement and consultation. Clubs are not one-size-fits-all entities; each has its own unique character, fanbase and operating environment. For example, the dynamics of a global club with millions of international fans will differ significantly from those of smaller community clubs, many of whose supporters live within a few miles of the ground. Let us take, for instance, the idea proposed in some amendments that clubs must prove that a majority of their fans support certain decisions. While the intent is admirable and builds on the FA’s and many clubs’ approach to heritage assets already, we must acknowledge the practical difficulties of legally mandating such approaches.

How does a club definitively determine what constitutes a majority? Should a global fanbase have the same weight as local season ticket holders? What happens when opinions are divided? Would the IFR reverse a decision if, down the track, it was found that the wrong methodology had been used? These are complex questions without any easy answers. We should be careful not to create a compliance culture that detracts from the spirit of good engagement. It is really good to make this aspirational on both sides. For fan engagement to work well, the club has to feel confident, be open and get out of its comfort zone; the fans must enter into the debate in a constructive and open-minded spirit too. The difficulty will come if the IFR is drawn into micromanaging fan consultation and adjudicating on individual decisions, therefore inadvertently feeding an adversarial approach between fans, groups and clubs.

Now that might sometimes be appropriate, but I strongly believe the IFR will often be best to focus on ensuring that principles are upheld, leaving the specifics to clubs and their supporters. I also want to make the point that many of these new structures and processes for engaging fans, such as the fan engagement standard and fan advisory boards, are still new; they need time to bed in.

There are some brilliant examples of good practice already; for example, clubs bringing fan advisory board members into their clubs and having them spend time with football, commercial and operational teams so that they can understand the realities of life inside the club. But it is too early to say what the best approaches or designs of these processes will be. We should encourage more thoughtful approaches that allow these structures to mature and evolve, with periodic reviews to assess their effectiveness. A rush to codify overly detailed requirements risks stifling this organic progress and creating unintended consequences.

Football Governance Bill [HL]

Baroness Brady Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 16th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I was on my last sentence, but I will now make it two sentences.

The noble Lord says that nobody is smoking now. It happens to be the evening of the Terrace Club’s Christmas bash. That is the House of Lords smokers’ group, and I can assure the noble Lord there are quite a lot of them smoking, cross-party, including from his own party. They are drinking and smoking, and every party is represented. It is in the hut round the back, by the way, in case anyone wants to pop out. There are quite a lot of people who smoke still.

Smoking advertising was taken out of sports, and a number of sports nearly collapsed—darts and snooker had a real problem. The funny thing is, guess who came in to save them? The gambling companies came in and saved those working-class, grass-roots, rank-and-file sports. Good on them, I say. The working classes were grateful at the time, and they did not all become problem gamblers as a consequence. They enjoyed the sport.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments seek to address gambling sponsorship in football, and include proposals to ban sponsorship entirely. This is a significant issue. I acknowledge the genuine concerns that many have, including the noble Lord, Lord Foster, about the role of gambling in sport. However, I would like to provide some context and explain why I believe that further interventions in this area are not required at this time.

The Gambling Act review has recently and comprehensively considered the role of gambling sponsorship across all sports, including football. The Government’s response reflects the extensive engagement and evidence gathered during that process. As part of this, the Premier League has already taken significant, proactive, voluntary steps to address concerns, demonstrating its commitment to act responsibly.

Most recently, the Premier League and its clubs have led the way, not just within football but across all sports, by taking the voluntary step to move away from gambling sponsorship on the front of shirts. This was a key ask made of us by the DCMS, and we agreed. This is a significant decision, and one that I do not believe any other major sports organisations have taken.

The impact of this step on clubs is, frankly, quite painful. Contrary to what the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said, most clubs cannot afford to do it, but they have done it anyway because they have been asked to. The typical difference between gambling and non-gambling shirt sponsorships is around 40%. For some Premier League clubs, this decision will mean a reduction of around 20% of their total commercial revenues. For clubs in the bottom half of the Premier League table or those newly promoted, the financial hit will be especially pronounced in the short term, and comes on top of the £250 million hit to Premier League clubs over the Parliament, as I have already mentioned in this Committee, following the Budget’s rise in employer national insurance contributions. The pressures are acute, but the Premier League clubs took this decision, fully aware of the difficult commercial consequences, because it was the right thing to do and was aligned with what the Government asked of us.

Furthermore, the Premier League has led the way in driving forward the development of an all-sports code of conduct, published earlier this year. This sets out standards on gambling partnerships, including the critical issue of awareness and responsible gambling messages, that all clubs and sports organisations will adhere to. The code reflects the seriousness with which football in particular is addressing this issue, and provides a strengthened framework for responsible engagement with the gambling sector.

It is important to acknowledge the vital role that gambling sponsorship plays in supporting clubs across the football pyramid. For many clubs, particularly those outside the Premier League, gambling sponsorship represents a significant source of revenue. That is the reality we all need to be conscious of, especially in the context of the Bill, which focuses on financial sustainability. Noble Lords may be aware that the EFL has a much greater reliance on gambling sponsorship, including its title sponsorship deal with Sky Bet. The Premier League itself has never had a gambling sponsor. This demonstrates that the issue is not uniform across football and that heavy-handed interventions may well risk disproportionately affecting clubs lower down the pyramid.

The Premier League’s voluntary decision to phase out gambling on front-of-shirt sponsorship is just one major step, but it is proof that football is taking this issue seriously. It shows that football can lead the way on responsible change, even when it causes difficulties for clubs, without the need for heavy-handed interventions. We must properly address concerns about problem gambling and the need for responsible behaviour and stringent regulations. Football must clearly be part of the solution, as it wants to be, just as all sport needs to act responsibly. However, I argue that the Premier League in particular has already shown important leadership here, taking proactive and voluntary steps that, as far as I am aware, no comparable organisation has yet replicated.

In the light of the progress already made, I respectfully suggest that football does not require further statutory intervention in this area. We have shown—but of course we must collectively continue to show—that we can be relied upon to make progress on this vital issue.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath, for his vigilance on this topic, as he always showed when I stood at the Dispatch Box opposite. I know he will be particularly vigilant as the Minister holds the responsibility for gambling. I am sure that she will be glad to have the chance to talk about something directly in her portfolio, in addition to the work that she has been doing on the Bill.

I am pleased to hear that the hip operation of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, went well, and even more pleased that she missed my disobliging comments about Arsenal this evening. That is the team she supports, so it is probably just as well that she was not here to hear them.

Of the two amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Foster, I am more taken with Amendment 143, which seeks to require football clubs to consult their fans on gambling advertising and sponsorship. I am mindful of the example of Wonga, a payday loan company rather than a gambling firm, and Newcastle United. It was an important reminder of the discomfort that fans feel when they are forced to wear the logo of companies and others of which they might not approve when they buy the football strips of the team they support.

Engaging fans on sponsorship is worth while, particularly where the companies are ones about which clubs know that fans have views. The noble Lord set out the growing concerns about the prevalence of gambling in sport and its potential to influence fans, particularly younger and more vulnerable groups. If we can strike a better balance between the immediate commercial needs of clubs and the long-term interests of the fans who support them then that is worthy of our consideration.

I am struck too by the points that my noble friends and others have raised about the importance of sponsorship deals on the finances of football clubs—particularly those in the lower leagues—to maintain their financial stability, which is such an important point underlying the Bill. Although Amendment 143 has much to commend it, the consultation must be a genuine and two-way conversation between clubs and fans to address the importance of investment in the sport and the good work that many are doing.

The second amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Foster, Amendment 255, seeks to prevent regulated clubs and competitions promoting or engaging in gambling advertising or sponsorship altogether. In doing so, it rather overrides the open-minded consultation of his first amendment. I think this goes too far: an outright ban on gambling advertising and sponsorship would, in my view, be too blunt an instrument for addressing the complex issue of gambling and the broader questions of sponsorship in football.

I am grateful to the noble Lord for tabling both amendments and the fact that we can consider them side by side in this group. I look forward to hearing what the Gambling Minister has to say about them.

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Companies or investors that think they might invest in a British football team will say that it is not worth the candle, as they will not be able to focus on being a good football team because they will have to do all the things that the Bill requires, with a regulator—already all these shadow people are being hired, one by one, to plan how they are going to exercise control over football clubs. They will decide not to do it. I can predict that with this Bill, especially if we add all of these baubles to the Christmas tree, we are going to see the Premier League—the greatest league in the world—gradually go down the drain.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I will address the amendment tabled by my noble friends which seeks to remove equality, diversity and inclusion requirements from the corporate governance code outlined in the Bill.

First, I acknowledge a concern that I believe underpins this amendment: the sense that EDI has, in some cases, become a compliance-driven exercise, where box-ticking and slogans replace meaningful action and real change. I recognise the frustration with the rise of what some see as the EDI industry, where jargon-laden initiatives create more paperwork than progress and risk alienating those they seek to engage. I share those concerns.

I know from my experience in football and the wider business arena that real change does not come from bureaucratic edicts or tokenistic gestures. In the end, change comes from understanding people and the barriers they face, the biases they encounter and, above all, the opportunities they need to succeed. For me, EDI must be about more than processes; it must be about outcomes.

This is where football, and particularly the Premier League and its clubs, is showing how it can be done and done well. The Premier League’s equality, diversity and inclusion standard, or PLEDIS, is a good example of an enabling framework that empowers clubs to embed EDI in their operations while avoiding the pitfalls of bureaucracy. I am very proud to say that West Ham United have been awarded the highest level of PLEDIS you can get.

PLEDIS is not a blunt tool; it does not impose rigid, one-size-fits-all rules. Instead, it provides clubs with expert guidance and a structured framework to identify their own unique challenges and set meaningful goals. For example, clubs are supported to collect and analyse data so that they can understand where underrepresentation exists, whether in senior leadership, academy coaching staff or community programmes. Clubs are helped to develop tailored plans based on their specific circumstances, whether that means increasing female representation in the boardrooms or improving accessibility for disabled fans. PLEDIS helps to bring about a genuine culture of learning and development. We have held some really good educational sessions about unconscious bias, cultural awareness and inclusive leadership.

I am not saying that everything the Premier League does is perfect, but we have tried collectively to develop a system that avoids the pitfalls of bureaucracy and instead empowers clubs to take ownership of their EDI journey. You need some outside help and challenge for it to work effectively. You need external expert support to ensure that clubs are not left to navigate this work alone and to help clubs turn principles into action, with practical advice rather than burdensome mandates. The key to success in EDI is not just to measure compliance but to drive cultural change. That is what the Premier League approach aims to achieve. I believe that PLEDIS almost always continues to be used when clubs are relegated to the Football League, because clubs find it so valuable.

Consider too the impact of initiatives such as the Premier League’s No Room For Racism campaign. Although public facing, this work is backed by systemic efforts within clubs to tackle discrimination, create pathways for underrepresented groups and hold those in power accountable for progress. The Premier League has developed great programmes to develop more black coaches, bring more South Asian players through the talent pipeline and help black players on the path to becoming club executives.

All this matters, and I fully agree with my noble friend Lady Fox that it cannot be about box-ticking. It is about ensuring that every player, coach, staff member and fan feels that football is for them. When implemented correctly, EDI does not create diversion or resentment; it fosters unity by ensuring that everyone has a fair chance to participate and succeed.

I have a lot of sympathy for my noble friends who worry about the potential for overreach or missteps in EDI, and my noble friend Lady Fox is right that poorly conceived and implemented EDI policies will be burdensome and ineffective. But now that EDI has been put into the Bill, my approach will be to work with the football regulator to ensure that it is done thoughtfully, innovatively and with that laser focus on outcomes. Football clubs will have nothing to fear from embracing this work. EDI done well is not a threat; it can strengthen clubs by ensuring they reflect the communities they serve and are able to attract diverse talent, and will fundamentally make their clubs better places for everyone to work.

This does not have to be a binary choice between rigid mandates and doing nothing. The best path forward is an enabling framework supported by expert guidance and underpinned by meaningful accountability. Clubs should be encouraged, not coerced, to embrace this work; it can and it should be aspirational. I urge the Government and the regulator to consider how these requirements can be implemented with that spirit in mind.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, for bringing this amendment and for giving us opportunity to look at the new additions that the Government have put in the Bill. As my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough reminds us, this is one of the areas in which the Bill has changed from the Bill that was before the previous Parliament. He did not like the other one either, but I think that it is clear that he likes these provisions even less.

While I am highly supportive of efforts to improve equality of access for people in football and indeed in all sports—when we last looked at these issues, I spoke about the progress we have made in tackling the horrendous racism and homophobia that blighted football for a long time—I share some of the concerns that my noble friends, including my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, have raised about enshrining in law what are clearly shifting sands. As the ever-changing acronyms and the ever-expanding rainbow of colours on flags and lanyards show, this is an area that continues to change, and we must not allow the noble aim of opening up access for people and treating everybody with equal respect to be pegged to a certain moment in time in the way that it is done. I am mindful too, as my noble friend Lady Brady has just reminded us, of the enormous strides that clubs have taken to drive improvement in this area, and we congratulate West Ham on the recognition that they have won for their work on that.

We must be very wary of what is a mandatory requirement in the Bill, in the way that the noble Baroness’s amendment focuses on, and the clear cost and burden that will impose on the clubs that have to comply with it. My noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough spoke about those costs and burdens, and he was right as well to worry that, with the work that is done in this area, we sometimes inadvertently bring about division rather than diversity as we pit various groups of people against one another in what sometimes feel like informal hierarchies of grievance.

I share some of the concerns that my noble friends have raised, and I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for honing in on this further requirement that the Government seek to impose on clubs. I hope the Minister will respond to the points that they have raised.

Football Governance Bill [HL]

Baroness Brady Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I refer the Committee to my interests as detailed in the register. I support Amendments 187ZA and 187ZB, tabled by my noble friend Lord Moynihan, which propose a sensible and very necessary adjustment to the presumptions under- pinning the ownership test.

These amendments address an important issue in the Bill, ensuring that the ownership process is fair, reasonable and aligned with best practices in other regulated sectors. As my noble friend has said, as it stands, Clause 32(5) means that if the independent football regulator fails to determine an application for a new owner or officer within a set timeframe, the applicant will be automatically treated as unsuitable. This is a really problematic approach. It assumes that any delay is the fault of the applicant or reflective of their unsuitability when, in reality, delays can occur for many good reasons. Quite often, they are entirely outside the applicant’s control or, indeed, the control of the selling club.

Simple cases can, of course, be done quickly, but acquisitions of football clubs can be complex undertakings. Applications for ownership done well involve a detailed examination of financial records, governance structures and regulatory compliance. Imposing arbitrary deadlines does not speed things up; it just risks poor decisions being taken on very consequential issues without all the facts. Indeed, taking time to get it right is in the best interests of all involved: the club, the fans and the broader football ecosystem. To penalise an applicant simply because the IFR runs out of time is neither fair nor proportionate.

The Premier League allocates significant resources to operate its own owners’ and directors’ tests. I have spoken to it about this issue and, of course, so has DCMS. It has told me that the league sees no benefit whatever in arbitrary deadlines and has explicitly told the Government that unless this is staffed and resourced intensively, the IFR will almost definitely hit the deadline in a range of cases. Of course, this will be compounded by the fact that the Premier League will be running its own process without a statutory deadline, meaning the IFR would be ruling people to be unsuitable for no good reason while the league would still be performing its test. This is a recipe for chaos and, I am afraid to say, litigation.

This presumption of unfitness if a statutory deadline is not met could have significant unintended consequences. Let us imagine a scenario where a club is on the brink of critical ownership transfer—perhaps its survival depends on transferring the ownership—and the only prospective buyer is deemed unsuitable purely because the IFR failed to meet its deadline. In the last Committee debate, the Minister said:

“Although the risk of clubs going into administration will be greatly reduced, it may still happen”.—[Official Report, 16/12/24; col. 54.]


For a club to go into administration because the regulator has not met its deadline would be unfair, and catastrophic for its supporters. Even if it did not result in immediate administration, it could leave the club in limbo, unable to secure necessary investment and potentially sliding into financial difficulty or worse.

This issue is not confined to the immediate impact on clubs. There are also wider reputational and practical implications for prospective owners and officers. Being deemed “unsuitable” by default could carry consequences far beyond football, affecting their credibility and standing in other sectors. That is not how a fair and just regulatory process should operate.

The amendments before us propose a simple but important correction. By reversing the presumption, they would ensure that applicants were not unfairly penalised for delays that were outside their control. Instead, if the IFR fails to make a determination within the specified timeline, the applicant would be treated as suitable by default. As my noble friend Lord Moynihan said, that is much more aligned with practices in other regulated sectors. For example, in merger control, if the Competition and Markets Authority fails to make a decision within the statutory time limit, the merger is automatically allowed. That ensures that the time limits are meaningful but that regulatory delay does not create unnecessary barriers or unfair outcomes.

It is important to emphasise that this amendment does not undermine the integrity of the ownership test. The IFR will still be able to make a determination based on the suitability of the applicant, but it will no longer have the ability, in effect, to penalise applicants or clubs because of its own delays. It would, in truth, be far better not have a timeframe at all, for the reasons I have outlined. However, if there is to be one, we must reverse the presumption and place incentives in the right place.

I hope the Minister will recognise the value of these amendments, and the much greater fairness and reduced risk they would bring to the process. It is a small but crucial change that will help ensure the ownership process operates in way that is both reasonable and just. I urge the Government to give the amendments the consideration they warrant.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, in this matter. It cannot possibly be fair to have a regulatory system in which, if the regulator does not perform and reach a decision within the specified time, for reasons that are not the responsibility of the applicant, the application fails. That is plainly unjust and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, says, it is contradictory to the approach adopted in competition law, where the regulator has short time limits and must comply with them. The alternative is to have a more open-ended system, whereby the regulator can take more time if it is necessary to do so in exceptional circumstances.

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[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 190 I will speak to my further amendments in this group, Amendments 191, 195 and 198. I will also speak to Amendment 204, which is in the name of my noble friend Lord Markham, to which I have added my name as well.

The amendments in this group focus on the criteria that the regulator will take into consideration when determining the suitability of a potential owner of a regulated club. My Amendment 190 is intended as a probing amendment, to tease out the reasonings behind the Government’s removal of what was Clause 37(2) in the previous version of the Bill. While the wording of this amendment is exactly the same as that of the subsection that was taken out when the present Government introduced their version, I want to be clear that I am not necessarily arguing that I want to see it reinserted. My intention here is to use this opportunity to understand why the Government took it out, and to ask the Minister a few questions for the sake of the Committee to elaborate on the Government’s position.

The Government have said that the previous requirement for the regulator to have regard to the foreign and trade policy objectives of the United Kingdom and its Government was one of the main concerns that UEFA had with the previous version of the Bill, and that removing the provision has pacified it. But has it fully pacified UEFA? We have not yet had sight of the letter from UEFA to the Secretary of State, which the Committee has heard about a number of times. My noble friend Lady Brady sent her own correspondence to the noble Baroness, Lady Twycross, on 2 December, asking her to publish that letter and to place a copy in the Library so that the Committee can see it, but I do not believe my noble friend has yet received a response. It would be very helpful for the whole Committee to be able to see that letter, so we can be reassured about what exactly UEFA has said in that regard.

At present, it is not clear whether this provision was the only part of the previous Bill with which UEFA was not content or whether there are further parts of the Bill currently before us with which it is still unhappy. It would be useful to know how strong UEFA’s opposition was to the old provision on trade policy and so on. Did the Government remove it because UEFA threatened to exclude England from European competitions if, and only if, it remained in the Bill, or was UEFA’s opposition weaker and focused on other aspects of the Bill? I would be grateful if the Minister could elaborate on that for the Committee, and I hope that my noble friend Lady Brady will receive a response before Report.

My Amendment 191 would insert the word “relevant” to Clause 37(2)(c). This requires the regulator to consider whether a prospective owner or officer has been party to any civil proceedings in a court of law. The intent of including “relevant” here is to give a more precise wording, and indeed a bit of leeway. Our concern is that the current wording permits a wide range of court proceedings to be considered by the regulator—for example, divorce or child custody would surely be a civil proceeding. Making this simple change would focus the scope on civil proceedings which are directly related to somebody’s ability as an officer or owner of a regulated club.

I seek through Amendment 195 to prevent the regulator amending the considerations relevant to owner and officer determinations. This follows the theme that we have carried through this Committee of ensuring maximum clarity for clubs which are going to be regulated, and ensuring that the powers granted to the regulator by Parliament are not expanded in future. To allow that would be to grant the regulator a blank cheque to demand more and more requirements as it wishes.

The last amendment in my name in this group is Amendment 198, which would remove the provision stating that the regulator may not refuse ownership of a regulated club because of a prospective owner’s connection with the Government of a particular territory. I am sure we can all think of particular countries or territories at present which would indeed be grounds for immediate disqualification—this perhaps flows from the debate we had on group 2. For instance, at present, connection with the Government of the Russian Federation would surely be an open-and-shut case—would the Minister not agree? We want to ensure that the regulator is independent of our own Government, of course, but I do not see why the regulator should be prohibited in law from considering factors such as this in the determinations that it makes.

Amendment 204, in the name of my noble friend Lord Markham, prevents the regulator prohibiting multi-club ownership models. There are currently a large number of Premier League and English Football League clubs which are owned by individuals or consortia that own other clubs. There has been some controversy in this area, I gather, but we should be alive to the benefits of the model—one of which is a reduction in financial risk. It gives the ultimate owner of a club greater protection from one of their clubs being relegated or suffering a slump in revenue. Because there is a common owner, other clubs in the multi-club model can act as a buffer to absorb losses in one of the other clubs. There is, consequently, less risk of that owner facing difficulties and having to sell the club or, even worse, that club going into administration. Multi-club ownership models can absorb financial risk, thereby aiding the regulator to achieve the goals we want to see it achieve in regard to financial stability Surely the regulator should not prohibit this. I beg to move.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 191, which seeks to add the word “relevant” to Clause 37(2)(c). This would be an important adjustment that would bring additional clarity and guidance to the IFR, as it develops its ownership test. The clause currently requires the independent football regulator to consider

“whether the individual is or has been a party to proceedings (other than criminal proceedings) in any court or tribunal”.

This is a strikingly broad provision. It would allow any civil proceedings, regardless of their nature or relevance, to count against someone in an ownership determination; it may even be that the individual in question seeking ownership has brought the civil action or tribunal that, as a result, is likely to disqualify them from owning a football club. It is a very concerning approach. Amendment 191 would provide a much-needed safeguard against unintended and disproportionate outcomes.

Let me take this opportunity to ask the Minister again the question I asked earlier in Committee—it is quite a fundamental question. Is the ownership test provided for in this Bill going to be subjective or objective? That was not made clear by the Minister when I asked the question before, so I would really like clarity—surely it cannot be both. Without this clarity, we risk creating an ownership framework that is open to arbitrary and inconsistent application, which would undermine investor confidence and, ultimately, the credibility of the regulator.

This concern is particularly acute when we consider the clause as it stands. Most successful businesspeople who have lived rich and varied commercial lives will have been involved in civil proceedings at some point, somewhere in the world. These could range from contractual disputes to regulatory disagreements or employment tribunals, and very often instances where they were not at fault whatever but had to defend their interests or bring such cases themselves. Are we seriously suggesting that such proceedings should disqualify them from passing an ownership test?

This is not a hypothetical concern. Civil proceedings can be entirely routine and, in many industries, reflect the complexity of modern business rather than any moral or professional failing. The absence of the word “relevant” means that such cases could be treated as a disqualifying factor, even when they have no bearing whatever on the individual's ability to responsibly own or direct a football club. This is not aligned with practice in any other regulatory sectors and will create an entirely unnecessary barrier to investment.

Clarity on the scope and purpose of the ownership test is essential for not just the regulator but the entire football ecosystem, including investors, leagues and clubs. Noble Lords have already highlighted serious issues with the current drafting, not least the lack of definition of “significant influence”. On the very unclear situation of Newcastle United, the Minister confirmed that the Crown Prince would be subject to the owners’ test, and the issue of significant influence would mean that this is the case. At least that situation was clarified and he knows where he stands.

Amendment 191 provides an opportunity to address at least one aspect of this mixture of problems by narrowing the scope of Clause 37(2) to focus only on what is genuinely relevant. This small change would provide greater clarity, fairness and confidence for all stakeholders in football. I encourage the Minister to reflect on this issue and the broader issues around this element of the Bill. As we move towards Report, it would be helpful to hear how the Government intend to address the now quite numerous concerns about the scope and application of the ownership test in the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

My Lords, before we have any further interventions, I thank my noble friends Lord Bassam of Brighton and Lady Taylor of Bolton, as well as the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, for their amendments. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Maude of Horsham, for his contribution on this group, which sparked a lively debate, and for giving notice of his intention to oppose the Question that Clause 53 stand part of the Bill. It is useful to remember why we are here, but my comments will focus on the amendments in this group. It is imperative that the regulator can raise the funds necessary to deliver its regulatory functions, so I thank my noble friends and the noble Lords who have raised this important issue.

Turning first to Amendments 250 and 254 in the name of my noble friend Lord Bassam, I want to reassure him that the existing drafting in Clause 53(3) is comprehensive, in the Government’s view, and provides the necessary mechanism for raising these funds. Clause 53(3) also acts as an important constraint on what the regulator can charge clubs for. We believe that the amendment would risk bypassing this safeguard. We also want to be clear that, under the existing drafting, any such central fund could not be used as a form of lifeboat fund to prop up clubs in distress. It is the Government’s opinion that a zero-failure regulator, as implied, would create moral hazard and encourage the very risk-taking that the regulator is trying to address.

On Amendment 252 in the name of my noble friend Lady Taylor of Bolton, the Government acknowledge the importance of any charges on clubs being transparent and proportionate, and offering value for money. These values should be at the heart of any public body. This must be achieved while maintaining the regulator’s operational independence and flexibility, which is why it would not be appropriate to prescribe an exact methodology in legislation for charging the levy. Doing so would remove the regulator’s ability to explore other, possibly more effective and proportionate, methods of charging. The Bill already requires the regulator to have regard to clubs’ financial resources and position in the pyramid. I am confident that this will be sufficient to ensure that the levy is fair and proportionate. I hope this will give my noble friends reassurance that these costs will not be burdensome to clubs.

Amendment 256 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, would require the regulator to consult with the Chancellor of the Exchequer specifically, as opposed to the Treasury, when making, amending or replacing levy rules. Consulting with the Treasury on levy rules is standard practice for a regulator, and this approach has been agreed with the department. The Chancellor, as head of the Treasury, will have full oversight of the Treasury’s response to the consultation. The Chancellor is accountable for the decisions of the Treasury and any consultation with the Treasury is likely to have the approval of the Chancellor. Therefore, the Government’s view is that the existing requirement to consult with the Treasury is sufficient to ensure value for money.

Finally, on whether Clause 53 should stand part of the Bill, this clause will allow the regulator to charge a levy to licensed clubs that covers the regulator’s running costs. This follows the precedent of other regulators such as the FCA, the CMA and Ofcom.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

I thank the Minister for allowing an intervention. Has there been any further development on the cost of the regulator? I know that we have asked the question on numerous occasions, but we have not had a reply. It would be very good for clubs to know what the Government expect the regulator to cost. The Minister mentioned the FCA; that costs £762 million a year. I hope it will not be that much.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I was going to come on to that. I anticipated that if the noble Lord, Lord Hayward, was here, he would ask me that question. If I can carry on through my speech, with the noble Baroness’s permission, I will address that later in my remarks.

We think it only fair that industry should cover the cost, as opposed to taxpayers. Football is a wealthy industry, and the cost of regulation would represent just a tiny fraction of its annual revenue of over £6 billion. However, this legislation puts robust checks and balances on the regulator. It will be limited to raising funds to meet a set of tightly defined costs that are necessary for regulatory activity only. The regulator will not have a blank cheque; it will be subject to numerous safeguards, including annual auditing by the National Audit Office, and its annual accounts will be laid before Parliament. This will provide the necessary transparency and scrutiny to deliver value for money.

Clause 53 also requires the regulator to have regard to a club’s individual financial position and the league it plays in when setting the levy charges that a club must pay. This should ensure a proportionate approach where no club, big or small, is asked to pay more than what is fair and affordable. As noble Lords are aware, the regulator will be the one that decides on the methodology and, ultimately, the cost of the levy.

I understand, however, that there is a clear desire, as expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, the noble Lord, Lord Hayward, and other Members of your Lordships’ Committee, to have a much better understanding of how the costs may be borne at different levels of the game. I will endeavour to provide more clarity on this issue. Therefore, after further discussions with the shadow regulator, I will write to noble Lords to provide further clarity on costs ahead of Report. I will also place a copy of this letter in the Libraries of both Houses and would be happy to meet noble Lords or take any questions.

This is a complex issue and we cannot fetter the discretion of the regulator. The letter, when it comes, cannot therefore be considered a definite estimation of costs. It will merely be illustrative, in an attempt to be helpful to this Committee and provide your Lordships’ House—and the clubs that will be regulated—with some clarity and reassurance before we get to Report.

For the reasons I have set out, I am unable to accept the amendments in this group. I therefore hope that noble Lords will not press them.

Football Governance Bill [HL]

Baroness Brady Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Addington (LD)]

My Lords, I am not very bothered by having a muscular regulator; I want an efficient one that gets things done and looks after the lower clubs. There is a disagreement between us that has been there all through this Committee.

I regard the series of amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, as a smorgasbord from which we should select something that is actually going to get us to have a look at what is going on. There are lots of options and I have put my name to one of them. Making sure that we get the regulator right and get money going down to preserve something we regard as good is the primary objective. It is not just to take money off the Premier League; it is to make sure that the structures below survive.

If the Government think these amendments are not the right way to progress, hearing why from the Minister would be sensible. Nobody is quite happy with the backstop power in the regulation structure at the moment. Everybody is a little bit upset about it. People who were happy are now not happy. The Premier League and EFL are having great fun not talking to each other or disagreeing. I have no real objection to a slightly more muscular approach. I do not think it is a light touch that is required; it should be efficient.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group cover a wide range of issues relating to the backstop. While I understand the intentions behind many of these amendments, I fear that they collectively risk making an already contentious and divisive mechanism even more complex and counterproductive.

I respect that Ministers believe they have designed a balanced mechanism that places incentives in the right place, but I think what we will come to unpack is that that is wholly mistaken. I believe this Committee will see that this backstop has not and will not incentivise industry-led agreements, which is supposedly its overreaching policy purpose. I believe we will see that it will not result in a balanced, pragmatic solution that will be good for football.

It will instead drive posturing, game playing and the development of extreme and damaging solutions. We will see that this backstop is legally untested and uncertain, and it could sink football and the regulator into a legal and political quagmire that could drag on for years. Worst of all, we will see that this backstop has already poisoned, and will continue to poison, the well of football bodies’ relationships, when we all need to work together for our continued collective success.

I will briefly address some of the amendments in this group. The proposal to expand the scope of the backstop to include multiple parties all at once—for example, the National League, or potentially the FA and, even in the future, the women’s game—is concerning. This risks creating division where none currently exists. The Premier League, far from being at odds with these stakeholders, has made intensive and carefully considered efforts to support them, just as it has with the EFL.

Just a few months ago, the Premier League announced a £12.6 million package for the National League system over three years, a substantial increase on previous arrangements. For the women’s game, the Premier League has provided significant financial assistance, including a £20 million interest-free loan to help the new Women’s Professional Leagues Limited in its formative years.

These are examples of proactive, voluntary agreements that demonstrate collaboration rather than conflict. This set of amendments would encourage all stakeholders to start competing, simultaneously claiming the Premier League’s revenues, fracturing relationships and introducing adversarial dynamics where none currently exist.

This is not the way to build a sustainable and co-operative football ecosystem. Indeed, I will make a prediction: it is far more likely that the National League will seek to trigger the backstop in relation to the EFL, which does not provide any financial support to the leagues below it. The idea of the IFR triggering the backstop mechanism independently is particularly troubling. The purpose of the backstop, as described in the Bill, is to act as a last resort when the parties fail to reach an agreement; it is not supposed to be a front- stop. Allowing the IFR to bypass this voluntary process would undermine its very purpose and disincentivise genuine negotiation.

The idea that any change—not even a reduction—in revenue received by one party could automatically trigger the backstop is, frankly, unworkable. Revenue distributions in football are dynamic and fluctuate according to complex interrelationships. The amounts change every year, almost always upwards. A mechanism that automatically treats any change as a potential trigger would, with the greatest of respect to the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, be absurd. It would trigger perpetual uncertainty, which is the last thing that football needs.

Finally, and more positively, the suggestion that the IFR could impose its own settlement deserves careful scrutiny. I have tabled my own, slightly different amendments to that effect, which will be debated in a later group. I fully agree with noble Lords that the binary mechanism in the Bill is unworkable for football. However, with respect, I am not sure that this particular amendment would place incentives in the right place. To allow the IFR to impose its own settlement only where both parties’ proposals are inconsistent with the IFR’s objectives would allow parties to offer unrealistic proposals. It would mean they could anchor with a very extreme demand, knowing that the IFR would be forced to step in and create a compromise. This would further entrench division.

What is striking about the amendments in this group is that they demonstrate a fundamental dissatisfaction with the mechanism in the Bill from all sides of the House, as well as the main competition parties involved. The Premier League has raised serious concerns about the divisive nature of the backstop, while the EFL has, I believe, inspired the amendments in this group. It too sees significant flaws in the process as designed. This really should give the Government significant pause for thought.

Let us not forget that English football’s success has been built on collaboration and solidarity. UEFA has made this very point about the deficiencies of the current Bill’s mechanism. A backstop requires thoughtful, proportionate regulation that respects the autonomy of its stakeholders. These amendments, and indeed the existing backstop mechanism, would disrupt that delicate balance. I urge the Government to reflect carefully on whether the backstop as designed is fit for purpose. It should be fostering co-operation, not driving division. If that requires revisiting the mechanism, we should do so without hesitation. Football’s future really does depend on getting this right.

[Lord Maude of Horsham (Con)]

My Lords, I want to pick up one particular word that my noble friend Lady Brady raised: divisive. There is no doubt that this Bill has turned what was intended to be a backstop—a last resort or nuclear option, however it was described—into something that can be used pre-emptively. Some of the amendments proposed tonight—which would make it more aggressive and interventionist, and more able to be used pre-emptively—have behind them the sense that this is bound to be aggressive, antagonistic and adversarial. I want to contest that.

The truth is that, wherever a club is in the pyramid of English football, it has an interest in the whole pyramid being strong. There is no benefit to the Premier League in keeping lots more money to itself and weakening the rest of the pyramid, because it depends on the pyramid; its strength is drawn from all the way through the pyramid. It is really important that we try to take ourselves away from the sense that there is a finite pie of limited size and so we should work out how to enable different parts of it to get more for themselves.

English football—the whole pyramid—has seen tremendous growth. It had the huge challenges of the pandemic, but it survived and came out strong. As we have repeatedly said, the Premier League is not just the most successful football league in the world but the most successful sporting league in the world. The Championship is the sixth most successful and richest league in Europe. It is strong and it will grow more, but it will not do so if the whole mindset behind how this is constructed just puts one set of interests against another. The aim should be to ask how we grow the pyramid further and encourage the different parts of it to work together and see the mutual benefit, to make two plus two add up to five, rather than—as I fear the danger is in how this is constructed—add up to three. I urge the Government to take this away and look again at how it is constructed.

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[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I appreciate that the noble Baroness, Lady Evans, may take a different view and I completely understand people’s concerns that it will be a front-stop—as a spoiler alert, and with apologies to my noble friend, I am not going to accept these amendments; we will come to that in a moment. However, we genuinely think that the model we have established is very similar, apart from the possible inclusion of the parachute payment—for want of a better word; it is not the phrase used in the Bill, but that escapes me for a moment—should the “state of the game” report suggest to the regulator that it needs to allow that to be taken into account.

My view is that the model we have presented should incentivise the leagues and the parties to come to an agreement themselves, and that opportunity to do so does not go away once the regulator is established. That is the design of the model and an essential part of it, as it was in the previous iteration of the Bill, so this is absolutely intended as a backstop process. We can go on to debate that in later groups as well as in this group. I am happy to do that and to meet people individually to go through why we think this will be a backstop and not a front-stop whereby the minute the regulator sets off in motion, everybody will claim that they want to have the backstop triggered.

However, there are things that the regulator will need to take into account if somebody asks for the backstop process to be triggered. It is not the necessarily the case that the regulator would have to accept that that process was set in motion. The whole model is designed around the principle of trying to get people to come to an agreement themselves. It is really important to ensure—

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

I thank the Minister for giving way. If she was right, we would have a deal in place by now. This has been the model for two years, so it is definitely a barrier to conversations. There is a view that whatever the Premier League agrees with the Football League, that, in effect, becomes its insurance policy. It then triggers the backstop and goes straight to the regulator, knowing that it will never get less than it has been offered and could get more. We will be in a perpetually revolving door of triggering mechanisms that will never give any club any certainty of its income, which will be very dangerous and very bad for football.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

It is important for us to go through how the regulator’s backstop powers and power of last resort would work. I appreciate that the noble Baroness is entirely right that an agreement has not come into place, and that might be—or might not be—because of people waiting to see what form the regulator takes and the exact iteration of the wide range of views we have heard tonight and on previous occasions.

If, under the Government’s intended model for the backstop, the relevant leagues cannot reach an agreement, they can apply to trigger the backstop—the noble Baroness is quite right on that. If certain high thresholds are met, of which the regulator must be satisfied, the backstop can be triggered, but let me go through what would happen first: the relevant leagues would enter a period of mediation and, if there was still no agreement, they would move to a final proposal stage.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

I thank the Minister for allowing me to intervene. Rick Parry went before the Select Committee and said he would trigger the backstop in any event—even if he got more money from the Premier League in the meantime—because there is no risk to the EFL in the backstop.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I am not going to comment on what people did or did not say in that committee meeting at this point. The backstop would be applied only if certain high thresholds were met. The regulator will be an independent regulator and it will have strict measures to meet—high thresholds which it must be satisfied of if the backstop is to be triggered. If there is still no agreement, the parties will move to a final proposal stage and, at that point, the regulator would convene an independent expert panel and invite final proposals from both relevant leagues with accompanying analysis, and the independent expert panel would choose the most appropriate proposal. This model incentivises both parties to compromise, as unreasonable proposals would not be chosen.

The whole model, which is almost identical in every detail to how the previous Government were planning to do this, is intended—

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[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I appreciate the noble Lord’s point, but if the EFL triggers the backstop or makes a proposal in bad faith, it could end up worse off if the Premier League’s proposal is more reasonable, so this does not encourage the EFL or Premier League to be confrontation or divisive. I am sure we will come back to this at a later stage, probably this evening, but definitely when we come back in the new year on Report.

I am really happy to sit down with noble Lords and talk this through, but I will continue to use my speaking notes for some time and then, I hope, give some reassurance that we are considering this carefully. I am always happy to meet with noble Lords, as is the team that has been working on this. As noble Lords are aware, a number of the officials working on this have been doing so right the way through from the fan-led review, so this is a really good example of the consistency of advice both to this Government and the previous Government, notwithstanding the fact that not everybody here liked the Bill’s previous iteration.

To return to my speaking notes—although I am fairly sure I have got slightly out of order now—we think that this approach encourages future collaboration. We might need to agree to disagree on that point and come back to that debate.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

The Minister says that she believes that the mechanism will deliver collaboration. For my benefit, please could she name a single example of a binding final offer process working in UK regulatory terms, and its use in the UK to deliver the outcomes she is talking about?

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

The Competition and Markets Authority has used it.

The process proposed by this group of amendments, excluding Amendment 260, would allow the regulator to intervene at its discretion and would require it to take into account the potential use of any revenue distributed. It is the Government’s view that this is regulatory overreach and a fundamental change to the intent of the process as drafted.

The other amendments from my noble friends Lord Bassam and Lady Taylor seek to change the structure of the backstop process from a two-party mediation and final proposal/order process to one that could apply to any number of relevant parties. I understand the overall intent of these amendments and have chosen to address them as a group to ensure that that intent is understood comprehensively, and that the Government’s position is in turn communicated coherently.

To clarify, the Premier League, the English Football League and the National League can all apply to trigger the backstop process. Any of the specified competition organisers can submit an application to trigger the process, and simultaneous instances of the backstop process could be triggered to cover the relationships between each of the leagues. The process is inherently designed as a two-party process. Fundamentally, distribution agreements are agreed between two individual leagues and the process is designed to facilitate these agreements. As the final offer process is set up and designed between two parties to facilitate a decision between two proposals on the basis of relevant principles, it would not be effective for the regulator to engage in this process with more than two parties. This is also, in part, why it would not be appropriate for the regulator to make a third offer. Without the incentive of the two-proposal process, parties are likely to stay at polarised positions, rather than find areas for compromise. However, when the two proposals submitted are the only choices, the pragmatic decision is to submit the most reasonable proposal possible. This is the incentive we wish to create.

I now turn to Amendments 292, 296 and 314, tabled by my noble friends Lord Bassam and Lady Taylor of Bolton. While there is a slight difference between “special” and “compelling”, we are satisfied that the bar is set sufficiently high with the use of “special”, which is the more usual terminology in these sorts of provisions. There is likely to be no tangible difference in outcomes, and therefore these amendments would be minor, insignificant changes to the wording of the Bill. As such, the Government believe the current drafting is sufficient. This is also the case for Amendment 264. While we understand the intent behind this amendment, we are content that the current drafting in the Bill sufficiently captures all revenue relevant for consideration during the backstop process. The proposed drafting change would not capture any revenue sources not already captured by the existing wording.

I turn now to Amendments 261, 262, 276 and 315. Amendment 276 seeks to significantly broaden one of the conditions by which the backstop process could be triggered. Condition 2 is specifically designed to be triggered by a material reduction in relevant revenue, as this poses a significant threat to the financial sustainability of the pyramid. Amendment 315 would, if the distribution process was ended due to incomplete or inconsistent proposals, require the regulator to issue a distribution order based on its expert panel’s own proposal, rather than ending the process. This would prevent the regulator ending the final proposal stage without an order, even if both leagues have chosen not to submit proposals.

These amendments, and the others referenced, would increase the likelihood of an enforced rather than an agreed solution. The Government’s preference is for an industry-led solution. It is our view that the regulator should have a role in facilitating the final proposal process only where no agreement can be reached on distribution, and that the process should be the least interventionist it can be while remaining effective. This approach encourages future collaboration and prevents the leagues relying too heavily on the regulator in the future.

I turn now to Amendments 284 and 286. While I agree that the state of the game report is a usual source of information to be considered as part of the distribution agreement process, it is our position that these amendments are unnecessarily prescriptive. As it stands, the Bill does not make specific reference to the report being included as a potential question for consideration. However, the existing drafting does not in any way exclude consideration of the state of the game report, and the regulator must have regard to it as part of its general duties. I would expect the state of the game report to be considered by both the leagues applying to trigger the backstop process, and the regulator, given its relevance. However, to include this expectation beyond what is already set out in primary legislation would be inflexible.

Turning to Amendment 267, while the Government understand the broader intention to involve fans in as many areas of the Bill as possible, it would not be appropriate for the regulator to be mandated to consult a group which is neither directly financially involved nor a governing body. This is not to say that fans should not make their views known to the regulator, and there will be many instances, such as in the state of the game consultation, where we expect the regulator to be able to consider a number of perspectives. This includes the views of fans on the financial situation in English football. Furthermore, the proposed drafting requiring consultation with representatives of regulated clubs is duplicative, given that the Bill as drafted already requires the consultation of the leagues.

Finally, Amendment 319 seeks to remove the provision that explicitly outlines that leagues can come to an alternative agreement at any time in the backstop process. The ability of leagues to come to an agreement independently has been protected in the legislation itself intentionally, to highlight that an industry-led solution is both preferred and encouraged. We believe this explicit protection will encourage the leagues to reconsider at every step of the process whether regulatory intervention is necessary, ideally bringing them closer to an independent agreement that works for all of football.

I hope that my responses have reassured my noble friends and other noble Lords that the Government’s approach is appropriate and provides the necessary protections, and that my noble friends will not press their amendments.

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Again, I know the Minister understands this. Like all of us, she has the good of the game at heart. I know her team understand this as well. I look forward to hearing her on this very important issue. I beg to move.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 263 in the name of my noble friend Lord Markham, which seeks to exclude parachute payments—the financial lifeline provided to relegated clubs—from the definition of “relevant revenue” under the backstop. This amendment is essential to addressing the profound risk created by the current drafting of the Bill.

Parachute payments are not just a feature of football finance, they are a key part of the scaffolding that delivers the competitiveness, the investability and the financial sustainability of the English football ecosystem. Without them, relegation would become a financial free-for-all—a cliff edge that would devastate many clubs and their communities. Parachute payments are designed to manage the significant financial shock of relegation, where clubs can lose enormous amounts of revenue almost overnight, yet their overheads stay the same.

I speak from some personal experience here. At West Ham United, we have known the daunting realities of relegation. Without parachute payments, the response in 2011 would have been wholesale disinvestment, a disorderly fire sale of players, job cuts, and a complete halt to critical investments in infrastructure. That is exactly how clubs start to spiral. Parachute payments do not come close to eliminating the pain of relegation but they provide some breathing space to make difficult but measured adjustments.

Yet this Bill places the very existence of parachute payments on the table, making them a part of the binary backstop process that pits two competing visions of football finance against one another. This is an intolerable risk. The EFL has been explicit that its proposal in this process would be for massive reductions in parachute payments, based on the argument that the financial gap between the Premier League and the Championship should be closed. But this argument fundamentally misunderstands the problem. The central issue here is not the gap itself, which reflects the commercial realities of two very different leagues, but whether clubs can transition effectively between those levels, between those two leagues.

Here the evidence is clear. Parachute payments work. If they did not exist, you would simply have to invent them. Crucially, parachute payments do not lock up promotion opportunities. Look no further than the examples of Luton Town and Ipswich Town from each of the last two years. Well-run, innovative clubs have every chance of success in the Championship, which is a highly competitive and appealing league.

Parachutes are not a significant distortion but a significant stabiliser, providing clubs with the tools to manage transition responsibly and sustainably. The EFL’s proposal is essentially to level down the Premier League to meet the Championship; to stretch out the bottom half of the Premier League. But that would destroy the top-to-bottom competitiveness that makes the Premier League the most watched and admired league in the world. Enabling such a proposal, as this Bill now does, expressly privileges the Championship over the Premier League. That is an astonishing position to take. It risks reducing the quality of the game at the top of the pyramid and undermining the ability of clubs to compete both domestically and internationally.

Let us also consider the impact on investment. Investors are rational. They are drawn to football because of its structures, parachute payments central among them, that provide clear pathways for responsible investment and sustainable growth. Without parachute payments, the Championship clubs become less investable. Why would anyone seriously invest in a club that cannot make the financial journey to the Premier League without risking complete collapse on relegation? The logic of the previous Bill was that, if there are challenges with parachute payments—challenges that the Government’s state of the game review may or may not identify—these can be addressed through increased solidarity payments. The exclusion of parachute payments in the previous Bill meant that the very existence of parachute payments was not placed at risk. It recognised the critical value of parachute payments to protect their role in managing these vital transitions. But now parachute payments are suddenly on the table. It is a hugely significant change of policy.

I know that the Minister would prefer that I should refrain from pointing this out, but the process by which this expanded backstop mechanism has been introduced has been alarmingly inadequate. As we know, the Secretary of State held just one 30-minute meeting with seven hand-picked Premier League clubs between July and October. The backstop was one of the many things that were discussed at the meeting, but at no time during the meeting were we given any warning that this decision was even being considered, let alone added to the Bill. Those seven clubs wrote to the Secretary of State following the meeting, which was five or six months ago, and we still have not had a reply. We also know that UEFA explicitly advised Ministers to reconsider the previous mechanism before parachute payments were even included. But, instead of narrowing the scope, the Government have significantly broadened it. I ask again: why? Parachute payments do not create financial irresponsibility. They are its enemy. They do not distort competitiveness; they enable it.

If you are Championship club newly promoted into the Premier League, you need to know that you can invest in your team to give you any chance to be competitive and to stay there. Clubs invest when they are promoted only because they know that they can rely on the parachute payment to cover some of the investments they have made in order to be competitive in the Premier league. Those investments are almost always in transfer fees and players’ wages. Clubs need that parachute to cover those things if they are relegated. If you do not have a parachute payment to soften the blow, you know that you cannot make the necessary investment in your team and in transfer fees when you get into the Premier League to try to stay there. You know your team will not be competitive enough, because you know that, if you are relegated without a parachute payment, you will face the real risk of administration.

Parachute payments help soften the blow. Without them, you cannot cut your overheads in any way, because there is no cause to terminate players’ contracts—that is part of the PFA agreement. So this means that, if you get promoted into the Premier League knowing you cannot contribute to the competitiveness of the Premier League—the idea that on any day any club can beat any other—you are going to affect the competitiveness and the global appeal of the Premier League, as my noble friend Lord Markham said, but, most of all, you are going to damage your own club.

Parachute payments do not reward failure. They allow clubs to recover, rebuild and stay financially sustainable. Frankly, I think that is the whole purpose of Bill. So I urge the Government to reconsider and to protect the stability of the football ecosystem, protect the ability of clubs to manage the transition between leagues responsibly, and protect the investment in both the Premier League and the Championship, which make English football the global success story that it is today.

[Lord Maude of Horsham (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lady Brady, who speaks with passion and deep expertise. I support this amendment.

I suspect I am not the only football supporter sitting in your Lordships’ House who had never heard of parachute payments until I started to get my head around the Bill. It took me a little time to get my head around the concept. I have listened very carefully to, and interrogated, the arguments for it, and understand them. The essence seems to me that it is simply a fact—an irrefutable fact and not readily to be changed—that there is a huge gulf in the financial rewards that come to a club in the Premier League compared with one that is in the Championship. One might regret that, but the only way you could possibly change it would be, as my noble friend said, by levelling down and reducing the competitive tension that there is in the Premier League.

The arguments that my noble friends Lord Markham and Lady Brady made about how parachute payments can narrow the gulf between Premier League and Championship are powerful and compelling. But the truth is that, without the ability for clubs that have been promoted to invest to become competitive, you would not have the competitive tension within the Premier League that is part of what makes it so successful. We have said repeatedly, but it bears repeating, that the Premier League is the goose that lays the golden eggs that reward the rest of the pyramid. If we damage that, we inflict damage not just on the Premier League but on the whole of English football, and that is what we have to be incredibly careful of.

There is a high degree of mobility within the Premier League. I say this with regret as a supporter of a club that is always regarded as in the top six but is languishing —temporarily, I hasten to say—in 10th. It is, as we know, the hope that kills you, not the despair. Nottingham Forest were promoted two or three seasons ago and are now fourth in the Premier League, in a Champions League spot—there is strong mobility. Could they have done that without the confidence to be able to invest and to grow the team and the players? This is part of the magic of it, and to suggest that this is somehow a game and a racket and that it should be put in jeopardy is not to understand the magic of a degree of competitiveness that exists in English football all the way through the pyramid.

This is something that the clubs and leagues have themselves come up with, and it is something that works. The idea—frankly, this thought applies to quite a lot of what the Bill is about—that what has worked and been proven to work will somehow suddenly be improved by the introduction of a state regulator might turn out to be true, but all the evidence of history suggests that it will not.

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[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

Clearly, it does not need to wait for the state of the game report to decide whether they are relevant. The approach we have adopted in the Bill means in practice that if the regulator has clear evidence, whether from a different source or from the state of the game report, that parachute payments are causing sustainability issues to the wider pyramid, it will now be able to address them. In our view, this was a potentially serious gap in the legislation that we feel has now been rectified. I stress “potential”.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

What the Minister said would be fine if the regulator was making a balanced determination, but because the Government have created a binary process whereby one proposal can be accepted, it could choose to abolish them. The Government have created that risk, and it is an intolerable risk.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

We went through in quite a lot of detail how the backstop mechanism would be triggered. I know we have more to come, as the noble Lord, Lord Maude, said, but in my view, it is not unreasonable for the regulator to be able to consider them. However, the regulator does not need to consider them.

On the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Brady —clubs and planning, and how they can deal with their financial future if parachute payments could change as part of the backstop process—while the Government understand the desire to ensure that regulated clubs have as much time to adjust to change as possible, we acknowledge that significant time has already passed without a financial distribution agreement. Ensuring a timely and satisfactory agreement is in the interests of football and the wider public. The backstop process is a built-in transition period specifying that parachute payments cannot be reduced within one year of the distribution order coming into effect.

We understand concerns around the future of clubs that may already have factored parachute payments into their forward-looking financial planning before a potential order that could lower payments had been issued. We would expect the leagues to maintain effective communication with clubs throughout the backstop process, which, alongside the built-in transitory provision, will mean that clubs should have ample time to adjust if parachute payments are deemed in scope. There will not be any sudden reduction in payments without warning. I feel that that should provide some reassurance to noble Lords and to the clubs.

On the definition of relevant revenue, football is a fast-paced industry, so it would be erroneous to assume that the definition of relevant revenue might not need to change. If broadcast revenue ceases to be the primary source of revenue stream in the game, the definition would need to be amended to ensure the process remained a viable regulatory intervention. Furthermore, there are already significant safeguards in place to ensure that this power is not used incorrectly. For example, consultation with the regulator, the Football Association and specified competition organisations is required before the power can be utilised.

With noble Lords’ indulgence, I want to say a bit about the consultation process. On a number of occasions it has been stated in your Lordships’ House that there has been insufficient consultation. Particularly in response to a point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, I want to put on the record that this Football Governance Bill is the culmination of years of work, including a huge amount of consultation. During that time, there has been extensive regular engagement with key stakeholders, including clubs that will be subject to the regulation. All clubs have been provided with a number of formal opportunities to share their views, particularly as part of the fan-led review and the formal consultation process on the football governance White Paper, where all 116 clubs in the top five leagues at the time were invited to give their views on the proposals. Over that period, DCMS Ministers and officials have had many hundreds of meetings with clubs, leagues, fan groups and other stakeholders from across football, and we continue to engage with the industry now, so this number is constantly growing.

Clubs have had five years to write to or meet DCMS to make their position known. No club that has requested a meeting has not had one. Indeed, some Premier League clubs were recently invited to meet officials and turned down the invitation, which I stress is their right. We have met and continue to meet a range of clubs, at all levels of the football pyramid, that will be subject to regulation.

The leagues have a role to play here. We would expect them to support their clubs in their understanding of the development of the regime and in their engagement with the Government, as well as to keep their clubs updated on any engagement that the leagues have had with the Government. Indeed, this is what has been explicitly asked of us at times by some of the leagues. Richard Masters, the CEO of the Premier League, Rick Parry, chair of the EFL, and Kevin Miles, CEO of the Football Supporters’ Association, have all praised the Government’s constructive approach to engagement with the clubs and the leagues.

This is not the end of the process or of the consultation. There are still lots of opportunities for clubs to have their say as the legislation passes through Parliament and work continues to establish the regulator. Even once the regulator is established, its approach will be advocacy first, aiming to work constructively with clubs on an ongoing basis to resolve issues wherever it can.

I have asked for an answer to the noble Baroness’s question about the response to the letter, and I will have to revert to her after the debate. Given the lateness of the evening, I have not been able to get a response on that.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

Is that the letter I sent on 2 December about UEFA or the letter that the seven clubs sent to the Secretary of State to which she is going to reply? Maybe the Minister can tell me that afterwards.

It is a statement of fact that the Secretary of State has met only seven clubs for half an hour. I am not talking about other officials. I have to say that there was zero consultation on including parachute payments in the Bill. There may have been other meetings, but between the two Bills that was a significant change that has caused lots of difficult conversations within the leagues.

The Minister said that there was no deal in place. There is a deal; it has been in place between the Premier League and the EFL since 2018, and it has a three-year notice period—just so she knows.

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[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I asked officials to draw up the words that I said on consultation because, night after night, group after group, it has been said to me that there has been insufficient consultation on the Bill. I went back and asked whether I could stand up and say that there has been sufficient consultation on the Bill. What consultation happened? When has it happened? How has it happened? Who has it been with? I am confident there has been a huge amount of consultation on the Bill and I will continue to state that when I am asked. I will follow up things that people feel have not been followed up, but any club that wanted to have a meeting has had one, and some have said they did not want one. I will sit down and allow the noble Lord to finish, but I am not going to accept that there has not been sufficient consultation.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

I am sorry to intervene, but I want to say again that on the specific issue of parachute payments there was no consultation with either the Premier League officials or the Premier League clubs that attended that meeting before this went into the Bill. I am not saying that there was not consultation on other areas, but this is a significant change to the Bill that had zero consultation with the Premier League or Premier League officials.

[Lord Markham (Con)]

It may be that it should be a matter of fact and we can find out one way or the other. The question is: how much consultation has happened specifically on the parachute payments? Obviously, they have been a recent introduction. My understanding from my noble friend is that there was just that 30-minute meeting, at which this was barely raised. I would be grateful if the Minister could ask her officials directly.

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[Lord Maude of Horsham (Con)]

My Lords, I find my noble friend’s arguments very persuasive, and I will ask just one question. I do not know what the answer is, so others who know much more about this will correct me if I am wrong. My understanding is that no one made the Premier League make the already unprecedentedly large distribution from it down to the EFL. There was no regulator or Prime Minister threatening legislation that forced that to happen. It was because the Premier League saw it as in its interest to have a strong pyramid. It did not see this as “us against them”; it wanted competition within the pyramid but not between the segments and the different layers. I therefore question the idea that you somehow have to force a better distribution when it is plainly in the Premier League’s interest—and the way it has historically behaved illustrates that it understands that it is—to commit, through a voluntary agreed distribution, to the money trickling and cascading down through the pyramid. That illustrates that this is not necessary.

The danger is that the money that is creamed off by the regulator to sustain it—and is drained off from the clubs to comply with its demands—will mean that there is less to distribute. That money is already efficiently and pretty fairly distributed by agreement, so I am persuaded by my noble friend’s arguments that this part of the Bill is not only unnecessary but potentially very harmful.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 271, 307 and 316 in this group. My noble friend Lord Maude is right: the Premier League’s distribution outside our ecosystem is the highest amount of money of any other sporting competition in the world, and no regulator has forced the Premier League to do that.

My amendments seek to embed principles into the backstop mechanism. My aim in doing so is to ensure that it operates in a way that is proportionate, legally defensible and fit for purpose. At the heart of the amendments lies a simple but critical idea: any intervention by the IFR on this issue must be guided by clear, fair and transparent principles.

The backstop mechanism in its current form lacks sufficient criteria to direct the IFR in exercising its powers. It dictates that the IFR must choose the proposal that is “more consistent” with its principles. But what are those principles? The first is to “advance the IFR’s objectives”, and we have already discussed at great length how nebulous those objectives are. The second is not to place any “undue burden” on the parties’ commercial interests. The third is to ensure that relegated clubs have a one-year transition for any changes to parachute payments. That is it. There is no other guidance for the regulator in making this enormous and binary choice. This is quite incredible, and it creates huge risks, not only for the clubs and the leagues but, more importantly, for the very integrity of the regulatory process itself.

Let me begin with a fundamental principle of protecting property and contractual rights. It is vital to understand that the revenues subject to redistribution under the backstop are not collective funds but revenues generated solely by the Premier League and the Premier League clubs. So the backstop is not a neutral act; it is interference in the property rights of Premier League clubs only.

Under Article 1 of Protocol 1 in the Human Rights Act—A1P1—any interference with those rights must therefore be justified on clear and compelling public policy grounds, and adhere to principles of proportionality and necessity. There are concerns that this crude mechanism, with so few transparent criteria, is legally challengeable under A1P1, even more so now as a result of parachute payments being included, and that is not a good thing; it is in everybody’s interests for this backstop to be legally defensible. But without robust principles to guide the IFR’s decision-making, any determination risks being challenged, leaving the IFR open to judicial review and the entire system mired in uncertainty and delay.

A1P1 case law also emphasises the principle that less intrusive measures must be considered before more significant interventions are imposed, so this is also enshrined in my proposed amendment. The backstop mechanism, as drafted, establishes a binary process that compels the IFR to choose between two competing proposals, but it provides no framework for the IFR to tend towards the least intrusive option, particularly in relation to respecting the Premier League’s property rights as the sole funder of financial redistribution. That is a very dangerous oversight.

Without explicit guidance to the IFR that it should tend towards the least intrusive measure, particularly in its treatment of Premier League revenues, there is a real risk that the backstop could lead to legal overreach. Including this principle in the Bill would provide the IFR with a clear steer, reflect the unique role of the Premier League as the funder of any distribution order and ensure that the mechanism operated in a way that respected property rights.

The principle of good faith is another cornerstone of these amendments. The binary nature of the backstop mechanism incentivises brinkmanship rather than genuine negotiation. These amendments seek to create a framework that rewards constructive engagement and discourages posturing. Without this principle, the backstop risks becoming a tool for division rather than collaboration.

Another critical safeguard in the amendments is the requirement that any backstop decision must not force clubs into breaching their own league’s or UEFA’s existing financial rules and covenants, including profit and sustainability rules or the IFR’s own licence. A sudden and drastic redistribution could reduce Premier League clubs’ revenues, which in turn could destabilise their own business plans, which in turn leads them to breach the profitability and sustainability rules in their own leagues. That would lead to fines, sanctions or even points deductions for Premier League clubs. It would be a remarkable irony if a mechanism intended to promote sustainability instead penalised clubs for failing to meet their own financial obligations.

Finally, let me address the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Maude, which would ensure that the backstop could not be used as a first resort. The IFR must first regulate clubs in the EFL to ensure that they are financially responsible and not conveniently reach for the Premier League’s revenues before it has even sought to impose those controls. If the IFR cannot deliver sustainability through its own regulatory tools, what confidence can we have in its ability to manage a redistributive mechanism fairly or effectively? My noble friend’s amendment rightly prioritises the use of all other tools before triggering the backstop.

These amendments would provide the IFR with the steers that it will desperately need to navigate one of the most consequential issues in football. Without these amendments, or something very similar, the backstop risks sinking into a legal and political quagmire. We should all be aligned in preventing that outcome, so I hope the Minister will listen carefully and sympathetically to these arguments.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, and the noble Lord, Lord Maude of Horsham, for these amendments, and the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, for giving notice of his intention to oppose that Clauses 56 to 60 stand part of the Bill.

I will start with Amendments 271 and 316, from the noble Baroness, Lady Brady. I thank her for clearly stating some of her core concerns about the backstop process through these amendments and hope to reassure her that the existing drafting of the Bill already addresses her concerns without the need for this additional clause. First, I will cover her concern regarding the explanation of suitable alternative regulatory solutions when I address subsequent amendments. On her other concerns, current drafting of the Bill already requires the regulator to trigger the process only if its ability to advance its objectives would be threatened if it did not. Final proposals are already required to advance the regulator’s objective of ensuring financial sustainability and resilience. They also have to ensure that they do not place an undue burden on the commercial interests of either league. We have been mindful of property rights when designing the backstop, which is why the process can be triggered only in specific circumstances and why, even when the high threshold for triggering the process is met, commercial interests must still be considered. We consider this to be a suitably high bar to ensure that the regulator takes adequate consideration of regulated clubs’ property rights and commercial interests.

I understand that the noble Baroness is especially concerned about the issuing of a distribution order that may force clubs into non-compliance with the league’s own internal rules. We would expect the regulator’s decisions to be internally consistent in terms of advancing its objectives, so we cannot see a scenario where the regulator would issue a distribution order that required a club to become non-compliant with its licence conditions. However, there may need to be some adaptation by regulated clubs and competition organisers to renew the regulatory landscape.

If a distribution order issued to ensure the financial sustainability of football put a club at risk of breaching a league’s rules, we would expect competition organisers to work with the club in question and the regulator to understand the decision and its impact. Just as we may expect adaptation by clubs transitioning from unregulated to regulated, we may also expect to see the adaptation of competition organisers.

The amendment implies a scenario where a distribution order results in clubs becoming non-compliant with existing financial regulations. The regulator is already required, as part of its decision on whether to trigger the process, to consider whether the lack of arrangement has arisen as a result of bad faith. Therefore, we are confident that the existing drafting of the backstop proposal process is sufficient to ensure that the regulator already considers the factors outlined in this amendment.

I turn to Amendment 307. While I understand the desire to ensure the proposals chosen at the final proposal stage of the backstop process meet the objectives of the regulator, I believe that the existing drafting already suitably addresses this concern. Final proposals are already required to advance the financial sustainability and resilience of the football pyramid, under existing Clause 62(2)(a). I do not think that the proposed change in wording would lead to significant altered proposals or subsequent distribution orders; therefore, I do not consider that the change is necessary.

I turn to Amendment 288A, from the noble Lord, Lord Maude of Horsham. I understand the desire to ensure that the backstop process is triggered only as a last resort, as this is how the process has been designed and is intended to be used. However, one of the existing conditions that must be met for the regulator to trigger the process in response to an application is that its ability to deliver at least one of its objectives would be jeopardised if the backstop was not triggered. We would expect that, as part of the assessment under this condition, the regulator would review whether existing financial regulations and other regulatory tools could be utilised to better effect instead.

While in service of the same goal, the wording of this amendment is unnecessarily restrictive, requiring the regulator to exhaust all possible other regulatory approaches, and it adds a regulatory burden by requiring the consideration of an expansive array of approaches without prioritisation. This forces the regulator to spend additional time and resources considering options unlikely to resolve the conflict in question. We believe that the current wording already allows the regulator to make its own considered assessment of relevant options before triggering the process.

I now turn to the clause stand part debates and will respond to the noble Lord, Lord Markham. Part 6, of which Clause 56 is the first clause, relates to financial distributions and the backstop mechanism in its totality. I understand the desire on both sides to apply appropriate scrutiny to a part of the Bill that could significantly impact the future financial landscape of football. I hope that, throughout the debate on the backstop process on this and future Committee days, I will be able to demonstrate that the approach taken in Part 6 is the most proportionate and effective approach possible.

These backstop powers have been introduced to help ensure that an agreement can be reached between the leagues in regard to the distribution of revenues from the selling of TV broadcast rights. An agreement of this nature is vital to ensure the future financial sustainability of the football pyramid. The process has been designed to incentivise reasonableness, encourage industry solutions and tackle any bargaining imbalance between leagues. The design of the process is a final offer mechanism, a process that has been shown to incentivise negotiation. It achieves this by removing the ability of the negotiating parties to rely on the third party, in this case the regulator, to design a solution for them. We do not want football to become reliant on the regulator to decide its agreements.

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Moved by

[Baroness Brady]

280: Clause 57, page 47, line 32, leave out “five years” and insert “the applicable period (see subsections (7) and (8))”

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 280 and 281 in my name seek to reinsert the ability for the Premier League and the EFL to agree distribution arrangements for longer than five years without triggering the automatic availability of the backstop mechanism. These amendments are essential to restoring common sense, legal certainty, aligned incentives and, crucially, to restoring trust between football’s governing bodies.

When I first read the revised Bill, I thought I must be mistaken. “Surely”, I thought, “no Government would propose that two consenting parties mutually agreeing a long-term financial arrangement should be actively disincentivised from doing so by the automatic availability of a dispute mechanism”—and yet, astonishingly, here we are. Removing the freedom of football stakeholders to agree arrangements for more than five years by mutual consent cannot possibly be about fairness, transparency or sustainability. This is purely a device enabled by an active decision of the Government to turn the backstop into a ratchet. It ensures that no long-term agreement between the Premier League and the EFL, no matter how mutually beneficial, can ever provide genuine stability or be truly relied upon.

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[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, for her amendments and for her introduction to what was, thankfully, at this time of the night, with apologies, a very short debate—so far.

These amendments are intended to allow leagues to reach an agreement to extend the time that must pass before the backstop can be triggered. While I entirely understand the desire for negotiations to be a league-led process, the timeframe outlined in the Bill has been chosen to ensure that the regulator can intervene in cases where an agreement has not been reached for a significant period. We believe that it is the correct amount of time to get a good view of how potential agreements have affected sustainability, while ensuring that a new agreement is reached in a timely manner. Crucially, many noble Lords have talked about certainty in the regime. We consider that five years provides enough certainty to all parties.

Finally, we have concerns that allowing industry to come to a different timeframe could lead to an element of coercion towards much longer agreements, nulling the presence of the power. The Government’s view is that the five-year timeframe is critical to the effective functioning of the backstop as a regulatory intervention.

For the reasons I have set out, I am unable to accept the amendments and hope that the noble Baroness will withdraw Amendment 280. But, first, I also wish all noble Lords a very happy Recess. I genuinely look forward to continuing the debate in the new year and thank the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, for his kind words.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response and for engaging with the points raised in this debate. However, it will not surprise her that I remain completely unconvinced.

This decision does not deliver certainty: quite the opposite. It enshrines short-term thinking and locks football in a perpetual cycle of instability, with both sides forever negotiating under the shadow of the backstop. As I said, it is a recipe not for certainty but for fractiousness and mistrust.

The Minister also referenced the nature of football’s landscape as the reason to limit agreements, but I am not sure that can be right. I urge her to think again. This new backstop is the Government’s gamble that the Premier League has achieved escape velocity and can absorb anything that even its own Government can throw at it. However, the Premier League is not a cow to be milked. It is a national treasure to be protected. English football deserves much better. I am sure that we will be discussing this issue again on Report, but, for now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 280 withdrawn.