Defence Investment Plan

Al Pinkerton Excerpts

Wednesday 10th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Dr Al Pinkerton (Surrey Heath) (LD)]

I associate myself and my hon. Friends with the condolences paid to the families of the crew who died in the tragic helicopter crash last week.

The defence investment plan is still not published, and after nine months, industry waits for certainty, our allies for clarity and our armed forces for the investment they were promised. At a time of acute threat, defence cannot be switched on overnight. We cannot rebuild industrial capacity, train personnel, modernise equipment or restore deterrence through vague promises about working at pace. Small and medium-sized enterprises are clear that investment decisions are delayed, expansion is on hold and our contracts are being lost overseas. British firms stand ready to grow and hire, but this delay is freezing procurement, paralysing the supply chain and creating doubt about Britain’s commitment to rearmament.

Will the Secretary of State confirm whether he has assessed the economic damage caused to British businesses by the delayed defence investment plan? Given the apparent deadlock between the Treasury and the MOD, will he seriously consider our proposal to issue £20 billion of defence bonds?

[Luke Pollard]

I thank the hon. Member for his questions, and for the condolences on behalf of his party. It was polite of him to promote me in his question; I will ensure that the Secretary of State has heard what he had to say.

It is important to set out that we have not waited for the defence investment plan to deliver the new capabilities, the new contracts and the new investment. The hon. Member mentioned small businesses, and earlier this year we stood up the Defence Office for Small Business Growth to create a single doorway for small businesses to access defence. We have supported more small businesses, and we have increased the target for direct spend by the Ministry of Defence by 50%, which is an extra £2.5 billion of direct spend going into small businesses.

We will continue to support SMEs. The 1,400 major contracts I mentioned in my response to the initial question support not only companies such as BAE Systems, Babcock and Thales—the very large defence primes—but the entire supply chain, with many of those contracts going to small businesses. We want to see the innovation, job creation, energy and dynamism of small businesses have a bigger role in defence, and that is especially true in areas such as autonomy, in which many of the companies from which we are buying capabilities are small businesses with huge growth potential. When the defence investment plan is published, the hon. Member will see that we are backing those innovative companies and SMEs.

Armed Forces Bill

Al Pinkerton Excerpts

Committee of the whole House
Tuesday 2nd June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Mr Francois]

I thank the hon. Member for that intervention. I think she may have been here just a few months ago when we had a debate about the history of the Gurkhas in British service. I echo everything she said about the bravest of the brave. I therefore look forward to her supporting the new clause in the Division Lobby this evening.

The Royal British Legion and Poppyscotland have campaigned on this matter for a number of years. I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon for taking up the cudgels so effectively on their behalf this afternoon. As he argued powerfully, Governments of both colours have indicated in the past that they were minded to make this change. Indeed, it is worth reiterating that this proposal was in both the Conservatives’ and Labour’s 2024 general election manifestos, but the change has yet to come to pass. Having re-examined the issue within His Majesty’s Opposition and consulted shadow departmental colleagues, I am pleased to tell the Committee that should my hon. Friend seek to press the new clause—and should you grant that request, Madam Chairman—we on the Opposition Front Bench will support it. We encourage all hon. Members to do so, too. There would be a cost to the process, but we believe that, in return for service to this country, the Ministry of Defence should absorb that cost in its wider budget. The annual cost would be a very modest outgoing, given the scale of the defence budget. In other words, the Department would bear the cost, not those who have served or their families. People should not be disadvantaged for having offered to serve this country in uniform.

My hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon put the case very well, and I will not try the House’s patience by repeating it. Suffice it to say that I believe that there is a strong moral case for doing this, and I very much hope that the Government might be prepared to accept the amendment. If they are not, I hope that my hon. Friend will press his amendment to a vote, and in that case, I hope that the whole House will find it in their heart to support it.

New clauses 1 and 6 relate to the European convention on human rights and its effect on armed forces personnel, including, potentially, reservists who might be mobilised under the auspices of the Bill. How did we get to a situation in which the convention has spread to the battlefield, not just in Europe, but globally? The history is significant here; it lies behind why we tabled the two new clauses. This all came about because of something called the al-Jedda case, which was heard before the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords a couple of years or so before the United Kingdom Supreme Court was created back in 2009. The al-Jedda case was about the treatment of a prisoner detained in Iraq during Operation Telic, and was brought by a now disgraced lawyer called Phil Shiner. His name will be known to anyone who has ever served in the British Army. For the record, Shiner was subsequently convicted of fraud and struck off as a practising solicitor.

Phil Shiner instructed legal counsel to put forward his case to the House of Lords. The lead appellant in that case, before he became a Member of Parliament, was one Keir Starmer QC. The Minister for Veterans and People got into some trouble over that, because when we highlighted the matter in the Commons, she was adamant that he had not been working for Shiner. Unfortunately for the Minister, we had the court records from the House of Lords, which showed very clearly that Keir Starmer, as he then was, was the lead appellant appointed and instructed—that word is used in the records—by Phil Shiner’s law firm, Public Interest Lawyers. The Minister had the embarrassment of having to come to the Commons in February to correct the record and admit that our version of events, as explained to the Commons, was true.

Phil Shiner was a persistent man, particularly when money was at stake, so several years after losing in the House of Lords, he took the case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. To be clear, Keir Starmer was not acting in that action. Shiner won, so the Strasbourg Court ruled that the European convention on human rights would then apply to any theatre in which British armed forces personnel were serving. Through that judgment, an industry was effectively created, which Shiner then massively exploited. He brought literally hundreds of cases against current and past British armed forces personnel. Many of the cases were funded by British taxpayers through legal aid, and were completely and utterly fabricated for money. It was the use of the ECHR that allowed him to do that.

In other debates in the Chamber, we have heard senior Ministers, including the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, say that there is no such thing as a vexatious prosecution. Self-evidently, there must be, because otherwise why was Shiner struck off and convicted of fraud by a court of law? There can be—in fact, there were—hundreds of vexatious prosecutions against British military personnel. It was, for the record, Johnny Mercer, a former Member of this House, when he served on the Defence Committee some years ago, who led a sub-Committee investigation into this issue. Its very powerful report helped to bring Shiner to book, no doubt saving the taxpayer a lot of money, and leading to Shiner’s career ending in disgrace.

To come to the present day, what if there were a ceasefire in Ukraine? Let us posit a situation in which, under the auspices of the coalition of the willing, British service personnel were deployed to Ukraine. If, by some happenstance, they became involved in a firefight with Russian troops who had made an incursion across the line of ceasefire, who is to say that years—maybe decades—later, those personnel would not end up in a court of law for obeying what they believed to be perfectly legitimate orders, after some second-guessing by a human rights lawyer, perhaps with Russian assistance?

In short, we cannot allow this Government’s obsession with human rights to put our armed forces at risk, either now, in the future or historically, and potentially force them to fight ruthless opponents with one arm tied behind their back. This issue will not go away, and at some point, the Government will be forced to address it, be it through the Northern Ireland Troubles Bill or some other mechanism. The purpose of these new clauses is to force them to address it today.

[Dr Al Pinkerton (Surrey Heath) (LD)]

I should like to quote a few words from the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty), speaking just a couple of months ago in this Chamber:

“This month marks 20 years since I returned from serving on Operation Telic 7 in Iraq. While I was there, we patrolled Basra in Snatch Land Rovers, and 34 British soldiers died in Snatch Land Rovers. They were called “mobile coffins” and “suicide wagons” for a reason. In 2006, it was highlighted to the Government that those vehicles were unsuitable, and it was not until years later that they were replaced.”—[Official Report, 15 April 2026; Vol. 783, c. 842.]

It was not the ECHR that put British soldiers’ lives at risk in Iraq, but it was the ECHR that provided the legal basis for the families of those victims to seek justice. I think that the right hon. Gentleman is looking through the wrong end of the telescope on this one. By seeking to remove us from the ECHR, he is potentially putting British service people at greater risk, rather than offering them protection.

[Mr Francois]

It is extremely sad that the hon. Gentleman is seeking to conflate two completely different issues, and I suspect that anyone who actually served on Operation Telic would understand that.

Having made that point, let me turn to the Opposition’s new clause 2, which would require the Secretary of State for Defence to lay a defence investment plan before Parliament within a month of the passage of this Act, if it had still not been published by then, which, for reasons I will come to in a minute, is not as fantastical as it might seem. For context, today is the one-year anniversary of the publication of the Government’s much-vaunted strategic defence review. There is a lot of good in the document, but one of the criticisms made at the time was that much of the programmatic detail on which new equipment the Government intended to purchase for our armed forces was omitted. For instance, the Government talked about buying “up to” 12 new nuclear attack submarines. That could mean two.

All that detail was going to be provided in the defence investment plan, but one year on, it has still not been published. This has drawn serious criticism from right across the defence industry, and also from the authors of the SDR. Indeed, the lead author, Lord Robertson, a lifelong Labour man to his fingertips, has accused the Prime Minister of “corrosive complacency” because of the ongoing delay in saying how the Government will fund the strategic defence review and its attendant equipment requirements. When we were in government, we used to publish a 10-year plan for the purchase of military equipment, universally known as the equipment plan.

Strategic Defence Review: Funding

Al Pinkerton Excerpts

Wednesday 15th April 2026 Commons Chamber

[Luke Pollard]

The right hon. Member is absolutely right that we need to go beyond conventional defence. That is why we have conventional and nuclear deterrence as part of our armed forces posture. She will also have heard in my opening remarks about the investment we are making in cyber. This is not just a Ministry of Defence effort; increasingly, if we are to deliver the national security we need, we need a whole-of-Government approach. That means the MOD working with the Home Office, the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, the Cabinet Office and the devolved Governments to be able to tackle the deliberate misinformation that we see our adversaries trying to pump into our newsfeeds. Let me be very clear that we do not accept in any way Russian interference or any interference in our democracy or our way of life, but across Government we are having a national conversation that enables people to be better equipped to identify and challenge it, as well as putting more pressure on social media companies to remove it and not have it on their platforms in the first place.

[Dr Al Pinkerton (Surrey Heath) (LD)]

My question follows on perfectly from that of the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Liz Saville Roberts). Lord Robertson said that we are ill prepared for the threats of today, never mind tomorrow. While Britain may not be under daily attack from missiles and tanks—not yet, anyway—we are under daily assault by misinformation and disinformation from hostile actors who are targeting our institutions, democracy and social cohesion. The Minister has referred to the investments and operational changes that have been put into cyber and electromagnetic security. Given the foundational nature of the challenge to our democracy, is he convinced that the Chancellor is convinced of the urgent need to make huge investments in this area? This is a challenge we have never experienced before—a challenge that collapses the traditional idea of the frontline with the home front.

[Luke Pollard]

I thank the hon. Member for the way that he posed his question. There was much in it that I agree with him on. He is certainly right that we are not at war but nor are we at peace. We can look at a number of domains where we see UK forces and infrastructure being attacked, the cyber domain being the most obvious. The Defence Secretary revealed only last week the threats to our undersea infrastructure from covert Russian activity, and we must be able to call it out and say to Putin, “We see what you are doing. You will not have deniability.” In fact, the military call it “denying deniability”, which is a typical military phrase, but I think we all know what that means. There is more to be done here, including the national conversation about the threats that we face and how all of us can, in our own way, take actions—just updating the operating system on our phones makes us and the country safer. There is lots more that we can do, especially in this House, to further support that, and I am happy to have a conversation with him about how we do that.

Middle East

Al Pinkerton Excerpts

Monday 23rd March 2026 Commons Chamber

[John Healey]

I can indeed. I hope my hon. Friend, and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and their military, realise that the steps we took well before this war broke out to reinforce defences in Cyprus and across the region, have been there not just to protect British personnel and step up defences at our base, but they are defending and helping to protect the whole Republic of Cyprus and the island of Cyprus.

[Dr Al Pinkerton (Surrey Heath) (LD)]

From the first moments that the attempted rocket launches towards Diego Garcia were reported over the weekend there has been growing speculation, fuelled mainly by Israel, that Iran’s strike capacity now stretches far beyond what we previously conceived, and far beyond the Gulf region. Given what the Secretary of State said today when he confirmed that they were Iranian rockets—that goes beyond the NATO Secretary General yesterday—can he confirm how close those rockets or missiles came to Diego Garcia? What is now the MOD’s assessment about the effective strike range of Iran’s missile capacity? Does it stretch deep into Europe, and is the UK even now at risk?

[John Healey]

As I have said, the missiles that were fired in the direction of Diego Garcia fell well short. One came down, and one was brought down well short. The specific capabilities of adversaries like Iran, and what they hold, are certainly not details that the hon. Gentleman would expect me to disclose to the House or in public.

Oral Answers to Questions

Al Pinkerton Excerpts

Monday 16th March 2026 Commons Chamber

[Al Carns]

I do not have the details of that specific case, but I am sure that the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry would love to do so.

[Dr Al Pinkerton (Surrey Heath) (LD)]

Following the drone attack at RAF Akrotiri earlier this month, there has been growing disquiet within Cyprus and the Cypriot community about the continuing existence of the sovereign base areas. Given the absolute necessity of this defence relationship between the United Kingdom and Cyprus, will the Minister update the House on the Secretary of State’s visit to Cyprus earlier this month? Could he also say what reassurance the Cypriot Government need from us to ensure not only that the base is safe but that the future security of Cyprus is ensured?

[Al Carns]

Our sovereign base in Cyprus is not in question. When the Secretary of State for Defence visited Cyprus, the Cypriot national guard reaffirmed that our relationship is closer now than ever before. We must always remember the complexity of dealing with air defence. When it involves high and fast ballistic missiles combined with slow and low drones, it is a very complex problem for anyone to deal with, but we are trying to ensure that we come as close to 100% as we can.

NATO and the High Arctic

Al Pinkerton Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2026 Westminster Hall

[Dr Al Pinkerton (Surrey Heath) (LD)]

As ever, Dr Huq, it is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. I thank the hon. and gallant Member for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger) for securing this geostrategically important debate and drawing this issue to the attention of the House.

At a moment when the world’s attention is understandably distracted and drawn to other parts of the world—whether to the brutal war in eastern Europe or the escalating tensions in the middle east—it would be all too easy to park an issue such as this and see it, perhaps, as something for the future rather than as something for immediate attention. I contend, however, that that would be an enormous strategic error; history, after all, has a terrible habit of punishing those who overlook the vital importance of geography.

The opening up of the Arctic is undoubtedly one of the most consequential geopolitical shifts of the 21st century. As we know, climate change is transforming the region at extraordinary speed. Retreating sea ice is opening new maritime routes and increasing access to energy resources and critical minerals, drawing renewed strategic interest from major powers.

At the same time, the co-operative governance structures that once defined the Arctic are under strain. For much of the post-cold war period, the region was described as “High North, low tension”. That description no longer holds. The era of Arctic exceptionalism seems to be over. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fractured the Arctic Council and accelerated the wider geopolitical tensions that now shape the region. Strategic competition is returning to the High North—not as a distant possibility, but as a clear and present reality.

Although the United Kingdom is not an Arctic coastal state, we are undeniably a near-Arctic nation. We are geographically proximate, strategically exposed and directly affected by developments in the High North. Instability in the Arctic affects our maritime approaches, north Atlantic shipping lanes, subsea cables, offshore energy infrastructure, and ultimately the deterrent posture of the Royal Navy. For the United Kingdom, the Arctic is not a remote frontier; it is part of our immediate strategic environment.

A few weeks ago, I had the enormous privilege of visiting Greenland and Denmark, alongside my Liberal Democrat colleague, my hon. Friend the Member for Bicester and Woodstock (Calum Miller). I can report that in Nuuk, Greenland’s capital, life often appears outwardly calm. The harbour is busy and the cafés are full. The rhythms of daily life continue, despite the long Arctic winter and the limited daylight available in February, when I was there. However, anyone spending any time talking to Greenlanders will hear something quite different: a persistent and gnawing anxiety about what might be coming down the tracks from not Moscow or Beijing—nobody realistically thinks that either Russia or China pose an immediate threat to Greenland—but, extraordinarily, from Washington.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

My hon. Friend knows a great deal about this subject; I am also grateful to the hon. Member for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger) for securing this debate.

Yesterday, President Trump suggested that our current Prime Minister is no Churchill. Should we not add that the current President of the United States is no Franklin D. Roosevelt? FDR was a big supporter of the development of the United Nations and knew about the importance of sovereignty. Does my hon. Friend share my view—I think he will—that who governs their countries is a matter for the Danes and Greenlanders alone?

[Dr Pinkerton]

I am grateful to my hon. and gallant Friend for his intervention; the President of the United States is perhaps more Teddy Roosevelt than Franklin Delano Roosevelt. He seems to be living every day under the impression that his mission should be to expand US territory and to plant the US flag, no matter how loyal and allied the country in question has been in the past.

I clearly recall the deeply offensive remarks that the President of the United States made about both Britain and Denmark’s past military contributions to US international adventurism. I remember watching a film called “Armadillo” about the extraordinary work that Danish troops did on the frontline in Afghanistan. I agree with my hon. Friend’s comments wholeheartedly.

For Greenlanders, this is not a recent experience; they have been living with the threats of Donald Trump for the best part of 12 months. Over the past year, he has repeatedly suggested that the United States should “acquire” Greenland, presenting the idea as a matter of American national security. Sitting here in Westminster, it may be tempting to dismiss such remarks as rhetorical theatre, but in Nuuk they are experienced profoundly differently. Greenland is a self-governing Arctic society of 56,000 people. When the world’s most powerful country repeatedly discusses one’s homeland as though it were a strategic asset to be acquired, the effect is not abstract.

During my visit, we heard accounts of families stockpiling supplies. Some described moving savings abroad in case of financial disruption to their homeland and their lives. Others spoke of delaying vital, essential medical treatment in Denmark—treatment that many Greenlanders rely on—because they feared that further escalation would mean that they would not be able to return to their homeland afterwards.

Greenlandic commentators have described the psychological effect of the campaign from the United States as a form of “mental terror”. It is a striking phrase, but it captures an important truth: security in the Arctic is not solely about missiles, submarines and military installations; it is also about trust, stability and the ability of societies to live without fear.

There is also a profound strategic irony here. The United States already enjoys extensive rights in Greenland under the 1951 US-Denmark defence agreement, including the operation of the Pituffik space base—formerly, the Thule air base—and any other base that it may wish to re-establish in the present moment. Greenland sits inside NATO’s security architecture through Denmark and benefits from the protections of article 5. The idea that Greenland must somehow be owned to be defended simply does not withstand any scrutiny. What it challenges, however, is something far more fundamental: the principle that people are not property and that sovereignty cannot be negotiated away for strategic convenience.

Across Greenlandic politics, the response has therefore been consistent and unequivocal: Greenland is not for sale. For liberal democracies, that principle should not be negotiable. If western democracies cannot defend the idea that territories cannot be simply acquired by powerful states, then the rules-based order that we claim to uphold begins to look increasingly selective and fragile. Nowhere are those principles more important than in the wider strategic geography of the North Atlantic.

At the heart of that geography lies the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap: the naval corridor between Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom. During the cold war, NATO prioritised that corridor to detect and constrain the submarines of the Soviet northern fleet departing the Kola peninsula into the Atlantic. Today, it has again become central to NATO’s strategy. Russia’s northern fleet must transit through or around the GIUK gap to reach the north Atlantic.

Monitoring the corridor remains essential to tracking submarine activity and protecting the integrity of the north Atlantic. The corridor also safeguards the sealines of communication between North America and Europe. In any NATO contingency, the transatlantic reinforcement route would pass directly through those waters. If the GIUK gap were compromised, the United Kingdom’s western maritime flank would be exposed. Control and surveillance of the space are therefore fundamental to preventing adversaries from projecting power into the north Atlantic or threatening western Europe and North America.

Within the strategic geography, Greenland’s importance cannot be overstated. Its location makes it pivotal for missile early-warning systems, Arctic sea routes, access to the north Atlantic, and space-based infrastructure. Destabilising Greenland or undermining Danish sovereignty would fracture NATO cohesion, complicate security in the GIUK gap and weaken Arctic governance structures at precisely the moment when unity is most needed.

The Liberal Democrats are therefore clear: sovereignty and international law are not negotiable principles. I am deeply concerned that the Prime Minister has yet to state unequivocally that British soil, British bases and British facilities would never be used to propel American troops on to Greenlandic territory by force. The Government must put that matter beyond doubt.

Any suggestion that one NATO ally could coerce another would erode alliance cohesion, weaken deterrence and play directly into the hands of President Putin. Fragmentation in the Arctic theatre would directly benefit Russia’s northern fleet posture and its wider Arctic military strategy. Again, this is not about abstract diplomacy; it is about the credibility of collective defence. The UK must therefore deepen its commitment to Arctic security and north Atlantic resilience. That means strengthening anti-submarine warfare and maritime domain awareness, investing further in north Atlantic patrol and surveillance capabilities, and reinforcing defence co-operation with our Nordic and Baltic partners.

Crucially, the Government should invest further in the Joint Expeditionary Force, and convene a summit of JEF leaders here in the United Kingdom to address the rapidly evolving security environment in the High North. The reality is simple: the Arctic is no longer a peripheral concern; it is at the frontline of strategic competition, alliance solidarity and international law.

I leave the Minister with three questions. First, what concrete steps have the Government taken to ensure that the UK is prepared for the reality that I have just outlined? How is the UK strengthening defence co-operation with our Arctic allies, including considering enhanced diplomatic presence in Greenland and perhaps the establishment of a permanent consulate in Nuuk?

Finally, the strategic defence review mentions the High North as a space of geopolitical and geostrategic interest, but does not offer a defence strategy per se. Do the Government intend to bring one forward? How does the Government’s future procurement reflect that strategic concern?

Arctic and High North

Al Pinkerton Excerpts

Tuesday 13th January 2026 Westminster Hall

[Al Carns]

Security in the Arctic must be achieved collectively, with NATO allies including the United States, by upholding the principles of the UN charter on sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders. These are universal principles and we will always defend them.

It is worth noting that we completed Exercise Tarassis, one of the biggest exercises in the High North, late last year. The next set of exercises in the High North is known as Lion Protector. We have a JEF chiefs of defence meeting coming up at the end of this week. Cold Response will take place, and is already under way, with a 40% increase in the Royal Marines deployed in the High North. They will be there all year round.

The RAF continues to patrol in the High North with various types of aircraft. Some bilateral outstanding agreements, such as the Lunna House agreement, have established interoperability like never before across our naval forces, particularly with Norway.

[Dr Al Pinkerton (Surrey Heath) (LD)]

Prior to our brief interruption, the Minister described a part of the world that is undergoing considerable change and turbulence, not least from climate change. Will he reflect on how UK procurement and military doctrine might have to go to a similar scale and rapidity of change in order to respond to, and reflect, the challenges of an increasingly liquified Arctic that is no longer in a frozen state?

[Al Carns]

For a long time during the cold war, a large proportion of our time was predisposed to looking to the high north-east and north-west in the Atlantic and the High North. It is a case of relearning some of our old lessons, and ensuring that our capability and technological mix is adapted into our doctrine, training tactics and procedures. For example, some of the work now going on in Exercise Cold Response is not necessarily about training; it is about actual mission set planning to prepare for the worst-case scenario, and that is how we are seeing it evolve through time. That will continue through the Lunna House agreement and various agreements we have with Sweden and Finland as part of the NATO alliance, so it will continue to get stronger. Importantly, we will never forget the JEF either, which is a super-important geopolitical alliance.

Politically and environmentally, the Arctic is in absolute flux. Rising temperatures are remoulding landscapes and turning centuries of certainty on their head. As the region grows increasingly contested, it is more important than ever for Britain to collaborate with like-minded states to uphold international law and strengthen our collective security. That is precisely what we are doing. We are working intensely with our partners to monitor threats, bolster our forces and stand up for our interests. As we boost defence spending to 5% of GDP over the next decade, protecting the stability and security of the High North and Arctic will be integral to our plans. That is how we will keep Britain secure at home and strong abroad.

Question put and agreed to.

War in Ukraine

Al Pinkerton Excerpts

Thursday 4th December 2025 Commons Chamber

[Jim Shannon]

Yes, I agree with that. I wish that the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire South (Johanna Baxter) had been able to be here today because she has spoken valiantly in this House about bringing back the 30,000 children who have been kidnapped and undergone Russification. The Russians are trying to make them Russian and make them fight for Russia against Ukraine—it is obscene and it really bothers me greatly.

I have no idea about the name of the family I mentioned, but the reason that I remember that case is because I think about that wee boy, whose mother was being violated, and her screams—

[Dr Al Pinkerton (Surrey Heath) (LD)]

The hon. Member mentioned the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire South (Johanna Baxter). Recently, she was good enough to organise an extraordinary showing of a film called “Children in the Fire” in one of the Committee rooms. It explained in detail, through some very personal stories, the devastation that children have faced during the conflict, and we had the privilege of meeting some of the children, some of whom had been previously abducted and had escaped Russia. It was an extraordinary moment that was deeply revealing and emotional. I am grateful to the hon. Member for paying such close attention to the plight of children in this conflict: it is a horror that none of us should accept.

[Jim Shannon]

We all appreciate and understand that horror that children have had to endure.

The right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) and I were among the first in the House to wear the Ukraine ribbon. I have worn it every day since then and I will wear it until the war is over—I may even wear it after the war is over, in solidarity with the Ukrainians. I will always plead their case in this House, as other hon. Members do, and no sanction from Putin will ever stop me from doing that.

The monitoring by the United Nation’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights reports that some 50,000 civilians have been killed or injured in Ukraine since February 2022, with thousands of verified civilian deaths. Many have also reported that the death toll could be significantly higher. I am prepared to be proved wrong, but due to the lack of reporting, I suspect that it probably is higher. Roughly 5 million to 6 million people are registered as refugees abroad, with a further 3.5 million internally displaced within Ukraine.

The human rights monitoring mission in Ukraine stated that since 24 February 2022 there have been hundreds of cases of conflict-related sexual violence. Girls from as young as eight to women as old as 80 have been violated by Russian monsters who think that they can do whatever they want. I want to see justice for those families. When the war ends, accountability for the actions of those who have murdered and killed across Ukraine has to be a part of the peace that comes. The Ukrainian ombudsman referred to 292 cases of sexual violence—how many have gone unrecorded?

I remember—we all do—the case of Bakhmut. Whenever the Russians retreated, left or were forced out, a mass grave was found of over 200 men, women and children who just happened to be Ukrainians. The Russians thought they could murder them. Accountability? I tell you what: I want to see accountability for that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Al Pinkerton (Surrey Heath) (LD)]

I thank the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin) for securing this very important debate. There have been plaudits and praise enough for all the speeches made by Members across this House—they have been an extraordinary collection of speeches and thoughtful interventions that show intellectual clarity and deep emotional connection. I am grateful to all Members who have spoken.

It is absolutely clear that Vladimir Putin poses an existential threat to Ukraine and a once-in-a-generation threat to European security. For far too long, he has been allowed to wield grotesquely disproportionate influence over global diplomacy and security, and the consequences have been catastrophic. While the global geopolitical scene may have been shaken and upended by his imperial ambitions, the true cost of this war—the fullest cost—has been borne by the people of Ukraine, in the form of the atrocities committed and the suffering of the Ukrainian families who are the direct victims of his malicious and destructive impulses.

Today in Ukraine, there is active hand-to-hand combat, the military lines are active and volatile, and Ukrainian cities face relentless bombardment. Critical infrastructure is targeted, civilian lives are under constant threat and the human toll grows. Since February 2022, Ukraine has reported more than 14,000 civilians killed and more than 38,000 injured. More than 1 million Russian personnel have been killed or injured, and the Ukrainian military toll is more than 46,000 killed and 380,000 wounded. How many more lives need to be lost?

This war did not begin in 2022, with Russia’s full-scale invasion. As we know, it began in 2014, with the illegal seizure of Crimea. That annexation set the stage for the violence, brutality and inhumanity we see today. Russia’s aggression now threatens European security as a whole. Millions of Ukrainians have been displaced from their homes, entire communities destroyed and the social fabric torn apart, leaving trauma that will span generations.

As we have heard several times today, the most harrowing horror of all is the systematic abduction of Ukrainian children. At least 19,000 children have been taken, stolen, cynically and evilly—abduction and exploitation as a most appalling weapon of war. A moral red line has been crossed, and crossed again. This vile human injustice is yet another cost that Ukraine has had to bear. Against that backdrop of human suffering and strategic fragility, we must give Ukraine the leverage it needs in any negotiations and support its efforts to push Russian forces back.

Let me be absolutely clear: Trump’s original 28-point proposal was not a peace deal; it was a horrific geopolitical compromise—a foul capitulation that would serve only to embolden the aggressor. It would force Ukraine into neutrality; limit Ukraine’s ability to defend itself; ban NATO deployments; lock Ukraine out of NATO; recognise Russian sovereignty over Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk; lift sanctions on Russia; invite Russia back into the G8; and even force Ukraine into elections within 100 days. That is not peace—not even close. It rewards and legitimates Russia’s decade-long aggression, and signals to every authoritarian regime around the world that conquest works.

Yes, peace talks have taken place, and the Liberal Democrat position is clearer than ever. First, emergency legislation is vital to seize frozen Russian assets and repurpose them to fund Ukraine’s defence, reconstruction and humanitarian rehabilitation. Secondly, the return of every abducted Ukrainian child is a non-negotiable red line. Thirdly, there must be no reward for Putin: no G7, no G20 and no rehabilitation into the international community. Finally, no settlement can force Ukraine to concede territory. If lands are ceded, one question will echo loudly: what about the children stolen from those territories? Russia already claims them as Russian, and ceding territory may be taken as tacit confirmation of that appalling logic.

That is precisely why peace cannot be built on appeasement directed from Mar-a-Lago. It must be justice as seen from Kyiv. It must be built on a foundation that allows Ukraine not only to survive the war, but to rebuild afterwards: rebuild its infrastructure, its communities, and its way of life as a coherent, bordered, bounded and fully sovereign state. Ukraine’s right to freedom and self-determination is immutable. Any settlement must respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and its sovereign choice to make alliances and coalitions, free from the long arm of Russia and Putin.

This moment is about more than rebuilding Ukraine; it is about rebuilding European security. Russian aggression has made one truth clear: Europe must take greater responsibility for defending Europe. We face the greatest challenge to European security in several generations. The United States has, regrettably, shown itself to be unpredictable and capricious. At any moment, President Trump could shift his attention, whether by choice or necessity, towards the genuine threat of China or the somewhat more local distractions that he sees in Venezuela, Mexico, Greenland or, dare I say it, even Canada, leaving Europe exposed. That is a strategic reality that we cannot ignore. Multipolarity brings both opportunities and new responsibilities. Europe can and needs to act collectively. Europe can and needs to co-ordinate defence procurement, intelligence sharing and economic solidarity. Europe can and needs to step up to the moment, and the United Kingdom can and needs to take a leading role.

We are living through an unusual moment in geopolitics. We can see the future with rare clarity and certainty. Our Prime Minister and Chancellor have hinted repeatedly, particularly in the lead-up to the recent Budget, about the need to rebuild bridges with Europe for the sake of our productivity and our economy. To that, I would add Europe’s collective security, defence, resilience, military-industrial procurement and innovation. Yes, it is a challenge and it requires political courage, but the UK should keep pursuing the deepest possible participation in Security Action for Europe, deepen co-operation, strengthen shared defence planning and align ourselves once again with the partners who share our values and our security.

Those in Europe who are dragging their heels need to lift their heads to the horizon and see the bigger picture. We face a generational challenge. We are stronger together. If we fail to act now, we will be judged by history as the generation who allowed these atrocities to take place, who allowed invasion and occupation by violence to redraw Europe and reshape the future, and who failed to put national self-interest aside to secure the cause of freedom, liberty, democracy and the international rules-based order.

To conclude, we cannot afford to be bystanders in this fight. Justice is what we owe Ukraine and what we now must deliver.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)]

I call the shadow Secretary of State.

Oral Answers to Questions

Al Pinkerton Excerpts

Monday 3rd November 2025 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

[Dr Al Pinkerton (Surrey Heath) (LD)]

May I begin by associating myself and my party with the sentiments reflected by the Secretary of State about the terrible events in Huntingdon at the weekend?

The Secretary of State’s ambition to reverse the outflows from our armed forces is absolutely right, particularly considering the damage the last Government did to our military, but it is far from clear that the Government are doing enough to achieve the necessary changes. There continue to be more service personnel leaving the Army year on year than are joining. In order to strengthen our defence, we need to give more people better incentives to join the armed forces. Will the Minister consider accelerating recruitment properly and tackling outflow rates by backing Liberal Democrat proposals for a £10,000 signing bonus to attract new recruits?

[Louise Sandher-Jones]

In addition to the measures I have outlined to speed up recruitment, we are looking at expanding novel ways of entry into the armed forces, such as direct entry in the cyber stream. We are hugely focused on retention, and this is a very personal mission for me, having left the forces in 2020 and knowing what measures might have helped retain me in service for longer. We are utterly dedicated to addressing the reasons that people give for leaving, not least with our multibillion-pound investment into fixing forces housing.

Support for Disabled Veterans

Al Pinkerton Excerpts

Tuesday 28th October 2025 Commons Chamber

[Louise Sandher-Jones]

We are fortunate to have a wonderful charity sector made up of charities both large and small, some with quite broad remits and some, as my hon. Friend mentions, very focused. I am always blown away by people’s dedication to supporting our veterans, and I applaud their valuable work.

[Dr Al Pinkerton (Surrey Heath) (LD)]

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Eastleigh (Liz Jarvis) for securing this debate. Where the state falls down, so often the charitable sector and amazing volunteers are there to pick up the pieces. Will the Minister join me in paying tribute to some of the incredible charities in my Surrey Heath constituency, which, as she knows, is deeply connected to the military through the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Pirbright and the former Deepcut barracks? I think in particular of the recently reconstituted branch of the Camberley Royal British Legion, but also the Surrey Heath veterans hub and incredible volunteers such as Roy Sellstrom, who have for years given time and effort to rehabilitating and supporting our very well respected veteran community.

[Louise Sandher-Jones]

As the hon. Member knows, I spent some time in his constituency while at Sandhurst. It is an area with deep connections to the armed forces, and I certainly join him in applauding them and the charities that he mentions.

The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) and, I believe, the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough (Tom Gordon) spoke about the challenges of making sure that the covenant is applied fairly across the country. As I am sure they are aware, we are extending the armed forces covenant into law. Part of that is about preventing a postcode lottery so that we can set clear expectations about how the covenant affects a range of policy areas, particularly those delivered by local government, but also across areas such as housing.