Football Governance Bill [HL]

Committee stage
Wednesday 4th December 2024 Lords Chamber

Committee (3rd Day)

15:51

Relevant document: 8th Report from the Delegated Powers Committee

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, before we commence Committee, I remind noble Lords that we need to make substantial progress on the Bill. This is now the third day in Committee, so there should be substantial progress today.

Clause 2: Key definitions

Amendment 19

Moved by

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay]

19: Clause 2, page 2, line 31, leave out subsection (3) and insert—
“(3) For the purposes of this Act a “specified competition” includes—(a) the Premier League,(b) the English Football League, and(c) the National League.(3A) The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument amend the competitions specified in section (3).”

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, I rise in that spirit to move Amendment 19. In doing so, I thank the Committee for indulging my request not to take it at the end of business late in the evening on the previous day in Committee but to start with it today.

We began a very important debate on this matter on Monday evening, but it came well past 10 pm and got rather confused, so I thought it would be helpful if we return to this amendment to look at the issue again with cooler heads, particularly in the light of the letter which the Minister undertook to write and which she has very helpfully circulated to those of us who were in Committee on Monday. I thank her very much for doing that and for turning it around since the previous day of our debate.

I will not repeat the arguments that I made about the issue at hand in my Amendment 19, which is about including specific competitions in the Bill, but I will briefly remind the Committee—particularly for the benefit of those who were not here on Monday evening—that I was sceptical of the Government’s arguments for why the leagues in scope should not be put in primary legislation. The arguments that the Minister advanced on Monday, and in her letter this morning, related to the need for legislative agility and the requirement for the Government to retain the ability quickly to alter the relevant competitions should they change, or should the names of the leagues change slightly, as she set out on Monday.

As I said then, and as the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee of your Lordships’ House has said in its report on this Bill, codifying the leagues in scope in the Bill does not preclude the possibility of making future alterations. The second part of my Amendment 19 would allow the Secretary of State to alter by statutory instrument the leagues in question, if they should change in future. That is the same method of alteration as currently set out in the Bill, so the pace at which those changes could be made, should the Government require them, is unchanged. What would be different is the starting point. My amendment would give competition organisers and football clubs the certainty they need, and surely deserve, to start planning their financial matters and regulatory compliance, since they would know from the outset whether they would be included in the scope of the Bill.

The other reason for returning to this matter today is so that we can talk properly about hybridity. This is fundamental to the Bill; it came very late in our debate on Monday, and the questions that it throws up require some answers. I do not think that the Committee was particularly satisfied with where we got to on Monday, so I hope we can make more progress today.

I have been advised by the Clerk of Legislation that my Amendment 19 could make this Bill hybrid. I believe the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, have been similarly advised about their Amendment 21. However, this Bill is, to all intents and purposes, already doing hybrid things; it is just not doing them explicitly.

The Government are clear about who they want to target with this Bill, and have said so in their Explanatory Notes and in comments outside this Committee. However, they do not want to say so in the Bill because that would afford those clubs and leagues the opportunity to petition Parliament directly about this new law which directly affects their organisations. If putting the leagues that the Government have publicly stated that they wish to see regulated into the text of this Bill makes it hybrid, should we not confront that question and refer it to the Examiners?

As I have mentioned before, the Government did not previously use the possibility of hybridity as an argument against placing the leagues in scope in the Bill. That might have been because they were not aware that doing so would make the Bill hybrid. I was certainly not aware of that until I was alerted to it by the clerks after I tabled this amendment. I think that was also the case for the Minister, who said on Monday,

“in the explanation of this group of amendments that I received from officials earlier today, they made it clear that following the tabling of Amendments 19 and 21, issues have been raised about hybridity. That was the point at which hybridity was raised with me”.—[Official Report, 2/12/24; col. 1018.]

The Minister made it clear on Monday that that was the first time she was aware of the issue. I do not doubt her sincerity, but I was a little surprised when she said it, because the email I received from the Clerk of Legislation alerting me to it was copied to her noble friend the Government Chief Whip. He was certainly aware on 26 November—that is, last Tuesday—that this raised questions of hybridity. I do not know what discussions they had in the light of the email that he received, but it would be helpful to know.

That is rather incidental. The fact is that we are all now apprised of this issue and understand that the Bill is seeking, by not putting the leagues on the face of the Bill, to deny private businesses and much-loved organisations the right to petition Parliament about the impact this Bill has on their affairs—as is their right when a Bill is designed in a way that would affect certain groups more than others.

On Monday, I drew the Committee’s attention to Clause 91(5), which establishes that secondary legislation made under the Bill once it becomes an Act of Parliament to allow the Secretary of State to specify the leagues in scope is to be treated as if it is not hybrid. It is important to draw noble Lords’ attention to that again. It says:

“If a draft of an instrument containing regulations under this Act would … be treated for the purposes of the Standing Orders of either House of Parliament as a hybrid instrument, it is to proceed in that House as if it were not a hybrid instrument”.


That appears to demonstrate that the Government were aware, in at least some regard, that there are hybrid implications to this Bill.

We have special provisions relating to hybrid legislation for a reason. They are intended to protect private interests from being unjustly affected by the laws that we pass here. It is disagreeable to skirt around these rules by pushing potentially hybrid provisions into secondary legislation, and to tuck away at the end of a Bill measures to do the same in relation to secondary legislation brought by it. On Monday, the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, and others reminded us of the report of your Lordships’ Delegated Powers Committee entitled Democracy Denied? I raised concerns on Monday that this would be another instance of the democratic rights of those organisations being restricted, if we were to proceed in this way.

I was keen that we return to this matter at the start of today, our third day in Committee, because I want us to ensure that, when the Bill becomes law—as all parties want—it has been scrutinised as thoroughly as it should be. I am conscious that we can do our duty here as legislators to examine the consequences for football. But, with some honourable exceptions—such as my noble friend Lady Brady and the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, on the Benches opposite, to give just two examples from across the Committee—not many of us in your Lordships’ House know as much about the implications of the Bill for football as football organisations themselves would be able to say if they could petition Parliament.

I am grateful for the opportunity to return to this question of hybridity. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her letter to us. I hope that she will respond to the concerns raised both today and on Monday, and I look forward to her response. I beg to move.

16:00

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Culture, Media and Sport (Baroness Twycross) (Lab)]

My Lords, I take the opportunity to rise early on this group to establish the Government’s position on an issue the Committee clearly cares about. The Committee debated Amendment 19 at length on Monday evening and asked me to write on the points raised. I was not confused, and I do not feel that the Committee was sitting unusually late for discussions on important legislation. I also do not think that the leagues are confused about which leagues this legislation will apply to. I have since written to the noble Lords, and a copy of that letter has been placed in the House Library.

I also want to put this rationale on record and reassure noble Lords that this power is both reasonable and the result of extensive evidence-based consultation with all key stakeholders in the industry. This power ensures that the competitions in scope can be amended in a timely manner, and it ensures that the scope of the regime remains relevant. It future-proofs for future innovations and protects against circumvention.

On the noble Lord’s point, I note that the previous Government included an equivalent provision in the Media Act 2024—the noble Lord himself brought that provision before your Lordships’ House. I hope this provides the explanation that he was after. We have now debated the amendment at length, and I have clearly outlined the Government’s rationale for the power. I hope the noble Lord opposite is now able to withdraw the amendment so that we can continue progress on the Bill past Clause 2, and I look forward to continuing discussions on this matter ahead of Report.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I refer the Committee to my interests, which are declared in the register. I defer to other noble Lords who have experience of the technicalities of hybridity and parliamentary procedure, but I hope it is helpful and illuminating in this context to raise the issue of consultation with clubs. We are creating legislation that will profoundly affect 116 unique institutions, from Premier League clubs through to the National League community clubs. But it is important for everyone to understand that the consultation with these affected businesses by the current Government has been remarkably limited—almost unbelievably so.

Just seven Premier League clubs—mine was one of them—were granted a brief half-hour meeting with the Secretary of State over the summer. Following this cursory engagement, significant decisions were made that could fundamentally affect the future of English football, most notably with the inclusion of parachute payments within the backstop mechanism. I say again: seven clubs out of 20 have been seen for just half an hour since the Government took office and before they made that seismic decision.

This is particularly concerning given that fundamental issues still remained unresolved. We still lack any clarity on UEFA’s position regarding state interference, for example. This clearly creates profound uncertainty for clubs competing in, or aspiring to, European competition, as well as our national teams. We do not know what the ownership test will look like. This causes significant uncertainty for potential investors as to whether they are able to own a club.

I have listened with real interest to this debate on hybridity. Can the Minister help my understanding here? Can she confirm that, if my noble friends are correct and hybridity is a live question for the Bill, this would give clubs at all levels a real opportunity to present their specific circumstances to Parliament? For example, would it mean that National League clubs could explain their concerns about the regulatory burden and the concerns of the many that they say “would not survive” this regulation? Would it mean that Premier League clubs could have more than half an hour to detail the very serious implications for them, and the risk that we may harm the competitive balance of the Premier League, which we have all agreed that none of us wants to do?

That would be especially important, given that the impact on Premier League clubs is very different from that on other stakeholders in the Bill, as the Premier League is the only party that provides funding to any other part of the football pyramid. The backstop is clearly designed as a mechanism to gain direct access to, and apportion, Premier League revenue and no one else’s. It would allow the IFR to do this even if it was against the Premier League clubs’ will, or even without the clubs’ agreement, even if it was to have a detrimental effect on the clubs and the overall competition that it removes revenue from.

I have spoken to many of my colleagues across the whole football pyramid. We are all alarmed about, and puzzled by, the lack of discussion on the Bill with Ministers. Does the Minister agree that we all want to get the detail of the Bill right, and can she see any downsides to providing meaningful opportunities to hear from all clubs across the football pyramid affected by the legislation?

[Lord Markham (Con)]

I must admit that, probably like other noble Lords, I am scratching my head over this. As the Minister said earlier, it is very clear that the leagues know who we are talking about here and that a large section of the Bill is talking about the whole arrangement, and in Clause 6 about the distribution agreement, the pyramid, the parachute payments and all that. There are only two instances where that counts, in the payments from the Premier League to the other leagues, so it is very clear that we are referring to Premier League and English Football League clubs. I do not think there is any doubt about that at all. As I was taught as a kid, if it walks like a duck, looks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it is probably a duck.

I am pretty sure that this is a hybrid Bill already. I am not an expert, but I cannot see why it is not a hybrid Bill because, as the Minister just said, it is very clear to everyone which leagues we are referring to. The argument that somehow we could not change things if things changed, or if league structures changed, just does not stand up. Just as we are going to nominate which competitions we are talking about under secondary legislation, we could do exactly the same if there was any change in the format of the leagues. The Minister wrote in her letter about trying to stop people gaming the system, but we have a very easy way to stop them gaming the system. It is set up there already—you can change it in secondary legislation, just as the Government intend to do in defining the competitions involved in the first place.

I cannot see any reason why we would not call it as it is. It is as if we were somehow trying to stop the clubs having the proper amount of consultation. As my noble friend Lady Brady just said, it is clear that there has been very little consultation to date. The clubs themselves have said that there was very little consultation. The people here who are members of those clubs probably know more than anyone else about this.

I believe that we are all united in this Committee in wanting the best for football. That comes through very clearly in every conversation we have had. I know that colleagues from right across the spectrum want what is right for football, and I know that the Minister wants what is right for football—so why not give clubs the opportunity to be properly consulted and have proper input on something that is going to profoundly affect the whole game?

[Lord McLoughlin (Con)]

My Lords, I will very briefly support my noble friend Lord Parkinson’s Amendment 19. I do so as chairman of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, although the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, chaired the relevant meeting in my absence. My noble friend’s amendment addresses a serious issue. I would have thought that, given the committee’s report on this, the Government would have at least considered the arguments and sought to alter them.

As noble Lords have noted, our committee’s eighth report highlighted that this Bill, as drafted, does not make the fundamental definition of English football clear. The committee was concerned because this Bill leaves us wanting. It leaves us with no definition in primary legislation of what it seeks to address; it is a Football Governance Bill that does not define what part of football it will govern and leaves such a key part of the definition of the Bill to come later in secondary legislation. As my noble friend has pointed out, certain parts of it say that the secondary legislation, if it were to be hybrid, should be ignored as hybrid. That gives a very wide-ranging power which we should be cautious about.

The memorandum explains that

“the rationale for regulatory intervention is based on market failures in the professional men’s game, and problems or harm that most typically and markedly arise in clubs of a certain size and type (typically professional clubs)”.

It then gives four different reasons why the Bill does not explicitly state that it intends to regulate the top five tiers of the professional men’s game. These reasons have been covered by other Members, so I will not go over them.

The Government argue that they need to define the scope in secondary legislation to allow them to change it in future. However, should they need to amend which leagues are in scope, they could still amend primary legislation to alter those leagues by statutory instrument. There is no change to that in my noble friend’s amendment. We have seen hybrid Bills before. I took one through the other place as Secretary of State for Transport, dealing with a rail link from the West Midlands to London. They are more complicated, but people know how to do them and know what regulations need to be abided by.

This amendment is not asking us to decide whether the Bill is hybrid; the Government are being asked to accept that there is inherently a form of hybridity in this Bill regardless, and that they must therefore allow it to go before the Examiners to see what they find. The Government should give very careful consideration to what the amendment says.

[Lord Moynihan (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord McLoughlin has made an incredibly important point. While I do not think that this is the moment for us to test it, we should give due consideration to whether this ought to go before the Examiners after Committee and before Report, particularly because the Minister has today said that the leagues are not confused about which leagues this legislation applies to.

We are grateful to the Minister for writing to us today. She stated in her letter that:

“The initial intended scope of the top five tiers of Men’s English football is built on a strong evidence base and extensive consultation with all key stakeholders”.


Nothing could be clearer about exactly who this Bill is meant to refer to. Yet, in this whole long Bill, there is no reference to the five tiers of men’s English football and we have no idea whether the Secretary of State will ultimately keep to that or not. We are going through legislation about which we have no clarity to whom it refers. That is, if not unprecedented, extremely rare. It is important that we heard from my noble friend Lord McLoughlin, not least because, to repeat what his committee said in its report:

“The argument that something should not be fixed in primary legislation because it might need changing in future would be an argument against having any primary legislation”.


I urge the Minister to listen carefully to my noble friends and to make sure that the Government at least place what we are talking about in the Bill, so that we know which clubs it refers to and where the onerous powers contained in it for the potential state-appointed regulator will fall. Without that, we are talking in a vacuum.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

My Lords, one of the amendments in question is in my name and that of my noble friend. I am surprised that Members opposite think that the previous Conservative Government would have introduced a hybrid Bill. I remind the House that this Bill is almost identical to the one they introduced and I am surprised that they thought that that might be hybrid. That Bill was discussed in another place at quite some length, but this question was not raised. As I understand it, the Bill would not have received a Second Reading had it been deemed to be hybrid at that time, so I do not think there is any question that this Bill is hybrid now. It can be made hybrid only if one House or the other passes an amendment that makes it so.

16:15

The amendment we put down was just to probe what the intention might be in future—it was a mechanism for debate, not to make this Bill hybrid. I am not sure of the intentions of those opposite, but certainly we were not intending to make it hybrid. It is not hybrid now and I do not think we should look to make it so in future. I suspect that any suggestion about referring this elsewhere is part of the delaying tactics that we have seen so much of these last few days.

[Lord Goodman of Wycombe (Con)]

To follow that point directly, I raised the original question of hybridity following an intervention by my noble friend Lord Markham, at which the Minister nodded. The Minister has since written to us, and I am grateful for her letter setting the situation out. I want to respond to what has been said in the following way. The noble Lord, Lord Bassam, who is in his place, has at various times produced a copy of the Bill as it was under the last Conservative Government and pointed out, as the noble Baroness just said, that the two Bills are, in certain respects, almost identical.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

The Bills are 95% identical. That is why we are somewhat surprised that noble Lords opposite are so opposed to its content. There is only one fundamental policy difference in it.

[Lord Goodman of Wycombe (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for intervening, because it buttresses the point I want to make. The Minister made it very clear on Monday that she was not aware of the hybridity issue that would arise were the leagues to be named in the Bill until that afternoon. It is evident, therefore, that someone in the department, as my noble friend said from the Front Bench, was aware of the hybridity issue under the last Government and under this one. I raise this as a member of the Delegated Powers Committee; when we received the view of the Government about why the leagues were not named in the Bill, the hybridity issue was not mentioned. It seems to me intuitively quite wrong that so important and real an issue should not have been named when the communication was made between the Government and the committee.

I am told that, procedurally, the people who speak on the Government’s behalf to those who brief us on the committee about the Bill are not obliged to tell the committee about the hybridity issue. If there is something as important as the hybridity issue, should the committee not be made aware of it somehow? I am grateful to the noble Lords opposite for raising the point about the Bill being much the same under the two Governments, as it is germane to the point I want to make.

[Lord Mann (Lab)]

My Lords, in one of the quaint ways that the Commons has of occasionally putting people, for whatever reason, on obscure committees, I found myself for 15 years on the hybrid Bill committee —one of the more obscure joys of life. I should just say that it was not the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, who put me on it.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

You should not offend the Whips.

[Lord Mann (Lab)]

There are vast numbers of Bills that could in theory be called hybrid Bills but are not, such as the Great British Railways Bill. It is a nonsense argument, and there are millions of football fans waiting to see some change made.

The thing that triggered the origins of the Bill, with Boris Johnson and others, was a European super league. If Parliament ever attempted to say that the clubs that tried to form a breakaway European super league have a specific hybridity status—in relation to the people, having voted for manifestos that wish to stop this, being able to do so—the whole concept of how we make rules of law would come into question. This Bill is not hybrid and could not be hybrid, in exactly the same way that vast numbers of other Bills which have an impact on various private businesses are not hybrid. I think many noble Members realise that.

[Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)]

The noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, has hit the nail on the head. We did a bit of research as well; the question of whether this is a hybrid Bill was asked in the other place, and it confirmed that it is not, so it comes to us with that confirmation. The letter from the Minister is really helpful, in that it clarifies that position for these Benches, and we will be happy if the mover withdraws the amendment.

The best thing would be to retire this amendment gracefully today, bring it back on Report and if need be, force a vote on it and let people decide. This is endless. The Chief Whip said, “Let’s be brief”. We are now 30 minutes in, rehearsing the rehearsal of last week’s four hour debate.

The noble Baroness, Lady Brady, said that seven Premier League clubs met the Minister. I presume that the Minister invited all the Premier League clubs to that meeting; they would not have been selected. If only seven bothered to turn up, again, that gives you a clear—

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

I can confirm to the noble Lord that only seven were invited. They were selected.

[Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)]

To be helpful to the Committee, could the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, give us the names of the seven clubs? That might shed some light on what is going on here. There seems to be an illusion that the Premier League was suddenly born out of the ether, and then provides for all. Players such as Ryan Giggs, Phil Foden and Alan Shearer do not just suddenly materialise; they come up from the other divisions. I get what the noble Baroness is trying to do, and I respect her position, but you have to look at this in a holistic way. This is about a regulator regulating for the five divisions, and if it is not blindingly obvious to anybody what those five divisions are, they may be sat in the wrong place.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. It has been worth while having it again, painful and irritating though it may be. I am sorry if that upset the Minister—it certainly was not my intention to do so. I did it because this issue matters.

By the Minister’s own admission on Monday, she did not know about the issue of hybridity until it was raised with her on Monday. Does she think that a few hours’ consideration, along with all the other matters we gave attention to in Committee on Monday, and a few minutes’ debate in Committee late on Monday evening, is sufficient to dispose of an issue as fundamental as this?

As I said in my opening remarks, the Government Chief Whip knew about this issue at the same time I was alerted by the clerks, on 26 November, almost a week earlier. I am grateful that he stayed to listen to our debate on this group. Maybe he, if not the noble Baroness, can tell us what discussions he had in light of that issue being raised with the usual channels on 26 November. This is about engagement with the people, organisations and businesses that this new law will profoundly affect. I was shocked to hear what my noble friend Lady Brady said about only seven hand-picked clubs being given just half an hour of—

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

As requested, I will clarify who the seven invited clubs were: West Ham, Crystal Palace, Brighton, Liverpool, Spurs, Everton and Brentford.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for providing that information to the Committee. As I am not the world’s greatest aficionado of football, I will leave it to others judge whether that is a representative spread of the beautiful game, but I am interested to hear from the Minister the rationale by which those clubs were selected. I would like to know whether she was present at the half-hour meeting with those clubs and, if she was not, how much time she has given to engaging with clubs before bringing this legislation before your Lordships’ House and asking us to pass it.

As my noble friend Lord Markham set out, the changes the Government have made to the Bill since the last Parliament—on backstops and parachute payments—make this a substantively different Bill. I disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton: this is not a virtually identical Bill; there are some substantial differences in policy terms, to do with parachute payments and so on. I think she would agree that those affect certain leagues and clubs more than others, and engage the question of hybridity and to what extent this Bill is targeting certain groups differently from others.

As with the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, and the noble Baroness, my Amendment 19 was a probing one to see whether we could provide clarity in the Bill for those whom it will regulate, so they know from the outset what they must do and that they must comply with it. Like the noble Baroness, the first I knew was when we received the advice from the Clerk of Legislation explaining that this would make the Bill a hybrid one.

It is worth saying that I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, that the previous Bill, when it was in Committee in another place, was not a hybrid Bill and it was right to conclude that. The question is, if we give that explicit information to the English Football League, the Premier League and the National League, so they know that they are going to be covered by this law—which the Government, in their Explanatory Notes, say they will: something they are happy to say outside the House but are not happy to say in the Bill, because that would afford them the right to come and speak directly to Parliament—then it is a question well worth pausing on, and I make no apology for returning to it today.

I am proud of the way your Lordships’ House scrutinises legislation; we go through things sometimes slowly, more slowly than Governments would wish— I have stood on the other side of these Dispatch Boxes and share the pain the Government Chief Whip and the noble Baroness are feeling today. This is a shining example of the importance of your Lordships’ House and the excellent advice we receive from its clerks. Thanks to that advice, two successive Lords’ Ministers for this Bill have been alerted to the fact that it could become a hybrid Bill if it is said in it what it is trying to do. That is an important point to have returned to in Committee, and I would like to understand from the Minister why, when we pass this law, we should not tell the people it is going to affect that it is going to affect them.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the opportunity to respond to the debate. I have already outlined the Government’s position on an issue that the Committee clearly cares about. I can confirm to the noble Lord opposite that I am clear that this position is correct and, if the noble Lord is concerned that I am upset, then I am slightly surprised. I am more concerned that the noble Lord thinks we should still be confused about matters on which I have written an extensive letter to noble Lords earlier today. The House debated Amendment 19 at length on Monday evening and asked me to write on the points raised. I have done so, and a copy of the letter has been placed in the House Library. I do not really want to repeat my explanation of when a Minister might have to nod; however, I will do so if that is raised again.

I hope we can work through any residual concerns swiftly so that your Lordships’ House might be able to lend its scrutiny, which I agree is important, to the other very important parts of the Bill. I understand the noble Lord’s desire to have in the Bill upfront clarity as to which competitions will initially be in scope of the regulator’s regime. However, as I explained on Monday night, and in my letter, there is a sound policy rationale for the approach taken in Clause 2.

16:30

As my noble friend Lady Taylor of Bolton stated, this is the same position that the previous Government took. It will ensure that these competitions can be amended in a timely manner in the future, to ensure that the scope of the regime remains relevant if there is a change in the structure of the football pyramid. This will also ensure that regulation cannot be circumvented. For example, clubs and competition organisers cannot simply reconstitute, rename or establish new domestic competitions to avoid the regulator’s regime. In such a scenario, failing to amend the scope quickly enough could result in the legislation failing to deliver the effect intended by Parliament.

The noble Baroness, Lady Brady, referred to what she called a lack of consultation. I am thoroughly surprised by and do not recognise this. The intended scope of the Bill is built on one of the most sound evidence bases and most extensive consultations possible. Over the past three years, there have been countless opportunities for all affected and interested parties to make representations. These include the fan-led review, the Government’s response to the fan-led review, and the White Paper. No club that has asked this Government for a meeting has not had one. Some Premier League clubs have indeed turned down invitations to meet. I met the noble Baroness myself and I attended the meeting in the summer that was referred to.

A number of other noble Lords raised whether the scope should appear clearly in the Bill. We understand the importance of clarity and certainty for the industry. The football industry is unique in that the definition of the market in scope of regulation is not straightforward. This is why the regulated population must be defined by reference to the leagues in scope, which are subject to change. If there is a change in the market, as there was in 1992 when the First Division became the Premier League, the regime needs to be able to adjust so that its scope remains relevant. In such a scenario, failing to amend the scope in a timely fashion could result in the legislation becoming ineffectual and the regulator being undermined.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

Does the Minister recognise that my Amendment 19 seeks to allow that to happen? In its second part, it keeps the provision for the Secretary of State to make, by regulation, amendments if the name changes. I take on board the point she made on Monday and that she repeated in her letter about the policy intent here, but my amendment, if she accepted it, would allow that to continue to happen. It would also give the clarity from the outset to the leagues that are going to be regulated.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

As I previously explained, I do not think that the leagues that are likely to be regulated by this legislation in the first instance are in any doubt, but I will answer the noble Lord’s point about why we are not going to put the top five leagues in the Bill and take a power to amend it. I believe I have set out very clear reasons for the approach taken on defining the scope of the regime. The Bill delivers the effect intended, closing any loopholes that would allow avoidance of the regime, while allowing for agility in responding to any potential changes in the structure of the football pyramid. This is a clear, simple procedure that can be consistently applied to the competitions initially designated as being in scope, as it can to any future competitions.

We have heard from numerous noble Lords opposite about their concerns over the number of delegated powers in the Bill, and I hear those. I have set out why specifying the leagues in scope in the Bill is a potentially flawed approach and open to avoidance. At best, this approach leads to superfluous or unnecessary provisions in drafting. At worst, it could undermine the entire regulatory regime. That is why the approach in the Bill that the Government have taken, and that the previous Government took, is the right one. For that reason, I am unable to accept the noble Lord’s amendment and hope he withdraws it.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

I am sorry to hear that from the Minister; it does not give us much more than we had in the debate on Monday. I thank her for restating it, but I do not think it has engaged with the point that my amendment seeks to provide, which is allowing that flexibility to answer all the policy questions that she has set out, but also giving the clarity in law to the leagues that will be regulated by the Bill. As far I can see, the only material difference between accepting my Amendment 19 and proceeding in the way she wants to is that it would allow those leagues to petition Parliament and make their voices heard more clearly. That would be a good way of hearing from those who will be affected by this law.

I was struck by the sage advice from the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, who is acting as referee on this matter. This is something we will have to return to, and I am grateful to the clerks who alerted me to it. We will have to think about the question of hybridity and the right of football clubs and leagues to make their views known on this legislation, as the Minister and I have both just come to understand. The Committee has, through the course of this and Monday night’s debate, been able to begin considering it, and we should continue to consider it between—

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

If the noble Lord insisted on this being included in the Bill, what would his response then be to further proceedings on the Bill?

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

I am interested in making sure that the Bill passes. I have been very clear from Second Reading onwards that we want to see it pass, that we want a regulator to be set up and that we want football to be protected and well governed. However, we want it to be done in a way that is not unduly burdensome, is proportionate and genuinely protects what is a hugely enjoyed pastime, a vital export and a group of hugely successful businesses for this country.

Thanks to the noble Lord’s Amendment 21 and my Amendment 19, we are given the opportunity to pause and consider whether we can have deeper and more fruitful conversations with those leagues and clubs to make sure that we get this legislation right. That is a question worth pondering with greater patience than I think we have seen from the Government Benches so far. I will certainly continue to consider it, and I hope that other noble Lords will do so too. For today, and in the interest of making further progress with our Committee deliberations, I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 19 withdrawn.

Amendment 20

Moved by

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay]

20: Clause 2, page 2, line 31, leave out from “competition;” to end of line 34

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 20, I will speak also to my Amendment 22. These amendments, while technical in nature, address some important issues underpinning the Bill: the preservation of integrity, clarity and fairness in football governance across the whole nation, alongside the safeguarding of competition and community interests.

My amendments are necessary on the basis that the English football pyramid is littered with examples of English teams playing in Welsh or Scottish league systems, or vice versa. I understand that Cardiff City FC has played in the English football pyramid for 104 years, famously winning the FA Cup in 1927, and, more recently, reaching the FA Cup final in 2008. Its participation in the English football pyramid does not make Cardiff an English club—at least, it would take a very bold person to say that to a group of Cardiff fans.

Similarly, in the case of Wrexham AFC, as I am sure that many noble Lords are aware and have been aware for longer than I have, Wrexham has been in the English football system even longer than Cardiff, having joined an early English football league known as the Combination as far back as 1890. It is, proudly, the third-oldest professional association football team in the world. Although the club has suffered from financial hardship down the years, Wrexham has recently had new life breathed into it by its purchase four years ago by the Canadian actor Ryan Reynolds and the American actor Rob McElhenney. The attendant publicity from the docuseries “Welcome to Wrexham” had a significant impact on the club’s renown, leading to it acquiring a new, global fanbase, without precedent for a team that was in the fifth division at that point. I had the pleasure of visiting its Racecourse Ground when the club was supporting Wrexham’s excellent bid to become the UK City of Culture for 2025. I saw how rooted the club was in its community and the great work it was doing on behalf of the whole wider area.

I hope that those two historical examples provide instructive and relevant information on the point that I intend to make. It is foreseeable that, if the Bill is read on its simple meaning, it could apply only to English clubs. That could lead to a grave lacuna whereby the regulator is instructed to regulate English clubs only but not all football clubs in the English football pyramid. I know that that is not the intention, but with my probing amendments, I hope to seek clarification on that point.

We do not want a case where Swansea AFC, Cardiff City, Wrexham AFC, Newport County, Llansantffraid and others could be in a unique position where they play football against regulated clubs but are themselves unregulated. I have added my name to the amendment tabled by my fellow Northumbrian, the noble Lord, Lord Beith—I believe he was born in Cheshire, but his 42 years representing Berwick-upon-Tweed makes him a Northumbrian in my eyes—who is seeking reassurances for a team closer to home for us both. I hope that the Minister will be able to allay the concerns that he has raised through his amendment as well and set our minds at rest on this important matter. I beg to move.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for his introduction to what I am going to say about Berwick Rangers. I declare an interest as having for some years been the honorary president of Berwick Rangers Football Club, which has existed for 143 years. During virtually the whole of that time, it has played in Scottish leagues, despite its stadium being in England. My amendment is there simply to secure clarification, which I am confident the Minister can give—although clarification would not necessarily survive subsequent amendment of the parts of the Bill to which I shall refer.

It appears to me that none of the regulatory provisions applies to a team in a competition that has not been specified by the Secretary of State. Under Clause 2(3), the Secretary of State does not have power to specify a competition in which the majority of the teams are not English teams. Thus, the Secretary of State could not designate the Scottish League, or the Lowland League or the Scottish Cup, in all of which Berwick play or have played.

Furthermore, Clause 15 makes it clear that operating licences are required only for a club operating a relevant team, which is defined in Clause 2(1) as a team participating “in a specified competition”. That would not apply to Berwick Rangers, because competitions in which they play could not, under the Bill, be specified. However, references in the same clause to a club with a stadium in England does raise in people’s minds the question about whether the Bill could be extended to Berwick—which would not be the Government’s intention, I am quite sure. Not only do they not seek to extend the Bill to Berwick Rangers, I do not think they are trying to move into the world of Scottish football, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Reid is well aware, is quite distinct in many respects, some of them desirable, some of them perhaps less so.

It has been the privilege of Berwick-upon-Tweed to play in Scottish football for almost the whole of its existence. Indeed, it has led to occasions on which we have played Glasgow Celtic, when I was able to welcome the noble Lord, Lord Reid, who came with the team for that fixture. We have played Glasgow Rangers on a number of occasions, defeating them in 1967 and holding them to a draw in the Scottish Cup on another occasion. To have a club playing such distinguished teams is obviously an asset to a town and, if there is any regulatory structure to be put in place, it should be the same one as for other teams in the Scottish league in which they play.

Berwick’s notable history is a very powerful case for making sure that any legislation deals properly with it. I am confident that the Government have no intention of causing us problems in this respect, but it would be helpful if the Minister could give us some clarification and would keep the matter in mind if there is any redrafting of this part of the Bill.

[Lord Watson of Invergowrie (Lab)]

I just want to make a point that has emerged in this short debate—or has become obvious to me in it. The first thing is to say to the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, that I take issue with his characterisation that England is “littered” with clubs from Wales. There are only four. There is another one at level 6, Merthyr, but that is not the point I want to make. I am concerned, looking at Clause 2, that subsection (3) refers to

“teams that are members of … or … participate in”

competitions being

“exclusively or predominantly English teams”.

However, Clause 2(4) says a team

“is an ‘English team’ if the ground at which the team customarily plays its home matches is in England”.

These are contradictory because, as we have heard, there are two Welsh clubs in the Championship, one in League One and one in League Two. So I think perhaps on Report there will have to be an amendment, which I am happy to bring forward if it is helpful to the Minister.

I also take the point that the noble Lord, Lord Beith, makes about Berwick Rangers, who made a contribution to Scottish football over many years. I was sorry to see them drop out of the Scottish League and I hope that they will soon be back. But they do play in Scottish football still at a lower level. It is unusual; UEFA, the governing body for European football, is very strict on clubs not playing their matches in another country. The practice of Welsh clubs playing in the Welsh FA Cup and representing their teams and cities in Europe was stopped by UEFA. Now it is only the much smaller Welsh clubs that are able to do that, because UEFA said that clubs had to choose which jurisdiction they were playing under. The only other example I can think of within the UK is Derry City. For reasons that might be quite obvious, since Derry is right on the border of the Republic of Ireland, they play in the League of Ireland, not the NI Football League.

16:45

So it is very difficult for clubs to play in another country and get permission from UEFA. For historical reasons, the case of Berwick Rangers will remain. However, I am concerned that the Bill seems, in Clause 2(3) and (4), to be contradictory. It must be set out there that this does not preclude clubs in Wales from being regarded essentially as English clubs—which, to all intents and purposes in terms of playing, they are.

[Lord Addington (LD)]

I will make one small and quick point. We talked about this being for fans and the traditions of the game. These accepted historical changes to the structure are something that most people involved in football accept. I hope that when the Minister replies she will accommodate them. If not, a small amendment would be appropriate.

[Lord Harlech (Con)]

My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group. I spoke at Second Reading on issues affecting Welsh clubs and it is a pleasure to speak to this group of amendments.

The New Saints perhaps offer a different Welsh perspective from those that we already have heard. TNS FC, known for a brief period as “Total Network Solutions” after a sponsorship from a local IT firm, are a Welsh professional football club that play in the Cymru Premier League but is based completely in England—in Oswestry, Shropshire. I declare an interest as that is where I was born. TNS are the most successful club in the Welsh league structure, with 16 league titles to their name. Recently, they became the first side playing in the Welsh system to qualify for the group or league stage of any European competition after reaching the league phase of the UEFA Conference League. They play in the Welsh league because the club was formed in the village of Llansantffraid, on the Welsh side of the border, in 1959, later merging with Oswestry Town, based in Shropshire, in 2003.

TNS FC sit at the pinnacle of Welsh domestic football, while occupying the peculiar position of being a club based in England. Does the Minister not agree that it would be unfair that TNS would be the only club playing in the Welsh top division to be regulated? Would it not create a difficult situation for Welsh football if a club with Welsh roots, playing in the Welsh league but geographically situated in England, had to comply with regulations that other teams in their league would not, perhaps creating a competitive disadvantage?

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

I thank noble Lords for their support for this group and apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Watson of Invergowrie. “Littered” was probably not a well-chosen word. I meant it in the sense of an adorable litter of puppies that enhance the joy of all of us. I am grateful too to my noble friend for giving another example in the shape of TNS. They seem to be the football league equivalent of him—both a Shropshire lad and a man of Harlech. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Beith, for setting out his Amendment 23 and hope that the Minister can allay the concerns that have been raised on behalf of all these clubs and others in similar situations.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay and Lord Beith, for their amendments to Clause 2 and the opportunity they present for me to clarify this matter.

Amendments 20 and 22 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, would allow the Secretary of State to include in the regulator’s scope competitions that are not exclusively or predominantly made up of English teams. This would mean the loss of an important protection that, as currently drafted, ensures Welsh football competitions could never be brought into scope. The noble Lord will be aware that sport is a devolved matter for Senedd Cymru, the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly. Therefore, if intervention of this nature was deemed necessary within Welsh, Scottish or Northern Irish football, it would be for their respective legislatures to take forward.

While I am on the subject of Welsh football, I take this opportunity to congratulate the Welsh national team, who qualified for the Women’s Euros last night. It is the first time in their history they have qualified for a major tournament. This is a fantastic achievement and one I am sure your Lordships will want to join me in celebrating.

[Noble Lords]

Hear, hear!

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

On Amendment 23, I understand the aim of the noble Lord, Lord Beith, to ensure clubs are not inadvertently captured by the regulator’s regime or left out—for example, where they are based in England but compete in the Scottish league system. I reassure him that the Bill already sufficiently protects against this risk. Only clubs competing in competitions specified by the Secretary of State will be subject to regulation, and the Secretary of State can specify only English competitions. Therefore, clubs such as Berwick Rangers, which is part of the Scottish pyramid, cannot be subject to the scope of the regulator as long as they do not play in English competitions. Conversely, clubs playing in those specified English competitions, including Welsh clubs, will be regulated.

I am happy to meet noble Lords to discuss this further if that would be helpful but, for the reasons I have set out, I am unable to accept the noble Lords’ amendments. I hope that they will not press them.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness. As she could hear from the cheer, I think we all associate ourselves with the congratulations that she offered to the Welsh women’s team. It is marvellous news. I thank her for the reassurances. As the noble Lord, Lord Addington, said, these are some of the quirks of our history that we celebrate through football, which we play across these islands. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for the clarification she has set out and I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 20 withdrawn.

Amendments 21 to 25 not moved.

Clause 2 agreed.

Amendment 26 not moved.

Clause 3: Meaning of “owner” etc

Amendment 27

Moved by

[Lord Moynihan]

27: Clause 3, page 3, line 15, leave out “influence or”

[Lord Moynihan (Con)]

My Lords, in moving my Amendment 27, I will also speak to my Amendments 28 and 29. These amendments seek to omit reference to the “influence” a person can have over the activities of a club being considered for a licence to operate as a professional football club in England.

Walking through this maze of state-imposed regulation on professional sport, for the purpose of the amendments I assume that the Government intend to allow the government-appointed regulator to determine who is a fit and proper person to be granted a licence on the question of their “influence” over a club’s activities. If we try to seek clarity in the Bill, we are immediately referred to Schedule 1, where, in keeping with this hydra of a Bill, we are once again left totally in the dark. It says, at page 83:

“The Secretary of State must prepare and publish guidance about the meaning of significant influence or control for the purposes of this Schedule”.


So the Bill continues to blindfold parliamentarians before they take the knee and kick off their important scrutinising role, which is the central purpose of your Lordships’ House.

Perhaps the best way to seek clarification from the Government is to work through a specific example. Newcastle is majority owned and financially controlled by the Saudi sovereign fund, the PIF. The PIF became the majority shareholder and de facto owner of the club, with 80% of the shares acquired in October 2021. The chair of the PIF is Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, son of Saudi Arabia’s King. MBS, as he is known, runs the Saudi Government.

For once, the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, cannot pray in aid that this is an inherited Conservative Bill, because in the Conservative Bill there was a protection against the Government-appointed regulator investigating whether, for example, the Crown Prince and chair of the PIF was a fit and proper person to exercise control over Newcastle through his chairmanship of the PIF. The current Government deleted the very protection that the Conservative Government put in the Bill that required the regulator to,

“have regard to the foreign and trade policy objectives of His Majesty’s Government”.

This removal was a direct result of UEFA’s insistence to the current Prime Minister that this protection politicises sport. When faced with expulsion from the European Championship in 2028, which, incidentally, is to be hosted in the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, and asked to jump, he said “How high?” and deleted the protection, clearly without the Government considering the consequences. This is a classic example of the need to beware of unintended consequences.

When the Prime Minister heads off to Saudi Arabia this month to promote trade and relations with Saudi Arabia, what will he say when the Crown Prince asks, “As I exercise influence over the PIF and since the PIF owns Newcastle, am I to be subject to detailed investigation by the regulator as set out in your Bill, and is there anything the regulator will not take into account about me as a ‘person of influence’ over the future of Newcastle United?”

Sadly, I can assure the Committee that for anyone who has read the Bill, the answer to Newcastle fans is that, unlike under the Premier League or UEFA rules, the Crown Prince is to be subject to investigation by the regulator. That is exactly what the Government intend the regulator to do, because they have removed the one protection it had. So let the Prime Minister be in no doubt that the answer he has to give to the Crown Prince and the PIF, which is investing billions in global sport and encouraging full British co-operation with the growth of boxing, golf, the International Olympic Committee’s Esports and tennis, to name just a few recipients of Saudi influence in global sport that is celebrated by many professional sports in this country, all of whom benefit from it.

When the Minister comes to answer, the Committee is looking for simple clarity. Yes, the regulator has full rights to use his or her many powers to investigate and opine on the suitability or otherwise of any owner who exercises a degree of influence over, for example, Newcastle United. That is just one example of such detailed and intrusive investigation which exists solely in the powers of the proposed regulator but nowhere else in football—not in UEFA, FIFA, the EFL or the Premier League. The intrusive investigation which this phrase leads to will be replicated across the Premier League unless we accept my amendments.

We have a clear understanding of the first meaning of an “owner”, which is those who control or exercise control over a club, and shareholders are a good example. However, to understand the second phrase, the concept of “influence” over a club, we need to understand what the Government mean by “influence”. What is deeply disturbing is that, from other parts of the Bill, it is clear that the definition conflicts with the approach to ownership of the government regulator, the Premier League, UEFA and the EFL, all of which would be conflicted with the government regulator’s role. I predict that it would be mired in litigation for years to come and lead to capital flight by current owners in the Premier League and other leagues, so I owe it to the Committee to explain briefly why.

The starting point is whether there is a difference in the definition of an owner between what is in the Bill and in the Premier League’s rulebook. If there is a difference, what will this mean in terms of whether a newly identified owner would have to go through a test or whether they would still be defined as an incumbent owner who, incidentally, will have to go through extensive new tests under this legislation?

This Bill tells us that the regulator must identify an “ultimate owner” as opposed to companies that have ultimate control. How is this defined in the Bill and what does it mean? At what point in the process must the ultimate owner be identified? For example, can he or she be identified for a provisional licence? I would argue that they have to be. If new individuals are identified, will they have to go through the full owners and directors tests as new prospective owners or will they be treated as incumbents?

17:00

To my understanding, an owner is defined as an individual or registered society that meets one or more of the conditions in paragraph 2 of Schedule 1. The first of these conditions is that a person has the right to exercise, or actually exercises, significant influence or control over all or part of the club’s activities. Remarkably, there is no requirement on the Secretary of State, who will write the guidance that determines what “significant influence or control” means, to consult anyone on the drafting of that guidance. We can speculate about what the definition might be by looking at other legislation where the same phrase is used, but there is no guarantee that the Secretary of State will follow the same approach on this Bill as has been taken for other legislation. It is not worth relying on the Companies Act guidance because there is no requirement for the Secretary of State to follow that guidance.

What is certain at this stage is that, because there is no definition in the Bill—again—it will be open to the Secretary of State to make guidance that would allow a wide group of individuals, companies or other bodies to fall within the category of persons having significant influence or control, and fans would be up in arms if he did not include a very wide definition.

The Premier League Handbook requirements about the requisition of control—just the word “control”, without “significant influence” attached to it—are, significantly and wisely, narrower in scope than the Bill. An acquirer falls within the Premier League Handbook only if they propose to acquire control of the club. That is different from the Bill, where the Secretary of State has added “significant influence or control” and taken the responsibility of defining it, so persons who exercise significant influence do not fall within the scope of the Premier League Handbook but fall within the scope of the Bill.

An individual or registered society will be an owner if they meet one or more of the conditions in paragraph 2 of Schedule 1. Here is the real nub of the issue, and it comes in the words of the Government in the Explanatory Notes to the Bill:

“If the trustees, partners, or members of the body meet one of the other four conditions in relation to a club, and a person has significant influence or control over the trust, partnership, etc, then that person is an owner of the club. This means that an owner cannot avoid being identified as an owner simply by, for example, placing”

his or

“her 30% shares in a club into a trust. The test that will be applied is whether”

he or

“she has the right to exercise, or actually exercises, significant influence or control over the activities of that trust (for example, will the trustees vote the shares however she instructs them)”.

This is a highly complex area, and I feel for the many clubs within the EFL that are going to have to face these questions.

Thinking about the common ownership structures for premier leagues, you can see that it might be a complex exercise to identify the ultimate owner, and that the requirement to identify ultimate owners is a significant departure from the way the Premier League currently identifies the person who controls the club. That is far more intrusive and onerous a test than any in the Premier League Handbook or UEFA regulations. It permits state control over ownership of football clubs through the influence clause, which the regulator has to follow.

Without any doubt, the Crown Prince is an owner in the context of the Bill—an owner who exercises influence over the activities of the club as defined in proposed statute and regulation. Premier League football is a particularly attractive investment for sovereign wealth funds due to its long-term investment potential. What is unusual about the provisions in the Bill is that, unlike other sectors, the owners, and ultimate owners behind these funds, will have to be identified by the government regulator because the Government specifically state that an owner cannot avoid being identified as an owner simply by, for example, placing their shares in a club into trust.

What is worse is that the identity of each owner and the ultimate owner must be identified to the regulator when the club applies even for a provisional licence. I ask the Minister: if new individuals are identified, will they have to go through the full owners’ and directors’ tests as new prospective owners, or will they be treated as incumbents? I emphasise again that we should think of the complexity and cost of this process for EFL clubs in the lower leagues as well.

It is a really important issue—possibly the most important issue that we have considered to date—because it goes right to the heart of one of the most intrusive and complex regulatory frameworks that I have seen anywhere, including in the Companies Act, and it is applicable to professional sport in this country, which should be based on the autonomy of that sport and the ability of the sport to self-regulate.

That has been the case for many generations. The regulator now comes into this sport and controls the game. In clause after clause, the game is controlled through government control and guidance—most of which, tragically, is not even in the Bill and is hidden under a cloak of anonymity. This is the most far-reaching, direct political intervention into the running of any sport in the history of this country—the country which once gave the world the rules and regulations for sport to be universal, autonomous and self-regulating. It is a historic irony that ours should now be the first Government in the western world to take control of sport and, by doing so, unleash the potential to do exactly the opposite of what the Government—and all football fans, from both sides of the House—want.

Think of the current owners and just look at the clauses we are considering in this group. The Bill encourages, not diminishes, the long-term potential of a super league. It may in the short term stop it in its tracks but, in the future, this onerous government intervention will do little to attract new investment—why should it? The losers will be the fans. Existing Premier League ownership tests are already onerous, as they should be, but there is no case to add the influence test.

[Lord Markham (Con)]

Before I speak to the amendments in my name, I start by thanking my noble friend Lord Moynihan. This is yet another example where, as we understand this Bill further, we see more and more complexities and unintended consequences which will have a profound impact on the sport that we all love. Those points were very well made by my noble friend, and I look forward to the Minister’s response to them.

My amendments are trying to be helpful and practical, given the complications set out by my noble friend around how you determine who is an owner or who has influence on it all. At the very least, as proposed in Amendment 30, the regulator must inform who it considers to be counted as an owner. I hope noble Lords would agree that that is a fairly sensible move, given that such a person might not consider it themselves but might be deemed to have influence.

Just as we require a certain competence from officers, Amendment 177 suggests that owners should be subject to a similar assessment.

We are all mindful of the numerous situations we have seen where there is a timeliness to the acquisition of a club, particularly in the context of rescuing a club or where there are certain deadlines, as happened in the case of Abramovich and Chelsea. Amendment 186 states that the regulator must make a decision about an owner or an officer within one month. Officers can be critical to the running of a club as well, so we need timeliness there.

My two further amendments, Amendments 188 and 189, propose that where the regulator is seeking to act retrospectively—as has been pointed out, this gives it the power to reopen the issue of ownership and officers—there needs to be a high bar before it is allowed to go in; otherwise, before we know it, it could be investigating and unpicking the officers and owners of every club. Once again, this is a massive example of just how overbearing we are in danger of setting up this regulator to be.

Amendment 188 says that the regulator can investigate the current owners only if it believes that there is a reason for them not being suitable. It is trying to put an evidential burden or barrier on that. Similarly, Amendment 189 is about trying to determine the fitness of current officers only if it already has information in place suggesting that those current officers are not fit. Otherwise, if we add up all the multiple hundreds of officers of the hundred or so clubs, we would be setting up a whole logjam of investigations, which I would hope that all noble Lords think does not best serve the interests of those clubs or football as a whole.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Moynihan and I commend him on his comprehensive demolition of the Government’s case. I have fundamental problems with this clause, as it stands, in respect of ownership. As my noble friend rightly says, it goes way beyond the admonitions and existing legislation of, say, the various Companies Acts. It is much more draconian and prescriptive than anything we have seen in company law. It is quite sensible, and not ignoble, for all Governments to take a value judgment on who is a fit and appropriate person to be a company director and to trade and take part in commerce. We all understand and support that, but what we see here is very oddly drafted legislation. It seems to me that it may be a reaction to the trade policy clause that existed in the original Bill, which was withdrawn.

At the same time, the Bill is extremely opaque, permissive and open-ended in the power that is bestowed on the Secretary of State. Looking at the schedule, I am very uncomfortable about giving those sweeping powers, not least because there is a differential between the “significant influence”, as contained in the schedule, that a director or a person involved in a football club may have and what we read in Clause 3, which is just “a degree of influence”. What does a degree of influence mean?

It is not all a case of the Saudi royal family and Newcastle United. We are talking about 116 clubs. Is “influence” popping into the dressing room at half-time and saying, “Great match, guys; here’s a beer”? Is it saying, “If you play better next year, my company might sponsor you more favourably”? It may seem ridiculous to use those examples, but this wording is so unclear—so opaque and permissive—in asking to give Ministers very significant powers that we need to think carefully, again, about whether it is appropriate to let it remain in the Bill.

For that reason, I strongly support the eloquent and comprehensive case made by my noble friend Lord Moynihan and, in passing, of course I support the amendment from my noble friend Lord Markham. This is a bad clause. It will give rise to very big risks of litigation. Ministers should think carefully about whether it remains in the Bill and we should think again, perhaps on Report.

[Baroness Evans of Bowes Park (Con)]

My Lords, Norwich City were very fortunate to have Michael Wynn-Jones and Delia Smith as majority shareholders for the past 26 years. They have been fantastic custodians of the club. They joined the board when Norwich were in a perilous financial position and helped steward the club through the highs and lows of six promotions, six relegations, two play-off finals and 15 managers. Of course, Delia was not averse to some direct fan engagement with her “Let’s be ’avin’ you” rallying cry, which we all know and love.

In October, Norfolk Holdings, a group led by the principal owner of the Milwaukee Brewers, assumed majority control of the club, so a new chapter has begun. While Michael and Delia have relinquished control, they remain committed fans, as they always have been. I know that all Canaries are extremely grateful for their unwavering commitment to the club.

17:15

I raise this because Norwich have been very fortunate to have owners committed to running the club in a stable and—dare I say it—sustainable way over the last couple of decades. I entirely agree about the importance of proper scrutiny of football owners. Norwich have benefited from stability in ownership, basically because fans who had enough money to run the club were running it. But I have a couple of questions for the Minister about the impact of the Bill, which I would appreciate clarity on.

First, I would be grateful if the Minister could explain in more detail the potential implications for existing club owners. My impression—I may have misunderstood this from our meeting last week with representatives of the shadow football regulator—was that the provisions of the Bill would be applied in relation to potential owners after the Act comes into force. But, according to the Explanatory Notes, Clause 34 on incumbent owners opens the door to the IFR being able to make a determination about the suitability of existing owners,

“if the IFR has information that gives it grounds for concern about whether the … owner meets”

the ownership fitness criteria. Can the Minister give some sense or some examples of what sort of information or level of evidence might need to be gathered to trigger this provision in relation to existing owners? For instance, pressure could be put on the IFR to test individuals where third parties raise concerns about them or, as my noble friend said, if they do not currently fall within the Premier League or EFL definition of ownership and therefore have not been subject to a test.

I am sure the Minister will agree that it is important that any process undertaken by the new regulator is transparent, robust and rigorous, as she will understand that the potential implications for any clubs that face such a situation could be catastrophic. A forced divestment of an incumbent owner would probably be disastrous for many clubs. The Bill appears to provide for that possibility, because it does not grandfather existing owners in, and it does not make clear the threshold for triggering a test. I would be grateful if the Minister could give us a bit more of an explanation of that.

Secondly, the Premier League has made clear its intention to maintain its ownership tests. In our meeting last week with representatives of the shadow regulator, they said that they had had conversations and knew that that was the situation—so everyone is working from the same page. But, obviously, that test is different from the test that the IFR will follow. Can the Minister explain what happens if the situation arises that the Premier League finds an owner suitable through its tests but the IFR does not? An even more tricky situation is if the IFR finds an owner suitable and the Premier League does not. Can the regulator overrule the Premier League in both these circumstances? Importantly, how would that difference be resolved? Obviously, that would be quite a critical situation and, for fans, a seminal issue for their club.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, in the debate on an earlier group we heard some dilemmas around the fact that, for example, Welsh teams such as Wrexham might not be in scope of the Bill. It is possible that Rob McElhenney and Ryan Reynolds will be relieved to discover that they might not be. Those following Wrexham’s progress will know that they spend a great deal of time complaining about the ridiculous regulatory framework that the football club has to negotiate. It is not football regulation but every other—as they say—bonkers regulation that means they cannot build. There are many hoops that they have to jump through.

This is slightly important because, when we have this discussion about suitability and fitness, we constantly see it as scrutiny because we are wary of charlatans. Everybody that has ever been involved in football is anxious about types of owner who might not have football at their heart, but the reality is that many owners of football clubs and many people with influence over them love the game and are nothing but great influences on the clubs. That is obviously why Rob McElhenney and Ryan are well-known heroes worldwide now. But there are also corporate interests that can be just as beneficial and important.

One reason why this is so tricky, why it needs to be clarified and why I am glad to see these amendments in this group is that any discussion about suitability and fitness that gives so much intrusive and overbearing power to a regulator has to be queried to understand exactly what it will mean. The last question from the noble Baroness, Lady Evans, was important: what happens if there is a clash?

Outside of football, the debates on who is suitable to run what are subject to all sorts of subjective and sometimes malicious trouble, caused by people who do not have the best interests of the clubs at heart. If noble Lords have ever spent any time with football fans, they will know that many do not think that their club’s owners are suitable or would pass any suitability test—as I will tell you over a pint. It might well be the gripe of the day.

My point is that the Bill has to be reined in, in terms of how much power has been given to make decisions that are not straightforward or scientific. Until we recognise that there is a danger of unintended consequences, the Minister might—not through any desire to—open a can of worms that will be damaging to many football teams.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak about ownership definitions and tests proposed in the Bill, and particularly to support Amendments 27 to 29 tabled by my noble friend Lord Moynihan.

Although everyone can support proper scrutiny of football club ownership, I have concerns that the current provisions create unnecessary complexity and uncertainty. It is important that we are clear about the purpose of the Bill in this respect. As my noble friend’s amendments demonstrate, the Bill proposes a new definition of ownership that goes beyond current football tests, introducing the concept of influence. This goes beyond the football authority definitions, which focus only on control. Yet the Bill provides little detail about how this extended scope will work in practice or what problems it aims to solve. It will apparently be for the Secretary of State to decide what is meant by “influence”.

Equally concerning is the lack of clarity regarding existing owners. As has already been asked, do the Government envisage using these new powers to retrospectively challenge current ownership arrangements? If not, why create a broader definition than the existing tests? If they do, this represents an extraordinary intervention into private property rights that demands much greater scrutiny.

The Premier League has significantly strengthened its owners tests, including in relation to the Abramovich case, and sanctioned individuals. What evidence suggests that parallel tests, with differing criteria, would improve outcomes, rather than creating uncertainty and potential legal conflict? Without such clarity, we risk creating a framework that deters responsible investment, while failing to address any real problems in football governance.

Let me be clear about another point. As my noble friend Lady Evans pointed out, the EFL is, I believe, very happy to give up its own ownership test to the regulator because it views the exercise as costly and time consuming—that is its right. But the Premier League fully intends to maintain its own ownership tests—why should it not? It is a fundamental right of a members’ organisation to determine its own composition, and the Premier League really is a membership body. We have only 20 clubs, not 72, and it is a fundamental part of how we drive forward the Premier League, grow in international markets and make collective decisions about the future of the game, together with the FA.

Determining who can come into the group is therefore a key part of how we collectively run the Premier League as equal shareholders. I would argue that we have one of the most sophisticated ownership tests in world sport. Yet the Bill would introduce a parallel test, and it would do so without defining its contents. Naturally, this creates immediate uncertainty.

The Bill is troubling, too, on detail. The planned test, which will be for the regulator to create and define at some stage in future, would appear to include more subjective elements than the Premier League’s existing criteria. That would be very strange. Surely it would be quite a good idea if prospective investors and owners could know with confidence, from the outside, whether they qualified to buy a football club. I would be grateful if the Minister could answer a simple question: is the test provided for in the Bill going to be a subjective or an objective test? It obviously cannot be both. As my noble friend Lady Evans said, the practical implications run deeper. What happens when the regulator approves an owner, but the Premier League does not, or vice versa? Can the IFR force the Premier League to take in an owner that it does not want? The Bill makes no provision for resolving such conflicts. Instead, I worry that it creates the perfect conditions for prolonged litigation—exactly what proper regulation should avoid.

Of course, all this uncertainty is likely to be very damaging to investment. Put yourself in the shoes of an investor examining Premier League football as a potential opportunity. They now face not one ownership test but two, both with different criteria. One test is not even defined in legislation. Either could result in rejection. Both could trigger lengthy legal challenges. What serious investor would begin spending the millions of pounds required to explore a transaction in football —on the investment bankers, the lawyers, the due diligence, the regulatory compliance, the tax advisers and the rest of it? Why would we want to introduce such fundamental uncertainty?

I worry that, without far more clarity in the Bill, we risk deterring the very kind of responsible, long-term investors that football needs and wants. I urge the Minister to carefully consider these points. At a minimum, we need clarity on: how conflicts between tests will be resolved; exactly how and why the IFR’s test is intended to be materially different from the existing tests; what provisions exist for managing litigation; why the definition of ownership is wider than that used by the football authorities today, and what the implications are; and, above all, how investment confidence will be maintained.

The goal of proper ownership scrutiny is, of course, completely correct, but we must achieve it through clear, workable mechanisms and not parallel systems that create uncertainty and confusion.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

My Lords, I enter this debate from a slightly different angle—and I make no apology for that. My concern is linked more to what I might describe as preventing another Wimbledon, or to “Wimbledon-proofing” the legislation. That is what the amendments that we have in this group attempt to assert.

This is important, because Wimbledon was a warning shot across football when it happened—when Wimbledon Football Club was transported 61 miles away from its home community to Milton Keynes. Only one other club has had to move further than that, and that was Brighton & Hove Albion when we were shunted inexplicably—well, rather explicably, in the end—to Gillingham to play our home games. I know that I could go on about that for a long time, but I want to prevent that sort of thing happening in future. As part of the determination of suitability, we are trying to get a commitment—and perhaps the Minister can help us—that issues related to where the home ground is will be an important part of the test as to whether a person is a fit and proper person to become an owner of a regulated club. That is what our Amendment 182 seeks to clarify.

Fans need that long-term security. They need to understand that the people who take ownership of a much-loved community asset are there for the longer term and have a longer-term interest in the community and its football club. We need that because the majority of clubs most likely to be affected by this legislation are those smaller clubs with which there is a great affinity and community bond. I hope that the Minister can assure us that one of the relevant considerations when looking at a new owner will be their commitment to ensuring that the ground stays pretty much where it is and that fans are consulted about any changes to be made to it.

17:30

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I read with interest the noble Lord’s Amendment 182. The wording says of the commitment to the home ground

“with said commitment to be codified in such form as the IFR may determine”.

Does he agree that it could undermine any existing contractual relationship and bring uncertainty into the business activities of that club, were this amendment to be adopted?

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

I do not think that it would. It is designed to stop owners disposing of the assets. I will give the noble Lord the example of Brighton, because what happened there is very instructive. Back in the 1990s, it was taken over by some rogue owners —Bellotti, Stanley and Archer. Apart from becoming local hate figures, they sold the stadium before they had anywhere else to locate the football club. Then they tried to blackmail us politicians in Hove Council and Brighton Council—we were not a unitary at the time—into providing them with a completely unsuitable site for relocation, with no planning permission and no business plan at all. That was wrong, and it destroyed that club for a period of time. It has taken us a long time to recover from that. It has taken the support of fans and the good will of good local politicians to rebuild Brighton into the excellent and well-run club that it is today. Now, I would say that, wouldn’t I? But it is the truth, and that was the situation.

This amendment is quite personal to me. I did not go on marches, protest or do what I could as the leader of the council to see that position undermined. I would hope that the noble Lord opposite, as a supporter of Peterborough, would have a similar passion for his club. That is the reason for this amendment. We want to make sure that we provide fans with that security and knowledge and understanding of the importance of that commitment.

[Lord Addington (LD)]

My Lords, briefly, if we are talking about influence, it is reasonable that we know what it means. As the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, has said, this is an example of why we have this Bill. There have been rogue owners, and one of the traditional ways they come in is by looking for a property deal on the site. It is important to remember that as an example of what happens when you get this wrong. We need to balance these two points together. I hope that, when the Minister comes to answer, she will at least start to shed light on how we will seek to do this.

[Lord Mann (Lab)]

My Lords, I have talked to quite a number of major new investors in English football and have not found one who opposes the general principle of having a regulator. They are quite relaxed about it, yet they are the major new investors. I think one reason is that, when people invest, they often find some hidden nasties that had not been disclosed about the investment and its finances. That extra element of transparency is not necessarily a discouragement to investors; it can be an encouragement, particularly to reliable, long-term investors.

If you talk to a random selection of football fans, one case that will always quickly crop up is the Glazers buying Manchester United, not with their own money but with leveraged buyouts. I am rather more benign about the Glazers, because their intentions were always very open: they were borrowing money from reliable sources and attempting to make a profit. I would not be too comfortable about that if it were my club, but it cannot be denied that what they did was clear, transparent and out in the open. Anybody who thinks that there are not people today who the fans believe are generous and beneficial owners who have put lots of their own money in, but who have in fact borrowed the money from sources that are not public, are being rather naive, because that is still a model through which people buy football clubs. Football clubs are easy to move money in and out of and speculative investment has proven over the last 20 years, particularly in English football, a reasonable bet and may continue to be so. Indeed, the whole case of the Premier League is that it will continue to be so, so the regulation being proposed is not necessarily an anti-business case.

There is another interesting aspect that does not come to light because we do not know about it. I hear from current and recent professional players about the impact and influence of agents. Are there now agents who are sufficiently powerful in the game, with the corporate entities they have created to own footballers and, more critically, footballers’ rights, that their unseen investment in a club could have an influence in ways that the wider public, including the fans, do not know about? It seems to me, from a fan perspective, that that is a problem for the health of the game. On balance, the good, long-term investor who could make good money —that seems to be a rational motive—will be in favour of this element of transparency and not against it.

[Lord Evans of Rainow (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Mann, with his very pertinent points on agents and fans. I rise briefly to support my noble friend’s Amendment 27 and to make a point about owners being fit for purpose, fans’ interests and consultations and unintended consequences. Along with other noble Lords, I spent last Friday afternoon with the shadow regulator. I asked whether they were aware of how unpopular they could be. I used the example that has already been used of Newcastle United, which has a new owner and a sovereign wealth fund, and the fans are excited because of the potential that brings. That is great, but what would this regulator make of the new ownership? Compare and contrast that with the previous owner, Mike Ashley.

Noble Lords will be aware of what Newcastle fans thought about Mike Ashley: in their eyes the team was underperforming and he was not investing in the club and its players. However, he was probably being prudent and working within the constraints of the rules of the game, and the regulator might have judged him to be a perfectly fit and proper person to run and own that club. I ask noble Lords to imagine a situation where the regulator says to a sovereign wealth fund owner, a country such as Saudi Arabia, “I do not believe you are a fit and proper person to take over and own this club”, but the fans think it would be wonderful. The regulator could end up in a situation with literally tens of thousands of protesters going down to Manchester from clubs like Newcastle.

As the noble Lord said, Brighton and Hove Albion supporters are very passionate, and he clearly did a good job there as a council leader. However, we know that fans will travel all around the country to support their team and we could end up with the unintended consequence of the regulator denying the potential of an owner to buy a club based on his set of rules and regulations, but tens of thousands of fans would disagree and we could have a situation where they would go down and protest. That could be one of the unintended consequences, so perhaps the Minister could let the House know whether the Government have thought of that.

[Lord Watson of Invergowrie (Lab)]

My Lords, I support Amendments 182 to 184 in the names of my noble friends Lady Taylor and Lord Bassam. I do so, as my noble friend Lord Bassam said, specifically in relation to Wimbledon—not AFC Wimbledon, at which I happen to be a season ticket holder, but Wimbledon, the previous club, which has now been moved 60 miles up the M1 to Milton Keynes. I want to focus on the situation prior to that happening, and that is why these amendments are relevant.

Ironically, in one of the debates on the Bill last week I talked about state intervention and mentioned the Taylor report. It was that report, published in, I think, 1991, which said that our grounds at the top level must be all seated. Wimbledon’s ground was too small and too cramped, with houses round about it, for that to be done, so they moved from there to a ground share with Crystal Palace, ostensibly on a short-term basis—it turned out that they would be there for more than 10 years, but that is not really relevant to this. The point is that the owner eventually sold the ground from under the fans to a supermarket chain, and subsequently sold the club to Norwegian owners. The point is that the fans were nowhere consulted in any of this, although they made their views clear. But the point is that the home ground is key to any football club and there has to be the long-term commitment to that.

My noble friend Lord Bassam talked about going up to Milton Keynes. The previous owner of Wimbledon FC wanted to move it to Dublin. That was a serious proposal. Thankfully, it came to nothing, of course. On this issue of whether a club can move, that is why the regulator is important. It is maybe lost in the mists of time that, when Wimbledon FC were about to be moved, the FA and the Football League opposed it, and the FA, totally wrongly, set up a commission, which gave the club permission to move to Milton Keynes. It was famously said that retaining the club in Wimbledon would be

“not in the wider interests of football”.

Well, 25 years later, Wimbledon FC, now in Milton Keynes, gets crowds of about 6,000 and AFC Wimbledon, the new club, gets crowds of about 8,000—so noble Lords can work out what is in the wider interests of football from that.

My concern is about the commitment to the club’s ground. It is important that, unless we can get a long-term commitment for when ownership is going to change, there is no reason why any ground could not be sold off, with a new owner claiming, “Well, I’ve had such and such an offer from a supermarket chain, I can’t possibly turn it down. I’ll build a new ground some time in the future, but I don’t know when”. That is why the word “codified” in Amendment 182 is particularly important. It needs to be nailed down, because the importance of the home ground cannot be overstated in terms of the investment of fans into their football clubs.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, I am conscious that the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, has not been able to be with us today to speak to her Amendments 187A and 187B; I know she has a commitment to chairing some Welsh sports bodies, which I know the Committee will understand and support. I just wanted to draw the Committee’s attention to the two amendments that she tabled, which have been grouped together with the others that we have debated here. As her explanatory statement sets out, they aim to provide a route for the regulator

“for other individuals and groups of people, who may have more inside knowledge than the average fan, to act as whistleblowers and raise any concerns they have about the suitability of an owner or officer”.

It is regrettable that the noble Baroness has not been able to be here to set out the case more fully, but I am sure that noble Lords will pay attention to that and consider those amendments as well.

17:45

I rise to speak to the amendments, in this rather large group, tabled in the name of my noble friend Lord Markham, to which I have added my name; they are Amendments 30, 177, 186, 188 and 189.

Amendment 30 requires the regulator to give a notice to inform any of those whom it considers to be an owner under the Bill. As my noble friend set out, this is to make sure that those who are liable for the duties under the Bill can be informed of that fact; that seems very sensible and I hope the Minister will look favourably upon it.

Amendment 177 standardises the language used in the Bill regarding owners and officers. Currently, owners are not required to have requisite competence, but officers are. But we know from experience that an incompetent owner can be just as damaging—if not more so—than incompetent directors, and we have heard some clear and powerful examples in the debate today. So, again, I hope the Minister will look favourably on Amendment 177, which sensibly tries to ensure that the same standards are applied to both.

I listened with interest to the amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, set out on his behalf and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton. I understand his reasons; he spoke very eloquently about the club dearest to his heart. When one remembers iconic football grounds, such as Highbury and Upton Park, which have formed part of the bedrock of a local community, or, indeed, the case of MK Dons and AFC Wimbledon, which I was first told about by my noble friend Lord O’Shaughnessy, who is a fellow supporter of AFC Wimbledon—which the noble Lord, Lord Watson of Invergowrie, might be pleased to know—we can certainly see the appeal here. There are later provisions in the Bill which seek to make sure that any move of a football ground involves consultation with fans, and I am conscious that we will have a chance to debate those as well. Weaving it into the regulation of owners could give rise to some of the concerns about overregulation that we have heard, so that is the reason I have not yet expressed support for them—but I will listen with interest to what the Minister says. It is a way of adding a further protection to the important area the noble Lord set out.

It is also important to remember that football clubs—like political parties, businesses and many organisations —do change with the times, and they have got to retain the freedom to evolve. The example of the Arsenal is probably the most profound one; it was originally a club founded in south London and named after the Woolwich Arsenal, but is now very much grounded in north London. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, set out her support for Arsenal and she is, I think, a south Londoner rather than a north Londoner, so is perhaps apposite in her allegiance.

While we are supportive of maintaining the historic links between clubs and their home grounds, and making sure that fans are properly consulted if a move is to happen, we have also got to be conscious of the fact that circumstances change. We have got to make sure that the regulator is not excessively prescriptive in its provisions. So I look forward to hearing what the Minister says on her noble friend’s suggestions.

Amendment 186 in the name of my noble friend Lord Markham seeks to limit to one month the period in which the regulator must make a determination under Clauses 28 and 29. We have heard concerns expressed across the Committee about the risks of overregulation and mission creep, and this amendment seeks to probe the Government’s intention regarding these judgments. As I hope the Government will appreciate, as is the case in any regulated sector, timely decision-making is crucial to prevent the regulator hampering good governance or having the sort of chilling effect that we want to avoid.

I hope the Minister will be able to give the Committee a sense of what the Government expect the relevant decision-making period to be. As currently drafted, the Bill leaves this timescale yet again to be defined in secondary legislation. That would allow the rules to be varied at relatively short notice and without the consent of the clubs that are being regulated. This is another example of our concern at the secondary powers here and the lack of clarity for those who will feel the force of them. The attempt through this amendment is to close the gap between the expectations of the regulator and the expectations on clubs. If we expect prospective owners to inform the regulator in a timely manner of their intention to buy a regulated club, then by extension we must surely expect the regulator to respond in a timely manner.

Amendments 188 and 189, also tabled by my noble friend Lord Markham, seek to insert the word “only” into Clauses 34 and 35. That is to link up the wording used in the Explanatory Notes and in the Bill, thereby limiting the ability of the regulator to investigate incumbent owners and officers. This will guarantee that the regulator can exercise its powers under Clause 34 or 35 only if it is in possession of information that gives it cause for concern. The tightening of the language here can only benefit the Bill.

Like my noble friend Lady Evans of Bowes Park, I was concerned about the implications of Clause 34 for incumbent owners when the Bill gains Royal Assent. Noble Lords might expect me to have alighted on the case of Newcastle United. As was powerfully set out by my noble friends Lord Moynihan and Lord Evans of Rainow, fans of Newcastle would be concerned by the implications that my noble friend set out in his very powerful and eloquent speech opening the debate on this group. Again, his forensic contribution underlined the problems of uncertainty and lack of specificity in the wording used in the Bill. That is something that has troubled a lot of us across the House and, indeed, has troubled the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. I hope the Minister will respond to the specific questions he raised about what the Prime Minister might say to the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia when he is in that kingdom next month about what the Bill might mean for the fund and for Newcastle United.

If I may, I hope the Minister can answer another question, which is a timely one given the state visit that is currently under way. In 2022, our now Prime Minister, who dined with the Emir of Qatar last night—and I gather met him again today—banned his colleagues in the Labour Party from attending the football World Cup in Qatar. At the time, he said that

“the human rights record is such that I wouldn’t go, and that’ll be the position of the Labour Party”.

Given the importance of friendly relations with our partners across the Gulf and the diplomatic power of football, does the Minister still believe that was the right approach for the leader of her party to take? And if England was playing a match in Qatar tomorrow, would she go?

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Moynihan and Lord Markham, in her absence the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, and my noble friends Lady Taylor of Bolton and Lord Bassam of Brighton for the amendments in this group. It is absolutely right that clubs have suitable owners, a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Evans of Bowes Park, among others. That is why a new statutory owners’ and directors’ test is a key element of the regulatory regime.

In response to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, the current tests have proven ineffective. They result in a drawn-out process that still allows unsuitable owners into the system. We have seen numerous instances of unsuitable owners and officers causing harm to clubs and detriment to their fans—that stops now. The definitions ensure that those who are responsible for clubs can be identified and tested. They cannot hide behind complex ownership structures to avoid this, as existing tests currently allow. My noble friend Lord Mann made a strong case for strong tests, and my noble friend Lord Watson of Invergowrie added his own experience of Wimbledon.

The noble Baroness, Lady Evans of Bowes Park, asked a number of questions around the owners’ and directors’ tests. In response, I will say that football authorities can still conduct their owners’ and directors’ tests if they choose to do so, but the regulator’s test is set in statute. Any owner who fails the regulator’s tests will be removed and any prospective owner must pass the regulator’s tests before taking ownership, no matter the results of the league’s tests.

Given the importance of this issue, I welcome the opportunity to clarify the Government’s position further. I start with Amendments 27, 28, and 29 from the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan. The definition of an ultimate owner is an important part of the Bill, and we are confident that we have the right definition that achieves the Bill’s aim. The current drafting takes its lead from the precedent of other Acts that use “influence or control” together, including the Companies Act “persons with significant control” regime and the economic crime Act “beneficial owners” regime. This ensures that an individual who exerts significant influence over a club, more than that of any other owner, can still be identified as the ultimate owner, even if they do not have formal legal control.

[Lord Moynihan (Con)]

That is an exceptionally helpful and clear answer; now she has given us the Government’s view on what “significant influence” means. Why, then, do the Government not put that in the Bill, rather than simply say that at some stage in the future it will come forward under secondary legislation?

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

The Government’s view is that we do not need to put it in the Bill.

[Lord Moynihan (Con)]

It is absolutely critical to achieve the clarity that the noble Lords, Lord Mann and Lord Watson, have been talking about, and I agree with them completely. What is needed is clarity for investors. It is absolutely essential that it goes in the Bill; it is critical to the definition of ownership and to the whole regulatory framework that is being placed in a hugely lengthy enabling Bill. The clubs and owners at the EFL and the Premier League need clarity. The Minister has very kindly given the Committee clarity on the definition, as she sees it, of significant influence, so what is there to resist in terms of placing it in the legislation so football clubs can consider it in detail?

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I am happy to meet with the noble Lord and discuss this further, but in our view this is not required in the Bill but will become clear from the work of the regulator. We think this will be clear in practice.

This is also a term and a part of the Bill that was within the iteration of the Bill laid before Parliament by the previous Government, notwithstanding the noble Lord’s right to object to the Bill that his Government may have laid before Parliament.

[Lord Moynihan (Con)]

I am sorry to intervene again on that, but that is actually not correct. The one area of the Bill that is actually different from the previous Bill is the requirement on the regulator to have regard to the foreign and trade policy objectives of the Government, which is why we used the example of Newcastle. The Minister has not answered the very clear question: as chairman of the PIF, does the Crown Prince, who exercises control over the PIF, now exercise control over Newcastle, and as a result would be captured by the regulatory requirements of the Bill and not by the Premier League requirements?

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

My Lords, earlier, I said that I was not confused. I am now slightly confused, because noble Lords were very clear earlier in Committee that any issue with the legislation that might lead to UEFA objecting to it was problematic; now, the Government have removed a part of the Bill that was problematic and objected to by UEFA, that risked us being able to compete as a country in leagues within overseas competitions. So, I am slightly confused on that point, but as I said, I am happy to meet the noble Lord.

The other point is that the Companies Act guidance on this is long and complicated. In our view, it has more detail than is appropriate for the Bill, and I assume that the previous Government took the same view.

[Lord Moynihan (Con)]

Can I clarify this point once and for all? Anything—not just the clause on the Government’s foreign and trade policy objectives—that could put a stop to our entry into European competition or World Cup competition should not appear in the Bill. I have argued consistently that anything that would cause the independent bodies regulating international football—UEFA and FIFA—to stop our clubs competing in international tournaments should be resisted at all cost. UEFA intervened and said that the clause to which we were just referring was a political clause and should be removed from the Bill, and the Prime Minister immediately removed it—but the moment you remove it from the Bill, there are unintended consequences.

18:00

This is nothing to do with what I just said, but removing it from the Bill has the unintended consequence of not giving guidance to the regulator that it has to have due regard to foreign and trade policy objectives—that is now removed from the Bill—but allowing it to focus exclusively on the significant issue of influence. I simply put the point that the regulator therefore has no protection. Given that the regulator has to deem on influence, does the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, who has influence as chair of the PIF, which owns Newcastle, fall within the context of the regulation that this Government are putting before the House without the clause that was previously in the Bill? The answer is yes.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

We cannot pre-empt or direct the regulator, which will make objective decisions on a case-by-case basis. However, I repeat that I am very happy to sit down with the noble Lord to discuss and go through the unintended consequences that he appears to be concerned about. I will move on.

I turn to Amendment 30 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Markham. When a club applies for a provisional licence, it has to submit a personnel statement setting out its owners, ultimate owners, officers and senior managers. The regulator will then approve the personnel statement, subject to any modifications, once it is satisfied that it is accurate. The club must then publish it, and this must be updated on an ongoing basis to ensure that it stays accurate. This, therefore, already provides clarity to the club, owners and fans as to who the owners, ultimate owners, officers and senior managers are.

A core part of ensuring that clubs have suitable owners and directors is the fitness test, which Amendment 177 seeks to expand. Let me be clear: the individual fitness test criteria for owners—honesty and integrity, and financial soundness—have been carefully designed. They are based on precedent and are specifically relevant to whether someone is suitable to be an owner of a football club. This amendment seeks for an owner’s competence to be assessed too. We do not believe that this would be relevant in the regulator’s assessment of someone’s fitness to be solely an owner. Some owners are hands off, and so their competence is not strictly relevant. If an owner also meets the definition of an officer, the regulator will be able to test them as both an officer and an owner. Therefore, as an officer, their competence would be assessed. However, an owner simply having a financial interest in the club does not mean that they make decisions that an officer would about how it is run on a day-to-day basis.

I turn to Amendments 181 and 183 in the name of my noble friend Lady Taylor of Bolton on the information that must be provided as part of a prospective owner’s application. I agree with the intention of the amendments —that the regulator will need information about an individual’s fitness in order to make an assessment—which is why Clause 28(2) already does that. It gives the regulator the ability to require information from an individual about their fitness. In fact, the Bill goes even further: it recognises that information about an individual’s fitness may come from, or be corroborated by, another source. That is why the Bill establishes information-sharing gateways with organisations such as the National Crime Agency. Specifically on Amendment 183, there is a risk that this amendment incentivises applicants to submit large volumes of unrequested information to the regulator, which could make it more difficult for the regulator to process applications efficiently.

The Government recognise and support the intent behind Amendments 182 and 184 in the name of my noble friend Lord Bassam of Brighton: to ensure that football continues to be played in a club’s home ground and that owners are committed to this. However, in many instances, neither clubs nor club owners own their home grounds. This amendment would therefore place a requirement on prospective owners to commit to something that may not be in their control. The Bill already has a number of comprehensive home ground protections to safeguard against inappropriate sales or ill thought-out relocations, including duties on the club itself about selling the club’s home ground or relocating from it—an issue that my noble friend highlighted effectively today. Under the current proposals in the Bill, the regulator can hold senior managers to account if they are responsible for breaching these duties.

Amendment 186 from the noble Lord, Lord Markham, and Amendment 187 from my noble friends Lord Bassam of Brighton and Lady Taylor of Bolton concern the timelines and deadlines for testing prospective owners and officers. I absolutely agree and understand that timely decision-making about the suitability of new owners and officers is highly important. Without deadlines, we have seen league determinations drag on, unable to reach a decision and leaving clubs in limbo. We believe it is important that the regulator has the time to conduct tests with an appropriate level of scrutiny, but it also needs to make decisions in an appropriate time- frame to ensure that clubs are not unnecessarily impacted in what is a fast-paced industry—I think all noble Lords can agree on that. That is why the regulator will be bound by a statutory timeframe, as well as by its objectives, general duties and regulatory principles.

We are confident that, with these existing provisions, the regulator will already conduct tests as quickly as reasonably practicable. However, putting a specific deadline in the Bill would restrict the flexibility for this deadline to be amended in future. That is why we have proposed that the determination period, including the maximum amount of time by which it can be extended, will be set by the Secretary of State in secondary legislation. This will ensure that the regulator is bound by it but that there is still flexibility for the deadline to be amended in future. I hope noble Lords agree that future-proofing is a key consideration for this and any other legislation.

In the spirit of the debate, although the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, is not in her place, I will speak briefly to Amendments 187A and 187B in her name. They concern whistleblowing on the suitability of an owner or officer, as the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, highlighted. I share the noble Baroness’s desire to ensure that concerned parties can blow the whistle on unsuitable owners or officers. However, I assure noble Lords that there is no need to amend the Bill to allow this. It is already open to anyone, including all those listed in Amendment 187A, to share relevant information with the regulator. Therefore, we do not see the need to create a separate obligation in the Bill for individuals to report information to the regulator.

The noble Baroness, Lady Evans of Bowes Park, raised a number of pertinent issues covered by the subjects raised in Amendments 188 and 189 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Markham. They seek to ensure that the regulator can test an incumbent owner or officer on their fitness only if it is in possession of information that gives it concern about whether the individual would meet the applicable fitness criteria. The Government very much agree with the intent behind these amendments, so I would like to reassure the noble Lord that the intent of these amendments is already delivered in the current drafting of the Bill. Clauses 34(1) and 35(1) give the regulator the powers to test incumbent owners or officers on their fitness if the regulator

“is in possession of information that gives it grounds for concern about whether the individual meets those criteria”.

If the regulator is not in possession of such information, it will not be able to test an incumbent owner or officer. The definition of an incumbent is clearly set out in Clauses 34(3) and 35(2). For the reasons I have set out, I will be grateful if the noble Lords do not press their amendments.

[Baroness Evans of Bowes Park (Con)]

I am very grateful for the Minister’s very clear answer on the Premier League and the regulator’s suitability test clashing. She said that the regulator is statutory and therefore would override the Premier League saying that it wanted someone the IFR did not. It may be a very unusual situation, but does it therefore follow that, if the Premier League decides through its test that an owner is unsuitable but the IFR decides that they are, the IFR can, in effect, impose an owner on a club? The Minister answered half of my question, and I am very interested to hear about the other half. If she cannot answer now, can she write to me?

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

No, it cannot.

[Lord Hayward (Con)]

Before the Minister sits down, perhaps I could make a comment. The Minister has been very helpful in offering meetings to discuss a whole range of issues that arise, which we greatly appreciate, and to write beforehand. On one thing which she touched on—I will obviously have to read Hansard very carefully to check, because she moved on fairly quickly—was why companies legislation was not acceptable for the Bill. I just register that I would like when we meet to discuss this more fully. She referred to Companies Act legislation being very lengthy, but I am not clear on why, if it is acceptable in general Companies Act legislation, it is not acceptable here. We can discuss that, but I just wanted to register it at this point so that when we meet, it is a subject for conversation.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I am happy to go into more detail on that point when I meet the noble Lord and I will ask my officials to contact him to set up a meeting.

[Lord Moynihan (Con)]

I thank everybody who has participated on this set of amendments. I heard a somewhat surprising answer from the Minister just now and I hope that it might be clarified. My noble friend Lady Evans put the question to the Committee as to which regulator takes precedence. My clear understanding of this Bill is that, through the licence procedure, the regulator we are setting up will take precedence over anything that the Premier League may choose to do. Indeed, that would be part of the contract of the licence issued by the proposed regulator, and that would take priority over, for example, the suitability and fitness tests, the degree of political interference or whatever the league might wish to do on the licensing of a club. However, I heard the Minister perhaps giving a somewhat different answer and, again, I would be grateful for clarification. A meeting is gratefully accepted and I look forward to meeting with the Minister, but, more importantly, these specific points need to be covered in writing to all members of the Committee, because I think there is wider interest than among just those whom she has kindly and graciously offered to meet.

I am sorry she did not respond to my noble friend Lord Parkinson’s question about Qatar. For the record, I am a great believer that sport is a catalyst for change. You know, when you win the right to host the World Cup, that you are shining a torch into the inner recesses of that country, which few other opportunities do. It means the world’s press and the football fans of the world are very conscious of what is happening in your country.

There is no doubt that hosting the World Cup in Qatar had significant influence on important social and employment changes that took place in that country. The fact that the ILO had an office there, worked there beforehand with the Government, was pushing for changes and continues to be there, is a great example. It is the only country in the Middle East that has that office. It is a great example of the power of sport for good and the power of sport for change. So I am sorry the Minister did not respond to that point, because I think it is an exceptionally important one.

I regret to say that I have not been persuaded by the Minister’s defence of retaining influence on the face of the legislation and yet not defining it, saying that it is for secondary legislation. It is one of many, many things that are for secondary legislation. For example, once the regulator identifies the owners and ultimate owners at the stage of the licence application, the regulator can, as the Minister said, make use of its powers under Clause 34 to determine the suitability of those owners. That includes whether the owner meets the individual fitness criteria and whether they have a source of wealth connected to serious criminal conduct. Serious criminal conduct is an extremely important concept that needs defining. If we look further towards the back of the Bill, it comes under “minor definitions” and will be for the Secretary of State to come forward with secondary legislation to define what he means by serious criminal conduct.

18:15

This Bill, I regret to say, is riddled with contradictory comments, huge regulation and a requirement to come back all the time with secondary legislation. I agree with the noble Lords, Lord Mann and Lord Watson, who have said many times, “Let’s have clarity”. We need clarity; football needs clarity; this Committee needs clarity. The wide potential interpretation of influence, rather than control, should really be a worry if we want to encourage owners to come in at all levels of football and make sure that they enhance the national game and increase the value of the Premier League, through which flows all the benefits down through the rest of the professional leagues. We do not even know which leagues we are talking about in the Bill. It is a huge pity—and I say that with a heavy heart, because I am in favour of many of the issues that come up later, not least some of those that come forward in amendments from the Labour Benches, because I think that they focus on the fans—and the fan side of this I do not have a problem with.

I really wrestle with the financial regulation set out in the 140-odd pages of this Bill, because I do not think it is clear, it is exceptionally onerous, it would deter investment and it requires clarity in the Bill. In my view, this set of amendments is about the most important that we will consider because, if we do not take this away and think carefully before Report about how we can improve this set of amendments and this part of the Bill to get greater clarity, we risk disincentivising owners in future—and if we do that, it is football that is damaged and, ultimately, the fans who will not forgive Parliament for the way it has gone about this regulatory framework. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 27 withdrawn.

Amendments 28 to 30 not moved.

Clause 3 agreed.

Schedule 1 agreed.

Clause 4: Meanings of “officer” and “senior manager” etc

Amendment 31

Moved by

[Lord Markham]

31: Clause 4, page 4, line 37, at end insert—
“(5A) The IFR must give a notice to all persons it considers to be an officer of a club for the purposes of this section informing them that they are considered as officers under this section.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Regulator to inform every individual that it considers an officer of a club.

[Lord Markham (Con)]

This looks at the tests around the officers and I start by saying that we are all united in the Chamber in wanting good management in place, so the officer tests involved here, I think we would all agree, are well intentioned, because it all comes down to good managers. However, at the same time, I think we are quite aware that a lot of the things we are talking about here are beyond the directors and Companies Act tests that are in place. We are extending to a new category of officer, or senior manager, and we are putting new responsibilities on them. The amendment tries to be quite simple. First, the Bill is not clear who an officer is. It talks about having one or more club affairs that they are responsible for. So, first, we are trying to get clarity by letting those people know who they are.

That is important because we are talking about having some pretty serious and quite intrusive checks on them. Again, those are well intentioned—there are amendments coming up later in Committee where we will go into what those checks should be—but they are quite intrusive; they are looking at your criminal record and whether you have been involved in any court or tribunal. Maybe they are all very good tests, but I think people should be aware of them, because they might not be certain that they are actually an officer of a club. So, again, this is making sure that they are aware of it before they take something on.

Thirdly, and probably most importantly, not only are we giving them director-style responsibilities but we are potentially putting even wider-reaching penalties on them, of 10% of club revenue or £75,000, which many people would say is quite a deterrent. I am not talking about the big clubs. A lot of this refers to clubs that are pretty small, maybe run by a handful of people and for which a £75,000 penalty is pretty big. At the very least, they need to be aware that they are taking on those sorts of responsibilities and that should be outlined. That is what Amendment 31 tries to do.

Regarding Amendment 179, again, we talk about one of the tests being financial soundness. I think that we would all agree that, around an owner, that is right in terms of their financial soundness. I would like an officer or senior manager of a club to be financially sound too, just for their own good sake, but that does not necessarily make them a good or bad manager. They are not personally putting money into that club. Therefore, whether or not they have run up a lot of debts is not relevant to their ability to carry out the duties that we would want them to undertake.

Many of the 116 clubs are quite a bit smaller and often depend on people working on a voluntary basis. Those people suddenly having all their finances investigated and it being determined whether they are deemed sound or not, when we are not asking them necessarily to contribute any money to those clubs, is not proportionate. It might deter people who could probably be very helpful in the running of that club. I beg to move.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Markham, for these amendments. I agree that it is important for transparency and accountability to fans and officers that it is clear who a club’s officers and senior managers are. That is why this is already an integral part of the Bill. When a club applies for a provisional licence, it must submit a personnel statement. In that personnel statement, the club must set out its officers and senior managers, which the regulator will approve once it is satisfied that it is accurate. The club must then publish it and keep it updated. Therefore, this already provides clarity to clubs, officers and fans as to who has a role in the running of their club.

On Amendment 179, it is essential that clubs have suitable officers. The regulator has a key role to play in this. It is officers who exercise a significant level of direct control over the day-to-day operations of the club. These can include financial decision-making. That is why it is vital that the regulator ensures that these decision-makers are financially sound. It includes assessing the personal finances of anybody where they have held a position of responsibility. This will help to identify any concerns or irregularities that would impact on their ability to act as a suitable custodian of a football club. For example, I am sure that noble Lords will agree that if a club’s chief financial officer has bankrupted companies in the past, that is a relevant fact for the regulator to consider. Ultimately, these tests should help to prevent fans suffering the consequences of poor leadership and financial mismanagement, as has often been the case to date.

I hope that such clarity gives reassurance to noble Lords on these points. For the reasons I have set out, I would be grateful if the noble Lord did not press his amendments.

[Lord Markham (Con)]

I thank the Minister for her replies. While we understand financial soundness in the context of a chief financial officer, in terms of the senior managers, as referred to in the Bill, we are talking about non-financial duties. I think that most people who run a club would say that the chief operating officer or the person responsible for the actual operations of the ground on the day is a key person. I am sure that they would be drawn into this definition and so would have all their finances investigated. Do not get me wrong: we want people as far as possible to be in a financially good position but, as I mentioned before, their personal finances are not necessarily relevant to whether they can be a good operating officer who can run the club very well on match days, with all the decisions involved with that. My fear is that we will deter people who are sometimes the backbone of the running of a lot of the smaller clubs from wanting to take on that sort of role because they know such intrusion will take place.

Those are the things that I am talking about. I absolutely get it when it is a financial director—the Companies Act and directors’ responsibilities cover that for finance directors. People who are not finance directors but who may be very involved in the operations are where the concern lies. I hope that we can cover this in more detail later on, but at this point I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 31 withdrawn.

Clause 4 agreed.

Clause 5 agreed.

Schedule 2: The Independent Football Regulator

Amendment 32 not moved.

Amendment 33

Tabled by

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton]

33: Schedule 2, page 85, line 23, leave out “chair” and insert “Board”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is a consequential amendment following on from the above

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

I do not wish to move the amendment.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

I think anyone in Committee anyone can move an amendment, so I am very happy to move Amendment 33. I am curious as to why the noble Baroness has not moved it and perhaps she can set out why, as it is a sensible one and I was intending to speak in support of it.

Amendments 32 and 33 sought to ensure that the chief executive of the new independent football regulator could be appointed by the whole board and not just by the chairman of the board. That would seem a sensible improvement in terms of collective decision-making and an additional safety valve to ensure that the appointment of the chief executive was not a politicised move. I know that a number of noble Lords have significant board experience and may have views on the merits of this.

I was also keen to come in because the amendment allows us to ask the Minister for an update on the appointments, because we are scrutinising this Bill not knowing who the chairman of the new regulator will be or the board. I understand that the deciding panel met to sift applications for the non-executive roles on Monday—I do not know whether she can confirm that—and that people who have applied have been asked to hold the 17, 19 and 20 December for interviews. Can she say now or in writing whether that is still the timetable on which the Government are operating? That would be helpful, because when we took the Online Safety Bill through, we knew who held the regulatory roles at Ofcom and could have some dialogue with them. Anything more that the Minister can say, now or in writing, about the timetable by which these important figures are appointed might aid the discussions that we are able to have in parallel to the scrutiny of the Bill about the people who will be taking forward these important roles.

I beg to move Amendment 33, so that the noble Baroness can have time to respond. I do not know whether the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, wanted to say why she was no longer in favour.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, for the opportunity to respond to the amendment. The Government recognise the intent behind it, which is to ensure that the decision on the appointment of the chief executive of the regulator has the appropriate input and scrutiny. I reassure my noble friends and others that the Bill already suitably achieves this.

As per paragraph 5 of Schedule 2, the chair must consult the other non-executive members of the board, as well as the Secretary of State, before appointing the chief executive. The chief executive will have the responsibility of appointing a portion of the board—namely, the executive members. For this reason, I am sure noble Lords can see that it would be circular and impractical for the entire board to collectively appoint the chief executive.

I am happy to discuss this at greater length but I hope this reassures the noble Lord. I would therefore be grateful if he could withdraw the amendment.

18:30

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

Is the Minister able to say any more on the timing of appointments? If not, I would be very happy for her to write. The processes to appoint the chairman and the board members began before the election. As I understand it, that process has continued but the Government extended the window of applications for people applying to be the chairman. That closed. I believe the sift took place on Monday, and people are being asked to hold dates next week and beyond for interview. Is the intention to try to make an announcement while the Bill is before your Lordships? Might we know who the new chairman and board members are, or has the timeline slipped?

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

Whether we get the result while your Lordships are debating the Bill is a moot point, given the length of time we are taking to get through Committee. The noble Lord is correct, though: the timetable for the interviews is the same, and they are intended to take place on 17, 19 and 20 December.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

In which case, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 33 withdrawn.

Amendment 34

Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton]

34: Schedule 2, page 85, line 27, leave out from “unless” to end of line 28 and insert “they do not have a conflict of interest.”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment creates an objective test for whether a proposed IFR director has a conflict of interest, rather than leaving it for the person appointing that director to determine whether the director being appointed has a conflict of interest.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

My Lords, this amendment tries to probe what might happen and what protections there may be in cases of conflicts of interest in respect of members of either the board or the expert panel. My noble friend Lord Bassam and I have tried to be somewhat specific in our amendments about where conflicts of interest might apply. We have talked about consultants and organisations that might derive half of their income from one of the organisations that might be involved in a competition.

I hope that that can lead the Minister to talk about some of the difficulties that might arise if we do not get the right people in these positions working with the regulator. It is extremely important that anybody in this capacity is independent. We do not expect them not to have any interest in football but we do expect them not to have any financial interest that might at some stage create a conflict. If anybody is employed by a club or an organisation that is dependent on money from one of the leagues then difficulties could arise. Given the framework that has been established, which could be very robust and could help the regulator very clearly, we need to make sure that there are not conflicts of interest that could cut across this new regime.

[Lord Addington (LD)]

My Lords, these amendments seem quite reasonable. It would be interesting to see whether conflicts of interest at this level are addressed. I hope the Minister has a nice succinct answer that means we can all go away and move on to the next group. Having said that, I shall sit down and allow her to give it.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, again, there is good sense behind the amendments that the noble Lord and the noble Baroness have tabled in this group. They address a critical issue about ensuring transparency and fairness in the governance of our beloved game.

Amendment 34 seeks to introduce an objective test to determine whether a proposed director of the new independent football regulator has a conflict of interest. Under the previous framework, the decision was left in the hands of the appointing party, leaving the process vulnerable to subjective interpretations and, potentially, political interference or favouritism, which I am sure we all want to strive to avoid. By introducing an objective test, the amendment would remove that ambiguity and ensure that potential directors are rigorously vetted before they take office. That is an important suggestion that would uphold the values of fairness and accountability in football.

Amendment 35 would take that further by requiring all directors of the independent football regulator to not only undergo this rigorous vetting but publicly declare any potential conflicts of interest. This would be a vital step in increasing transparency and holding accountable those who wield the new powers the Bill brings about. We on these Benches all agree that the integrity of the sport must be upheld through adherence to ethical standards and think that the amendments are an important step in that direction. The chief executive officer of the independent football regulator will be given the task of maintaining a register of these declared interests, ensuring full transparency and accountability in football governance.

Similarly, Amendments 43 and 44 would extend this principle to members of the expert panel, ensuring that they too declare their interests. Again, the independent football regulator’s chief executive will be responsible for maintaining a register of interest for the expert panel, providing an additional layer of transparency. By implementing these measures, we would reinforce the importance of ethical conduct and accountability across the regulator’s board and its expert panel, both of which will be key to the fair and transparent governance of football under the new regulatory regime.

Finally, Amendment 331, which would expand the nature and definition of a conflict to include a situation where the perception of a conflict may arise, also has some merit. Perception is often just as important as reality in maintaining trust. By introducing non-exhaustive examples, the amendment would ensure that we address conflicts of interest in a comprehensive and forward-thinking manner.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness and the noble Lord for tabling the amendments, which represent a robust and progressive framework for managing conflicts of interest in the governance of the sport. They would introduce clear, objective tests, require declarations of interest and ensure transparency through the form of the public registers, all of which are important. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I thank my noble friends Lord Bassam of Brighton and Lady Taylor of Bolton for tabling these amendments. The Government acknowledge the intent behind them, which is to fortify the Bill’s provisions for dealing with conflicts of interest. It is essential that the regulator can deliver its regime, free from undue influence and vested interests.

I reassure my noble friends that the Bill already sufficiently makes certain that the regulator will be free from conflicts of interest. This is supported by public law principles and non-legislative measures that are already in place. As with all public bodies, members of the regulator’s board will be subject to the Cabinet Office’s code of conduct for board members of public bodies, which sets out clear requirements regarding the appropriate disclosure and management of conflicts of interest. It includes a responsibility on board members to openly and honestly declare any interests that could give rise to actual or perceived conflicts. Any breach of these requirements would be a breach of the member’s terms of appointment.

The Bill also places an additional onus on the appointer to check for conflicts that have not otherwise been declared, both at the point of making the appointment and on an ongoing basis from time to time. In addition, paragraph 16 of Schedule 2 requires members of the board to declare their interests in any matters which fall for consideration by the board, and for this declaration to be recorded.

On Amendment 331 in the name of my noble friend Lord Bassam, the Government are confident that the existing definition of conflict of interest is appropriate and will capture the correct issues. The expansion of the definition proposed by my noble friend would also see perceived conflicts explicitly forbidden. We believe this is disproportionate and goes beyond the normal interpretation of conflict of interest. For example, almost all noble Lords here support a football club. In an extreme interpretation, that alone could be a perceived conflict. All in all, we are confident that the Bill, supplemented by public law principles and non-legislative measures already in place, provides comprehensive safeguards to identify and manage conflicts of interest appropriately. For these reasons, I am unable to accept my noble friends’ amendments and ask my noble friend to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Minister for emphasising that the potential for a conflict of interest is there and potentially quite significant. I accept that we all have an interest. If an interest in football was a perceived conflict then we would all be in great difficulty, but I think it is important to emphasise that we are talking about potential financial conflicts of interest. I am grateful to the Minister for putting that on the record. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 34 withdrawn.

Amendment 35 not moved.

Amendment 36

Moved by

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay]

36: Schedule 2, page 85, line 37, at end insert—
“6A No person may be appointed to the Board if that person currently has any broadcast or media interests or any role in a television or media broadcast which relates to football.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment prohibits any person who currently has any interests or roles in a television or media broadcast that relates to football from being appointed to the Board.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, I will also speak to my Amendment 40. This flows from the discussion we have just had about financial conflicts of interest but looks at the broader issues of a person who has a current broadcast or media interest, or any role in a television or media broadcast relating to football, being appointed to the board of the independent football regulator. It seeks to prevent conflicts of interest relating to those who take part in television, radio and podcasts that are linked to football.

The concern here is that any person with that sort of involvement in such media or broadcasts would have, by the very way that they carry it out, publicly held opinions about the game that they would be expressing frequently and sometimes in a live environment where questions could be put to them. We would not want to see people with vested interests that might conflict with the proportionate and reasonable exercise of the regulator’s functions put in a position where their thinking about how they carry out their duty is scrutinised in that forum and in that way.

As my noble friend Lord Markham pointed out on a previous group, this is a new regulator that will have enormous power to determine the specifics of the rules and regulations that football clubs will have to abide by. That includes the levy rules set out in Clause 53, which states that the amount the regulator will be able to charge clubs is to be determined in rules established by the regulator. Again, the details are not set out in the Bill but are to follow. There are some limits on what that levy could be, but the exact amount that will be charged and how that levy will be scaled to take account of the different financial situations of clubs are to be established and amended by the future board of the new regulator.

So the level of intrusion into the affairs of clubs is not entirely settled by this Bill. It will be decided by the people who are appointed to run and oversee this regulator. That is why we will be interested to know who these people are in due course. We wish all those who have applied to take on these important roles good luck in their efforts to be the inaugural holders of their posts. However, it is very clear that the board and, specifically, its chief executive will in very large part set the direction of the regulator, its tone and the means by which it goes about its work.

That is why it is important that we make sure that nobody can be appointed to the board, particularly in the first cohort, who has any conflicts of interest or who might be swayed once in office. Of course, in doing that we do not want to preclude anybody who has experience of the operation of football clubs or great knowledge of the game being appointed to the board. Those sorts of skill sets will clearly be needed. If we have people who have been involved in the running of football clubs, they may be quite powerful and important people to speak out against excessive regulation and mission creep. I hope that through this amendment we can have a debate about the public-facing elements of their role and the way they go about it.

18:45

Amendment 40 seeks to limit the remuneration that can be given to members of the board. As currently drafted, the Bill does not place any limit on this. It simply states that the Secretary of State will decide the remuneration of the non-executive members and that the pay of employees, including the executive members of the regulator’s new board, will be decided by the non-executive members. It is important that we try to curb spending to begin with and put some limit on the threshold. I have chosen in Amendment 40 to set it at £172,153 per annum, which might seem a curious number but I believe it is the current salary of the Prime Minister, who I am sure the noble Baroness thinks is doing an excellent job and is great value for money. I would be interested whether she thinks that employees and board members of this new regulator ought to be paid more than him in carrying out this duty, or whether she shares my concerns about the currently unlimited amount that they could be paid under the Bill. I beg to move.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

I am not sure the noble Lord has made his case for why somebody who has an interest or a role in television should not be a member of the board. I am sure that there are commentators who may say things from time to time with which the noble Lord may disagree, but that is irrelevant. We are talking about people who have a degree of expertise about the game, and I cannot see why somebody whose job it is to comment on the game of football cannot have a role in this.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

I am happy to say a bit more. This is a probing amendment, and I am keen to hear the views of others. My concern is about how public facing a figure this new regulator is to be. I am mindful of comparisons with debates on legislation that I have taken through. We benefited in the scrutiny of the work of Ofcom and the new online safety regulatory regime from having the noble Lord, Lord Grade of Yarmouth, here in your Lordships’ House. He attended and sat through all our debates in Committee and on Report but did not speak because he felt that it was important that he heard the views of Parliament but did not actively participate in the debate about the regulatory regime that Ofcom would be following once Parliament had given it its instructions. The self-denying ordinance that he applied and the rules of debate in your Lordships’ House made it easier for him than it might have been had he been a commentator on television or frequently appearing on television and in media interviews and being asked about the work.

I am sure we want to see the regulator held accountable publicly as well as to Parliament, and I look forward to our debates on later groups about how we ensure greater accountability to Parliament for the work that it does. I am sure that fans will have strong views about the work of the regulator, just as they do about how referees conduct their duties during matches. However, I wonder whether somebody who is taking on this role, potentially one with a large and unlimited salary, should be combining that with ongoing media interests in which they have a commercial interest in adding to the drama and to public debate about the game. I will be grateful for the Committee’s views on that matter.

[Lord Berkeley of Knighton (CB)]

I imagine that this could be a rather tricky area, for the reasons we have just heard. I can see that someone who has great expertise —an ex-international, for example—would be useful on a board and may be asked occasionally to comment, which would not mean a great deal of compensation or money. I am sure the noble Lord does not want to see those sorts of people excluded.

[Lord Addington (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 36 seems to be taking a sledgehammer to a nut. If you have some expertise and you are commentating, you may well be qualified to be in that role. There is a balance to be struck here. The Minister might ask, “What would be an unacceptable position within the media that would exclude you from this role?” If you are a senior executive with Sky, in the current situation, that would exclude you, but what if you happen to be a commentator, say, for a local paper dealing with your own local team, and possibly going on further? Would that exclude you? I would be interested to know if the Minister or the Government have an opinion on this, because there is clearly a balance here, as the noble Lord has just pointed out.

[Lord Markham (Con)]

This is exactly why we want to have these sorts of debates in Committee. Funnily enough, I put my name to this amendment. As noble Lords know, when I talk about media interests, I do so as a former director of a pay TV company. I was thinking about media interests less in relation to broadcasting and more that—the noble Lord, Lord Birt, will know this—when you are making sports media rights bids, all information is good information. You would then be party to a lot of privileged, and maybe even inside, information.

I agree that there is a balance to be struck, because these are exactly the sort of people you want involved in the regulator as well; but if they have a current role that involves them bidding for media sports rights, that would probably rule them offside—if you will excuse the pun. Again, that is exactly why we bring issues such as this to Committee to discuss.

[Lord Birt (CB)]

There is a potential conflict on both sides. There are many different roles in media but obviously, it is a single role that might be filled here. I would feel very uncomfortable if someone were sitting in both camps, were I to be in the decision-making capacity ever again in a broadcast organisation.

[Lord Londesborough (CB)]

My Lords, I shall address Amendment 40 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Parkinson and Lord Markham.

Before I do, I have remained silent for the last few days, taking in what has been said. I have a problem with Amendment 40, which I will come on to in a moment, but I want to reflect on the role of the regulator and the CEO. We are now on day three in Committee. It is important that both sides—I am trying, as a Cross-Bencher, to act as an honest broker—work productively and do not lose sight of what the majority of us want, which is to establish a new regulator with a clearly defined remit that does not stray into areas of overregulation or overreach.

That is not to say that issues such as environmental sustainability, CSR, women’s football or player welfare are not important; they are, but if we do not focus tightly on the core responsibilities of the regulator, I fear we are going to end up with a very complicated Bill that lacks pragmatism and leaves the regulator, whose salary I will come on to in a moment, in a pretty unworkable and unpopular role, at increasing expense to the football clubs in terms of the licence fees. I am thinking here particularly of the clubs in tiers 3, 4 and 5.

I would like to bring back a bit of financial perspective to this debate. Remember, financial sustainability is really what brought us here. Yes, there is fans’ engagement, but we have rather lost sight of that. The Premier League is the richest and most-watched league in the world, a fantastic creator of jobs and a multibillion-pound generator of exports. However, we have warning lights flashing on our dashboard that we ignore at our peril.

Total debt across the Premier League is fast approaching £4 billion—not the £2 billion that one of your Lordships mentioned on Monday—and that figure comes from the University of Liverpool. Losses across the Premier League are running at close to £1 billion per annum, per season. As we have heard, typically, 16 to 17 of its clubs generate losses, while in the Championship 80% of clubs have negative equity, and not one of those clubs generates an operating profit outside of player trading.

Having said that, I appreciate that we need to strike a balance and not interfere unnecessarily. I have listened carefully, this week and last week, to the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, among others, when she spoke about the danger of overreach and the need to be careful that we do not kill off the ambition, aspiration and calculated risk-taking of clubs—in other words, that we do not kill off the excitement and jeopardy of the game, which of course involves financial risk. That is a really important point.

Taking that into consideration, we need to be disciplined and define the parameters of the IFR with an eye on realism, pragmatism and effectiveness. The Bill runs to 120 pages, with 99 pages of Explanatory Notes. We have 340 amendments, which, thankfully, are reducing—and I think we are still on page 4. That is not a great advert for productivity.

Anyway, that is enough background from me. I return to Amendment 40. We are going to need a CEO of the highest calibre for the regulator, and that CEO is going to have to show great leadership skills and profound and relevant domain experience. Capping his or her salary at £172,000 per annum will simply make the recruitment of a high-calibre CEO that much more difficult. I appreciate that we need to control costs, but that is not the area in which to do it.

[Lord Hayward (Con)]

I echo the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Birt, about a conflict of interest. I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Addington: making small or one-off contributions because you have been asked to, given that you hold that particular role, is very different from having a specific and clear role in the media. There would be a conflict of interest if you held both positions and were contributing on a regular basis. I cannot see that it would be perceived by the average fan as acceptable to have someone who held both positions.

My noble friend Lord Parkinson has included in his amendment the word “currently”. I assume that he would accept someone giving up one role specifically to take up another—I think that is what he is referring to—but I certainly take the view that any substantial media interest would be utterly unacceptable for someone in these circumstances. Millions of football fans would take the view that they were pro a particular point of view at any given point.

I share the view of the noble Lord, Lord Londesborough, on salaries, particularly because it is always dangerous to put a salary in legislation. What happens if you have inflation? First, you have to change the primary legislation, and there is no indication of inflation adjustment in the amendment.

Those are small observations, but I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Birt, and the direction of my noble friend Lord Parkinson’s amendment—that there should not be a prima facie case of conflict of interest in these circumstances.

19:00

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, for tabling these amendments and thank all noble Lords who have contributed to what I thought was a very thoughtful discussion. As with the previous discussion on this matter, the Government would like to reassure noble Lords that the Bill already sufficiently makes certain that the regulator will be free from conflicts of interest, irrespective of sector. This is supported by public law principles and non-legislative measures already in place. As I said previously, the Bill requires members of the board to declare their interests, and this declaration is to be recorded.

Taking Amendment 36 first, we are confident that there are comprehensive safeguards to root out and manage conflicts of interest appropriately. For example, a board member would not be permitted to take part in any discussion relating to a matter if they had a significant direct or indirect interest in it. Failure to declare an interest would also be a breach of the board member’s terms of appointment. In response to noble Lords who asked me for a definitive view, my view is that beyond these comprehensive existing provisions we do not think it is necessary or appropriate arbitrarily to rule out specific sectors or sector interests such as television, broadcast or media.

On Amendment 40, we acknowledge the importance of the regulator offering value for money. It will be required to lay its annual accounts before Parliament and the Comptroller and Auditor-General for scrutiny. The regulator will also be subject to pay remit guidance in the same way central government departments are to ensure pay rises are justifiable. This will ensure value for money for taxpayers. However, having a maximum salary in legislation risks the regulator being unable to attract the right talent, potentially leaving it without the skills and expertise it needs to deliver its objectives—a point the noble Lord, Lord Londesborough, made very succinctly. We agree with the point around the need to control costs. A fixed salary in legislation is also inflexible to inflation and market changes, and it could become rapidly outdated, as the noble Lord, Lord Hayward, pointed out. For these reasons, I am unable to accept the noble Lord’s amendments and ask that he withdraw or not press them.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for that response and to noble Lords who took part in the debate. This is a strength of the Committee stage—I can see the furrowed brows with the opinions being weighed up and I am grateful to noble Lords who have engaged with the probing amendment I tabled in this way. I hope, if nothing else, it has been useful to the Secretary of State who, as we know from the Minister’s responses in the previous group, is soon to make her decision about who ought to chair this new regulator and who should be on the board. I hope that the points that noble Lords across the Committee have made will be taken back and inform her deliberations.

I take on board what the noble Baroness said and indeed the point that the noble Lord, Lord Londesborough, raised about the need to make sure we are paying enough to attract the calibre of person that is going to rise to the task ahead of them. On pay and salary, I am grateful as well to the Minister for what she said and was struck particularly by what she said about pay restraint. I know from my ministerial experience that, when public bodies want to push for pay rises above what would be normal in the private sector or across the economy more generally, then that comes to Ministers. If there is that sort of oversight and check and balance in the system to ensure that the regulator’s salary costs are not spiralling as quickly as we feared, then that would be a good thing. With gratitude to the Minister and to all who took part, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 36 withdrawn.

Amendment 37

Moved by

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay]

37: Schedule 2, page 85, line 37, at end insert—
“6A “(1) Any person appointed to the Board must agree to appear before any relevant Parliamentary Committee.(2) A relevant Parliamentary Committee is any Committee of the House of Commons, or House of Lords, or of both Houses, which has notified the Secretary of State, in writing, that they have assumed the function of scrutiny of football regulation.(3) Any person appointed to the Board may not take their position unless they have been approved by a resolution of each relevant Parliamentary Committee.”

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, as well as moving my Amendment 37, I will speak to my further amendments in this group, Amendments 38 and 123. In the letter which she kindly sent to the Committee earlier today, the Minister displayed her familiarity with and affinity for Erskine May and, even if I did not have unbridled delight as to the contents of the letter, I was pleased to see this reference to one of our great constitutional experts and authorities on legislative procedure.

In that spirit, I would like to quote another revered expert on constitution matters, the great AV Dicey, who expounded that:

“The principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty means neither more nor less than this, namely, that Parliament … has, under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament”.


In more recent times, the Constitution Unit at University College London has set out particularly relevant arguments for the importance of parliamentary accountability. In its 2023 briefing Parliamentary Scrutiny: What is it and why does it matter? the unit rightly said that:

“Government accountability to parliament is central to our democratic system”.


I think this all demonstrates that the right of Parliament to oversee and hold public bodies to account must be upheld dearly as well.

This new regulator, which we are bringing about through this Bill, will at the start of its existence have recourse to public funds. It is crucial that any body which has funding streams derived from the taxpayer at any point should be accountable to and scrutinised by Parliament. That is what Amendment 123 requires.

Amendment 37 seeks to ensure that any person who is appointed to the board of the regulator must be approved by a parliamentary committee, and Amendment 38 requires the chief executive to appear before a parliamentary committee at least once a year if they have been so invited. This ensures that anyone who is going to be holding any formal position in this new regulator can be scrutinised by parliamentarians before they can be appointed.

Following on from the debates in the two groups that we have just had about conflicts of interest, it may be that rather than setting it out in the Bill, as the probing amendments sought to do, the parliamentary oversight that we could bring about this way might be able to give us the reassurances we seek that the people who are given these awesome new responsibilities are doing so without conflicts of interest or the pressures on them that we wish to resist. I beg to move.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I support this group of amendments, which I think are very helpful because they will help to tease out one of the real challenges at the heart of this Bill—how to achieve the right balance of proper oversight with the absolute necessity of delivering regulatory independence. We should, of course, acknowledge the natural instinct to ensure democratic accountability of any new regulator. Given the cultural and economic importance of football to our nation, Parliament should rightly maintain some oversight of how this new body exercises its considerable powers.

The question “Who regulates the regulator?” is beginning to be asked more and more often, not least in relation to the many clear failings of UK regulators, and rightly so. However, I believe we must also tread with real care here. Football’s international governing bodies, UEFA and FIFA, have clear provisions against state interference in the game. While their primary concern has historically been direct government control of national associations, they could well choose to interpret these provisions more broadly. We have already seen their willingness to act even in response to the mere creation of this regulator, and we have seen the Government’s instant removal of a clause in this Bill relating to foreign and trade policy. This tension means we must achieve a delicate balancing act: too little accountability and we clearly risk regulatory overreach; too much involvement of the state and our democratic institutions and we risk creating leverage that could be used against English football’s interest.

I have already spoken about some of the risks here. If Select Committee oversight and IFR responsibility to both bodies was seen as political interference, it could feasibly create that leverage we have warned about whereby clubs participating in European competition, or even England’s tournament participation, is put in jeopardy. We have already seen concerning signs of how these tensions might play out. In just a short time since this Bill’s introduction, we have witnessed numerous attempts to expand the regulator’s scope from environmental sustainability to ticketing prices and kick-off times to corporate responsibility requirements. I am concerned about how this pressure might intensify with direct parliamentary oversight.

Members of the other place, responding quite correctly to constituents’ concerns, might press the regulator to intervene in broadcast arrangements or ticket allocations, or elements that go to the heart of competition tools that should be reserved for the leagues. Select Committees could demand action on issues far beyond the regulator’s core financial sustainability purpose. Each intervention, however well intentioned, risks creating exactly the kind of state interference that could threaten English football’s international position.

We have seen this pattern in other sectors: regulatory mission creep that is driven by political pressure and external events. Football’s unique international framework makes this dynamic particularly dangerous. Every expansion of scope and political intervention creates new vulnerability to UEFA and FIFA leverage. I would be grateful if the Minister, when she responds, could explain how the Government intend to manage these competing demands. How will they maintain appropriate accountability while preventing political pressure from expanding the regulator’s remit? How will they ensure that parliamentary oversight does not become a backdoor for state intervention in football’s affairs? What safeguards will protect against the regulator being drawn into issues that should remain matters for the football authorities only?

Finally, I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm whether this issue has been directly discussed with UEFA and, if so, what its view is on how the IFR’s independence should be preserved in this respect. It seems clear that without comprehensive assurances on every single aspect of the IFR and how it will operate, we risk inadvertently subjecting English football to permanent external control. The irony of creating this leverage will be quite incredible. In seeking to protect our game through regulation, we must not end up permanently compromising its independence and losing control of English football for ever.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

My Lords, when the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, started speaking, I thought that we were going to have a first. She started off by agreeing with the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, on some points that I would agree with him on. Then she went totally against that and said that a Select Committee might be too interfering. I point out to her that the Select Committee that covers DCMS has, for many years, talked about the problems in football such as ticket pricing and the timing of matches. That has not impinged in any way on any international arrangements.

We have to make a clear distinction between Parliament and the Executive, because we are not talking about state control or government control. What we are talking about in this amendment is a proper accountability for any regulator. As I mentioned at Second Reading, I have the privilege of chairing the Industry and Regulators Committee of this House. We had a report about who regulates the regulator, so it is strange that the noble Baroness should use those words. This is not about regulating the regulator; it is actually about holding regulators to account. Both Houses have a very important role to play in making sure that regulators are held to account by Parliament.

I go further: if some of the regulators had been held to account more closely by Parliament in recent years, we would not, for example, have the crisis that we have today in the water industry. There has been a failure of Parliament to hold regulators to account.

My Amendment 89 is not grouped with these amendments but covers very similar points and the same principle. I hope that the Minister will give us an assurance that Parliament will have a role to play in holding all regulators to account, including the independent football regulator.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton. Her words are born of great experience—not just the dark arts of the Whips’ Office, I know, but many years of speaking up for her constituents in the other place. I think she ended up agreeing with my noble friend Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay.

I support this amendment because of my experience of four years on the Public Accounts Committee in the other place. I had the great privilege of serving under the excellent leadership of the noble Baroness, Lady Hodge of Barking, who was a superb chairman. That is not to take away from the work of Meg Hillier, who recently did an excellent job in that role.

My point is that the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, mentioned the division between the Executive and Parliament. Our worry on this side, and the reason we put forward this amendment, is that we see too many powers being vested in the Executive and Parliament having too few.

19:15

The experience of my time on the Public Accounts Committee was very instructive. Yes, we had the big ticket showdowns with Starbucks, Amazon and others over tax, but quite often the unglamorous work of the committee—two reports and two meetings a week, backed up by 800 people in the National Audit Office—was to get into the minutiae and the granular detail of how the regulators were performing. Your Lordships will know that we very rarely had sitting Members of Parliament, whether Ministers or others, before us. We often had Permanent Secretaries there and often gave quite a hard time to regulators for failing in their duty. I am honest enough to admit that there were of course some significant failures in the previous Administration —Ofwat being one, along with the Financial Conduct Authority and others.

My other reason for rising to speak is in response to the very helpful letter to my noble friend Lord Hayward that the Minister sent yesterday. It throws up a number of questions that a parliamentary committee would address in the course of its deliberations on this new independent football regulator. For instance, it is quite unclear at the moment what the exact cost of the regulator would be. The letter says:

“We cannot know the exact costs of the Regulator until legislation has been passed”.

It bears repetition that this is a hugely consequential, epoch-making Bill in the enabling powers it vests in Ministers. An appropriate parliamentary committee will therefore need to look at that.

Another issue is the safeguards on and proportionality of

“the Regulator’s levy and cost to businesses”.

That would be one of the key areas on which a parliamentary committee would seek to interrogate the new independent football regulator.

[Lord Hayward (Con)]

Since my noble friend is referring to a letter that was addressed to me, I assure him that in the debate on another amendment I shall return in far greater detail to this letter, not least because the first heading of the letter refers to “Exact cost”. I never asked for exact costs. I preferred to use the word “probably”.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

Your Lordships and I can rely on my noble friend’s forensic interrogation of the letter and the Bill generally. I know that we will come back to this issue.

I mentioned proportionality and a final example is the framework document, which has a strange description on page 2 of the letter. It says:

“DCMS as the sponsor department will agree a ‘framework document’ with the Regulator”.


It will be up to a parliamentary committee to look at what the point of that framework document is and whether its delivery by the regulator is efficacious. We need to know about the accounting officer. We need to know about the role of the National Audit Office and how it will intervene and work with the department, the regulator itself and any parliamentary committee. The levy, the proportionality and the cost are all areas where Parliament has a very important role to play.

I think we have reached the turning point in trusting regulators to discharge their duties without appropriate and close examination by legislators. That is our job and the job of those elected in the other place. Because the weather has changed for regulators, we no longer implicitly trust them to be full of experts and to do their job effectively. As my right honourable friend the former Prime Minister Rishi Sunak said, “In God we trust, everyone else bring data”. I am not just looking at the right reverend Prelate when I say that. The serious point is that we need to see that the regulator is doing its job. We cannot rely on just undertakings and assurances. We need the proper statutory function of a committee to oversee the work of the regulator. On that basis, I warmly support my noble friend’s excellent amendment.

[Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lord Jackson and to support the three amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Parkinson. I spoke a few days ago about how the Premier League became so successful, so popular and such an enormous contributor to the soft power of this country around the world, as well as to our finances in the many billions of pounds of taxes it pays. I spoke about the very delicate nature of entrepreneurial activity and the danger that comes from overregulation.

As noble Lords will know, I am not keen on the whole idea of this regulator—particularly one that is given so many powers in such an enormous Bill. But there is only one thing worse than a regulator given many powers and that is one given untrammelled and unscrutinised powers. Therefore, if we are to have this regulator, it is absolutely crucial that there is sufficient scrutiny of what it does.

We know that regulators like to regulate. People who are attracted to the idea of supervising other people like to get really involved and talk about what they would like to happen and how they can make that happen. They want to have the powers to make it happen—and preferably without scrutiny. I do not know how many Members of this Committee have had the experience of many years of scrutiny by regulators who decide, “You’re a wrong ’un and we’re going to go after you”. The process becomes the punishment.

And as many noble Lords have asked already this evening and earlier, who is going to come into this game? Who is going to apply their entrepreneurial flair if they believe that an untrammelled and unsupervised regulator is going to be able to second-guess everything they do, consider their fitness and will be able—from what we were told earlier—to reach into their funds and, through the backstop, extract them for whatever purpose, unchallenged, unsupervised and without any scrutiny. I submit to noble Lords that these amendments, if we are to have a regulator, are absolutely crucial for the regulator’s good functioning and for the future success of this wonderful part of our economy.

[Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)]

On these Benches, we broadly support these measures. It is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, because he speaks his mind and I like that. There is no ambiguity in what he is trying to say; he just says it. That, to me, is refreshing.

In supporting the amendments from the noble Lords, Lord Parkinson and Lord Markham, with respect, we do not need Erskine May or Burke. It should be common sense to us that the regulator must be accountable to Parliament. We are the heart of democracy and the social fabric of the country, and we are funding it. So, if there were an overwhelming reason why the Government did not want this, I would find it unfathomable; the regulator should be accountable.

The noble Baroness, Lady Brady, was passionate in what she said, and I understand the pitfalls she can see coming, but this is really about regulation and accountability. That is the fine line that we draw. We are not overregulating but we need that accountability. I suppose it is about scope and the number of times we may be calling people, and which Select Committees can call them. I would suggest it should not be just any Select Committee; it should be pertinent to the business.

The Government will ask that the amendments be withdrawn today, but could they commit that this will be somewhere in the Bill? Without an agreement that the regulator will be held to account by Parliament and will report to Parliament, this group of Peers—the small and happy band that we are—will be less than supportive of not supporting this, if that makes sense.

[Baroness Evans of Bowes Park (Con)]

My Lords, building on what was just said—this comment is not particularly for the Government but is perhaps a reflection for both Houses—as this will be a completely new regulator, there should potentially be a committee of both Houses, unusual though it may be, with representatives from both sides. It might be quite useful for a committee to be set up to look at this regulator, not least because of all the issues we have been discussing, as it is something completely new.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way. The Industry and Regulators Committee, with outside organisations such as the Institute for Government and others, has looked at what might be appropriate going forward. There is a real concern that we do not have a drumbeat of accountability for all regulators, so some new mechanism might be appropriate, potentially even in the way that the noble Baroness suggests.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, perhaps I could have a clarification. The noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, said that he had lots of experience of regulators. He referred to the Online Safety Act and Ofcom and his dealings there. I found it incredibly unhelpful to be constantly told by Ministers at that time that something was not up to them, it was up to Ofcom, even when we were making a decision about what the Ofcom regulator was going to do.

There are times when it feels as though Governments of any political stripe can outsource authority to a regulator. They tell the regulator what to do and then, when you try and hold somebody to account, the Government say, “Oh no, it’s the regulator that makes that decision”. So it actually removes any accountability. I am very keen on a mechanism for accountability and I am very anxious that, when we constantly stress that they are independent, arm’s-length regulators, that can be a way of avoiding any kind of political accountability.

However, I am also sensitive to the issues raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, about the kinds of things you can imagine happening if there is accountability at Select Committee level. I want accountability and I can take on board what the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, said about the forensic way that Select Committees can hold people to account. That sounds very positive. But it depends which one it is and who is on it. I can imagine the political fads of the day. You can imagine a Select Committee saying, “Why aren’t you doing more on”—my favourite topics—“EDI or the environment?” or “Where’s your environmental target? You’re not doing enough on that, are you?”

We have to be quite precise about the principle. On the one hand, there is the very important principle of parliamentary accountability. On the other, we also have to ensure that that does not become political interference, because it could. There could be a kind of pressure from Parliament for the regulator to adopt political priorities rather than football priorities.

[Lord Markham (Con)]

We have had three days of debate and it is fantastic that we have an outburst of consensus. On all sides of the Committee, we seem to agree that we are putting a lot of trust in this regulator. We have had long and thorough debates about what its objectives should be. I come back not to Erskine May or other writings but to the Gorbachev and Reagan saying, “Trust, but verify”, which I always remember. There is consensus around the Committee about how vital parliamentary scrutiny is for what we think is such an important role. I hope that, when the Minister responds shortly, she will take on board the consensus view of the Committee and respond positively.

19:30

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

I will briefly encapsulate some of what we have heard and respond to the point of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. She is right: it was a chastening experience to stand at the Dispatch Box as a Minister and repeatedly have to say that something was a matter for the independent Ofcom, the independent Arts Council, the independent board of the BBC, or the Betting and Gaming Council. There are good reasons why many of those organisations are independent of government, and that independence should be carefully guarded. However, given the additional role that Ministers in this House have, and in providing parliamentary scrutiny, the distinction that the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, makes between the Executive and the legislature comes to the heart of it.

I am grateful to my noble friends on these Benches for expressing some of the concerns that they would raise if they were on a parliamentary committee overseeing the work of this regulator. As the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, reminded us, the concerns could go in all directions, and that is the beauty and importance of parliamentary accountability. This is an important regulator doing hotly anticipated and important work, and I am grateful for the consensus, which my noble friend Lord Markham points out, on the need to find a way to make sure that it can continue to be accountable to both Houses of Parliament.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, for tabling these amendments, which relate to the transparency and accountability of the regulator. The discussion was interesting, and I found my noble friend Lady Taylor’s expertise on this matter particularly helpful to our debate. I look forward to discussing this further with her.

The noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, raised some interesting points. I stress that the Government recognise that it is vital that the regulator is transparent and able to be held accountable by Parliament and others. A number of provisions in the Bill already ensure this. The exercise of the regulator’s functions will be reviewed in the regulator’s annual report. The Secretary of State and Parliament will be able to scrutinise these reports, which will be laid before Parliament. The regulator’s chair and non-executive directors will be required to go through the public appointments process, as is appropriate given the weight of the role and responsibility for other appointments to the regulator. The chair of the regulator will already be subject to pre-appointment scrutiny with the relevant parliamentary Select Committee. However, as far as I am aware, there is no precedent for board members to be expected to go through such an extensive process as the chair is expected to, and neither has the relevant parliamentary Select Committee sought this. We therefore do not think that such a requirement is proportionate or necessary.

The regulator will be expected to work alongside the parliamentary process, which already allows committees to compel witnesses to attend. If a committee wished to invite a relevant member or the chief executive to appear before it, the Government would certainly expect them to fulfil this. These amendments would set an unprecedented and rigid approach to committee invitations that we do not feel is appropriate to place on the regulator. It would also not be appropriate for the Government to dictate to parliamentary committees who should appear before them—that is surely a matter for committee members themselves to determine.

Almost all of Amendment 123 dictates various actions in relation to parliamentary committees: who should appear before them, what they should scrutinise and when they should do so. I am sure the noble Lord agrees that parliamentary committees are quite able to take these decisions themselves and do not need the help of any legislation to do so. On the expert panel, the legislation already sets out a number of requirements to publish decisions and reasons for them. For these reasons, I am unable to accept the noble Lord’s amendments and ask that he withdraws Amendment 37.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

I am grateful to the Minister for that response. I recognise many of the lines she uttered; I have uttered those and similar on previous Bills. For me, the most important contribution was that of the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, who has given greater thought to this over a long time.

The Minister is right: it is not for the Government to tell parliamentary committees whom to call as a witness and how to do it. But there is a growing concern that there are so many ways in which the Government have devolved power to powerful regulators that can accrue—in the way that the Bill achieves—new powers or go in new directions through secondary legislation that does not get the sort of scrutiny that we are giving the Bill at the moment. Perhaps some broader mechanism needs to be found for looking at the work of not just this regulator but regulators in general. As I say, that was a feeling that gnawed at me when I stood at the Dispatch Box opposite. We will probably not crack the answer as we look forward to a well-earned dinner break, so, with gratitude to the Minister, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 37 withdrawn.

Amendment 38 not moved.

House resumed. Committee to begin again not before 8.21 pm.