Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

When I observed these deployments of facial recognition and looked at the 20 policemen standing around, it occurred to me that they would probably find a lot more of the people they were looking for if they just went round to their houses and knocked on the door, rather than working on the off-chance that they might walk past them in the high street.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Doocey for eliciting a very useful debate, as was the intention. I particularly welcome some of the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, but say to him that a Crime and Policing Bill might possibly be the place for discussion of the use of live facial recognition in policing. Maybe we can make some progress with the Government, we hope, responding or at least giving an indication ahead of their consultation of their approach to the legislative framework around live facial recognition. I very much hope that they will take this debate on board as part of that consultation.

As my noble friend Lady Doocey clearly stated, these amendments are necessary because live facial recognition currently operates, effectively, in a legislative void, yet the police are rolling out this technology at speed. There is no explicit Act of Parliament authorising its deployment, meaning that police forces are in effect, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger indicated, writing their own rules as they go. This technology represents a fundamental shift in the relationship between citizen and state. When LFR cameras are deployed, our public spaces become biometric checkpoints where every face is indiscriminately scanned. By treating every citizen as a suspect in a permanent digital line-up, we are abandoning the presumption of innocence. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, made that point very well. As a result, there is a clear issue of public trust.

Amendment 379 would prohibit the use of LFR during public assemblies or processions unless a specific code of practice has been formally approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament. This is essential to protect our freedoms of expression and assembly under Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR. The pervasive tracking capability of LFR creates what the courts have recognised as a chilling effect, as described by my noble friend Lady Doocey and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. Law-abiding citizens are discouraged from attending protests or expressing dissenting views for fear of permanent state monitoring. We know that police forces have already used this technology to target peaceful protesters who were not wanted for any crime. People should not have to hand over their sensitive biometric data as the price of engaging in democratic processes. Without explicit parliamentary consent and an approved code of practice, we are sleepwalking into a surveillance state that bypasses democratic oversight entirely.

Amendment 471 would establish that LFR use in public spaces must be limited to narrowly defined serious cases—such as preventing major crimes or locating missing persons—and requires prior judicial authorisation specifying the scope and purpose of each deployment. The need for this oversight was made absolutely clear by the 2020 Court of Appeal ruling in R (Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales Police, which found LFR use unlawful due to fundamental deficiencies in the legal framework. The court identified that far too much discretion is left to individual officers regarding who ends up on a watchlist and where cameras are placed. We must replace operational discretion with judicial scrutiny.

The Government themselves now acknowledge the inadequacy of the current framework, which they describe as a “patchwork framework” and say it is

“complicated and difficult to understand”.

Well, that is at least some progress towards the Government acknowledging the situation. They say that the current framework does not provide sufficient confidence for expanded use—hear, hear. The former Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner made clear his concerns about the College of Policing guidance, questioning whether these fundamental issues require

“more than an authorised professional practice document from the College of Policing”

and instead demand parliamentary debate. The former commissioner raised a profound question:

“Is the status of the UK citizen shifting from our jealously guarded presumption of innocence to that of ‘suspected until we have proved our identity to the satisfaction of the examining officer’?”


Such a fundamental shift in the relationship between citizen and state cannot, and should not, be determined by guidance alone.

The College of Policing’s APP on LFR, while attempting to provide operational guidance, falls short of providing the robust legal framework that this technology demands. It remains non-statutory guidance that can be revised without parliamentary scrutiny, lacks enforceable standards for deployment decisions, provides insufficient detail on bias testing and mitigation requirements, and does not establish independent oversight mechanisms with real teeth.

Most critically, the guidance permits watch-list compilation based on subjective assessments without clear statutory criteria or independent review. This leaves fundamental decisions about who gets surveilled to operational discretion rather than judicial oversight. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, who was keen on one bit of our amendment but not the other, I say that this intelligence-led tool effectively delegates it to a senior police officer and they, in a sense, have a conflict of interest. They are the ones who make the operational decisions.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. It seems that he and his noble friends keep talking about the police and the restrictions which will be imposed on the police. But Amendment 471 seems to extend facial recognition to hundreds and hundreds of public authorities, provided they adhere to a code or comply with certain practices. Does he still stand by the idea that facial recognition should be extended to hundreds of public authorities, in addition to the police?

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

If the noble Lord accepts the fact that controls are required, which he did not in his earlier comments, I think he would be greatly reassured if you had to have judicial oversight of the use of live facial recognition, which is useful in circumstances other than purely policing. What we are talking about is a greater level of control over the deployment of live facial recognition. We can argue perfectly satisfactorily about whether or not it should be extended beyond the police, but we are suggesting that, alongside that greater deployment, or possible greater deployment, there should be a much greater degree of oversight. I think that effectively answers the noble Lord.

The Metropolitan Police’s own data from recent LFR operations shows a false alert rate requiring officers to make numerous stops of innocent people. Even with claimed accuracy improvements, when a system processes thousands of faces, even a small error translates to significant numbers of misidentifications affecting law-abiding citizens.

More concerning is the evidence on differential performance, and that is where I fundamentally agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. The National Physical Laboratory’s 2020 testing of facial recognition systems found significant variation in performance across demographic groups. While contemporary LFR systems used by UK police show better performance than earlier algorithms, independent research continues to identify measurable differences in accuracy rates across ethnicity and gender. The Court of Appeal in Bridges ruled that South Wales Police breached the public sector equality duty by failing to satisfy itself that the software was free from racial or gender bias, yet current deployment practices suggest insufficient progress in addressing these equality obligations.

We should also address the secrecy surrounding police watch-lists. The Justice and Home Affairs Committee of this House recommended that these lists be subject to compulsory statutory criteria and standardised training. There is no independent review of watch-list inclusion, no notification to those placed on lists and no clear route for challenge or removal.

I also very much appreciated what the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, had to say about the problems with software. But the chilling sentence he delivered was “Technology has to take over”. That is precisely the problem that we are living with. If technology is to take over, we need a legal framework to govern it. The current patchwork of overlapping laws addressing human rights, data protection and criminal justice is not fit for purpose.

These amendments provide the democratic and judicial guard-rails needed to contain this technology, and we cannot allow the convenience of new tools to erode our established civil liberties. Only Parliament should determine the framework for how LFR is used in our society, and only the courts should authorise its deployment in individual cases.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

Before the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, sits down, can he address an issue that none of us has addressed yet? These amendments concern the state’s use of facial recognition, for all the reasons that we have talked about. But the private sector is far in advance of this. Some 12 or 13 years ago, it was using a product called Facewatch, which was started at Gordon’s Wine Bar because Gordon was sick of people walking into the bar and either violently assaulting his patrons or stealing things. He put a clever camera on the door and patrons did not get into the bar if they had been accused of something in the past. That product has moved right around the world, and certainly it is extensively used in the UK in different settings.

I am not arguing that that is good or bad; I merely observe that, if we end up in a position where the police have less access to something that can be a good technology, and private commerce is getting benefits that presumably it is able to justify, that inequality of arms does not benefit anyone. It should at least be considered in the consultation that the Government started, which is particularly focused on the police. But as well as the police, we should consider airports, railway stations, et cetera.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

Very briefly, I do not think that the noble Lord is making a bad case at all. Live facial recognition, whether in the hands of the public sector or the private sector, needs a proper legal framework: there is no doubt about that. My noble friend made it clear that we believe it is a useful technology, but, the more useful it is, the more we need to make sure that it is under proper control.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments touches on how the police should deal with modern threats and how we balance civil liberties with the clear duty of the state to protect the public.

I listened very carefully to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, when she introduced her Amendment 379, which, as she said, would prevent the police using live facial recognition when imposing conditions on public processions or assemblies under the relevant provisions of the Public Order Act, unless and until a new statutory code of practice had been approved. If we accept—as we on these Benches and, I think, others in your Lordships’ House do—that live facial recognition can be a legitimate and valuable policing tool in preventing crime, identifying suspects and protecting the public, it is difficult to justify singling out its use in this specific context for an additional and likely onerous layer of bureaucracy. The police already operate within an extensive framework of legal safeguards, such as data protection law. To require a further code of practice, subject to affirmative approval by both Houses of Parliament, risks delaying or deterring the deployment of technology precisely where it may be most needed. So, regretfully, we cannot support the amendment.

Amendment 471, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, goes further in seeking to affect the Government’s ability to use live facial recognition technology. It would restrict the circumstances in which live facial recognition could be used; it would require prior judicial authorisation in the specific circumstances of its use; and it would create an extensive new enforcement and oversight architecture. Public order situations are often fast-moving and unpredictable. Senior officers must be able to make operational decisions quickly, based on risk and intelligence on the ground. Introducing additional procedural hurdles at the point of use risks undermining that agility. We should focus on rolling out effective technology at pace to combat crime and disorder, while ensuring robust safeguards and scrutiny.

In particular, the requirement for prior judicial authorisation is, in our view, particularly problematic. One of the principal advantages of live facial recognition is its speed and flexibility. It can be deployed rapidly in response to emerging intelligence, acute threats or serious risks to public safety, and requiring prior judicial approval risks rendering the technology ineffective in precisely the circumstances where it could prevent serious harm. In dynamic operational scenarios, such as events of violent disorder, knife crime hot spots or rapidly evolving threats, delay can mean failure.

I was particularly taken by the speech of my noble friend Lord Moynihan, who spoke about the position in New York, where, because of there being fewer police on the streets, the technology had to take over. He was right to say that.

We on these Benches are concerned by the attempt to narrow the scope of live facial recognition to a tightly defined set of purposes, because, if Parliament accepts the use of this technology in principle, it makes little sense to confine it to only a small number of scenarios. Crime does not present itself neatly within statutory categories. Policing requires judgment and discretion. Artificially restricting the use of a tool that has demonstrated value risks depriving the police of one of the most effective capabilities available to them.

We of course recognise the need for appropriate safeguards to be implemented in the use of this technology. This new and expanded use of people’s data, even if to facilitate an objective that we support, must be enacted with transparency and proportionality. But these amendments would constrain the police’s operations and weaken our ability to respond to modern threats. At a time when criminals are increasingly sophisticated and technologically adept, Parliament should be empowering the police to use lawful, proportionate and effective tools rather than tying their hands.

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The Conservatives and the Government have the same aim. I hope that the Minister will understand why we believe our measures would improve effectiveness in tackling theft. I very much look forward to hearing his reply. For now, I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, this group addresses the extension of warrantless search powers for electronically tracked stolen goods to the service police, in Clause 129, alongside civilian police, in Clause 128. While we recognise the need for police to tackle high-tech crime, such sweeping powers, particularly warrantless searches, must be meticulously governed to avoid abuse and uphold civil liberties. I have tabled Amendments 386 to 389, which would ensure that robust governance and accountability mechanisms are embedded in these provisions.

Amendment 386 would require the Secretary of State to produce a code of practice for the operation of Clause 129, specifically mandating consultation with civil liberties and human rights organisations and relevant service police bodies. This would ensure due process regarding the authorisation, seizure, retention and disposal of evidence.

Amendment 388 would require the Secretary of State to provide appropriate training for service police personnel on how to exercise these powers proportionately and lawfully.

Amendment 387 would mandate the establishment of an independent mechanism for handling, investigating and reviewing public complaints arising from the exercise of these powers, giving complainants similar statutory rights to victims reporting to the Independent Office for Police Conduct.

Amendment 389 would mandate that the Secretary of State produces an annual report detailing the exercise of these warrantless search powers under Clause 128, ensuring transparency and accountability to Parliament. Further, these new obligations would require the affirmative procedure for their governing regulations, ensuring full parliamentary debate before they are enacted, as sought in Amendments 499 to 501.

We on these Benches are opposed to Amendments 383 to 385 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies, which seek to remove the requirement, as we have heard from the noble Lord, for an officer to even possess electronic tracking data before conducting a warrantless search. By stripping away this technologically justified threshold, these amendments would transform a specific investigative tool into an arbitrary power of entry, undermining the core principle that a person’s home is his castle.

In contrast, Amendments 386 to 389 provide the necessary basis for these intrusive powers to be overseen. Specifically, Amendment 386 mandates a statutory code of practice for the Armed Forces to ensure that their exercise of these powers is necessary, proportionate and strictly compliant with the Human Rights Act. Furthermore, Amendment 387 would establish an independent mechanism for handling public complaints, ensuring that any misuse of power is investigated by a body demonstrably independent of the service police.

Finally, my amendments would require post-implementation reporting to Parliament every 12 months. We must see the data on the demographic profile of those targeted and the subsequent criminal justice outcomes to guard against disproportionate application or mission creep. Without these safeguards, we risk creating a shortcut—as other provisions might do—to a surveillance state, where convenience is prioritised over constitutional protection.

The safeguards that I have proposed in Amendments 386 to 389 regarding service police are only as strong as the parliamentary scrutiny that would underpin them. We must ensure that these powers are exercised with not just efficiency but a regular check of parliamentary accountability.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, this group of amendments addresses Clauses 128 and 129 granting new powers to the police to enter premises to search for and seize stolen items that can be electronically tracked there, without the need to first apply to a court for a warrant. I welcome the welcome given to these new clauses by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, on behalf of the Opposition.

These new powers are intended, as he said, to be exercised where a stolen item is electronically tracked to a specific location. This is in direct response to public concern that the police are not able to act swiftly in response to crimes such as mobile phone theft, even when victims have clear, real-time electronic evidence of the phone’s location. It will reduce the risk that stolen goods are quickly moved on or used to facilitate other crime. I suggest to the Committee that the main benefit of these clauses is ensuring that mobile phone theft is addressed and combated.

The noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, is no longer in his place, but when speaking to an earlier group he suggested that there is an impression that the police do not prioritise criminal behaviour such as mobile phone theft but instead concentrate on other issues, which I will not go into. I suggest that the police being able to more quickly and effectively tackle very common criminal behaviour such as mobile phone theft would also very much enhance the reputation of the police. As the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, said, it is sometimes at risk of being downplayed.

I will first address the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. Amendments 383 to 385 would remove the requirement in Clause 128 that the power may be exercised by police only in relation to stolen goods electronically tracked to specified premises. They would also remove the condition that before the use of power is authorised by a senior police officer, he or she must be satisfied that there is electronic tracking data linking the stolen item and a specific premises. These amendments would significantly broaden the scope of the proposed powers and remove important safeguards.

Powers of entry are inherently intrusive, and there is a balance to be struck between ensuring that the police can act quickly and decisively against thieves, and retrieve victims’ stolen property, and safeguarding the right to a private and family life. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, put it very well when he referred to it as a technically justified threshold. I contend to the Committee that people generally accept the need for warrants to be used in detecting stolen goods, but some devices can be tracked electronically in real time. The police turn around and say, “We can’t do anything about this because we have to go and get a warrant”, but you can point to the address where you know that phone is and you know that, if the police do not act quickly, there is a good chance that phone will be moved out of the country. It is only right that we use that as an apposite threshold to introduce these powers, rather than saying that they should be used for any stolen good of whatever nature, where there is no electronic tracking data involved. It will do much to improve confidence in the police in catching up with the 21st century and current technology, but we do not see the need to go further.

The requirement for electronic tracking data linking at least one stolen item to the premises before powers can be exercised provides a further layer of reliability in their use, while ensuring, as I said, that the police can act swiftly when they need to. I say again that removing these requirements would dilute the safeguards intended to ensure that police officers use these powers lawfully, proportionately and only in specific circumstances.

That brings me neatly to Amendments 386 to 389 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I commend his intent to ensure that there is strong accountability, independent oversight and scrutiny of the use of these powers. As I have said, the Government recognise that these new powers are intrusive by their nature, particularly as they can be exercised by officers without them first needing to seek authorisation from a court by obtaining a search warrant. We have, accordingly, built in appropriate safeguards to ensure that the new powers are used appropriately and within well-established independent oversight and scrutiny mechanisms.

Amendment 386 would require the Secretary of State to issue a statutory code of practice to which the service police must have regard when exercising the new powers. I stress to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that these new powers will be subject to the relevant provisions in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and its codes of practice. The Government will amend PACE Code B, and Code B of the service police codes of practice, to reflect the new powers, providing clear and detailed guidance around their use for both territorial and service police. These revisions to the codes will be completed before the powers are commenced. This will provide robust statutory guidance to police and will be complemented by the College of Policing’s authorised professional practice.

Amendment 387 would require the creation of an independent oversight mechanism to investigate public complaints about the use of these powers by service police. Any complaints about their use by territorial police would be addressed in the normal way through internal police complaints procedures and referrals to the Independent Office for Police Conduct, where required.

The service police are the focus of the noble Lord’s amendment, and any complaints would be dealt with under the complaints system for service police. As set out in the Service Police (Complaints etc.) Regulations 2023, this is overseen by the Service Police Complaints Commissioner, whose role is similar to that of the IOPC. The commissioner is independent of the service police and the MoD, and has a statutory duty to secure, maintain and review arrangements for procedures that deal with complaints and conduct. They deal with the most serious complaints and set the standard by which service police should handle complaints. The Service Police Complaints Commissioner has the same powers as the service police where it has been determined that they will carry out an investigation, and they can also determine that a complaint can be reinvestigated, if they are satisfied that there are compelling reasons to do so.

Amendment 388 would require service police to undertake training before they could exercise the new powers. All members of the service police undergo training that addresses each element set out in the noble Lord’s amendment, including on the legal requirements and limitations of search and seizure powers, proportionality, maintenance of clear records and compliance with Article 8 of the ECHR and the Human Rights Act 1998. Service police trainees are tested on arrest, entry, search and seizure before they can exercise these powers. Training is updated in response to any change in legislation that would affect service police officers’ exercise of their powers. Specifically, training will be updated in light of the new powers in this Bill.

Finally, Amendment 389 would require the Secretary of State to make an annual report to Parliament on the police’s exercise of these new powers. Noble Lords will recognise that statutory powers are already subject to regular review and rigorous scrutiny. The well-established parliamentary arrangements enable members of both Houses to examine the exercise of these and other statutory powers through Written and Oral Questions, Select Committees and other means. Police accountability is ensured through a variety of statutory and non-statutory oversight and scrutiny mechanisms, including the Independent Office for Police Conduct, the service police—

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt. The Minister is clearly getting to the end of what he has to say. What raised my eyebrows reading Clause 129 is the fact that these powers have been given to the service police in the first place. What is the rationale for them having these powers in particular, how much mobile phone theft are the service police dealing with, and why are we putting them on all fours with the civilian police? The Minister will have noticed that I have not tried to amend Clause 128; all my focus is on the service police. If a military policeman turned up on my doorstep and asked to check out my house, I certainly would be rather concerned, hence the need for safeguards. But there seems to be no rationale for the service police being brought into this and being given these pretty extensive powers.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, the bad news is that not all service personnel are absolute angels: it could be one junior soldier stealing a mobile phone from another junior serviceman. These arrangements are very sensible, and I agree with everything that the Minister has had to say. My only question for him, while I am on my feet, is this: is there any evidence that the service police make mistakes on the procedures when they are exercising their powers? I am not aware of any problem.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I will take the last one first. I am not sure there is any evidence; I would have to look into that. To answer the more substantive intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, as to why service police need the powers to deal with electronically tracked stolen goods, while service police deal with crime in the defence context, it is important that they are equipped to respond effectively to current and future trends in criminal behaviour. Obviously, the provisions in the Bill help to ensure that service police can respond with lawful, fair and proportionate action, now and in the future, to the full spectrum of criminality that threatens the cohesion and operational effectiveness of our Armed Forces. These new powers will give officers more chance of quickly finding and retrieving stolen items that are electronically tracked at premises, and reduce the risk they are lost or moved on. Maybe put it down to an overabundance of caution but also an acknowledgement that crimes that affect and have to be investigated by civilian forces can also affect and be investigated by the Armed Forces.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, all I will say is that, faced with an abundance of caution—that is to say, if in doubt— “give the police powers” is not an approach that is particularly favoured on these Benches.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

That is a point well made and well taken. I add that the powers would, of course, be exercised only within the jurisdiction of the service police, so service police would not suddenly be moving into areas of activity that you would expect the territorial police to be pursuing.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, anticipated that I was winding up. I hope that my comments have reassured the noble Lord that the spirit and intention behind his amendments have been incorporated within the proposals in the Bill. In the light of my remarks, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, these amendments build on Clauses 130 to 137, which confer powers on law enforcement agencies to extract information from online accounts as part of their investigations into immigration crime and sexual abuse cases, and to protect national security and our borders. Taken together, Amendments 441 to 444, 452, 393 and 394 ensure that the police can access information held in the online accounts of individuals subject to national security-related civil orders. These include terrorism and state threat prevention and investigation measures, as well as youth diversion orders, which are being introduced by clauses earlier in this Bill.

It is increasingly common for individuals to store data in the cloud for various reasons, such as to free up space on devices and, increasingly, because of the way devices or applications are designed, but also, regrettably, in some cases deliberately to make it less accessible to law enforcement. This is particularly the case with young people: police operational experience has shown that this cohort will regularly store data in online accounts. This data can be critical in supporting law enforcement to manage terrorist and broader national security risks. The increasing reliance on cloud data means that the police are likely to have an increased need to access cloud data as part of compliance checks where an individual—this is the important thing for the Committee—is subject to online restrictions as part of a civil order, such as the youth diversion order. These amendments will provide a clear statutory basis for officers to access cloud data when conducting a compliance check for an individual—again, this is the important point—who is subject to either a youth diversion order or a terrorism, state threat prevention or investigation measures order.

The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 contains a provision allowing for the extraction of information from electronic devices in cases where the user has died. Amendment 392 will clarify that this power also now applies to online information, as long as the authorised person is satisfied that the power is proportionate and there is no other practical way of obtaining the information.

Lastly, Amendments 389A to 389F are small but important drafting changes to Clause 132. The clause before the Committee identifies which senior officers may authorise the use of a power in Clause 130, which provides for a general extraction power for law enforcement agencies to obtain online information. Currently, the table refers to “Navy”, “Military” and “Force” but does not explicitly mention the police. I think noble Lords would wish the police to be mentioned, and therefore the amendments insert the term “Police” after each of those references to correct the omission. I hope that is clear to the Committee. This is in the specific circumstances that I have outlined in my speech, and I hope that noble Lords can accept the amendments at the appropriate time.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, this grouping deals with the complex landscape of remotely stored electronic data, or what is commonly known as cloud access. Government amendments in this group, such as Amendments 393, 394 and 441, significantly expand the ability of the state to inspect online accounts through seized devices, including the interception of authentication codes. We acknowledge that, as evidence shifts from hardware to the cloud, the law must evolve. However, we remain deeply concerned by the widened scope for investigation, which carries an inherent risk of excessive prying.

These powers go beyond merely searching a phone. They allow law enforcement to walk through the digital doors of a person’s entire life—their private communications, financial history and medical records. As the Minister said, under Clause 169 these intrusive inspections can now be included as conditions of a youth diversion order. While the Government maintain that these are necessary to identify harmful online activity early, we must ensure that they are used only when strictly necessary and proportionate to protect the public from serious harm.

I ask the Minister to clarify the oversight mechanisms for these powers. We cannot allow the inspection of a child’s entire digital history to rest on a subjective belief, rather than a rigorous, objective assessment of risk. The digital ecosystem must not be a safe haven for perpetrators, but neither can it become a borderless opportunity for state surveillance.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I thank the Minister for tabling, and setting out the rationale behind, this group of government amendments. Amendments 393 and 394 authorise the interception of certain communications in order to access online accounts. These amendments represent an additional measure to youth diversion orders on top of the existing powers provided to the authorities under the current drafting of the Bill.

Public safety is and should be the first priority of any Government. Youth diversion orders exist in order to curb and prevent young people from engaging in terrorist activity or associating with those affiliated to terrorist groups that seek to radicalise children. We are supportive of the measures in the Bill to increase the scope and applicability of youth diversion orders, such as Clause 167, which enables chief officers of police with the power to apply for a youth diversion order. These are necessary and proportionate measures that should be implemented in order to mitigate terrorist risk.

We on these Benches are equally supportive of the amendments in this group that are aimed at ensuring that, when youth diversion orders are made, they contain the necessary provisions to enable authorities to carry out their operations as effectively as possible. There is no point in making a youth diversion order if the provisions of that order do not sufficiently provide police with the ability to execute its objective. Terrorists and extremist groups are increasingly turning to online forums and communities in order to identify individuals for radicalisation and to spread misinformation. Therefore, where the courts deem it necessary to issue a youth diversion order, it is right that a provision of such an order can contain the inspection of any online account. Not only will that ensure that young people are kept safe from dangerous and hateful rhetoric, but it will enable authorities to understand who is targeting children and their methods of radicalisation.

It is also important that the imperative to keep the public safe is counterbalanced with appropriate regard for individual liberty. Youth diversion orders contain a number of provisions which impact on people’s daily lives, so it is right that they are sanctioned only where it is considered strictly necessary. I therefore seek assurances from the Minister that these amendments, and youth diversion orders more generally, are accompanied by having the appropriate safeguards in place to mitigate state overreach and the unnecessary deprivation of people’s freedoms and, of course, their right to privacy.

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[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group are designed to probe a proposed extension of counterterrorism and national security powers, usable only at ports, airports and places near the land border with Ireland, that are among the very strongest of all those powers vested in the police. I have consistently supported those powers, controversial though they once were, and I support the extension of them to data on the cloud by Clause 137. The issue raised by these amendments is whether those powers and their extension should be attended by improved but streamlined safeguards. My amendments suggest two simple and modest ways of achieving this.

Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and Schedule 3 to the National Security Act 2023 authorise counterterrorism police to stop any person passing through a port or airport, on a no-suspicion basis, for the purpose of determining whether they are or have been involved in terrorism or hostile activity. Such persons may be searched; they may be detained and questioned for up to six hours; they are denied the right of silence in the face of the officers’ questions; indeed, they are liable to be prosecuted if they refuse to speak. All these powers are exercisable, I repeat, on a no-suspicion basis.

There are some thousands of Schedule 7 examinations every year—well down from the peak, but still a significant number. That is not all: any “thing” that a traveller has with them can be seized and inspected, again without any need for suspicion. That power has its origins in the historical power to rummage through hand baggage, and there are all kinds of “things” in there. Thanks to modern technology, such “things” now include laptops and mobile phones. Under the existing law, the contents of these electronic devices may be copied and retained for as long as the examining officer believes that they may be needed for use as evidence in criminal proceedings, or in connection with deportation. That is fair enough in my book. In addition, however, and relevant to my proposed amendments, the contents may be copied and retained

“for as long as is necessary for the purpose of determining”

whether a person is or has been involved in terrorism or hostile activity.

Clause 137 would extend this power so that it applies not only to data that can be extracted from the phone itself but—as touched on in the previous group—to data that is accessible from the phone and stored on the cloud. This includes, for example, the entirety of a person’s Gmail account and all their iCloud photos. The operational logic of the extension is faultless: cloud storage is a fact of life. I have no problem with Clauses 130 to 134, which apply the same principle to powers that are already well attended by safeguards. But Clause 137 gives us an opportunity to reflect, not least in the light of comments from the courts, on whether the Government and your Lordships are content for data that has been seized without the need for suspicion—and which, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, said in the previously group, increasingly encapsulates every aspect of a person’s private life—should be retained by the police without clearer parameters.

We are urged to take that opportunity to reflect by Jonathan Hall KC, my successor but one as the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. In a note published last October, he suggested that Parliament might want to consider: what safeguards will prevent excessive data being extracted and copied; how journalistic and legally privileged material on an online account will be protected; and, given the quantity of personal data that members of the public knowingly or unknowingly hold on the cloud, accessible from their device, whether, as he put it,

“merely travelling through a port or border”

is

“a sufficient reason to surrender so much of their privacy”.

Jonathan Hall does not say for how long data is, in practice, retained for the purpose of determining whether a person is involved in terrorism or hostile activity. The experience of the old management of police information, or MoPI, regime suggests, however, that personal data may be retained in police systems for very long periods indeed, particularly when the grounds for doing so are very broadly and vaguely expressed.

As one would expect, powers as strong as these have attracted legal challenge. The leading case was brought by Mrs Beghal, who was questioned under Schedule 7 at East Midlands Airport in 2011. The essentials of Schedule 7, as it then stood, were found, in 2015, to be compatible with the European convention by a majority of the Supreme Court. Lord Kerr, followed by a unanimous first section of the European Court of Human Rights, found otherwise. Fortunately, for those tasked with defending the power in the courts, Mrs Beghal was not subject to the inspection, copying, or retention of data on her phone, let alone, of course, on the cloud, but the Supreme Court was sufficiently troubled by this aspect of the power to address the issue anyway. It did not object to the suspicionless seizure, copying and retention of data belonging to a person going through a port or airport, but it did express the view, by way of obiter dictum, in paragraph 58 of its judgment that retention beyond an initial period for the purposes of determining whether a person is involved in terrorism should require objective grounds for suspicion.

My Amendment 390 would act on that dictum of the Supreme Court in relation to the existing Schedule 7 power and the proposed amendment to it. It would fix the initial period during which no suspicion is required at three months. This might be considered rather generous to the police, given that the Supreme Court appears provisionally to have had a period closer to seven days in mind. Should Amendment 390 find favour with your Lordships, a similar amendment to Schedule 3 to the National Security Act could be tabled alongside it on Report.

My Amendment 391 is directed exclusively to the National Security Act 2023. Its Schedule 3 allows an even broader basis for retaining cloud data than the Terrorism Act. As proposed by the Government, it will be sufficient reason for retaining such data that

“the constable believes it necessary … in the interests of national security”

or the

“economic well-being of the United Kingdom”—

national security being a concept that is famously undefined in our legislation.

The test of subjective belief on the part of a constable in relation to these weighty matters is about the least onerous threshold that could be imagined. Amendment 391 would replace it with an objective test—the same objective test proposed in relation to the alternative ground for retention in new paragraph 22B(a) in the Bill. This is keyhole surgery of the most minor kind, but I suggest it is the least this situation requires.

These are probing amendments, but they go some way to meeting the challenge we have been posed by the independent reviewer. They invite discussion of a question that is surely significant by any measure: are we or are we not prepared to contemplate meaningful limits on police retention of the most extensive private details of the lives of people who have done nothing more suspicious than pass through a port or airport? I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I support Amendments 390 and 391 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, which I have signed. As he has explained, these amendments are designed to probe the proposed extension of border powers. These are powers which are already among the strongest vested in the police, which are useable at ports, airports and near the land border with Ireland.

The Committee needs very little reminder of the pedigree of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, as the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. This informs his view of these new powers under Clauses 135 to 137, which represent a major extension of state reach. They extend the existing power to seize a physical device to include data that is accessible from a phone but stored in the cloud. We are no longer talking about just a handset, but the entirety of a person’s Gmail account, iCloud photo library and private digital history. Although the operational logic of following data in the cloud is understandable, we should reflect that this information is seized without the need for prior suspicion of an offence. As the successor of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, has asked,

“is merely travelling through a port of border a sufficient reason”

for a citizen

“to surrender so much of their privacy?”

As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said, Amendment 390 would introduce a vital safeguard based on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Beghal v DPP, which stipulates that if the police wish to retain the extracted cloud data for longer than three months they must have reasonable grounds to suspect the individual is involved in terrorism or hostile activity. We cannot allow the digital core of an innocent traveller to be duplicated and kept indefinitely by the state simply because they pass through a port of entry, as the noble Lord said.

As the noble Lord said, Amendment 391 is directed at the National Security Act 2023. As it is currently drafted, the Government would allow the retention of cloud data based on the purely subjective test that the constable believes that it is necessary. This is perhaps the least onerous threshold imaginable in our law. Amendment 391 would perform what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, described as minor “keyhole surgery” by replacing this subjective belief with an objective test of necessity, which would ensure that the retention of highly sensitive personal data, which may include journalistic or legally privileged material, was governed by an actual legal standard that can be scrutinised, rather than a mere hunch or the personal belief of an individual officer.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hope I can help the noble Lord. The Schedule 7 and Schedule 3 powers are exercised at pace. Some investigations, particularly those involving complex or sensitive matters, could well extend beyond three months. Evidence often emerges gradually and may be fragmented.

Statutory codes of practice provide a flexible and responsive mechanism for setting out detailed safeguards and allow for timely updates on operational and legal contexts. If we embed such details in primary legislation, with due respect to the noble and learned Baroness, that would create inflexibility and mean that we may not keep pace with changing threats or operational realities. The codes are subject to parliamentary scrutiny; they can be revised as needed and ensure robust protection. That is why I have put that argument before the Committee. If it feels that that argument is not acceptable, we will have to have that discussion later on. That is my defence against having keyhole surgery at this time.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, will respond shortly, but I am sure the Minister realises that he cannot sit down quite yet. He talked about the process, the statutory guidance and so on, but does he accept the substance of the amendments and has he given an assurance to the Committee that, if it were agreed hypothetically that the statutory code guidance was an acceptable way forward, the substance of these amendments would be incorporated into it? Does he accept the case made so eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I think I have said that the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, are worthy of reflection, but we will put the discussion ultimately into the code of practice. The final settlement will be a consultation on the code of practice. I have heard what has been said today. There will be a consultation and an opportunity for the noble Lord, with his former hat on and his position in this House, and others to comment on it. That is the case I am making and I hope I have convinced the Committee. If not, methods are available. Given the late hour and the amendment target we are trying to reach, I will rest my case.

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I am afraid that noble Lords are going to get the full set today. I support my noble friend’s Amendment 396, which is the meat of this group of amendments. It was proposed by my noble friend Lady Doocey and signed by me, and it addresses the profound privacy implications of Clause 138. While the Government describe the clause as a technical clarification of access to DVLA records, we on these Benches and groups such as Big Brother Watch see it as the foundation for a vast national facial recognition database. It is also a massive pre-emption, in our view, of the consultation on live facial recognition which is currently being conducted by the Government.

This amendment provides a specific and essential statutory bar. Authorised persons may not use DVLA information for biometric searches using facial recognition technology. Members of the public applying for driving licences do so to drive cars, not to be placed in a permanent digital lineup without their consent—and we know that facial recognition technology is demonstrably biased, as we discussed earlier today. Expanding its use to a database of tens of millions of law-abiding citizens would be a grossly disproportionate interference with the right to privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR. The Government claim that this is not their intention, yet they have not put that promise in the Bill.

If the Minister is sincere that this power will not be used for mass biometric surveillance, he should have no objection to this amendment. We cannot allow the end of anonymity in public spaces to be achieved through a legislative back door. We are being asked to buy into a massive extension of police access to biometric information. The technology represents a monumental shift in the relationship between the citizen and the state. Such a shift must be governed by Parliament, not by secret police watch lists. As my noble friend Lady Doocey said, this can only lead to further erosion of public trust in the police unless these safeguards are installed.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments raises important questions about the use of data, modern policing techniques and the appropriate safeguards that must accompany them. We are sympathetic to the principle that underpins government Amendment 394A. It respects the devolution settlement in Northern Ireland and the constitutional and operational sensitivities around policing. There is a careful balance that must be struck between maintaining consistency across the United Kingdom, respecting the powers of devolved Administrations and ensuring that law enforcement agencies have the tools they need to keep the public safe.

There is also a parallel balance that must be struck between safeguarding individual liberties and being robust in tackling crime. While we recognise the intent behind the amendment, we also acknowledge that the Government must retain sufficient flexibility to ensure effective and coherent law enforcement arrangements across all parts of the UK. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response in addressing both these issues.

Amendment 396 would prohibit the use of the DVLA database for searches using live facial recognition technology. It will probably come as no surprise that we are firmly opposed to that restriction, as it would undermine one of the key inputs on which the success of live facial recognition hinges. Live facial recognition is an important and increasingly effective tool in modern policing. Used lawfully and proportionately, it has already demonstrated its value in identifying serious offenders, locating wanted individuals and preventing violent crime before it occurs. It is particularly effective in high-crime environments and transport hubs, where the risk of serious harm is elevated and where rapid identification can make a decisive difference.

Equally, across the DVLA, using driver licensing data for law enforcement purposes is not new: nor is it unregulated. Clause 138 ensures that the use of this is accompanied by safeguards, regulation-making powers to the Secretary of State, consultation requirements, a statutory code of practice and annual reporting to Parliament. These measures are designed to ensure proportionality and accountability. To carve out facial recognition from this framework would unnecessarily impede law enforcement’s ability to use the technology effectively. It would also deny the police the ability to use accurate and targeted technology to identify individuals suspected of serious criminality, even where strong safeguards are in place.

I therefore welcome the opportunity for the Minister to expand on how facial recognition fits within this framework and on the safeguards that will ensure that its use is proportionate and effective. But we should be clear that this technology, which can save lives, disrupt violent crime and protect the public, should not be ruled out by default.

Computer-generated Child Sexual Abuse Material

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The simple answer to the noble Lord is yes. The Government expect Ofcom to exercise its powers under Section 121 of the Online Safety Act where needed. A consultation ran to March 2025. We expect advice to the Home Secretary by April this year, and we will act when that advice comes forward.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, given the recent experience with AI platforms such as Grok generating unacceptable non-consensual sexual images and the warnings from the Internet Watch Foundation, I welcome recent comments from the Secretary of State for DSIT about Grok. However, what discussions are senior Ministers having with technology companies directly to ensure that they understand their duties under the Online Safety Act and will comply?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord should know that my view is that Grok is creating degrading non-consensual images, that that is an absolute disgrace and that Grok should take action on it. It is simply not acceptable. Ofcom has powers to tackle this. I will give a similar answer to the noble Lord that I gave to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile: there is a consultation on this. Ultimately, though, it is not acceptable. Ofcom will act, and if it does not the Government will.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Morgan of Cotes (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will briefly speak to Amendment 358. It is a pleasure to follow the noble Lords, Lord Vaux and Lord Young of Cookham. Because we are going to be discussing this and a later amendment on fraud, I declare my interest as a director of Santander UK.

It was a huge pleasure and privilege to chair the Lords inquiry into online and digital fraud, which reported in 2022, and I would like to think that we had some impact in raising the issues, which are of huge importance to the public. Fraud is one of the crimes that people are most likely to be victims of. I know the Minister knows that because he is the Anti-Fraud Minister in the department.

Noble Lords have already spoken about the importance of this amendment, the need for the law to be kept up to date as the technology develops, and the fact that allowing as much flexibility in legislation as possible to enable that to happen is important. The reason we talked about the “fraud chain” in the report is that, obviously, people encounter fraud in myriad ways. Fraudsters are, as we have heard, incredibly flexible, and entrepreneurial—for all the wrong reasons. Of course, telecoms—people’s smartphones or phones—is where many people will first encounter the fraudster, who will then try, as we heard in our evidence, to get them away from technology and strike up some kind of relationship which unfortunately ends in people often losing life-changing amounts of money.

I do not want to pre-empt the debate on Amendment 367, which I hope we will also reach today, but the question, perhaps now or for later, is whether the Minister is confident that the previous Government’s and this current Government’s ask of the telecoms industry is strong enough given the frequency with which the public encounter fraud via their telephones. I will ask the question now, but I am sure we will come back to it. We are all waiting for the forthcoming fraud strategy from the Government, which we understand is—I hope—close. Can the Minister give us a little precursor of whether that will impose tougher asks and potential penalties on the telecoms companies for the reasons that we have already heard?

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, we strongly support Amendment 358 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Vaux, Lord Young of Cookham and Lord Holmes of Richmond, and the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, who have made the case extremely well today. I pay tribute to the Fraud Act committee chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, and I shall quote from it extensively in the next group.

This amendment would rightly ensure that the definition of a specified article included devices capable of using virtual subscriber identity modules, not just physical SIM cards. As we have heard, the criminal landscape evolves rapidly. If we legislate only for plastic SIMs, criminals will simply pivot to readily available virtual SIM technology. By incorporating virtual SIMs into the definition now, we will help to future-proof these provisions and make them genuinely effective against highly scalable, technology-enabled fraud.

Clauses 112 to 117 quite rightly seek to address the serious and growing problem of SIM farms being used at scale to perpetrate fraud and other abuses—it was very interesting to hear the quotes of the noble Lord, Lord Young, from the Select Committee’s report, which demonstrates that the problem has been with us for several years now—but, as drafted, Clause 114 risks being a technological step behind the criminals. As we have heard, it refers to devices capable of using physical SIM cards, but the market is already rapidly moving towards virtual or embedded SIMs. Indeed, I have an iPad in my hand that has a virtual SIM inside it—no physical SIM card at all. If the Bill focuses only on the plastic card and not the underlying functionality, it will leave an obvious loophole that organised criminals will quickly exploit.

The noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, spoke of “entrepreneurial” but not in a good way. We know that fraudsters are highly adaptive. As mobile operators deploy more robust controls on physical SIMs—I suspect not enough for the noble Lord, Lord Vaux—and as handsets and routers increasingly use eSIMs or other virtual identities, those intent on running industrial-scale smishing and scam operations will migrate to those platforms. If we legislate today for yesterday’s technology, we will simply displace the problem from one category of device to another and be back here in a few years’ time having the same debate. I hope the Minister will be able either to accept the amendment or to confirm that the Government will bring forward their own wording—there is always a bit of “not invented here” with these things. Without that assurance, there is a real risk that this part of the Bill will be lacking in force from the day it comes into effect.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, for speaking to this group. On his Amendment 358, I agree that the Government should look to make provisions that account for all forms of SIM cards used in SIM farms. As the noble Lord stated, the current drafting of Clause 114 does not encompass eSIM cards in the devices used for SIM farming. Given the number of mobile phones that now use eSIMs, this really should be amended.

This speaks to the larger issue of defining provisions ahead of legislation coming into force. When changes are being made to the legality of certain products, suppliers and consumers should be made aware well in advance; behaviours will have to change with reform. This is a case of not just courtesy but constitutional propriety. That is the reasoning behind my Amendments 358A and 538A.

Legislating for the criminalisation of specific devices and software related to fraud should not be done on a whim. Individuals should not wake up one day and possess an illegal device or software that was considered legal a day before, with no warning of the coming change. Some notice must be given. Currently, the Bill simply permits Ministers to specify a device whenever they wish. There is no requirement for those regulations to come into force before the new offences of possession and supply come into force. My amendments would ensure, in the interests of fairness and the rule of law, that the new offences could not come into force until at least three months had passed from the making of the regulations defining the articles.

I believe that a period of three months before the possession and supply of certain articles becomes illegal is sufficient for people to change their habits and businesses to change their models. We in this House would be doing the public a disservice if we did not provide them with the necessary time to adapt. I hope the Minister agrees with this reasoning. I hope he will consider the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and, as always, I look forward very much to hearing his reply.

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Moved by

[Lord Clement-Jones]

359: After Clause 117, insert the following new Clause—
“Digital identity theft(1) A person commits an offence of digital identity theft if—(a) the person obtains, or attempts to obtain, personal or sensitive information relating to an individual, including but not limited to passwords, identification numbers, credit card numbers, national insurance numbers, biometric data, or other unique digital identifiers, and(b) the person intends to use this personal or sensitive information to impersonate that individual, or to enable another person to impersonate that individual, with the purpose of carrying out any transaction, activity, or communication in their name without their consent or lawful authority.(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)—(a) “personal or sensitive information” refers to any data, whether digital, physical, or otherwise, that can be used to identify, authenticate, or impersonate an individual;(b) “obtains” includes acquiring, accessing, collecting, or otherwise coming into possession of such information.(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine, or both;(b) on conviction on indictment in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to a fine, or both.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment creates an offence of digital identity theft.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, my Amendment 359 would create a new offence of digital identity theft. I am very pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, has signed and supports it.

The amendment is deliberately tightly framed. It targets the foundational act that underpins so much modern fraud and serious criminality: the deliberate harvesting of someone else’s personal and sensitive information with the intent to impersonate them and conduct transactions, activities or communications in their name without their knowledge or consent. It is about criminalising the act of stealing and weaponising a digital identity before the fraud or other downstream offending takes place.

As things stand—and I hope the Minister will confirm this and, indeed, that the promised fraud strategy will recognise—the act of identity theft is not recognised in our law as a criminal offence in its own right. The Fraud Act 2006, the Computer Misuse Act 1990, the Data Protection Act 2018 and subsequent data protection Acts all play an important role, but they are concerned primarily with what happens after the identity has been stolen—after the account has been opened, the loan has been taken out or the money has been moved. They address the fraud, the unauthorised access or the misuse of data. What they do not do is grapple squarely with the initial acquisition of personal and sensitive information with the purpose of impersonation.

Indeed, as the House of Lords Fraud Act 2006 and Digital Fraud Committee, chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, heard in evidence, identity theft is still formally regarded in much official material as a social rather than a legal concept. That might have been tolerable in a predominantly analogue world, but it is simply not credible in the age of data breaches, credential stuffing, deepfakes and synthetic identities. Treating identity theft as a mere background condition rather than as a legal wrong in itself leaves people’s most intimate identifiers—biometric data, passwords, national insurance numbers and digital credentials—fundamentally underprotected.

The effect in practice is that law enforcement may feel it has limited tools to intervene at an early stage, even where there is clear evidence that large quantities of personal data have been harvested and traded with a view to impersonation. Instead, the system waits for the fraud, money laundering or other downstream crime to crystallise. By then, the victim’s credit record may be shredded, their bank accounts compromised and their reputation damaged. Yet the initial act of stealing their identity remains conceptually elusive.

The scale and nature of digital identity theft make this gap increasingly untenable. We now know that organised criminals and fraudsters operate, in effect, industrial-scale harvesting operations, feeding on the constant stream of data breaches and leaks from both public and private sector systems. Those databases of stolen credentials are then traded, refined and recombined, very often on the dark web, to facilitate mass impersonation and fraud. This activity is not just an adjunct to fraud. It is, as the Fraud Act 2006 and Digital Fraud Committee rightly described it, a “predicate action”—a necessary precursor to a great deal of online financial crime and, in some cases, to other serious and organised criminality, including terrorism financing.

The threat is being turbocharged by new technologies. Large language models enable highly convincing phishing and social engineering communications at scale and with very low cost. Deepfake audio and video systems allow criminals to mimic a person’s voice or image in ways that can be all but indistinguishable from the real thing. When those tools are combined with rich stolen identity data, criminals can construct synthetic identities or impersonate genuine individuals to open bank accounts, obtain credit cards, register mobile phones and pass remote know your customer checks with alarming ease. In that ecosystem, the act of stealing and collating identity data is itself a sophisticated, harmful criminal enterprise, not simply background noise.

The Bill is rightly concerned with modernising a range of policing and crime powers for the digital age. It updates police powers in relation to electronic devices and remotely stored data and seeks to equip the criminal justice system to deal with contemporary threats, yet it does not deal with this most basic of digital harms: the theft of a person’s identity. That is why this amendment would define a clear, free-standing offence of digital identity theft.

The test that the amendment proposes is straight- forward and proportionate. A person would commit the offence if

“the person intends to use this personal or sensitive information to impersonate that individual, or to enable another person to impersonate that individual, with the purpose of carrying out any transaction, activity, or communication in their name without their consent or lawful authority”.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for tabling the amendment, which would introduce a bespoke criminal offence of digital identity theft. I know that he has tabled similar amendments—he was persistent on these matters during the Data (Use and Access) Bill. I heard the support from the noble Lords, Lord Holmes of Richmond, Lord Fuller and Lord Blencathra, and note that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, put forward a number of caveats to his broad support. These are caveats I share.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, asked whether I would read out a number of amendments to previous legislation. I may disappoint him by reaffirming those issues, as he would expect. Although digital identity theft is not a stand-alone offence, there are, as he recognises, several criminal offences already in existence to cover the behaviour targeted by his amendment. The Fraud Act 2006 made it a criminal offence to gain from the use of another person’s fraud. Cases where accounts or databases are hacked into are criminalised under the Computer Misuse Act 1990. I could read him the offences captured in Sections 2 and 6 of the Fraud Act, Sections 1 and 2 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990, and Section 170 of the Data Protection Act 2018. All apply to the online sphere.

My argument, which the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, might have some sympathy with, is that to create a new criminal offence could be unnecessary duplication. The Fraud Act 2006 captures cases where someone uses another person’s identity and there is an equivalent common-law offence in Scotland. The Fraud Act establishes the offence of someone having in their possession or control an article which includes data or programmes in electronic form. The Computer Misuse Act criminalises unauthorised access and Section 170 of the Data Protection Act covers the deliberate or reckless obtaining, disclosing and procuring of personal data.

That is not to downplay the issue that the noble Lord mentioned. It is important and I recognise the concerns he raised. I hope that the Government will act decisively on these matters. We are currently in the process of transitioning from the Action Fraud service to a new, upgraded platform that will provide a better reporting tool for victims, stronger intelligence flows for police forces and enhanced support for victims. We are looking at doing what the noble Lord wants and upskilling police officers. We have completed a full review of police skills and the recommendations are being delivered through updated police training on this important matter. He will know that this Government have made sure that His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services has now updated the strategic police requirement. That will be published this year and will drive forces to upskill their staff on wider police reform on fraud matters. We want to try to upscale and upskill capability, to ensure the police keep pace with the challenges that the noble Lord has rightly identified.

It is important to take on board the points that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, mentioned in his supportive critique of the proposals in the amendment. The Home Office has commissioned an independent review into disclosure and fraud offences. Part 1 of the review, which addressed disclosure, has been conducted; part 2, with Jonathan Fisher KC leading for the Government, will examine whether the current fraud offences are fit for purpose, and specifically whether they meet the challenges of investigating and prosecuting fraud, and whether existing penalties remain proportionate. I am awaiting that report, which may cover the areas that the noble Lord has mentioned. It is important that we have proper examination of that, and that is currently ongoing.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

Without wishing to interrupt the Minister, could he give us an idea of the timescale? Would it be deliriously possibly to see this report before Report?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I should have tattooed on my forehead the words, “due course”. As ever, the commitment I can give is that it will be produced in due course. Report on the Bill will be some significant time away. We have another five days of Committee, with a gap for recess, and we will have a statutory gap before our consideration on Report after Committee has finished. It is some while away. The noble Lord is very adept at tabling further amendments on Report, should he so wish.

Part 2 of the report is being considered by the Government; we want to examine that and will publish in due course. I expect that, in the very near future, we will be producing the newly updated fraud strategy, which will address the evolving threat of fraud, including the harm caused by identity theft. Before the noble Lord intervenes, I cannot yet give him a date for that either, but I will try to help the Committee by saying that it will be soon. I will bring the fraud strategy to the House in due course, which will potentially cover some of the areas that the noble Lord has mentioned.

There is a lot going on, but there is existing legislation. I anticipate and understand that this is a genuine issue, and I very much welcome the fact that the noble Lord has brought it before us. I hope that on the basis of what I have said, he will—today, at least—withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister and I will respond in a second.

First, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, for agreeing with the thrust of the amendment, in his words, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for his in principle support. I entirely accept the points that he made—indeed, if the additions are not there, they should be. Any amendment that is brought back on Report should definitely take heed of the reservations he raised.

For the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, I was anticipating that, in a sense, there might be too much continuity. During the Data (Use and Access) Bill, his colleagues pushed back on the idea of a digital identity theft offence in rather more adamant terms than the Minister has today. I am grateful for his in principle support, with all the reservations that he had.

The noble Lord, Lord Holmes, encapsulated quite a lot of this. As we move into the world of digital ID, having your digital identity stolen is an issue of digital and financial exclusion. It is going to be increasingly important. I was very interested that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, dug out the figures on this; the scale of digital identity theft is huge, so the number of people affected by what is effectively financial and digital exclusion is only going to grow.

However, I did take some comfort. There was a glimmer of light coming out of the Home Office, and I am not always used to that. I celebrate that, particularly in view of the fact that a review is taking place that may well report in the near future. Whatever the Minister has stamped on his forehead, I am sure he is impatient to see it, given his specific role as the Fraud Minister.

I agree with the Minister about the need for the police to have specific powers and skills. I welcome what he said about the upgraded platform in terms of understanding the evidence that is going to be under- pinning any move towards creating an offence. I think, almost inevitably, I am going to come back with something more refined on Report in the hope that the Home Office review of current fraud offences will come up with the goods. I live in hope, but often where the Home Office is concerned my hopes are only too frequently dashed. I live in hope, and I beg to withdraw Amendment 359.

Amendment 359 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Lord Clement-Jones]

360: After Clause 117, insert the following new Clause—
“Defences to charges under the Computer Misuse Act 1990(1) The Computer Misuse Act 1990 is amended as follows.(2) In section 1, after subsection (2) insert—“(2A) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that—(a) the person’s actions were necessary for the detection or prevention of crime, or(b) the person’s actions were justified as being in the public interest.”.(3) In section 3, after subsection (5) insert—“(5A) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that—(a) the person’s actions were necessary for the detection or prevention of crime, or(b) the person’s actions were justified as being in the public interest.”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment creates defences to charges under the Computer Misuse Act 1990.

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 360 seeks to introduce statutory defences to charges under the Computer Misuse Act 1990. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, again for his support. He has tabled a number of amendments which are companions to this amendment.

The Computer Misuse Act 1990 is widely recognised as outdated. It inadvertently criminalises legitimate and beneficial cyber security research, making the UK a difficult place for cyber experts to operate in. There has been a very vigorous campaign, as I am sure the Minister is aware, the CyberUp campaign, which has made the case very clearly. This anomaly risks undermining our national cyber resilience and the ability of researchers proactively to detect vulnerabilities. This amendment would address this by inserting a statutory defence where unauthorised access was demonstrably necessary for the detection or prevention of crime or carried out in the public interest.

This reform is vital for supporting responsible cyber research and aligning our laws with the needs of the 21st century digital landscape. The CMA was passed in 1990, when cyber security, as we know it today, simply did not exist. At the time, only 0.5% of the UK population regularly used the internet. Critics, including 93% of cyber security professionals surveyed, believe the Act is no longer fit for this century. The current criminal law criminalises unauthorised access irrespective of the good intentions or defensive motivations of the professional.

This has created a perverse situation in which the UK’s cyber defenders are forced to act with one hand tied behind their back. Threat intelligence researchers investigating criminal infrastructure, for instance, are often unable to obtain the explicit consent required under the Act. This has resulted in 80% of surveyed cyber security professionals having worried about breaking the law while investigating cyber threats. This ambiguity and restriction deters a large proportion of the research needed to assess and defend against emerging threats posed by organised criminals and geopolitical actors.

It also limits the UK industry’s capability compared with foreign competitors in countries such as France, Israel and the US, which already offer more permissive legislative regimes. Consequently, the UK cyber industry is held at a competitive disadvantage. This is a clear economic issue, not merely a legal one. Reform of the CMA is essential to securing a robust digital economy. Updating the Act is estimated to unlock up to £2.4 billion in additional annual sector revenue and support the creation of thousands of highly skilled jobs.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I say to the noble Lord—and I hope that he takes this in the way in which I respond—that the review commenced in 2021, and it is now 2026. That is a long time for a review, and I would want to ensure that we come to some conclusions on the 1990 Act. However, at this stage, I cannot give him a timescale for the reasons that I have mentioned, about the complexity of this matter. I along with Minister Jarvis have had custody in the Home Office of these issues since July 2024; that is still three years into a review that was commissioned in 2021. I cannot give him a definitive timescale today, but I hope that the House can accept that there is active consideration of these very important matters raised by Members and that the Home Office plans to reform the Act. I hope that I will demonstrate that we are progressing this work at pace, but we need to get it right. Sadly, we are not going to be able to legislate in this Bill, but there is scope to examine issues at a later date. With those reassurances, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, unusually, light is flooding through the windows of the Home Office, and I thank the Minister, but I shall come back to what he had to say. First, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, for her support. As the Minister said, her huge experience in this area is valuable, and it is really valuable to have her support in those circumstances.

I also say a big thank you to the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, who thinks these things through in a very eloquent fashion. He more or less reminded me that, back in 1990, the thing that I was using was a dial-up Apple Mac Classic—probably a Classic II—which just shows how long ago the Act was.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I do not wish to disturb the noble Lord in full flow, but I have just remembered that I missed an important point for the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, who requested a meeting with either me or another appropriate Minister. I will take that request away and get back to the noble Lord in due course about a meeting with me or my colleague, Minister Dan Jarvis—or both of us—and anybody the noble Lord wishes to bring with him.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

That is a very useful offer for those who are involved in or have an interest in pushing this agenda forward. As the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, also emphasised following the speech from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, it is not just about being out of date; it is positively harmful. The Home Office appears to be aware of that, despite the stately progress on the review. The fact that the Minister has said there is a recognition of the need to update the Act is very helpful. He said that they have made progress in formulating a limited defence, but I am not quite so sure about that—let us see when it arrives. I am sure that he has engraved across his forehead the phrase “an update at some point”. That is not quite as good as “shortly”, but it is perhaps better than “in due course”. One has to take away the crumbs of comfort that one can.

What I take most comfort from is the fact that we have a cyber security and resilience Bill, which will come to this House after hitting the Commons, where it had its Second Reading yesterday. If the Home Office picks up a bit of pace, there might well be the opportunity to produce a clause there to provide the kind of defence that we are talking about today. I understand that the Minister has a rather Trappist vow at this point, in terms of being limited in what can be said, but we very much hope that he can be let loose at some stage in the future. We look forward to that but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 360 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

The level of smartphone thefts and the associated crime wave is a blot on Britain, and especially on London. I urge the Minister to agree to our amendments, which seek to ensure that technology companies use technical measures, such as cloud-based blocking and IMEI-linked device locks, to make the resale of stolen mobile phone devices abroad more difficult, and to bring this into effect six months after Royal Assent. Only this action will materially reduce the incidence of phone thefts in the UK. I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I am pleased to support Amendments 366 and 538, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, and introduced so cogently by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. I thank her for the reference to my honourable friend Martin Wrigley, who helped to identify this particular issue, which addresses the growing problem of mobile phone and device theft, often fuelled by the profitability of reselling these stolen goods overseas.

We are currently facing an epidemic of mobile phone theft, as the noble Baroness said, with reports indicating that phone snatches have increased by as much as 150% in certain areas. Every single day, approximately 200 mobile phones are stolen across the country, with many being destined for a lucrative resale market abroad. These stolen devices remain valuable criminal assets, because, currently, they often can still be accessed or resold even after being reported.

We support Amendment 366 because it seeks to strike at the heart of this criminal profit model. The amendment would ensure that technology companies actively employ technical measures, specifically cloud-based blocking and IMEI-linked device locks, as the noble Baroness described, to deter the resale of stolen mobile phone devices. Without compulsory co-operation from cloud service providers and manufacturers, stolen data and devices will remain valuable criminal assets, even if the physical device is recovered. This is an essential step towards forcing technical solutions from technology companies to counter the incentives for theft.

Amendment 538 would provide the industry with a necessary and reasonable lead-in period, specifying that these cloud service access restrictions will come into force six months after the Act is passed. This would ensure that technology companies have the time required to implement the necessary technical standards and administrative processes.

For too long, the manufacturers and cloud providers have treated device theft as a secondary concern. It is time that they work in a much more customer-friendly manner, in the way that the noble Baroness described, and use their immense technical capabilities to simply turn these devices into mute bricks the moment they are stolen, thereby removing the incentive for the crime altogether. I very much hope that the Minister will accept these common-sense measures to protect our property and safety.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, ably explained by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. I may cover some of the same ground—I was only grateful that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, intervened, because people might have forgotten some of the points made, but if I amplify them too much I am sure that somebody will remind me. I was particularly keen to support the amendment because, in the past, I have criticised the police for a lack of enforcement and detection—but of course, they cannot do everything.

We know that organised crime, which I will come to later, is about money; it is just another form of business. Theft is driven by people trying to make a profit. The amendment is all about the commercial business of mobile phone sales—some of it legal but some of it criminal. Apparently, there are about 88 million mobile phones in this country. They can be about £1,000 each, so that is a market of about £88 billion or something of that order. It is a massive market. In 2023, the purchase of these devices totalled £5.8 billion, and there is another £2.5 billion-worth of services that they provide and that we all pay for, from data to the general use of a mobile phone. This, by any measure, is a massive business.

The value of the phones stolen, as the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, mentioned, was about £20 million, with a reinsurance value of £50 million. The number of phones stolen in the UK is about 120,000, with two-thirds of this happening in London. It is a big city, and there are an awful lot of targets for the criminals wandering about. As they leave the Tube, people take their phone out to get a signal, as we all want, and to check on the messages they have not received while they were on the Tube. That is where the criminals spot them, and they then follow them to a place where they relieve them of their phone. I suspect that is one reason why we see so much of this in London. Clearly, the business model works very well here.

These are the crimes that are reported. An awful lot of phones that are stolen are never reported. I have talked to people in this place who have not reported their phone as stolen because there has been a level of embarrassment about the fact that it has happened to them on the street—they have just got another phone. We only know about the bare minimum of the number of phones that have been stolen in the course of a year.

On many occasions, violence is used. Just the ripping of a phone from a hand can lead to somebody trying to hold on to it, and we never know where that contest might end. If somebody ends up on the floor, violence can follow and the physical consequences can be quite severe.

As far as the mobile phone industry is concerned, £20 million is a very small number compared to an £88 billion market. More importantly, as the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, pointed out, the industry benefits, because when you have your phone stolen you go back to get another one. So why would it stop this? There is no financial incentive to actually do anything about it. There might be a moral one, but I am afraid it looks as though the moral incentive is not having an awful lot of effect. Of course, none of the manufacturers or the networks tries to lead in the market by saying that if their phone is stolen then it cannot be used. There is no market incentive for one manufacturer to say that its phone is better because it cannot be stolen, or, alternatively, that if it is stolen then it has no value. There is no effect on the market that is helping to prevent the theft of phones.

It is all to do with organised crime. There are some fancy definitions—one or two people in the Chamber may know of them—of organised crime and what is it all about. It is about money. It is about being organised enough to steal things in such a volume and have somebody to buy them which means that they have been worth stealing in the first place. The market they are involved in is enforced by violence. There is no monopolies commission supervision of this market, whether it be drugs or mobile phones; it is enforced by violence to ensure that they succeed and that other people fail. It is therefore really important that we get this right.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, said, the resale value of a mobile phone that has been stolen is about £300 to £400. The thief does not get £300 to £400, but, by the time it has gone through a few hands, that is the return that they are expecting. To pay everybody out, they need to get £300 to £400 to make sure that it works.

The problem is that 78% of the phones that are stolen are going abroad, as has been said, and we cannot seem to stop them at the border. This is not entirely surprising. Phones are very small items and some 90% of the world’s goods travel by sea, in containers. Without intelligence, the chance of finding mobile phones is very limited. Therefore, we are not able to physically stop the phones leaving the country and going to places such as Algeria and China. At the moment, the police are fighting a losing battle to catch the thieves, who are low down the organised crime chain, and trying to prevent the export of stolen phones. As I said, given the size of a phone, that is quite difficult: they are looking for a very small needle in a very large haystack.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 15th December 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Clement-Jones]

317: Clause 87, page 100, line 34, at end insert—
“(aa) if the name change is by deed poll, seven days prior to submitting an application for change of name (if that day is earlier than the day specified in paragraph (a)), or” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that if a person is changing their name by deed poll, they must notify a new name to the police prior to submitting the application.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, this group of amendments addresses a vital aspect of public protection, closing the loopholes that allow registered sex offenders to evade detection and monitoring by changing their identity. Effective management of offenders in the 21st century requires a justice system that is not only legally robust but properly resourced and technologically capable.

On these Benches, we strongly welcome Clause 87, which requires sex offenders to notify the police of a name change seven days before using that new name, in the words of the clause. This is a significant improvement on the current retrospective notification regime, which has allowed offenders to disappear from the radar of the authorities. However, my Amendment 317 seeks to tighten this provision further regarding deed polls. As currently drafted, an offender could theoretically go through the legal process of obtaining a deed poll to change their name without the police being aware until the moment they intend using it, again using the language of Clause 87.

My amendment specifies that if a name change is by deed poll, the offender must notify the police seven days prior to submitting the application. This would ensure that the police are alerted at the very start of the administrative process of changing identity rather than at the end. It provides authorities with the vital time needed to conduct appropriate risk assessments and, if necessary, intervene before a new legal identity is formally established. This proposal has been championed by campaigners such as Sarah Champion MP in the other place, and it is a common-sense safeguard to ensure that the police are always one step ahead.

I stress that the management of offenders today is not just about physical monitoring but about digital monitoring. Just as we have seen criminal recruitment drives for money mules take place on social media platforms, we know that the internet provides avenues for offenders to reoffend or breach their conditions. Although Amendment 317 seeks to tighten the management regime legislative framework, I urge the Government to ensure that the police and relevant agencies have the digital resources and data-sharing capabilities required to enforce these new powers effectively rather than relying on a fragmented system that allows offenders to slip through the net. This measure would strengthen the safety net around our communities immeasurably. I hope that the Minister will accept this amendment as a logical extension of the Government’s own objectives in Clause 87. I beg to move.

[Baroness Maclean of Redditch (Con)]

My Lords, the Gender Recognition Act 2004 was designed for a world with low demand for gender recognition certificates and did not anticipate modern safeguarding realities. I believe that that context has fundamentally changed, and that creates a serious gap that my amendment seeks to close. The system is no longer confined to a small number of older adults. New Ministry of Justice data shows that almost 10,000 GRCs have been issued. Last year alone, over 1,169 were granted. That is the highest number on record and more than triple the annual figure five years ago. This is quite a dramatic generational shift: almost a quarter of new certificates now go to people born since the year 2000. Demand has changed but safeguarding has not kept up.

I recently tabled a Written Question to the Government after I had seen multiple cases of male-born sex offenders changing their gender identity, so by the time they appeared in court or were sent to prison they identified as women. I was curious, so I asked the Government what safeguards would prevent a convicted rapist or sex offender going on to obtain a gender recognition certificate and being legally recognised as a woman. First, I was troubled that this Question, when it came to be answered, had been transferred to the Minister for Equalities rather than being answered by the Home Office. I believe it is fundamentally a matter of safety and not about equality. It should have been answered by the Home Office, so I worry that that demonstrates a confusion at the heart of the Government on this issue. Rape and sex offences are not about equality or identity but about safety.

Moreover, and more importantly, the response ignored the core issue. While of course we welcome the measures on name changes, passports and police notification, they do not prevent a convicted sex offender, if I understand it correctly, changing their legal sex under the Gender Recognition Act and going on to live the remainder of their life legally as a woman. To me, that highlights a serious safeguarding gap, and this amendment seeks to close that.

Noble Lords may ask why this is necessary and what this risk is that I speak about. We must be frank—sexual predators cannot be cured. The risk may be managed but it is not eliminated. That is why we have the lifelong monitoring regimes we have. That is why MAPPA exists and why I believe that the law must ensure that those who pose a permanent risk to women and girls, and men and boys, cannot access a legal mechanism that alters their status in ways that Parliament never intended.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I remind the Committee that the position of any of these individuals—as the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, mentioned in her initial contribution—will be subject to consistently heavy management. These are serious offenders. There is a Probation Service. There is a MAPPA process. There is the registration. I have given the assurance that both names will be included in that registration.

Every piece of legislation that any House of Commons and House of Lords passes is subject to people breaking it. That happens, but there will be significant consequences in the event of that occurring. I am simply saying to the noble Baroness who has proposed this amendment, and to the proposals in the Bill that are genuinely welcome across the Committee, that there is significant supervision of sex offenders, and the requirements are as I have outlined to the Committee already. I hope that on that basis, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. I am glad he focused on risk mitigation, and I think we got there in the final few paragraphs of his response. We need to take very seriously what he said, and I hope that if anything he said needs qualification, he will write to us subsequently, because this is a really important area.

--- Later in debate ---

Prolonged and sustained abuse, particularly where it involves coercive control and psychological harm, can be the catalyst for the deepest despair and ultimately for the loss of life. The amendment would recognise this and encourage judges, coroners and police to investigate these cases thoroughly so that victims are no longer failed in death as they were in life. I urge the Government to consider it carefully and I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I follow my noble friend Lady Doocey in this small but perfectly formed group of amendments. My Amendment 335 would mandate a statutory consultation on the guidance to accompany the new encouraging or assisting serious self-harm offences contained in Clauses 102 and 103.

On these Benches we welcome the underlying intention of Clauses 102 and 103 to implement the Law Commission’s recommendations for a broader offence covering encouragement or assistance of serious self-harm, expanding beyond digital communication to include direct assistance. However, offences that involve encouraging self-harm must be handled with the utmost care, given the vulnerabilities inherent in such cases. The critical issue here is the risk of inadvertently criminalising legitimate support services, which has been raised with us by a number of support organisations.

The offence requires a specific intention to encourage or assist serious self-harm. This is intended to ensure that charitable organisations and mental health professionals who advise sufferers on how to moderate or manage self-harming behaviour are not criminalised. My amendment addresses this directly by requiring the Secretary of State to produce guidance and consult extensively with representatives of self-harm support charities and organisations; mental health professionals, including those providing trauma-informed care; and legal experts—prosecutors and defence practitioners—regarding the application of the specific intent requirement. This mandatory consultation is essential, in our view, to ensure that the statutory guidance clearly differentiates between criminal encouragement and legitimate therapeutic activity. Without ensuring that this guidance is informed by experts and laid before Parliament, we risk confusion among front-line practitioners and the inadvertent penalisation of those working hardest to help vulnerable people. I hope the Government will give serious consideration to this amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I fully appreciate the general principle behind these proposals. This is an incredibly serious subject, and I appreciate the sincerity with which the noble Baronesses have approached the debate.

On the amendment in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Blower, everyone wants to reach a scenario where all possibilities are accounted for, and there are no loopholes through which those who either encourage or abet self-harm can jump. It is for that reason that I cannot offer my support for proposed subsection (6) in the noble Baronesses’ amendment. First, I am sceptical of the need for more aggravating factors. The general offences that fall under loosely defined so-called honour-based abuse are crimes themselves, so I am unsure why there is a need to create an aggravating offence when a criminal will already be able to be tried for those offences individually.

Primarily, though, I do not think this is the right time to be incorporating new definitions into our legal framework. There is guidance for Crown prosecutors as to what might fall under honour-based abuse and examples as to how that might look, but it is yet to be enshrined in law and it is a rather broad and non-exclusive term within our law. That is not to say that it is not easy to spot—it often is—but it should have its own delineated legal definition before it is made an aggravating factor. I agree with the noble Baroness that honour-based abuse is an increasing issue that we must tackle head on, but that cannot be done with a single amendment. However, I offer my support to the principle behind proposed subsection (6)(b).

I welcome the sentiment behind Amendment 335 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. Policy rooted in pragmatism is crucial, and consultation and guidance are one of the primary ways to achieve that. The Government should base all the policy that they bring forward on the testimonies of people who dedicate their lives to the subjects that we legislate on, and that it is especially important for a policy in such a sensitive area as this. I hope the Minister agrees, and I look forward to her response.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for tabling Amendments 334A and 335 respectively.

I am aware of the cases that have motivated the desire to have an amendment such as Amendment 334A, and I completely understand; the stories that the noble Baroness outlined cannot fail to move anyone listening to them. Having said that, the Government will not be supporting either of these amendments today, for the following reasons.

I shall deal first with the amendment by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. When a defendant has previous convictions, including those relating to a history of domestic abuse, that is already recognised as a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing. In addition, aggravating factors that are associated with honour-based abuse, such as abuse of trust or targeting vulnerable victims, are already covered in the domestic abuse guidelines. The presence of aggravating factors such as these should therefore already result in the sentence reflecting those factors, and in my experience it always would. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, about not adding an ever-increasing list of statutory aggravating factors. This is certainly the third group of amendments that I have dealt with that has proposed different forms of offences.

On the second aspect of the amendment, proposed subsection (6)(b) raises a sensitive and important issue. The Government wholeheartedly agree that, when it can be proved that suicide was the result of abuse or encouragement, the abuser should be held accountable. There are existing offences that cover this situation, such as manslaughter or encouraging or assisting suicide offences, which have maximum penalties of life imprisonment and 14 years’ imprisonment respectively. However, imposing a requirement for the court to sentence the defendant in those circumstances as though they had been convicted of murder, when in fact they have not been convicted of murder, would be at odds not only with the current sentencing approach but with the principle that people are sentenced only for matters that have been proved to the satisfaction of the court. I also make the perhaps obvious comment that there is no range of sentences for murder; there is only one sentence, which is life imprisonment. For those reasons, amending Clause 102 in this way would not be appropriate.

However, I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that the Law Commission is currently undertaking a review of homicide offences and of sentencing for murder, and this will include a review of the use of, and the obstacles to using, manslaughter offences where abuse may have driven someone to suicide. I hope that the noble Baroness will understand why the Government are reluctant to make any piecemeal amendments in advance of the Law Commission reporting.

I turn to Amendment 335, from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I thank the noble Lord for his welcome of the offence. As to the guidance that he proposes in the consultation, as many in this Committee are aware, I was principal legal adviser to a rather well-known former Director of Public Prosecutions—I spent five years working for the Crown Process Service—so it is important to me to emphasise that it is in fact for the independent Crown Prosecution Service to update guidance on prosecuting offences under this new provision. It may well be that many noble Lords know this but, while the statutory Code for Crown Prosecutors governs in general terms how prosecutors make decisions on which cases to prosecute and which not, sitting underneath that is a raft of legal guidance that is published and publicly available. It exists for two reasons: the first is so that members of the public can see the basis on which the CPS makes its decisions, but the second is so that the CPS can be held to account. If it fails to follow its own guidance, that will often provide a ground for challenging the decision made.

I understand that the noble Lord’s amendment aims to ensure that legitimate support or therapeutic activity is not criminalised, so I reassure him that the offence has been carefully drafted to avoid capturing vulnerable individuals or those providing mental health support. The offence as drafted in the Bill was recommended by the Law Commission in its 2021 malicious communications report and contains two key safeguards: first, that the person must intend to encourage or assist serious self-harm and without such intent no offence would be committed; and, secondly, that serious self-harm is defined as harm amounting to grievous bodily harm. These safeguards ensure that the offence targets only the most serious and culpable behaviour and protects those who are, for example, sharing personal experience or discussing self-harm but not encouraging it.

The offence also does not cover the glorification or glamorisation of self-harm. The Law Commission found that that was too broad and would potentially capture vulnerable people who might then be exposed to prosecution: so, taking on board the commission’s comments, the Government have not included that.

In our view, this approach ensures that the offence is necessary, proportionate and focused on genuinely harmful acts. There is also a further protection for the vulnerable, which is provided by the public interest stage of the full code test. This requires that, even where there is sufficient evidence, prosecutors must consider whether or not a prosecution is required in the public interest, and plainly the vulnerabilities of the potential defendant would come into play at that stage.

I hope that the reasons I have provided clearly set out why the Government do not support either of these amendments today, and I ask that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, do not press their respective amendments.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I thank the Minister, who has carefully taken us through three limbs, as far as I tell: first, there will be CPS guidance in terms of the specific offence, in the way that it decides whether or not to prosecute; secondly, the way that the offence itself has been drafted; and, thirdly, the public interest test. However, will she engage with the organisations that are concerned about the offences? I think I understand what she is saying about intent, grievous bodily harm and the other limbs that mean we will not see the kinds of prosecutions that people are concerned about, but will the MoJ engage with the organisations that have concerns?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. As far as the first of the three protections is concerned, obviously I cannot bind the Crown Prosecution Service—the whole point about it is that it is independent of government. However, based on my own experiences, where there are areas of the law that plainly need clarification as to when the Crown Prosecution Service would prosecute and when it would not, it usually issues guidance. As regards engaging with the organisations, of course, it is sometimes not easy to explain the law and the thinking behind it. It is in everyone’s interests that the organisations which are concerned for vulnerable people understand that the Government have those interests very much at heart. I would welcome the opportunity to explain to them.

Social Media: Scam Adverts and Fraudulent Content

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Thursday 11th December 2025 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Clement-Jones]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the role social media platforms play in enabling scam adverts and fraudulent content.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

The Government take seriously the criminal abuse of online advertising to promote scams, distribute malware and launch phishing attacks. All social media platforms and advertisers must play a role in driving out fraudulent activity. Under the Online Safety Act, the largest social media and search services will be required to address fraudulent adverts on their platforms. More can be done, and further action will be set out in the Government’s forthcoming fraud strategy, for which I am responsible.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, we face a wave of increasingly sophisticated AI-generated scams, yet, despite what the Minister has said, Ofcom’s updated road map has pushed the consultation on the codes of practice for fraudulent advertising into mid-2026, meaning that new online safety protections are unlikely to be fully in force until 2027. Given the rapid evolution of AI fraud, what steps are the Government—and indeed the Minister, as the designated Fraud Minister—taking to speed up the vital protections provided by the Act? Will the Government ensure that robust action against all scam advertising is included in the fraud strategy and will be quickly implemented?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. I met with Ofcom recently. I know that the facts he has laid before the House are correct, but Ofcom wishes to proceed at pace to ensure that it can bring that regulation into power as soon as possible. Early in the new year, I will produce the revised fraud strategy. The previous Government had a three-year fraud strategy. We have updated that. It has taken about 15 months to work on it. The fraud strategy will look at a number of key threats, and the emergence and future threats of AI will be a key aspect of the government responses. I hope I can bring the fraud strategy before the House in relatively short order in the new year for consideration, discussion and implementation.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 19th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I think I can say yes to both those points. If I cannot, I shall revert to her shortly.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, on these Benches, we support the intent behind this blizzard of government amendments. Of course, as the Minister says, the effect of these amendments and other consequential changes is to apply tougher maximum penalties and provisions relating to offensive weapons in Scotland and, in certain cases, Northern Ireland.

It would be extremely useful if the Minister could say whether the law in each of the home nations is the same. I assume that is the effect of all these different amendments—that the UK should be on exactly the same footing, however and wherever you commit that offence. Even though I understand that it was at the request, in the first instance, of the Scottish Government.

We very much support the way in which the amendments reflect the gravity of the kinds of violence that plague our communities from these offensive weapons and that the manufacture, supply and possession of these articles will be met with the full force of the law. We welcome not only the amendments but the original provisions of the Bill, but we need to think of not just penalties but prevention. I hope some of those provisions will make individuals accountable with the digital identity, which we also support.

Like the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, I would like an answer to the question of whether the analogue identity provision will continue. Otherwise, that could lead to forms of digital exclusion, which I do not think that we or the Minister would welcome.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for the noble Lord’s comments, which I will respond to in a moment, but it is important that I clarify the point referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. I was half right. The answer “yes” is to the question of passports; it is correct that digital passports or driving licences can be approved documents. There is a power by regulation to add other documents; at the moment, the PASS card is not added to that as a form of identification, but obviously it potentially can be in due course, if Governments decide to add that. That will again be subject to regulation. I apologise, but the noble Baroness asked me a question and I gave her the answer in good faith, but it is best that we clarify that point now.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and I am genuinely sorry. I understand where he is coming from, and I am grateful to him and the Opposition Whips’ Office for giving notification that they would have concerns over those matters, but I am sorry that he has done it. We are in the 21st century; digital ID is becoming a commonplace issue. I understand that we are going to have steps to have age verification, such as acceptable digital ID, as the norm in future.

As I set out earlier, it is to allow different forms of digital ID to be used to verify purchasers’ identity information. When changes to the acceptable proofs of identity, digital or otherwise, are proposed, they will be subject to the affirmative procedure, so there would have been an opportunity for the noble Lord, and in both Houses, to oppose or question at that time, but I understand where he is coming from. I am of the view that as technology progresses, there will be different types of digital ID which might be acceptable. It is not an attempt by the Government to speed up or usurp the process; it is just future-proofing, because there may be digital ID on a range of issues.

As an example, I have a digital and a hard copy of my railcard. I show both at different times, depending on which one is easiest to get to. Digital ID is progressing, and it will continue to do so. There are potentially new digital documents, such as the recently announced digital ID card, coming downstream. As with any new legislation, that is still a matter for Parliament to consider, but if a Bill comes before the House—after the outcome of a consultation, it might be in the next few weeks—that is something we are trying to future-proof accordingly.

I hope that, given those assurances, the noble Lord is prepared to support all the amendments, but I guess that he will not—that is a reasonable position for him to take and one we must look at. To help him today, in a genuine spirit of trying to help, if the noble Lord remains unpersuaded, which I think he is—he confirms that he is—I will move only Amendments 57 to 70 and Amendments 193 to 209 to Clauses 28 and 29, respectively. I will not move Amendment 210A, which makes equivalent provision for Northern Ireland to that contained in Clause 36 and, in due course, the related consequential and drafting amendments to the Bill, so that we can look at these matters on Report and not have that debate and discussion today. At this stage, I will not move the amendments to Clauses 31 to 35 and the associated back-of-the-Bill consequential amendments. The Committee should rest assured that I will bring them back on Report, and if the noble Lord has his disagreements then, we will test the House. If the House votes one way, we accept it; if it votes the other way, we potentially test the House again. That is a matter for discussion and debate downstream.

There is nothing to fear from the proposals for someone having a digital ID and showing it when receiving a knife or weapon through the post. That is not something to be afraid of. We are in the 21st century —I am in the 21st century at least, let us put it that way. We will go from there.

I also assure the noble Lord that paper documents such as passports and driving licences will be acceptable as forms of ID, as well as potentially any digital versions of those in due course. I hope that satisfies his question.

I welcome, in a spirit of co-operation and consensus, the agreement from both Front Benches to the provisions for Northern Ireland and Scotland, so that in those areas there is a United Kingdom response from the three Administrations who deal with these matters in a devolved or non-devolved way. I commend the amendments I said I would move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

Before the Minister sits down, I thank him for what he said. I am slightly baffled. There is no Bench more strongly against compulsory digital ID than the Liberal Democrat Benches, so I find the Minister’s assurance that the analogue form of identity will continue—and digital ID in this instance, whatever is prescribed by the Secretary of State, is an alternative form of identification—wholly convincing, but if we must come back on Report and debate this at length, so be it.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

Will the noble Lord respond on the mandatory conditions on the digital proof-of-age pass, which he confirmed would be published before December?

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Moved by

[Lord Clement-Jones]

122: After Clause 32, insert the following new Clause—
“Sale and delivery of knives: review(1) The Secretary of State must review the impact of sections 31 and 32 of this Act within two years of these sections coming into force.(2) A review under subsection (1) must consider—(a) the effect of sections 31 and 32 in preventing the online sale of knives to those under the age of 18,(b) whether safety design regulation would limit the availability of knives that may be used in violent offences, and(c) what mechanisms could be used to improve data collection by the police of bladed articles used in all knife-related crimes.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to review the effectiveness of sections 31 and 32 in preventing the online sale of knives to under 18s, and requires the review to look at other measures that might limit the availability of knives that could be used in violent offences.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, while we welcome the effort to strengthen accountability for businesses and sellers in tackling online knife sales, we must ensure that these new powers are effective, enforceable and subject to continuous review.

In moving Amendment 122, I also speak to Amendment 194. Both aim to enhance the long-term effectiveness and impact of this legislation. Amendment 122 would insert a new clause immediately after Clause 32. It would mandate that the Secretary of State conducts a review of the impact of Sections 31 and 32 of what will be the Act within two years of these provisions coming into force.

New powers addressing the remote sale of knives are crucial, yet legislative intervention alone is rarely sufficient to address a complex societal challenge such as knife crime. I recall some years ago running a project in the London Borough of Lambeth on precisely this issue, and it was extremely complex dealing with young people in this particular area. We must ensure that the mechanisms we are implementing, such as the requirement for physical ID on delivery and the provisions for age verification, and indeed those mentioned by the Minister, moving towards digital verification, are actually achieving the desired result and preventing the online sale of knives to under-18s. The review must go beyond merely confirming compliance. Crucially, it must also look at other measures that might limit the availability of knives that could be used in violent offences, such as the design of knives—for instance, by changing kitchen knives available online to rounded ends.

Home Office statistics indicate that two-thirds of the identified knives used to kill people in a single year are kitchen knives. We are very much on the same page as the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, with his Amendment 123. We must not stand still but use real- world evidence of what works in tackling and preventing violent crime. We need to continuously monitor and assess the effectiveness of the solutions we put in place. Amendment 194 relates to Clause 36:

“Duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk”.


Clause 36 introduces the requirement for sellers to report bulk sales, an essential provision for tackling the grey market and ensuring accountability. However, for this provision to be an effective law enforcement tool, the information reported must be timely.

My amendment would require regulations made under Clause 36(1) to include a clear provision that any reportable sale must be notified to the specified person in real time or as soon as is reasonably practicable. Furthermore, to eliminate any ambiguity, the amendment would set a hard stop specifying that notification must occur, in any event, no later than the delivery of the bladed articles or the end of the day on which the seller became aware that the sale constituted a reportable sale. If we expect law enforcement agencies to use this reporting data to intervene and prevent crimes, giving them advance warning is paramount. A delay in reporting a suspicious bulk purchase renders the power largely reactive rather than preventive, and this amendment would simply ensure that the regulations implement the duty to report as soon as possible, turning bureaucratic compliance into actionable intelligence. I hope the Government will support Amendment 122 to ensure accountability and scrutiny over time and Amendment 194 to ensure that the immediate operational impact of the new bulk reporting duties is maximised. I beg to move.

[Lord Hampton (CB)]

My Lords, my Amendment 123 says:

“Within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must launch a consultation”—


as a teacher, marking my own homework, I realise that the drafting is then wrong and it should say “on a ban on sharp-tipped knives”. In this, I associate myself with the words of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I am a teacher, and two years ago my school lost a student to knife crime. With respect to my noble friend Lord Russell of Liverpool, who is not in his place but who at Second Reading warned that there must not be too much law, I will use the analogy that amendments are like cars: everybody agrees that there are too many but nobody wants to give up their own. According to the ONS, last year 46% of homicides in the UK were with a sharp instrument, and 50% of those were with a kitchen knife. It was 52% the year before. Combat knives account for 6% and zombie knives 2%. Are we looking in the wrong direction here? Should we be looking within the home?

I am very grateful to Graham Farrell, professor of crime science at the University of Leeds, the Youth Endowment Fund and the Ben Kinsella Trust for their help. If anybody has not watched Idris Elba’s brilliantly thought-provoking film “Our Knife Crime Crisis”, I heartily recommend it. It is still available on BBC iPlayer.

Pointed-tipped knives are significantly more lethal than round-tipped knives, as shown by forensic studies on penetrative damage. A rounded knife will not penetrate clothing, let alone kill. Domestic settings are high-risk environments—especially for women—in which kitchen knives are readily available and often used in fatal attacks. Blade magazine disagrees. It says:

“The harsh truth is this: no amount of blunted blades, banned kitchen knives, or bureaucratic licensing schemes will stop individuals hell-bent on violence. You can’t legislate evil out of existence by targeting inanimate objects. England doesn’t have a knife problem—it has a people problem. A system problem. A failure-to-act-when-it-matters problem”.


But it is not the situation in which a perpetrator has planned their attack and carefully obtained or adapted a weapon to kill that this would prevent. It is the impulse homicide, particularly within a home environment, that we are trying to reduce here.

Situational crime prevention theory supports reducing crime opportunities by altering environments and tools, such as replacing lethal knives with safer ones. Rounded-tipped knives reduce temptation and harm, making impulsive violence less deadly without affecting culinary function. Small paring knives that do not penetrate far enough could be used in kitchens where a sharp point is really needed. Evidence also shows that crime rarely displaces to other weapons when access to one is restricted. Alternative weapons, such as scissors or screwdrivers, are less effective and less available and carry a lower status, thereby reducing their appeal. Dining knives are already rounded, showing a public tolerance for safer designs in everyday life. There are also policy parallels, with phase-outs such as incandescent light bulbs, diesel cars and the smoking ban.

The expected outcomes from this include a halving of knife-related homicides, reducing other knife crimes and preventing thousands of injuries. Can we please just have a consultation on this?

--- Later in debate ---

These issues in relation to knives are extremely important. I say finally to the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, that we are actively exploring options to strengthen enforcement and prevention measures, particularly in relation to the pointed ends of knives. That will form part of the discussions that we have. I say to both noble Lords that this is a work in progress. We will consult still further. I hope that with those assurances the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, before I come to the Minister’s very constructive response, I want to thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. It has been a very valuable debate, and we have had a huge degree of consensus on the way forward. I very much welcome what the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, had to say about there being no easy answers. I would say that he is lethal not just at the checkout but elsewhere in this House.

On a serious note, we have a common cause here to prevent knife crime in any way we possibly can. I very much appreciated what the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, had to say with his experience as a headteacher. He quite rightly gave Idris Elba a namecheck, as he has done so much towards the cause of knife crime prevention. I accept what the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, had to say in caveating this kind of review. It could be as specific as the Minister has said, in looking in particular at design. He certainly indicated that in his response.

I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst—and I very much appreciate the support from the Opposition Front Bench. As he says, it is legitimate to seek adjustments in response to the evidence; that is a very important point that was made. When he says that this is a moderate measure, I will take that; I think moderate is good in this context.

I come to what the Minister had to say. He said that the current provisions were an honest attempt to tackle these issues. I entirely take that, but I also took a lot of comfort from what he said about what the Government are doing to explore further preventive measures, including perhaps licensing schemes, or whatever. I very much hope that, between Committee and Report, we can discover a bit more about the shape of that. I also took comfort in what he had to say about the content of the regulations: that appropriate timescales would be included in those regulations.

On the basis of those two assurances—I think the Minister has responded—we can take some comfort in the fact that we are not only seeking answers but continuing to question whether we have all the answers.

[Lord Hampton (CB)]

Before the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, sits down, can I correct a quick note of fact? It is very kind of him to promote me massively, but I am a simple design technology teacher. I have a very good headteacher way above me.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 122 withdrawn.

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[Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington (CB)]

My Lords, I also support the amendments put forward by my friend and colleague, my noble friend Lord Hogan-Howe. I will address the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for a short period. He was a Minister, as was one other person in this Committee, when I was a senior police officer. I do not remember the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, once instigating or taking through legislation that did not have an effect. That is a fact.

The other thing I am going to disclose—I was going to keep it secret, but I know I can trust all of you and that you are all positively vetted—is that when the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, left he was given a helmet, as was the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey. She was also an extremely effective Minister in my time. The noble Lord was offered a truncheon, but he decided that his shepherd’s stick was far more effective than a truncheon, so we did not give it to him. As a matter of record, I used my truncheon once. I was chasing someone down Tottenham Court Road. I hit him three times and it had absolutely no effect. From then on, I never used it. However, on the flying squad, when we were going to violent robberies where we had intelligence that weapons were being used, we used pickaxe handles. They are far more effective.

This is a move in the right direction. I think the noble Lord described it as a practical approach. We need a common-sense approach to things such as straight truncheons and all the other issues that have been raised this afternoon. It has been a great debate as far as I am concerned, but we will make a difference. Following the approach of my dear friend the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and his historical delivery in terms of what he delivered with the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, in the time they were Ministers, we will make a difference.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, far be it from me to disagree with two former commissioners; that would be extremely inadvisable. We have heard the word “liberal” used twice in this debate, which shows that interpretations can vary.

In this House, we learn something new every day. I had no idea that we can trace pre-1945 steel in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, described. I thank him for his clear and expert introduction to his amendments, which seek to refine the definitions and provide necessary defences within the existing offensive weapons legislation.

His amendments that seek exemption for agricultural tools and historical and cultural items seem entirely sensible to us on these Benches. They would protect legitimate interests in the film, theatre and television industries, as well as non-public museums, and seek to prevent the law from becoming obsolete or unnecessarily broad. We are entirely comfortable with ensuring that while we crack down on those who equip themselves for violence, we do not punish collectors, farmers or those engaged in artistic production. To us, these are common sense amendments that safeguard the legitimate possession and use of articles that could otherwise be caught by broad definitions, and we support them.

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, the education of townies such as myself continues. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Brady of Altrincham, for his Amendments 214A and 438, which aim to deregulate sound moderators, muzzle brakes and flash hiders. It had not occurred to me that they would be caught by the legislation, so this measure, explicitly designed to alleviate the administrative burden on police firearms licensing departments without increasing risk or danger to the public, seems eminently sensible. Police resources are already stretched, and we are demanding an increased focus on neighbourhood visibility—we have talked about this during the passage of the Bill—so we support sensible deregulation that removes unnecessary bureaucracy without compromising public safety. We support these amendments.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this is a group of relatively straightforward and common-sense amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Brady of Altrincham. It tends to carry out the Government’s own consultation results in a careful and measured way.

Amendment 214A, moved by my noble friend Lord Brady, is a simple procedural measure that implements the Government’s own recommendations. As my noble friend set out, this amendment would not impact, let alone endanger, the public. Sound moderators are inert objects that contain no moving parts. They do not enhance the ability of a firearm, nor is there significant evidence of them being used in crime. The Government have themselves concluded that removing regulation of them will not pose any risk to public safety. I understand the original logic of including them in many firearms regulations, but, in practice, it means that police firearms officers must now obtain a certificate. It is an administrative burden that is not necessary.

Amendment 438 acts much in the same vein. It would require a review of the administrative burdens that noise and flash accessories place upon the police. The Government’s own previous consultation on the latter demonstrated that there is scope here for reform; to expand that to cover other accessories seems a very logical step.

We should aim to remove bureaucratic and administrative hurdles wherever they appear. This is particularly the case for the police, as our forces are under strain. This measure is evidently a small reform among many that should be made and is based on the right principle.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 17th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

The House will be relieved to know I will be mercifully brief on this occasion. Until 1968 the Met and other police forces used CID officers to do SOCO work—that is, collecting forensic evidence at the scenes of crimes. For many it was not their speciality and they often damaged vital evidence. Police forces realised that teams of dedicated civilians who specialise in gathering evidence at crime scenes could do a better job. Naturally, the Police Federation opposed any civilians being brought in to do it. Now, civilians do command and dispatch—which used to be done by serving officers—investigation support, and crime analysis. Over the years the police service has had to recognise, reluctantly in my opinion, that a constable of whatever rank may not be the best-qualified person to undertake increasingly complex tasks. We see credit card fraud going through the roof because there is practically no one in any police force capable of investigating it. Goodness knows who could do it —forensic accountants, perhaps.

All I am seeking here is an assurance from the Minister that this important co-ordinating role will not go to an inspector or a superintendent unless he or she is an absolute expert on the internet and online sales. This requires a switched-on internet geek, and not necessarily a uniformed bobby. Can the Minister assure me that the police will recruit for this role the best-qualified person, from wherever that person comes from, provided that he or she passes all the integrity tests, and that the guidance envisaged in the clause will say so? I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I must say, I admire the range of interventions made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. I do not want him to fall back on his seat, but on this occasion, we have some sympathy with the two amendments he has put forward. This group addresses the establishment of the new civil penalty regime for online advertising, a measure which we on these Benches support for its goal of strengthening accountability for online platforms. The introduction of civil penalties in this part of the Bill is intended to tackle the online grey market that facilitates the sale of illegal weapons, enabling earlier intervention and prevention of offensive weapon crimes. We must ensure that the framework we establish is not only robust legally but operationally effective in the digital age.

Amendment 55B tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, concerning Clause 13, focuses specifically on the essential role of the co-ordinating officer. Clause 13 mandates that the Secretary of State designate a member of a relevant police force or a National Crime Agency officer as the co-ordinating officer for this chapter. The amendment proposes that:

“The coordinating officer need not be a constable but must be someone versed in the internet and online sales and purchases”.


We on these Benches recognise that 21st-century crime fighting is no longer solely about boots on the ground. It relies heavily on specialised digital expertise to effectively police online marketplaces and hold search services and user-to-user services accountable. The designated officer must possess deep knowledge of digital platform sales techniques and online advertising mechanisms, as the noble Lord indicated. By explicitly allowing this officer to be a non-constable professional and expert, we would ensure that law enforcement can deploy the most qualified individuals to secure content removal notices and apply civil penalties. In our view, this pragmatic approach would ensure efficiency and maximum efficacy against technologically sophisticated platforms.

Amendment 55F in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, relates to Clause 24, which governs the guidance issued by the Secretary of State regarding the operation of this new regime. All new intrusive powers, especially those concerning online services, require clear, precise guidance to avoid unintended consequences and ensure fairness. Proper statutory guidance is the mechanism by which the principles established in the Bill should be translated into proportionate and actionable requirements for online service providers.

In short, in our view these amendments seek to guarantee that the architecture of this new regime is built on technical expertise and clarity, both those pillars being essential in ensuring that our online crime-fighting tools are fit for purpose. As such, we support them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 55C, I will speak also to my Amendments 55D and 55E. My three amendments here are all similar, as I argue that a value-based penalty is more effective than a maximum fixed fine. The issue of illegal knife sales on the internet is a matter of serious public concern. It is big business with big consequences when those knives—machetes and zombie knives—are used to kill and maim, as is increasingly the case.

The proposals in the Bill to fine individuals and businesses up to £60,000 for selling illegal knives online seem hefty at first glance. However, the effectiveness and fairness of such a fixed penalty are questionable. A more effective approach would be to impose a fine equal to 500% of the total value of all the illegal goods advertised. I want to convince the Minister that a proportional penalty is, in some cases, superior to a subjective fixed maximum fine.

First, there is the subjectivity of the fixed maximum fine. Setting a maximum fine of £60,000 for selling illegal knives leaves the final penalty to the discretion of the court. This introduces subjectivity into the process, as judges must determine what amount is appropriate in each case. The outcome may vary significantly depending on the judge’s interpretation of the offence’s severity, the defendant’s circumstances and other factors. Consequently, similar offenders could face vastly different penalties, undermining the consistency and predictability of the law. Then, of course, I come back to my favourite organisation, the Sentencing Council, advising that the £60,000 fine should never be imposed—but let us leave that aside for the moment.

Moreover, a fixed cap may not reflect the true scale of the illegal activity. For example, a small-scale individual seller and a large business operation could both face the same maximum penalty, despite the latter potentially profiting far more from illegal sales. This lack of proportionality can result in fines that are either too lenient or excessively harsh, depending on the specifics of the case.

In contrast, my suggestion of a fine set at 500% of the value of all illegal knives advertised is directly linked to the scale of the offence and the profits. This proportional penalty approach ensures that the penalty increases in line with the seriousness of the crime. Large-scale operations, which are likely to profit more and cause greater harm, would face correspondingly larger fines. This not only achieves greater fairness but strengthens the deterrent effect. As we have said on many occasions, criminals are primarily motivated by profit. If the financial penalty reliably exceeds any potential gains—by a factor of five in this case—the risk heavily outweighs the reward. I suggest that that creates a strong disincentive for individuals and businesses to engage in illegal knife sales.

The proportional system also ensures that penalties remain meaningful, even as the market or profitability of legal knives fluctuates over time. The proportional penalty system is more likely to deter criminal behaviour, because it removes ambiguity and subjectivity from sentencing. Offenders know in advance that any profits from illegal activity will be entirely wiped out and replaced by a substantial loss. That clarity and certainty are crucial in discouraging would-be offenders. Furthermore, tying the fine to the value of the legal goods ensures fairness across all cases. Small-time offenders are punished proportionately for their actions, while major players face penalties commensurate with the harm they cause and the profits they make. That upholds the principle that the punishment should fit the crime.

In summary, I submit that a fixed maximum fine of £60,000 for selling illegal knives online introduces subjectivity and inconsistency—whereas a penalty of 500% of the value of all illegal goods advertised is fair, more predictable and far more likely to deter criminal activity.

I do not need to speak to my Amendment 55E; it is the same concept but suggests a mere 100% proportional penalty for a lesser offence. I urge the Minister to consider adopting a proportional penalty system to effectively combat the sale of illegal knives over the internet. I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, has so concisely described—he gets more concise as the evening goes on—this group deals with the sanctions applied under the online weapon advertising regime.

We very much welcome the Government’s commitment to ensuring accountability for businesses and sellers who facilitate the online sale of knives. However, if the penalties imposed are too small, they merely become a tolerable cost of doing business for large, wealthy online service providers. As the noble Lord explained, the Bill proposes maximum civil penalties for service providers of up to £60,000 for failing to comply with content manager requirements or for failing to comply with a content removal notice. His Amendments 55C and 55D directly challenge that maximum limit by proposing that the penalty for a service provider’s non-compliance should instead be a minimum of 500% of the value of the illegal goods advertised.

In our view, that proposal shifts the focus decisively towards financial deterrence—although I hate to agree with the noble Lord twice in one evening. The argument embedded within these amendments is sound: fines should reflect the scale and profitability of the illegal advertising business they enable. By linking the minimum fine directly to five times the value of the illegal goods advertised, we ensure that the penalty scales proportionally with the volume of the illicit trade facilitated by the platform, making it financially unsustainable to turn a blind eye to illegal weapon content.

The noble Lord’s Amendment 55E applies this same principle to the penalties imposed on the service provider’s content manager. Clause 23 currently sets the maximum penalty for the content manager at £10,000. Amendment 55E seeks to replace that cap with a minimum penalty of 100% of the value of the illegal goods advertised. That would ensure that the individual responsible for overseeing compliance within the organisation also faces a penalty that reflects the seriousness of the content they failed to manage or remove, particularly where that content is tied directly to the advertisement of unlawful weapons.

These amendments force us to consider how we can make our laws genuinely tough on organised online crime. In our view, legislation must be proportionate; and proportionality, in the face of corporate digital crime, means that penalties should meaningfully exceed the profits derived from facilitating criminal activity. The amendments rightly push us to consider the financial consequences that would truly deter platforms from risking public safety for private gain.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Blencathra for these amendments and offer support from the Front Bench for them.

The three amendments by my noble friend all have the same aim: to tie the level of financial penalty directly to the value of the illegal knives being advertised and the profits generated from their sale. The logic behind them is obvious—and they also raise an important point. Fines that merely represent a modest operational cost to criminals will do little to deter those who deliberately trade in dangerous and illegal weapons. If the economic reward remains greater than the economic risk, the deterrent effect is minimal. Therefore, it seems prudent to put into statute appropriate provisions to ensure that that never is the case. The purpose of penalties must be both to punish wrongdoing and to disrupt the business model that makes it worth pursuing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for his explanation of the amendments in this group. As he said, Amendment 55C would set minimum fines for companies that fail to comply with an appointment notice that requires them to designate an executive to be held liable for failing to take down illegal knife and weapons content. Amendments 55D and 55E would set minimum fines for companies and liable executives that fail to take down illegal content when requested to do so. As he explains, his proposed minimum fines are proportionate for companies; they are set at 500% of the value of the knife or the weapon for companies, and 100% of the value for individuals.

I hate to disappoint the Committee or to ruin the spirit of accord that has broken out across the Benches opposite, but while the logic of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, is good, I am afraid it does not reflect the actual behaviour and experience of the marketplace. If I can, I will try to explain why it would not be as effective or as impactful as he no doubt intends.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I hate to interrupt the Minister—well, I do not really—but can he explain what he means by that about the market? I did not grasp what he meant by that.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

Well, that is a very good segue into the words that are just following—I was about to get there.

Many knives and weapons that are sold illegally are sold relatively cheaply, in the order of tens of pounds. Some sellers who sell knives and weapons over social media tend to hold and advertise small stock numbers. Therefore, we contend that the suggested minimum penalties are simply too low to incentivise the prompt removal of illegal content. The independent review of online safety of knives shows a case study as an example where an individual bought 30 knives to sell illegally over social media for under £50 each. Should the social media company not take the illegal content down, the proposed minimum fine under these amendments would be £1,500 for the executive and £7,500 for the companies. Those penalties, as I am sure noble Lords would agree, would be too low for large tech companies and executives to be worried about at all. Not having a minimum penalty will leave full discretion to the police, who specialise in investigating illegal knife sales online. This will allow them to use their judgment to issue fines that are commensurate in each case.

The penalties for failing to comply with these are, as already noted, issued in the form of civil penalty notices by the police. They can be up to £60,000 for companies and £10,000 for individuals. I remind noble Lords that these penalties are for single violations and will add up if companies and executives repeatedly fail to comply with removal notices. The measure is intended not just to punish companies but to facilitate behaviour change. I trust that the police administering these measures will issue fines of an appropriate level to incentivise the prompt removal of illegal content.

I note the experience, which I found instructive, of the independent review of the online sale of knives, that a lot of the activity is undertaken through very small stocks that are cheaply sold. If we used the regime of a proportionate measure, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, we simply would not generate enough. Noble Lords may not think that £60,000 is worth much, but we certainly would not generate anywhere near £60,000 in those examples.

It is worth bearing in mind that a lot of the grey market sellers do so over social media websites. The recipient of the fine is the tech company that does not take down the illegal material, rather than the person selling the knives or the weapons. We understand the intended recipient of the punishment—the fines—which is why we think that having the £60,000 or £10,000 level is appropriate, because that is for single offences. Any time a company fails to remove the content for which they have received a notice, the fines will add up and accumulate, which will make an impact—and we would all agree that that needs to be done.

In response to another point made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, we feel that the Sentencing Council is unlikely to comment on the level of a civil penalty. That may be a little speculative from my perspective, but I think that it is probably what the experience bears out.

Given this explanation and the clarification of our view of how the environment—I should not have used the word “market” earlier—in which these sales take place, I hope that the noble Lord is sufficiently assured that these penalties will have an impact in the way they are set out in the Bill and that he will be content to withdraw his amendment.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 10th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Clement-Jones]

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 6, at beginning insert “Subject to a review of existing anti-social behaviour powers under the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2014 being conducted and completed by an independent person appointed by the Secretary of State within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent,”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Government to review current anti-social behaviour powers within six months of the Bill becoming law, before the new measures proposed in the Bill take effect.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 1, I will speak to other amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Doocey.

I welcome the start of Committee and the opportunity to engage in detail with Part 1 of the Bill concerning anti-social behaviour. We on these Benches recognise the imperative to make our streets safer, and we support measures designed to tackle genuinely persistent and disruptive anti-social behaviour. However, the Liberal Democrat approach to public safety demands that new laws be not just tough but fair and proportionate. We reject measures which risk the erosion of civil liberties or the criminalisation of the vulnerable. This debate on respect orders goes directly to that principle.

Clause 1 introduces the respect order for adults, which partly replaces the old anti-social behaviour injunction. The fundamental difference is severe. While breach of an ASBI was treated as a civil contempt, breach of a respect order is explicitly categorised as a criminal offence that can lead to an unlimited fine or up to two years’ imprisonment. If the state intends to use a civil tool granted merely on the balance of probabilities to impose prohibitions whose breach results in criminal sanctions, that tool must be subject to the most rigorous safeguards. Unfortunately, respect orders currently risk replicating and arguably worsening the problems and abuses associated with past anti-social behaviour regimes.

The Manifesto Club—I declare an interest as a member of its advisory board—highlights several fundamental flaws in the previous regime under the 2014 Act, which civil liberties advocates argue must be addressed before new anti-social behaviour powers such as respect orders are introduced.

The core legal powers underpinning PSPOs and CPNs are inherently flawed due to their low legal threshold and vague scope. PSPOs can be implemented if activities are deemed to be having a detrimental effect on the quality of life in a defined public area. The Manifesto Club notes that this is an unprecedentedly low legal test for criminal intervention and argues that there is often no requirement to show substantial evidence of this effect. PSPOs are vague and subjective restrictions and are often drafted broadly, which leads to them functioning more as a tool applied at the discretion of officers than as a precise law, and this has resulted in what the Manifesto Club calls

“absurd, stigmatising and authoritarian orders”

that ban diverse and sometimes anodyne non-criminal activities.

A major criticism centres on the weak governance and poor assessment of these powers. Manifesto Club research found that nearly half of all PSPOs issued by local authorities in one year were signed off by a single council officer, without passing through scrutiny procedures within the council, such as approval by cabinet or full council. Despite legal requirements for consultation, the Manifesto Club points out that the legislation requires consultation only with the police chief, the landowner and whatever community representatives the local authority thinks it appropriate to consult, meaning that there is no requirement for any public consultation or minimum standards for one.

There is a significant lack of official data collection and central government scrutiny on the use and effectiveness of anti-social behaviour powers such as CPNs and PSPOs. The broad and unchecked nature of the powers creates inconsistency of enforcement across the country, leading to postcode lotteries for victims, where enforcement depends on location rather than circumstances.

PSPOs and dispersal powers are often unfairly imposed on or enforced against homeless people, including bans on rough sleeping and begging. Homeless individuals report being moved on by police multiple times a day and feeling that the system is set against them. Examples of arbitrary and overzealous enforcement include fines issued to an 82 year-old man for cycling his bike in a town centre, for the feeding of stray cats, for the flying of model aircraft, for keeping a wheelbarrow behind a garden shed and for using foul language. Community protection notices have been issued with restrictions on how people conduct themselves in their own home, sometimes based on weak evidence reliant on hearsay.

There is increasing commercialisation of enforcement of anti-social behaviour powers. Many councils outsource the issuance of fixed penalty notices for PSPOs and CPNs to private companies. The most common contractual arrangement involves companies receiving a percentage of FPN—fixed penalty notice—income, which directly incentivises officers to issue as many penalties as possible.

This practice is explicitly stated to contradict statutory guidance, which notes that enforcement should in no circumstances be used as a means to raise revenue. Private officers employed under this system have been accused of setting daily targets, hiding badges, intimidating people and ticketing minor offences or non-offences. This intensification of busybody offences and penalties risks increasing injustice, particularly for vulnerable people.

Amendment 1, tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Doocey, and signed by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, would require the implementation of respect orders to be delayed until a comprehensive review of existing anti-social behaviour powers under the anti-social behaviour Act 2014 is conducted and completed by an independent person within six months of Royal Assent.

Before we introduce a new measure, we should assess whether the myriad existing tools—ASBIs, community protection notices and public space protection orders—are truly fit for purpose. The process of anti-social behaviour governance is already widely criticised as confusing, inconsistent and prone to arbitrary enforcement.

Without undertaking this vital review, we risk merely layering a new, complex civil order onto a system that is already confusing, ineffective and unjust, leading to overlapping powers and making enforcement decisions more difficult. Additional support for this delay, and an independent review, comes from key stakeholders, including Justice and the Victims’ Commissioner. We must pause, review what we have and then legislate effectively.

The core legal test for imposing a respect order is dangerously permissive. It rests on two conditions: the civil standard of proof—the balance of probabilities that the individual has engaged in anti-social behaviour—and the judicial belief that it is merely just and convenient to make the order. This is an alarmingly low threshold for an order that can severely restrict an individual’s liberty and lead to imprisonment. We must insist on a higher standard.

Amendment 5, in the name of my noble friend Lady Doocey and signed by me, proposes to replace the vague phrase “just and convenient” with the essential standard of “necessary and proportionate”. This change is essential to ensure that the restrictions imposed align strictly with the principles of the Human Rights Act 1998, ensuring that the conditions are tailored and appropriate to the specific case.

Amendment 4, also in my noble friend’s name, probes the wording that allows an order to be made if a person “threatens to engage in” anti-social behaviour. This vague phrasing gives excessive scope for judicial speculation, allowing the state to impose serious orders based on future suspicion rather than concrete, proven past behaviour.

Amendment 7, also in my noble friend’s name, seeks to specify a maximum length of time for an order, challenging the Bill’s proposals that a respect order can be imposed for an indefinite period. An indefinite order, based on a civil standard of proof, is inconsistent with the framework of other behaviour control orders. We propose a maximum duration, such as two years, to align respect orders with other established orders and requiring judicial review for any extension.

We must ensure that these powers cannot be weaponised against those struggling with homelessness or mental health issues, as seen with past anti-social behaviour powers targeting people for begging, sleeping rough or feeding the birds. Amendment 12—I thank the noble Lord, Lord Meston, for signing it—seeks to remove the power to exclude a person from their home. This power, introduced in new Section C1, is disproportionate; exclusion from one’s home is an extremely severe sanction. While the Bill limits this to cases involving violence or a significant risk of harm, such threats should be handled exclusively through the criminal justice system or specific protection orders to ensure that the necessary safeguards and standards of proof are met. We on these Benches are particularly concerned about the risk of this power being used inappropriately against victims of domestic abuse, potentially leading to their eviction instead of the perpetrator’s detention.

Amendment 18 would remove the provision creating interim respect orders. Interim orders lack proper procedural safeguards and carry the inherent risk of disproportionate interference with liberty, particularly when they are made without notice to the respondent. If a situation is so urgent that it requires immediate prohibition, a more specific or criminal intervention is warranted. Anti-social and behaviour measures must possess strong democratic and public accountability to counter the risk of arbitrary local restriction.

Amendment 9 in my name requires respect orders to pass through full council and be subject to a full public consultation before the relevant authority makes an application to the court. This would ensure that elected representatives approve decisions that directly impact civil liberties, which would mitigate the democratic deficit seen in the implementation of other local orders such as PSPOs.

Amendment 21, in my name and signed by my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, mandates that the Secretary of State must conduct a full public consultation exercise prior to issuing any statutory guidance on respect orders. This guidance must be informed by groups including the police, victims’ interests groups, housing providers and, crucially, homeless persons and legal practitioners. This would prevent guidance aimed at curbing behaviour being developed in a vacuum and ensure that it is practical and trauma-informed, especially when dealing with those struggling with addiction or homelessness.

In conclusion, these amendments collectively seek to address the historical weaknesses of the ASBI regime —weak judicial thresholds, arbitrary enforcement, indefinite application and a lack of accountability—before they are codified in a new measure that carries the full weight of the criminal law. If respect orders are to succeed where previous civil orders failed, they must be founded on evidence, necessity and transparency. I urge the Minister to recognise the fundamental importance of these safeguards. I beg to move.

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That was a long climb, and I am still only about 10 feet up Everest, but I hope that those comments help the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. This has been a useful discussion, but I hope that we can reach a conclusion on those matters now.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I think it is the Matterhorn at this stage, rather than Everest, but we will see. I thank the Minister for his very full reply, and I thank all noble Lords for their support for this set of amendments that I and my noble friend Lady Doocey put forward. The Minister has set out his stall; he is clearly very wedded to the current wording, and that will merit careful consideration. I recognise the point he made about this being a manifesto commitment, but Amendment 1 is not designed to negate respect orders; it is designed to review the existing suite of anti-social behaviour legislation in order to make sure that it is effective.

I recognise the point the Minister made about the 1 million incidents, but we do not know at this stage, other than from the Minister’s assertions, that the respect orders are going to be effective in dealing with those, or, indeed, whether existing powers would have themselves been effective.

The Minister did not really explain why the current legislation is inadequate. He also did not for one second admit that the current regime of PSPOs and CPNs had its faults.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The real difference between this legislation and the existing legislation is that action can be taken immediately. I think I did touch on that point, but if it was not to the noble Lord’s satisfaction, I apologise. We can take action immediately on a breach.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I think we are going to need some more convincing that that is the case, compared to anti-social behaviour injunctions. So, we remain somewhat unconvinced.

We have the common aim across the House of achieving an effective system that is fair and proportionate. The one chink in the Minister’s armour was that he was prepared, in response to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to consider the wording “necessary and proportionate”. I very much hope that he will consider that as a possible amendment to his proposal.

I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, that Governments reach for the statute book; we need to consider whether existing legislation is sufficient. The noble Lord, Lord Hacking, called for a pause. Whether it is a pause or a review, we will definitely want to return to this on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 1.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

Just briefly, because this is a very important aspect of the enforcement of respect orders, I ask whether the Minister is saying that all that is needed is that it is shown beyond reasonable doubt that the respect order has been breached, or does one go back to the original decision on the civil balance of probabilities—the reasons for the respect order? Is it purely that you have to show beyond reasonable doubt that the respect order has been breached, in which case it is still a civil balance of probabilities requirement for the original respect order to be enforced?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

There is a determination, and I believe the legislation before us today is clear on that matter. We will debate this still further, undoubtedly, but there is essentially a respect order where the court will consider the potential breach and will make a judgment on it, and having examined that, it will determine the issue in relation to that breach. The noble Lord raises that issue now, but as regards Amendment 19 before us today, which is the point I am making now, limiting the scope of where an interim respect order can be issued risks further harm for communities as a whole.

I will just focus on the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, mentioned. She covered in the last series of amendments the same issue, in a sense, about capacity, which is important. It will be a matter for discretion of the applicant and the court to determine what requirements will be most suitable in line with the resources and options that are available in a given area. So, again, that discretion is there at a local level to determine; for example, if an alcohol awareness course is required, then self-evidently an alcohol awareness course has to be available for the individual to take up that course. Those judgments will be made at a local level by the local individuals who are determining these matters.

Again, I refer noble Lords to the economic impact assessment that we have published. The ASB package is expected to lead to

“an overall reduction in prison places”.

The respect order replaces the civil injunction, and we are not expecting additional cases per se. Once in a steady state, annual prison places for respect orders will stay more or less the same, and we expect respect orders to have a neutral impact on prison places, given that they are replacing civil injunction powers. So I hope that that again reassures the noble Baroness in relation to the resource question of the additional impact of these matters. With those comments, I respectfully request the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

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[Viscount Goschen (Con)]

My Lords, the Minister mentioned in his remarks on the first group that there are over a million instances of anti-social behaviour in the United Kingdom, and he is seeking broad new powers in the early part of the Bill. Can he give the House any guidance as to what sort of effect, if the House were to give the Government these powers, will be seen in terms of a projected reduction in anti-social behaviour as a result?

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I will seize the opportunity to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, while the going is good and before I have to disagree with him on future groupings. I entirely agreed with what he had to say, as indeed I did with the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower.

This stand part debate goes to what might be called the heart of legislative utility. Why do we need a new tool if the old tools are sufficient? We must ask: does Clause 1 solve a problem or does it merely create complexity and risk? The Bill, as we have heard, introduces respect orders, but it also retains anti-social behaviour injunctions. Many of us already feel that the new respect orders, as we debated in the first group, are unnecessary and largely either replicate powers already available under the 2014 Act, or, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, made very clear, add undesirable elements to those powers.

We have seen with ASBIs that there have been some proposals to include positive requirements tailored to underlying causes of behaviour. If the goal of the Government is to better address the underlying causes of persistent anti-social behaviour, we could be strengthening the existing injunction framework, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said, focusing resources on effective enforcement and mandating psychological or therapeutic interventions, rather than introducing a confusing, duplicated power.

Our preference on these Benches is very clear. We should focus on accountability, review and proportionality to ensure that the existing framework works effectively, rather than adding a potentially flawed new tool that invites mission creep and targets the vulnerable.

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Moved by

[Lord Clement-Jones]

23: Clause 4, page 12, line 8, leave out subsections (3) and (4)
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes the subsections increasing the level of fines attached to FPNs, aiming to address concerns that existing notices and orders are being imposed in inappropriate circumstances.

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 23 would remove subsections that increase the maximum level of fines attached to fixed penalty notices for breach of public space protection orders and community protection notices. The core proposal of Clause 4 is to increase the maximum FPN for these breaches from £100 to a punitive £500. This represents a 400% increase in the penalty for infractions often issued without judicial oversight.

The Manifesto Club—a body which I mentioned previously and with which I have engaged extensively on these powers—rightly labels this increase as a

“grossly out-of-proportion penalty”.

We must look at the nature of the offences that these fines target. The Home Office claims that this increase shows a “zero-tolerance approach” to anti-social behaviour, but that ignores the actual activities being punished. Manifesto Club research, relying on freedom of information data, shows that the vast majority of penalties are issued for innocuous actions that fall far outside anyone’s definition of serious anti-social behaviour. This is leading to what the Manifesto Club calls

“the hyper-regulation of public spaces”.

For instance, in 2023, Hillingdon Council issued PSPO penalties largely for idling—leaving a car engine running for more than two minutes. This affected 2,335 people, including a man waiting to collect his wife from a doctor’s surgery. Other commonly banned activities that face this grossly increased penalty include loitering, swearing, begging, wild swimming, busking and feeding birds.

The Manifesto Club has documented community protection notices that target non-harmful behaviours, which are also subject to the increased fine. Orders have been issued banning two people from closing their front door too loudly, prohibiting a man from storing his wheelbarrow behind his shed and banning an 82 year-old from wearing a bikini in her own garden. The increase in fines to £500 for these so-called busybody offences appears to be simply a form of message sending, rather than a proportionate penalty designed to resolve community harm.

The second, and perhaps most corrosive, effect of Clause 4 is that it will spark a boom in the enforcement industry and intensify the practice of fining for profit. The Manifesto Club found that 75% of PSPO penalties in 2023 were issued by private enforcement companies. These companies are typically paid per fine issued, which creates an overt financial incentive to pursue volume regardless of genuine harm or proportionality. They target easy infractions rather than the most serious offenders.

Increasing the financial reward fivefold heightens this perverse incentive to issue as many FPNs as possible for anodyne activities. Crucially, while Defra has published guidance stating that environmental enforcement should never be a means to raise revenue, the Home Office has not prohibited fining for profit for anti-social behaviour offences such as PSPO and CPN breaches, nor even formally acknowledged the issue. I have raised this many times in the House.

Rather than authorising this increase in fines, we should be prohibiting incentivised enforcement for all ASB penalties in primary legislation or statutory guidance. The system of FPNs is already heavily criticised for undermining due process. They are issued solely based on the decision of an official and do not involve the production of evidence in court. This lack of judicial scrutiny means that, when innocent people are fined for innocuous actions, they often feel completely helpless, lacking the means to appeal a decision made by incentive-driven officers.

If we are serious about addressing serious anti-social behaviour, the enforcement should focus on serious criminality and nuisance, not extracting revenue from arbitrary restrictions. We must resist measures that intensify arbitrary law enforcement and injustice. This increase in penalties must be abandoned. I therefore urge the Government to support Amendment 23 and reject subsections (3) and (4) of Clause 4. I beg to move.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to my Amendments 24 and 25. In some aspects, I take a slightly different view from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, because I approve of the increased £500 penalty, provided it is for real anti-social behaviour. I accept the noble Lord’s point that there seem to have been quite a few ASBOs granted for “busybody offences”, and that is not right.

However, my concern here is making sure that the fines are properly paid. If we give the rise to £500, what will be the punishment if criminals do not pay it? Imprisonment is not important. In the words of the great capitalist Del Boy, it is “cushty”, and most criminals, from the smallest to the greatest, regard a term of imprisonment as factored into the crime. What about fines? No problem, they will simply not pay them, and with sufficient sob stories to the court, they will probably get away with a ridiculously low payment plan. Then, when they go outside and drive away in their BMW while texting on their new iPhone, that is great.

Only one thing works as proper punishment—they hate it—and gives the state and victims proper recompense: that is the confiscation of their ill-gotten gains or of any part of their property, which will cover the amount of any unpaid penalty. Of course, there are compensation orders, which can be made for most crimes, but, again, the convict will probably not pay up and nothing more will be done about it.

We must expand confiscation orders to all crimes where a penalty has not been paid, and my amendments are, I would suggest, a tiny but good example. We seem to go out of our way to make compensation orders as difficult as possible to obtain and deliver. Confiscation orders in the UK can be issued for any crime that involves financial gain, not just specific offences. They are used to take away profits from criminal activity, with the court determining the amount of the order based on the defendant’s benefit from their criminal conduct. The common crimes involve fraud, drug trafficking, theft and organised crime, but any offence where a financial element is present can trigger an order.

How do confiscation orders work? First of all, a conviction is required. Even I would agree with that. A confiscation order can be made only after the defendant is convicted of a crime. The Crown Court decides whether to issue an order after gathering information from both the prosecution and defence. The court’s goal is to recover the benefit—they stress “benefit”—the defendant gained from the criminal conduct. The court considers whether the defendant has a criminal lifestyle, which can be established by their conduct over time. The ultimate aim is to disrupt criminal activity by making the crime unprofitable and preventing future offences.

Why on earth stop with that tight confiscation concept about ill-gotten gains? If someone has committed a crime and gets a financial penalty or a fine and he does not pay up, he has benefited from that crime. He has made a financial gain in that he has saved the money he should have spent on a fine. In those circumstances, it is only just and right that the court’s bailiff can confiscate all and any property of the convict to recover the fine he has refused to pay or says that he cannot pay.

In this case, we are looking at confiscation of his goods and property up to a value of £500 plus a small administration fee. My amendment advocates automaticity, and that is essential. We do not need all the evidence of ill-gotten gains that prosecutors have to go through to prove that the superyacht, Bentleys and five homes all over the world came from drug running or ripping off a pension fund, since we would be collecting only on a known fine imposed by a court.

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I recognise where the noble Lord is coming from. He shakes his head in slight unhappiness at my response, but I think this is a reasonable approach, and the Government’s intention is that, when fines are levied, they are paid. That is the key point on which we share common ground. With that, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lord, I thank the Minister for his reply, disappointing though it is, but that is probably a pattern that will continue as the Bill carries on.

I did not even get an acknowledgement from the Minister that there are flaws in the existing PSPO/CPN system; often, it is just busybody offences that receive fixed penalty notices. He just recited a number, at perhaps the outer edge of anti-social behaviour, which of course should attract fixed penalty notices. He also prayed in aid the fact that environmental offences can have fixed penalty notices at a higher level, but we have heard quite a lot of anecdotal evidence about those being misused. The chances are that these new higher penalties will be misused as well.

I also did not seem to get any acknowledgement that the fining-for-profit aspect of this by local government is a problem. I do not know whether the new statutory guidance the Minister mentioned will include something along those lines. I very much hope so, and that he can reassure us that there will be a reaffirmation of the need for proper democratic oversight of PSPOs and CPNs. The current guidance recommends that councils, either in full council or in cabinet, approve these orders but that appears not to be the case currently, with all the consequences that the Baroness, Lady Fox, has outlined.

I hope that, if we are going to learn from the experience of the current anti-social behaviour powers, the Government take on board some of this debate and the points made in previous groups. We will probably return to this on Report, but for now, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 23.

Amendment 23 withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 10th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 26 relates to Clause 5. Clause 5 is very short and is titled “Closure of premises by registered social housing provider”. It says that Schedule 2 amends various parts of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014

“so as to enable registered social housing providers to close premises that they own or manage which are associated with nuisance and disorder”.

My amendment says:

“An RSH provider may issue a closure notice in respect of an individual flat within a housing block for which they are responsible”.


I apologise to the Committee and to the Minister if my amendment is already included in the definition of “premises”. However, the only definition I can find is in Clause 92 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act, and that says

“‘premises’ includes … any land or other place (whether enclosed or not) … any outbuildings that are, or are used as, part of premises”.

Thus, it would seem to me, as a non-lawyer, that a person could argue that an individual flat in an RSH housing block was technically not “premises” within the definition of the 2014 Act or Schedule 2 to this Bill.

I tabled this amendment because I am aware of a serious problem in a block of flats next to mine and only about 400 yards away from here. Over a period of about two years, residents complained of blatant drug dealing in a flat owned by the L&Q social landlords. Addicts were threatening other householders to let them in to buy drugs from the flat. Children in other flats were scared to come home from school in case they met violent druggies in the corridor. The police were involved but could not sit there 24/7, waiting to catch drug dealing in practice. The Westminster City Council anti-social behaviour unit and the local MP got involved, demanding action, but L&Q refused to do anything. It even lied that it had applied for an ASBO, and it took two years before that tenant was finally evicted. Of course, the Bill and my amendment cannot force a negligent RSH, such as L&Q, to issue a closure notice, but it might help those who do care about their tenants.

Just for the record, I have named that company because my noble friend Lord Gove, then the Housing Minister, called in the chief executive after writing to him, stating:

“You have failed your residents”.


He did that after a devastating ombudsman’s report uncovered a prolonged period of decline in L&Q’s repairs and complaint handling.

I do not need to say any more. If the Minister tells me that “premises” includes individual flats within the definition and we will be covered with this, I will not come back to this on Report. But if I have a valid point, I hope the Government will make a little tweak and amend the Bill accordingly. I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I knew there was a reason why I was so nice about the earlier amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. I am afraid we do not agree with Amendment 26. The amendment focuses on the power to issue closure notices, a measure which deals directly with the security of the home, which we believe is a fundamental right in our society. A closure notice is an extreme measure, and any power enabling the exclusion of a person from their residence must be subject to the highest legal scrutiny and strict proportionality, and we do not support the amendment.

Social justice groups consistently caution that new powers risk disadvantaging tenants and vulnerable groups. We must remember that, where these orders relate to social housing, they have the potential to render entire families homeless. We believe that the amendment would exacerbate that.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his Amendment 26 to Schedule 2 to the Bill, which permits a registered social housing provider to issue a closure notice in respect of premises they own or manage, under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. As my noble friend and other noble Lords have stated, a closure notice under Section 76 of that Act is a notice which prohibits a person from accessing specific premises. Currently, such a notice can be issued only by the police or the local authority, but Schedule 2 permits an RSH to also issue such notices.

My noble friend’s amendment would ensure that the RSH provider is able to issue a closure notice for an individual flat in the premises it is responsible for. Given that paragraph (2)(b) of Schedule 2 does not specify that fact, I look forward to the Minister’s answer and hope he might clarify that point.

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[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, these are powerful amendments and it is hard to see how they can be argued against. We have all heard of cases where victims have had a very tough time demonstrating the persecution that they have experienced, and they often get challenged in court, unreasonably, I think. These amendments are excellent and we should encourage the noble Lord to push them to a vote later.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, this group, so well introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Stedman-Scott and Lady Jones, focuses on putting the victim first, a principle that we wholeheartedly support.

Clause 6 aims to strengthen the anti-social behaviour case review, and we support the package of amendments to the clause tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Russell and Lord Hampton. We support the objective of establishing a statutory threshold for convening a review that explicitly considers the victim’s vulnerability. This is crucial, as it would remove the discretion for authorities to apply additional caveats and ensure that the severity of the impact on the individual is prioritised over mere persistence of the behaviour.

We back the proposal in Amendment 29 to ensure that the review is chaired by an independent person who has not previously been involved in the case. Independence is essential to restore trust and ensure objectivity when agencies review their own failures. We also strongly agree with the demand in Amendment 30 that authorities must publish the reasons for determining that the threshold for a review has not been met. This is a simple but powerful measure to increase accountability and transparency in the decision-making process. Amendment 27, which would require police officers to undertake an ASB impact assessment when the threshold is met, is a common-sense measure to ensure that victims experiencing high levels of harm receive appropriate support.

These amendments demonstrate how we can collectively strengthen the system to deliver genuine justice for victims of persistent anti-social behaviour, ensuring that their trauma and vulnerability are fully recognised. I very much hope that the Government will take them on board.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group are technical amendments that affect provisions in the Bill containing data-sharing provisions. Within the relevant clauses and schedule, there are general provisions that bar the disclosure of data if such disclosures would contravene data-protection legislation. These protections against data-protection overrides are now no longer needed within the Bill, as a general provision to the same effect is now made by Section 183A of the Data Protection Act 2018, which was inserted by Section 106(2) of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025. That Act came into effect on 20 August and, now that the general provision is in force, the amendments remove the redundant duplicative provisions from the Bill. I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I welcome the Minister’s confirmation that the amendments are matters of purely technical housekeeping, because they remove provisions that are no longer needed, and that this is caused by the insertion of Section 183A into the Data Protection Act 2018 by Section 106(2) of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025. I must confess, having spent time in the salt mines of the then Data (Use and Access) Bill, that this did not come to my attention at the time, but I am sure it is a valuable piece of legislation.

This creates an overarching safeguard, ensuring that new enactments such as this Bill do not automatically override core data protection requirements. However, I must say that the fact that the Government’s intentions are technically sound in this respect does not remove the need for clarification and specific statutory safeguards in certain highly sensitive policy areas, which we will be debating in due course. I thought I would put the Minister on notice that we will be calling for the adoption of additional safeguards ensuring that new powers in the Bill are fair and proportionate: for instance, the DVLA access and facial recognition provisions in Clause 138, which grant powers for regulations concerning police access to DVLA driver licensing information. We remain deeply concerned that the power granted by Clause 138 could be used to create a vast police facial recognition database, and we will be looking for additional safeguards.

On Clauses 192 to 194, concerning international law enforcement information-sharing agreements, the cross-border transfer of data inherent in such agreements presents significant civil liberties concerns, so we will be calling for mandatory privacy impact assessments. That is just a taster.

In conclusion, while the Government’s amendments are technical in nature, we will in due course be using the opportunity to embed specific, robust statutory safeguards for a number of new powers in the Bill.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 16th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I add my welcome and thanks to the Minister for her introduction to the Bill. I also thank my noble friend Lady Doocey for setting out the Liberal Democrat stall so cogently both on policing more generally and on this Bill. On these Benches, we recognise the imperative to make our streets safer and to equip the police with the tools necessary to address modern crime. We support the elements of the Bill that tackle knife crime, combat online child exploitation and pursue criminal proceeds.

However, the foundation of our approach to public safety is our demand that new laws should be not just tough but fair and proportionate. We reject measures that risk the erosion of civil liberties or the criminalisation of the vulnerable. A core priority for me and my party is ensuring that our legal framework is modernised and future-proofed against evolving digital and online threats, as my noble friend emphasised. We support the new measures concerning the online supply chain of offensive weapons. We welcome the introduction of civil penalties aimed at strengthening accountability for businesses and online platforms involved in the advertising or selling of unlawful weapons. To enhance police intervention capability, we will, however, propose an amendment mandating a proactive real-time system for reporting under the new duty to report to the police bulk or suspicious sales of bladed articles.

The current cybersecurity landscape is badly hampered by outdated legislation. The Computer Misuse Act 1990 is now 34 years old, stemming from a time before widespread internet access. It inadvertently criminalises legitimate cybersecurity activities such as vulnerability research, which are essential for national security. We call for the introduction of a statutory public interest defence within that Act to decriminalise the vital work of cybersecurity professionals and provide clearer legal protections.

Furthermore, to combat organised crime and address widespread online fraud, we want to see the creation of a specific criminal offence for digital identity theft. This new offence must target the unauthorised obtaining of personal or sensitive information, such as passwords or biometric data, with the clear intent to impersonate an individual for unauthorised activities.

We support new online child protection offences targeting AI-generated child sexual abuse material and enhanced Border Force powers to compel device unlocking for CSAM searches. On extreme pornography, we will strongly support amendments to be tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, following her review, extending the online definition to explicitly cover incest, pornography, and material depicting adults acting as or depicting children.

We want robust safeguards against the inappropriate use of intrusive technology. We oppose police use of live facial recognition—surveillance in public spaces without a statutory framework—given concerns regarding privacy and algorithmic bias. Deployment of LFR should be explicitly authorised by a judicial warrant and governed by a statutory code of practice, complete with an independent oversight body.

For antisocial behaviour measures, accountability and fairness are crucial. New respect orders must be subject to rigorous democratic scrutiny. Applications need to undergo full public consultation and should be approved by the relevant full council or its executive or cabinet before implementation.

We oppose the punitive increase in fixed penalty notices for breaches of public spaces protection orders and community protection notices from £100 to £500. This sharp increase risks intensifying abuses and arbitrary enforcement against the most vulnerable individuals. We will continue to protect the fundamental right to peaceful protest.

On these Benches, we will seek to amend the Bill to ensure that it is rooted, online and offline, in accountability, proportionality and the protection of civil liberties. We must ensure that this legislation is fair, effective and fit for the future.