Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

391: After Clause 167, insert the following new Clause—
“Misconduct investigations where officer acquitted(1) The Police Reform Act 2002 is amended as follows.(2) In section 13B –(a) in subsection (1), at end insert “but this is subject to the exception in section 13BA.”, and(b) in subsection (2), at the beginning, leave out “The” and insert “Unless the exception in section 13BA applies, the”.(3) After section 13B, insert—“13BA No re-investigation on acquittal for the same conduct(1) Where this section applies, the Director-General may not make a determination under section 13B(2) to re-investigate the complaint, recordable conduct matter or DSI matter.(2) This section applies where—(a) the Director-General, appropriate authority or relevant review body (as the case may be) has made a determination under paragraphs 23(2)(c), 24(2)(b) or 25(4G) of Schedule 3,(b) as a result of the determination mentioned in paragraph (a), the Director of Public Prosecutions has brought criminal proceedings against the relevant person, and(c) the relevant person has been acquitted in those criminal proceedings.(3) The exception in subsection (1) does not apply only if—(a) the relevant authority has come into possession of substantial new evidence relating to the conduct that was the subject of the investigation, and(b) the relevant authority is of the reasonable opinion that the new evidence would, if considered, be significantly likely to lead to a finding of misconduct or gross misconduct.(4) In this section—(a) “relevant person” means the person to whose conduct the investigation related; (b) “relevant authority” means the Director-General, appropriate authority, local policing body or relevant review body (as the case may be).”(4) After paragraph 24C of Schedule 3, insert—“Investigation where person acquitted in criminal proceedings
24D (1) This paragraph applies where—(a) an investigation of a complaint, conduct matter or DSI matter (“the index investigation”) has concluded and the final report has been submitted to the relevant authority,(b) the relevant authority has made a determination under paragraphs 23(2)(c), 24(2)(b) or 25(4F),(c) as a result of the determination mentioned in sub-paragraph (b), the Director of Public Prosecutions has brought criminal proceedings against the relevant person, and(d) the relevant person has been acquitted in those criminal proceedings.(2) In this paragraph—(a) “relevant person” means the person to whose conduct the index investigation related;(b) “relevant authority” means the Director-General, appropriate authority, local policing body or relevant review body (as the case may be).(3) Where this paragraph applies, the relevant authority may not initiate a new investigation, re-open an investigation or order a re-investigation against the relevant person in relation to the same complaint, conduct matter or DSI matter that was the subject of the index investigation.(4) Sub-paragraph (3) does not apply only if—(a) the relevant authority has come into possession of substantial new evidence relating to the conduct that was the subject of the index investigation, and(b) the relevant authority is of the reasonable opinion that the new evidence would, if considered, be significantly likely to lead to a finding of misconduct or gross misconduct.”(6) In paragraph 25 of that Schedule—(a) after sub-paragraph (4D) insert—“(4DA) The Director-General may not direct that the complaint be re-investigated under sub-paragraph (4C)(b) if paragraph 24D applies in relation to that investigation.”, and(b) after sub-paragraph (4E) insert—“(4EA) The local policing body may not make a recommendation to the appropriate authority that the complaint be re-investigated under sub-paragraph (4E)(a) if paragraph 24D applies in relation to the conduct to which the investigation related.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would prevent the Independent Office for Police Conduct from investigating an officer where that officer has already been investigated and acquitted in court for the same conduct matter.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 391 stands in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. In Committee, speaking to the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, I raised the case of the police officer, Martyn Blake, whose case served as the perfect example of the difficulties of serving as a police firearms officer.

The Independent Office for Police Conduct, as is the norm, investigated Martyn Blake following a police firearms operation in London that resulted in the fatal shooting of Chris Kaba, and he was subsequently charged with murder. The case proceeded through the full criminal justice process and the evidence was examined in open court before jury under the rigorous standards of criminal law. After hearing the evidence, the jury acquitted him.

For most people, an acquittal, after an initial investigation and then a full criminal trial, would represent the end of the matter, but in this case, despite the acquittal, the IOPC indicated that the circumstances of the case would still be examined further in the context of police misconduct proceedings. The IOPC then reopened those proceedings, constituting its second investigation and the third investigation overall.

Whatever one’s view of the original incident, the situation raises the question of how many times an officer should be required to defend themselves for the same conduct. We have had restrictions and double jeopardy since the 12th century, but this appears to be triple jeopardy. Police officers can be investigated by the IOPC, referred to the CPS, dragged through the courts, acquitted and then reinvestigated. My amendment would amend the Police Reform Act 2002 to ensure that where a police officer has been investigated for a complaint or a conduct or DSI matter, prosecuted in a criminal court and acquitted, the same conduct cannot simply be reinvestigated by the Independent Office for Police Conduct unless there is substantial new evidence. That last point is important.

The Criminal Justice Act 2003 reformed the law of double jeopardy by permitting retrial where there was new and compelling evidence. I completely understand that if new evidence comes to light, the IOPC may need to reopen an investigation. There is a safeguard in the amendment to ensure the fairness of the police complaints system. I do not dispute the importance of police accountability; public confidence in policing depends on robust oversight, and the Independent Office for Police Conduct plays a vital role in that framework, but accountability must also be balanced with basic principles of justice. When the criminal courts have examined a case and reached a verdict, there must be a strong presumption that the matter is settled.

I know only too well that police officers make difficult and sometimes life and death decisions in circumstances that are fast-moving, dangerous and highly uncertain. They do so in order to protect the public. When something goes wrong, it is entirely right that their actions are scrutinised carefully and independently, but it is equally important that the process is fair, proportionate and finite.

I hope that the Minister will realise the harrowing mental burdens placed on the police and accept the amendment. All I am asking is for him to meet me half way and bring something at Third Reading or perhaps commit to bringing forward a proposal along these lines in the upcoming Bill on police reform. If he does not accept my amendment today and cannot give me an assurance about police reform, I will seek to divide the House.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

In family cases of sexual or physical abuse, someone can be tried and acquitted but then dealt with in the family court on very much the same evidence. That is partly because there is a difference in the standard of proof, which, in a criminal case, is much greater than in civil and family proceedings. Having said that, I am entirely sympathetic to this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for initiating his Amendment 391. I know that it is motivated by the desire to support police officers in the difficult role they perform. He and I share that motivation. I say to him, however, that the amendment as drafted would have the effect of curtailing existing powers that the Independent Office for Police Conduct can use to reinvestigate or reopen a case that it has previously closed. The amendment also seeks, more generally, to prevent the reopening of investigations into complaints against the police from the public, again if such complaints have resulted in criminal proceedings which have not resulted in a conviction.

I take very straightforwardly the points made by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who made the point that I was going to make: we know of no recent cases where the Independent Office for Police Conduct has reopened a closed case. However, it is in the public interest that cases of alleged police misconduct can, if need be, be reopened in the light of substantive new evidence or evidence that the original investigation was flawed. As has been said by the three noble Members who have spoken, not all criminal proceedings against serving police officers involve line-of-duty incidents. Some may involve serious corruption or sexual violence by police perpetrators, and there may be compelling public interest arguments for reopening such cases.

The powers of the Independent Office for Police Conduct to reinvestigate a case are already limited by existing law, which requires the IOPC to have compelling reasons to reopen a case. This is a legal threshold and is already a high bar. Disciplinary proceedings involve different evidential tests, as was mentioned by those who contributed, and the lower threshold for finding misconduct or gross misconduct is the balance of probabilities. They also serve a different purpose from a criminal trial. We rightly expect the highest standards from our police officers, so a blanket presumption that no police officer who has been acquitted in the criminal courts should face disciplinary proceedings would, in the Government’s view, be quite wrong—I think that reflects the points of view put by the noble Viscount, the noble Lord and the noble and learned Baroness. That is a compelling argument which I hope the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, will reflect on if he seeks to push the amendment, which I hope, in due course, he will not.

Amendment 392, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, seeks to improve the timeliness of police complaints and misconduct investigations by creating a new system of legal adjudicators with the power to overrule both chief constables and the Independent Office for Police Conduct by closing down investigations where they determine that there is no good or sufficient reason for any delay. As we have previously debated, unnecessary delays in these investigations are not in anyone’s best interests. I know the impact they will have on public confidence and on the welfare of the police officers involved. However, while it is right to strive for improvements in timeliness, this amendment risks adding another layer of bureaucracy, thereby adding cost and delay and not removing it.

The Government are committed to supporting chief constables to remove those who are not fit for purpose, but the amendment has the potential not only to overrule the responsibilities of chief constables and the Independent Office for Police Conduct, but to create some perverse outcomes. The Government’s recent police reform White Paper already confirms our commitment to an independent, end-to-end review of the police conduct system, which I know the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, would support. It will include looking at timeliness and how this can be improved. Again, further process will be brought back following the police White Paper proposals.

Amendment 393A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, would require that, where a police officer uses force based on an honestly held but mistaken belief, that belief can justify the use of force only if the mistake was objectively reasonable. In effect, as she knows, it seeks to codify the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of police officer W80, which found that the civil standard applied to this test. As the House will know, police officers carry out important and demanding roles. The Government are determined to ensure that both the public and the police are able to feel confident in the police accountability system. That is why we commissioned a review—again, the noble Baroness referred to this—from Timothy Godwin, a former senior police officer, and Sir Adrian Fulford. They carried out a rapid, independent review into police accountability.

The findings of that review were published in October 2025—again, the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, referred to this—and it recommended that the Government change the legal test for the use of force in police misconduct cases from the civil to the criminal law test. The Government, again, have accepted this recommendation and we are in the process of making the necessary changes via secondary legislation. Our intention is that these changes will come into force later this year, in the spring of 2026.

While I understand the noble Baroness’s concept, I cannot support it, because we have put in place the independent commissioners to examine the matter thoroughly and they heard evidence from a wide range of stakeholders. Their recommendation was clear: the current approach has created confusion, inconsistency and, I accept, a very bad effect on police morale, particularly among firearms officers. I hope the changes we are making will bring clarity to the system. I reassure the House that it will still be the case that any force used must be proportionate, reasonable and necessary. I hope that satisfies the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, after her comments—it may not—and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey.

Finally in this group, I will speak briefly to government Amendments 395 and 397. These are technical amendments to ensure that specialist police force barred and advisory lists are consistently applied across police forces. The provisions in Clauses 173 to 181 and Schedule 21 are part of a broader effort to raise standards and conduct within law enforcement. They also include the closure of a legislative loophole. These technical amendments have been tabled to ensure that we have alignment in the treatment of civilian employees within the police service.

I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I hope I have satisfied the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, and the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington. I hope not just that I have satisfied the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, but that on reflection he is able to listen to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and therefore not push his amendment to a vote. But, as ever, that is entirely a matter for him.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. I am grateful to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for his valid points and for injecting his valuable experience into this debate. I say to my noble friend Lord Hailsham that it is wrong to draw a comparison between policing and the medical profession. Policing is uniquely different.

This has been a thoughtful discussion about how we maintain robust police accountability while ensuring fairness to the officers who serve the public. The case of Martyn Blake has brought this issue into the public consciousness. Whatever view one takes of the circumstances of that tragic incident, the fact remains that the case was heard in open court before a jury and the officer was acquitted, yet the prospect of further investigation has remained. For many officers watching that case unfold, the concern is not about accountability; it is about whether there is ever a point at which a matter can truly be regarded as concluded.

As my noble friend Lord Bailey of Paddington pointed out, there is much current discussion about police morale and those young-in-service officers leaving the police service. The proposal in my amendment is fair to officers. It is clear for the system and maintains the integrity of the oversight framework. It is highly unfortunate and extremely disappointing that the Minister has not been able to at least meet me half way and make the commitment that I sought. On that basis, I beg to test the opinion of the House.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 9th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I support these amendments because it is very important that live facial recognition should be subject to legal oversight and judicial oversight; there should be a law. We should see such amendments in the context of an overall parliamentary democracy which believes in lawful freedom of expression, whether it is in Parliament, the newspapers or public places. Live facial recognition without a proper legal framework could be used in an undemocratic fashion. Police, sadly, will find evidence very often for whomever they wish to convict. I know that is not necessarily the case, but if you are under pressure as a police officer to make your case stick, you will trawl whatever evidence you can to get it through to the stage of being investigated. I urge your Lordships to support these amendments because they will strengthen our democracy, and it is important that people should feel that they live in a free country, not in one subject to the sort of powers we see exercised in other countries, such as China.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments returns us to an issue debated at some length in Committee: the use of live facial recognition technology in policing. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for tabling these amendments on this important topic.

As set out in Committee, we on these Benches cannot support proposals that would severely restrict or pre-empt the operational use of live facial recognition by law enforcement. Live facial recognition is an increasingly important tool in modern policing. Used lawfully and proportionately, it has already demonstrated its value in identifying serious offenders, locating wanted individuals and preventing violent crime before it occurs. It has been deployed particularly effectively in high-risk environments such as transport hubs and major public events, where rapid identification can make a decisive difference in protecting the public.

That does not mean that safeguards are unnecessary. There must always be a careful balance between the protection of civil liberties and the need to equip police with effective tools to tackle serious crime. The use of new technologies must be proportionate and subject to appropriate oversight, but the amendments before us would go significantly further than that. In different ways, they would either prohibit particular uses of the technology, place rigid statutory barriers in its way or create restrictions that would unnecessarily impede the ability of the police to deploy it where it may be most needed. Amendment 374 would prohibit the deployment of live facial recognition in the context of public assemblies or impose extensive prior authorisation requirements. It risks tying the hands of the police at precisely the moments when rapid and flexible operational decision-making may be required.

We must recognise the points raised in Committee that the Government are currently consulting on the future regulatory framework for live facial recognition. To attempt to settle these questions piecemeal through amendments to this Bill would risk creating an incomplete or inconsistent framework. While the concerns raised by noble Lords are legitimate and deserve careful consideration, we should not default to restricting a technology that has already shown its potential to disrupt serious criminality and protect the public. The challenge is not to prohibit its use but to ensure that it is deployed responsibly, lawfully and proportionately. For those reasons, we cannot support the amendments in this group. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for tabling these amendments and to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for supporting some of the arguments that I will make in response to them. The noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones, Lord Strasburger and Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, have all put their finger on their concerns around the use of this technology.

I will begin by providing a view of what live facial recognition does. It allows for real-time location of individuals of interest to the police. It scans the faces of those passing a camera in real time, comparing faces against a predetermined, specific watch-list of, potentially, wanted criminals, vulnerable missing persons or individuals posing risks to public safety. If no match is made—this goes to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, made—currently, the scanned face is deleted instantly. Every deployment and every specific bespoke watch-list for that deployment must have a defined policing objective, be supported by clear intelligence and ultimately be determined by humans.

Noble Lords will be aware that the use of facial recognition technology in all circumstances, including in live facial recognition, is already subject to safeguards, including those provided in the Human Rights Act and the Data Protection Act. I agree that there needs to be a framework, which is the nub of what I think all noble Lords have said in this debate.

The noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, will know that the Government had a 10-week consultation for that very purpose—to look at the issues of a legal framework where law enforcement use of biometrics, facial recognition and similar technologies could be used. The consultation ended on 12 February. I give the House an assurance that the Government intend to respond to it by the summer; we have more or less a 12-week deadline from the end of its closing, but it will be by the summer. The consultation is clear that the Government need to design a new framework and assess how the police use technologies such as facial recognition. It needs to ensure that there are safeguards, as noble Lords have mentioned, around the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, that we protect these rights and that facial recognition technology is demonstrably proportionate to the seriousness of the harm being addressed.

We are currently considering the consultation and, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, said, that should take its course. However, we intend to set out our proposals in due course, which will be subject to scrutiny by both Houses of Parliament. I hope noble Lords accept that it would not be appropriate to pre-empt the outcome of the consultation or the proposals that Government will bring forward, which we will ensure have new legal framework for the use of facial recognition technology by law enforcement agencies.

While I think that the points made by noble Lords have real merit, I hope that, with the comments I have made and the reassurances I have given, we will save the difficult debate about regulation, how it operates and what the proposals mean for a proper legal framework for another day, which will come very soon. I hope the noble Baroness will—

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville (LD)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as a member of the APPG for Gypsies, Travellers and Roma, and speak in support of Amendments 375, 466 and 468. I thank the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, for his introduction to this important group of amendments. As has been said, this is the start of a journey to reach equality of access to services for those currently living a nomadic life.

Several noble Lords across the Chamber made representations against the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act, brought in under the previous Government in 2022 and subsequently ruled to be a breach of the Human Rights Act. Those who objected listed the effect the new restrictions would have on family life, those with health issues and access to education, et cetera. In a society that purports to uphold the rationale of equality for all, it is unacceptable to discriminate against those who follow a different lifestyle from the majority of us.

I have long campaigned for legislation to require every local authority to provide permitted permanent sites for Gypsies and Travellers alongside permitted temporary stopping sites for those who travel as part of their culture and way of life. This has always been rejected by Governments of different political persuasions, and I welcome the Minister’s comments this evening on the provision of sites in the future.

I am now lucky enough to live in an area that has adequate, decent provision for those identified as Gypsy, Roma or Traveller. Several of those sites are within a short walk of my home. I am delighted that those people are able to be married in the church in which I also worship, and that they are able to grieve the passing of their loved ones in the same environment. Everyone should be able to access education for their children, alongside healthcare for their elderly, even if they are moving from area to area around the country. A stopping place or site which allows this to happen should be a right, and not left to a local landowner to permit for short periods.

This small group of amendments is not a magic wand to ensure that sites appear overnight, but it is a step in the right direction to help families raise their children in a relatively safe environment. I support the Minister’s amendments.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome the opportunity for debate that the Government’s Amendment 375 has afforded us. This is obviously a highly contested issue but, before we start, I put on record the very specific nature of the issue we are debating. In 2024, the High Court declared that a specific section of the Conservative Party’s Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 was incompatible with Article 14, the prohibition of discrimination, and Article 8, the right to private life, of the European Convention on Human Rights. That section extended the prohibition on returning to land covered by requests to leave from three to 12 months. That is why the Government are now attempting to reverse that change. The judgment did not, as claimed in Committee, nullify that no-returns order.

I will make His Majesty’s Loyal Opposition’s position clear: although we accept that the law as it currently stands renders the continuation of the current offence of returning to or re-entering prohibited land untenable, we would ultimately rather that the human rights law that has caused this incompatibility be repealed and the offence upheld. It is not racial discrimination to uphold one of the fundamental governing systems of our society. As perhaps some noble Lords in the Chamber will want to hear, private property has been a continuous thread throughout our history that has galvanised peace and prosperity in our country. Remove the right to private property and you create a system that favours freeloaders and fraudsters.

In the judgment, the presiding judge spoke of a balanced structure between the property rights of landowners and occupiers and the interests of Travellers. The increase in a no-returns order from three to 12 months would supposedly disproportionately affect the balance in favour of landowners. I do not believe that the interests of trespassers should be equally balanced with those of landowners and occupiers, if at all. That does not pertain to the Gypsy Traveller community; it does not matter who the people are. Declaring that the right to private property should trump the subjective desires of an individual or group does not have a racial element. It is an entirely neutral law and fundamentally liberal, in that it affords the same freedoms to all.

It is true to the latter point that it is disheartening to see the party that was once the vehicle of Manchester liberalism now supporting such a partial and anarchic view of the world. Therefore, if the law posits that upholding the belief in private property and enacting its enforcement in law is considered wrong, the law should be repealed. If the law ascertains that private property undermines an abstract theory of human rights and that the latter should prevail, the law should be repealed. If the law favours the human rights of the infringer over the victim, the law should be repealed. If the law is able to overturn the decision of a sovereign, elected Parliament acting of its own volition, the law should almost certainly be repealed.

Therefore, although we welcome the Government’s attempt to find a compromise between our legal commitments, we are unfortunately of the opinion that they are amending the wrong Act entirely. They are still rather dogmatic in their commitment to this outdated doctrine, but they are simply kicking the can down the road and delaying the inevitable. Whether the courts allow a three-month no-return period is immaterial; there would still exist an extrajudicial doctrine that has the ultimate say over the United Kingdom’s Parliament. There will simply be an appeal to this amendment, and if that is unsuccessful, they will find themselves facing the ECHR in another challenge to another Act.

We are sympathetic to the Government’s attempt at a balancing act, but they are targeting the symptoms over the cause. That cause is the ECHR enshrined in the Human Rights Act. The ECHR has served its purpose, but the fact that it now favours rule-breakers over rule-takers shows that it does so no longer. The Government must recognise this truth, and I suspect that deep down they do. They should follow the advice of the Conservative Party and leave the ECHR. Perhaps the Minister will reply bearing good news.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Before the Minister replies, I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that the rule-breakers are not those who want to return within three months; they are the local authorities that have statutory obligations to provide proper sites for Travellers but are failing to do so.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I accept that, to a certain degree.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Let me clear up something straight away. There is not going to be a meeting of minds between me and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, on the abolition of the ECHR. I will leave it at that. There is no common ground between us. Yes, we are generally looking at some reforms, but there is no common ground on abolishing the lot, which is what the noble Lord seeks to achieve. There is blue/red/orange water between us on this; I will leave it at that.

On the question raised, I am grateful for the support of my noble friend Lady Whitaker and the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville. We have moved in light of the judgments that were made, and we have instated the three-month period in this legislation. That is the right thing to do in relation to the legislation. I think the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, accepted that, while having a wider target. At the moment, I will take his acceptance of that as support. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, for her support, and I am grateful for the constant chivvying of my noble friend Lady Whitaker on this issue.

In my opening remarks, in anticipation of what would be said, I said that the Government agree that planning appropriately for the housing and accommodation needs of our diverse communities is essential in supporting sustainable and inclusive growth. It is important, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, just reminded the House, that the responsibility to set pitch and plot targets for Traveller sites lies with local authorities, and absolutely right that they must identify specific deliverable sites sufficient for five years against targets. As I said in my opening remarks, a revised National Planning Policy Framework and the Planning Policy for Traveller Sites were published at the end of December 2024, following extensive consultation.

The Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government is currently consulting on a new national planning framework. That consultation runs until 10 March. The noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, and my noble friend Lady Whitaker mentioned the need to look at more sites. That is actively being looked at. Despite the wide reservations of the noble Lord, but with the support of the Liberal Democrat Benches and my colleague Lady Whitaker, I hope that my amendments can be accepted by the House tonight.

--- Later in debate ---

Irrespective of any argument on Ziegler, I suggest that the effect of this proposed new clause as drafted is inconsistent with the Human Rights Act and is in fact a dangerous clause. The same goes for the proposed new clause that is specifically about the obstruction of the highway—it is part of the same argument in that narrow context. I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, that it is difficult to decide on, but, sometimes, the courts are there to decide difficult issues.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, the recent ruling of the Supreme Court in R v ABJ and R v BDN has thrown the law of public protest into even greater confusion. That case relates to two protesters prosecuted under Section 12(1A) of the Terrorism Act 2000 for expressing public support for Hamas, a proscribed organisation. The appellants claimed that their charges under the Act represented a disproportionate interference with their right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court unanimously dismissed this appeal and, in doing so, ruled that the Section 12(1A) offence in the Terrorism Act does not represent a disproportionate interference with the convention rights.

I raise this ruling because it highlights the confusion around protest law ever since the Supreme Court delivered a different ruling in the case of DPP v Ziegler in 2021. We have discussed the implications of the Ziegler ruling in this House on a number of occasions. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has again reminded us of the details in that case. There is a clear tension between the court’s ruling in Ziegler and its ruling last week.

The court has made it clear that the Ziegler logic does not apply to the Terrorism Act defence but has not yet rectified the damaging consequences of the Ziegler decision. The basis of the court’s reasoning in Ziegler was the lawful excuse defence in Section 137 of the Highways Act 1980. In Committee, my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and I tabled amendments to remove the reasonable excuse defences from a number of Acts that are used to prosecute highly disruptive protesters, including the Highways Act and the Public Order Act 2023, and from this Bill.

When I spoke to those amendments, the Minister said that,

“the reasonable excuse defence is necessary in these instances to ensure an appropriate balance between protecting the wider community and the right to protest”.—[Official Report, 13/1/26; col. 1633.]

It is clear that the balance has not been made. I have not tabled those amendments to remove the reasonable excuse defences again, apart from Amendment 377B, which would remove the reasonable excuse defence from Section 137 of the Highways Act. I can think of no possible excuse for anyone purposefully to block the highway unless they are authorised to do so, such as the police or officers of National Highways. Removing that defence would render the issue in Ziegler null and void since that defence was the issue under consideration by the court.

However, I accept that the problem has now grown. The Supreme Court’s decision in the Ziegler case means there is now judicial precedent, and defence lawyers up and down the country have been lining up to utilise that argument so their clients can get off scot free. That is why I will be supporting Amendment 377 from the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. While I would prefer to remove those defences entirely, it would be better that the clarity in the law provided by Amendment 377 was made. His amendment would apply more widely than mine and therefore, I am happy to admit, provides a more substantial solution to the problem.

I would like to pick up on something that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said in Committee:

“much of the criticism of Ziegler fails to recognise that the courts themselves have understood that Ziegler went too far, and that what Parliament has determined in relation to the law is the governing law”.—[Official Report, 13/1/26; col. 1623.]

I accept his interpretation that the courts by subsequent decisions have recognised the issue of Ziegler, but the decision in Ziegler still stands as case law. It has not yet been overturned. I think that serves as one of the strongest arguments for Parliament to pass Amendment 377 and rectify the error that the courts have themselves acknowledged.

If the European Convention on Human Rights prevents the application of the law as passed by Parliament or prevents the conviction of those who should be convicted, that demonstrates that we should leave the ECHR, but while we remain within the purview of the Strasbourg court and while the Human Rights Act remains on the statute book, the decision in Ziegler needs to be reversed. Therefore, if the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, wishes to divide the House on Amendment 377, he will have our full support.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who took part in this short but important debate, and I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Davies of Gower, for tabling these amendments which seek to narrow the existing lawful or reasonable excuse defences that may be used for public order offences.

It may be helpful to set out how a lawful excuse works in practice. A person is automatically treated as having a lawful excuse only under two specific circumstances. The first is if the defendant honestly believes that the person who is entitled to consent to the damage has given consent or would have consented if they knew of the circumstances—for example, an honest belief that the owner of a car in which a child was locked on a hot day consented, or would have consented, to the defendant smashing the window to get the child out. The second is if the defendant acts to protect their own or someone else’s property and they honestly believe both that the property needs immediate protection and that their actions are reasonable—for example, a person damages one person’s property while accessing the property of another to prevent a fire. It does not matter whether a person’s belief in those circumstances is reasonable or justified; it just needs to be honest.

Whatever the failings of, or, indeed, one’s views on, the Ziegler judgment, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said in his sagacious contribution, case law has moved on and the Supreme Court has made subsequent rulings which chart a clearer path. It is the case that the right to private property will always need to be balanced with other convention rights, such as the right to protest and freedom of expression. This will have to be judged on a case-by-case basis, but leading case law has set out the parameters, and the Court of Appeal did not say that the exercise of a person’s convention rights could never form the basis of lawful excuse for criminal damage.

While I acknowledge the concerns of noble Lords, I have a great deal of sympathy for the arguments advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. It is for the Crown Prosecution Service and the courts to decide what may constitute lawful or reasonable excuse in individual cases. Further, the current scope of the defence allows the CPS the necessary flexibility to consider the full circumstances of each case on its merits. The types of behaviour that noble Lords have suggested, such as intimidating or harming members of the public or the risk of damaging property, are unlikely to be considered a reasonable excuse. Therefore, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

377C: After Clause 142, insert the following new Clause—
“Extension of notice period for public processions(1) Section 11 of the Public Order Act 1986 (advance notice of public processions) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (5) for “6” substitute “28”.(3) In subsection (6) for “6” substitute “28”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would extend the notice period that is required for public processions to take place from 6 to 28 days.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this amendment seeks to extend the notice period for public processions from six days to 28 days. The Government have resisted this; however, the police feel that it is difficult to operate under the current system and would prefer that it was 28 days as opposed to six. On that basis, I think we should be supporting the police, and I beg to test the opinion of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

377D: After Clause 142, insert the following new Clause—
“Prohibition of protests(1) Section 13 of the Public Order Act 1986 (prohibiting public processions) is amended as follows.(2) For subsection (1) substitute—“(1) The chief officer of police may apply to the Secretary of State for an order to prohibit the holding of all public processions (or any class of public processions so specified) for a period of not more than 3 months in any district or part of a district if either of the following conditions are met.(1A) The first condition is that the chief officer of police reasonably believes that the powers under section 12 will not be sufficient to prevent a public procession in the district or part of the district from resulting in –(a) serious public disorder,(b) serious damage to property, or(c) serious disruption to the life of the community.(1B) The second condition is that the procession would place undue demands on the police.”(3) In subsection (2)—(a) omit “a council may with the consent of”;(b) after the first “Secretary of State” insert “may”.”

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this amendment relates to the prohibition of protests, where the chief officer may apply to the Secretary of State for an order to prohibit the holding of all public processions, and where he or she considers there may be serious public disorder, damage to property or, indeed, serious disruption to the life of a community. That is an eminently sensible amendment, and the Government have resisted this again. However, I feel that it would be a great tool in the box for police, so I look to divide the House on it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said that the fact that this access is to be authorised by regulations is a saving grace. We know full well that in this House, fatal Motions virtually never succeed. The Conservative Front Bench may take some comfort from the fact that there would be provision for regulations, but the reality is that once the enabling legislation is passed, regulations will be in the hands of the Government, and nobody can do anything about it.

This is an issue of consent. People who apply for driving licences do so and have done so for many years on the basis that their photographs and biometric data are provided for the limited purpose of applying for a driving licence—that goes for all the information they provide. It is not for the purpose of enabling a trawl for suspects. One can envisage a position where, in some circumstances, authorisation to use information in public hands, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, suggested, may be appropriate, but this is not the place for it to be provided for by regulations subsequent to and consequent upon this enabling clause.

It is a question of public trust. The information and photographs are provided by applicants for driving licences based on the trust that they will be used for that purpose and that purpose alone. To misuse that information to enable a trawl of photographs to see if they might be suspected of some offence, with nobody having any real control over that use, is an abuse of trust. For that reason, I support the amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I will address Amendment 380 in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Moulsecoomb, and the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Strasburger. I am grateful to them for raising an issue that deserves careful consideration. The amendment would prevent authorised persons using information held on the Driving and Vehicle Licensing Agency database for biometric searches using facial recognition technology. It is right to ensure that Parliament scrutinises these emerging powers thoroughly. Public trust in policing is vital, and it is only through open debate and clear safeguards that such trust can be maintained.

The DVLA database contains photographs and personal information provided by millions of law-abiding citizens for the specific purpose of licensing drivers, and it is therefore entirely understandable that noble Lords should question whether it is appropriate for that information to be used in other contexts, particularly the context of advanced biometric searches. The principle that personal data should not be repurposed without clear justification is one that many of us across the House share.

However, while the concerns behind this amendment are sincere and valid, I fear that it is unnecessary and ultimately misguided. It would risk undermining the ability of our police and law enforcement agencies to prevent and investigate serious crime. First, it is important to recognise the operational value that carefully regulated facial recognition tools can provide to modern policing. The technology, when used responsibly, can assist officers in identifying suspects in serious crime, locating dangerous offenders and protecting the public in situations where time is of the essence. It can be particularly valuable when investigating crimes involving unidentified individuals captured on CCTV or other images.

The police already rely on a range of databases and identification tools to perform these tasks. Photographs from custody suites, passport records and other lawful sources have long assisted the police in identifying suspects and victims alike. Facial recognition technology represents in many ways a technological evolution of that long-standing investigative practice. The amendment before us would place a blanket prohibition on the use of DVLA images for biometric searches involving facial recognition. Such prohibition risks creating an artificial and potentially harmful limitation on investigative capability. If a suspect’s image appears on CCTV and the only high-quality image available for comparison is contained within a DVLA database, the amendment would prevent police even conducting that comparison. We must ask ourselves whether that is a proportionate outcome.

Secondly, it is worth emphasising that the use of facial recognition technology by police forces in the United Kingdom is not taking place in a regulatory vacuum. The deployment of such technologies is already subject to a framework of legal safeguards, oversight and guidance. Police forces must operate within the boundaries of data protection law, including the principles established under the UK general data protection regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018. Their activities are subject to oversight by bodies such as the Information Commissioner’s Office and, where appropriate, the courts. Moreover, the use of live facial recognition by police has already been subject to significant judicial scrutiny. The courts have made it clear that deployments must be proportionate and transparent, and accompanied by appropriate safeguards. That jurisprudence has helped shape operational guidance and policing practice in this area.

Given that context, I question whether it is wise for Parliament to impose a sweeping statutory ban in relation to one database. Doing so risks pre-empting the careful regulatory balance that is already evolving through legislation, oversight and case law. That does not mean that the concerns raised by the amendment should be dismissed—far from it. The growth of biometric technologies demands a clear and robust legislative framework. Many Members across this House have rightly called for greater clarity about how facial recognition should be governed in the future. I feel the same. Questions of transparency, accountability, accuracy and bias must continue to be examined with great care.

However, those broader questions should be addressed through a comprehensive approach to biometric governance rather than through a single amendment targeting one database in isolation. If Parliament concludes that additional statutory safeguards are required for facial recognition technology then we should consider them holistically, ensuring that any rules are consistent, proportionate and grounded in operational reality. A piecemeal prohibition risks creating unintended consequences while failing to resolve the underlying policy debate.

For those reasons, while I commend the spirit in which the amendment has been brought forward, I regret that I cannot support it. Instead, I hope that the House will continue the broader necessary conversation about how facial recognition technologies should be regulated, ensuring that we protect civil liberties and the ability of our police to keep our communities safe.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been a useful debate. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for tabling the amendment, and to the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for speaking in support of it. I am grateful for the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, which echo some of the points that I will make. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pointed to one of the arguments that I will make: that access to the data will be subject to a statutory code of practice to ensure that its use is appropriate.

I remind noble Lords of the purpose of Clause 154: it is simply about bringing legislation up to date, which is what I said in Committee when we debated this matter. As a result of technical changes to the way police and law enforcement access driving licence data, it has become clear that we need to improve the DVLA data access regime by setting out clearly in statute—which is what Clause 154 does—which persons can access DVLA driving licence data. The legislation provides additional clarity on this issue.

The measure will enable us, through secondary legislation made under these new powers—this goes to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—to expand the purposes for which DVLA data may be accessed automatically to include policing or law enforcement purposes. This means that the police will have another tool to cut crime and keep the public safe, in line with the commitment by chief officers to pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry when investigating an offence. I emphasise that access to the data will be subject to a statutory code of practice to ensure that its use is appropriate.

We are clear that there will be strong safeguards around the use of DVLA data, which, as I have said, will be introduced via regulations made under the new provisions. We debated earlier government Amendment 382, which ensures that these regulations are subject to the affirmative procedure in both Houses, in line with a recommendation from the Constitution Committee.

We want to ensure that officers undergo training prior to being able to access information. The police are already legally required to consult with local communities. Extensive audits of who has accessed DVLA driving licence data are maintained. It is already standard practice that each time the DVLA driver database is accessed by a police officer, the details of what information is accessed and for what purpose is logged. This will continue to be the case once the revised measure is implemented.

On the issue of facial recognition technology, I want to make it clear to all noble Lords who have signed this amendment, including the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that police forces do not conduct biometric facial recognition searches against images contained on the DVLA database. Officers use the DVLA database for day-to-day policing matters. Anybody who has watched a police programme on a Monday night—when they get the opportunity in the recess to do so—will have at some point seen a police officer pull over a car and look at an individual who says, “I haven’t got my licence with me”, and tell them they are Jimmy Jones of X address. The police officer then wants to check that they are Jimmy Jones of X address, and so they access the DVLA database. Nine times out of 10, on the police shows that I watch on a Monday night during recess, it is a false name, and therefore there is police action accordingly. That is the purpose for which the police currently use the database.

As I said in our earlier debate on Amendment 374, the use of facial recognition technology in all circumstances is currently subject to safeguards, such as the Human Rights Act and the Data Protection Act. As I have said in previous discussions, any use of facial recognition technology will be subject to the outcome of the consultation that we finished on 10 February. That will be completed in about 12 weeks and, by the summer, we will have government proposals which the noble Baroness, along with both Houses of Parliament, can scrutinise, to achieve some view on whatever the Government propose following the outcome of that consultation.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, that, if the amendment were agreed by the Government tonight then the police officer who stopped somebody on the street—potentially a drunk driver, an unlicensed driver or a driver with no insurance—would not be able to access the DVLA database. That goes to the very points that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, made in his speech.

This is not about mass surveillance. It is about using the DVLA database in an appropriate way—logged, recorded and monitored by the police to ensure that we check that person A is actually the right person who can drive that vehicle at that particular time. It is not, with due respect to noble Lords, mass surveillance. It is proper use of police technology to ensure that the DVLA database helps catch bad actors in the act of doing bad things. I hope the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lebedev (CB)]

My Lords, I will not take much of your time. First, I fully respect and acknowledge the arguments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, which I feel have been addressed very well from the other side of the House. I support Amendment 387B and endorse the arguments made by noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, in favour of this amendment.

Last July, I was able to raise the widespread concerns so many of us have about non-crime hate incidents—NCHIs—in a short debate in this House. I was encouraged by the widespread support across parties for a robust stance in defence of free speech. Many noble Lords outlined how pernicious NCHIs are. I was grateful to the Minister for his thoughtful engagement on the arguments.

Since that debate, there has been a welcome retreat from the use of NCHIs, with the Metropolitan Police Commissioner and others recognising the inappropriateness of using valuable police time to harass individuals for exercising their right to free speech. Like the noble Lord, Lord Young, I am pleased that police leaders and Ministers now recognise that recording the names of citizens on police databases for actions which are not crimes should be curtailed. That is customary good practice, but it is, in this case, not enough.

We need to ensure that there is appropriate statutory protection for free speech, and we need to ensure that past expressions of opinion, which may have been recorded under a previous regime, cannot be used to blight the future of citizens. Amendment 387B would not only wipe clean the slate but affirm the importance of free speech, the foundational freedom on which all others depend. I commend it to the House.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow so many excellent speeches from noble Lords across the House who recognise the problems that non-crime hate incidents have caused. I am very pleased to see that there is much agreement on this matter, and I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Herbert of South Downs, for his update, as it were. I am also particularly grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, for her very important intervention.

Like many of my noble friends and many noble Lords around the House, I fully support Amendment 387B tabled by my noble friend Lord Young of Acton and the noble Lords, Lord Strasburger and Lord Hogan-Howe. The amendment would bring about the abolition of the category of so-called non-crime hate incidents. If this were to become the law of the land, NCHIs would be permanently dead. Their recording and retention would end, and we could finally put this well-intentioned but ultimately damaging experiment to bed.

We have had many debates during the passage of the Bill about the various tenets of hate crime laws and aggravating factors based on hostility. Indeed, only last Wednesday, the Government were successful in expanding their enormous web of legislation even further, despite our best efforts to stop them. We have lost that battle for now, but I reiterate my opposition to those provisions. While related to the debate we had last Wednesday, the matter before us now is rather different. Non-crime hate incidents are not hate crimes; they are something quite different. They represent the recording by police of incidents that are not crimes at all.

The House will have heard the background to NCHIs from other noble Lords, so I will not repeat that, but their establishment in 2014 via guidance issued by the College of Policing was motivated by sincere intentions. They were supposed to assist police in identifying patterns of hostility in communities that might escalate into criminal behaviour, and that objective was understandable, but in practice, the policy has drifted far beyond that limited purpose. We now find ourselves in a position where individuals can have a police record created about them for conduct that is entirely lawful, simply because another person perceives it to have been motivated by hostility. That is a very serious matter indeed.

The threshold for the recording of these incidents is ridiculously low. A person needs only to be concerned by another’s conduct in order for them to report such conduct to the police for recording as an NCHI.

The matter has quite rightly received serious scrutiny in recent years, and I particularly want to reference the independent review conducted by the College of Policing and led by my noble friend Lord Herbert of South Downs into the use of non-crime hate incidents. The review acknowledged a number of very significant concerns, and it recognised that the recording of such incidents had in some cases created a chilling effect on free expression. It also identified problems with the threshold for recording and the potential for disproportionate interference in the lives of individuals who had committed no crime.

The review led to revised guidance from the College of Policing intended to raise the threshold for recording NCHIs and better protect freedom of expression. I welcome that effort. It was a step in the right direction.

The review also demonstrated something more fundamental—that the concept itself is deeply problematic. We have seen, over the years, a number of examples where the recording of non-crime hate incidents has been plainly vexatious, trivial or disproportionate. In one widely reported case, a former police officer found himself the subject of a non-crime hate incident after engaging in a debate on social media about gender identity. There are several examples that have been given in the debate, so I shall not provide further evidence. There have been cases where individuals have had police records created simply for sharing satirical material online, expressing controversial opinions or engaging in perfectly lawful political debate. We should pause and consider what this means in practice.

In some circumstances, such records may be disclosed during enhanced background checks conducted by the Disclosure and Barring Service. That means that an allegation about a non-criminal matter could potentially affect a person’s employment prospects, particularly in professions involving children or vulnerable adults. There have been documented cases where individuals have feared precisely that outcome.

I also recall the remarks of Ministers during our Committee debates, in which the Government acknowledged the importance of protecting free speech in this area, and the Home Office has repeatedly recognised the need to strike the right balance. Indeed, the Home Secretary herself has spoken publicly about the importance of ensuring that policing does not stray into the regulation of lawful expression. She has emphasised that police officers must focus on real crime and genuine threats to public safety. I agree with those sentiments, but I suggest that the time has come to move beyond incremental reform. The fundamental difficulty is that the concept of a non-crime hate incident places the police in the position of adjudicating perceived hostility in circumstances where no law has been broken. That is an uncomfortable and inappropriate role for the police service.

I put on record my thanks to the Minister for making the time to meet us and to the College of Policing for the briefing it gave on its plans for the future recording of such incidents. It was helpful of the Minister to set out some of that when we opened.

As my noble friend Lord Young of Acton said, the proposals by the college are certainly welcome. It has been clear that NCHIs will not exist any more and that any incident where hostility is a motivating factor will now be recorded as an ASB incident. Critically, these will not be disclosed in enhanced DBS checks. The college has also said that it will be providing updated guidance and training to clarify the higher standards of proof required for the recording of such incidents, and a new triaging method.

This is all welcome, but that does not mean that all is perfect. I still have some concerns and will briefly outline them. My first concern is that, if the abolition of NCHIs is not embedded in statute, there is the possibility of them being brought back to life in the future. All it would take is a change in Home Secretary, or a new Prime Minister, who could reintroduce them by the back door. If all we have is guidance, there is no legal safeguard to prevent them returning. I would feel much more comfortable knowing that they are gone for good and will never be resurrected from the dead.

Secondly, it must be explicitly acknowledged that any guidance produced by the College of Policing about the future recording of incidents will have freedom of expression at its heart. If this had been the case when the NCHI regime was created, we might not have seen as many unintended consequences. It is a fairly basic requirement, which is why I am pleased that my noble friend has included that in his amendment.

Thirdly, the issue of historic NCHI recordings needs to be addressed. Given that the Government have now agreed to abolish them, it does not seem right that thousands will still exist and may very well be disclosed in enhanced DBS checks. That is a matter of fairness. Individuals should not carry the burden of a police record relating to conduct that was never a crime in the first place. That has now been acknowledged as a mistake.

However, like my noble friend, I appreciate the point made by the College of Policing: that to require their deletion within a few months, as the original amendment sought, would be a highly labour-intensive process. If our purpose is to prevent the police wasting time and allow them to do their job, requiring them to sit down and trawl through every single file does not make sense. However, where NCHI recordings are discovered, they should be deleted and they most certainly should not be disclosed. It is sensible to have the guarantee in statute.

The college and the Government have made commendable progress and I reiterate that I am genuinely pleased at the direction of travel. However, we still need some guardrails. That is why we on these Benches believe that there must be a provision in legislation to ensure that NCHIs are gone, that they do not return and that the new regime is more transparent, reasonable and respectful of freedom of expression. For that reason, I very much support Amendment 378B and, if my noble friend does press it to a Division, we will follow him into the Content Lobby.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for the discussion and, in winding up this debate, I put on record my thanks to Sir Andy Marsh of the College of Policing for the work he has done on this exercise of examining non-crime hate incidents. I remind the House that we are here today with the amendments I have tabled and with the outline that I have given from the College of Policing response, which the chair of the College of Policing has also endorsed. We are here today because the then Home Secretary, my right honourable friend Yvette Cooper, commissioned that review and asked for a report to be produced. That is why we are here today: we have taken action.

I listened with great interest to the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, talking about his experiences. That was not the responsibility of this Government. We are trying to change that regime. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, that we are trying to change that regime. I say to all noble Lords who spoke that we are trying to change that regime. However, I say to my noble friend Lady Lawrence of Clarendon that, in doing so, we want to ensure that we keep the essence of what that regime was established for: to identify precisely the issues that she mentioned in her very powerful contribution. The intent—to gather information, to prevent crime, to understand tensions, to look at potential areas where tensions could arise, to support investigations and to safeguard the vulnerable—remains as relevant today as it did 30 years ago.

I say to the noble Lords, Lord Lebedev, Lord Fuller, Lord Young of Acton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, who have spoken on this issue, that we understand the issue. However, I hope that we are making some movement to address the concerns, at the same time as keeping the essence of why those non-crime hate incidents needed to be recorded in the first place, and to have the revisions that the College of Policing have brought forward. Once they are endorsed, we will look at how we put those into practice in due course. I hope that will help both the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 9th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

I will finish here because this is Report, but 50 metres is too short, although I think vicinity works. I agree with the noble Baroness on clarity; I am not against that, but you have to leave the police some flexibility given the circumstances they face. I do not think vicinity is an unreasonable suggestion. We can make that work, but 50 metres will never work.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, we have started the fourth day on Report with a wide-ranging and interesting debate on the general landscape of public order law. The noble Lords, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Lord Strasburger, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Fox of Buckley, have argued that there are too many statutory limitations on protest in this country. I do not agree, and I suspect I will find myself in much agreement with the Minister on those amendments.

First, I will speak to my Amendments 377C and 377D. Amendment 377C would extend the notification period for public processions from six to 28 days. Currently, Section 11 of the Public Order Act 1986 requires any person organising a protest to notify the police of their proposal to hold it with six days’ notice. The purpose of this period is to ensure that the police can plan their resource requirements effectively. They need to examine the route, number of attendees and timing, gather intelligence on the groups and people involved and assess the likelihood of violence and disorder. If the procession is likely to be large or the cause highly contentious, or if those involved have a history of causing disorder, they may very well need to make contingencies and possibly bring in more officers.

The short period of six days causes significant problems for the police, the public and the organisers of the protest, and it may take the police a substantial amount of time to gather all the available evidence and set conditions so the organisers can often only be notified of those conditions the day before the protest is due to take place. This does not give them adequate time to ensure that they can comply with those conditions, nor does it allow the public and businesses adequate time to adapt.

Policy Exchange’s polling demonstrated that the medium level of notice that respondents believed protest organisers should have to give to the police is 28 days. In its survey, 51% said organisers should have to give at least three weeks’ notice while 45% said the period should be at least four weeks. The 28-day period is also incidentally the same notice period as exists in Northern Ireland, and while I appreciate the different historical and political context in Northern Ireland, it does not seem unreasonable to extend that to England and Wales—especially given the substantial time and effort that police must pour into planning for large-scale protests.

Amendment 377D concerns the criteria on which the police may prohibit a protest. Currently, Section 13 of the Public Order Act 1986 permits the police to prohibit protests if there is a likelihood that the protest will result in serious public disorder. However, that is the only criterion included in that section, meaning there is no ability for the police to prohibit a protest if there is a risk of serious disruption to the life of the community, nor does it allow the police to take into account their own resources and ability to maintain public safety when making their assessment. My amendment would extend the criteria for the prohibition of protest to include where the chief officer of police has a reasonable belief that the protest could result in “serious public disorder”, “serious damage to property”,

“serious disruption to the life of the community”

or that it would

“place undue demands on the police”.

Given the Government's commitment to reform of public order law, I would think they should be able to accept these two amendments. Before the Minister says they need to wait for the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, into public order and hate speech to report, I gently remind him that the Government were perfectly happy to pre-empt that review and legislate to extend the legislation aggravators based on characteristics last week. If they were happy to do so for that provision, I do not see why they cannot accept mine. However, if the Minister finds himself unable to do so, I am minded to press them to a Division when called.

I will also briefly comment on the other amendments in this group. Amendment 369, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and others, would create a new statutory right to protest. While the attention behind this is understandable, it is difficult to see what legal gap it is intended to fill. As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has already explained, the right to protest is already protected through the common law and currently through Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights incorporated domestically through the Human Rights Act.

However, it is important to recognise that we do not derive our rights in Britain from international treaties or even from domestic statute. The right to protest was protected before Parliament passed the Human Rights Act in 1998 and before we joined the ECHR. It is a right derived from ancient English liberty and our common law inheritance, so placing it into the Crime and Policing Bill in 2026 will not change a thing. I dare say if we were to leave the ECHR and repeal the Human Rights Act, we would still have our ancient freedom to protest intact.

What is more, creating a new declaratory clause risks adding greater complexity without adding meaningful protection. Indeed, by restating rights that are already well established, we may inadvertently create new areas of legal uncertainty rather than clarity for the police, local authorities and the courts, and for those reasons I cannot support that amendment.

A similar concern arises with Amendment 369A, which would introduce a reasonable excuse defence relating to concealing identity at a protest. Clause 133(2) already contains these defences. They include when a person is wearing a face covering for health reasons, religious observance or a purpose relating to their work, and that is a perfectly reasonable and pragmatic list of exceptions.

Amendments 372A and 372AA seek to narrow the circumstances in which conditions may be imposed on protests in the vicinity of places of worship. In doing so, they replace the current test by which a protest may intimidate with a requirement to demonstrate a specific purpose to intimidate. That is a significantly higher threshold. The difficulty is obvious. In practice, intimidation often arises from the circumstances and impact of a protest rather than from an explicitly stated intention. Requiring the police to prove purpose before acting risks tying their hands precisely when communities may feel most vulnerable.

On Amendment 373, as I stated in Committee, we on these Benches are supportive of the introduction of police powers to take into consideration cumulative disruption when placing conditions on protests and assemblies. I do not therefore agree with removing Clause 140. After all, the previous Government tried to introduce this in 2023 and it was the Liberal Democrats and Labour who voted it down in this House at the time, so it is good to see the Labour Party finally has come round to the Conservatives’ way of thinking.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Marks, Lord Strasburger and Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for affording us this further opportunity to debate the right to protest and public order measures in the Bill. I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this important debate.

The Government fully recognise the importance of peaceful protest in a democratic society. However, Amendment 369, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, would place in statute a right that is already clearly protected in domestic law—and it is not only me saying that, as we have heard from the formidable legal troika of the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Pannick, and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. As they said, public authorities are bound by the Human Rights Act to uphold Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights which cover freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. These rights are qualified and may only be limited when restrictions are lawful, necessary and proportionate. Common law also provides strong recognition of peaceful protest. Introducing an additional statutory provision risks creating overlap and uncertainty, particularly for operational policing, without offering any meaningful new protections.

In their contributions, the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, talked about the risks of, shall we say, a more extreme Government and this paving the way for further restrictions on the right to protest. I can only agree with comments made by a number of noble Lords, particularly the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Faulks: I hope the occasion never arises, but that is democracy, and any incoming Government that have that kind of mandate would not find it hard to overturn not only provisions that the Government are making in this Bill but the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, proposes, should it make its way on to the statute book. I am therefore not sure that argument really washes.

The Government remain firmly committed to safeguarding the right to protest. That is one reason why we have asked the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, to review the current legislative framework. One of the matters being explored as part of the review is—to quote its terms of reference—whether the current legislation

“strikes a fair balance between freedom of expression and the right to protest with the need to prevent disorder and keep communities safe”.

The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, is expected to report later in the spring. I assure noble Lords that we will consider very carefully all his recommendations, including any proposing a strengthening of the right to protest.

Amendment 369A, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, would provide a reasonable excuse defence for concealing a person’s identity at a protest in a designated area and shift the burden of proof away from individuals within that designated area on to police. Instead of requiring a person to justify why they had a valid reason for wearing an item to conceal their identity, as set out in the specified defences, it would place the responsibility on the police to assess, during a live protest, whether the explanation provided was reasonable or not. As we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, that is not necessarily always an easy thing to do.

Clause 133 currently provides three statutory defences for concealing identity at a protest within a designated area: relating to the health of the person or others; religious observance; or for a purpose relating to that person’s work. The offence carries a reverse burden of proof, meaning it is for the individual to prove they concealed their identity for one of these reasons. I consider this a proportionate and carefully balanced offence.

It is important to highlight that any decision to designate an area and arrest a person concealing their identity must take into account Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, meaning that all decisions must be necessary and proportionate in relation to the right to peaceful protest. It is important to bear in mind that a locality will be designated only when it is thought that a protest activity is likely to involve or has involved criminality, so it is expedient to do so in order to prevent or limit the commission of offences.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I think it is very odd that there should be a distinction made by the Government between a memorial to Florence Nightingale and a memorial to Edith Cavell. That is purely an example that the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, has given us. If that is so, what on earth is the point of the clause?

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Parkinson for tabling these amendments that seek to ensure that our memorials of national and historic importance are afforded the respect and protection they deserve under the new offence created in Clause 137. As was noted in Committee, the offence of climbing on specified memorials was introduced to address gaps revealed by recent protests around war memorials, such as the Royal Artillery Memorial and, indeed, around the statue of our great wartime leader Sir Winston Churchill just outside this place. It was first introduced as part of the previous Government’s Criminal Justice Bill, and it is welcome that this Government have taken up the mantle.

Under the current drafting, however, only grade 1 listed memorials are specified, together with the statue of Sir Winston Churchill, but the list does not capture other memorials of equal national significance. As my noble friend has argued so eloquently, using grade 1 listed memorials does not serve a real practical purpose. It is much more about administrative ease. Why does Sledmere get two specified memorials but the Women of World War II Memorial gets no such protection? Amendment 370 would broaden the definition of “specified memorial” to include any war memorial that has been listed or scheduled, not just those that happen to be grade 1 listed.

That approach aligns with the fact that the significance of a memorial is not solely a function of its listing grade but of the history it commemorates and its role in national remembrance. Expanding the scope in this way provides a more objective and inclusive basis for protection and avoids arbitrary outcomes based on historic listing decisions.

Amendment 372 complements Amendment 370 by adding two memorials of particular national importance: the monument to the women of the Second World War in Whitehall, which honours the immense contributions of millions of women during that conflict, and the Holocaust memorial garden in Hyde Park, which stands as a poignant reminder of the horrors of genocide. Including those memorials recognises the breadth of sacrifice in the diverse stories that make up our collective history. I hope the Government will concede to this. If they do and my noble friend is content, so will I be.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to everyone who spoke in this short but important debate, particularly to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Norwich, who spoke very movingly about the power of memorials in every community and the hurt that communities feel when they are damaged or disrespected. Amendments 370, 372ZZA and 372ZZB, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, seek to expand the list of war and other memorials covered by the new offence of climbing on a memorial provided for in Clause 137. I am grateful to him for taking the time to meet with me and officials last week on this issue and for his thoughtful consideration of how best to achieve the Government’s aim, which I think is shared across the House.

As regards Amendment 370, I fully acknowledge that many of the listed and scheduled memorials covered in the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 and the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act 1979 commemorate events and individuals of great national importance. The Bill intentionally sets out a clear and fixed list of memorials which provides certainty for the public, policing and the courts. By contrast, Amendment 370 would link the offence to memorials listed or scheduled under two separate heritage Acts. Those Acts encompass a far wider range of structures than the focused list in this measure and can change over time. Therefore, this would introduce an uncertainty about which memorials were captured at any given point, undermining the clarity and consistency that the measure is intended to achieve. For this reason, I cannot support the amendment.

The noble Lord, and perhaps the House, will be pleased to hear that I am much more disposed towards his Amendments 372ZZA and 372ZZB, which seek to add the monument to the women of World War II and the Holocaust memorial garden in Hyde Park to Schedule 14. Our aim is to ensure that memorials that have been deemed at threat in the course of a protest are covered by the offence. As the noble Lord has explained, these two memorials have been targeted in recent years. They are both culturally significant, and I agree with him that we need to protect them under this new offence. I am therefore happy to confirm that the Government support these two amendments.

The Holocaust memorial garden in Hyde Park is of course designed to be enjoyed as a garden and people are free to walk within it. I have given consideration to the practical issue of whether the police will be able to enforce this offence. The intention of the offence is to capture the action of climbing and I am confident it will not capture walking on an installation such as the Holocaust memorial garden. There are other memorials listed in Schedule 14 which have steps that may be sat on by members of the public, such as the Royal Artillery memorial in Hyde Park. I am content that, in enforcing this offence, police officers will use their discretion to consider whether an offence is committed.

As I have previously stated, the provision includes a power for the Home Secretary to add further memorials by secondary legislation. This might include the statue of Florence Nightingale in Waterloo Place, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. This Government will be able to add to the list of protected memorials should a site be identified that requires inclusion. I remain of the view, however, that not every memorial or every war memorial can be included. To do so would make the measure unenforceable due to the number of memorials and many, by their nature—for example, commemorative plaques—cannot be climbed on. That said, I accept we need a clear process for deciding whether to add further memorials to Schedule 14.

We will commit to setting out the process through which the Government will add to the specified list of memorials through secondary legislation. We will ensure a methodical and structured approach to consider which memorials have a significant public interest in being included. We will set out the process shortly after the Bill receives Royal Assent. As the Home Secretary has already indicated, this will include the national Holocaust memorial when it has finally been built. I hope that I have been able to persuade the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, and that the combination of the addition of the two memorials specified in his Amendments 372ZZA and 372ZZB and the process I have outlined for considering the case for adding further memorials will persuade him to withdraw Amendment 370.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I wish to add how delighted I am that the Government have done that. It is rather overdue and will give some degree of satisfaction to at least some families of MPs in particular.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, in Committee I raised some strong objections to the amendment that the Government were proposing then. We were concerned that the proposals could inadvertently criminalise canvassing and leafleting an officeholder from a rival political party. We were also concerned about the proposed second aspect of the offence, which could criminalise making representations about a matter relating to the officeholder’s private capacity.

I still have reservations about the principle behind Amendment 371. I do not accept the Government’s argument that all protests outside a public officeholder’s dwelling constitute harassment. That is the stated view of the Government, but I think it is demonstrably false. If a protest outside a public officeholder’s home becomes actual harassment within the meaning of the law then that should be prosecuted as such, and if the protest breaches the peace or becomes highly disruptive then there are already laws to deal with that, but simply saying that any person who wishes to make representations to a politician about their actions or policies outside their house is harassment and therefore unlawful seems a disproportionate infringement of liberty.

Having said that, I am grateful to the Minister for taking our comments on board. The amendment that the Government have tabled on Report is much improved and far more tightly drafted, and I welcome that. Could the Minister confirm that the definition of a protest in the amendment will not include canvassing and leafleting or asking someone to sign a petition? I think we would all benefit from that being on the record. Given that the Government have listened to our concerns, while we are not completely content, we will not oppose this amendment.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I particularly thank the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, because I feel that at this Dispatch Box I do not always meet the high bar that she sets for defending the Government’s position, so it is always good to win her praise.

To pick up on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, the Government are committed to defending democracy. I therefore assure him that Amendment 371 does not restrict political campaigning. It is perfectly legitimate for campaigners during election time to door-knock and speak to their local public officeholders about different political opinion. Where this crosses the line is when these people choose to protest against the public officeholder at their home.

These government amendments are vital to protecting our democracy. As my honourable friend the Security Minister has made clear, harassment and intimidation must never be accepted as part of a public officeholder’s role. This cannot become the new normal, and the scale of the problem cannot be overstated. It is not simply MPs, either. The Local Government Association’s Debate Not Hate survey in 2025 found that seven in 10 councillors had experienced abuse or intimidation in the previous year. The Speaker’s Conference reported that an astonishing 96% of MPs who responded to their survey had suffered at least one form of abuse, intimidation or harassment. This demonstrates that it is a real problem. Harassment is not simply confined to online spaces; it is very active in the real world too. We must therefore put protections in place not only to keep public office holders safe but to ensure that they feel safe, and that their families are protected. With that, I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

371B: In subsection (1), leave out paragraphs (a) to (c) and insert “Condition 1 has been met and that one of either—
(a) Condition 2, or(b) Condition 3,has been met.(1A) Condition 1 is that the group has as its purpose and practice the deliberate commission of one or more of the following offences—(a) an offence under section 1 of the Public Order Act 1986 (riot),(b) an offence under section 2 of the Public Order Act 1986 (violent disorder),(b) an offence under section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 (destroying or damaging property), or(d) an offence under section 7 of the Public Order Act 2023 (interference with the use or operation of key national infrastructure).(1B) Condition 2 is that the offences mentioned in Condition 1 are carried out with the intention of influencing public policy, parliamentary debate, ministerial decision-making or the exercise of democratic functions.(1C) Condition 3 is that the activities of the group create a risk of serious harm to public safety, democratic institutions, or the rights of others.”

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Walney, for bringing forward Amendment 371A and all noble Lords who have added their name to it. I thank the Members of your Lordships’ House who, I hope, will be speaking to it. This amendment is eminently sensible. We have heard several examples already of groups which engage in criminal and intimidating behaviour to further their ideological ends, but which do not necessarily pass the terrorism threshold. There is no justification for their continued lawful existence, but to proscribe them as terrorists obfuscates the meaning of the category and incorporates inactive supporters within the definition. The pertinent example of this is Palestine Action. I will not speculate on whether the behaviour actually amounts to terrorism, but the actions of its supporters following its proscription highlight the necessity for action.

An organisation that damages defence infrastructure and attacks members of the public should cease to exist, but for the police to then have to spend precious time arresting hundreds of protesters with placards is clearly not ideal. It may seem morally dubious on behalf of those protesters, but I think we can all agree that they are a far cry from the archetypal terrorist supporters of, say, ISIS or the Taliban. Most importantly, it is a waste of police time to have to deal with sanctimonious protesters who otherwise peacefully support a general ideological cause. That is why we entirely support the noble Lord’s amendment. Our Amendment 371B introduces a minor change to the drafting that reflects our belief that the proscription of groups in this category should not be contingent on whether they fulfil the criteria of both subsections (1A) and (1B). Individually, the actions in both subsections should merit a protest group being proscribed and prohibited from taking further action.

If a listed crime is committed that creates a serious risk to the safety of the public, then the line is crossed from dissent to danger. I think noble Lords can agree that whether a group is for an ideological end or not, this should merit proscription. The very act of a group entering an arms factory with sledgehammers should preclude its existence, regardless of motive. That said, ideological motive is also a factor that should be considered in its own right: if a group shuns peaceful protest and becomes willing to commit criminal offences to further a political end, that should be grounds to ban it. Take, for example, BASH BACK, the activist group which has consistently engaged in criminal damage, vandalism and intimidation in the name of so-called transgender rights. To take one example—as I am sure my noble friend Lady Cash will highlight—it recently spray-painted the office building of the Equality and Human Rights Commission for simply declaring that biological sex is biological sex.

This vandalism is an offence under Section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 and should result in a group being proscribed. I am, however, wary that spray painting and other forms of vandalism may not be seen to create a risk of serious harm to public safety, and I am not confident that, with the right lawyers, the actions of these groups would result in them being proscribed, because of a technicality. Criminality alone introduces the possibility of restricting the practice of a protest group. Whether this is augmented by either a risk to public safety or by an intention to influence political decision-making should confirm that decision.

That being said, I reaffirm my support for the noble Lord’s original amendment. It is a pertinent time for this debate, and I believe that Amendment 371A finds the right balance between prohibiting criminal activity and permitting peaceful support. I hope all Members of your Lordships’ House can recognise the rationale for moving away from a rigid binary between terrorism and protest and acknowledge that it is a spectrum that will benefit from more nuance. His Majesty’s loyal Opposition will support this amendment, and I look forward to hearing the closing remarks of the Minister and of the noble Lord, Lord Walney.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 371A from the noble Lord, Lord Walney. As the noble Lord mentioned, the House will be very familiar with the problems that have arisen from the use of the power that the Secretary of State has to proscribe a terrorist group. The virtue of Amendment 371A is that it avoids any such description. It focuses on the severe mischief that we know certain groups are causing in our society.

Who could object to the Secretary of State having a power, by regulation, to designate a group as an extreme criminal protest group if there is a reasonable belief that its purpose and practice is the deliberate commission of the serious offences set out in this amendment: riot, violent disorder, destroying or damaging property, and interference with the use or operation of key national infrastructure? Surely the Secretary of State should have power to take action, particularly when, as the amendment requires, those offences are carried out with the intention of influencing public policy, parliamentary debate, ministerial decision-making or the exercise of democratic functions, and they create a risk of serious harm to public safety, democratic institutions or the rights of others.

We all support the right to protest, but there are limits, and these clearly are breached by deliberate conduct the purpose of which is to act in the way set out in the tightly drawn amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Walney. As he has pointed out, he has avoided in his drafting the real problem that has arisen in the Palestine Action case: that people are criminalised by reason of support for that body. That has caused problems. The Court of Appeal case is pending, but this amendment avoids those difficulties.

So I support this. I hope the Minister will not tell the House that this is not the time and that we should wait in particular for the report of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. I too have the highest regard for him, but we should bear in mind that, with this Bill, the Government have not waited for his report in a number of provisions relating to public order, particularly and rightly on cumulative disruption. So I say to the House: let us deal with this. This is a legislative opportunity; it is a pressing problem, and we should deal with it now.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, despite having some hesitation about it, we are broadly support of Amendment 371A from the noble Lord, Lord Walney. The concept of the new category of extreme criminal protest groups that are not proscribed has real merit and is plainly an attempt to plug an uncomfortable gap. We agree with the noble Lord, Lord Walney, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, that unlawfulness is at the heart of this amendment. The amendment states that the group must have

“as its purpose and practice the deliberate commission of”

one of a series of serious offences, and that

“such offences are carried out with the intention of influencing public policy, parliamentary debate, ministerial decision-making, or the exercise of democratic functions”,

and that,

“the activities … create a risk of serious harm to public safety, democratic institutions, or the rights of others”.

Those provisions make it clear that extreme criminal protest groups are well named. The provisions as a whole would also make it clear, however, that it is not appropriate for proscription of those groups whereby any support for the groups is made a criminal offence under the Terrorism Act.

If the amendment would avoid the prosecution of peaceful protesters for peaceable support of groups that could be branded terrorist under the Terrorist Act, we could support it unconditionally because there would then be a hierarchy of offences. At the top of the tree would be offences under the Terrorism Act, and then the treatment of groups which qualified as extreme criminal protest groups under the Walney amendment. But the Government have not committed and would not commit—and I do not suppose they will at this stage commit—to end prosecutions for peaceable protesters under the Terrorism Act. That may change after the Macdonald review, or it may change if the Government’s appeal against the High Court’s decision in relation to Palestine Action is unsuccessful. However, our position is that it would be helpful to have a middle course, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, pointed out in very sensible terms. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, articulated the same point very well, but in a different way.

The problem we see with the amendment is that it does not affect the Terrorism Act, and there would remain the potential for prosecution of peaceful protesters under that Act as the law stands. So we have decided, with some hesitation, that it is probably sensible to await the Macdonald review. I accept that I am making that point in the face of the argument made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that we should not be asking for any legislation along the lines of the Walney amendment to wait at all. Of course, there is the problem that not accepting this amendment would leave us with the limited choice of the Terrorism Act or nothing, and that is a very unfortunate position to be in.

We have some concerns about the drafting of the amendment, and they are not minimal. Under proposed subsection (3)(b),

“promotion of a designated ECPG, including public advocacy, recruitment, or dissemination of the group’s materials”

would be an offence. Would subsection (3)(b) cover handing out leaflets or carrying posters or flags in a peaceable way? In proposed subsection (3)(e),

“providing material support, training, funds or equipment to the group where the person knows or ought reasonably to know that the recipient is a designated ECPG”

suggests that the level of knowledge required is very low. What is material support? What would count as equipment? Would posters, flags or banners count as equipment? It would be considerably worrying if the answer to those questions was positive.

In sum, we are broadly supportive and believe that there should be a middle category, but we are concerned about the amendment as it stands. The Government should be seriously considering their position between now and Third Reading; they should listen to the very strong feeling in the House that something is needed in the way of a middle course that would prevent these prosecutions for peaceable protest and support under the Terrorism Act. They should then come back to the House at Third Reading with an amendment that could answer the criticisms and gain widespread support.

Finally, we have considerable sympathy with Amendment 419 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, which calls for the publication of a counterextremism strategy.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. Noble Lords have spoken of the effects that these groups can have when they go unchecked, and I think that the whole House has benefited from listening to these anecdotes. We cannot stand for a society in which violent, insurrectionary behaviour is normalised. Groups such as Palestine Action or Bash Back should not be allowed to exist given their past actions, and this amendment provides for that. That said, their supporters are not advocates of general terrorist activities and, while they support morally dubious causes, requiring their arrest for standing outside with a placard is a monumental waste of police time.

For similar reasons, I also support Amendment 419, tabled by my noble friend Lord Goodman. His is a very simple amendment, which merely asks the Government to publish a counterextremism strategy, given the ever-increasing extent of political extremism and its encouragement in some quarters. Amendment 371A strikes a balance. It adds nuance to a category of offences that desperately needs it, and we wholly support its intent. I hope that the Minister will agree. I am happy to withdraw my Amendment 371B and, should the noble Lord, Lord Walney, wish to divide the House, we will support him.

Amendment 371B (to Amendment 371A) withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading
Wednesday 4th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I want briefly to thank the Government for Amendment 338. I know the Domestic Abuse Commissioner and her team are extremely grateful that they have been listened to—this is something they have wanted for some time—so I would just like to say a big thank you for that. On Amendment 361A from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, I understand the reasons for it, and I hope the Minister will be able to give an encouraging response. As far as Amendment 409C is concerned, I cannot see the Government accepting that. The reasoning behind it is right, but I cannot see it being practical or effective.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Government and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for their amendments in this group. I do, however, have some concerns about the Government’s Amendment 338. We on these Benches believe that domestic abuse protection orders are a very important civil tool; indeed, they were introduced under the previous Conservative Administration. However, they are not, and should never become, a substitute for proper criminal justice consequences. Amendment 338 will expand orders to include mandatory participation in assessments and activity programmes. With respect, I do not believe that the answer to domestic abuse lies in programme participation; it lies in firm sentencing and, where appropriate, immediate custody.

I raise these concerns in the wider context of the Government’s sentencing policy. During the passage of the Sentencing Bill, this House divided at Report on a Conservative amendment that sought to exempt domestic abuse offences from the new rebuttable presumption against short custodial sentences of 12 months or less. Noble Lords on these Benches, in particular my noble and learned friend Lord Keen, argued that domestic abusers should not benefit from an assumption in favour of suspension. When the issue was pressed to a vote, the Government resisted that exemption.

Noble Lords are therefore now faced with an uncomfortable contradiction. The Minister will no doubt say the Government are determined to be tough on violence against women and girls; yet, when given the opportunity to ensure that domestic abusers would not fall within an automatic presumption against immediate custody, they declined. Against that backdrop, it is difficult to accept that expanding programme requirements within civil protection orders represents a meaningful, tough stance against domestic abuse. Real deterrence requires certainty of punishment.

Turning briefly to Amendment 361A, I have sympathy with its intention. Where suicide may have followed a history of domestic abuse, investigation must be rigorous and sensitive. However, requiring all such cases to be investigated as if they were homicides raises practical and legal concerns. Police investigations must follow clear evidential thresholds, and homicide procedures carry significant procedural and resource implications. A rigid statutory instruction risks unintended consequences and may not in practice deliver better outcomes. It is for officers and detectives who arrive at the scene of a crime to determine, on the basis of the available evidence, how to investigate that death. Prescribing in law how to advance an investigation in specific circumstances is not an appropriate course of action.

In conclusion, I am not persuaded that expanding the scope of domestic abuse protection orders is a legislative solution to the problems women and girls face daily. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I genuinely thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Doocey, who is not in her place, for Amendment 361A. As I find is so often the case with the noble Baronesses, there is very little between us on the principles involved. The Government agree that it is vital that police officers understand the link between domestic abuse and suicide; the only issue is how it is most effectively to be achieved.

There are three reasons that the Government cannot support the noble Baroness’s amendment. The first is that this is about the effective enforcement of police standards and, in our view, primary legislation is not the right place for this to sit. The second is a concern that it would not work, because there are no consequences contained within the amendment for not doing what the amendment requires one to do. If police forces are not inclined to do it anyway then an amendment that does not have any consequences is unlikely to make a difference.

The third and real reason is that, as we say, we are already on it. I will explain why we say that. The Government are already taking steps to improve police responses to suicides, including for cases where victims have taken their own life following domestic abuse. First, last year, the College of Policing published new national guidance for officers which highlights the importance of considering any history of domestic abuse and applying “professional curiosity” at the scene of these deaths. Secondly, the Home Office is working with the police to monitor the implementation of this new guidance, and has since commissioned five deep dives with select police forces to examine how the police are responding to suicides and unexplained deaths that follow domestic abuse. Thirdly, the Tackling Violence Against Women and Girls Strategy, published in December 2025, sets out that the senior investigating officer training programme for police officers will, going forward, cover deaths that follow domestic abuse, including suicides.

Fourthly, the Government are continuing to build the evidence base on suicides that follow domestic abuse through funding research developed by the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s domestic homicide project in order to capture information on these deaths from all 43 police forces in England and Wales and identify how the response can be improved. Fifthly, the Home Office is working with the domestic homicide project to explore the possibility of expanding the project’s scope in future years to encompass all suicides that occur in the context of violence against women and girls. This will enable deeper analysis and a more comprehensive understanding of every suicide resulting from these forms of violence and abuse.

Lastly, in relation to the criminal law, the previous Lord Chancellor asked the Law Commission to undertake a review of homicide law, including the use of manslaughter offences where abuse may have driven someone to suicide. Its final report is scheduled for publication in 2028. I know that your Lordships have expressed concerns before about this particular review, but this is the Law Commission’s own time frame and it is a serious piece of work.

I completely understand and acknowledge the impact that these deaths have on families; it is absolutely devastating. Supporting them is central to the Government’s approach. That is why the Home Office funds the organisation Advocacy After Fatal Domestic Abuse to provide specialist support to families bereaved by suicide following domestic abuse. The Government are clear that the police must respond effectively and comprehensively to suicides following domestic abuse, and the programme of work that we are already undertaking will ensure that they have the knowledge and the tools with which to do so. In the light of the Government’s ongoing work, I hope that the noble Baroness will be content not to press her amendment.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell, for supporting government Amendment 338 today. With the greatest respect to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, we are not here to re-debate the Sentencing Act all over again. The point is that this is only one tool in the toolbox of domestic abuse protection orders, and many of the other tools are much more punitive in nature. We have to remember that some of these people will go on to have other relationships in the future, and we want them to stop doing this. We want to make sure that these things are effective. The use of DAPOs is being evaluated by an independent research organisation. With that in mind, this is an important change. I am grateful that it has been welcomed by your Lordships, and I commend the amendment to the House.

--- Later in debate ---

Thirdly, the Minister pointed to the 2022 Act, which makes it an aggravated offence to assault someone providing a public service or performing a public duty, and suggested that this makes the amendment unnecessary. But the fact that abuse of public-facing workers is continuing, despite the 2022 Act, shows that that measure alone has not stopped abuse and threats becoming routine for many on the front line. If we now create a stand-alone offence only for one group of public-facing workers, we risk weakening rather than reinforcing these existing protections. Safety at work goes to the heart of social cohesion, and of the basic conditions for economic growth. If we want people to keep filling these roles, we must do everything we reasonably can to protect them.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Stowell of Beeston for moving Amendment 359. I know that she has been pursuing it with tenacity. This amendment and Amendment 361 relate to the Government’s proposal to create a specific, stand-alone offence of assaulting a retail worker at work. I want to be clear from the outset that it is already an offence to assault a retail worker, because it is an offence to assault any person, full stop. That is the law. I do not believe that criminal law should treat anyone differently based simply on whether they are a retail worker. I fully recognise that retail workers face an appalling level of abuse and violence in the course of their jobs, but to say that the creation of a new, specific criminal offence of assaulting a retail worker will stop assaults on retail workers is, frankly, for the birds.

What will stop these assaults, or at least reduce them, is the police stepping up enforcement, and the Government stopping the release of criminals and handing anyone convicted of these offences suspended sentences. However, the Government clearly believe that creating this new offence will reduce violence against retail workers. If we are to take their logic to its conclusion, why would we not extend the offence to cover all public-facing workers? Does the Minister believe that transport drivers, as mentioned by my noble friend Lady Stowell and endorsed by the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, are of lesser value than retail workers? If the Government believe that this new offence will work then why do they not believe it will work for other public-facing workers?

My noble friend’s amendment exposes the absurdity of the Government’s position. They argue that violence against retail workers is a significant problem that needs to be tackled, which is absolutely correct, but then propose a solution that they refuse to extend to other workers who also face significant levels of violence at work. There is simply no logic to the Government’s approach. Either they believe that creating a new offence for specific groups of people will reduce violence against them or they do not. They cannot argue both. I would prefer that we did not have any new offences that outlawed things that are already outlawed and that we did not legislate to criminalise actions towards specific groups of people but not others. That would be my preference, but if we are to do these things, then we must take them to their logical conclusion. For that reason, I support the amendments from my noble friend.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her amendment, and for the opportunity to discuss it with her and with the organisations she brought in for face-to-face discussions with us. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lord Hendy for his contribution and for our meeting.

I declare my membership of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers, which I joined 47 years ago and which sponsored me as a Member of Parliament. I put that on the record. I must also say to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, that I understand that he would prefer to have no offence. I understand that because when, as a Member of Parliament in the House of Commons, I tabled amendments to put these types of offences down, the then Government rejected them. I therefore understand where he is coming from, because that is consistent with the position of previous Conservative Governments.

In this case, we have a Labour manifesto commitment endorsed by the electorate. My noble friend Lady O’Grady mentioned USDAW. I pay tribute to that union, which has collected evidence and, through three general secretaries, including my noble friend Lord Hannett of Everton, campaigned strongly for an offence against retail workers. The Labour Party listened to that in opposition and put in its manifesto—I cannot claim credit for this, because I was out of Parliament at the time—a commitment to legislate for that offence, which appears in the Bill before the House today.

I have heard the comments from the noble Lord, Hogan-Howe and the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, and others, and from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, on the Liberal Democrat Front Bench, on why they think that the bespoke offence against assaulting a retail worker should be extended to all public-facing workers. Along with proposing a new broader offence of assault against public-facing workers, the noble Baroness has tabled an amendment that would place a duty on courts to make a criminal order in the event of a conviction.

I hate to disappoint the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, but I repeat the arguments that I put to her in Committee and elsewhere. Public-facing workers such as those mentioned by my noble friend, the noble Lady Baroness, Lady Harding, and others, are covered under existing legislation, such as the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, which includes a range of violent offences, such as actual bodily harm and grievous bodily harm. Further, the provisions of Section 156 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, which was introduced by the previous Conservative Government, makes it a statutory aggravating factor of assault against any public-facing worker. That offence means that if someone, having been charged with the serious offence of assault and having gone through a trial, is deemed to have committed assault against public-facing workers, the court has the power to add aggravating factors to that sentence. That covers every type of worker that has been mentioned by noble Lords today. The aggravating factor applies in cases of assault where an offence is committed against those public service workers performing a public duty or providing a service to the public. That is an important factor.

Noble Lords have asked why there is a specific offence against retail workers that is additional to the aggravating offence. That is a reasonable question to ask. In clauses that have been mentioned there is provision for additional prison sentence capacity, criminal restriction orders and an unlimited fine for this stand-alone offence. Retail workers are still covered by Section 156 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, so why have we put that extra power in place?

The reason for this—and why I declared an interest—is that USDAW has, to my knowledge, for 17 or 18 years campaigned regularly for this in the Freedom From Fear Campaign. It has done so under the three general secretaries that my noble friend Lady O’Grady mentioned, and it has done so for a purpose—one that the Government share. Retail workers are fundamentally on the front line of upholding the laws passed by both Houses of Parliament on a range of matters. It is a retail worker who stops illegal sales of cigarettes, it is a retail worker who stops illegal sales of alcohol, it is a retail worker who stops an illegal sale of a knife, it is a retail worker who stops an illegal sale of a solvent, and it is a retail worker who protects the community by upholding all the laws on those issues that we have passed in this House and in the House of Commons. That is why USDAW campaigned for the specific offence, and it is why the Labour Party in government has been pleased to support the creation of that offence by putting it in the Bill.

That goes even further to the appalling shop theft situation. I do not call it shoplifting—it is shop theft. There has been a continued rise in shop theft over many years, and it is the retail worker who is on the front line saying, “Put that back”, calling the police and taking action in the shop. The Co-op, Tesco, Sainsbury’s and a whole range of retail organisations have campaigned for this, alongside USDAW, over many years. It has been thought through and there is an evidence base. It is a manifesto commitment, and we are trying to introduce that extra offence. I do not wish to see a train operative or members of customer services, as the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, mentioned, attacked with a knife. This is covered by common assault legislation from 1861 and by the 2022 Act as an aggravating offence. But the Government have put forward a stand-alone offence for shop workers for the reasons I have outlined.

Does that potentially create an anomaly? Let us discuss that and reflect on that view. But the manifesto commitment is clear, and we are delivering on that manifesto commitment. This is an important issue, based on evidence and campaigning by a range of bodies—retail organisations and trade unions—and it has my support. Therefore, I cannot support the noble Baroness—I have told her that—or my noble friend.

That is not to say that the Government accept that attacks on those members of staff are a normal part of what they should face. We are committed to driving down assaults and to enforcing, with the courts, the legislation on the statute book. The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, asked what the Government are doing to reduce the attacks in the first place. This Government are rebuilding the police force—13,000 neighbourhood police officers—and have put in place, with this Bill, changes in shop theft legislation. This Government are focusing on retail crime in hotspots and on making sure that we drive it down. We will ensure that the police forces have retail crime as a major priority.

In the last 14 years before July 2024, police numbers fell, neighbourhood policing fell and the focus on the high street fell. It was not a Labour Government but a Conservative Government who did that. They refused the legislation on assaults on shop workers that I proposed in the House of Commons, they refused to take action on shop theft on high streets and they refused to stand up for the workforce. With due respect, I will not take lessons today from the Conservative Front Bench.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, for bringing this amendment back, because I had some thoughts on this after the debate we had in Committee. Having read English at university, I went back to the definition of “alarm” and started to look at the definition used in the Public Order Act. There are components of causing alarm, particularly in the Public Order Act, which the noble Lord wants to amend. The levels at which charging happens use different definitions of alarm, which are quite interesting for these purposes.

The definition of alarm in this context is to create a state of apprehension, fear or panic in a person, often accompanied by a sense of immediate danger or worry that something unpleasant is going to happen to them. There is a key difference in usage. Section 4A of the Public Order Act details using “threatening, abusive or insulting” conduct with

“intent to cause … harassment, alarm or distress”,

and, on likelihood, using threatening or abusive conduct that is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress, without necessarily intending to.

The issue I take with the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, is that he says it is all just about how you are feeling, but the point is that the definitions at the different levels within the Public Order Act, at least semantically, seem to show that it is more than that, because you need to identify what has triggered that sense of alarm. It is a range, as we have discussed in previous debates. Because his amendment wants to remove “alarm” from intentional harassment, alarm or distress, it falls at the higher level that I have just described. I wonder whether he might reconsider it in that light, because when the 1986 Act went through it was clearly very well thought through.

Interestingly, the OED definition:

“To make (a person) feel suddenly frightened or in danger; to strike or fill with fear”,


says that more recently it has been seen in a slightly weakened use. However, the WordWeb online dictionary says:

“Experiencing a sudden sense of danger”.


In a lot of dictionaries I have looked up, there is the repeated use of it as not just how you feel but a panic response to danger, a heightened level. Therefore, certainly in my books, it should stay with harassment as well, because they are both more serious than just feeling a bit worried about something, which is what the noble Lord described.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough’s amendment, which would remove the word “alarm” from the relevant sections of the Public Order Act. I entirely support his aims. Alarm is not an emotion that should be policed, if emotions should be policed at all. The Act in question has been used for the unprecedented policing of speech that we have seen recently, for which Sections 4A and 5 have been largely responsible, and any measure that weakens the effect of this law is welcome. So, although I am sceptical that he will, I hope the Minister will accept this amendment.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am afraid I cannot accept the amendment, and I will explain why to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson. I am grateful to him for bringing it forward. We will therefore have another opportunity to look at the offences in the Public Order Act 1986 and to reflect on the balance we must continue to strike between free expression and ensuring public safety.

The Government remain firmly committed to protecting freedom of speech. The ability to voice strong and at times uncomfortable views is fundamental to democratic life. However, as I set out in Committee, the ability to intervene early is an important tool for police to protect both the public and those involved, a point that I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Jackson, will accept. The definitions in the 1986 Act, passed by a previous Conservative Government, including the words “alarm” and “distress”, are there so that there can be early intervention and examination, and so that people who feel “alarm” and “distress” can have that support.

The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, has also referred to the review of public order and hate crime legislation led by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. Government has given it the task of examining the threshold definitions of public order legislation, which are needed to protect the public, while ensuring that we do exactly what I know the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, wants to do: ensure that we do not have undue interference in freedom of expression. The review is expected to conclude in the spring—it is a flexible definition, as we know, but it will be in the spring—and the Government will carefully consider its recommendations before determining whether legislative change is necessary.

I cannot commit to where we are on that because we have not seen the outcome of the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald. Given the circumstances —and given that the Act is now 40 years old and has stood the test of time from Mrs Thatcher’s Government to those of John Major, Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, however many Conservative Prime Ministers held the office between 2010 and 2024, and my right honourable friend the current Prime Minister—it strikes me that it is a sound piece of legislation. It has stood the test of a number of Prime Ministers and Governments. With the review pending, I hope that we can examine and look at all those issues. With those comments, I hope the noble Lord is content to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has got to the nub of an issue that seems to fall between a rock and a hard place. One of the issues that we face in terms of the crime survey, which is now being used by the Government as the primary way of deciding police resources, is fraud. Without doubt, the increasing use of digital identity will be the source of more fraud if we are not careful.

The Government seem to be in a predicament about whether to press ahead with digital ID more generally. We saw the resignation of a Minister at the weekend over their dubious ways of trying to challenge the credentials of a journalist assessing the organisation Labour Together. The Government have reappointed a Minister to undertake this task of establishing a digital identity card, which I am led to believe there will be a consultation announcement on within the next week. I hope that the Government are listening to the noble Lord by getting ahead of the issues that could come about with the mass spreading of digital identity.

I am very grateful to Nationwide, which rang to alert me to a fraud that was happening. I had used my card when I was abroad representing Parliament at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and suddenly it was being used in a number of places to secure money. That is a reminder, as we move to this digital approach to money, with cash evaporating, that the last Government did a lot to try to protect cash and to make sure that it was still being used on a widespread basis, and I appreciate that. However, it would be useful to get a sense of what the Government are doing to tackle this very real threat of digital identity theft.

This is particularly pertinent because of the 10-year NHS plan—never mind the 10-year NHS cancer plan—regarding how much is being put into the hands of government. With artificial intelligence understandably being introduced to increase productivity and the deployment of public services, somebody’s identity is precious, and the validity and protection of digital identity can become an extraordinary challenge to somebody’s integrity.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, has set out a number of issues in a great deal of detail in Amendment 366, with the proposed new subsection (2)(b) defining what “obtains” would mean. I think it would be helpful to the Committee to understand what protections are in place or being planned by the Government not to mandate the use of initial identity but regarding what their desire is. Again, I understand the desire of the use for government, but what is good for government is also good for general commercial practice.

It would be helpful to get an understanding of why the Government are resisting the amendment—if the noble Lord tests the opinion of the House, I will vote with him in that Division—and a sense of where they believe they have sufficient protections in making this case. We have discussed identity, fake imagery and deepfakes quite a lot during the passage of this Bill. I seem to recall in the last general election that the now Prime Minister was, all of a sudden, in the middle of a deepfake situation, with comments attributed to him that were not made.

We can go further with how technology has advanced in that regard, but where would this go if we started using digital identity to register for elections? Where is this going when it is about accessing cash, frankly, from the Government? I know from running the DWP for three years that, unfortunately, people seem very determined to try to commit fraud to get money to which they are not entitled. But as we continue to try to use AI as a force for good, what are the Government doing to try to stop it being used as a force for bad?

I do not wish to labour the point, but the noble Lord has really hit on something. There is a gap. There is a desire by the Government to do this good, but I think the amendment would plug the gap very well. There are so many instances in this Bill and other Bills which are coming before the House where the Government want all sorts of powers just in case. This is not a “just in case”; this is a “waiting to happen”. It is happening now, so what are we doing to address it?

I go back to the fact that 40% of crime is due to fraud. Two-thirds of that is digital, online fraud. This is affecting not just people in this Chamber but people right across this country, and that is something that I hope the Government will consider carefully. If there was a vote, I would certainly support the amendment to make sure that the Government take note and actually get something done about this. I support the noble Lord’s amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for bringing back his amendment on Report. His Majesty’s loyal Opposition retain our support for his measures, and I thank him for continuing his campaign.

I understand that the Minister refrained from supporting the amendment in Committee for fear of unnecessary duplication of legislation. I gently urge him that this provides an opportunity for the opposite. It is common practice across Governments to use new legislation to amalgamate old pieces of legislation into a single draft. This seems the perfect time to do so with digital identity theft.

There is an array of Acts that creates a puzzle from which a digital identity theft offence appears, but it is somewhat distorted, if not fragmented. At least five Acts cover areas of digital identity theft; a wide purview is by no means a bad thing, but they were all designed for a different age. Just reading out the years of our primary Acts demonstrates this: 1968, 1990, 2006 and 2010. Even the Data Protection Act 2018, the most recent application, is for an era without AI.

It is not worth repeating the statistics that we have heard throughout the course of the Bill. A simple fact will suffice: 60% of all fraud cases are identity fraud, and the recent increase has been driven by the internet and artificial intelligence. The Government talk about being ahead of the curve on AI safety and online regulation. That is commendable, but to claim one thing and then refuse to act on it is not. I hope the Minister can at least acknowledge the scale of digital identity theft and its growing prevalence. If he cannot support it now, I hope that he will commit to look into it in the future.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for returning to this important matter. As I set out previously, although digital identity theft is not a stand-alone offence, the behaviour the noble Lord highlights is already captured by existing legislation. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, predicted some of the response that I would give; it has not changed hugely since Committee. This includes the misuse of personal sensitive identifiable information. The Fraud Act 2006 criminalises the use of another person’s identity with the intention to gain or to cause loss. Unauthorised access to personal data, including biometric information, is covered under the Computer Misuse Act 1990.

I fully recognise the concerns raised, which is why the Government are already taking clear action. The new Report Fraud service has replaced Action Fraud, giving victims improved reporting tools and providing police with stronger intelligence and better support pathways. A full review of police skills has been completed and its recommendations will be reflected in the upcoming fraud strategy, which the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will be pleased to know will be published imminently.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 4th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Pidgeon (LD)]

My Lords, this group of amendments is focusing on penalties and other measures for dangerous cycling on our streets. These Benches support a proportionate and evidence-based approach to updating the law, whereby any changes do not discourage people from cycling—considerately, of course—which we believe is an important mode of sustainable transport. The amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, once again try to disqualify cyclists for dangerous cycling. None of us likes seeing inconsiderate cycling on our streets, just as we do not like seeing dangerous or inconsiderate driving. However, we do not think these amendments are practical; they are not easily enforceable, so we will not be supporting them.

The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, looking to add up to 12 points to a person’s driving licence for dangerous cycling, are an interesting proposal, given that many people who cycle also have a driving licence. However, fewer people are learning to drive, and this would not work for every cyclist. Whether this is proportionate and right is debatable. The issue remains, as we have heard throughout this debate, that traffic policing has been facing cuts across the country and it is not a prioritised area for policing; limited enforcement is also a challenge.

We do not support the other amendments from the noble Lord, Hogan-Howe, and the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, to set up a licensing scheme for cyclists and reports on cycling. We do not think they are necessary. The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and the new amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, try to tackle the many problems that have arisen with the rise in the number of delivery cyclists on our streets. We have been debating this here and on the devolution Bill. Most are picking up shopping from supermarkets or fast food and taking it to people’s homes. The amendments attempt to put some responsibility in law for the company the cyclist or driver may work for, but, as we have discussed, the challenge is that they may not actually be an employee.

We all acknowledge that there are real issues in this area with emerging micromobility modes and technology and their use. But the way forward is comprehensive legislation on e-bikes and e-scooters, addressing what is legally allowed on our streets, what safety standards we expect and the rules on their use. I therefore ask the Minister when the House might expect such legislation to address the many concerns we have heard expressed throughout the passage of this Bill. This is a real issue: we all see it day in, day out. I would like to understand how the Government plan to address it going forward, beyond this Bill. Specific legislation and a joined-up approach, as noted by the noble Lord, Lord Russell, are clearly needed, rather than amendments to the Bill today. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, we have spent many hours in your Lordships’ House debating the issue of dangerous cycling and the misuse of e-bikes. In Committee, I welcomed the Government’s measures to create offences to criminalise causing death by dangerous cycling, and it is right that offences relating to cycling are brought in line with those for driving. I am also aware that there are significant concerns about criminality arising from the use of e-bikes and that courier companies are not being held responsible for the actions of their riders. There is very evidently a problem here. It is for the Government to now come to Parliament with solutions to these issues. We do not need report after report, review after review and trial after trial. We need to need to know what the Government wish to do in this space, rather than simply what they do not want to do.

Fundamentally, there is a serious problem with enforcement. A large number of laws, rules and regulations already apply. E-bikes have legally prescribed specifications and cyclists are supposed to obey the rules of the road. The crux of this issue is enforcement—or the lack of it. Cyclists frequently flout the rules of the road with impunity and owners of e-bikes are illegally modifying them to go far faster than they were intended to. This presents real and very serious concerns for public safety. It is time for the Government to act and not prevaricate. I look forward to what the Minister has to say.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, so aptly put it, cycling is one of the issues that your Lordships’ House likes to debate at length. It is an important issue and I thank everyone who has taken part in this debate: the noble Lords, Lord Lucas, Lord Hogan-Howe, Lord Blencathra, Lord Shinkwin, Lord Russell of Liverpool and Lord Davies, the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Neville-Rolfe, Lady McIntosh and Lady Pidgeon. Some of them, though not all of them, were a very interesting supporting cast at a meeting in which I very much played junior partner to my noble friend Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill. I also thank them for that. There, we had a helpful discussion about some of the wider issues about the way that we frame some of the vehicles we have been talking about this afternoon.

We can all agree on the need for all cyclists, as with motorists, to obey the rules of the road so that our roads and pavements are safe for all users. As the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, put it, we can all say—at least, I hope we would—that we are pro-cycling but anti-lawbreaking. The issue is whether the proposals in these various amendments are workable, proportionate and do not have the unintended effect of deterring cycling and other forms of micromobility.

I will address the amendments in turn. Amendments 318 to 325 and Amendment 333, from the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, would allow for persons to be disqualified from cycling upon conviction of any of the offences in Clause 121. As we made clear in Committee, our fundamental concern is that such a disqualification could not be adequately enforced without some form of licensing for cyclists. Licensing for cyclists would be both costly and complex, and would mean the majority of law-abiding cyclists would face additional costs and barriers to cycling. It is a disproportionate response, given that these new offences are to deal with those rare cases in which cyclists have caused the death or serious injury of another road user.

I do not accept that the cycling disqualification would be an effective deterrent without effective enforcement. Moreover, it would place an unreasonable burden on the police or, alternatively, raise unreasonable expectations if your Lordship’s House were to give the courts the power to impose a disqualification without an accompanying effective enforcement mechanism. It may well be the case that the only way the police could identify whether such a disqualification was in force would be if the person was found to have breached it after being involved in a subsequent incident. This would entirely defeat the purpose of the disqualification and would not have prevented another incident. It would, in fact, likely be discovered only after another incident has occurred.

I turn to Amendments 326 to 332 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, starting with the amendments that would enable a person to receive up to 12 points on a driving licence upon conviction of any offences in Clause 121. Reaching 12 points on a driving licence would result in a person being disqualified from driving a motor vehicle. Section 163 of the Sentencing Act 2020 provides a general power for the criminal courts to impose a driving disqualification on an offender convicted of any offence. In addition, Section 14 of the Sentencing Act 2026 provides courts with the power to impose a driving prohibition requirement as part of a community sentence or suspended sentence. I hope these go some way to meeting the noble Lord’s objectives.

Amendment 343, again in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, would create a registration scheme for the purpose of enforcing the new offences in Clause 121. Although I accept that a registration scheme for cycles would make enforcement of offences easier, the absence of a registration system does not, of course, make enforcement impossible. As the noble Lord will know, the police would be expected to pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry open to them. As he said in his own contribution, there are some forces that are very effective at this, in particular the City of London Police, which he has direct experience of.

As with the example of licensing for cyclists that I referred to earlier, we cannot escape the likely significant cost and complexity of introducing a registration scheme for cyclists. Around 1.5 million new cycles are sold every year. No data is collected on this, but some estimates say that over 20 million cycles are in existence. It would therefore be a gargantuan task to introduce such a registration scheme, or indeed a licensing scheme. It would, for example, require all existing cycle owners, potentially including children, as well as those making new purchases to submit their information to some form of central database, and for some form of registration plate to be produced and affixed to each individual bike. Even if that were deemed proportionate, it is not realistic to suggest that detailed regulations could be delivered on this within six months of Royal Assent, as the noble Lord’s amendment proposes.

Amendment 341, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, would require the Secretary of State to undertake a review of the misuse of e-scooters, including their impact on safety and an assessment of the appropriateness of the legislation within 12 months of Royal Assent. At this point, as others have, I pay tribute to the work that the noble Baroness has done previously in this area. The safety of all road users is, of course, an utmost priority, and no one should feel unsafe on our streets. It is essential that new transport technology works for everyone. That is why we must crack down on those using e-scooters irresponsibly and in an anti-social way.

However, I do not believe that, after more than five years of running e-scooter trials, the Government should tackle that issue by undertaking yet a further review. I remind noble Lords that private e-scooters remain illegal to use on public roads, cycle lanes and pavements. Rental e-scooters can be used only as part of the Government’s national rental e-scooter trials. Last year, we announced an extension to the rental trials until May 2028, to ensure we have the best possible evidence base to inform any future legislation. We have collected some evidence, but it is still relatively new technology and there remain things we need to learn. We will use this additional time from extending the review to supplement our evidence and draw on further experience.

As I mentioned in Committee, the Department for Transport has already announced that the Government will pursue legislative reform for micromobility vehicles. As the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, said, we want to pursue a joined-up approach. We will pursue legislative reform for micromobility vehicles, which will include e-scooters, when parliamentary time allows. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, tempted me to go down a path of speculating what might be in a forthcoming King’s Speech, which is several rungs above my pay grade. I am afraid I cannot do that but, as I said, this is something we wish to pursue when parliamentary time allows.

Electronic Travel Authorisation: Dual Nationals

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Thursday 26th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, any suggestion that there have been insufficient transitional arrangements for the ETA system is surely for the sky. The scheme was introduced three years ago but was not made mandatory, to allow for people to adjust. It is absolutely right that the Government are now making this system mandatory and that dual nationals should have to enter using British passports—I am with the Minister on that. My question is: now that we have this system in place, how will the Government utilise the information for stronger immigration enforcement?

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his support. As he knows, this position was introduced by the previous Government, and I am very pleased that we have been able to see it through. He asked how we will use this information for important border control. The whole purpose of the system is to have border control. As he probably knows, today we have had some new figures on immigration positions. They show that asylum hotels are at the lowest level for 18 months, which coincides with the UK Labour Government; the asylum backlog has fallen for the fourth quarter in a row to 64,426; and small boat arrivals are 9% lower than the peak in 2022. This is part of a government strategy to control our borders and ensure that they are firm. I welcome his support not just for this measure but for the wider government agenda.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 25th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government’s amendments in this group all relate to certain of the delegated powers in the Bill. In the main, they respond to recommendations made by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and the Constitution Committee in their reports on the Bill. I am very grateful to both committees for their scrutiny of this legislation. Your Lordships’ House will be pleased to hear that I will not repeat all the arguments made by the Government. Instead, I point noble Lords to the responses to each of the committees’ reports, which are available on their respective web pages. However, let me briefly explain the various government amendments that address the committees’ concerns.

First, Amendments 15 and 25 to Clauses 9 and 24 provide that the guidance on fly-tipping enforcement and the new civil penalty regime, in respect of a failure to remove illegal online content relating to knives and offensive weapons, are subject to the negative procedure. I stress to noble Lords that the Government’s general position remains that it is not necessary or appropriate for the generality of statutory guidance to be subject to any parliamentary procedure. However, there are limited exceptions to that general rule, and we agree that the guidance provided for in Clauses 9 and 24 should be two such exceptions, as per the DPRRC’s recommendation that in both cases the guidance should be subject to the negative procedure.

Secondly, Amendment 382 to Clause 154 provides for driver information regulations to be subject to the affirmative procedure, in line with a recommendation by the Constitution Committee.

Thirdly, the amendments to Clauses 85, 129 and 134 narrow the scope of the regulation-making powers provided for in those clauses.

Fourthly, Amendments 415, 416 and 417 to Clause 196 ensure that all iterations of the guidance in respect of youth diversion orders are laid before Parliament, including in cases in which revisions are insubstantial.

Finally, Amendments 11 and 381 do not stem from a committee recommendation. Rather, they simply provide that pre-commencement consultation on the regulations relating to the provision of information about anti-social behaviour and the code of practice about access to driver licence information satisfies the requirement to consult under this clause. I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, we have come to the first of two groups containing a large number of government amendments. I find myself having to express my strong frustration and disappointment with the number of government amendments that have been brought to this Bill on Report. As we broke up for recess, the Government tabled 243 amendments to the Bill. Then, on Monday, two days before the first day of Report, they tabled a further 73 amendments. This completely flies in the face of the accepted norms and conventions whereby the Government are supposed to table amendments a week before.

Most concerning is the introduction of entirely new amendments that have not previously been discussed, most notably the Government’s amendment relating to aggravation of offences. We will spend much time debating that amendment later, but suffice it to say that it is a very wide-ranging and incredibly worrying matter—never mind the fact that the amendment has not been debated in Committee in this House, nor in the other place, and as such will not receive the proper scrutiny it deserves.

Having said that, I do welcome some of the changes the Government are making. Amendments 15, 16, 17, 25, 26 and 267 all enhance the ability of Parliament to scrutinise some of the regulation-making powers granted to the Home Secretary. Requiring the draft guidance to be laid before Parliament for a period of 40 days is welcome and, we hope, will ensure that Parliament can diligently hold the Government to account. On Amendments 362 and 363, I am naturally cautious about the Government granting themselves more powers via secondary legislation, which in this case permits them to specify different articles that may be considered as “SIM farms”. My concern is slightly allayed by Amendments 364 and 365, which do place limitations on the Secretary of State’s power, but it would be useful to know what types of devices the Government envisage being brought into the scope of Clause 129.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful, to an extent, for the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. The vast majority of the Government amendments that have been laid before your Lordships’ House are either in response to issues raised through discussion in Committee, or subsequent to that discussion, or, as I said in my opening remarks, in response to the issues raised by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and the Constitution Committee. It is also important to say—and we will come to this in a large group coming up shortly—that they are large in number but they are all, in a sense, because of the nature of the legislation, making the same changes around devolution to many parts of the Bill. This is how the issues were understood and discussed. It followed discussion in Committee on that group, when the Opposition Front Bench presented their rationale for opposing this. We decided not to move the Government amendments that were tabled in Committee at that time.

This is an iterative process. I think it fair to point out that the point of Committee is for the Government to hear concerns and to be able to respond to them. I think there will be many areas where we will table Government amendments throughout Report stage of the Bill, not least the ones we are discussing in this group right now. I am grateful for the words of welcome for these Government amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. Concerns were raised by both committees about our approach to statutory guidance and secondary legislation, so we have responded to them.

The Government’s new clause on aggravated offences, which the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, referred to, as well as delivering on a manifesto commitment, responds directly to the debate on the issue in the other place. It was touched on in your Lordships’ House at Second Reading and in Committee, where we reiterated the Government’s intention to bring forward an amendment on Report. Moreover, the issues raised in the Government’s new clauses do cross over to those raised in what are now Clauses 122 to 124, which were thoroughly debated in Committee. I would be happy, in addition to this, to carry on the conversation, if the noble Lord is happy to do so, by writing to him on the specifics he raised concerning Clause 129. But, given that explanation, I reiterate my moving of Government Amendment 11.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

13: Clause 9, page 17, line 27, at end insert—
“(1A) The guidance issued about the enforcement of offences under section 33 must ensure that, where a person is convicted of a relevant offence, they are liable for the costs incurred through loss or damage resulting from the offence.(1B) The guidance must also ensure that it requires the waste regulation authority to engage with the local police force to take all reasonable measures to ensure that the landowner, or community, responsible for the land upon which the relevant offence occurs, is not liable for the costs incurred resulting from the offence.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would ensure the Secretary of State’s guidance on fly-tipping makes the person responsible for fly-tipping, rather than the landowner or community, liable for the costs of cleaning up.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, the amendment in my name relates to fly-tipping and measures that can and should be taken to combat it. Fly-tipping is a serious and growing blight on society. In 2023-24 local authorities in England had to contend with approximately 1.15 million fly-tipping and litter incidents, an increase of 6% on the previous year. It is even worse in rural areas. Rural fly-tipping has increased by 9% over the past year, with one farmer saying that relentless fly-tipping happens almost every week. Last week it was reported that an elderly Hertfordshire farmer was facing a £40,000 clean-up bill after almost 200 tonnes of waste was fly-tipped on his land.

There is a significant disparity between the offences and the enforcement, which sends the signal to offenders that they are unlikely to face any consequences of their actions. Amendment 13 would seek to address this inequity. The Government propose to issue guidance relating to fly-tipping. Our amendment would ensure that guidance makes it clear that where a person is convicted of fly-tipping, they, not the victims, are liable for the costs incurred as a result of their offence. It would further require engagement between waste authorities and the police to ensure that the landowner or community upon whose land the dumping occurred is not left footing the bill.

Amendment 19, also in my name, proposes that a person convicted of fly-tipping should receive three penalty points on their driving licence for their offence. It seems self-evident to say that much fly-tipping is vehicle-enabled. Vans and cars are used to transport waste far from the original site and dump it illegally. For many offenders, particularly those operating for attractive profit margins, a fine alone may be viewed as a calculated business risk, and a price worth paying. The prospect of licence endorsement, however, introduces a personal and escalating consequence.

Amendment 20, which has been signed by my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough, would add fly-tipping to the list of offences for which vehicles may be seized under Section 59 of the Police Reform Act 2002. If a vehicle is reasonably believed to have been used in connection with fly-tipping, the police should have the powers to act decisively. Removing the instrument of the crime is one of the most effective deterrents available, and this amendment would disrupt organised dumping activity and reinforce the seriousness with which we should treat environmental crime. I hope the Minister is listening, and I have to say to the House that if he will not accept my amendments in this group, or give assurances as to the Government’s intent, I may well seek to divide the House.

Amendment 14 (to Amendment 13)

Tabled by

--- Later in debate ---

Amendment 14 (to Amendment 13) not moved.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate; I hope they will not be offended if I do not name them personally. However, I want to single out the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, for his example of what amounts to, as he said, rural crime. I was somewhat disappointed in the Liberal Democrat response. In particular, I thought that the noble Earl, Lord Russell, was somewhat contradictory in his response to Amendment 13.

I thank the Minister for what he said. I am not entirely sure that a press notice will address this situation, nor am I convinced that the long-winded process of convicting somebody and then pursuing them for costs is satisfactory as it stands. I do not need to reiterate the appalling impact that fly-tipping has on communities, in particular rural communities up and down the country. The only measure in the Bill related to fly-tipping is the Secretary of State’s guidance to be issued under Clause 9. That is not good enough. The British people are tired of seeing verges, lay-bys, farmland and residential streets turned into dumping grounds. If we are truly serious about tackling fly-tipping, we must ensure that enforcement is credible and that the costs of criminality fall where they belong: on the perpetrator. If the Government are unwilling to take the necessary action to tackle this scourge, I am afraid I have to test the opinion of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

19: After Clause 9, insert the following new Clause—
“Points on driving licence for fly tippingIn section 33(8) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (unauthorised disposal of waste: offence), at the end insert—“and in either case is also liable to the endorsement of their driving record with 3 penalty points.””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to add penalty points to the driving licence of a person convicted of a fly-tipping offence.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 25th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I am not sure whether I am in order. I am looking at the noble Lord, Lord Katz, who is nodding, which is good news. I thank him; it is much appreciated. There is nothing worse than writing a speech and being unable to deliver it.

I welcome the government amendments in this group, brought forward by the Minister, concerning the remote sale and delivery of knives and bladed articles. As I noted in Committee, we on these Benches fully support the intent behind the Government’s measures in this area. We must strengthen accountability for businesses and sellers in tackling online knife sales. We welcome the robust two-step age-verification checks being implemented. It is entirely right that we ensure a consistent UK-wide approach by extending these provisions, including those relating to crossbows, to Scotland and Northern Ireland. It is vital that the law across the home nations is exactly on the same footing, so that criminals cannot exploit cross-border differences to acquire lethal weapons.

I also welcome the amendments that clarify the rules around identity documents. The requirement for a physical identity document to be shown upon the delivery of a bladed product provides a necessary safeguard. Furthermore, we acknowledge the provisions allowing the Secretary of State to prescribe alternative age-verification steps such as digital ID.

As I made clear to the Minister previously, there is no Bench more strongly against compulsory digital ID than the Liberal Democrats’, so we remain highly supportive of the assurance that analogue physical forms of identity will continue to be accepted alongside any new digital alternatives. Embedded among these amendments, however, is our Amendment 177, referred to by the Minister, on the remote sale of knives. This amendment requires that regulations mandate the reporting of bulk knife sales to the police

“in real time, or as soon as is reasonably practicable”.

In Committee, the Minister stated that he was sympathetic to the overall aim of this amendment but argued that the current duty in Clause 36 was sufficient and that exact timeframes would be handled later in regulations, following consultation. Sympathy does not intervene in a crime. We have seen cases where young people effectively act as arms traders, buying huge numbers of illegal weapons online for community distribution. If the police are to effectively track and intercept these bulk purchases, they need that intelligence immediately, not days or weeks later when the weapons are already on the streets. Amendment 177 would ensure that operational effectiveness is guaranteed in the Bill, turning bureaucratic compliance into actionable, life-saving intelligence.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, in Committee, I asked the Government to withdraw their amendments that permitted them to require by regulations the use of digital ID for age verification for the online sale of knives and crossbows. My concern was that permitting this would be the first legislative step towards mandating digital IDs. Since then, of course, the Government have conceded that digital IDs will not be made mandatory and, while I still harbour some reservations, I am now content for the amendments to be made to the Bill.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. If I may, I will address the points from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and thank him for returning to the issue of fixed-penalty notices with his Amendment 177.

We are clear that, in order for the reports on bulk sales of knives or other bladed articles to be a useful tool for the police to prevent knife crime, they must be sent to the police in a timely manner. I say to the noble Lord that we are working with the police on the details of a reporting system, and I want to reassure him that the points he has raised both in Committee and in his amendment, and during the debate today, will be taken into account when drafting the regulations. I do not believe there is any difference of substance between us on that; it is just that we are of the view that the timeliness of reports is best left to regulations, rather than primary legislation. We will be bringing those regulations forward, and I hope he will be able to support, comment upon and discuss them at that time. I hope the noble Lord will be content not to move his amendment.

Before I finish on this it is worthwhile, both in the context of this debate and the previous group, to place on record that while overall knife crime was previously climbing, since the start of this Parliament knife homicides have fallen by 27% and knife-enabled offences have recorded an 8% decrease. The latest admissions data for NHS hospitals in England and Wales also shows a 10% fall in admissions for knife assaults. Now, I am not complacent and will not stop pressing on this, but those results demonstrate progress. Given the measures in this Bill, and the measures we may have on digital and non-digital ID two-step verification, I hope we will further reduce those figures in the coming months. In the meantime, having moved my Amendment 28, I will beg to move the other amendments and hope that the noble Lord will be content not to move his.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I warmly welcome the Government’s amendments in this group, which deliver on the commitments made by the Minister during our debate in Committee. As I noted at the time, townies such as myself were being educated during the passage of the Bill on what these items were. However, the logic of this measure was immediately clear when the noble Lord, Lord Brady of Altrincham, introduced his amendments, and we were very pleased to support them when he first championed the cause. We are delighted that the Government have accepted his amendments.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I too thank the Minister for bringing forward these amendments. These measures were rightly pressed for in Committee by my noble friend Lord Brady of Altrincham, so I am glad the Government have taken his points on board and are now implementing them. These amendments will remove an administrative burden currently placed on the police—something we all support—and will pose no threat to the public. They are wholly reasonable, and we support them.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, it is very rare to have both unanimity and common sense break out across the Chamber. I thank all noble Lords for their comments, including those among townies—I associate myself with the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, as a fellow townie. It was an education and I have learned an awful lot. I thank everyone for their support.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for tabling these amendments. We wholly support the intention of Clause 41, which introduces the offence of child criminal exploitation, but I have several concerns regarding the amendments, which I hope he will be able to allay.

First, is the original crime being brought forward to highlight and punish exploitative behaviour? An adult will perhaps get a 12 year-old to shoplift or deal drugs because they are less conspicuous and have less chance of being caught. That type of coercion is what is being targeted here. I am not so sure that this is always the case when it comes to older teenagers. When the child is 16 or 17, it is often far more of a voluntary decision, based on a mutual understanding, to commit a crime. While there may be exploitation, the offender may not be enticing them towards crime because they are a child. That is a subtle but important difference in intention. Introducing strict liability up to 18 removes the discretion that courts often exist to provide.

That brings me to my second concern, which is that this may end up being used to absolve fully complicit young offenders of criminal responsibility. The Government have made it clear that they see 16 to 18 year-olds as adults, and the law already provides them with many legal rights that 15 year-olds do not have. The Government will soon give them the right to vote. Is the Minister really arguing that personal volition never plays a part in crimes committed by young people? Of course there will be cases of exploitation, but I am sure that your Lordships’ House will agree that there will also be cases where that is not the case. Introducing strict liability will open the door to others already implicated in the crimes committed by the teenager being rendered wholly liable for a crime that somebody else was a part of.

I understand the Government’s intentions with this updated measure. It involves a different principle from child sexual assault, but just as that crime includes a condition that factors in intent, so should this crime, on the part of those under-18. Obviously, there should be an arbitrary cut-off, as the original measure suggests, but we have a criminal age of responsibility of 10 and we are giving 16 year-olds the vote; to suggest that 16 to 17-year olds involved in a crime with an adult can always claim that they were exploited and coerced is not consistent. I hope that the Minister will be able to address these points.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. I was just checking with another Member of your Lordships’ House before I started my winding-up speech. My apologies for not attracting his attention.

We welcome the Government’s decision to address child criminal exploitation. The range of measures in the Bill are certainly a start and address the growing concern about children being exploited into criminality. I particularly welcome the Minister’s letter, dated a couple of weeks ago—about 15 February—explaining that the amendments laid address a highly specific concern about the requirement for the prosecution to prove that the perpetrator did not reasonably believe the child was aged 18 or over, if the child was aged 13 or over. We thank him for that.

However, from these Benches we urge the Government to go further in the longer term in ensuring that all children are safeguarded from exploitation. This needs to be recognised as a form of exploitation. Along with a number of organisations, we think that this should be done through a statutory definition in Parliament, partly because that will guide the services but also because it would make it very clear where the boundaries are on CCE.

Hand in hand with this is the whole issue of cuckooing, which we will come to in the next group. That is equally important. It is one of the newer, more virulent ways of coercively controlling children. We welcome the amendment, wish it had gone further, and look forward to discussions in the longer term about how that can be remedied.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to noble Lords and will try to respond briefly. I remind the House that we are responding to requests from noble Lords, and in addition from partners in children’s charities, law enforcement and Members of the House of Commons, to make a change to ensure that the child criminal exploitation offence works as intended to protect the children most at risk of being targeted.

As both the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, have said, boys aged between 15 and 17 and, very often, Black and other minority children are commonly overrepresented in those figures. They are the same children at risk of being wrongly perceived as being older, and therefore not protected. We have tried to ensure that we place the responsibility for any criminal activity firmly where it belongs in this case, which is with the adult who is effectively trying to groom, encourage, lead—however we wish to describe it—the child under the age of 18. For the purposes of this legislation, a child is dealt with as being under the age of 18.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies, raised again his concerns about voting at 16. That is an issue for debate, and it is a Labour manifesto commitment, but it is not an issue for debate today.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

It is a comparison.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord says it is a comparison. I accept that, but for the purposes of this legislation, we are saying that individuals aged 15 to 17, particularly, are vulnerable. This goes to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. Requiring the courts to consider what age the perpetrator reasonably believed the child to be by reference to their appearance or behaviour risks, in my view, reinforcing the injustices we have and risks somebody who has undertaken child criminal exploitation getting off because they believed that that person was older than they actually were.

That is a line we have drawn and an argument we have made, and it is in the legislation. I am not the Minister responsible for this, but I would still be happy to have a discussion with the noble Lord at some point about why votes at 16 is important. If he wants to do that, we will find an opportunity, I am sure, if it relates to a Home Office Bill at any time in the future.

--- Later in debate ---

It would be useful to know if the Government are thinking in the longer term about whether they could strengthen the rules that they are laying down. The charities’ concern is that they are not strong enough, and they believe that the guidance that they suggest would be a very good way of strengthening them without necessarily needing the detail on the face of the Bill.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for tabling these amendments, and I fully appreciate that they are concerned with the protection of children and young people. The amendments would restrict the new offences of cuckooing and coerced internal concealment so that they applied only to those aged 18 and over, and they would require the Secretary of State to issue statutory safeguarding guidance in connection with these provisions.

Let me say at the outset that we all recognise the deeply exploitative nature of cuckooing and forcing or coercing individuals, particularly vulnerable people, into internally concealing drugs or other items. The purpose of these new offences in the Bill is precisely to target that exploitation, and we on these Benches have a lot of sympathy for that principle. The clauses are designed to disrupt organised criminal activity that so often preys on the vulnerable.

However, we cannot support the amendments in this group. They would, in effect, create a blanket exemption for 16 and 17 year-olds from criminal liability for these offences. In this country, the age of criminal responsibility is 10. Parliament has long accepted that young people under 18 can, in appropriate circumstances, be held criminally responsible for serious criminal conduct. To carve out a specific exemption here would create inconsistency in law and risk signalling that certain forms of serious exploitation-related offending are less culpable when committed by older teenagers.

That is not to deny that many young people involved in such activities are themselves victims. The courts already have extensive powers to take age, maturity, coercion and vulnerability into account at charging and sentencing. Prosecutorial direction and the youth justice framework provide mechanisms to distinguish between a hardened exploiter and a child groomed into criminality; a blanket statutory exclusion would go too far.

As for the proposed requirement for additional statutory guidance, safeguarding responsibilities are already embedded in existing legislation. Public authorities with safeguarding duties are well aware of their obligations, and we should be cautious about layering further statutory guidance unnecessarily. We must ensure that exploiters are prosecuted, victims are protected and the law remains coherent. For those reasons, while I very much respect the intentions behind these amendments, I cannot support them.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for taking part in this debate. I start with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb—and I start by welcoming her genuine recognition of the progress that we are making through this legislation by introducing the new child criminal exploitation and cuckooing offences in this Bill. We are grateful for that. As she explained, her Amendments 195 to 197 seek to restrict those who commit the cuckooing and internal concealment offences to those aged 18 or over.

The Government fully recognise that children, particularly those exploited by county lines gangs, are often used to carry out cuckooing activity or to persuade others to internally conceal items such as drugs for a criminal purpose. The act of turning these children into exploiters themselves is particularly appalling and is why this Government’s work to target child criminal exploitation is so important. I think that everyone across your Lordships’ House recognises that. While I appreciate the spirit of these amendments and believe that it is absolutely right that children, when they have been exploited and groomed into criminality, should be protected as victims, this does not in itself override the age of criminal responsibility, where the law holds children over a certain age responsible for their actions. It is possible for a child to commit cuckooing or internal concealment without having been exploited to do so.

Let us be clear that decisions as to whether to charge someone should be taken on a case-by-case basis. As with all offences, the police exercise operational judgment when investigating and gathering evidence to establish the facts of a case, and the Crown Prosecution Service’s public interest test will of course apply. This includes consideration of the child’s culpability and whether they have been compelled, coerced or exploited to commit any potential crime of cuckooing or internal concealment. We will also issue statutory guidance to support implementation of the cuckooing and internal concealment offences, including on how the police should respond and identify exploitation when children are found in connection with cuckooing or internal concealment.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, posed the question why we are not creating a statutory defence for children against their prosecution for crimes, including cuckooing and internal concealment, committed as a result of effectively being a victim of child criminal exploitation. When a victim of proposed child criminal exploitation offences also meets the definition of a victim of modern slavery, they may retain access to the statutory defence contained in Section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. Many victims of CCE will continue to be able to access the Section 45 defence, as they do now. However, we consider that creating an additional stand-alone statutory defence for victims of child criminal exploitation beyond that which already exists in Section 45 of the 2015 Act for victims who are also victims of modern slavery and/or human trafficking could have unintended consequences, given the breadth of the proposed offence. The child criminal exploitation offence is to address the imbalance between children and those individuals who criminally exploit them.

I add that we are working with partners in the criminal justice system to improve awareness and understanding of the Section 45 defence, which will support the early identification of potential victims of modern slavery and prevent criminal proceedings being brought against victims. It is intended that guidance on the potential availability of the Section 45 defence under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 for victims of child criminal exploitation will be included in the statutory guidance that will accompany the new offence.

I turn to Amendment 198. We similarly sympathise with the intention behind the amendment to introduce statutory guidance for multi-agency partners. It is essential that agencies work together to safeguard and protect children and vulnerable adults from criminal exploitation. However, statutory safeguarding responsibilities are already set out in statutory guidance, principally in Working Together to Safeguard Children, which includes guidance on child criminal exploitation. To supplement this, we will issue non-statutory guidance for partner agencies on the child criminal exploitation offence and orders and on cuckooing and internal concealment to support them to identify these harms and recognise how their statutory responsibilities apply. Issuing separate statutory guidance with additional legal burdens for safeguarding partners on these specific crime types alone risks duplication and a siloed approach to protecting children and vulnerable adults—something that I am sure we would all wish to avoid happening.

More broadly, the Government are taking a range of actions to strengthen child protection through the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill, which will introduce new multi-agency child protection teams in every local authority in England. This will ensure stronger join-up between police, health, education and children’s social care when responding to harms such as child criminal exploitation.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, mentioned stalking offences, which are committed mainly against adults, so it is appropriate to have bespoke guidance. Here we are talking about safeguarding children where the DfE guidance will apply, so it is appropriate that we take this approach, given the range of agencies involved for children. I hope that, given those assurances, the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.

Life Sciences: Beagles

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Monday 9th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

That is a long way from animal testing but I will give the noble Baroness a straight answer on it anyway. I personally voted to ban fox hunting on every occasion in the House of Commons when I was a Member of Parliament. I personally support the Government’s intention to stop trail hunting. Those are matters of management and political decision. That is what the Government will do, and I hope the noble Baroness will continue to raise those issues. We will look at the consequences, but ultimately it is the right thing to do.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, having recently debated the life sciences sector and being aware of how crucial it is, not only for our economy but for our national security, we know that much of the research conducted in Britain is increasingly at risk from espionage, cyber attack and theft, most notably from China. What steps, in addition to the legislation, have the Government taken to robustly disrupt such efforts by our adversaries and protect the British life sciences sector?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

That is an important point. We have to ensure that the sector operates properly and effectively and is not damaged by foreign state actors or any other criminal elements. That is why we put in place the measures in relation to protests, which we debated in this House last week. The Government will continue to ensure that robust measures, about which it would not be appropriate to talk in this Chamber, are put in place to protect all sectors of our industrial society.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 5th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 464 I will speak to Amendments 467, 468 and 503, in my name. These amendments collectively address the governance of Clauses 192 to 194, which grant the Secretary of State broad powers to make regulations giving effect to international law enforcement information-sharing agreements. Following the recent passage of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025, we are now operating in a new legal landscape, where the statutory threshold for protecting data transferred overseas has been lowered. These amendments are not just desirable; they are essential safety mechanisms to fill that gap.

Amendment 464 would be a safeguard of, so to speak, look before you leap. It stipulates that, before regulations are made under Clause 192 to implement a new international agreement, the authority must publish a comprehensive privacy impact assessment. The necessity of this assessment has intensified following the enactment of the Data (Use and Access) Act. The UK’s new test for onward transfers of data has lowered the bar. It no longer requires foreign protections to be essentially equivalent to ours, but merely not materially lower. This creates a dangerous new risk profile. The European Data Protection Board has explicitly noted that this new test omits key safeguards against foreign government access and removes redress mechanisms for individuals. If the general statutory floor has been lowered, Amendment 464 becomes the essential safety net. We must assess these specific risks via a privacy impact assessment before we open the digital borders, to ensure that we are not exposing UK citizens to jurisdictions where they have no legal remedy.

This brings me to Amendment 467, which addresses the nature of the data being shared. Where regulations authorise the transfer of highly sensitive personal data, such as biometrics, genetics or political opinions, this amendment would require enhanced protective measures. All this highlights the illusion of data protection when transferring data to high-risk jurisdictions that lack the rule of law. We know that in authoritarian states domestic intelligence laws will always override the standard contractual clauses usually relied on for data transfers. Because the Data (Use and Access) Act has removed the requirement for foreign safeguards to be essentially equivalent, we cannot rely on the general law to protect highly sensitive biometric or health data. My amendment would restore the requirement that transfers of such sensitive data must be demonstrated to be strictly necessary and proportionate. We cannot allow efficiency of data sharing to deny the reality that, in some jurisdictions, once data arrives, the state will have unrestricted access. Transparency must follow these powers.

Amendment 468 would mandate the production of an annual report on international law enforcement information sharing. This is vital because we are entering a period of divergence. The European Commission, at the urging of the European Data Protection Board, will be monitoring the practical implementation of the UK’s revised data transfer regime. If the EU will be monitoring how our data laws operate, surely Parliament should be doing the same. We need an annual report to track whether these law enforcement transfers are inadvertently exposing UK citizens to jurisdictions where they have no effective legal redress. Without this feedback loop, Parliament is legislating in the dark.

Finally, Amendment 503 would ensure that regulations made under Clause 192 are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. Given that the primary legislation governing data transfers has been loosened, it is constitutionally inappropriate for these specific law enforcement agreements to slip through via the negative procedure. Amendment 503 would ensure that these regulations, which may involve the transfer of our citizens’ most sensitive biometric data to foreign powers, must be actively debated and approved by both Houses of Parliament.

We support international co-operation in fighting crime, but it must not come at the cost of lowering our standards. These amendments would restore the safeguards that recent legislation have eroded. I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, we thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his amendments and the importance that he has obviously placed on the right to privacy of the general public.

I support the principle behind Amendment 464. Sharing information often carries a risk with it, particularly when it is for the purposes of law enforcement, and especially when this is done internationally. Law enforcement data contains information that is far more personal to the individual or case in question than the norm. Any data of this sort must be handled with the highest discretion. Ensuring that the sharing of this data respects the right to privacy carries no unintended consequences and, most importantly, is necessary and should be the benchmark from which regulations are made.

If this amendment is accepted, I do not see the additional need for Amendment 468. At the very least, the privacy impact assessment under Amendment 464 should form the basis of any annual report that Amendment 468 would mandate. Less is more when it comes to admin and reports, so I am hesitant to support a new report that is not necessarily needed.

I think Amendment 467 is sensible. In general, internationally shared data should not include information prejudicial to any individual, let alone domestic citizens. This particularly extends to the sharing of biometric data for the purpose of unique identification or genetic identification.

These categories of data are obviously vital for the purposes of law enforcement, but law enforcement extra territorially risks placing this data in the wrong hands. This and similar data should therefore be particularly protected, which is the aim of the noble Lord’s amendment. I hope that the Minister can outline what the Government intend to do to ensure that the international sharing of personal data is undertaken in the most discreet and protected manner.

--- Later in debate ---

I am aware of the considerable technical detail in this contribution, but it is clear, talking to the Defence Extradition Lawyers Forum, that it is very concerned that Clause 195 would reverse some of the key basic human rights afforded to people under the threat of extradition. This is serious and I hope that the Minister will be prepared to meet any speakers in this debate and DELF to discuss this further. I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for tabling this clause stand part notice. I would like to add my reservations about this clause.

First, I am concerned that this clause has not received sufficient scrutiny and consideration by Parliament. It was added on Report in the other place on 17 June last year. The Minister moving the new clause dedicated only 255 words to explain its effect and it was not mentioned by a single other Member. It has not received adequate attention. For that reason, I am pleased that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has tabled this amendment to allow us to press the Government on the measures they are proposing.

The second point is the potential impact this clause could have on the right to a fair trial for British citizens. Under Section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003, where a person has been convicted in another country, the judge at the extradition hearing must first decide whether the person has been convicted in their absence and then decide whether the person deliberately absented themselves from the trial. If the judge is satisfied that the person was convicted in absentia and did not deliberately absent themselves from the trial, the judge must determine whether the person would be entitled to a retrial or to a review that amounts to a retrial in the territory to which the person would be extradited. If the judge does not believe that the person would be entitled to a retrial if extradited, the judge must discharge the prospect of extradition.

The Supreme Court in the recent cases of Bertino and Merticariu distinguished between the right to a retrial and the right to apply for a retrial. The court has held that a person’s entitlement to a retrial does not simply mean the person “might” be entitled to a retrial but that they “must” be entitled. This means that a conditional entitlement to a retrial that is dependent upon the finding of the court in the requesting country is insufficient for extradition to proceed. This places a decision on whether a fair trial can be had firmly in the hands of British judges. That is surely right. It is plainly preferable for the determination of the ability for a retrial to take place to be undertaken by a British judge, as opposed to merely relying on the decision of a foreign court.

However, in Clause 195, the Government are seeking to overturn this ruling, thereby removing a key safeguard against unfair extradition. If this clause is brought into force, the judge in Britain would have to order a person’s extradition on the simple assertion by the requesting country that the person could be permitted to stand trial in person, regardless of whether that is actually true or not.

Let us imagine a person who was tried in absentia and was not aware of their conviction in another country. If they were extradited and not permitted a retrial, they would not have been able to stand up in court and defend themselves against the charges they had been accused of. That is surely a recipe for serious injustice. In short, I am concerned that this clause will lead to more British citizens being extradited on the whim of a foreign judge and not afforded the right to a fair trial. For this reason, I very much support the proposition from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, that the clause should not stand part.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, I begin by saying how sorry I am that it is the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, moving her proposition and not Lord Wallace of Tankerness, who we will greatly miss. As we all know, he was a staunch advocate for the people of Orkney and Shetland. I served nine years with him in Parliament, as we crossed over during that time, and found him to be an exemplary public servant as Deputy First Minister for Scotland and as a Member of Parliament. I had less contact with him in your Lordships’ House and I am genuinely sorry that I cannot have contact with him today. I pass my condolences to his family. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness Lady Brinton for taking up the cudgels on this specialist subject and doing it in a way that is professional. I promise that I will try to answer the questions and follow up on the points she has raised.

I am also grateful to the noble Baroness for reminding me of the constituency case of Paul Wright in Mold, which I dealt with in a former life as Paul Wright’s Member of Parliament, following the extradition case with Greece. I will have to google it to refresh all the details in my memory, but it was an important constituency case for me to take up as a Member of Parliament at that time. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, feels that this did not receive sufficient scrutiny, but I take his point, and I hope I can answer his points today.

Clause 195 standing part of the Bill means that, under the Extradition Act 2003, the UK may extradite individuals either to face trial or serve a sentence. Where a conviction occurred in absentia and the UK court finds the person did not deliberately absent themselves, the judge must determine whether they will be entitled to a retrial in the requesting state. This clause will amend Sections 20 and 85 of the 2003 Act to restore the original policy intention that the individual must have a right to apply for a retrial, not a guaranteed retrial, for extradition to proceed. The amendment is required, as the noble Baroness mentioned, following the Supreme Court’s judgment in Merticariu v Romania, which interpreted the current drafting of the 2003 Act as requiring a guaranteed retrial—something some states cannot offer. Without this fix, certain legitimate extradition requests could be blocked, undermining justice for victims.

I know the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, mentioned this, but the amendment itself does not change any existing safeguards or processes governing extradition. The full suite of safeguards in the 2003 Act, including judicial oversight and human rights protections, remains unchanged. This includes the UK court’s powers to consider and determine whether someone deliberately absented themselves. I hope that gives her some reassurance.

The small government Amendment 537 makes minor drafting changes. It simply provides that Clause 195 will be commenced by regulations, as opposed to automatically coming into force on Royal Assent, as was originally planned.

I have heard what the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, has said and I have heard the complex case that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has mentioned. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, asked whether she could have a meeting with appropriate supporters to discuss this and I would be happy to do so. For the purposes of confirming that, I would be grateful if she could email me the details of who she wishes to attend that meeting. It is entirely up to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, but I would be happy if the noble Lord, Lord Davies, wishes to attend—or I could offer him a separate meeting if he wants to have further discussions or representations. If that can be discussed outside Committee, I would be happy to do that.

In the meantime, I hope the reassurances I have given are sufficient for the moment. I would be happy if the noble Baroness would withdraw her opposition to the clause standing part, pending any discussion, which I will ensure takes place if possible—subject to our diaries—before Report, as appropriate. If not, we can still have the discussion, so that we can at least reflect on the points that have been made today.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, as a former trustee of UNICEF, I rise to support Amendment 469, so clearly presented by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and signed and spoken to by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. Internationally, the minimum age of criminal responsibility is recognised as 12, and UNICEF has always been clear that it should be 14. I heard what the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, said, and understand his concerns about the very large number of young people and children being groomed and pulled into criminal gangs. He is right to say that we need more concerted support in terms of police, education and youth work intervention, but it is not the children’s—younger children’s—fault that they have ended up there. The noble Lord, Lord Hacking, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, recognised that heinous crimes needed to be marked in a certain way, but both also commented on the fact that we needed to understand that these were children. I am really grateful for the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd.

Your Lordships’ House has been discussing this for many, many years and as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said, she was campaigning on this long before she came into Your Lordships’ House. Now is the time; we need change. We need to do that because there is so much evidence now.

In 2011, Nicholas Mackintosh, who chaired the Royal Society study on brain development, told the BBC then that there was

“incontrovertible evidence that the brain continues to develop throughout adolescence”,

and that some regions of the brain, responsible for decision-making and impulse control, do not mature fully

“until at least the age of 20”.

That Royal Society report cited the

“concern of some neuroscientists that the … age of criminal responsibility in the UK is set too low”.

We are still discussing it today.

UNICEF’s view is that 14 should be the minimum age, using scientific research as a base, but it is very specific that no country should have the age below 12. This places England, Wales and Northern Ireland in breach of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which is bad enough, but the real problem is a court system that assumes that children have capacity to make decisions when all the research shows that that is not reliable. It is wrong for a Government to assert that any interference with a child’s human rights can be justified.

UNICEF says in its excellent guidance note on youth offending published in 2022, that children under the minimum age of criminal responsibility,

“should not be considered (alleged) child offenders but, first and foremost, children in need of special protection”.

It says that offending behaviour by such children

“is often the result of poverty, family violence and/or homelessness … their involvement in offending behaviour is an indicator of potential vulnerability that has to be addressed by the social welfare system. Special protection measures for children … should address the root causes of their behaviour and support their parents/caregivers. The measures should be tailored to the child’s needs and circumstances and based on a comprehensive and interdisciplinary assessment of the child’s familial, educational and social circumstances”.

That matches the advice of the medical specialists too. Frankly, it is time that the Government stepped up and took the brave decision that we need to recognise that we are out of kilter with the rest of Europe and, frankly, most of the world.

Prosecuting children and holding them in young offender institutions does not give them the time and space to learn how to live their lives differently. We have heard from both the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, about how the arrangements work for children in specialist secure accommodation. We can still use those systems but without giving children the label of being a criminal when, clearly, they are not capable of making the right decisions.

I am really grateful to my noble friend Lord Dholakia, who has been campaigning on this particular issue for decades before he came into your Lordships’ House in 1997. His Private Member’s Bill in 2017 resulted in a wide public discussion. It is a shame that, nine years on, we have not progressed further. Let us do so now.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this has been a genuinely interesting debate. The amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, would raise the age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales from 10 to 14. For the reasons I will set out below, I am unable to support it.

First, the purpose of the age of criminal responsibility has not been designed to criminalise children unnecessarily. Rather, it is to ensure that the state can intervene early and proportionately when a child’s behaviour causes serious harm. As the noble Baroness, Baroness Levitt, the Minister, stated in this House, setting the age at 10 allows the justice system to step in at a point where intervention can prevent further offending and protect both the child and the wider public, and, crucially, children are not treated as adults. They are dealt with through youth courts under a distinct sentencing framework with rehabilitation as the central aim.

The evidence shows that the system already uses this power sparingly. We are told that, in 2024, only 13% of all children sentenced were aged between 10 and 14, and that proportion has been falling year on year. Of the 1,687 sentences imposed on children in that age group, just 23 resulted in custody. Those figures matter. They demonstrate that the age of criminal responsibility being set at 10 does not mean routine criminalisation of children. It means retaining a backstop for the most serious and persistent cases while diversion remains the norm.

Raising the age to 14 would create a dangerous gap. It would mean that children aged 10 to 13 who commit grave offences—including serious violence, sexual offences or sustained harassment—could not be held criminally responsible. This would limit the state’s ability to manage risk, protect victims and, in some cases, protect the child. There are rare but tragic cases—

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord. Section 44 of the Children Act deals with children who are a danger to themselves and to others. The only difference in the criminal court is that it comes through the family proceedings court, but in fact the local authority would have to deal with it and the child would be put into secure accommodation. I wonder whether the noble Lord could take that on board.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Baroness for that. I do not dispute that fact; I quite accept it.

There are rare but tragic cases, such as the murder of James Bulger, where a criminal justice response is unavoidable and undoubtedly in the public interest.

I respectfully suggest that international comparisons cited in this debate are far from straightforward and can sometimes serve to confuse matters. In fact, certain countries are now moving in the opposite direction. Sweden, for example, is proposing to lower its age in response to gang exploitation of children who know that they cannot be prosecuted. That underlines a key point. If the threshold is set too high, it can incentivise adults to use children as instruments of crime.

It is also worth noting that, although Scotland recently raised the age of criminal responsibility, Scotland’s experience should not justify this amendment. Even after deciding the age of criminal responsibility should be raised from eight years old, Scotland raised the threshold to 12 and not to 14. The Scottish Government also retained extensive non-criminal powers to respond to serious harmful behaviour. This amendment would go significantly further without clear evidence that such a leap would improve outcomes for children or public safety.

It is worth noting that a number of Commonwealth countries retain the doctrine that a child is considered incapable of wrongdoing, which was abolished in England and Wales by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. In many of those jurisdictions, the standard age of responsibility is similar to ours. Australia, for example, has a standard age of criminal responsibility of 10 years old, but a rebuttable presumption exists up to the age of 14. However, I should also stress that, simply because other countries may have higher ages than England and Wales, that is not, in and of itself, a justification to alter ours. We must ensure that the age of responsibility here is suitable for our needs—

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

Before the noble Lord leaves the question of international comparisons, can he confirm that in Sweden the proposal is to lower the age of criminal responsibility from 15 to 13, rather than leaving that unsaid?

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I cannot confirm that, but I will certainly have a look at it.

The question is not whether children should be protected but whether removing the ability to intervene criminally until 14 years old would make children, victims or communities safer. I do not believe that it would. The current system already prioritises proportionality and rehabilitation, while retaining the capacity to act when it is absolutely necessary. For those reasons, I cannot support this amendment.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti has a long and honourable record of raising issues on behalf of some of the most vulnerable in society. She and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, make a formidable team when moving this amendment. I am very grateful to them for ensuring that this important issue remains at the forefront of every Government’s mind, including this one.

It was about a fortnight ago that your Lordships’ House debated this issue in response to my noble friend’s Oral Question. I said at the time, and repeat today, that the age of criminal responsibility is a complex and sensitive issue. I want to take this opportunity to set out in a bit more detail than the Oral Questions format allows why the Government believe that we should keep the age of criminal responsibility at 10 years old.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, it might not surprise the Committee to hear that I do not support this amendment and I am sure I will find myself making the same arguments as the Minister when he responds.

In 2021, Parliament passed the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act, which was introduced to this House by my noble and learned friend, Lord Stewart of Dirleton. Its effect was to create a legislative framework through which covert intelligence officers can be authorised to participate in conduct which would normally be criminal. The criminal conduct authorisation might be granted under Section 29B of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, as inserted by the 2021 Act, only if it is proportionate and necessary, in the interests of national security, prevention of crime and disorder, or in the interests of our economic well-being. Subsection (6) of that section also requires the person authorising the criminal conduct to ensure—and this is important—that all alternative avenues that do not make use of criminality have been exhausted. Subsection (7) states that the decision to grant an authorisation is required to comply with the Human Rights Act 1998. Finally, there is an explicit goal for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.

Therefore, there already exists a number of safeguards to prevent covert intelligence officers overstepping the bounds of their authorisation and to ensure that the authorisation itself is tightly drawn and strictly necessary. When a criminal conduct authorisation is granted, the officer to whom it relates is permitted to engage in the specified criminal conduct and cannot be prosecuted for that conduct. It is perfectly well understood and accepted that covert agents do, on occasion, have to engage in such criminal conduct in the course of their operations. It is absolutely right that the law protects them when this is the case.

It is also worth noting that the 2021 Act did not create new powers for the police and intelligence services; it simply placed on a statutory footing the mechanism by which they can be authorised to engage in criminal behaviour. This is surely preferable to having the whole system working on the side and in the dark.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, proposes in her Amendment 470 to remove the criminal and civil immunity provided to officers when they commit a criminal offence in pursuance of an authorisation to do so. She proposes replacing it with a defence to criminal or civil charges. However, she has also included an exception to that possible defence—when an officer encourages, assists or attempts to discredit the person who is under surveillance. I find this a startling exception. If a covert officer is given a criminal conduct authorisation and that authorisation, taking into account all the available safeguards, includes permission to commit an inchoate offence, I cannot see why that officer should not be able to do so. Certainly, the officer should not be held criminally or civilly liable.

I am sure the Minister will have further points to add, but we on these Benches cannot support this amendment.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Is the noble Lord saying that he supports officers or their assets acting as agents provocateurs, inciting crime rather than investigating it?

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I am not saying that at all. We all recognise that things have gone wrong, but what I say generally is that this type of policing—indeed, quite a number of aspects of policing—is about testing the law. Certainly, this is the case with the involvement of CHISs.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

The noble Lord mentioned all the safeguards, but why does he think the safeguards failed not once, but multiple times, and over quite a number of years?

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I cannot answer for all the cases that have gone wrong; indeed, I cannot answer for any cases that have gone wrong—it is not my place to do that. I can say, however, that it very much depends on good leadership and good supervision, and all of that comes down to good training. It has always been my view that training is at the core of all of this.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

Does the noble Lord accept that statutory blanket immunity from civil or criminal action acts as a barrier for people who are affected by such unlawful activities? It is a significant concern because of the impact that barrier has on those who might need to bring such action, and who might have difficulty getting funding or access to the necessary support. Then, there is an ongoing huge impact on trust in the police.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

Trust in the police in this area is essential. I am not sure I quite get the gist of what the noble Baroness is asking, but I am very happy to discuss it outside the Chamber later, if that would help.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

It was about statutory blanket immunity—the extent of the immunity.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

Again, I would have to have a look at that before I give an answer. I am very happy to discuss it with the noble Baroness.

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

Can the noble Lord comment on the case of R v Barkshire, and does he endorse the behaviour of the counter-intelligence officer in that case?

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I am not entirely sure that I know all the facts of that case, so I am probably not qualified to answer that question. I spent my job putting people behind bars, not defending them. I am not a lawyer; I would not like to take that any further, frankly.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti for her amendment. The discussion today has taken me back to my time in Northern Ireland, when I had to see the product of covert intelligence. As Counter-Terrorism Minister in 2009, I had to see the product of that intelligence, so I understand the value of that. I also understand that the amendment seeks to amend the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 by removing the legal protections for covert human intelligence sources who have been tasked by the police and a limited number of other public authority agencies, such as the intelligence services, with engaging in specific, tightly defined, pre-approved criminal conduct. Furthermore, the amendment seeks to remove protections for CHISs engaged in such authorised criminal conduct where it engages the offences of encouraging or assisting an offender under the Serious Crime Act, or seeks to discredit those who are subject to a particular investigation. I understand the motive behind what my noble friend has brought forward.

I begin by addressing the undercover police inquiry, raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, my noble friend Lord Hacking and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, from the Liberal Democrat Front Bench. I took office in July 2024, and the undercover policing inquiry had operated for nine years at that stage. It is clear that the historical allegations under consideration by the inquiry are absolutely appalling. Such behaviour should rightly be condemned. The inquiry is ongoing, and we await the findings and any recommendations, but let me assure all those who have spoken that I am now responsible in the Home Office for managing inquiries, and I wish to see recommendations as soon as possible, for the very reasons noble Lords and Baronesses have mentioned today.

The current landscape around undercover operatives is much changed, and since 2013 enhanced safeguards have been put in place, but the Government want to see the lessons of that inquiry and consider them as soon as possible.

Noble Lords may recall the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021, which has been referred to today, and the revised CHIS code of practice of 2022, mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, which were subject to debate and approval both here and in the House of Commons. This scrutiny includes consideration of similar amendments proposed by my noble friend at the time.

I say to noble Lords generally, including my noble friend Lord Hacking, that CHIS play a crucial part in preventing, detecting and safeguarding the public from many serious crimes, including terrorism, drugs and firearms offences, and child sexual exploitation and abuse. Those who do it do so at such personal risk to themselves. I noted and welcome the support from the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Jackson—I will take the support where I can get it. It needs to be properly authorised and specifically defined criminality by the state, and they do so knowing that they will not be penalised for carrying out that activity, particularly by those engaged in criminal or terrorist activity, who may otherwise pursue legal action against them.

It is important that we place on record that CHIS authorisations and criminal conduct authorisations under Part II of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 can be validly given only where the proposed conduct is necessary, proportionate and compliant with the Human Rights Act. Valid authorisations make activity carried out in relation to them “lawful for all purposes”, providing protection from criminal and civil liability. However—I know my noble friend knows this—should a court find that the authorisation does not satisfy these necessary requirements, or should the conduct go beyond what is permitted by the authorisation, it will not be rendered lawful.

Given the significance of these powers, it is important to note that there are independent and effective avenues of oversight and redress, and that these exist—I know that colleagues who have spoken know this, but it is worth putting on the record again—via the Investigatory Powers Tribunal for anyone who believes they have been subject to improper activity by a public authority using covert investigatory powers.

--- Later in debate ---

While it is clear that there would not be many cases likely to end up in British courts, we on these Benches consider that holding these very serious alleged perpetrators to account is vital. I hope that the Minister will consider making these small changes in order to help change the world.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I fully understand the noble intentions behind Amendments 472 and 473, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool. The crimes he speaks of are among the most abhorrent and the work he has done is admirable. He is to be warmly congratulated. However, for reasons I will set out, the Opposition cannot support the amendments.

We must first recognise that the British justice system has, first and foremost, a responsibility to uphold the rule of law and punish criminality in Britain. Similarly, the British Government have, first and foremost, a responsibility to protect the security of Britain, and this must be our principal concern. The British Government are not a global Government; we cannot police the world, and we must be very open and honest about that.

It is also a more than unfortunate fact that there are a number of Daesh fighters and other terrorists who have been returned to Britain but have not successfully been prosecuted for the crimes the noble Lord, Lord Alton, refers to. Daesh committed widespread war crimes, genocide against Yazidis and numerous crimes against humanity. To pick up on the noble Lord’s point, if we have people in Britain who committed these heinous crimes but have not yet been prosecuted, I am not sure we should be adding even more by bringing prosecutions against people with no connection to the United Kingdom. Let us prosecute those who have been involved in genocide and war crimes who are in the UK first, before we start trying to prosecute others.

It is also very important that we do not simply welcome people with terrorist connections back into our country. We on these Benches are firmly supportive of the Home Secretary robustly using her powers to exclude people from the United Kingdom who pose a threat to the British people and, where necessary, to strip particularly dangerous people of their British citizenship.

Finally, there is also a question of where prosecutions should best take place. There is a compelling argument for prosecutions and investigations to take place closer to where the crimes were committed, which should allow for a better evidence-gathering process. Ultimately, we must be careful not to subordinate the safety and security of the British public for the purposes of advancing international law. For these reasons, we cannot support the amendments.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

Can my noble friend comment on the remarks of the noble Lords, Lord Verdirame and Lord Macdonald of River Glaven? Did he find nothing in what they had to say the least bit attractive?

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I would not say that I found nothing.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, my old home city, for the way in which he has approached these amendments. I thank him for the work of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which he chairs, and through him I pass on my thanks to my old colleague Sarah Champion, the MP for Rotherham, for the work she has done on this issue. As he knows, we had an opportunity to debate the committee’s report in Grand Committee. I was fortunate that my noble friend Lord Katz took the debate on that occasion and was able to set out the Government’s response, which the noble Lord, Lord Alton, will realise has not really changed in the intervening months since that debate. However, I am grateful to him, my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, the noble Lords, Lord Wigley and Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, for their supportive comments, and I will come on to comments from other noble Lords in due course. I know the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, is not in her place at the moment, and missed the start of the debate so was therefore not able to speak in this debate—although she tried—but if she reads Hansard tomorrow, she can make any points she was going to raise in a letter to me and we will consider those prior to Report, which I hope is a fair compromise.

Before I go on to the main bulk of the arguments, I refer to the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, and his comments on the death of Mr Ryan Evans, of Wrexham, which is close to both him and me. It is obviously a deeply sad incident and his death in Ukraine in 2024 followed a Russian strike, as the noble Lord outlined. The UK Government continue to support efforts to ensure accountability for the crimes that are committed in Ukraine. This includes supporting the independent investigation of the International Criminal Court into the situation in Ukraine, as well as providing assistance to Ukrainian domestic investigations and prosecutions of international crimes. Although I cannot give him much succour today in relation to that particular issue, I hope he will pass on the Government’s condolences to Ryan’s parents. We are obviously happy to have further representations on that matter should he wish to make them in due course.

The points made by my noble friend Lord Katz in the previous debate—and those with which I shall respond to the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool—relate to the fact that the UK applies its universal jurisdiction only to a very few specific international crimes. Our approach to universal jurisdiction is designed to ensure that those suspected of, or accused of, crimes are investigated, charged and tried fairly and impartially at every stage, with access to all available evidence. This is in accordance with local constitutional and legal frameworks. It remains the case—and I know this will disappoint those noble Lords who have spoken in support today—that we do not believe that it is necessary at this time to extend the scope of the UK’s policy on universal jurisdiction to include genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. It is the long-standing view of successive Governments in general that where there is no apparent link between the UK and an international crime—and this goes to the point the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, made—we support the principle that such crimes are best investigated and prosecuted where they are perpetrated. That also goes to some of the points mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, because the advantages of securing evidence and the witnesses required for a fair investigation and a successful prosecution are part of a credible judicial process.

It should be noted that the UK already has jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity where they are alleged to have been committed by UK nationals or residents. In some cases where the UK does not have jurisdiction, such as in Ukraine—I have just mentioned the situation in relation to Mr Ryan Evans, as alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley—we are trying to ensure that we build domestic capabilities, and we support the work of the Office of the Prosecutor General to ensure that allegations of war crimes are fully investigated by independent, effective and robust legal mechanisms.

To go back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, the most serious international crimes not covered by the UK’s universal jurisdiction policy are generally already subject to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, which, again, I would argue today, is better placed to prosecute such offences where they are not being dealt with by the relevant domestic authorities. The UK is a strong supporter of the ICC and its mission to end impunity. I know that we will do what we can to ensure that the crimes that have been mentioned today are dealt with by that international court, but I have to say that the debate that we had in the Moses Room, led by my noble friend Lord Katz, and the response I have given to the amendments today are the Government’s position. I accept and respect the points that have been put to the Committee today, but given the considerations that I have mentioned, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Alton, to withdraw his amendment. In saying that, I suspect we will return to these matters on Report. The Government will always reflect on what has been said in Committee, but I hope in due course the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, economic crime is not a marginal issue. It is a national crisis affecting millions of people every year but, generally speaking, it goes under the radar most of the time. These are not victimless offences: they destroy life savings, devastate small businesses and undermine trust in our economy and democracy. When economic crime goes unchecked, it is not the powerful who suffer but ordinary people.

The amendment is modest and pragmatic. It would not establish a new fund; it simply asks for a viability study. I know the Minister is never keen even on turning a semicolon into a comma but, in this instance, it is not asking an awful lot of the Government—the Minister must stop stabbing his heart—just to agree to look at a viability study. It is really not a big deal. There are already clear precedents for this approach, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, just said; the FCA, the Ministry of Justice and parts of the police are already able to retain fines in different ways. If the Government are really serious about the UK’s reputation as a global financial centre, they must match rhetoric with resources. Can I persuade the Minister, for once, to move and just say yes?

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, for moving this amendment. Economic crime is one of the most pervasive threats to public trust and business confidence in the UK. In the year ending March 2024, fraud accounted for around a third of all crime recorded by police. Industry estimates suggest that economic crime costs the UK economy tens of billions of pounds per year, according to police statistics. These staggering statistics underscore the need for effective enforcement and resourcing.

In this context, the need to seek more sustainable and predictable resourcing for economic crime enforcement is understandable. The proposal to assess the viability of an economic crime fighting fund based on reinvesting a proportion of receipts from enforcement reflects a desire to tackle this persistent and widespread issue. I recognise that there may be merits to an approach that allows specialist technology and expertise to be built and retained over multiple years.

The amendment also calls for an examination of the impact of budget exchange rules on the functioning of the asset recovery incentivisation scheme. There have been reports that recovered assets sometimes cannot easily be redeployed by front-line investigators and that incentives can be blunted by accounting constraints. If funds that are recovered through enforcement cannot, in practice, be retained or redeployed effectively by those doing the work, it is sensible to ask whether the current framework is optimally aligned with the policy objective of strengthening economic crime capability. However, I recognise that any move towards hypothecation of enforcement receipts raises potential governance issues, and there is also the question of how such a fund would sit alongside existing funding streams and the Government’s wider strategy in this area.

I therefore look forward to the Minister’s response to this amendment. I would be grateful if he could outline what steps the Government are currently taking to fight economic crime and whether they believe that any further action is required.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, not just for his amendment today but for his patience in sitting through the Committee debates prior to introducing his amendment this evening. I am also grateful for the meeting we had with him and Phil Brickell, MP for Bolton West, in October and the meeting we had on 18 November.

It is important that Amendment 482 is considered. It would require the Government to consult on the viability of a ring-fenced economic crime fighting fund, and the intention of the amendment is to examine whether such a fund could provide multi-year resourcing for tackling economic crime. I am grateful for the comments from the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, in support of the amendment. The amendment recognises the significant harm that economic crime causes—reflected in the contributions made—to individuals, businesses, the economy and wider society.

The Government remain committed to tackling economic crime. That is evidenced not just by words in this Chamber but by our continued investment through the asset recovery incentivisation scheme and the economic crime levy, which has allocated £125 million to tackling economic crime in recent months. These schemes are delivering state-of-the-art technology to provide law enforcement agencies with the tools they need to stay ahead of criminals. It also includes an important factor, which is the recruitment of 475 new officers across the threat leadership, intelligence, investigative and prosecution capacity. We are putting people on the ground to deal with this issue as part of the, we hope, tangible benefits that we can get in the fight against economic crime. As a Government, we want to continue to work with our partners to ensure that we are most effectively investing the funding available.

I understand and accept—and did so in the face-to-face discussions we had with the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, and the Member of Parliament Phil Brickell—that the call for sustaining funding is an important one that needs to be investigated. I want to confirm to the noble Lord what I hope is of help to him: the Government are committed to exploring the funding landscape with the aim of strengthening economic crime enforcement. This is witnessed by the statements we have made in the recently published economic anti-corruption strategy, which was published last December —particularly paragraph 42, on page 23, which I quote for the noble Lord:

“In the context of Spending Review 2025”,


we will

“explore the funding landscape with the aim of strengthening economic crime enforcement”

as a joint Treasury and Home Office priority commitment in that anti-corruption strategy.

This strategy is fixed and there was a timescale for it when published. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, will accept our intentions in identifying the issues that he has raised and not just doing what we have done to date, which is to ensure that we have put resources in already. I hope that that review commitment in the strategy from December is of help to the noble Lord regarding the objectives of his amendments here today.

With that commitment, I would be grateful if he would at least welcome it and hold us to account on it and, in doing so, withdraw his amendment today.

--- Later in debate ---

I accept that the Government have made a start on these issues, but there is more to do. We seek further progress on these matters. If we accept, as Ministers and police chiefs now do, that rural crime is complex, cross-border, organised and uniquely problematic, we need more action to take these matters forward. I support this amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer, the noble Earl, Lord Russell, and the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, for tabling their amendment. As a rural-dweller myself, I agree and recognise many, if not all, of the offences that have been identified. Our rural communities are incredibly important. On this side of the Committee, the Opposition have made it an absolute priority to support them in this difficult time. That support extends past simply fiscal policy following recent tax policies to all issues that affect them, including crime. It is promising that, last year, rural crime fell by over 16%, but there is still work to be done. Those offences still cost rural communities over £44 million a year—a fact that underlined our pledge to set up local taskforces to tackle rural crime.

Our objectives are not different from those of the noble Baroness; we simply differ on delivery. A top-down, centralised approach is never normally the most effective way to tackle local disconnected issues, and rural crime is a prime example of this. It is far less the operation of the highly organised criminal gangs we see in our cities, and more often the actions of an isolated few who sense an opportunity to steal or exploit the countryside and act on it.

Localised problems require localised solutions. Police forces are budgeted based on local needs, and are therefore the most alert to the specific issues facing their communities. It should be them organising taskforces to tackle rural crime, as they have the knowledge and ability to act and adjust to the changing crime picture in their area. While we agree with the noble Baroness’s intentions and entirely support them, we would much rather see funding directed to local forces and delegate responsibility to them and their taskforces to tackle the rural crime that we all want to see curbed. I hope the Minister agrees.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer, for raising these issues, and to the noble Lords who have spoken in support of her. As someone who represented a rural constituency in the House of Commons for 28 years, I can say that things such as sheep worrying, isolation and local policing were meat-and-drink on a daily basis. In fact, the north Wales rural crime unit was the model for a lot of the work that has been done on rural crime at a national level. I therefore appreciate and understand the problems that are faced by rural communities. I say to the noble Baroness and others that the Government remain committed to tackling those crimes that particularly impact our rural communities.

Noble Lords have spoken today about some of the government measures being brought forward, but I want to address them as a whole. As part of our safer streets mission, we are introducing important measures to protect rural communities that look at clamping down on anti-social behaviour, strengthening neighbourhood policing and preventing the very farm theft that the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, spoke of, as well as the issue of fly-tipping, which has been mentioned by noble Lords today. I would also add shop theft to that. That is an important issue because, particularly in rural areas where there is perhaps only one shop, an organised crime gang, or regular shop theft, can impact small independent businesses very strongly. We are trying to deal strongly with those issues. Rural communities across England and Wales are already better protected from the rising threat of organised gangs, and we have new strategies to tackle crimes plaguing countryside areas.

I was struck by my noble friend Lord Forbes of Newcastle, who focused not just on the rural crime issues that I know he is aware of but raised important issues around fraud and the isolation that fraud can bring. I advise him that, in a three-year fraud strategy that we intend to publish in relatively short order, the Government intend to look very strongly at those issues and at what we can do in that space.

Developing a robust response to a rural crime is extremely important. I know that noble Lords have mentioned it, but the objective of the amendment is, as the explanatory statement says,

“to establish a task force to produce a strategy for tackling rural crime”.

I say to the mover of the amendment that, in November 2025, the Home Office, Defra and the National Police Chiefs’ Council published the Rural and Wildlife Crime Strategy, which, in essence, does what the amendment asks for, and which will bring together the points that the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, asked for, with ministerial oversight. The strategy is a vital step in the mission to provide safer streets everywhere.

There is also a Defra-led rural task force that was set up last year—that sounds like a long way away, but it was just over a month ago—with the aim of gathering evidence through a series of meetings and workshops to look at the specific challenges faced in rural areas. The evidence gleaned from the workshops is being examined, and it will be used to outline the Government’s strategic ambition for rural communities.

Some of the points that noble Lords have mentioned today, such as tackling equipment theft, are a huge concern. I understand that. We intend to implement the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023, which will introduce forensic marking and registration on a database of all new terrain vehicles and quad bikes. I am also pleased to say that we recently announced removable GPS systems. Those are demands that I had just over a year ago when I went to the rural crime conference chaired by the police and crime commissioners for Norfolk and Cheshire. We have acted on that.

Clause 128, which has already been considered, contains a valuable tool for the police that will help them tackle stolen equipment. It will ensure that, where it has not been reasonably practical to obtain a warrant from the court, the police can enter and search premises that have been electronically tagged by GPS or other means and where items are present that are reasonably believed to have been stolen. That is a very strong signal for organised criminals that we are going to track and monitor them and have a non-warranted entrance to their property if they have stolen equipment—and we will hold them to account for it.

I was pleased to be able to announce last year at the police and crime commissioners’ conference a long-term commitment of £800,000 for the National Rural Crime Unit and the National Wildlife Crime Unit. We have committed to replicating this year’s funding next year, in 2026-27; in what are tight and difficult financial times, we have still managed to commit that funding to help to support the National Police Chiefs’ Council in achieving the aims of that strategy.

To go to some of the specific issues that the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, mentioned, such as hare coursing, the establishment of that unit and work that it has done, and through that unit Operation Galileo, has seen a 40% reduction in hare coursing—again, that was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, as a specific problem that has existed and causes great difficulties in rural areas.

We have also looked not just at the excellent work of the National Rural Crime Unit but, overall, at how we can tackle rural crime in an organised way. Again, I recognise that there are challenges. The Government separately, through the Statement that we made only a couple of days ago in this House, are looking at reorganising and shrinking the number of police forces, and we are going to have a commission to look at that, with a review, in the next few months to come to some conclusions. We are trying to centralise some national activity on serious organised crime, which is very much behind a lot of that rural crime. That landscape will need to be looked at.

The noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, referred to what I said on Tuesday night. We are looking at how we review the funding formula—that is important. Again, I cannot give specific answers on that today, but I would say to the noble Baroness who moved the amendment and noble Lords who have spoken to it, including the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, that significant work is being done on this. We have a strategy and a task force; we have co-operation with Defra and specific measures being brought in that have been called for for a long time on equipment theft and wildlife crime, as well as on the funding of the unit. We have looked at a range of other measures that we will bring forward to tackle organised crimes in rural areas. With the neighbourhood policing guarantee, we are looking at every neighbourhood police force having named, contactable officers dealing with local issues. We are putting 13,000 of those neighbourhood police officers in place over the next three to four-year period, which will mean that we have 3,000 extra neighbourhood police officers by March this year and 13,000 by the end of this Parliament. That is focusing people from the back room to local police forces.

Again, there is a big mix in this, and I know that noble Lords will appreciate that it is a significant challenge at the moment, but I hope that that work is helpful and that the direction of travel suggested by the amendments is one that noble Lords can understand we are trying to achieve. With that, I hope that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Cromwell (CB)]

I will follow the strictures just put on us to stay with the amendment. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Deben, as he still came back for another bite, that as someone who sat on the Industry and Regulators Committee that looked into the water industry in detail, I know that the Victorian system reached its capacity in 1960, and public and private ownership both failed in different ways for the simple reason that he gave: short-termism. That is the problem we face: the multiple billions that have to be spent over a long period, and no Government looking to get re-elected for the next five years will ever spend it.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, for tabling this amendment and the noble Earl, Lord Russell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for putting their names to it and contributing today.

Although we understand the noble Baroness’s intention, we do not believe that this amendment is the right approach to ensuring that our water companies act ethically and serve the customer. Neither do we believe that increasing offences for companies or for individuals is the right approach to decreasing water pollution. They are already subject to the powers of Ofwat and the Environment Agency; additional measures will just drive up legal costs and encourage hostile behaviour.

The Water (Special Measures) Act of last year placed a new duty on companies to publish an annual pollution incident reduction plan, and we should wait and see what the outcome of that policy is before we attempt to legislate further. It is undoubtedly an important issue, but we simply do not believe that this is the best way to go about it. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, for tabling the amendment, the noble Earl, Lord Russell, for moving it, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for putting her name to it and speaking to it. I enjoy—well, “enjoy”—sparring on issues of water ownership and water companies. Usually it is in Oral Questions rather than in the middle of the Crime and Policing Bill but, hey ho, you take your chances wherever you can. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Deben, for bringing his sense of history and active participation over a number of decades, if I may say so, on the issue of water ownership and stewardship. I found myself agreeing—which may not be too strange—in no small part with many of his comments.

Before I get into the meat of my remarks, I want to be clear: as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said, the Government are not going to nationalise the water industry. It would cost around £100 billion.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I fully support this amendment. I agree effectively with every word that has fallen from the lips of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and my noble friend Lady Brinton, and almost every word uttered by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. I hope that the Government will listen and give careful consideration to this amendment.

The law of joint enterprise has long been unsatisfactory. It was substantially improved by the decision of the Supreme Court in the Jogee case, as explained by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. The present state of the law in the light of Jogee is that an offence is committed by an accessory only if the defendant charged as an accessory intended to assist the principal in the commission of the offence. Even so, the law is still unsatisfactory and unclear, as extensively supported by the academic evidence cited by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and it sorely needs reform.

The phrase “significant contribution” to the commission of the offence used in the amendment is apt. It would overcome the difficulties mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, with the Court of Appeal’s position on the related accessory offences of procurement. The phrase has been proposed by the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies and widely by academics. It was the phrase used in Kim Johnson’s Private Member’s Bill, which was supported by, among others, Sir Bob Neill, who was then chair of the Justice Select Committee, and therefore one presumes by the committee itself.

While the expression may in some ways seem vague, it sets exactly the type of test that juries can and do recognise and regularly apply, rather similarly to the test for dishonesty used in relation to Theft Act offences. The amendment would make an offence of being an accessory much more comprehensible and justifiable than the present test. The present test, I suggest, focuses disproportionately on the mental element of accessory liability, whereas the amendment would focus on the actual contribution of the accessory to the commission of the offence.

There is considerable cause for concern that joint enterprise law in its operation is discriminatory. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, mentioned the research showing that Black people are 16 times more likely to be prosecuted on the basis of joint enterprise than white people. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, mentioned the same research. What neither mentioned is that that staggering figure—I suggest that it is staggering—was based on the CPS’s own figures for 2023.

I accept that there may be cultural issues, as mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, but they have to be judged against the caution that was mentioned by my noble friend Lady Brinton. There is also serious evidence of unjustified, unwarranted group prosecution. There is significant concern about evidence of racial bias and the risk of guilt by association in consequence. The point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—that it sometimes may seem easier to prosecute for joint enterprise than by establishing individual guilt—is, or may be, justified. Concerns about guilt by association and gang involvement are entirely legitimate. I think they are shared by the public, and they are evidenced by the clear examples we have heard today. They evidence a lack of principle in prosecution and in the application of the law.

In evidence to the Leveson review, Keir Monteith KC and Professor Eithne Quinn from the University of Manchester argued that joint enterprise was overused. They went so far as to say that it contributed, as inevitably statistically it does, to the growth of the backlogs. They cited the trial of seven Black teenagers in 2022 who were accused of murder, where the prosecution accepted that they could not be sure who stabbed the victim, but asserted that all of those who went to the park where the killing occurred

“shared responsibility, at the very least contributing to the force of numbers”.

That was an inaccurate or, at the very least, incomplete statement of the law in the light of Jogee. Six of the seven defendants were acquitted, but the fact that they were tried and went through the period that they did prior to trial highlights the confused state of the law, which makes the essential ingredients of the offence difficult for jurors and sometimes even prosecutors to understand.

We should also take into account, particularly given the delays in bringing trials to court, the serious risk of charges based on joint enterprise leading to defendants who are ultimately acquitted being held on remand, as one of the seven defendants in the case I mentioned was for no less than 14 months.

Finally, I have a technical point that was mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, to whom I had mentioned it. While I support the amendment completely, it needs to be reworded or supplemented to cover summary offences. That is because, as a result of the amendment of Section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 by the Criminal Law Act 1977, the accessory offence under the 1861 Act applies only to indictable offences—offences that are either indictable only or triable either way. A parallel amendment to Section 44(1) of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 is required to cover summary offences. There is no justification for distinguishing between them. With that rather academic point, I hope that the Government will act on this.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier for bringing forward this amendment and for the care and intellectual rigour with which he has set out the case for revisiting the law on joint enterprise. He has laid out a clear case for why this area of criminal law generates much concern, not least because of the length of sentences involved and the understandable anxiety about culpability and clarity in attributing criminal responsibility.

My noble and learned friend has, rightly, reminded the Committee of the complex and often unsettled journey that this area of law has taken, from the missteps identified by the Supreme Court in Jogee through to more recent Court of Appeal decisions, which some commentators argue have again widened liability in ways that risk injustice. His concerns about overcriminalisation and the potential for convictions where an individual’s role is marginal are serious points that deserve careful reflection. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s thoughts on them.

That said, while I welcome this debate and acknowledge the force of many of the arguments advanced, I am not persuaded that this amendment provides the right statutory solution at this stage. The introduction of a requirement that an accessory must have made a “significant contribution” to the commission of an offence raises difficult questions of definition and application. What amounts to “significant” is not self-evident. If left undefined, it would inevitably fall to the courts to develop meaning over time through case law, creating precisely the uncertainty and inconsistency that this amendment seeks to address. Alternatively, attempting to define “significant contribution” exhaustively in statute risks rigidity and unintended consequences across a wide range of factual scenarios. Tied to this, there is currently a wealth of case law that can be applied by the courts when considering joint enterprise. This case law would be made redundant in many scenarios if the law were to be changed by this amendment, which would surely not be desirable.

I believe that my noble and learned friend acknowledges that this amendment may not be the only way, or even the best way, but rather uses it as a probing amendment to draw attention to the problem. There is clearly an ongoing need to ensure that the law of secondary liability remains anchored to principles of intention, causation and moral culpability and that juries are properly directed to distinguish between meaningful participation and mere presence.

However, given the Law Commission’s ongoing review of homicide and sentencing, which includes consideration of joint enterprise in light of Jogee, I am cautious about pre-empting that work with a statutory change that may generate further ambiguity. Reform in this area must be evidence based and coherent. While I welcome the discussion sparked by this amendment and commend my noble and learned friend for his persistence in pursuing clarity and justice, I cannot lend the amendment my support today. However, I hope the Government will reflect carefully on the concerns raised and indicate how they intend to ensure that the law on joint enterprise is both fair and clearly understood.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, as the Home Secretary observed in the recent White Paper, policing has not always kept pace with a rapidly changing world. Airspace has indeed become a new frontier for both opportunistic and organised crime. Drones are now being used by burglars and organised gangs as near-silent scouts, identifying empty homes, weak locks or high-value items through windows. The law can, of course, address the burglary that follows, but it struggles to capture the preceding act of reconnaissance. This is particularly relevant to rural crime, where drones are acting as the advance guard for the theft and export of GPS equipment.

In our prisons, drones are described by residents as “almost routine”, delivering drugs, phones and weapons straight into exercise yards. Ministry of Justice data shows more than 1,700 drone incidents in a single year. That fuels violence and instability across the estate. However, as the Justice Committee pointed out last October, the problem is not only the drones but the conditions that allow them in: broken windows, unmaintained netting and faulty CCTV. Creating a new offence may have value, but it cannot by itself remedy years of underinvestment in the prison system.

I want to raise two further concerns. The first is an operational one. With core capital grants under severe strain, how can we realistically expect overstretched forces to invest in drone detection and countersurveillance technology? Secondly, until national integration plans are fully delivered, data on drone incursions will remain largely trapped in 43 police silos, leaving us blind to the wider intelligence picture.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, for tabling his amendment. We entirely understand the intention behind it and support its aim.

In government, we gave police forces the power to intercept or seize drones suspected of being used to break the law, and those that attempt to smuggle drugs or weapons into prisons. Before the 2024 election, we announced our intention to implement no-fly zones around prisons, extending the current provisions over airports. We therefore entirely support the aim of prohibiting drone use for criminal ends. Using drone technology as a reconnaissance tool for a crime is self-evidently wrong and that should be reflected in the law.

Similarly, using drones to carry drugs, stolen goods, weapons, harmful substances or anything similar must be tackled by the police. For the police to do so, they must be given the means. Nowhere is this more evident than in prisons, where drugs and weapons are being transported in by drones in order to run lucrative illegal businesses. Reports suggest that some offenders are deliberately breaking probation terms in order to sell drugs in jail, where they can make more money. Anything that enables this must be stamped out. If drones are indeed a means of transport for many of these drugs, we should target those who operate the drones and play a part in criminal enterprises. I hope that the Minister recognises this problem and will agree with me that the amendment is entirely correct in its aims.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, for setting out the case for his amendment. In tabling the amendment, he wrote to my noble friend Lord Hanson of Flint and to my noble friend Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill at the Department for Transport on the issue.

I think across the Committee we share the same concerns. I stress that the Government take the issue of the use of drones to facilitate illegal activity extremely seriously. However, my noble friend Lord Hanson of Flint set out in his letter to the noble Lord that the challenges of responding to these are not gaps in our criminal law so much as limitations on the practical enforcement tools available and in regulation to improve the visibility and compliance of drones. We are working to address these issues by supporting the development of counter-drone technologies and operational approaches, and ensuring regulations are in place that enable the legitimate use of drones while assisting operational responders in identifying illegitimate users.

Amendment 486A seeks to criminalise the use of drones for criminal reconnaissance and the carrying of illicit substances. The act of criminal reconnaissance is not in itself currently an offence, as proving intent, prior to an act being committed or without substantive additional evidence, would be extremely difficult for prosecutors. Criminal reconnaissance using a drone encounters the same issue. It would be impractical and disproportionate to arrest anyone for taking photos of a property or site, or for piloting a drone. In both instances, the act of reconnaissance would not be practically distinguishable from legitimate everyday actions, making the proposed offence effectively unenforceable. Where intent could be proven, it is likely that such acts could be prosecuted under existing legislation—for example, the offence of going equipped for stealing in Section 25 of the Theft Act 1968.

The carrying of illicit materials, whether it is in and out of prisons or elsewhere at large, is already an offence, regardless of a drone’s involvement. There is already a comprehensive regime of offences relating to the possession and supply of drugs, weapons and other illicit materials. I do not think that the amendment would address any gaps in the criminal law.

The Government have already made changes to the unmanned aircraft regulations to require drones to be equipped, as the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, set out, with direct remote identification, which will improve visibility and accountability of compliant drones. This system will allow drones to broadcast identification and location information in-flight and will help identify drone operators who may be acting suspiciously or breaking the law.

I share the sentiment of the noble Lord and the Committee in seeking to curtail the use of drones for criminal purposes. However, for the reasons I have outlined, I ask that he withdraw his amendment and let me sit down—as I have a cough.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this is a short and uncontroversial amendment. The 15 days in Committee we have had on the Bill have been a very long but important process, and I thank all the noble Lords on the Front Bench opposite for the many hours dedicated to the Bill so far. The amendment makes an amendment to the regulation-making powers of Welsh Ministers in consequence of the Legislation (Procedure, Publication and Repeals) (Wales) Act 2025, and for that reason I have no objection.

Amendment 508A agreed.