Public Order Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 16th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall open by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for setting the scene and the background to this group of amendments. I agree with the way that he set out the history of this group of amendments. I also thank my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti for the way she set out her amendments and commented on the other amendments. I agree with her assessment that the Bill, as drafted, is vague and broad—and that it is vague and broad in a dangerous way. I agree with those central points.

Throughout the Bill, a number of clauses state that it is a defence for a person charged with an offence under the clause to

“prove that they had a reasonable excuse”

for their actions. As we have heard, the JCHR flagged this as a reverse of the burden of proof, so that rather than the prosecution having to prove that a person’s actions were done without a reasonable excuse and so were unlawful, it is for the defendant to prove, after they have been charged, that they had a reasonable excuse for their actions. This is in contrast to an offence such as obstruction of the highway, which we have just heard about, where the prosecution must prove that the defendant did not have lawful authority or excuse for their actions. For the new locking-on offence, the burden of proof would be on the defendant to show that he or she had a reasonable excuse.

Such a reverse burden of proof may be inconsistent not only with Articles 10 and 11 but with the presumption of innocence—a central principle of criminal justice and an aspect of Article 6 of the ECHR and the right to a fair trial. This is because requiring the defendant to prove something, even on the balance of probabilities, may result in a conviction despite there being an element of doubt, and it is hard to see why a reverse burden is necessary or appropriate in this case. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, gave the example of a bladed article and the reverse burden of proof in that context. It is of course a defence I am very familiar with as a sitting magistrate in London. It is of course right that the court will take its own view on whether the reverse burden of proof is reasonable in these circumstances.

I agree with the point made by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti that the better situation is that a police officer, when considering whether to charge, at that point takes into account whether there is a reasonable excuse, rather than it being subsequently resolved in a court case—although I also acknowledge the legal point made by the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Anderson, that it is not always simple to distinguish between the two. Nevertheless, the point is that the police officer should take into account a potential reasonable excuse defence before deciding whether to charge.

To summarise this debate, two noble Lords made points that I thought were particularly resonant. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, asked whether this was speciality legislation for ever more exotic offences that can be extremely annoying to the general public. As many noble Lords have said in this debate, there is existing legislation to deal with those offences, and there is scepticism that the police are feeling able to use the legislation that is already within their power. The noble Lord, Lord McDonald, challenged the Minister to give examples of the gaps in the existing laws: in fact, he defied the Minister to go ahead and give those examples.

I also want to comment briefly on my noble friend Lady Blower’s speech on Amendment 60, which of course I agreed with. I also agreed with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Balfe, that in the case of industrial action it should not be a reasonable excuse. The offences should never be charged in the first place. It is the same point, in a sense, that the potential use of a reasonable excuse should be taken into account right at the beginning of the process rather than once you get to a court case.

Although the amendments focus on particular detailed provisions in this Bill, I think a challenge has been laid down to the Minister to give examples and to say why this is necessary when we have a plethora of laws which are being used. The demonstrators on the M25 have moved on partly because of the sentences that have been given to them, so what is the necessity of pursuing this legislation?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, to which I have listened carefully. Before I turn to the specific amendments in the group, I shall start by setting out the case for Clauses 1 to 8 and why I disagree with the general thrust of many of the amendments that we are going to discuss today that seek to make these offences less effective.

Before I do that, I shall go on to a couple of general points. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said that this House had already rejected these measures, but one of the main criticisms that noble Lords made during the passage of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill was that the measures had not been debated in the House of Commons. The elected House has now had an opportunity to scrutinise this legislation and vote on the Government’s proposals and has supported its move into the House of Lords.

A number of noble Lords mentioned compatibility with the ECHR. I reaffirm that it is the Government’s view that the measures in this Bill are compatible with the ECHR, namely the rights to freedom of expression, assembly and association. However, these rights are not absolute. They do not extend to wreaking havoc on the lives of others. Of course, however, as with all existing public order powers, the police will absolutely need to act compatibly with the human rights of protesters when using those powers.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab Co-op)]

It appears from his general introduction that the Minister is going to proceed with this Bill. Surely, in the light of the overwhelming view on both sides of the House that existing legislation is entirely adequate—with one slight hesitation from the noble Lord, Lord Horam—it is a waste of the Minister’s valuable time and this House’s time to proceed with this. Will he now quickly have a rethink and withdraw this Bill?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Well, I thank the noble Lord for that, and the answer is, of course, no.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab Co-op)]

That is a very clear answer. I wonder whether the Minister could give, perhaps, a sentence or two of explanation as to why he does not think that it would be a wise move to withdraw this Bill, since all its aspects are already covered by existing legislation.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, it is reasonable to say at this point that we are about to have two days of quite detailed explanation on that, so I am afraid that that is as far as I can go on this.

Returning to the more general points that have been made so far in this debate, particularly as to why the police need these powers, what existing powers they have, and so on and so forth, we will be returning to this in a much later group, and I intend to speak in much more detail on it. From a general point of view, recent protests were clear that they had as their aim the intent of causing as much disruption as possible through the use of what can only be described as guerrilla tactics. These measures give the police the proactive powers necessary to respond to these dangerous and disruptive tactics quickly. We are going to work closely with our partners in the police to ensure that they have the support and resources in place that they need to use these powers.

Again, as my noble friend Lord Horam remarked, too often we have seen protesters acquitted on grounds of technicalities or get penalties that do not reflect the harm that they have caused to others. We want simple, stand-alone offences that ensure that those who cause this level of disruption and misery can be convicted and receive a penalty proportionate to the harm that they have caused. I will return more specifically to the legislation in a later group; I hope that will be acceptable.

To give one example of this type of behaviour, just two Just Stop Oil activists climbed the suspension cables of the Queen Elizabeth II bridge in the early hours of 17 October this year. They caused its closure for more than 36 hours. Once discovered, the Essex Police attended and closed the carriageway so that officers could safely leave their vehicles in an attempt to engage with the activists. It was later advised by National Highways to keep the road closed for the safety of the protesters, road users and responding partners. The closure of the carriageway meant that the entirety of the clockwise traffic from Essex to Kent that usually utilises the QE2 bridge had to be diverted through the east bore of the Dartford Tunnel, halving the usual counter-clockwise Kent-Essex traffic capacity that would normally use all the tunnels at the Dartford crossing. This had a number of knock-on impacts in terms of the emergency services and local communities and businesses. I am sure that we are all familiar with what those were.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, raised a hypothetical example of a landowner in respect of a tunnel.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Before the Minister continues, can he point to which part of this Bill would be deployed against the two Just Stop Oil activists who climbed on the QE2 bridge?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Well, we are about to go into a good deal of discussion about things such as serious disruption, key national infrastructure and so on, which form essential parts of this Bill. I am not a policeman, but I imagine that the police are perfectly capable of utilising those aspects of the Bill.

I come to the hypothetical example of the landowner that the noble Lord raised earlier. It is worth pointing out, in relation to the entire Bill, that the threshold is “serious disruption”. In the case that the noble Lord outlined, that is clearly not the case, so there would be no case.

I move on to the measures in Clauses 1 to 8. As well as the measures we will discuss next week, the police will have the proactive powers necessary to respond quickly to these dangerous and disruptive tactics.

I turn to the specific amendments in the group. Amendments 1, 7, 8, 24, 28, 29, 35, 39, 40, 55 and 59, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Paddick, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, Lord Skidelsky and Lord Coaker, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, seek to move the burden of proof for a reasonable excuse from the defendant to the prosecution, making it a key element of the offence. We will debate the subjects that the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, raised with regard to trade disputes in the fourth group today, so I will defer specific answers to those questions until the debate on that group.

Whether or not someone has a reasonable excuse for their actions is very specific to each particular incident, so we see it as entirely appropriate that the defendant, who has committed the offence in the first place and has personal knowledge of these facts, is required to prove them. It is also the case that the burden of proof resting on the individual is not a novel concept. There are multiple offences where this is the case, including—as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, pointed out—the defence of good reason for possessing a bladed article in a public place under Section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, raised the example of linking arms. Of course linking arms itself is not an offence; it is an offence and applicable only if the act

“causes, or is capable of causing, serious disruption to … two or more individuals, or … an organisation”.

Groups of protesters linking arms and obstructing roads or buildings can cause just as much disruption as those who use other equipment to lock on. For example, it is not right that groups of people who glue themselves to roads may fall under this offence but those who link arms and cause just as much disruption do not.

On the question from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, on why the burden of proof being on the defendant is in the public interest, we have seen people cause so much serious disruption and then continue to burden the prosecution with more and more requirements to prove things. Surely it is right that, where people have caused this kind of disruption, they should demonstrate that they had a reasonable excuse.

With these offences, the prosecution will still need to prove all the elements of the offence to the criminal standard of proof, including that the act

“causes, or is capable of causing, serious disruption”,

as I just explained, and that the defendant intended or was reckless as to serious harm disruption. For those reasons, I respectfully disagree with the amendments.

[Lord Skidelsky (CB)]

Does the Bill define serious disruption?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Again, we will come back to that in some detail in the debate on a later group. The amendments have been grouped thematically today so there will be a bit of overlap, for which I apologise. For now, I respectfully disagree with these amendments and ask that they not be pressed.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Will the Minister at some point explain to us why Section 78 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, introduced by this Government, does not meet exactly the requirements discussed in this Bill? It is not an ancient Act of Parliament but a new one, and it seems to me to fit the bill proportionately.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I commit to doing that in the debate on a later group.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Can the Minister address the issue of people being arrested and detained, and being allowed to deploy a reasonable excuse defence only once charged, as opposed to someone not committing an offence if they have a reasonable excuse, which is the normal process with most legislation?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I think I have gone into reasonable detail on the reasonable excuse situation, so I will rest my comments there for now.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am sorry to disagree with the Minister, but he addressed the issue of whether the burden of proof was on the prosecution or on the defence. He did not address, in any shape or form, police being allowed to arrest and detain people and their being allowed to deploy the reasonable excuse defence only once charged.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will come back to the noble Lord on that.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

If the Minister is going to come back to my noble friend, could he do so in this Chamber? That question is absolutely fundamental to the discussion on the Bill. To have the answer in writing, available in the Library if one goes to look for it, is in our view not adequate.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

This is Committee, so we are allowed this sort of debate. I want to reinforce what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said about Section 78 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act. It says:

“A person commits an offence if … the person … does an act, or … omits to do an act that they are required to do by any enactment or rule of law … the person’s act or omission … obstructs the public or a section of the public in the exercise or enjoyment of a right that may be exercised or enjoyed by the public at large, and … the person intends that their act or omission will have a consequence mentioned in paragraph (b)”.


That covers, completely and perfectly, the people on the gantry of the QEII Bridge. The maximum sentence for that activity is up to 10 years in prison. None of the provisions in this Bill goes anywhere near 10 years in prison. Why do the Government not rely on existing legislation rather than creating all these other offences?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I think I have already gone into that. As I say, the Bill creates another set of offences designed to deal with evolving protests, but I will come back on the specific point about the PCSC Act.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am almost speechless. I do not blame the Minister, but those briefing him really need to consider what we have been discussing today; we are talking about the rights and freedoms of people in this country, and it is a very serious issue.

I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this debate on the first group. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for, as always, bringing his policing expertise as well as his parliamentary skills to the debate. I also thank him for mentioning Charlotte Lynch, the LBC journalist who was arrested last week beside the M25 with a valid press card and with a microphone that was clearly branded with the name of her broadcaster. She offered her press card to the police, who then slapped handcuffs on her. They took her mobile phone from her and started scrolling to see who she might have been speaking to. Perhaps she had been tipped off about the protest by protesters; that is what journalists do in a free society. She was subjected to a body search and taken to Stevenage police station. She was detained in the police station in a cell with an open toilet and a simple bed for five hours, and was eventually let go without a police interview. Records show that they arrested her for the offence of “conspiracy to cause a public nuisance”. That happened under the existing law.

Now, without addressing concerns about incidents of that kind, and in the wake of what happened to Sarah Everard and all the crises there have been in public trust in policing in this country, the Government are proposing this suite of new offences—yet the Minister has not been able to identify the gap that those offences are supposed to address. That is a matter of considerable concern—a concern which was mentioned by almost every speaker in this debate, with the exception of the noble Lord, Lord Horam, and the Minister himself. The noble Lord, Lord Horam, called for clarity in the law, but I am afraid I was not totally clear which provisions or amendments he was addressing.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, gave a master class on issues of burdens of proof and reverse burdens, which are sometimes used in law. However, I remind the Minister that, when they are used in law, it is in relation to very tight offences that are problematic per se, such as carrying a blade or point in a public place. Most members of the public understand that that is not innocent activity; it is incumbent on somebody to explain why they needed to be carrying that knife in the street. That is not the case with carrying a bicycle chain or linking arms with a friend. That is innocent activity per se that is rendered criminal in certain circumstances, and so it is particularly dangerous to flip the burden of proof. Further, on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, it is essential that the person should be able to say to the police officer before they are arrested—not seven hours later, in Stevenage police station—that they have a legitimate reason for what they have done. I ask the Minister to think about Charlotte Lynch when he reflects on the powers that he is being asked to justify by others in this Chamber.

--- Later in debate ---

This has been a wide-ranging debate which has gone to the heart of a number of the issues within the Bill. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I once again thank your Lordships for all the contributions made in this debate. We turn to a series of amendments which seek to raise the threshold for the corresponding offences. Amendments 2 and 4 target the lock-on offence; Amendments 25 and 26 target the tunnelling offence; Amendments 36 and 37 target the offence of being present in a tunnel; and Amendment 54 targets the offence of obstruction of major transport works.

Before I deal with some of the questions concerning those amendments, I will just say two things. First, on the subject of the suffragettes, I entirely agree with the distinction the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, made between the protesters we see now and the suffragettes. Secondly, while we are slightly off the subject, I will make a few comments about the journalist who was arrested, who has been referred to twice. Clearly, the arrest of journalists lawfully reporting on events should not have happened—I want to make that very clear. I understand that an independent investigation into the arrests has been commissioned by the relevant police force. However, we do not agree that more powers will lead to further arrests of journalists: the issue lies with the training of journalists—a subject to which we will return.

[A noble Lord]

Police.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The training of police— I am sorry.

The scope of the offences is drafted as such to ensure that all kinds of behaviour that protestors engage in to cause misery and disruption can be captured. Amendments 2 and 4 would mean the offence would not account for situations where, for example, a person has locked on to a dangerous structure but is removed by the police before maximum disruption can be inflicted. Amendments 25 and 26 would mean the offence would not account for situations where, for example, a person has started creating a tunnel but is removed before maximum disruption can be caused. Amendments 36 and 37 would not account for situations where, for example, a person is present in a tunnel with the intent to cause serious disruption but is removed by the police before the tunnel can reach the designated area where maximum disruption can be inflicted.

Amendment 54, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, seeks to add a threshold of causing “significant disruption” to the offence of interfering with key national infrastructure. I am not sure whether the amendment should say “serious” disruption rather than “significant” disruption, as I note that the JCHR’s own explanatory statement stated the former. That would echo the threshold for other offences in the Bill. If Amendment 54 is intended to add a threshold of serious disruption, I would argue that while we assess that it is right for the lock-on offences and certain other protest-related offences to include serious disruption within their scope, we do not see it as necessary here.

As I have stated already, protestors have been able to cause huge damage to major projects such as HS2. While much attention has been focused on how protest activity across HS2 sites causes massive disruption to the project, protestors have also engaged in many more minor disruptive acts, such as disrupting ecological surveys, damaging construction vehicles or blocking access points to construction sites. While some of these acts may not meet the threshold of serious and/or significant disruption, they still have a significant impact on the project and its costs. The Government view such actions as serious and completely unacceptable criminal activity. The offence as drafted seeks to deter individuals from targeting these projects while giving the police powers that are more sufficient in order to respond.

Before I get onto the amendments dealing with serious disruption, I accepted the invitation of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, to read Section 78, and I will have a go at answering. Because many Just Stop Oil protesters have been arrested for public nuisance and obstruction of the highway, it has been asked why, in light of that, we need to introduce the measures in the Bill. The fact is that we are not solely interested in the process on the M25: the Bill was conceived before Just Stop Oil protesters were dangling off gantries. There are other unjustifiable protests, such as those targeting HS2, which I have just discussed. The criminal offences in the Bill extend to private land; currently, those who lock on or tunnel are only committing aggravated trespass, which carries a relatively low sentence. As it is a broad offence, I am sure that many here in the Chamber today would not welcome the sentences for aggravated trespass being increased. Finally, the pre-emptive measures in the Bill will improve the response to criminal protest. They were in fact conceived following discussion with the Metropolitan Police Service on what would have improved their response to Extinction Rebellion-style protests.

Amendments 3, 6, 17, 23, 27 and 38, all seek to provide a definition of serious disruption. I thank all noble Lords for these amendments, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Anderson—although I note that he is potentially deserting his—for our constructive engagement so far. I also thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for his thoughtful contribution to this debate.

I assure the House that I absolutely recognise the benefits that a clear definition of serious disruption could bring. However, we have faced some difficulties when trying to define serious disruption. That is because being too prescriptive in our definition risks creating a loophole which would provide those intent on causing as much disruption as possible an opportunity to evade arrest and prosecution. I would also say that, as drafted, some of these amendments offer a narrower definition of serious disruption than the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act provides for under

“serious disruption to the life of the community.”

None of that is to say that I dismiss the principle of these amendments. There is a balance to be struck between a definition which is too broad and one which is too prescriptive. We will consider these amendments in detail to ensure that they accurately reflect the disruption that the Government seek to target while providing clarity to the police and others, as many noble Lords have mentioned, and we will continue to work with all interested noble Lords on this important matter.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

Is there a prospect of the Minister coming up with definitions in time for Report, to prevent us having to discuss this all over again? It would be a great help if he could come forward with his definitions, if he is going to proceed along this line.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will certainly endeavour to—I can make no promises. I am sorry: the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked me about recklessness, which I forgot to answer. The definition of reckless is to capture those for whom we cannot prove that they intended to cause disruption but who were clearly happy to cause it. I hope that clarifies the matter to some extent. For now, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, made some very important points. He is a member of the Constitution Committee. He said that convictions for these offences could lead to more serious consequences such as serious disruption prevention orders and that some of the conditions that could be imposed under those orders are quite draconian, such as 12 months of electronic tagging. He made the important point that because the offences are very different in nature, there should perhaps be a tailored definition of serious disruption depending on what offence we are talking about.

The noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, made a very important point about creating ambiguity between the provisions in this Bill and Section 78 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. The Minister’s attempt to explain why Section 78 could not be relied on does not hold water. He started talking about offences of aggravated trespass and having low sentences, but Section 78 has a far more serious penalty than any of the offences contained in the provisions here, so I do not understand why we need new offences that have serious sentences attached to them when Section 78 can provide much stiffer penalties than any offence in this Bill. That does not seem to make any sense.

The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwell and Nottingham made an important point about places of worship. The noble Lord, Lord Hain, made an important point too. I greatly respect the role that he played in overturning apartheid in South Africa, but I am not sure he can say with confidence that what he did amounted to serious disruption when we do not have a definition of serious disruption in the Bill. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, supported by the Minister, talked about suffragettes and how they were very different from the protesters at this time, but that was not the point I was making. My point was that suffragettes locked on and the Government are saying that this new offence of locking on is a response to new tactics employed by protesters. Well, that is what the suffragettes did. That is the only point I was trying to make.

As for nothing being done, the police have been arresting stop oil protesters even before they have caused serious disruption. They have been arresting them for conspiracy to cause public nuisance. Whether it is for causing public nuisance under the famous Section 78 or highway obstruction, for which they can now be sent to prison, protesters are being remanded in custody by courts which are not confident that they would not go on to repeat the offences for which they have been arrested. Some of them have been sentenced to prison for highway obstruction. So I do not think it is the case that the police are not doing anything, or that existing legislation cannot be used effectively by the police.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, supported the idea of tailored definitions, hence his wavering, if I can put it that way, in terms of his own amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, reinforced the point about clarity and predictability. People need to know whether they are going to break the law if they do something, which is why we need these definitions.

The infamous Section 78 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act talks about serious harm, rather than serious disruption, but it is defined in the Act. So, if the Government can define serious harm in that Act, why can they not define serious disruption in this legislation? The noble Baroness, Lady Blower, talked about what the Minister said in the other place about there being a definition of serious disruption under the Public Order Act 1986. I agree with the noble Baroness that it is out of date and dubiously applicable in the circumstances set out in this Bill. Even the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, talked at Second Reading about the importance of clarity, and police witnesses at Committee stage in the other place said that as much precision as possible is desirable, yet the Minister seems completely ambiguous about whether the Government are going to define serious disruption in the Bill in response to the question asked by the noble and learned Lord. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, said that the National Police Chiefs’ Council is in favour of the definition of serious disruption to the life of the community put forward by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, so surely there is at least a lead for the Government to follow.

--- Later in debate ---

Many of us believe that the existing law works in many areas where the Government believe there are problems. So far the Minister has been unable to identify where the gaps are that the legislation seeks to fill. There are real concerns across the House about the implications for personal freedom and the ability to protest, and the Government need to come up with clear answers to some of the many questions that have been asked today.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this shortish debate. I have already spoken about the damage and disruption that these offences can cause. Narrowing the scope of these offences, as the amendments in this group seek to do, would restrict the ability of the police to stop individuals from causing unjustifiable amounts of disruption and harm.

Before I get on to the amendments, I agree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, about the scrutiny that this Bill deserves in this Chamber. I was merely clarifying an earlier point when I referred to its passage through the other place.

Amendment 5 provides a definition for the term “attached” in reference to the locking-on offence. We are fundamentally interested here in the disruption caused. The range of equipment used for locking on is extensive and ever changing. So, aside from bike locks, chains, cable ties and glue, police have also seen sophisticated devices that have been deliberately designed to be difficult and time-consuming to remove. Arm tubes involve protesters putting their arms through pipes containing concrete, steel or other materials that can either be released by the protester at will or require the police to use machinery to cut them free. Sometimes, such devices are designed to inflict harm on anyone who tries to remove them, placing the police in harm’s way. These devices are constantly evolving and designed to waste as much police time as possible. Given this, equipment that could be used in the course of, or in connection with, a locking-on offence is in scope. This could include locks and chains and large objects used to lock on, such as the bamboo structures that have featured in many protests. Specific equipment is not listed in the legislation as protesters can easily create new methods of locking on. Instead, referring to the act of locking on, and the serious disruption it causes, ensures this clause will remain relevant going forward.

Amendments 18, 19, 20, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 73, 74, 75, 76 and 77 seek to remove those acts which are taken “in connection” with these offences. I recognise the sentiment behind these amendments, but it is our view that it is vital that the full range of disruptive tactics that can be, and frequently are, deployed are captured to ensure our major transport works are protected.

With respect to the tunnelling offence, removing “in connection” would mean that those who carry items that are not strictly necessary for the construction or occupation of a tunnel are not in scope of this offence. The aim of the tunnellers is to cause disruption by delaying their removal for as long as possible. To achieve that, they will often create obstructions that will include, for example, coils of wire mesh and even nooses attached to the tunnel’s door to tie around their own necks. Items to make these are not themselves necessary for the commission of the other tunnelling offences, but I am certain that many in the House would agree that anyone carrying these items for these purposes should be in scope of the offence.

To use the obstruction of major transport works as an example, as I have already said, while many noble Lords will be familiar with the larger-scale protester action, many will be less familiar with the more minor acts of disruption that can start before construction even begins. Whether that is disrupting ecological surveys, removing or interfering with apparatus that is needed for construction, or blocking access to construction sites, all have a significant impact and can cause significant delays and additional costs to these works. For that reason, the scope of the offence is drafted as such to ensure all highly disruptive action are included in the scope.

Amendment 65, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, seeks to narrow the scope of the offence of interfering with key national infrastructure to include only those who interfere to a “significant” extent rather than “any extent”. Again, I understand the core sentiment behind this amendment, but I would like to remind noble Lords that the types of infrastructure regarded as key national infrastructure are those that this Government have identified as playing a vital role for the nation. This is also the infrastructure that is being targeted by protest groups who are intent on causing disruption of any kind. As such, it is important that key national infrastructure is protected using the existing threshold of the Bill.

In a similar vein, Amendments 66 and 67 seek to narrow the scope of what it means to prevent the use of, or operation of, key national infrastructure, so that it only refers to instances where significant delay is caused for the use or operation of the targeted infrastructure. As I have touched on already, there are many circumstances beyond significant delay that should be captured within this offence. For example, should protesters successfully reduce the output of oil from an oil terminal but not delay its delivery, we could still see heating switched off as supplies dry up. We therefore see it as wholly necessary that the full range of disruptive behaviours and acts are captured.

Amendment 68 and 78, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, would replace “newspaper printing infrastructure” with the term “communications” in the list of key national infrastructure on the face of the Bill. The list of key national infrastructure is based on sites that protesters have or are likely to target through their current tactics. Therefore, we do not believe it is necessary to add “communications”, as defined by the noble Baroness, into the list of key national infrastructure at present. However, as the noble Baroness will know—and we will definitely come to consider this in group six—the Bill does contain a delegated power that will allow us to amend this list as tactics and infrastructure evolve.

Amendments 70, 71, 72 and 79 seek to narrow the scope of the interference with key national infrastructure offence by altering the definitions provided for in Clause 8, including by removing B roads from the list of infrastructure in scope or by narrowing the definition of “printing presses”. The scope of the offence as drafted reflects the importance of the continued operation of the infrastructure as defined in Clause 8. Some B roads are lifelines for small towns and villages, and we see it as entirely right they should be included. Printing presses have been included to protect the distribution of print media and news. There are many publications which serve that purpose which are not newspapers.

Finally, I would probe noble Lords on what they deem as “essential” and “inessential” elements of infrastructure. Many elements that some deem inessential, such as signs along railways and roads, provide important information to train and car drivers and may be necessary to ensure the high standards of safety we expect in this country.

For those reasons, I disagree with these amendments and ask that they be withdrawn.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

Can the Minister help the Committee by saying how he would answer this question, and if he has asked himself this question? If he were one of the people carrying something that a constable challenged him for—maybe the padlock that I talked about earlier that a young couple were going to put on a bridge, or maybe a packet of cable ties—what would his answer be to the constable who challenged him? Does he think it would result in him not being charged?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, these things are judged on a case-by-case basis. It would depend entirely on where I was, what I was doing and also the intention as described in Clause 2 of the Bill.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I listened with great interest to the Minister’s reply to the Committee’s discussion on this. Could he explain why, rather than trying to define all these activities—this happening, that happening and this piece of equipment and so on—has he not sought to do it in terms of intent, and a requirement that before an offence is committed intent to cause disruption is demonstrated?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

That is captured. As I say,

“A person commits an offence if they have an object with them in a place other than a dwelling with the intention that it may be used in the course of or in connection with the commission by any person of an offence under section 1”.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

On this issue of intent, Clause 6 creates a criminal offence of obstructing “major transport works” but the Constitution Committee notes that unlike Clause 1, 3, 4 and 7, intent or recklessness are not required for an act to constitute an offence under Clause. Can the Minister explain why?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Not at this point, I will have to write to the noble Lord.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Bearing in mind the number of amendments, I worked out that the Minister spent 17 seconds per amendment in his response. I gave the example of a mobile phone that ended up on railway tracks interrupting national infrastructure and whether that was within the scope of the Bill. Does the Minister feel that his response has been comprehensive enough, on the very detailed questions he’s been asked?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am afraid I do.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. I have really enjoyed it and I think we are expecting some better answers in the future. The Minister said something about probing us on what we thought, but it is our job to probe him about what this legislation means. So far, it is not coming out very well.

Personally, I hope it gets thrown in the rubbish bin because, quite honestly, we are spending an awful lot of time and energy debating it when we know it is awful. It is not as if we can see a glimmer of hope that it might solve some problems. The Minister talked about the damage and disruption that these protesters are doing. In fact, the Government have done more damage and disruption to our social fabric than XR, Insulate Britain or Just Stop Oil could ever do. They have had 12 years and made the most horrendous mess.

Getting back to the Bill, the Minister did not answer my question about “attach”. I still do not know what “attach” means. I am happy to wait and hear a longer answer, if he has one, on another occasion.

Public Order Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 16th November 2022 Lords Chamber

It is not good legislation, even by the Government’s standards. Even if you think the Public Order Bill is a fantastic piece of new legislation that will solve the problems we face, it is not tight enough in definition or objective. That is unacceptable. On Report, a number of amendments will be made—I think they will be passed—and the Bill will, quite rightly, be sent back to the House of Commons to ask Members to think again. Of course, the House of Commons has a constitutional right to pass its Bill, but we have a constitutional right to tell it when it is wrong and to try to put right some of the inadequacies in the Bill as it stands.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, once again, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to the debate this evening. It has been a very lively and thoughtful discussion generally. I look forward—I think—to continuing to discuss these important issues next week. I first reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that I do not think she is rude. I may not agree, but I think the position she is coming from is highly principled. I also say to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that I do not think we have failed when it comes to definitions. We have committed to take that matter away and it is ongoing work.

The amendments in this final group take issue with the some of the offences listed in Clauses 1 to 8. Clause 1 is a key part of the Government’s plan to protect the public from the dangerous and disruptive protest tactic of locking on. Recent protests have seen selfish individuals seek to cause maximum disruption by locking themselves to roads, buildings, objects and other people. This has seen traffic disrupted, public transport delayed and the transport of fuel from terminals grind to a halt—to name just a few examples. Such tactics cause misery to the public, with people unable to access their place of work or their schools, or to attend vital hospital appointments.

I turn next to Clause 2, which is inextricably linked to Clause 1. During fast-moving protest situations, the police must be able to take necessary proactive action to prevent lock-ons occurring. Along with the associated stop and search powers, which the Committee will scrutinise later, this new offence will allow the police to prevent lock-ons before they occur and deter others from considering doing so.

Lastly, Clause 5, along with Clauses 3 and 4, is designed to make clear that the protest tactic of building tunnels to disrupt legitimate activity will not be tolerated. I am afraid there is a degree of repetition here, but projects such as HS2 have been targeted on multiple occasions by tunnels which have contributed to an enormous cost of £146 million to the project. Aside from the cost, these tactics are enormously reckless, putting not just protesters themselves at risk but those called upon to remove them and repair the damage inflicted.

There is one further amendment in this group: Amendment 69, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, which seeks to remove the delegated power for the Secretary of State to amend, add or remove the list of infrastructure in the legal definition of “key national infrastructure”. Throughout the debate, we have heard about ever-evolving protest tactics, targets and technology. We therefore see it as entirely right that Clause 7 is accompanied by a delegated power that will allow us to respond effectively to emerging threats. But I reassure the House that the power is subject to the draft affirmative procedure, thereby facilitating substantive parliamentary scrutiny.

Before concluding tonight’s debate, I will respond to speeches made by many noble Lords, but specifically the noble Lords, Lord Paddick, Lord Coaker and Lord Carlile of Berriew, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, about the necessity of the powers taken in the Bill. I have spoken about the three key general differences between the Bill and existing public order offences and legislation. First, it is about sentencing lengths; secondly, it is about offences that take place on private land; and, thirdly, it is about introducing more pre-emptive powers, providing the police with the ability to stop serious disruption before it happens.

It would be appropriate to acknowledge at this point that some of the commentary from the police is a little contradictory. Chief Constable Chris Noble, the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead on protests, said:

“There have been some very novel—without giving them any credit—and highly disruptive tactics; that is reflected on the contents page of the Bill. If we look across the breadth of protest organisations and groups, we see that they are very aware of some of the legal gaps, inadequacies and shortcomings; that is very clear from their engagement with police, as well as their tactics.”—[Official Report, Commons, Public Order Bill Committee, 9/6/22; col. 5.]


Of course we work with the police, and we will obviously continue to do so.

I will try to address some of the key existing offences that have been mentioned and talk about how the Bill differs and builds on these important offences. I turn first to Sections 12, 14 and 14ZA of the Public Order Act 1986, as amended by the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, which allows the police to place necessary and proportionate conditions on public assemblies and processions to prevent certain harms occurring—namely, serious disruption to the life of the community. These powers are for the safe management of large protests where many people assemble or march. They do not provide the police with the means to tackle non-violent direct action of the sort that Just Stop Oil engages in.

I turn now to public nuisance and obstruction of the highway offences. We are pleased to have put the public nuisance offence on to a statutory footing, and noble Lords are quite right that it can be used to deal with some of the highly disruptive protests that we have seen recently. As the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, indicated, both these and other criminal offences are currently being used to arrest and charge Just Stop Oil protesters.

But we have to remember that there are offences that can cause serious disruption but do not meet the threshold for the public nuisance offence, which is extremely high. At the moment, such protesters manage to find loopholes to get acquitted or are subject to low penalties. These new offences are therefore essential to give the police the powers that they need to deal with these offenders. Although many Just Stop Oil protesters have been arrested for public nuisance and obstruction of the highway, these offences do not necessarily apply to tactics such as those that have targeted HS2 Ltd. Therefore, new criminal offences covering tunnelling and locking on are necessary.

I turn to the offence of aggravated trespass, which criminalises intentionally obstructing, disrupting or intimidating others carrying out lawful activities on private land. The maximum penalty is three months’ imprisonment or a £2,500 fine, or both. This broad offence captures many activities that trespassers, protesters or others may engage in. The maximum penalty is not proportionate to the seriousness of some of the tactics used by protesters, which can put lives at risk. This is a broad offence that covers many non-protest behaviours, and it would not be appropriate to increase the maximum sentence for it. Therefore, new criminal offences that apply to private land are needed: locking-on, tunnelling and infrastructure-related offences.

I turn to stop and search. Section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 allows a constable to search individuals whom they reasonably believe are carrying something that could be used to commit specific criminal offences, including criminal damage. Furthermore, the police can search individuals after having arrested them. For example, after arresting Just Stop Oil protesters for conspiracy to commit public nuisance, the police searched their car and seized items suspected to be used in the course of the offence.

Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, queried the necessity of the measures given that HS2—which has experienced significant protest action at huge cost, as we have discussed many times—was able to secure a nationwide injunction. We agree that injunctions can be helpful for preventing the types of serious disruption we have seen, which is why we have introduced our own measure which provides a specific mechanism for a Secretary of State to seek an injunction against protest activity where it is in the public interest to do so. However, this is only one piece of the puzzle and we have seen from the M25 protests that injunctions do not necessarily stop people breaking the law.

I have tried to set out how the measures in the Bill will bolster the police powers to respond more effectively to disruptive and dangerous protests, to protect our key national infrastructure and major transport works from interference, and to better balance the rights of protesters with the right of the general public to go about their lives free from serious disruption and harm. For those reasons, I respectfully ask noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to all noble Lords for sticking it out and will try to be brief, given the hour. I am also particularly grateful to the Minister for reminding me that I did not speak to my Amendment 69, which, as he rightly said, would remove the ability to change the criminal offence of interfering with national infrastructure by adding further infrastructure. I stand by my concern that this kind of thing should not be done by way of secondary legislation, because it has such a profound effect on the rights and freedoms of people in this country to dissent peacefully. It would be very easy to abuse that power and it is not appropriate for secondary legislation. We will no doubt return to issues of powers of that kind at a later stage.

Once more, I must thank the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, for pointing out what the courts are having to grapple with: a burgeoning statute book with more and more offences, which police forces must deal with too. This menu of potential powers and offences just gets bigger by the year. The idea that, every time there is an innovative or novel protest, something must be done and there will be a new offering of legislation is not a coherent way to operate the rule of law in a constitutional democracy. Lots of dangers will come from this.

I take the point about the police service not speaking as one on any of these issues, and maybe it should not. I was particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for pointing out, as a former police officer, that there is quite a strength of police opinion and scepticism about the powers in the Bill. I was also grateful to him for reminding me that the offence of going equipped for locking on is, in a way, even worse than the offence of locking on. Locking on is incredibly broad, as I think the Minister accepted in some of his earlier responses. Yes, linking arms is sometimes terribly disruptive too, but going equipped for locking on is a proper thought crime and one of the reasons I am particularly concerned about that offence. It is a thought crime that is supportive of a crime that is, in itself, incredibly broad and will, theoretically, capture some activities that some people think are just natural to humans and innocent.

I was grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for addressing a very important process point. I totally understand the need for Ministers to write to noble Lords later, particularly in answer to the Questions we have each day. However, writing later should not be a central tactic of defending and promoting a Bill that has been some time in gestation. I was grateful to the Minister and his colleagues for coming up with a little more about the existing statute book in the latter part of this evening, but that will require a lot more examination. I know that noble Lords in Committee will be reading Hansard very carefully tomorrow and there will be more to discuss about that.

Ultimately, there are some protesters who, rightly or wrongly, care so much about the climate catastrophe, race equality, Brexit or whichever other issue that they are prepared to go to prison. There are some in that category for whom there is no new offence that will prevent their actions. So be it; that is life.

What I am concerned about, with the ever expanding public order statute book, are the people who are not in that category and who will get caught up in this kind of thing, as happened last week to the journalist who was detained for, in total, about seven hours, with five in a police cell, just for reporting on the protests. When you keep adding to police powers, adding to the public order statute book and catching more and more innocent activity, more injustice will follow. It will not be about catching the people who we all agree are going too far sometimes—and who are prepared to go too far for their cause; that is their conscience. There will be more and more innocent bystanders—journalists, people from racial minorities—who get caught up in this very broad blank cheque that noble Lords and Ministers are proposing to hand to the police. The police are from us; they are a part of our community and are imperfect as we are. It is not fair to hand this blank cheque to them and, when it goes wrong, to blame them. We have that on our conscience if we pass these powers.

Scammers

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Tuesday 15th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)]

My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Morrow, and with his permission, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in his name on the Order Paper.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, fraud awareness-raising activity takes place across government, law enforcement and the private and charity sectors. The Government provide free advice to the public online and via communications campaigns, including from Action Fraud, the Financial Conduct Authority’s ScamSmart, National Trading Standards’s Friends Against Scams, and the National Cyber Security Centre’s Cyber Aware.

[Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)]

I thank the Minister for his response. Unfortunately, I have in the past had to assist some who have been victims of such vile crimes, having been scammed out of considerable sums of money. Therefore, I am too aware of the trauma this causes. Does he agree that banks need to accept more responsibility when their clients have lost money from their accounts—sometimes their whole life savings—to these ruthless scammers?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I absolutely agree. I also point out that banks are heavily involved with the awareness campaigns. Many noble Lords will no doubt have seen a recent advert put out by Santander to stop scammers which features Ant and Dec, when they are not busy in the jungle. Also, the Scams Prevention and Support Programme, delivered by Age UK and funded by Lloyds Bank, is aimed at older people and helps them to spot and understand scams, and to take action to protect themselves from becoming a scam victim. Of course, I also agree that it is emotionally devastating to be a victim of these crimes.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, today the National Audit Office published a report on fraud, which says in terms that the Government do not have the data they need to understand the full scale of the problem and are unable accurately to measure the impact of their own policies on this growing area of crime, which is 41% of crime in this country. A spokesperson for the Government said, as we can expect:

“This government is absolutely committed to cracking down on fraud and economic crime”


and that the NAO’s recommendations will be “reflected” in the “upcoming fraud strategy”. What on earth use is a fraud strategy based on data that is now six years old?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord is quite right: the Home Office is leading work on a fraud strategy. The Prime Minister referred to it in the other place as recently as 2 November. We intend to publish on that shortly. It will consider all the possible tools required to go after fraudsters and to protect those who are most vulnerable. The strategy’s other aims will be to stop and block frauds being carried out, and to improve law enforcement. Considerable money is being invested in improving data collection, as well as law enforcement capability.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, of the £580 million taken from people through authorised push payment scams last year, less than half was reimbursed to victims. Banks say that people should be more careful, but this is unacceptable given the sophistication of these schemes and how rife they are. Will the Government replace the voluntary industry code on authorised push payments with a statutory code, including an obligation to reimburse victims unless there is clear evidence that they are at fault?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I have slightly different figures for the number of victims who were reimbursed. I am told that up to the year ending June 2022, 71% of victims got fully reimbursed. On the code to which the noble Lord referred, in 2021 the Payment Systems Regulator consulted on further measures to combat APP fraud. It proposed that all payment service providers must reimburse victims of APP scams where the victim is found not to have been grossly negligent. It is also worth pointing out some other legislative activity. In November 2021, the then Economic Secretary to the Treasury announced that the Government would remove any legislative barriers through the Financial Services and Markets Bill to enable the regulator to act to make reimbursement mandatory. That Bill is currently in Committee, and the PSR is currently consulting further on the mechanism for reimbursement.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

My Lords, this really is not good enough. The National Audit Office issued a helpful report five years ago on fraudulent scammers, which has been ignored by successive Ministers and Secretaries of State. This second devastating report, which my noble friend Lord Browne referred to, has found “limited” action taken by the Home Office to tackle a crime that is profoundly impactful on nearly 4 million people every year at a cost of £4.7 billion. Fewer than 5,000 prosecutions were launched last year. Many of the victims of this terrible crime are elderly. When is the Home Office going to re-examine its priorities and come up with a proper and effective plan that genuinely protects people from scammers, which our party and the National Audit Office have been demanding for the past seven years?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I have already said, the National Audit Office report is going to inform the new fraud strategy. I reassure noble Lords that this is taken incredibly seriously. Alongside the fraud strategy that is due to be published shortly, we are providing more than £10 million to the City of London Police to upgrade Action Fraud, which has come under some criticism in the past. Next year, a new user-friendly and accessible reporting tool and website will be launched, offering an improved experience for victims and simpler pathways to access further support and guidance. Overall, £400 million is being allocated to economic crime, of which £100 million is being spent on the prevention of fraud.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I have been privileged to be a member of your Lordships’ Fraud Act 2006 and Digital Fraud Committee which reported on Friday. I commend the report to the Minister and hope he has read it. One of the findings, which I think surprised all of us, is that it is not in fact the elderly who are most at risk from fraud but young people, who are also at risk of becoming money-laundering mules. Will the Government consider strengthening financial education for primary and secondary school children to equip them with the tools they need to stop being victims?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord is quite right: in the year to March 2022 people aged over 75 were less likely to be a victim of fraud than those aged between 16 and 74. He makes an extremely good point and I will take it back to the Department for Education.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, the report to which the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, referred states that

“all people have the capacity to become victims of fraud, regardless of perceived vulnerability.”

The House needs to understand that financial crime destroys lives and destroys families. Will the Government give an unambiguous commitment to include protection against financial harm in the Online Safety Bill?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I have already outlined some of the legislative work going on, and I am not going to unequivocally commit to doing anything in other Bills at the moment. I will go on to one other point which perhaps refers to the previous question: one of the more effective tools at the moment is Friends Against Scams, to which I referred in my opening Answer. It is run by National Trading Standards and encourages people to educate others about fraud. People sign up, do an online training course and then share it. More than 1 million people have signed up. That sort of work is very valuable.

[Lord Kamall (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend has rightly said that there is quite a lot of information online if you think you have been subject to fraud. Some of those sites encourage you to report a suspicious email or text, but do not do any more than that except say that they will remove it for you. What more can we do to direct people to websites that can actually help people who feel they have been a victim of fraud?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The National Cyber Security Centre launched its suspicious email reporting service to remove harmful scams online, and it is seeing high levels of success. As of October 2022 it had taken down more than 105,000 scams across 192,000 URLs. Another thing that the Government have done is the National Economic Crime Centre’s department dedicated to ensuring consistency of messaging. I will make sure it is aware of my noble friend’s suggestion.

[Lord Birt (CB)]

My Lords, for many years I was chairman of PayPal Europe. Working with the global head of security, I tried extremely hard to engage the British Government on this issue. With the Cabinet Office, the Home Office and the law enforcement authorities, there was absolutely no traction whatever. No real interest was taken in it. Can the Government now reliably estimate the enormous scale of online fraud, then a contagion and now an epidemic? To what degree are the Government bearing down on the offenders, who operate globally as well as nationally? Can the Minister tell us how many scammers were successfully prosecuted for online fraud in the last year for which figures are available?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid I cannot. I will endeavour to find the appropriate statistic. There is a problem about the collection of statistics—the noble Lord, Lord Browne, referred to it earlier—which is to do with differences of collection across the four nations, I am afraid. However the noble Lord, Lord Birt, is quite right: it is obviously a serious proportion of crime. I reassure noble Lords once again that the Government are taking this very seriously. As I said earlier, on 2 November the Prime Minister led on this.

Football Spectators (Relevant Offences) Regulations 2022

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Tuesday 8th November 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That the Regulations laid before the House on 5 and 22 September be approved.

Relevant document: 13th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. Considered in Grand Committee on 3 November.

Motions agreed.

Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (Consequential Amendments) (No. 2) Regulations 2022

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Tuesday 8th November 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That the draft Regulations laid before the House on 13 October be approved. 15th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, keeping the public safe is a top priority for the Government. Deprivation of citizenship, where it is conducive to the public good, is reserved for those who pose a threat to the UK or whose conduct involves very high harm. It is key to our ability to preserve the UK’s national security. Noble Lords will recall that the deprivation measures in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 attracted much considered and thorough debate. This House and the other place agreed that in cases where the Secretary of State intends to make a deprivation order on the grounds that it is conducive to the public good, without giving notice, an application must be made to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, which will consider the Secretary of State’s reasons not to give notice.

Implementation of this process requires amendments to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (Procedure) Rules 2003, which are made and amended by the Lord Chancellor. To create the necessary power to amend these rules we first need to amend the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997, which is the purpose of this instrument. Today, we are taking a significant step toward implementing the safeguards created in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 that this House agreed to. I therefore trust that noble Lords will support the draft regulations and I commend them to the House. I beg to move.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for explaining this statutory instrument. As he said, deprivation of citizenship, particularly without notice, is a very serious issue. We fought hard to get the safe- guards in the Nationality and Borders Act in place. We are concerned about any move away from open justice, but we understand that there may be circumstances where a refusal of entry as a worker may require a hearing before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. My reading of the other regulation is that it is a technical change, and on that basis we support these regulations.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, we opposed the clause in the Act that sought to extend the power of the Secretary of State to deprive citizenship without giving a reason or telling a person that it has happened. We voted to remove that clause, as we were not convinced by the Government’s arguments that the power they were seeking was just and proportionate. However, we supported significant amendments, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has just pointed out, which were accepted by the Government, to add safeguards to the process. I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for his leadership on those amendments. As far as that is the case, we accept that the regulations before us today comprise one of those necessary and proportionate safeguards being implemented.

I remind the Chamber that the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, restricted the range of circumstances in which notice can be withheld, introduced various judicial safeguards and said that the Secretary of State should review those safeguards. The Explanatory Memorandum states:

“This instrument is the first stage in establishing”


the process of application to SIAC and:

“Once the procedure rules are made … applications … can commence.”


We would like to know the timeline for this. How many other stages are there, given that the Government say this is the first stage and given the controversy there was about the introduction of this power and the fact that the House voted for the inclusion of these safeguards, which enabled the clause to be passed? When are all these safeguards going to be put in place? Can the Minister explain what the current procedure is? Is there any use of this power at the moment without these safeguards?

With those brief comments, we support this SI as proposed by the Government.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful for this short debate. I appreciate the strength of feeling about deprivation of citizenship, but I feel I need to repeat what I said earlier: maintaining our national security is a priority for this Government. On the specific point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, this is very much about the mechanics of how a deprivation decision is conveyed to the individual concerned, and it recognises that it may not be possible to give notice in certain exceptional circumstances. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked specific questions about when it starts. I cannot answer him at this moment, so I will write on that point, and to explain more clearly exactly how it happens now, if that is acceptable.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister. Given the importance of this issue, will he place a copy of that letter in the Library? I think all noble Lords would like to know those answers.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Absolutely; I am very happy to do that.

Given that we seem to have arrived at a conclusion, to finish, this instrument is the first step in creating the important safeguards which will hold the Government to account in relation to decisions to deprive a person of citizenship without giving them notice. As I said earlier, a separate instrument amending the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (Procedure) Rules 2003 will be laid in due course, but for now I beg to move.

Motion agreed.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (Offensive Weapons Homicide Reviews) Regulations 2022

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Tuesday 8th November 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That the draft Regulations laid before the House on 13 October be approved. 15th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, keeping people safe is the Government’s top priority. We must use every tool at our disposal to stop lives being lost to serious violence. Offensive weapons homicide reviews were introduced by the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 to support local agencies in working together to identify lessons that will help prevent future deaths. The Act places a duty on the relevant review partners to conduct an offensive weapons homicide review in certain circumstances where a person aged 18 or over dies and an offensive weapon was used. It is the intention to pilot these new reviews for a period of 18 months, beginning in early 2023, in specified areas in London, the West Midlands and Wales before any national rollout.

The regulations provide that the relevant review partners will be the local authority, police, and integrated care boards in England, or local health boards in Wales, from the area where the death occurs or, where the location of death is not known, where the body of the person is found. The regulations are intended to provide them with the detail they need to establish when a review must be carried out. The regulations clarify that not every homicide involving an offensive weapon will necessarily require a review. It will be necessary for one or more of the review partner agencies to have or reasonably be expected to have relevant information about the circumstances or background of the victim or suspected perpetrator that is likely to be pertinent to the purpose of the review. This will ensure that resources are not directed to cases where little or no relevant learning is likely to be found. It will also capture homicides where the identity of the victim or a suspected perpetrator is known, ensuring that homicides with circumstances that suggest that lessons can be learned to help prevent future homicides should qualify.

The regulations will allow the Secretary of State to direct which partners are the relevant ones to conduct a review, should there be uncertainty in any case. While we do not expect this power to be used often, it is important in ensuring that there are no instances where there is nobody responsible for leading the review. The regulations also make it clear that a review is not required where the death is a

“death or serious injury matter”

within the meaning of Section 12(2A) of the Police Reform Act 2002. This will exclude deaths caused by a police officer who, in the course of their duties, uses an offensive weapon and an individual dies. This will be subject to an investigation by the relevant police force or the Independent Office for Police Conduct. Finally, the regulations allow the review partners to delegate specified functions to one of themselves or to another person, including a third party, to lead or chair the review.

Reducing homicide and serious violence is a top priority for the Government. These draft regulations, in supporting the introduction and piloting of new offensive weapons homicide reviews, will deepen our understanding of serious violence, improve our response to it and, ultimately, save lives. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I join the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in thanking the Minister for the withdrawal of the SI with respect to serious violence prevention orders. He is to be commended for that, and we are very grateful that he has thought again about it.

We supported these provisions to extend homicide reviews to offensive weapons cases during the passage of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act and we welcome that the provisions are being piloted before being rolled out. We also welcome the fact that the Act requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament on the operation of the pilot before a further rollout can take place. Again, that is a very sensible way forward for this legislation.

To build on some of what the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked, the Explanatory Memorandum states:

“It has been estimated that 72 OWHRs may take place across the pilot areas throughout the 18 month pilot.”


It would be interesting to know how the Government have worked that number out, and again, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked, how the various pilot areas have been identified by the Government.

On funding, the Explanatory Memorandum states that the number of anticipated reviews

“includes a 20% optimism bias to ensure funding for all necessary reviews is available. Costs to the Home Office per review have been estimated as £1,222 to each of the three relevant review partners (totalling £3,666) and £8,688 for an independent chair.”

Again, how have those figures been arrived at? For clarity, can the Minister confirm that the review partners will be fully funded by the Home Office for their work on such reviews, and does that include staffing costs?

One of the issues raised during the Bill’s passage was that recommendations made in existing reviews, such as domestic homicide reviews or indeed the under-18 reviews that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, just referred to, are too often not acted on or shared as they should be to force change and create improvement. That is the whole point of the reviews: to inform practice and for people to learn.

I know that the Government intend to establish and fund the Home Office oversight board to oversee the introduction of the offensive weapon homicide reviews and to monitor and implement recommendations. The Explanatory Memorandum references the funding of the oversight board. However, can the Minister give us any other details about the crucial point? Once the review has happened and various recommendations have been made, how are those recommendations to be followed through so that the learning from the review is implemented by all the various partners? It would also be interesting if the Minister could say a little more about what the membership of that oversight board is likely to be and whether there are any functions that he could share with us. On relevant review partners, they can appoint a lead agency or an independent chair to take forward the review. Will all relevant review partners involved in a particular case be required to agree to this course of action?

I will address just a couple of specifics from the legislation—I know it is unusual in the Chamber, but this is effectively an SI that would normally be in Grand Committee. Part 2 of the legislation deals with the duty to arrange an offensive weapons homicide review. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made a really important point: who triggers the review? It is not clear to me from reading Part 2 of the legislation who does it. It just talks about all the various partners. However, somebody has to say that there should be a review and seek to have one take place. I do not know whether the noble Lord or any other Members of your Lordships’ House noticed that, but I could not see it. Unless I have misread it, not understood it or not seen it somewhere, I cannot see who triggers that review. That is important for the reason that the noble Lord mentioned. If it is a chief police officer, what happens if, bluntly, they do not want to, or it is the local authority and it does not want to, or it is the health body, which is the other statutory partner, and it does not want to because it is not in its interests?

For reasons of transparency, the difficult questions sometimes need to be asked. People would rather they were not asked, and it is not clear to me from reading Part 2 who has the duty to do that and what happens if they do not fulfil that duty when other partners think they should. It would be helpful if the Minister could explain that to us.

As I said, given that this is equivalent to what would normally take place in the Grand Committee room, I want to ask about the conditions that may trigger a review obligation. The conditions are that

“one of the following has been located— … the body of the person who died”;

I understand if the body of the person who died is located, but, for the second trigger, it says,

“or part of the body of a person who died.”

I am not trivialising this, but what do we mean by a part of a body? Without going into detail, fairly obviously, there is a difference between the whole of a top half and a toe. Again, I am not trivialising this, but it would be helpful for our understanding of the legislation to know what a “part” means.

I join the Minister and, no doubt, every Member of your Lordships’ House, in saying that we all want a reduction in the level of homicides, for whatever reason. Hopefully, a review of what has happened with respect to homicide through the use of offensive weapons will inform practice in future which will lead to a reduction in the number of homicides. On that, can the Minister tell us what is the trend at the moment for the number of homicides using offensive weapons, so that we have some understanding of the scale of the problem?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Once again, I thank noble Lords for their thoughtful contributions and questions, and I shall do my very best to answer all the points raised.

Both noble Lords asked about the pilot areas. It will perhaps help if I clarify what the areas are and how they were chosen. In London, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, highlighted, they are the boroughs of Barnet, Brent, Harrow, Lambeth and Southwark. In the West Midlands, they are Birmingham and Coventry, and in Wales it is the South Wales Police force area, which includes Swansea, Neath, Port Talbot, Bridgend, Rhondda, Merthyr Tydfil, Cardiff and the Vale of Glamorgan. The pilot is being focused on the local authorities within those three areas that, combined and based on historical data over the past five years, it is estimated may expect approximately 50 to 75 homicides of adults involving an offensive weapon during the pilot. I fear I cannot answer the question of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about coterminous borders with police and crime commissioner areas, but I will endeavour to find out whether there is an answer and, if there is, I shall write to him.

As for the proportion of homicides, that is a very good question. In 2021-22, there were 709, so it is up to about 10%, notionally, covered by the areas of the pilots. I would say that the homicide levels of recent years have been affected by the pandemic, and the numbers are skewed by mass victim incidents, to some extent. In 2020-21, obviously Covid-affected, there were 568 homicides. In 2019-20, there were 716, but 39 of those involved the lorry in Essex. The numbers are a bit confused in that way. I will endeavour to find out how many involved serious weapons, because, unfortunately, I do not know the answer—I apologise.

Both noble Lords asked about the relevant review partners and how they were identified. As I said, homicide reviews are intended to be an important tool in helping local partners tackle serious violence and homicide. When a death occurs in an area, it is right that the review partners in that area are involved in the review of the death. They will provide the local intelligence and help spot local patterns and trends and identify opportunities to intervene and prevent future deaths. Local partners are most likely to be involved in the lives of those involved in the death, to have information relevant to the question of whether a review is required and to identify opportunities for interventions in future.

We therefore think it important that the responsibility for establishing and conducting these reviews rests with local partners. By reducing ambiguity as to who those partners are, we are ensuring that the reviews begin as soon as possible following the death, while Section 29 of the Act provides the assurance that, if individuals involved in the death live or lived in other areas, an input is required from those other areas; that relevant information can be disclosed to them for the purpose of the review.

In terms of what happens if one of the review partners refuses to conduct a review, again, I am afraid that I will have to write to noble Lords because I am not quite sure of the answer.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

That is a really important point, so I thank the Minister for referring to it, but who starts the process? The Minister talked about somebody refusing to take part, but who kicks the process off? Who says, “We should have a review”? Is it any of them? I do not understand the process for that.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I understand the question. I will write to the noble Lord on that, if I may, to make sure that I do not get it wrong; I think I have the answer, but I would not want to give incorrect information.

Both noble Lords asked how the Home Office oversight board will work. It will be a non-statutory committee composed of experts in safeguarding, homicide, serious violence and public protection. They will oversee the local delivery of the offensive weapons homicide reviews, monitor the implementation of any findings and support the dissemination of learning both locally and nationally. We are currently in the process of appointing the chair and first member of the board with the final six members due to be in place for early 2024, ready for when the first OWHR reports are received.

The purpose of the oversight board is to oversee the local delivery of the reviews; to ensure consistency in criteria and approach by reviewing and assessing completed reviews; to draw together the reviews at a national level to assess and disseminate common learnings, themes, issues in service provision and areas of good practice at set intervals; to monitor the regional and national application of learning and the implementation of recommendations in policy, approach and delivery; and to share best practice and wider insight through learning events and opportunities. The membership will include representatives from areas such as local government, public health, the police, education, the voluntary and community sectors, probation services and the Crown Prosecution Service, as well as a representative from one of those areas with experience of working in Wales.

Both noble Lords asked about the funding for the reviews. The Home Office will provide the funding for the relevant review partners and the work they carry out to deliver an offensive weapons homicide review during the pilot. It will also meet the cost of the oversight board that I have just described. If the policy is rolled out nationally, the funding arrangements will be confirmed after the pilot. The costs of a homicide review vary as every homicide has a unique set of circumstances; each review will have to account for these. Based on existing reviews, we estimate that a homicide review will have an average cost of £12,354. We also anticipate that the Home Office oversight board will cost approximately £230,000 over the course of the 18-month pilot. Review partners will receive funding to cover the cost of work that they carry out in establishing and running these homicide reviews during the pilot, and details of how the budget will be allocated will be confirmed as the pilot is designed with local partners.

I think I have answered the questions I am able to—

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am slightly confused about the figures that the Minister gave. I think he referred to the death of a large number of migrants in the back of a lorry skewing the homicide figures. I asked about the proportion of offensive weapon homicides in the pilot areas compared with the number of offensive weapon homicides in total, unless—I think this would be rather unusual—in the case of the deaths in the back of a lorry, the lorry was considered to be an offensive weapon, which I am sure it is not.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

No, that is not what I meant to imply. I do not have the numbers on homicides involving offensive weapons; I have committed to write to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on that, so I will of course copy the noble Lord in.

I thank noble Lords for their constructive and helpful questions. These regulations represent an effective, balanced approach for offensive weapons homicide reviews. By improving our understanding of the circumstances, drivers and causes that lead a person to take another person’s life, we can, I hope, improve our ability to tackle homicide and ultimately save lives. On that basis, I commend the regulations to the House.

Motion agreed.

Football Spectators (Relevant Offences) Regulations 2022

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Thursday 3rd November 2022 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That the Grand Committee do consider the Football Spectators (Relevant Offences) Regulations 2022.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, this is a simple but important measure, which will ensure that those convicted of football-related offences involving class A drugs can be subjected to football banning orders. We had been on a long-term downward trend when it came to football disorder. However, we have just had a football season which saw more football-related arrests than in any of the previous seven seasons. Sadly, it is clear that, after pandemic restrictions were lifted, some football fans have concertedly pushed at the unlawful boundaries of safety and security, and this includes taking cocaine while attending football.

The police have been clear that they have seen an increase in drug-fuelled disorder at regulated football matches. This backs up the conclusions of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, who was commissioned by the Football Association to undertake an independent review surrounding the completely unacceptable disorder by England football fans seen at the Euro 2020 final. The noble Baroness found that cocaine use was rife during Euro Sunday, and witnesses on the day were terrified by the reckless and aggressive behaviour of some fans. Unfortunately, this trend has continued since the Euro 2020 final. A recent study found cocaine traces on nearly all tested toilet cisterns at a major football ground, and the police have found it necessary to carry out matchday operations to seize drugs at football matches and arrest individuals. Cocaine use is highly harmful to both the user and those around them. There is a clear nexus between those who are under the influence of class A drugs and those who have propensity to cause trouble.

A football banning order is an effective tool to help to combat this rise in football-related disorder. We want to be clear that anybody causing trouble at football matches is liable to a ban from all regulated football matches for between three and 10 years. Football banning orders have historically proved successful in preventing known troublemakers continuing to offend and deterring others from offending. This is an important point: we want to prevent offenders attending matches and deter others from future offending. Watching football is not a crime, obviously, but commit crime at football, spoil the match experience for everyone else, and you are not welcome and will be prevented from attending.

The instrument contains a measure to address this; it will ensure that those who turn up to football matches in possession of class A drugs or intending to supply class A drugs to others will be subject to football banning order proceedings following conviction. This will give the police an effective tool to combat the rise in drug use seen at football matches. Police data shows that there were over 140 reported arrests for drug offences during the 2021-22 football season. We cannot allow decent football fans to be frightened of attending matches, or football stadia to become unsafe.

I reassure your Lordships that this order has the backing of the Football Association, the Premier League, the English Football League and the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for football policing. I know your Lordships will recognise the detrimental effects that class A drug supply, possession and use can have at a football match, and I hope that your Lordships support this measure to combat these offences that have contributed to a rise in football-related disorder. I commend this order to the Committee and beg to move.

[Lord Faulkner of Worcester (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the statutory instrument and thank the Minister for introducing it so clearly. I regret that it is necessary. It is depressing that, according to the official statistics published by the Home Office on 22 September, the incidence of football-related disorder is at its highest level for some years—a fact that the Minister referred to. There were 2,198 football-related arrests under Schedule 1 to the Football Spectators Act 1989 in the 2021-22 football season—around 59% higher than those in the 2018-19 pre-Covid season and comparable to the levels seen in the 2011-12 and 2013-14 seasons. A new factor is the incidence of drug-taking at football matches, hence the reason for this order.

Those of us who were involved with the efforts of the football bodies and the Government to tackle what was described as hooliganism associated with the game in the 1980s and 1990s knew that alcohol played a huge part in many of the events that shamed English football at that time. Your Lordships may have seen that there is currently a three-part series of programmes on Channel 4 on Monday evenings which centre on the Italia 90 World Cup. They remind us how dire the reputation of English fans at home and abroad then was.

We had hoped that this was all behind us, but quite obviously that is not so. That impression is reinforced if one studies the excellent independent report produced for the FA by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey of Blackstock, on the events surrounding the Euro final at Wembley on 11 July 2021, to which the Minister referred. This was the subject of a Private Notice Question I asked on 6 December—almost a year ago now—in which I said:

“She makes it clear in her report that we shall never know for sure how close we came to a huge disaster involving major loss of life, caused by 6,000 ticketless fans outside the stadium who were ready to storm inside had England won the penalty shootout.”—[Official Report, 6/12/21; col. 1641.]


Contained in the noble Baroness’s report were a number of comments about drug-taking. For example, page 26 says:

“Eyewitness accounts given to the media in the immediate aftermath of Euro Sunday state that there was use of drugs, in particular cocaine, among the crowd. These are supported by the Review’s survey, which suggests illegal-drug taking must have been widespread and taken place in plain sight. More than 3,500 respondents (47 per cent) said they saw illegal drug taking when they arrived at Wembley.”


As the noble Baroness pointed out, and the Minister has confirmed today,

“Football Banning Orders (FBOs) can be given to supporters in relation to alcohol misuse. Offences include ‘possession of alcohol or being drunk while entering/trying to enter a ground’. But there is no equivalent provision for drugs”—

so far. As the Casey report says on page 117,

“drug use in football stadiums is a growing concern for football and policing officials.”

She cites the finding of cocaine traces on almost all the toilet cisterns of a major football ground.

Unsurprisingly, the noble Baroness said in recommendation 5 that

“the Home Office should consider … ensuring that the FBO regime to ensure drugs-related disorderly behaviour is treated in the same way as alcohol-related disorder”.

This SI implements that recommendation, and therefore I welcome it. I hope that the Minister will be able to confirm that the Government are taking equally seriously the other recommendations contained in the noble Baroness’s outstanding report.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I too thank the Minister for introducing this statutory instrument, which we support. I declare an interest as a sitting magistrate who has fairly regularly put in place football banning orders for various reasons. As the noble Lord said, this is about adding the possession or supply of class A drugs at football matches as a reason for giving a football banning order.

We welcome the work that the police have done with the football authorities to reduce violence and drug-fuelled behaviour at games, although I note the figures that the Minister and my noble friend Lord Faulkner gave about the deteriorating situation in recent years. As my noble friend said, it used to be so much worse back in the 1990s.

When was this matter first raised? Was it really as a result of the European final that it came starkly to the attention of Ministers, or were there concerns before that? Also, is there any evidence of similar concerns or problems with other major sports, such as cricket or rugby? Obviously we are talking about football banning orders, but how wide does this problem go?

Has there been any wider work done on why these problems seem to be worsening? Is it because of drug use, or are there other problems behind it? Is this being investigated by the Home Office? Is it that drugs are more generally available? There has been an increase in drug-related deaths in England and Wales in recent years, and we know that communities and children’s lives are being blighted by county lines gangs. What is being done to tackle the supply of drugs reaching fans and to ensure that police forces have the resources to support specialist drug enforcement teams and take action on recognising child criminal exploitation?

A football match should be a safe, accessible, enjoyable experience for fans of all ages, so what wider work is being done by the Home Office to encourage safe and positive environments for sports fans? We of course support the statutory instrument, but my questions go a bit wider, to other sports and to how this impacts on drug policy as a whole. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken and particularly note the widespread support for this measure, which is as it should be. I am sure we all agree that there is no place for class A drugs or the disorder they give rise to at football matches. This simple, practical measure to tighten the law will ensure that the football banning order regime properly encompasses those who commit drug offences related to football. I take particular note of the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, on the dangers of cocaine misuse.

I will try to address some of the specific points that your Lordships raised. The noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, quoted the statistics; I will go into a little more detail on those. Official statistics for the 2021-22 season show that there were 2,198 football-related arrests, which is a substantial increase—59%—on the last complete pre-Covid season. It is important to note that football-related arrests had previously been on a long-term down trend, reducing by some 50% since the 2010-11 season to record lows. Last season’s arrests total was comparable with the 2013-14 season. There were also 170 dedicated football officer-related incidents of supporter drug use during the 2021-22 season.

The noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, also referred to the Channel 4 documentary on Italia 90. I have not seen it—I am still mentally scarred by our loss to Germany, of course—but I will definitely watch it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Before the Minister concludes, does he not agree that drug offences are fairly unique in that a drug crime is recorded only when police make an arrest? Therefore, the more effort the police put into the enforcement of offences involving possession or supply of drugs, the worse the problem appears in terms of the statistics. The emphasis should be on reducing the disorder that results from drug-taking rather than placing any reliance on the number of people arrested or convicted of drug offences at football grounds, because that could be the product of enhanced police enforcement rather than an increase in use.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord is almost certainly right, although I cannot prove or disprove that either way. But as I said, a considerable and comprehensive report was written after the disturbances at Euro 2020 which highlighted these issues, so it would be logical to conclude that police upped their activity and I would imagine that that led to an increase. However, I cannot prove that, and if I am wrong, I will of course notify the noble Lord. In the short term, I commend the regulations to the Grand Committee.

Motion agreed.

Alcohol Licensing (Coronavirus) (Regulatory Easements) (Amendment) Regulations 2022

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Thursday 3rd November 2022 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That the Grand Committee do consider the Alcohol Licensing (Coronavirus) (Regulatory Easements) (Amendment) Regulations 2022.

Relevant document: 13th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee (special attention drawn to the instrument)

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, this instrument, which was laid before Parliament on 22 September, contains measures to provide ongoing support to the hospitality sector, which endured an immensely difficult period during the pandemic and is now grappling with cost of living concerns. As your Lordships are aware, the Government recently announced the energy bill relief scheme, which will provide a discount on gas and electricity bills for business customers, including those in the hospitality sector. This follows a number of measures to support the hospitality industry and other businesses during the pandemic and since Covid restrictions eased.

During the pandemic, we provided a package of financial support to businesses, including the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme, the Eat Out to Help Out scheme, and a business rates holiday for retail, hospitality and leisure businesses. We also introduced a number of regulatory easements through the Business and Planning Act 2020. Among those were temporary measures to make obtaining a pavement licence quicker and easier for those who wished to set up chairs and tables outdoors. Parliament has already agreed to extend those measures, and they will run until September next year.

A complementary measure on alcohol licensing gave a temporary off-sales permission to 38,000 licensed premises in England and Wales that did not have one. There were also measures which increased the number of temporary events notices that licence holders were allowed to give in a calendar year. Those provisions remain in place until December next year.

The instrument I propose today is relatively modest. It is an extension of provisions in the Business and Planning Act to allow sales of alcohol for consumption off the premises to licensed premises that did not have that permission for a further year, until 30 September 2023. In the intervening time there will be a consultation on long-term arrangements.

I assure the Committee that officials consulted the National Police Chiefs’ Council about the effects that the temporary off-sales permission has had. The view of the police then was that it had not caused any increase in crime and disorder.

I know that your Lordships will appreciate the impact that the pandemic and the cost of living have had on the hospitality industry, and I hope that you will support these measures to aid its recovery. I commend this instrument to the Committee. I beg to move.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am very grateful to the Minister for introducing these regulations. I understand that many people were very concerned about going to on-licensed premises—going to the pub—because of their concerns about catching coronavirus. My personal experience of socialising in central London—very limited, because I am always here doing work—is that most restaurants and pubs seem to be very busy. I am not sure whether the Minister can tell the Committee whether that is universal or a phenomenon just in central London, but that is my experience.

My understanding of the previous regulations is that they were to try to compensate pubs that had only an on-licence for that lack of trade so that people who were anxious about catching Covid could instead get their alcohol to take away—they could take it home or even, when the weather was more clement than it has been for the last few days, drink it outside. The only thing I would ask is this. Why do the Government think that that particular Covid support, which is what these regulations are about, should continue? What evidence is there that people are still nervous about socialising in an enclosed space and that it is therefore necessary for on-licensed premises to be able to sell to people to take away?

If this provision is simply for other reasons—the noble Lord mentioned increased energy prices having an impact on on-licensed premises in particular, but there is also the cost of living crisis, with people feeling that they cannot socialise as much as they did in the past because of the pressure on household budgets—why not have an alternative measure? The noble Lord talked about consultation on more permanent measures, but, bearing in mind that the police say that there has been no adverse impact on giving on-licensed premises the ability to sell alcohol to take away, why has a permanent change not been brought forward, rather than what appears to be the rather spurious extension of coronavirus-specific regulations that we have before us?

I appreciate that civil servants, particularly in the Home Office, have been very busy with other things in recent months, and it may be that the easy route was simply to extend the coronavirus regulations, but we need to move on from the impact of the pandemic and the virus and be more honest. If we think that this is a good thing in the long term, we should have a permanent change in the law. I know the Minister said a consultation is being conducted on it. That would be more honest than extending coronavirus regulations that, by this time, should have come to an end.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

One of my principal questions was going to be whether this is the easy route, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, put it, and whether there is a long-term review of the law. It may be appropriate to keep the changes in some cases and not in others, so I would be grateful if the Minister will respond to the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

We support this change. We have been told that, as far as the NPCC is concerned, there has been no increase in anti-social behaviour as a result of these measures. Did the consultation go beyond the NPCC? Were local police forces consulted? Are there variations in different parts of the country?

I too have experience of occasionally going to social events in central London, and it is true that the bars and restaurants seem to be extremely busy. However, in other parts of the country or other parts of London, many restaurants and pubs are shut because of the impact of the pandemic, as well as changing habits. How much variation across the country have the Government seen? Is this blanket approach appropriate and how should it be looked at over the longer term? Does the Minister have any updated information on the impact of Covid on the hospitality sector and its recovery? One reads extensively of the hospitality sector still struggling because, in spite of our experiences in central London, the numbers are not back to where they were, and this is proving a problem.

Have any local authorities raised any concerns about extending these changes? Are there any extra costs or burdens on local authorities? Finally, were any local communities consulted? Did they have views on the extension of these licences?

The central question is that asked by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about how this temporary change, which we approve of, fits into a wider review of provisions that were brought in during the pandemic, some of which may continue while others do not.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords who contributed. I am thankful for their general support for this measure and their recognition that we should be looking to support our hospitality industry, which has suffered a tumultuous few years and continues to feel the after-effects of the pandemic; I will come on to that in a second.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, questioned the fact that this a temporary measure and asked why it is not being made permanent, since it extends the off-sales provision only until next September. Let me go into some detail regarding what has happened since the pandemic.

Police: Vetting, Misconduct and Misogyny

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker]

To ask His Majesty’s Government how they plan to respond to the report of His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services on vetting, misconduct, and misogyny in the police service.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for his Question. This report contains extremely concerning findings about policing culture and vetting processes, which are falling short of the standards expected and damaging public confidence in the process. Forty of the recommendations in the report are for policing itself to adopt, for chief officers and the College of Policing respectively. Chiefs have committed to addressing the recommendations in full and the Home Office will consider and respond to its three recommendations in due course.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for the reply, but today we learned from the police inspectorate’s report of extraordinary failures in the vetting of applicants to join the force. Is it true that at a time when confidence in the police is being undermined, hundreds, indeed thousands of officers are on our streets who are guilty of serious offences? How has that happened and when was the Home Office aware of it? Is it acceptable that officers with convictions for robbery, indecent exposure and domestic abuse, and links with serious and organised crime, have been accepted? How is it possible that we read of unwarranted stops of women by officers as a result of the so-called booty patrols? This is happening now. It is not historic—it is not “Z Cars” or “Dixon of Dock Green”—so the need for action is urgent. What are the Government, with the police, going to do in practice? The time for reviews is over. It is action that is needed, is it not?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

It is, and I agree with the noble Lord entirely that it is completely unacceptable to have those people in our police forces. The fact is that the chiefs need to take immediate action to ensure that vetting is prioritised in their forces and the public can therefore have confidence in them. It is the responsibility of the individual police forces; they are responsible for their own vetting decisions, which they should take in accordance with guidance from the College of Policing. Frankly, I agree with the noble Lord: it is incredibly disappointing—worse than disappointing —that, despite some progress, previous warnings about vetting have not been acted upon. Chiefs must make clear to the vetting units the high standards they expect from them. There is no excuse for poorly recording the rationale in the vetting decisions.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, this is yet another devastating report on the police service—devastating particularly for female victims, who will be wondering whether they can trust the officer who arrives when they call the police, and devastating for the majority of decent hard-working police officers, who have again been let down by successive Conservative Governments and their own senior officers. Every single time there is mass recruitment in the police service, more of the wrong people slip through the vetting net, and police misconduct, corruption and criminality increase. It happened in the mid-1970s and in the mid-2000s, and it is happening again now. Will the Government tell the police that quality is more important than quantity, and will they give police chiefs the legislation they need to enable them to deal effectively with corrupt officers?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am not entirely sure I share the noble Lord’s analysis of the quality problem. The fact is that a new online application process has been introduced, replacing an old assessment centre system called SEARCH. The new process operates according to national guidelines and it has been reasonably successful so far. Some 83,500 candidates were invited to complete the assessment; 58,000 have had their results marked and 42,500 have been successful—that is 73.55%. It is not just online; all the candidates have to pass each stage of the recruitment process, which includes assessment centres, vetting, medical assessments and fitness tests—there are lots of face-to-face aspects of the process. I am not convinced that an uplift in numbers affects quality.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, when asked about these matters the noble Lord says repeatedly that police vetting, discipline and recruitment must be left to chief constables themselves, but should there not be a legislative framework for this? The Government are very ready repeatedly to legislate for extra police powers but not for what the public deserve, which is a rigorous legislative scheme for recruitment, vetting and discipline.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

That is the way the system is currently set up. As I say, the Home Office is not trying to absolve itself in this regard, but the fact remains that the vetting processes, which vary to some extent across forces, are the responsibility of chief constables.

[Lord Dear (CB)]

My Lords, I remind Members of the House of my previous service in senior positions in a number of police forces in this country. The report in the newspapers this morning will fill all of us with concern—indeed, dismay. The findings of the inspectorate report are horrific. There will be many factors behind this, but I ask a question on one factor only: the need for staff training to develop leadership. The Home Office disbanded the Staff College—and this is nothing to do with the College of Policing—some 12 years ago. It was not re-established, and it badly needs to be so. Do His Majesty’s Government have any plans to re-establish the Staff College?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Not as far as I am aware, but I defer to the noble Lord’s specialist knowledge on this subject and I will take the question back to the Home Office.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, in his first Prime Minister’s Questions last week, Rishi Sunak chose to close the session by bragging and baiting the leader of the Opposition—to braying from the Tory Benches—saying that there are 15,000 new police officers on our streets. When he did so, how much did he know about the scale and nature of this—that hundreds, perhaps thousands of those people may have passed through flawed vetting processes?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I have no idea what the Prime Minister knew or did not know.

[Baroness Foster of Oxton (Con)]

What is the role of the police and crime commissioners in dealing with a matter such as this?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As my noble friend will be aware, and as we debated extensively earlier this week, police and crime commissioners, along with chief constables, are responsible for setting out individual forces’ ways of dealing with and performing on these matters.

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

I ask the Minister gently about the decision to get rid of police officers during the first eight years or so, from 2010 onwards. Now that the Government have changed their policy, there is a need to get a lot of police officers in as quickly as possible in order to tackle crime. Does the Minister not think that those early decisions, in Budget after Budget, to take money away from police recruitment were terrible mistakes?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I obviously cannot answer that. I do not know if it was a good idea or not. The fact remains that the recruitment drive, as part of the police uplift programme, is delivering a large number of police officers. To reassure the House, there is no evidence to suggest that this is responsible for any adverse decision-making in vetting.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, is not the essence of this report contained in the third paragraph of the foreword, which says:

“Some police officers have used their unique position to commit appalling crimes, especially against women. Some forces have repeatedly failed to implement recommendations – from us and other bodies – that were designed to prevent and detect such behaviour”?


Who is responsible for ensuring that the police implement these recommendations?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, it is a matter for individual forces. I am pleased that the HMICFRS report and its recommendations have been accepted in full. The National Police Chiefs’ Council chair made the point in the report that chief constables, supported by national bodies, will act on these recommendations and put the problems right. We cannot risk predatory or discriminatory individuals slipping through the net because of flawed processes and decision-making. The noble Lord’s question is completely right; this is shocking, and I hope they do something about it with extreme speed.

[Baroness Blower (Lab)]

My Lords, clearly, there is a significant problem here. There is a system-wide failure if, as the report says today, officers were satisfactorily transferred between forces

“despite a history of attracting complaints”.

Moving a problem from one force to another does not solve it. Will the Government take urgent steps now to deal with these matters systematically and coherently?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Again, the noble Baroness is right: it is not right that these people get transferred across forces. I think I have outlined in previous questions the large number of people who are currently on barred lists. The forces are working on this, and it is a matter for chief constables to enforce. As I just said in my previous answer, they have accepted the need to do so speedily.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom (Con)]

Following the noble Baroness’s comment about transfers to other police forces, can my noble friend tell us whether the Police Federation has had anything to do with this?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid I do not know; I cannot answer my noble friend.

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, the subject of this Question takes us back to many of the areas we covered in both the Domestic Abuse Act and the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act, so there is a strong sense of déjà vu all over again. The Minister has made much about it being up to individual police forces to take what action they consider appropriate. I suggest to him, on the basis of this report and others, that they are not assuming their individual responsibility with any degree of similarity or with great efficiency. I listened to BBC Radio 4’s “Woman’s Hour” this morning, which is very informative. Is the Minister aware that an ex-head of the Greater Manchester police force, when asked what advice he would give to the young female members of his own family regarding interactions with the police, was unable to answer the question, saying, “I’m not quite sure”?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I did not hear the programme to which the noble Lord refers, but that is obviously very shocking indeed. The body responsible for vetting guidance is the College of Policing, which will consider any areas where vetting can be strengthened and respond accordingly. This is done within a national application framework, so it is hoped that this will be corrected, as I say, with extreme speed.

[Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean (Lab)]

My Lords, listening to the Minister’s answers, one could be forgiven for coming to the conclusion that he is saying that the Government have no responsibility for this. I find that quite extraordinary. Why can the Government not bring forward a legislative framework to ensure that these sorts of police abuses cannot occur?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I think I have outlined the current system; that is all I am doing. I am not saying that the Government are not very concerned by this report, but the simple fact of the matter is that the Government do not have responsibility for operational policing.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister just said that that is the current system. Are the Government satisfied with the current system, and if not, what are they are going to do about it?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

It is not in my gift to do anything about it, but I will take the noble and learned Lord’s suggestion back to the Home Office and make sure that there are further discussions on the outcome of this report, and indeed this discussion.

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords, it is frequently said, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”, but on this occasion it is broke and it does need fixing. Will my noble friend take that message, from all sides of this House? In particular, will he reflect upon the very sensible suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Dear, who really does know what he is talking about?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I reassure my noble friend that I did say I would reflect on the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Dear, and I intend to do so.

[Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe (Lab)]

The Minister is very well regarded in the House. He is on a difficult one today, but would he express a personal view on what he believes should be done in regard to the question from my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

No.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

Does the Minister feel that the time has come for a royal commission? Every day in this House we have a new fundamental problem—police and crime commissioners, police reporting, police culture or the question of whether there are too many differing police forces. Is it not time for a fundamental look at the relationship between government, the police and any other related body, to try to re-establish the reputation, which we have long gloried in, of our police forces in this country?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

What I would say—and this is a personal opinion—is that it is very clear that the nature of policing is changing dramatically and has done over the past 20 years. We have just heard about the technological changes that have taken us all by storm over the last decade, and about the vast number of reviews, reports and so on. It seems to me that there is a case to be made to bring many of these strands together and do some new thinking.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

What, if anything, is being done to see whether there are serving officers in the police today who may be in the category of those regarded by the whole House, and indeed the nation, as a complete insult to police officers?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble and learned Lord asks a very good question. Nine forces were—this is appalling English—deep-dived into by the HMICFRS. All nine chief constables have been alerted to the specific case studies that were raised and they are expected to act on this with extreme speed.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

There are 43 forces; the others are not immune from this problem.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

No, they are not. Indeed, there was considerable data sampling across the rest of the forces, so a very similar process will be undertaken with the rest.

National Security

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, as a former senior police officer with more than 30 years’ experience, I am acutely aware of the issues of national security, both physical and cyber threats. I welcome the appointment of the right honourable Tom Tugendhat MP as Minster of State for Security. He has a long and distinguished record in this area. He is clearly and quite rightly concerned about the threats facing Members of Parliament, those who work with us and the country as a whole from extremists and hostile foreign states.

It is regrettable that other members of the Government, past and present, appear not to have taken national security as seriously as the Member for Tonbridge and Malling is doing now. As the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said, the last but one Prime Minister had a meeting with a former member of the Russian KGB when he was Foreign Secretary, on his own, in a foreign country, without reference to officials. The previous Prime Minister had her phone hacked; and the current, and second but one, Home Secretary—the same person—used her own mobile phone to receive and transmit restricted documents. Does the Minister agree that the actions of senior members of his own party have damaged, rather than promoted, national security?

We on these Benches agree that the Security Minister’s initiative is welcome, if not overdue, and we agree that this must be a united effort involving all of us, working with our security and intelligence agencies and the police. Having visited both MI6, where representatives of MI5 were also present, and GCHQ, I know that we have outstanding security and intelligence services, but without Members of this and the other place taking security seriously—particularly members of the Government, not least Prime Ministers and Home Secretaries—their efforts will be undermined.

As the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, said in the House this week, it is not just the potential for leaks of our own highly sensitive information, as there is a risk that our security partners in other countries will not share vital intelligence with us because they fear that our security is not tight enough. Can the Minister confirm that from now on members of the Government will set an example by their own behaviour in relation to protecting national security, rather than providing counterexamples that jeopardise national security?

It is not only democracy that is at stake if hostile foreign Governments seek to influence or disrupt the democratic process, but the security of each and every citizen and the economic well-being of every business and industry in the UK. I am glad that an adult has been put in charge of this task force; I just hope that those who he is surrounded by will do as they are told.

We have a wealth of experience on these Benches, including privy counsellors and former members of the Intelligence and Security Committee, who I am sure will be only too willing to help and support the Minister with these issues.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I agree wholeheartedly with the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that the first duty of the Government is the protection and security of the nation. I also echo both noble Lords’ praise for our security services, which I also have some experience of and which I think are magnificent and first-rate.

As regards the questions on the task force, I think it makes sense for me to read out what my right honourable friend the Security Minister said yesterday, because I think it answers all the questions in full:

“The taskforce will work with Parliament, Departments, the security and intelligence agencies, the devolved Administrations and the private sector. It will work to better protect the freedoms and institutions we hold dear—institutions such as this very House.


The taskforce will look at the full range of threats”—


I add “including cyber”—

“facing our democratic institutions, including the physical threat to Members of this Parliament and those elected to serve across the country”,

as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, pointed out,

“so tragically brought home by the murder of our dear friends Sir David Amess last year and Jo Cox in 2016, and the support on offer through Operation Bridger and by the police. The work of this Taskforce will report into the National Security Council and more details will be set out in the update of the integrated review”,

so unfortunately I cannot answer his question about timing.

My right honourable friend in the other place went on to say:

“This is not just a taskforce for this Government. It will be cross-departmental and inter-agency, and I will be inviting cross-party co-operation, because, as I have said, this is not just about Ministers in office, civil servants or advisers across Whitehall. This work is for all of us in this House and those who have asked us to represent their interests.”—[Official Report, Commons, 1/11/22; col. 791.]


I do not think I could agree more.

I will go on to the more specific questions. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked about the meeting that the former Prime Minister had in Italy with Lebedev. When he was Foreign Secretary, he declared his visit to Italy, which was published under the usual transparency requirements. At the Liaison Committee on 6 July, he committed to follow up in writing, which he did on 26 July.

Both noble Lords asked about the case of the Home Secretary. I am afraid I am going to repeat an answer given by my noble friend the Minister for the Cabinet Office earlier. The Home Secretary has provided a detailed account of the steps that she took in her letter to the HASC. For national security reasons, we are not commenting on allegations about the then Foreign Secretary’s phone.

Going back to the integrated review, I say that it makes sense to remind the House that it concluded that China poses a

“systemic challenge … to our security, prosperity and values—and those of our allies and partners”,

and that the Chinese authorities adopt a whole-of-state approach in which businesses and individuals are forced by law to co-operate. We know that the Chinese authorities are actively seeking to gain our cutting-edge tech, AI, advanced research and product development. We are working to protect our national security and ensure that the UK is resilient.

The noble Lord specifically asked about the recent rather troubling stories about undeclared Chinese police stations in the UK. The reports are being taken seriously, and they are concerning. Any foreign country operating on UK soil must abide by UK law. The protection of people in the UK is of the utmost importance. For example, any attempt illegally to repatriate any individual will not be tolerated. As noble Lords would expect, Home Office officials are working closely with FCDO, DLUHC and other government departments to ensure that the UK is a safe and welcoming place for those who choose to settle here. I cannot go beyond that at this point.

Noble Lords asked whether there was a culture of Ministers using personal phones for official business. No, there is not. There are appropriate arrangements and guidance in place for the management of electronic communications within government. Ministers receive support and expert advice to help them meet their obligations in the most appropriate and secure fashion. Again, as my noble friend answered in the previous Question, government devices should, as far as practicable, be used for government business. The guidance does not rule out the use of different forms of electronic communications, however.

Our allies are obviously aware of what has happened here, but I remind noble Lords that we do take a leading role on the global stage in countering state threats. We will continue to work closely with like-minded allies and partners to defend UK interests and the international rules-based system from hostile activity. Unfortunately, as I have already stated, I cannot comment on details of any discussions where commenting publicly on threats to the UK would give an unnecessary advantage to our adversaries. I hope that answers noble Lords’ questions as fully as I am able.

[Lord Howell of Guildford (Con)]

My Lords, the scope of this new task force is, of course, enormous, since nowadays almost every aspect of connection and influence is being weaponised, including education, culture and issues far outside the normal security scope and outside the range of intelligence and cyberattack. We are subject, in this country, every hour of the day, to a bombardment of fake news and distortion, penetrating every aspect of our society and clearly covering our own debates. They say that the best form of defence is attack. Can the Minister assure us that this task force will also look at ways of returning in kind some of the material that pours out, in particular from the CCP in China, attacking not just democracy but our form of democracy and claiming, rather ironically, that China’s form is more precise and more effective than ours? Can he assure us that we have a full intellectual force ready to challenge the arguments at their roots in order to refute the kind of poison that is daring to try to demoralise and undermine our society?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am pleased to be able to reassure my noble friend that I can. I am going to give a long answer, for which I hope the House will be forgiving, because this is important. In 2019, we established the defending democracy programme. It is a cross-government programme, with an overarching objective to safeguard elections and referendums related to democratic processes in the UK. It focuses on delivering four outcomes. Elections are secured through the protection of their physical personnel and cyber infrastructure; the safety of elected representatives, parliamentarians, voters, candidates, campaigners and poll workers is protected; the regulation of political campaigning must be robust; the impact of disinformation, misinformation and wider information operations is mitigated and minimised.

There is also, as part of that work, the DCMS Counter Disinformation Unit, which leads the operational and policy response for countering disinformation across HMG. That has included responding to acute information incidents such as the Ukrainian conflict, Covid-19 and general elections. When false narratives are identified, the CDU co-ordinates with departments across Whitehall to deploy the appropriate response. This could involve direct rebuttal on social media or awareness-raising campaigns to promote the facts. Obviously, I cannot go into—and I do not necessarily know—what other sorts of action we take overseas, but that is certainly what we are doing here, and it is fairly robust.

[The Lord Bishop of Leeds]

My Lords, I really welcome the Statement and the very full answers that the Minister has given. It is very encouraging. However, when the Statement refers to protection that defends our democratic institutions, it is not just external threats: there are internal threats that weaken our defences, such as putting draft legislation into Parliament that threatens to breach international law. If we uphold the rule of law, we cannot continue to do that. Will the Minister give a commitment that the Government will not do this, as they did in the overseas operations Bill, the United Kingdom Internal Market Bill, and so on? Just to encourage him, I suggest that a reading of President Steinmeier’s speech on 28 October to the German people sets in a very good context how a Government might approach some of the threats and the wider challenges that we face.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the right reverend Prelate for that suggestion; I will read that speech, which to date I have not. He invites me to stray into areas where I would prefer not to go. There are differences of opinion when it comes to these laws; I will leave it there.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, the daily and repeated Russian missile attacks on Ukraine’s critical national infrastructure are evidence of the importance of this to our national security. Is the Minister aware of the two week-old report of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy about critical national infrastructure, which is scathing about the Government’s ability to protect it? It specifically identifies a lack of leadership, an absence of co-ordination among government departments and the disbanding of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat. In short, it calls on the Prime Minister to

“get a much better grip on … national security”.

When will we see the long-awaited national resilience strategy?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I cannot answer that specifically. I have seen that report and have read a variety of newspaper reports with mounting alarm, as I am sure the noble Lord has. I think the task force will address a good deal of the noble Lord’s concerns, and I look forward to hearing what it has to say.

[Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom (Con)]

My Lords, I echo the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Browne, but in relation to the report of this House’s risk committee, in which we found that there were real, critical vulnerabilities in our critical national infrastructure. The urgency of the Government producing the resilience report cannot be overstated. It is surely time for the Government to recognise that the front lines of battles that we face now are no longer in other countries but in our computers, our water systems and our electricity systems. They need to be taken really seriously.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for that question. I am afraid I will again answer at some length, because the subject of cyber resilience is at the heart of what he, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Browne, asked me. The current state of UK resilience to cyberattack is an interesting subject, and we are making significant progress in bolstering the UK’s resilience. We stop hundreds of thousands of attacks up stream while bolstering preparedness and helping UK institutions and organisations better understand the nature of cyber threats, risks and vulnerabilities down stream.

Despite this, there remain serious gaps in the nation’s defences, as both noble Lords have pointed out, and the collective resilience-building effort must continue apace. Poor organisational practices, processes and systems, and a lack of awareness of risks and mitigations, all contribute to attacks getting through. Taking some practical and cost-effective steps, such as improving the use of account authentication, could have prevented a lot of damage. I could go on, but at this point I reiterate my praise for the work of the security services. I have seen some of their work in this area, and it is incredible.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

Is it not a threat to national security to have a Home Secretary who uses inflammatory, racist language and dehumanises thousands of traumatised asylum seekers?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

If the noble Baroness is asking whether there was a threat to national security, I would have to say no.

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

My Lords, following on from the excellent question by the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, I ask the Minister to look again at some of the threats to national security coming from serious organised crime and cybercrime, and the way in which provincial police forces are responding. He touched on this briefly, but what more can the Government do to improve capacity and expertise among those provincial police forces?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for that question. As he says, I think I have already partially answered it. The NCSC has helped UK institutions and organisations better understand the nature of cyber threats, risks and vulnerabilities. It has helped them to take action to secure systems and services that society depends on. It stops attacks up stream, as I pointed out. It would be wrong to go into more operational factors, but I hope my noble friend is reassured that much work is being done in that area.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, I welcome the creation of the task force, but I fear I have to return to the issue of the Home Secretary. Had it not been for the fact that the Home Secretary inadvertently sent the email to someone whom she did not intend to send it to, we would never have known anything about this. Since the Home Secretary has ministerial responsibility for MI5, what do these facts do other than undermine her authority in the event that she finds similar instances in the ministry for which she is responsible?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am going to disappoint the noble Lord. I can say only what I said earlier: the Home Secretary has provided a detailed account of the steps she took, in her letter to the HASC. I am unable to comment further.

[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

My Lords, there are many definitions of threats to national security. The Minister is right to point to some of the differences between, for example, the more immediate threats posed by Russia and the longer-term strategic threats posed by China. My noble friend Lord Browne has already referred to the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy’s recent report on critical national infrastructure. It is a very good report and very pertinent to this question. Will the Minister assure the House that in the progress of this task force, which I support, it will also liaise with the same committee—of which I am a member—as we have just launched an inquiry into ransomware, which has aspects which directly relate to national security?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I agree with the noble Viscount—it absolutely does have aspects which relate to national security. I go back to what I said earlier when I quoted my honourable friend in the other House. This is not just a task force for the Government. It will be cross-departmental and inter-agency and he will be inviting cross-party co-operation. The noble Viscount makes a strong case for his committee’s involvement in that area.

[Lord Walney (CB)]

The reports of unofficial Chinese police stations in the UK and other allied nations are deeply alarming and have rightly been roundly condemned by the Security Minister. If the reports prove to be accurate, and these are not immediately disbanded, is there not a very strong case for co-ordinated action across our allies to impose sanctions on the Chinese Government for doing this?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord is right to point out that these reports apply not just to the UK. I believe that one suspected institution of this type has already been closed down overseas. I think he makes a strong case, but I do not know the progress of the investigation, so I cannot comment as to how they might be shut down.