Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sentamu (CB)]

My Lords, first of all, I want to congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady May, for getting legislation about modern slavery on to the statute books. I want to say thank you very much, because we have people—some from my own country—coming here under that very disheartening reality. The second thing I want to mention is what the noble Baroness did with the Hillsborough inquiry. She resolved a lot of pain for a lot of people in Liverpool, so I wanted to say thank you for that.

The question I want to ask is this. Under Amendment 47, the line of defence would be that they were

“acting under the duress of slavery”.

What about a member of one of these criminal gangs that are bringing people over? They could easily say as their defence, “I was under duress when I did what I have done”. What would be the response to such a line of defence?

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group, tabled by my noble friend Lady May, raise some interesting questions that I hope the Government will be able to address.

Modern slavery is of course an extremely serious issue. As the recent report from the Global Commission on Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking—which is most ably chaired by my noble friend—made clear, the effect that this brutal trade can have on the people involved is truly harrowing. It is right that the Government take this opportunity to outline how they will incorporate protections for those who are acting under duress of slavery into the immigration system. I welcome my noble friend’s amendment in so far as it provides the Government with an opportunity to address this important issue.

However, I want to raise a cautious concern about one particular aspect of the amendment, which is that the protection would apply only once someone’s status as having acted under the duress of slavery had been established. I understand that determining this status would involve going through the national referral mechanism, which, as noble Lords across the Committee will be well aware, faces severe backlogs. Not only that but, as the UN themselves has highlighted, far fewer foreign applicants under the NRM actually have a decision made in their favour, suggesting that immigrants are increasingly applying to the NRM on the basis that this will delay any decision to remove them, rather than because they have genuine grounds for a claim. That raises the question of whether the amendment would risk creating another loophole and another incentive for those crossing in small boats to delay any decision on their application in the full knowledge that the NRM mechanism already is severely delayed and backlogged.

It is the duty of the Government to seek to protect those who are under duress of slavery. As I have said, the amendment might risk creating a considerable loophole that could be easily exploited by bad actors. That is not to say that I do not support the intent behind the amendment, but I will be paying close attention to what the Minister has to say on this point.

On Amendment 49, we agree that this is an important provision and that it makes complete sense to be assured that articles will be both protected and kept in a condition that will allow them to be used and referred to in any future case. As my noble friend has already alluded to, my understanding is that the Police and Criminal Evidence Act powers will already cover this, and that if any seized articles were lost or damaged then that would perhaps be a disciplinary matter for the officer involved. We therefore question whether a protection in the Bill in the form of this amendment is necessary, but the point that my noble friend raises is an important one. We will join her in seeking strong assurances from the Minister that these articles will be protected and kept in a condition that will allow them to be used in the future.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady May of Maidenhead, for tabling these amendments and instigating this discussion. I am grateful for the efforts that she took as Home Secretary, all those years ago, to establish the first Modern Slavery Act, following the very good process that the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, mentioned. As I recall, having been the shadow at the time, that process had Frank Field, among others, chairing cross-party pre-legislative scrutiny efforts, which led to the legislation—the Act whose implementation my right honourable friend the current Home Secretary and I, as Members of Parliament, shadowed at the time.

It is one thing to pass an Act—we have all done that many times in this House and other Houses—but it is quite another to retain what I sense is a lifelong interest and passion for the issue. I say to the noble Baroness, 10 years on, that it is a tribute to her commitment at the time that she continues to do that. I also pay tribute to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Lord, Lord Randall, in his absence, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton. All four have now formed a sort of coalition—I think we will call them the quartet after the earlier intervention by colleagues—that is taking a real interest in the development of this issue. I was pleased to address, on behalf of the Government, a reception in the House of Lords a couple of weeks ago at which the noble Baroness, Lady May, appeared virtually to look at the next stages of tackling this issue.

Having said all that, I hope I can reassure the noble Baroness that the amendments she has tabled today are covered by existing legislation. I am willing to be tested on that, but I hope I can give her that reassurance. She raised these issues at Second Reading and I hoped I had given her such reassurances then.

Amendment 47 seeks to provide a reasonable excuse for articles for use in immigration crime for those who are acting under duress of slavery, a point made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu. I put it to the noble Baroness and the other noble Lords that the protections she is seeking are covered by Section 45 of the very Modern Slavery Act 2015 that was legislated for at that time. Going back to the point mentioned by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, Section 45 provides a statutory defence against prosecution where an individual was compelled to commit an offence as a result of their exploitation. That is very clear in the Modern Slavery Act, which—this is my view and that of my legal advisers in the Home Office, and I hope it has been echoed again today—can be interpreted to mean that, in the event of trafficking from modern slavery, all of the provisions of the Bill can be dealt with by that statutory defence. We can debate that, but I hope it will eventually satisfy the noble Baroness’s noble intention in bringing forward the amendment today.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th July 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

63: Clause 18, page 11, line 23, leave out “France, Belgium or the Netherlands” and insert “any other country”

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 63 seeks to future-proof the offence in Clause 18 of endangering another during a sea crossing. As currently drafted, the clause risks failing in its central purpose: to deter and prosecute those whose actions endanger lives at sea, regardless of where they are travelling from. Perhaps we should remind ourselves of what Clause 18 is intended to do. It is designed to create an offence for conduct that places others at serious risk of harm during unauthorised maritime crossings to the United Kingdom. That is a vital and necessary objective, especially given the number of people who choose to make this crossing—the number has breached 20,000 this year so far, a record high—and the very real risks of injury and loss of life for those involved.

However, as it stands, Clause 18 applies only to those travelling from France, Belgium or the Netherlands. I understand completely that those three countries are where the small boats are currently leaving from, but it is not necessarily true that this will always be the case. While this territorial limitation is not entirely arbitrary, it is illogical—it is predicated on a snapshot of today’s dominant routes, but we know all too well that the modus operandi of smuggling gangs is constantly evolving. Routes shift; departure points change. Those intent on profiting from human desperation will exploit any gap in enforcement or jurisdiction that we leave behind. What happens when a boat departs from Denmark, Germany or further afield? What if a criminal network re-routes its operations through new maritime channels not explicitly listed in the Bill? Are we to say that the same dangerous conduct, the same reckless disregard for life, somehow falls outside the scope of the offence? That is not a credible position, and neither is it a safe one. This amendment would ensure that the law is not constrained by geography. It would ensure that we legislate for principle, not convenience; that we criminalise the act of endangerment itself, wherever it occurs, not merely based on where the journey begins.

Our Amendment 64 in this group speaks to another critical shortcoming. The Bill as drafted appears to require a discrete, identifiable act that causes or risks serious harm, but in the case of these maritime crossings, the danger is not always the result of a single act. It is inherent in the crossing itself. It lies in the overcrowding, the use of flimsy dinghies and the absence of life jackets, navigation tools or any basic safety standard.

The act of stepping aboard such a vessel with others, knowing that it is patently unsafe, is itself the creation of danger and the act which places lives at risk. This very principle was, at the end of last week, endorsed by the Home Secretary, when she said that:

“Everybody who is arriving on a boat where a child’s life has been lost, frankly, should be facing prosecution … If you get on to a boat which is so crowded that a child is crushed to death in the middle of that boat … you should face some responsibility and accountability for that”.


We wholeheartedly agree, and our amendment seeks to incorporate this principle of collective responsibility into the Bill. Our amendment differs from the principle set out by the Home Secretary in one important way. It recognises this risk pre-emptively. It does not require tragedy to occur before the law is broken. If we are serious about saving lives, we cannot wait for them to be lost before we act. We need to intervene to ensure that actions taken to endanger life are themselves illegal.

The Government already recognise that the act of getting into a boat is dangerous and that everyone who gets into that boat is thereby creating a risk for other people. We therefore hope that they will agree that this principle should be applied proactively to save life, not just reactively once it has already been lost, and adopt this amendment to the Bill. The amendment is about targeting those who act with recklessness or self-interest in ways that expose others to mortal peril. We all recognise that the act of getting into a boat is creating that risk. This is our opportunity to combat those who, regardless, choose to do so.

The House has a duty not only to scrutinise the law but to ensure that it aligns with lived realities. Our amendments would make it clearer, more enforceable and more consistent with the Government’s stated goals.

On the other amendments in the group, Amendment 65, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would insert a requirement that for an offence to be committed under Clause 18, the individual must have acted “intentionally or recklessly”. The stated aim is to ensure that the offence targets people smugglers rather than those seeking asylum. However, this entirely misunderstands the purpose of the clause and the reality of these dangerous sea crossings. The threshold for this offence is already clear. It requires that a person commits an act that causes or creates a risk of death or serious injury during an illegal maritime journey.

As we have rightly recognised in our own amendment, the very act of boarding a dangerously overcrowded and ill-equipped vessel to cross the channel is reckless. It is done not in ignorance but knowingly, with an awareness of the risks not just to oneself but to others on board. This therefore automatically meets the “intentionally or recklessly” threshold that the noble Baroness talks about. To insert this new mental element, “intentionally or recklessly”, is not a clarification but an unnecessary restriction. It risks introducing a legal loophole that could allow individuals to escape prosecution, even where their actions had demonstrably endangered lives. We must not forget that the endangerment to life is a collective responsibility. The people whom we are talking about have knowingly made the decision to endanger themselves and, crucially, others.

This offence is not designed to criminalise those merely seeking safety; it is designed to ensure that anyone, whether a smuggler, pilot or fellow traveller, who engages in conduct that places lives in jeopardy can be held accountable. We cannot allow the law to be softened to the point where it fails to deter the reckless behaviour that is putting people, including children, at risk. This is not an academic concern. People have died making this crossing. People will continue to die making it unless we take robust action now which recognises the danger that this collective action creates.

Amendment 66, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord German, addresses a similar point and falls to the same problem in assuming that endangerment to life is an act that can be limited to a small number of people who are likely not on the boat at all. We must ensure that we prosecute people for the actions that they take, the risks that they run and the danger that they pose to others. Whether this is done for personal or financial gain is an unnecessary additional clarification which misses the point that the people whom we are talking about have endangered lives and well-being simply by choosing to get into the boat in the first place.

Finally, Amendment 67, in the name of my noble friend Lady May, serves as an important reminder in this debate that we need to consider the plight of those acting under duress of slavery, but I have to say to her that we have the same concerns about this amendment as those which I raised earlier. I am conscious of what my noble friend Lord Cameron said on an earlier amendment, which is that it risked creating a loophole which could be exploited by bad actors looking for a way to get out of being held to account for the crimes they will be committing. That said, I welcome the amendment from my noble friend, again on the grounds that it raises important issues which I hope the Minister will fully address in his response. I beg to move.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to those who have spoken. Clause 18 seeks to address a very real threat to life, but none the less confines itself to an arbitrary, narrow set of departure points, as if dangerous crossings were the exclusive preserve of the channel route. This is plainly not the case, and it is naive to legislate as though it were. If we want to future-proof our border laws, they must reflect the realities of irregular migration as they evolve; we must not freeze them in the present moment and base them on the sort of activity we see now, rather than that which could emerge in the future.

More than that, the amendments go to the heart of what it means to endanger life at sea. The danger does not begin when a trafficker pushes someone overboard. It begins the moment an individual, whether an organiser or a participant, boards an unseaworthy vessel, knowing it is not fit for the journey and puts lives at risk, often doing so for profit. I want to emphasise the point that we are not seeking to criminalise desperation. We are seeking to hold accountable those who, through their actions, their choices or their complicity endanger the lives of others. I will consider what the Minister has said but, for the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 63 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

I also have Amendment 209 in this group. Clause 19 defines “relevant person” for the purposes of search and so on in relation to what these days are simply called “devices”. There are other terms in Clauses 20 to 23. The amendment particularly goes to the point of retrospectivity. The clause provides that a relevant person is someone who has entered or arrived, whether before or after the section comes into force. The amendment would leave in as a subject someone who has entered in breach of a deportation order. It seems to me that there is a rather different flavour to retrospectivity here, because the individual knows what he is doing. Having been on the receiving end of a deportation order, he can hardly ignore that that is going to be relevant.

In the other cases, the wording puts it into the future: if the person

“requires leave … requires entry clearance … is required … not to travel … without an electronic travel authorisation”.

In parentheses, I wondered about the term “entered” compared with “arrived”, which I think might technically be the position, and the Explanatory Notes do not seem to help—but that is by the way. That first amendment would deal in all but one of the cases in this clause with the retrospective element.

Amendment 209 would require the affirmative procedure for regulations under Clause 25, extending powers to persons designated by the Secretary of State. This is a point made by the Constitution Committee, of which I am a member. As we said in our report, the committee has

“previously raised concerns about the extension to persons who are not recognised legal officials of powers which might be used to interfere with individual liberty”.

The Government say that the requirements would not create any new powers; they would extend the cohort of people who can use the powers, and the Secretary of State can impose such safeguards as she considers appropriate. The Constitution Committee reminds the Committee not only that it has previously raised these concerns but that the safeguards about designation of other people should be set out on the face of the Bill, so that this is not left to the discretion of the Secretary of State.

The affirmative procedure is of some assistance in scrutinising—but not really blocking—the provisions. It would, of course, enable parliamentarians to debate and scrutinise in public this power of the Secretary of State to designate whoever it might be.

The Bar Council has raised another issue on the provision that the Bill will allow civil servants, if so designated, to access and keep information found on devices. A police constable exercising powers such as these needs authorisation from a superintendent; that is the usual level of authorisation. This Bill will allow junior Home Office civil servants and immigration officials to do so without oversight.

The Bar Council has briefed on its concern about the potential for violating the rights of privacy and legal privilege of people who may have entered the UK years ago and are engaged in legal proceedings against the Home Office.

So, that is a range of concerns, which I hope would be addressed by my amendment. I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, it would be remiss of me if I did not begin my remarks on this group by mentioning the puzzling inclusion of Clauses 20 to 23 in the Bill, given that these powers already exist in statute. Section 15 of, and Schedule 2 to, the Illegal Migration Act 2023 already grant these exact same powers of search, seizure and access for electronic devices. Rather than retain the provisions that are already law, the Government are repealing those parts of the Illegal Migration Act and then re-enacting them through this Bill; I would submit that that does not really make much sense.

In fact, the wording of the sections that the Government are repealing are virtually identical to the clauses in the Bill. Paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 2 to the Illegal Migration Act says:

“An immigration officer may search a relevant person for any relevant article, if the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that the relevant person is in possession of a relevant article”,


while Clause 20(1) of the Bill says:

“An authorised officer may search a relevant person for any relevant article if the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that the relevant person is in possession of a relevant article”.


The only difference is that the Bill grants the powers to an authorised officer rather than an immigration officer. I understand the purpose of the distinction, as Clause 19 states that under the Bill the powers will be able to be used by police officers as well as immigration officers. I have no issue with that, but why repeal the whole of paragraph 3 of Schedule 2 to the Illegal Migration Act simply to replace one word?

The similarities continue. Paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 to the Illegal Migration Act authorises the search of vehicles and containers for electronic devices, and Clause 20(6) of the Bill does exact same thing. Paragraph 5 of Schedule 2 authorises the search of premises for an electronic device, while Clause 20(5) does the same thing and has the same wording. Paragraph 6 of Schedule 2 authorises the search the person’s property for an electronic device, while Clause 20(4) does the same thing and has the same wording. Paragraph 7 of Schedule 2 authorises the seizure of electronic devices, while Clause 21(1) of the Bill does the exact same thing and has precisely the same wording. I could go on, but I believe it should be blindingly obvious that there is no practical purpose to Clauses 20 to 23; they are simply regurgitated provisions of already existing statute that the Government are performatively repealing.

I turn to one of the very few aspects of the powers relating to electronic devices that the Government have actually changed. My Amendment 69 is intended to probe the Government’s definition of “relevant articles” from which electronic information can be accessed and stored under Clauses 20 to 23. As drafted, the Bill essentially defines that as any electronic item that could contain information relating to an offence under Section 25 or 25A of the Immigration Act 1971. Consequently, the powers under Clauses 20 to 23 can currently be used only to garner information relating to the facilitation of unlawful entry or the illegal facilitation of the arrival of asylum seekers.

However, those are not the only offences that immigration officers might need to access electronic devices to investigate. For example, what about the information on electronic devices pertaining to offences under Section 24 or Section 24A of the Immigration Act 1971? If the Bill is aimed at tackling illegal immigration and protecting our border security, should it not address that in its totality? Why should immigration officers and police officers not be able to utilise information they have gleaned from the electronic devices of illegal entrants as evidence of the commission of the offences of illegal entry or the use of deception to gain leave to enter or remain? Is the prevention of those offences not crucial to our border security?

The previous Government recognised that these powers need to extend to information relating to a wider range of offences, which is why in the Illegal Migration Act we did not limit the definition of electronic devices in such a way. Rather, relevant articles were defined as anything containing information related to

“any function of an immigration officer, or … of the Secretary of State in relation to immigration, asylum or nationality”.

That offered a far wider-ranging power to investigate the whole plethora of immigration crimes, all of which would fall under the Government’s definition of border security in Clause 3 of the Bill.

The Prime Minister has spoken on many occasions of giving the Border Security Commander counter- terrorism-like powers. I have to say to the Minister that the substance of what is contained in Clauses 19 to 23 is utterly consistent with the tough language that the Government have been throwing around, and if they are indeed serious about matching their rhetoric with their actions then they should accept Amendment 69 and expand the definition of relevant articles in Clause 19.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I always hope to be helpful to the noble Lord. I suggest that we consider those matters in some detail when we reach Clause 33. These amendments relate to the additional powers for the National Crime Agency and bringing the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Police Service of Scotland into the remit of the legislation. They have all been done in consultation with the three responsible bodies—the Home Secretary and the two devolved Administrations. I am very happy to examine Clause 33, but I think it would be in order to do so just after Clause 32 and before Clause 34.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, we appreciate that, as the Government go through the Bill, they will make minor adjustments to the language or corrective amendments to tighten it up, but the amendments in this group incorporate substantial changes that could well have been included in the Bill before. The fact that we are now turning to 17 government amendments, with at least eight substantive ones, speaks to the fact that the Bill could have been more carefully drafted. I will not take too much time dwelling on this issue, but it is important to raise that we on this side have been clear throughout Committee that we need to develop legislation that is robust and unambiguous and that can tackle this serious problem. That the Government are only just realising at this late stage that they have missed out key provisions perhaps does not inspire confidence.

Broadly speaking, we support the amendments in this group, in so far as they allow the more effective enforcement of some of the provisions in this Bill, in particular specifying that the NCA will have the capability to seize relevant articles and exercise reasonable force. However, we need to make sure that these powers are exercised with due care and proper procedure and process. I hope the Minister will set out how this will be ensured.

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Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

72: Clause 20, page 14, line 1, leave out subsection (2)
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would remove the requirement that a person can only be searched if they have not previously been searched.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, our amendments in this group speak to the important principle that, if we are going to do something serious about this issue, we need to make sure those who will be undertaking that vital work are given all the tools they need.

Amendment 72 removes the restriction under Clause 20 that a person may be searched only once. That limitation is both arbitrary and impractical. In the real world, people arriving in the UK illegally may conceal items, documents, electronic devices and false identification, only to reveal or discard them later. Preventing further searches, even when officers have fresh grounds for suspicion, is not a safeguard; it is a gift to traffickers and smugglers. This amendment would correct that mistake and restore operational flexibility where there is lawful cause. Indeed, we need look no further than the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for precedent and recognition of this fact; it permits multiple searches of a person if there are reasonable grounds. This is a commonplace power and we must ensure that it is incorporated in the Bill if we are to effectively tackle this sort of criminality.

Furthermore, Amendment 73 removes the requirement that a person must have been on the premises before a search can take place. Criminal organisations are constantly adapting their tactics, using safe houses, transferring items between locations and avoiding detection by not being physically present. By tying an officer’s hands to whether a suspect was on the premises at a precise moment, we risk losing vital evidence and allowing dangerous networks to evade accountability. This change would ensure that we are not outwitted by legal technicalities.

Furthermore, Amendment 74 removes unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles that require prior authorisation from an inspector and notification to a superintendent for a constable to conduct a search. Amendment 78 applies this principle to the seizure of relevant articles. Of course, oversight is vital, but we must not confuse oversight with obstruction. Our officers already operate within a strict legal framework and we are of the view that adding yet another layer of sign-off, particularly in time-sensitive operations, risks slowing down action, delaying disruption and missing crucial opportunities to intercept criminal activity. Officers need to be able to respond quickly, flexibly and effectively if we are to stand up to those who violate our borders. Indeed, constables are not subject to this requirement to seek permission to conduct a search under Section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, and in Section 18 of that Act, police offers are only required to inform an officer of at least the rank of inspector as soon as is practicable after they have conducted a search, not before. This provision to seek permission is therefore unnecessary and not in line with the relevant existing legislation.

These amendments are about restoring operational realism and strengthening our capacity to protect. If we are serious about securing our borders, cracking down on illegal entry and dismantling the networks that exploit vulnerable people for profit, we must give our officers the clear, workable powers they require. These amendments are sensible proposals that would cut back bureaucracy and allow us to get on and deal with this problem more effectively.

Finally, Amendment 91 would remove the requirement that a constable must obtain authorisation from an inspector and that the inspector must notify a super- intendent before accessing, copying or using information from a relevant article seized under Clause 23. We need to be clear on this. Clause 23 deals with information that may relate to the commission of serious immigration offences. In such cases, time is not a luxury. It is often the difference between success and failure—between a dismantled network and a missed opportunity. Indeed, this issue runs through all the amendments that I have spoken to in this group.

The current drafting imposes a two-tier authorisation system before any such information can even begin to be examined. The requirement to obtain inspector-level authorisation for each individual access, and then to escalate that to a superintendent, adds a bureaucratic burden that could hinder fast-moving investigations, especially when such information could reveal links to other suspects, routes and wider criminal infrastructure. Our amendment would ensure that our officers have the practical powers they need in a way that means they can be exercised with urgency and purpose. The constable will still be required to act lawfully, proportionately and within the scope of the clause, but removing these layers of procedural delay would ensure that our enforcement efforts are not undermined by red tape.

We cannot, on the one hand, claim to be taking a tough stance on illegal immigration and organised criminality and, on the other, design a framework that ties the hands of those trying to enforce the law. Amendment 91 works alongside our other amendments in this group to correct that imbalance. It would strengthen our operational capability while retaining the legal and ethical standards we rightly demand. I urge the Committee to support these amendments, and I beg to move.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I rise to speak to the amendments tabled by noble Lords on the Opposition Front Bench. As we have heard, Amendment 72 proposes to remove the requirement for an authorised officer to ensure that a person has not previously been searched using these powers. I respectfully but robustly oppose this proposed change. These are intrusive powers that allow for the physical searching of individuals who are not under arrest and could be victims or witnesses. To apply such powers multiple times to the same person without any procedural check not only is disproportionate but risks undermining public confidence in the fairness and proportionality of our system. We must remember that this safeguard was introduced for good reason. It was informed by lessons learned from previous misuse that led to legal challenge. Its inclusion has helped to address legitimate concerns about the potential for abuse of power.

Amendment 73 proposes removing the requirement that the relevant person must have been on the premises when, or immediately before, they were encountered by an authorised officer. We respectfully oppose this change. This safeguard is essential. It ensures that there is a clear and direct link between the individual suspected of possessing a relevant article and the premises being searched. Without it, the power becomes too broad, allowing searches of premises even when there is no reasonable basis to believe the person was ever present. The presence of the individual is often the only factual basis upon which an officer can form reasonable grounds to suspect that a device or article is located there. Removing this requirement risks turning suspicion into speculation.

Amendments 74, 78 and 91 propose removing the requirement for police constables and National Crime Agency officers to obtain authorisation from an inspector or equivalent grade before exercising powers under Clauses 20, 21 and 23. Furthermore, the amendments would remove the requirement that an inspector notifies a superintendent or equivalent grade as soon as reasonably practicable. We strongly oppose these proposed changes. These are significant intrusive powers, and the current authorisation process is not an administrative burden. Rather, it is a vital safeguard to ensure the powers are applied with proportionality, due process and respect to the legal system. It ensures that decisions to use the powers where we are obtaining personal data and privacy are subject to senior oversight and scrutiny, helping to prevent misuse and maintaining public confidence and trust in those who use the powers and in the Government.

Unlike immigration officers, who may use these powers more routinely, police and NCA officers may not exercise them as frequently. That makes the case for retaining oversight stronger, not weaker. Removing this safeguard risks inconsistent application of the powers and undermines the legal and ethical standards we have worked very hard to uphold. Again, we want the system that we are introducing to command confidence across all of society. That means that we have to balance powers given to the authorities with safeguards and proportionality. We must ensure that these powers are used lawfully, proportionately and effectively. Retaining the requirement for senior authorisation is an essential part of achieving that balance.

For those reasons, I urge the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, at the heart of this group of amendments lies the proposition that, if we are to confront the scale and complexity of illegal entry into this country, and indeed the criminal networks that are facilitating it, we must empower those on the front line to act swiftly, decisively and within a framework that reflects operational reality, not burdensome bureaucracy.

We on these Benches have listened carefully to what the Minister has said, but I am afraid that I have heard no compelling justification for why officers should be constrained to a single search, even in circumstances where new evidence arises, nor have we been given assurance that the narrow drafting of the premises clause will not impede investigations where criminal activity is thought to be located. I say to the Minister that those who orchestrate illegal crossings are not bound by procedure or protocol. Current legislation with regard to searches does not require such restrictions, so why should it apply here?

Under the current drafting of Clauses 20 to 23, the Bill proposes the imposition of a procedural bottleneck on our officers, who are working under pressure, often with incomplete information and in fast-moving, high-risk environments. We expect these officers to deliver results. Indeed, the Minister and his Government have staked a huge amount of political capital on these officers delivering results. Therefore, we need to make sure that we take decisions in this place so that those officers are equipped and empowered to get the job done.

These amendments would not lower standards; they would reduce delay and would not undermine safeguards. They would ensure that the law serves those it is meant to protect, not those who seek to exploit its gaps. If we are truly committed to securing our borders, upholding the rule of law and dismantling the infrastructure of exploitation that underpins these crossings, we must match the rhetoric with reality. These amendments certainly speak to our ambition, which is to give the officers the tools they need to do their jobs effectively.

Amendment 72 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, having supported the noble Baroness on her previous amendments, from these Benches we do so on these, too.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly on Amendments 84 and 90, tabled by my noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead. These amendments raise a serious and important concern that we believe merits the attention of the Committee. It seeks to ensure that, where personal belongings are retained by the authorities under Clause 23, particularly in the case of potential victims of modern slavery, those items and the information they contain are preserved in a manner that allows them to be relied on as part of a national referral mechanism determination.

For many victims of trafficking, the evidence contained on a mobile phone or similar device may be the only proof they possess of their exploitation, whether that be messages, photographs or location data. To risk the loss, corruption or mishandling of that data would not only undermine the pursuit of justice but could place the individual concerned at even greater risk. We therefore support the principle behind this amendment. These protections are vital.

That said, we also recognise that many of these safeguards may already be provided for under the existing statutory framework, particularly under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, which governs how evidence is secured and handled. But I accept what my noble friend said earlier about retention by police in some cases. If the Minister can offer the Committee reassurance that those protections already apply in the context of Clause 23 and that the rights of potential victims are adequately safeguarded in practice, that will be most welcome. This amendment raises a proper, necessary point of clarification and we hope the Government will respond accordingly.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, in addressing Amendments 84 and 90 proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady May of Maidenhead, I first take the opportunity to pay tribute to her work in this area, particularly as chair of the Global Commission on Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking, and indeed I acknowledge and pay tribute to her continued dedication to protecting vulnerable individuals. However, having said that—there is always a “however”—we feel that the amendments that she has tabled are not entirely necessary.

The amendments seek to introduce a statutory requirement to protect seized or surrendered items so they may later be used as evidence in court or in the national referral mechanism. Although obviously we agree with the intention behind them, we believe that they are unnecessary. The policy objective underpinning this measure is to ensure that the United Kingdom has the necessary powers to search for, seize, retain and use information from electronic devices belonging to irregular entrants or arrivals in relation to facilitation offences. These powers are vital to disrupting the operations of organised crime groups that exploit vulnerable individuals. It is essential that the focus of these powers is not changed and that authorised officers are fully equipped to use them effectively.

First, the current legislative framework already provides robust safeguards for the handling of personal property—notwithstanding the exchange with the Minister, my noble friend Lord Hanson, which I am afraid I was not in the Chamber for, on the operation of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. The Bill ensures that any electronic devices seized are treated appropriately and that any data they contain is preserved and processed in accordance with data protection laws, evidentiary standards and human rights obligations.

Safeguards are particularly important in the context of modern slavery and human trafficking, where, as we have heard, victims may be in possession of devices that contain sensitive personal information, indeed evidence of exploitation, or communications with support services. The Bill ensures that such material is handled with care and integrity, protecting both the individual’s privacy and the integrity of any ongoing investigation.

We recognise the importance of timely access to personal devices, particularly for victims of modern slavery, who may rely on them for communication, evidence or support. If we are able to successfully download relevant data from a device, we will return the phone to the individual at the earliest opportunity. If the device is still required for the purposes of investigation, we will retain it for only as long as is reasonably necessary. If the device must be retained, we can provide the victim with any downloaded material they may need to support a national referral mechanism application or to access support services.

As I said, the Bill makes it clear that devices and other personal property will be retained only for as long as necessary. Once they are no longer required for the purpose for which they are seized. they must be returned to the individual as soon as is practicable. This approach, we feel, strikes the right balance between empowering law enforcement to act decisively against organised immigration crime and trafficking networks, while safeguarding the rights and dignity of individuals, particularly those who may be victims of modern slavery. Given that, I respectfully ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) (Threshold Amount) (Amendment) Order 2025

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Monday 7th July 2025 Grand Committee

Having covered those key points, I confirm the Government’s commitment to tackling money laundering and note that this instrument forms part of the ongoing efforts in that important area. I commend the small changes in the order to the Committee.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am sure that all parliamentarians will agree that tackling money laundering is a shared mission across both Houses to create a safer society and support our economy. I am proud that the previous Conservative Government introduced the economic crime levy, which raises some £100 million per year from the anti-money laundering sector. I am pleased that today’s proposals build on this legacy of tackling money laundering.

These proposals will raise the threshold for two exemptions that apply to principal money laundering offences under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 from £1,000 to £3,000. This will reduce the resourcing burden on law enforcement and enable our officers to dedicate more time to activities that yield greater asset denial and to disrupting criminal operations more effectively.

If we look at the number of defence against money laundering reports submitted to the UK Financial Intelligence Unit in 2024, we can see why there is a case for raising the threshold. In 2024, 23,000 reports were submitted relating to transactions between £1,000 and £3,000. Of these, only 182 were refused, leading to £209,565 of assets denied. This represents 0.1% of all assets denied as a result of defence against money laundering reports in 2024.

It is both necessary and appropriate that we ease the pressure on enforcement agencies at this level and allow resources to be focused where they can have the greatest impact on tackling the most serious crimes. This policy area has been under review following the threshold rise in 2023, and a targeted consultation was carried out on money laundering reports. The outcome of the consultation shows strong support for increasing the threshold to at least £3,000. Respondents cited multiple benefits, including a reduction in the reporting burden, the reallocation of resources to higher-value investigations, and improved outcomes for customers, particularly by reducing the number of legitimate account users who face access issues. Raising the threshold to £3,000 is supported by the UK Financial Intelligence Unit, which believes it will also reduce the reporting burden on business and free up its resources to focus more on high-value activity.

Although the case is clear to raise the threshold, the Government must also be aware of the potential risks of criminals splitting transactions to come under the threshold. This was raised by a respondent in the consultation. Although mechanisms are in place, this must be a consideration. I ask the Minister to confirm that crime rates under that £3,000 level will be monitored and that the threshold will be changed again if it becomes necessary.

In conclusion, I support today’s proposals, which will help to tackle money laundering. There is no place for crime groups attempting to launder their illicit funds through the UK financial system. It is right that we prioritise resourcing for the highest crimes.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for having a shared approach to money laundering. He is right to point to the fact that there has been a consultation on this matter. He is also right to point out that, in essence, there is a shared understanding between all parties that the money laundering threshold needed to be reviewed. The figure of £3,000 that we have put in this order sets a balance. We will always keep it under review—there is potential for higher figures, which have been discussed as part of the consultation—but we have settled on a threshold of £3,000, which strikes the appropriate balance between reducing low-value reporting and mitigating the potential loss of asset denial outcomes.

The noble Lord is right to say that we need to ensure that we examine the risk of criminals splitting transactions into smaller amounts and seeking to avoid detection. The raising of the threshold is data led. It addresses an acute consumer duty risk and creates capacity in firms to tackle higher-value, more societally impacting economic crimes, all of which outweighs the residual risk of criminals circumventing the threshold limit as of now. The noble Lord was right to point to the very low level of transactions of interest between £1,000 and £3,000 in the previous regime, which resulted in further examination.

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his support. I can assure him that we will keep all matters under review, including the performance of this threshold, but I take and welcome his considered support. I commend the order to the Committee.

Music Festivals: Hate Speech

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Thursday 3rd July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My noble friend goes right to the heart of the Question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham. Individuals from any community, in this case the Jewish community, have the right to enjoy their lives without intimidation, threat or harassment, or indeed calls for death to be implemented on sections of a community. There is a role for peaceful protest and for argument about who and what happens in the Palestine-Israeli situation; that is perfectly legitimate. It is not legitimate to move that into harassment, intimidation or death threats.

With regard to the BBC, as I have mentioned, my right honourable friend is in active negotiation and discussion with the chair of the BBC. I am sure she will make further statements. Indeed, this very morning at DCMS Questions in the House of Commons, she answered further questions on this. There are certainly lessons to be learned, but I reassure my noble friend that members of the Jewish community, and indeed members of any community who face harassment and intimidation, deserve the support of the law, which is why Avon and Somerset Police are currently investigating to see whether that criminal threshold has been crossed.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, the Hamas attacks of 7 October targeted innocent people attending a music festival, so it was horrifying to see the events at Glastonbury. Yesterday, during a protest in Whitehall, protesters were repeating the very same chant used by those performers at Glastonbury and currently under investigation by police. Can the Minister confirm that the Government share the view that this calling for the death of Israeli soldiers is incitement to violence, and can he confirm that, in the interest of applying the law equally, leading on from the point made by my noble friend Lord Bellingham, the same action will be taken against those who incite violence on our streets, not just those who do so from a stage?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hope that I can again reassure the noble Lord. Legislation is in place, and his Government previously and this Government now want to see that legislation implemented when the police judge that criminal thresholds have been crossed. It is not for Ministers to determine whether a criminal threshold has been crossed; it is for the police to present a case to the Crown Prosecution Service, for the Crown Prosecution Service to put that to the courts and for a jury to convict or otherwise on the basis of evidence supplied. But I am supportive of his general aim. It is important that harassment, intimidation, threats and calls for death are seen as the serious criminal events that they potentially are. Therefore, it is right and proper that in this case Avon and Somerset Police follow that through, and it is right and proper that in any event, be it at a music festival, a football ground, a street protest or anything else, people have the right to protest but not the right to threaten, harass, intimidate or call for death.

Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2025

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Thursday 3rd July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I support the draft Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2025, which rightly moves to proscribe the group Palestine Action as a terrorist organisation under UK law.

The right to protest peacefully is a fundamental cornerstone of our democracy, as many noble Lords have expressed here this afternoon. It is a right that generations have fought to protect, but there is, and must be, a clear line between legitimate protest and violent coercion and wanton damage. Palestine Action has crossed that line repeatedly and deliberately, as its actions at RAF Brize Norton last month, which we have heard about, made absolutely clear.

This is not a question of silencing dissent, nor of suppressing pro-Palestinian voices; it is a move to uphold the rule of law and our true freedoms. It is intended to protect the public from targeted, dangerous and ideologically motivated criminal acts. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, has tabled an amendment to regret the proscription of Palestine Action. She set out that she is concerned that civil disobedience is being misinterpreted. We on this side are clear that Palestine Action’s actions do in fact cross a line. Civil disobedience is one thing, but breaking into, attacking and seriously damaging our national defence infrastructure is another, as was made clear by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

If the noble Baroness does not want to take my word for it, maybe she will listen to the words of the group itself, previously cited by the Minister. Palestine Action’s own training materials have stated that it is

“not a non-violent organisation”.

The group has a footprint in all 45 policing regions in the UK and has pledged to escalate its campaign. A group that openly admits its intention to be violent cannot be disregarded as a threat in the way that the noble Baroness proposed. A group that advances its views through violence is itself a direct threat to the integrity of free speech in our country.

It is clear that Palestine Action’s entire modus operandi is to use direct, violent action in pursuit of political ends. Its members do not operate through petitions, campaigns or democratic engagement; they operate through sabotage, criminal damage and threats. They have repeatedly targeted companies involved in the UK defence sector, often without regard for legality. They do so with the explicit intention of coercing change through unlawful means.

The group was established on 30 July 2020, when activists broke into and vandalised the interior of the UK headquarters of Elbit Systems in London. From the very beginning, members of this group have been intent on causing damage and have acted to assert their views through criminal violence. Is that not the rightful definition of a terrorist organisation?

Time and time again, Palestine Action’s activities have endangered third parties. They have vandalised property, occupied buildings and attacked not only private companies but critical components of our national defence. Its tactics are both calculated and militant.

When a group pursues its aims, not through democratic discourse, but through organised campaigns of destruction and violence, and strives to terrorise legitimate businesses and opinion-formers, its acts are those of terrorism as defined by the law. This order does not criminalise views; it outlaws those who use terror and violence to force their views on others.

To fail to act would send a message that violent extremism would be tolerated if it is dressed up as enthusiastic activism. We cannot allow such ambiguity. We must be consistent. This country has proscribed far-right groups that promote violence under the banner of nationalism; it did so in the 1930s against the Blackshirts. We cannot allow such abhorrent methods today. We must apply the same standard to all who use violence and intimidation and who seek to advance political causes by criminal means against law-abiding members of society.

This proscription does not ban support for Palestinian rights or peaceful demonstrations; it is a necessary step to uphold public safety and the democratic rule of law. There are other voices lawfully making the case for Palestine and Palestinians; Palestine Action is not one of them. We support this order in its entirety because we believe in protecting the public, defending our democracy and drawing a firm line against those who would use violence to impose their political will. We therefore welcome the Government bringing this order and are pleased to support it.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions to what has been a thorough and testing debate. Having introduced the order on behalf of the Government, it is my responsibility to respond to the points that have been made today. All three organisations in the order before us—this is a very important point for Members to remember—are subject to the same tests under the 2000 Act that this House and the House of Commons passed and put in place for 25 years, along with, to date, around 80 proscription orders that were passed under similar tests.

This debate is not about whether you support the rights of the Palestinian people to a homeland, whether you are appalled at the actions of the Israeli Government, or whether you think the Israeli Government are acting fairly and proportionately following the Hamas kidnappings and murders. This is not about that issue. It is not, dare I say it, about the right to protest. I served with my noble friend Lord Hain in Northern Ireland for two years, and I have some admiration for the way that he has approached some of the issues that I shared. I said at the outset that I have been carried out of a building for protesting the apartheid regime, I protested against the fascist regime in Chile and I have been on a picket line during the miners’ strike. I have been involved in protests across my political life that have been fair and open, but not those that have not led to harassment, intimidation, violence and criminal damage.

Noble Lords in this debate have, dare I say it, fallen into two camps—with the exception of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, who asked legitimate questions that I will return to. The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, the noble Lords, Lord Harper, Lord Beamish, Lord Weir of Ballyholme, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, Lord Austin of Dudley, Lord Turnberg, Lord Carlile, Lord Walney and Lord Pannick, and the Official Opposition have all, in one way or another, supported the approach that the Government have taken.

From this Front Bench, I recognise that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, has tabled an important amendment that has generated this debate—which is an important part of the democracy that I believe we should stand up for. She has had support from my noble friends Lord Hain and Lady O’Grady, the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, Lady Fox of Buckley and Lady Bennett. Again, she has put forward a legitimate point of view, but I want to draw noble Lords back to the essence of this debate.

Under the Terrorism Act 2000, the Home Secretary may proscribe organisations that she believes are concerned with terrorism. There is a clear definition of terrorism in that Act, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, said, has stood the test of time:

“‘terrorism’ means the use or threat of action … designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public”

and the actions used or threatened must involve

“serious violence against a person … serious damage to property … endangers a person’s life … creates a serious risk to … health … or … is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system”.

I say again that all three organisations in this order are being judged on their actions as to whether they are committing or participating in acts of terrorism, preparing for terrorism, promoting terrorism or are otherwise concerned with terrorism. If that statutory test is met, factors that the Home Secretary takes into account include the nature and scale of the organisation, the specific threat, the extent of the presence and the need to have support from members of the international community in the global fight against terrorism.

The Home Secretary does not sit in 2 Marsham Street and say, “What’s happening today? Should I proscribe these organisations?” There is a decision, which is never taken lightly. That decision has robust processes in place to ensure the evidence is available and is carefully reviewed and considered. The decision to proscribe Palestine Action has been taken with significant considerations, which include technical assessments, deep engagement with the subject matter, experts from across government, policy officials, law enforcement and a proscription advisory group that makes recommendations to the Home Secretary to determine whether that proscription is legitimate.

Police: Facial Recognition Technology

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, next to North Korea, the UK rates as one of the countries with the greatest surveillance presence—which, I might add, is no bad thing in my book. We heard from the Government that they are exploring whether legislation on facial recognition technology is necessary. What steps are they taking to address the great deal of public concern that clearly exists about this issue? How might this tie in with the Government’s position on ID cards?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his support for a range of surveillance methods. CCTV, for example, is one of the greatest crime prevention tools brought in in the last 30 years. It shows what happened at an event, not what might have been perceived to have happened, so it is very valuable. With DNA, CCTV and, potentially, facial recognition technology, progress is made through public confidence; and the Peelian principle of the police having the trust of the community is paramount. Going back to question of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, that is why we have consulted to get a range of views on this issue before potentially bringing forward better regulation to meet the very issue my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti has raised.

As to ID cards, when I was last a Home Office Minister, in 2009-10, we had ID cards; in fact, I had ID card number 3, I think. It proved to be useless because the Government he supported abolished ID cards in around 2011. If he wishes to bring them back, that is a debate we can have, and I look forward to engaging with him on it in due course. But it was not me who abolished them.

Migrants: Hotel Accommodation

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Tuesday 1st July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend. He mentioned a report, which was from 2023. This Government have been very clear that, as I said in my original Answer to the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe, we need to provide accommodation that meets all contractual standards and is safe, fit for purpose and properly equipped. The contractual standards, which are in the Asylum Accommodation and Support Contracts, must meet decency levels and be maintained. That is the objective of this Government. As I say, the details my noble friend gave are from 2023.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, if the Minister wants to talk about voting against the Government, perhaps he might like to recall that his party voted more than 130 times against our Bill designed to avoid this situation. Under the Conservatives, the number of asylum seekers being housed in hotels decreased in three consecutive quarters prior to Labour coming into office. Since Labour gained power, the number of asylum seekers housed in hotels has risen by some 29%. At what point does the Minister think his Government will honour their manifesto, given that small boat arrivals are now over 20,000, which is an increase of around 50% on this time last year?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The Government set a clear direction of travel on reducing hotels, tackling the asylum backlog, trying to prevent people coming to this country unfairly in the first place and, when they do claim asylum, processing those claims much quicker. I point the noble Lord to one figure, which I hope is helpful to him. That figure is 9,208, which is the number of people who have been removed from the United Kingdom up to the end of 2024, since the general election. This compares with an average figure of around 2,000 for the previous Government during their term of office. The noble Lord and his Government got us into the position of a rise in hotel numbers to a maximum of 400, a rising cost to £9 million, a record number of people coming to this country, a failure to remove people who are being denied asylum, and a failure to process asylum claims in a speedy and effective way. We are clearing up his mess and doing the best we can to achieve that.

Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Relevant Public Authorities and Designated Senior Officers) Regulations 2025

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Tuesday 1st July 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, we on this side recognise the Government’s intention to update the Investigatory Powers Act introduced by the previous Government, and we are supportive of introducing measures that protect the public by giving law enforcement the tools they need to prevent and prosecute crime.

As noble Lords across the Committee are aware, technology is a fast-moving space. As society’s use of technology changes, it is essential that we adapt and it is imperative that our public authorities are fully equipped with capabilities to prevent criminals exploiting technology features, hiding their identity, evading detection and putting the public at risk.

This statutory instrument amends the Investigatory Powers Act by providing 11 new public authorities with the power to obtain communications data. Seven of the new public authorities listed will have the power to apply for an independently approved authorisation to compel telecommunications and postal operators to disclose communication data. The remaining four entries are English ambulance trust services that were previously designated under the definition of an ambulance trust in England, which included a total of 10 ambulance services in England. Under the changes, this definition has been removed and replaced with individual entries, as six of these ambulance services have confirmed they no longer require the communication data powers.

Following the Home Office’s review of Schedule 4, this instrument ensures that only public authorities with a need to acquire communications data will be able to request access. While we on these Benches do not oppose the amendments being made, we must question why certain ambulance services will hold the ability to retain this power over other ambulance services.

We recognise that some ambulance services should retain these powers, which may help in preventing serious injury or death, but we must consider whether the inconsistent treatment of ambulance services presents any future risks. We understand that access to communications data is useful for some ambulance services, but we must not rule out that others might require access in future. Can the Minister assure us that services requiring access in future will not be unduly limited or delayed if judged to be in the pursuit of legitimate public interest?

We recognise that these powers are necessary, but they need to be complemented by adequate resources if they are to be wielded effectively. Can the Minister therefore update us on what consultations his department has undertaken with the public authorities empowered by the regulations? Can he confirm that those authorities have adequate resources and legal advice on the use of the new powers?

We recognise that the addition of entries to Schedule 4 increases the demand and strain on the resources of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office. This concern has been raised in Brian Leveson’s annual report on the use of communications data. It is essential that the Government consider ways to reduce pressures on the operational effectiveness of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office. Can the Minister set out what steps will be taken to address this?

In conclusion, while we do not oppose the measures being introduced, we would like some reassurance that those ambulance services that have been excluded will not be disadvantaged in the pursuit of preventing injury or death. We urge the Minister to recognise the impact of the amendments on the resources of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office and ask for further clarification on how these authorities will be supported in exercising these powers in the interests of the public.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to noble Lords for the short and useful debate. As my noble friend Lord Jones, who I have known for a very long time, said, it is useful to challenge the Executive on a number of matters to date.

If I may, I will start with my noble friend Lord Jones, who made an all-encompassing comment regarding the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. The current IPC is Sir Brian Leveson. He will be well known to Members of this House and has served in a number of capacities, including as a High Court judge. The commissioner is assisted by a team of 13 commissioners, who must all have held senior judicial office. Together they are responsible for the use of investigatory powers by public authorities. They are supported by a body of civil servants, known as the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office, which includes authorising officers and inspectors. Self-evidently, as I mentioned earlier, they were put in place by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. Their responsibilities include a statutory obligation to inspect the use of certain investigatory powers and to exercise delegated functions, as part of which they independently review communications data under Section 60A applications submitted by public authorities.

My noble friend touched on a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Harper, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, on the budget. In the financial year 2023-24, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office operated within a budget of £15.74 million, of which it spent only £13.06 million. That was confirmed in the IPCO annual report 2023, which was published in May of this year. I hope that helps my noble friend.

I am grateful for his service, not just in both Houses but on the Intelligence and Security Committee, and for his kind words about my service. I hope that also answers in part the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Harper—who I will come back to in a moment—and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower.

The noble Lord, Lord Harper, made a very valid point about what the process is for a public authority to be added to Schedule 4. Public authorities can be added to Schedule 4 either through primary legislation or by the use of a delegated power provided at Section 71. The delegated power provided at Section 71 provides that we have an enhanced affirmative procedure, which includes the requirement for a 12-week statutory consultation with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.

The changes being made here are, in a sense, the result of the bodies themselves asking either to be included or removed from the Act. If they wanted to be added to Schedule 4, they had to supply a very comprehensive business case that officials in the Home Office have examined and evaluated in some detail. The Home Office has then had to include a 12-week consultation process with public authorities and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. In this case, the consultation period for the new additions began on 23 October 2024 and completed on 17 January 2025. The IPC agreed that the seven public authorities had made a clear case for access, and the IPC response informed the Home Secretary’s policy assessment to include the amendments in the regulations that we have put before the Grand Committee today.

Licensing Act 2003 (UEFA Women’s European Football Championship Licensing Hours) Order 2025

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Tuesday 1st July 2025 Grand Committee

Can we get a little background on the process of assessment? Having a celebration, controlled properly, is a good idea, and I congratulate the Government on doing something on it, but can we get a little more on the criteria? I know the Minister gave us some of the criteria, but could he expand upon the idea behind why we are doing it? This will also apply to the men’s game, but particularly for women’s sports and smaller sports, what are we actually getting out of it? We might be happier doing this, which is something positive, if we knew the criteria and what happens and made sure we are a little more responsive—if anybody pays any attention to what we are saying today; let us face it, we are not exactly mob-handed. Going through this would help, but I am in favour of the order.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing this instrument. In the coming weeks, we will be preparing to support our home nations in what will be a proud moment for Britain. The 2025 UEFA European Women’s Championship will be held in Switzerland. I am delighted that, this year, both the England and Wales women’s national teams have qualified for this prestigious moment. For Wales, this monumental occasion will mark the first time they have qualified at the European Women’s Championship. For our defending champions, England, this will be their 10th appearance at the competition. If I may say so, in the spirit of good internation relationships, I wish both teams well, and both are to be congratulated on having the opportunity to appear there.

We must recognise the symbolic significance of historical moments such as this for future generations of female footballers and athletes. Last year, the Football Association reported a 56% increase in the number of women and girls playing football. Between 2020 and 2024 alone, the number of female coaches rose by 88% and the number of referees increased by 113%. That is why it is essential for us to support the statutory instrument introduced today, which proposes a temporary extension of licensing hours across England and Wales should either or both teams progress to the semi-finals or the final.

The extension of the licensing hours comes after overwhelming support from a Home Office consultation. Under the instrument, the normal licensing requirements of submitting a temporary event notice application and the £21 fee to the local authority will not apply. The extension will apply only to the sale of alcohol for consumption on the premises, such as bars and pubs, but will not be applicable to off-trade premises, including supermarkets and off licences.

We must recognise that this occasion is one that can help support local pubs in England and Wales, many of which have faced challenges over recent years, with an unprecedented number of closures. During the Lioness’s 2022 triumph, a peak of 17.4 million viewers tuned into the BBC1 programme, making it the most watched women’s football game on UK television. An additional 5.9 million viewers streamed the game online to watch on the BBC iPlayer and the BBC Sport website and app.

Not only will the extension of licensing hours help boost business for pubs and bars but it will allow them to accommodate the increase in demand during these key tournament dates. Fundamentally, this is an opportunity for us to come together and cheer on our national teams, who have done so much to inspire people across the country. I am sure that both sides of the Committee will agree with the positive benefits of the statutory instrument raised in today’s debate, from inspiring the next generation of footballers to boosting our local businesses. We have lots to celebrate over the coming weeks, and I am sure noble Lords will join me in wishing the very best to both Wales and England for the tournament.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the three noble Lords for their contributions. The noble Lords, Lord Hayward and Lord Addington, have moved the goalposts slightly, in the sense that this was a women’s football order. It has had a full consultation, which has given the support to date that I have mentioned. Noble Lords have made a very compelling case for the Women’s Rugby World Cup based in the United Kingdom to be considered. I will certainly consider those representations, and I will get back to both noble Lords. At the moment, there are no plans in the Home Office for such an order, but that does not mean that we cannot consider it. However, there needs to be a public consultation, because we have to do that. I will have to reflect on whether that would fit in with the timescales for the event that both noble Lords mentioned.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 26th June 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 6, leave out “designate a civil servant as the” and insert “appoint a”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would remove the requirement for the Border Security Commander to be a civil servant.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to open this first day of Committee. I will speak also to my Amendments 2, 26 and 27 in this first group. At Second Reading, a number of noble Lords raised the issue that the commander will essentially be a civil servant with co-ordination functions: a commander with nothing to command. I have tabled these amendments and a number of others to seek to rectify the situation and probe the Government’s full intentions for the new role.

Amendment 1 seeks to replace the words

“designate a civil servant as the”

with “appoint a”, thereby specifying that the commander does not have to be a civil servant. Nothing here serves as a critique of the current border security commander, Martin Hewitt, coming as he does from a law enforcement background; rather, it is a critique of the Government’s limited ambition for this new role.

That is not just my view but that of Tony Smith, the former director-general of UK Border Force. He said in evidence to the Public Bill Committee in the other place that

“the first thing that struck me is that the Border Security Commander will be another civil servant. I think it will be a director general post in the Home Office. I was a director general, and we already have quite a lot of them. I am not sure he will actually be able to command anything. He is probably going to be more of a co-ordinator”.—[Official Report, Commons, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill Committee, 27/2/25; col. 40.]

Those were the words of the person whose job it was to lead the agency that polices our borders. As he stated, there are already enough civil servants co-ordinating activities within the Home Office. The Small Boats Operational Command already exists, so can the Minister tell the House how it will work with the commander? How will their roles differ, and what degree of interoperability will exist?

As Tony Smith made very clear to the committee in the other place, if the Government wish to achieve their stated goals, Border Security Command needs to have expanded powers, for example to arrest and detain in the same manner as Border Force, the NCA and Immigration Enforcement. If the powers of the commander and his team remain as they are instituted in this Bill, they will be essentially toothless in their ability to tackle illegal migration. This is a role that, by the Government’s own admission, is meant to help secure our borders, disrupt criminal networks and co-ordinate multiple agencies in the face of complex cross-border threats. Surely, we can all agree that this is not a job for a generalist administrator or a nameless Whitehall official; it demands specialist knowledge, strategic leadership and operational credibility.

Amendments 26 and 27 are essentially consequential. They amend Clause 7, which relates to delegation of the commander’s functions, and Clause 8, which permits the designation of an interim commander. Just as I am concerned by the first clause, I am potentially even more concerned about the possibility of delegation. This commander might be well qualified for the task, but who will he delegate to? As the Bill stands, this will be a civil servant. We must ask whether this is appropriate for the task at hand. My amendment would ensure that only a person of appropriate rank—a similar rank to the commander—would be able to undertake any of the functions bestowed on the commander under the Bill. These amendments would therefore introduce a vital safeguard: that the commander may appoint only a person of appropriate rank and qualifications to fulfil delegated functions, not just anyone who happens to be on the departmental payroll. They would help ensure that we do not fall into the trap of creating yet another abstract, symbolic post—another title without substance, which I am afraid is what the Bill proposes.

I had the pleasure of meeting and spending an evening with the honourable Scott Morrison a few weeks ago. He explained that, when Australia began Operation Sovereign Borders, it instituted a structure that, on the surface at least, appears somewhat similar to this Government’s Border Security Command. Its job was to co-ordinate and lead the 16 agencies that had border security functions. However, there are two crucial differences: first, the Australian system came with far more robust powers than are in this Government’s plan; and, secondly—this is the crucial difference—the Australians appointed a senior military commander, Deputy Chief of Army Major General Angus Campbell, to lead their border security efforts.

This leads on to my Amendment 2, a probing amendment which seeks to gauge the type of background that the Government think most appropriate for the role of commander. I have specified that the commander should be only a former or current officer of the National Police Chiefs’ Council—meaning assistant chief constable or above—commander or above in the Metropolitan Police, a senior officer in Border Force or Immigration Enforcement or a senior military officer of at least brigadier-general, commodore or air commodore rank in the Royal Air Force. This amendment would therefore specify that the commander should be a senior police, immigration or military officer, which I believe would put the office on a stronger footing.

If we are serious about this role having teeth and want it to be a powerful, directive position that can genuinely drive change, then the least we can do is to require that the person filling it has the experience to do so effectively. We cannot afford to build this office on vague criteria and wishful thinking. The public deserve confidence that this position is not just another bureaucratic appointment but one that is fit for purpose from day one. I urge the Committee to support this, and I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I should explain that I have not usurped the position of my noble friend Lord German, who is in Strasbourg at the Council of Europe. I hope that noble Lords will forgive me for not being physically on the Front Bench; from this position, I can be propped up.

Although Martin Hewitt has, as the noble Lord, said, a law enforcement and—I believe—Army background, I do not think it is necessary for the commander to have “rank”, to use the term in his Amendment 26. If the border command and the commander prove effective—in other words, if the institution lasts—I hope that the Secretary of State would be imaginative enough to think outside the box of people to whom the rank might be applied and consider those who might usefully carry on the function.

I do not want to speak too long at this point, but the noble Lord picked up the issue of delegation. It struck me—I understand it is not possible to amendment it—that the heading to Clause 7 really does not describe what is in the clause. The clause is right; it spells out where responsibility lies—that is not delegation. The responsibility remains with the commander, and I think that is correct. I do not know whether anyone can pick that up somewhere behind the scenes, at a later point.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, who, acting as super sub today, continues to make very valid points on this issue. Let me go to the heart of the amendments, if I may. The group contains various amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Cameron. First, they seek to remove the requirement that the Border Security Commander is a civil servant. Given that the role sits within the Home Office and that the commander leads a directorate within the department, it is logical that the role sits within the Civil Service.

This does not mean that the post of Border Security Commander is reserved solely for existing civil servants. Indeed, the current officeholder was recruited externally. Any future recruitment exercises would seek to identify the most suitable candidate, irrespective of their background. Ultimately, they are acting in a Civil Service role, accountable to the Home Secretary. That is the important point, and I hope the noble Lord will reflect on that.

The noble Lord also raised the very important point about the prior experience required to be eligible to be appointed as Border Security Commander. As Members have recognised, the current Border Security Commander served previously as an officer of the National Police Chiefs’ Council. I do not believe it is prudent to limit the pool of candidates eligible to serve in this important position, and we believe that any future recruitment exercise would have the scope to identify the best talent, without limitation, ensuring that we bring the effectiveness of the role to its maximum potential.

The Government have been very clear that the Border Security Commander is responsible for requiring the step change in the UK’s approach to border security—the very point that the noble Lord, Lord Framlingham, addressed. We want to provide a clear and long-term vision for border security, to bring together and provide leadership to all parts of the system, to work to maintain the integrity of our border and immigration systems domestically and internationally. The significance of this role and this work is reflected in the Bill, which puts this office on a statutory footing, for the very reasons that I hope I have outlined. It creates legal requirements on the officeholder in fulfilling their duty.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, raised the issue of the background of an individual. We want to have as wide a pool as possible—I hope that addresses her point.

The commander has already used his post and the associated capabilities to deploy key functions to date across government on the border security system. He has also helped support the Home Secretary in signing a landmark agreement with the Iraqi Government. We have struck a new anti-smuggling action plan with the G7; we are hosting an international summit on organised immigration crime; and we have meetings early next month with colleague nations in the European community to look at how we can work on this issue. Those are important roles and tasks. They add value to the work we are trying to do in very difficult circumstances to smash the criminal gangs and to stem the flow across the channel.

The House can have confidence that those roles being exercised currently will be in future on a statutory basis, and issues to do with reporting and accountability have been set down in law. Therefore, it is not for today, but I hope the noble Lord will reflect on what I have said and, at a later date, not push the amendments to a vote.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lords who contributed to this debate.

We have heard the words from the Government Benches about co-ordination, structure and strategic intent, but let us not lose sight of what this role is supposed to be: a commander. That word carries meaning. It is not simply a metaphor or a piece of Civil Service terminology. I have to disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, when she says it is not about rank. Rank implies leadership, authority and the ability to direct. Without that, the title is misleading at best and meaningless at worst.

What we are being offered in the Bill is a model that risks falling flat. The important point is that it risks creating an official with no clear mandate, no operational standing and no public visibility—in short, a co-ordinator with a title that suggests much more than they are empowered to deliver.

If we fail to define this role properly now, we risk embedding a model that lacks clarity, ambition and—crucially—the power to deliver the very outcomes the Government claim to seek. We cannot risk this position becoming yet another layer of the Whitehall machine, held by a nameless bureaucrat with no real responsibilities.

The amendments we have tabled do not ask for the impossible. They do not tie the Secretary of State’s hands. They simply ensure that the commander is someone of appropriate rank, experience and credibility—someone who can command confidence not just within government but with operational partners and the public alike.

We have seen what can be achieved when such roles are taken seriously. I referenced the Australian example earlier, where a senior military figure led a co-ordinated, multi-agency border response, which shows what is possible with the right leadership and mandate.

We can do the same, but we will not get there by default or by quiet delegation within the Home Office. We must decide now whether we want this to be a genuinely powerful and directive post, or just another name in a long line of forgotten titles.

These amendments are a simple safeguard against mediocrity and a clear statement of intent that this House expects better than business as usual. We will look at this as the Bill progresses but, for the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

3: Clause 1, page 1, line 13, at end insert—
“(5) The Secretary of State must make a statement to Parliament stating that the Secretary of State has designated the person as Commander.(6) The person who has been designated as Commander by the Secretary of State must appear before any Parliamentary committee that invites the person to appear before them.”

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group are designed to extract some more information from the Government about who is going to be entrusted with the position of Border Security Commander. The Bill sets out that the Secretary of State can determine the terms and conditions of a designation as the commander. Our Amendment 3 seeks to tie the Government to publish these terms and conditions once they have been defined.

Crucially, our amendment also clarifies that the Government must define the KPIs that will be used to measure the performance of a commander in their role. This will allow not only the Government but these Houses and the wider public to review how effectively the commander is undertaking these duties.

The Border Security Commander is a big part of the Government’s offering on this question. We need to make sure that the person appointed is delivering a solution to the problem we are discussing, and how the Government are working to define parameters and conditions which will ensure that this is the case. If the Government are convinced that their policy will indeed tackle this issue effectively, I am sure that they will have no hesitation in welcoming the principle of these amendments as an opportunity for them to show the public how well their new policy is working, and to show their ambition in setting high standards for their new commander.

Furthermore, our Amendment 5 to Clause 2 seeks to incorporate greater oversight into the termination process for the Border Security Commander. The Government are creating a role which will be politically sensitive and upon which there will be a great deal of pressure, without necessarily the powers or duties to fulfil these demands. It is a post that demands public trust—and where public trust is concerned, silence is not an option.

To remove someone from that role without any explanation, transparency, accountability or scrutiny risks breeding, confusion, suspicion and the perception that something has gone wrong behind closed doors. That is precisely what undermines confidence in public institutions.

There is also precedent, as we know. When high-profile public officials are dismissed or step down, it is customary—indeed, expected—that a Ministerial Statement is made, and we have seen that with senior civil servants and the heads of public bodies. Unfortunately, the Government have been far too unwilling to come to Parliament to outline the reasons why they have chosen to terminate senior officials. We saw that only recently when the Government ousted the head of the Competition and Markets Authority, Marcus Bokkerink. The Secretary of State for Business and Trade issued a Written Ministerial Statement, but it took an Urgent Question from my honourable friend Andrew Griffiths for a Government Minister to come to the Dispatch Box in the other place to update Parliament. That should not be the case.

On a matter as important as this, we cannot afford to construct roles that can be managed and changed in the dark. We need to appreciate and understand the fact that the public have lost trust in the Government on this, and we need to make sure that the next steps we take command trust and regain the confidence that the public must have in us. I beg to move.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendment of my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower. It is a pleasure to participate in your Lordships’ Committee on this very important Bill.

Noble Lords will be aware that voter salience on the issue of immigration and border control is extremely high, and it is probably the second most important issue, behind the cost of living. That said, the Bill, as currently drafted, does a reasonable job, and we broadly welcome many of its measures, as the Minister will know. He started off as a bruiser, but he is now much more emollient in his reaction and in his Dispatch Box performance, and we agree on many things.

The Bill is very good on the accountability from civil servants, the Home Office and other key stakeholders to Ministers but less strong on that between Ministers and the outside world. When one looks at the level of scrutiny and oversight in, for instance, the Bundestag, the United States Senate or other legislative bodies that are performing a very vital scrutiny and oversight role of the border issue—which is, naturally, a very live issue now in the United States—one will see that there is nothing to lose by us having the opportunity to be open and transparent in seeing what the commander is actually doing.

It is vital that we put in primary legislation the ability of a parliamentary committee to bring the border commander to Parliament to answer questions at least once a year, to measure the efficacy of their policies and whether success is happening in line with what the elected politicians and your Lordships’ House require and to keep that bond of trust with the voters. There is a very low level of trust among the voters of all parties to deal, in the long term, with the issue of border control and the safety and security of the people of this country. It would be a very good idea for the Minister to at least consider that in relation to Amendment 3.

We also need clarity and openness about what the commander is doing. The worst thing about a closed system, where you have accountability only between one part of government and another, is that conspiracy theories and cynicism grow, and people cannot see that the Government are achieving their objectives. It would therefore be very useful to have the explicit terms and conditions to be laid down before Parliament included in Bill. I agree very much with my noble friend on that.

Finally, this is not an issue about the Labour Government; all Governments fall out with senior officials. It happened under the Blair Government, certainly under the Brown Government, and under the coalition Government. It is not ignoble to think that the person you have appointed no longer has the same priorities and imperatives that they should have in carrying out their role. Therefore, you have to do what they say in HR now and “dis-board” them—the opposite of onboarding and the equivalent of getting rid of them. We could say “giving them a new career trajectory”—let us be charitable. That should be the disinfectant of transparency. Bagehot once said, I think, that openness is needed to see what Governments are actually doing. The Government should therefore explain to the voters why that person did not fit in and was not able to fulfil their duties and responsibilities. That is the essence of Amendment 5.

On that basis, I ask the Minister to think about these things. As I often say, it would not invalidate the central premise of the Bill—it is very good in many respects, especially the first chapter—but it would be certainly improved by accepting the amendments. It would be a very powerful message from this Government and future Governments that they are serious about this topic, they are accountable and they are getting things done on behalf of the people who elected them.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am again grateful to noble Lords for tabling these amendments and for giving us the opportunity to discuss them.

I am slightly disappointed that I have moved from being a bruiser to being emollient—but there we go. I will take that as a potential compliment from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough. I just remind him that I reserve my right to bruise, if it is needed, but I hope it will not be on these issues.

This group contains various amendments relating to the appointment of the Border Security Commander, again tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Cameron. The key issue in the amendments is about how the Border Security Commander will engage with Parliament. The amendments state:

“The Secretary of State must make a statement to Parliament”


when an individual is designated as the Border Security Commander and to ensure that the Border Security Commander appears before any parliamentary committees when invited, and to make a Statement to Parliament in the event that the designation of the Border Security Commander is terminated, setting out the reasons for that termination.

If and when an individual is designated as the Border Security Commander—as well as the event of their ultimate termination—that would be announced in the usual way for senior officials in the Civil Service. We would make a Statement on that, and there would be the ability for a Private Notice Question or an Urgent Question to be tabled, depending on the House. There would be opportunities for the Government to table WMSs, and for Questions to be asked, on a daily basis in this House and on a regular basis in the House of Commons, about the reasons behind those decisions. The Government will certainly be transparent on these matters.

We also value the role that parliamentary committees play. If requests are made to attend committees, every effort will be made for the border commander to attend. There are already opportunities for officials across the Home Office and other government departments, who are at the level of the border commander, to appear, either independent of Ministers or in support of Ministers on key issues.

The final amendment in the group would require that the terms and conditions of the Border Security Commander and the key performance indicators used to determine their effectiveness are published. I draw the attention of noble Lords to Clause 2, which sets out the terms and conditions of the designation of the Border Security Commander. Although it would not be appropriate to disclose the detailed terms and conditions of an individual civil servant, the Border Security Commander is a director-general-level position in the Home Office and has the terms and conditions in line with that appointment.

The Government have been very clear that the Border Security Commander is responsible for leading the required step change in the UK’s approach to border security, providing a clear and long-term vision for border security, bringing together and providing leadership, and working to maintain the integrity of our border and immigration systems, both domestically and internationally. The significance of this role and its work is reflected in the Bill, which puts this office on the statutory footing we talked about earlier and creates legal requirements on the officeholder in fulfilling their duties.

The key performance indicators are the ones that the Government are setting themselves. We want to smash the gangs, reduce crossings made on an illegal basis, reduce and speed up asylum claims, and make sure that we reduce the number of hotel accommodations being used. Those are performance indicators which the Government have put in place. The Border Security Commander’s role is to help the Government co-ordinate those activities, with the budget and the staffing that they have, and to help deliver on those objectives. There is transparency and clarity on these issues. I hope that that will reassure the noble Lord on the amendments that he has brought forward.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for his response. I point out to noble Lords that these amendments are not about creating additional bureaucracy. They are very much about reinforcing something far more fundamental, which is trust—trust in the effectiveness of the new Border Security Commander, trust in the process by which they are appointed, assessed and, if necessary, removed; and trust in the Government’s commitment to openness and transparency on a matter of genuine public concern.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I just ask the noble Lord this question. Does he feel that the Home Secretary in the House of Commons and me, as the Minister in the Lords for the Home Office, would not be held to account for both the appointment and any removal of the Border Security Commander and their performance—by which I mean also the Government’s performance—as regards the issues which are of great concern to both sides of this House? That is where I think we are. This is the place to hold us to account on performance.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I fully accept what the Minister says. He can rest assured that he will be held to account in the House of Lords, and I am sure my friends in the other place will be holding the Home Secretary to account.

The Government have chosen to elevate this role, presenting it as central to their response to illegal migration and cross-border criminality, yet, as it stands, the Bill offers almost no insight into how that role will be structured, what standards of performance will apply, or what transparency will be in place if the arrangements break down. If the Government believe that this new position will be effective, and if they believe in the strength of their policy, then publishing the terms and conditions, setting the key performance indicators and offering transparency around dismissal should be welcome. These amendments would give Ministers the opportunity to prove they are serious about making this role deliver real results.

We cannot tackle this issue with platitudes and meaningless positions. The public need to know what sort of deal they are getting through this Bill. With that, at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 3 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I confess to being irredeemably urban—or perhaps suburban—but “The Archers” does have a function in reminding us about pig breeding and the sizes of litters. Listening to noble Lords’ comments has made me think of a number of related issues. I think it is found in a number of parts of life that people who commit one type of crime often commit another type of crime as well. We are well aware of the flexibility, if that is the right term, of the smuggling gangs. It is entirely possible that there is some sort of read across, or at least something that we should be being flagged about.

This also made me think about health, because I believe that somebody came back from Morocco with rabies very recently. It particularly made me think about the competition for facilities at ports, certainly at Dover and, I dare say, at others as well. When I was a member of the Justice and Home Affairs Committee, it was made quite clear, particularly by the Port of Dover, that the issue of space to undertake immigration controls was a really big issue.

The answer may be for these relationships to be governed by other authorities falling within the category of partner authorities. However, as well as the points that previous speakers have made very powerfully, there are relationships that need to be thought about very carefully, and the competition for resources of all sorts which are raised by these arrangements.

We have Amendment 19 in this group, which probes whether cybersecurity is an element of border security; it is clearly an element of security. GCHQ is not a partner authority in the Bill, so it is not within the functions of Clause 3, nor is there a general duty to co-operate as applies under Clause 5—there are to be special arrangements. I do not have a solution to this, but it is a genuine question about where cybersecurity falls within the responsibilities and how the border commander is to take account of cybersecurity.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, my Amendment 18 seeks to introduce another criterion to the definition of what constitutes a threat to border security. We believe it addresses a crucial and glaringly absent dimension from the definition of threats to border security—harm to the economic interests of the United Kingdom.

As drafted, the clause defines relevant threats as those involving criminality, risk of offence, or harm to persons or property. All that is right and necessary, but to leave out the economic dimension is to ignore one of the most significant consequences of border insecurity in the modern age. Illegal entry, organised immigration crime and abuse of our immigration system come at a cost, not just to public safety or border integrity but of real and measurable economic harm. This includes the burden placed on housing, healthcare and social services, and extends to the impact on wages, labour market distortions, the exploitation of workers and loss of public confidence in our immigration system.

These are some of the effects of illegal immigration which people across this country feel most keenly. We must ensure that we reflect this in our assessment of the threat which illegal immigration poses to us. If individuals are entering the UK unlawfully in ways that undermine legal labour markets, displace lawful employment or distort local economies through illicit practices, surely that is a matter of national interest. Surely that is as much of a threat to border security as any physical or legal risk. If our legal framework cannot even acknowledge that reality, how can it ever be expected to address it? This amendment would ensure that this important consideration is included in the Bill, in recognition of economic harm being one of the most serious effects of this issue.

I take this opportunity to speak to some of the other amendments in this group. Amendments 6 and 14, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, address an important and often overlooked issue. Illegal meat imports present a genuine risk to our agricultural sector, as we have heard, and affect our food supply chains and public health. The potential introduction of diseases such as African swine fever or foot and mouth through contaminated meat would be catastrophic, economically and environmentally. Biosecurity is a key part of our national security. The Government need to take action to ensure that this threat is addressed.

The amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, raises a matter that I hope the Government will clear up in their response. Cybersecurity is an important responsibility of the Government. I am not quite sure how it relates to border security and asylum, but this is none the less a probing amendment that I hope that the Government respond to. I share the noble Baroness’s concerns about cybersecurity. We have seen a number of high-profile and extremely damaging cyberattacks in recent months. Ministers will be aware of the urgent need to tackle this. The noble Baroness is right to raise this issue. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s reply.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I will add a couple of points to the excellent points that have been made by previous speakers. My noble friend Lady Hamwee’s point about the opportunism that is evident in the kinds of product that criminals can switch between was well made: they might one day smuggle people and another day smuggle contaminated food products, including meat.

The amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, concerning the impact on the economic interests of the UK very much ties up with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Deben, in particular, and with trying to persuade the Treasury that the costs of foot and mouth, BSE and bird flu are important. You would think that this was self-evident, even to the Treasury. I would like to say that I was surprised at hearing that it was not, but maybe I was not.

You do not have to be a countryman to think that. I admit that you could not get a lot more metropolitan than I am, but like my noble friend I listen to “The Archers” and care about the countryside. It is not true that all of us who live in cities do not care about the countryside, but we must care about biosecurity as consumers, as well as about the impact on farmers. I absolutely support that idea, but I look forward to the Minister’s response on whether it should be part of the functions of border commander. It certainly needs to go much higher—I was going to say “up the food chain”, but that would be a bad pun—up the profile of government priorities to protect the country from biosecurity threats.

There has been a lot of concern about whether post-Brexit controls are being implemented. I am not a world expert, but the can has been kicked down the road time after time on those controls. There is also concern about whether Border Force and port health authorities are being given enough resources to stamp out illegal meat and other contaminated food imports. The Minister’s colleague, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, was given a grilling by the EFRA Select Committee in the other place early last month; I do not know whether there has been any product from its evidence sessions, chaired by my friend in the other place Alistair Carmichael, but that committee is showing how importantly it takes these issues. We have noble Lords with experience of senior government posts in this area—the noble Lords, Lord Rooker and Lord Deben, and the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey—so I hope the Minister will give us a positive response.

Lastly, the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, mentioned the role of trading standards, which has been so underfunded, sadly. We know what pressure council budgets are under. As a consumer, trading standards is not even on my radar, these days. Where do you go if you have a consumer complaint? I have no idea. Was it not batted off to Citizens Advice a long time ago? Anyway, we know about this function: you have the border and then you have the inside the country attention to these matters. Probably we ought to be aware that they all seem to be quite underfunded and a bit fragile in places. We know that there are so many issues that the police are unable to deal with these days, in this whole area.

There is a lot of press coverage of things such as illegal meat imports, so it would be good to hear from the Minister that the Government—not only Defra but across government—understand and will take action on the very real threats that have been raised by the amendments tabled and discussed in this group.