Football Governance Bill [HL]

Lord Wood of Anfield Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 16th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, posed a number of questions about the operation of Part 3 in relation to licensing functions. I will add one further question, to which I do not necessarily expect an answer today. Pursuant to UEFA regulations and delegation from the FA, the Premier League currently licenses clubs for the purposes of their participation in UEFA club competitions. I declare an interest as a season ticket holder at Arsenal Football Club—I realise that some of the other clubs supported by noble Lords would not have an interest in this matter for various reasons. My question is: will this function of the Premier League be affected by Clause 15 or any of the other clauses in Part 3?

[Lord Wood of Anfield (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 168 and 169, which connect with some of the themes raised by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Moynihan. One of the most sensitive areas of this regime is the imposition of discretionary licence conditions on clubs. The purpose of my Amendment 169 is to say that the regulator can introduce such conditions only after being satisfied that the conditions would

“not be met by the club complying with all rules, requirements and restrictions which … will be imposed by a competition organiser”.

Essentially, this does not go as far as full delegation to leagues such as the Premier League—I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, on the broad criticism of that—but would introduce in one specific area what might be thought of as a limited principle of subsidiarity for the imposition of discretionary licence conditions.

The main purpose is to ensure that the regulator observes the norm of good regulatory co-operation—with not just the Premier League but all the leagues—by looking first to the adequacy of league arrangements in response to specific problems that will be the most politically and competitively sensitive, before stepping in and intervening with club-specific conditions attached. Why? It is because subsidiarity is a good principle of regulation where it is not inconsistent with the application of the intent of the law; also, I believe that it will foster the habit of regulatory co-operation more generally—not just on discretionary licence conditions. It will avoid duplication and confusion in regimes, and it will equip the regulator with a bit more political protection when it comes to the charge of political interference, because it can say, “We’ve looked to the leagues to step in first before stepping in”.

In the case of the Premier League specifically—let us face it, that is where the rubber hits the road on this issue most of all—it gives it, first, a chance to maintain system-wide and league-wide governance integrity before club-specific rules arrive, rather than risking the intervention of the regulator, leading to fragmentation between clubs. Secondly, it allows differences in application, inside the Premier League, of the general IFR rules in ways that account for differences in risk, finance and strategy, which we have heard discussed many times in Committee.

An example is capital buffers. The regulator will want to require cash reserves, and in the case of the Premier League, you want to take account of those areas where there are genuine differences from lower league clubs—differences in player registration rights, meaning players are more liquid assets, for example. The Premier League could design league-wide rules that are sensitive to these different conditions. The amendment does not say that Premier League rules would trump regulator rules, but where there are concerns, the regulator would look first to the Premier League to modify league-wide rules that respond to the concerns before the regulator directly intervenes.

Another scenario might be an issue of liquidity management inside a Premier League club. This amendment would point to the regulator first looking to the Premier League to take steps such as enhancing its monitoring systems, developing new metrics, et cetera, before it goes to individual licence conditions. This, again, would ensure that the league could retain the integrity of league-wide rules, rather than Premier League clubs having individual regimes as and when they trip up over certain rules.

What if the regulator wanted to intervene with a specific club as a matter of urgency? It could still do this. What if the regulator thought Premier League rules were inadequate to the task and insisted on imposing a licence condition that cut across and undermined league rules? Ultimately, it could still do that too; in fact, it may think that was the right thing to do. But what the amendment would do is introduce a prior stage that looks to the leagues to make league-wide governance adjustment first. In the name of good regulation, that seems to me a sensible, limited amendment.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to offer my support to the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wood, and by my noble friend Lord Moynihan. These amendments take quite different approaches, but they seem to be driving at the same thing: a desire to clarify and improve the financial licensing section of the Bill. In my view, they highlight a really important principle—that the IFR should adopt an outcomes-focused, light-touch approach to developing its regulatory framework, and that it should work closely with football to do that.

These amendments would, in my view, be a vital step towards achieving a good balance in football regulation, one that safeguards financial sustainability by targeting clubs that have problems, which are clearly critical, while also respecting the unique responsibilities and expertise of the competition organisers. The current drafting of the Bill leaves critical questions unanswered about the regulators’ approach to financial regulation.

It is currently unclear whether the IFR will take a blanket, rule-driven approach that imposes granular financial requirements such as specific liquidity ratios or debt-to-equity thresholds across all clubs or, alternatively, whether it will adopt an entirely bespoke approach, applying discretionary licence conditions to every single club—all 116 of them—according to their unique circumstances and business models. If the IFR did the latter—it is entirely open to the IFR, because that is how ambiguous the Bill is—it would significantly undermine competition organisers’ ability to maintain a level playing field. Those licence conditions would necessarily need to be confidential to protect commercially sensitive information. For example, my club, West Ham United, would have no idea whether other comparable clubs were operating under similar conditions or not. That is a recipe for competitive chaos.

These amendments would mean that the IFR would need to take a far more balanced path to an outcomes-based approach, setting high-level principles and objectives while allowing leagues to implement their own rules to achieve those outcomes. Of course, they would be able, and must be able, to take a targeted approach to clubs getting into difficulties, stepping in at any time if those rules were deemed systemically not to be working, or if there was urgent concern about a single club or group of clubs. A more outcomes-based approach would ensure that the IFR focuses on the “what” rather than the “how”. By defining clear financial outcomes such as on balance sheet health, resilience, transitionary finance and asset protection, the IFR could establish a framework that addresses financial risks while avoiding unnecessary micro-management of clubs.

There is no reason why financial licensing should not follow this proportionate, targeted model, particularly as competition organisers such as the Premier League and the EFL already have sophisticated financial sustainability rules in place. If another competition organiser, perhaps one that has had less success in enforcing financial rules, wishes to give up this area completely to the IFR, that would be its right, but let us not forget that competition organisers have a deep understanding of their clubs’ financial dynamics. They already operate robust systems to monitor and enforce financial sustainability; for example, the Premier League has detailed profitability and sustainability rules, which are strictly adhered to, while the EFL has its own financial monitoring requirements tailored to the unique challenges faced by its clubs.