Remote Observation and Recording (Courts and Tribunals) Regulations 2022
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Lord Bellamy
That the Regulations laid before the House on 27 June be approved.
Relevant document: 9th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. Considered in Grand Committee on 19 July.
Remote Observation and Recording (Courts and Tribunals) Regulations 2022
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Lord Bellamy
That the Grand Committee do consider the Remote Observation and Recording (Courts and Tribunals) Regulations 2022.
Relevant document: 9th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)
My Lords, the statutory instrument before us regulates the remote observation of court and tribunal proceedings across our justice system. Essentially, this instrument builds on the very positive experience of remote observation during the pandemic and extends and makes permanent powers that were originally contained in the emergency coronavirus legislation.
The instrument was made using the “made affirmative” procedure on 28 June 2022. It is fair to point out that the scrutiny committee of this House has been somewhat critical of the use of the “made affirmative” procedure in this case, as distinct from the normal draft affirmative procedure. My understanding of what has happened is that the enabling legislation, which is the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, was already delayed in Parliament. The department felt that we should move away from the emergency legislation as soon as possible. The emergency legislation then in force in any event did not cover certain tribunals, including employment tribunals, the Court of Protection and certain other jurisdictions, so the decision was made to press on using the “made affirmative” procedure. None the less, the comments of the scrutiny committee have been duly noted and I have reminded the department of the importance of ensuring full parliamentary scrutiny of all legislation, including legislation such as this.
The Committee will be aware that, at the outset of the pandemic, our courts and tribunals moved swiftly to holding hearings remotely using audio and video technology. I can take this opportunity to pay tribute to HMCTS for its work in enabling that to happen and the principle of open justice to be maintained.
The legislation permitting remote observation was very well received, especially by court reporters, legal bloggers and others who do valiant work in reporting what happens in our justice system. It allowed the courts to offer, in effect, the digital equivalent of the public gallery.
The Government have therefore taken the decision to make remote observation a permanent feature of our justice system and expand it to all our courts and tribunals, save for the Supreme Court and certain devolved courts and tribunals, and to any type of hearing, whether remote, in person or hybrid. The order is made, with the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals, by the Lord Chancellor.
The overall aim is to strengthen the transparency, openness and accessibility of the justice system. It is hoped that it will also have the incidental effect of strengthening the sometimes struggling profession of court reporting by providing modern, digital solutions, although public galleries of course continue to be available.
Various safeguards are contained in the enabling legislation which prevent participants making unauthorised recordings or transmissions of the proceedings. It is important to note that at the heart of the provisions is the principle of judicial discretion. It will be for judges, magistrates, coroners and tribunal members to decide on a case-by-case basis whether to provide transmissions of proceedings to members of the press and public.
This does not enable indiscriminate broadcasting or live streaming of proceedings, although that occurs in certain jurisdictions, such as the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal. It enables transmissions of proceedings to be made to individuals who have requested access and have identified themselves to the court or, in certain circumstances, to designated live-streaming premises. There is no obligation on judges to allow transmissions to be made to remote observers during a traditional in-person hearing, but it is hoped and assumed that this technology will greatly facilitate access to justice for many. Around 7,000 hearings a week now rely on audio and video technology. That is one of the reasons why this statutory instrument was brought forward as early as it was. The Government seek to strengthen and support the principle of open justice and to increase the accessibility and transparency of our justice system as part of our wider programme of modernising that system.
Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)
My Lords, I am sure this instrument will be widely welcomed. As the noble and learned Lord has explained, this builds on experience, which it is good to do, in two beneficial ways: it is making a temporary arrangement permanent and it is spreading the technological discretion right across the whole system, which is a very good idea. One does not want gaps in an exercise of this kind.
I have a point to raise on the detail of Regulations 3 and 4, simply to try to understand how this system will work. As the noble and learned Lord has explained, this will be an exercise of a discretion. Regulation 3 gives two very sensible matters on which the court must be satisfied, particularly sub-paragraph (b) on technological arrangements and so on, before the discretion is exercised. I have no problems with that, because it is very obvious that this needs to be done. I imagine that, if the court is being invited to exercise a discretion, it would be up to the advocate asking for it to provide the material the court needs to be satisfied with the points set out in Regulation 3.
Regulation 4 is trickier. It is a list of very sensible points which we are told the court must take into account. This is another example of something that has been happening over the years; in the Judicial Review and Courts Bill in particular, there was a list of things that the court must take into account, which caused some concern—some said the word “must” was wrong because it opened the door to criticism of the court if it perhaps failed to take something into account that it should have done. That problem lurks under Regulation 4. How will one be satisfied that the court has taken all these points into account without the court going through the entire list and saying that it has looked at sub-paragraphs (a) to (f)? Have the Government any thoughts on how this will work in practice? Is it simply to be assumed when the court exercises discretion that it has done this, or should it be transparent and laid out in some kind of understandable practice that these points will all be addressed and that the public will be told why and how the court has been satisfied on them?
I raise this not to tease the noble and learned Lord; it is just that somebody, somewhere, might start complaining that, let us say, sub-paragraph (a) has not been taken into account because the magistrate or the judge did not say so. One needs to be a bit careful with these lists to be sure how the thing will actually work in practice. I simply throw that out for the noble and learned Lord to consider. Maybe a definitive answer cannot be given today, but somebody needs to think about it, and maybe guidance needs to be given to those who are exercising the discretion so that they do not fall into a trap.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, we support these provisions. They will replace and extend the temporary emergency provisions included in the Coronavirus Act 2020 which allow for certain proceedings to be observed remotely and recorded. We believe in the principle of open justice and think this goes a step towards that and should be welcomed for that reason. However, we are aware that sometimes legal proceedings are very sensitive and painful, and attending a court or tribunal can be a difficult experience for people. For that reason, decisions regarding which types of proceedings should be broadcast or available to different people to observe should not be taken lightly. I am very aware that different jurisdictions will have different considerations in that respect.
Just for the record, I sit as a magistrate in the family, youth and adult jurisdictions, and I sat all the way through the coronavirus pandemic. I started off in the family jurisdiction doing court hearings by BT MeetMe and we graduated to MS Teams. We were making extremely difficult decisions which we felt we had no alternative but to make because of the circumstances which we found ourselves working in as a court.
Of course I agree with the objectives behind this statutory instrument, but I wanted to make one substantive point on the level of technology in these courts. It is highly variable between jurisdictions. When one is dealing with litigants in person, it is not unusual for them to be trying to do things on their mobile phones. Sometimes they have poor signal and all sorts of handicaps if they are trying to take part in court proceedings remotely. In my experience, when a court is 100% remote —that is, everybody is remote—it can be made to work. However, it is more difficult when it is hybrid—when some parties are in the room and others are not. Whether it is fair to go ahead with a hearing is ultimately a matter for judicial discretion, but certainly in my experience, hybrid hearings in various jurisdictions can be detrimental to people who are not physically in the room, and the court needs to be aware of that when it is deciding whether to go ahead with a case. Nevertheless, having said that, we welcome this statutory instrument and we will be happy to support it when it is put to a vote.
Lord Bellamy (Con)
My Lords, thank you. On the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, I am not sure that I have an answer off the cuff that I am able to give, and I entirely understand the point he makes as to the difference between “must” and “may” or similar expressions. I think the presumption, which I do not have the confidence to reproduce in Latin but which is to the general effect that everything is presumed to be regular unless the contrary is shown, would kick in here, and it would be a matter for the Lord Chief Justice to decide whether some further guidance is made necessary. I hope that those two points will at least accommodate the observation of the noble and learned Lord. However, the overall point is understood.
European Convention on Human Rights
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Baroness Humphreys (LD)
My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend, and with his permission, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in his name on the Order Paper.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)
Her Majesty’s Government are committed to remaining a state party to the European Convention on Human Rights and protecting all the rights set out in the convention.
Baroness Humphreys (LD)
My Lords, when the European Court of Human Rights halted the deportation of migrants to Rwanda, the Prime Minister and some of his government colleagues began considering withdrawing the United Kingdom from the European Convention on Human Rights. The convention is a major contributor to peace and democracy, and we cannot afford not to be part of it. However, if the Government will insist on pushing ahead with this reckless decision—and we have not had a denial from some of the candidates in the leadership race—is the Minister confident that such a move will not negatively impact the rights of vulnerable groups in the United Kingdom?
Lord Bellamy (Con)
Her Majesty’s Government, with respect, are not pushing ahead with any reckless decision. The policy of the Government is to remain within the convention on human rights; speculation to the contrary is quite unfounded.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord has been asked this Question many times and has said that it is the Government’s policy to remain inside the ECHR. However, scepticism and questions persist because a senior government Minister, the Attorney-General, has a number of times over the last week said that she wants to withdraw from the ECHR. What conversations has the Minister had with the Attorney-General in the last few days to resolve this?
Lord Bellamy (Con)
I have had no conversations with the Attorney-General, and what the Attorney-General says or may have said in her capacity as a leadership contender is neither here nor there—as an unsuccessful leadership contender, I hasten to add. We need to get this straight. Unless we can define the boundaries of the debate we are about to have, we will be in a very unsatisfactory place. We are talking about the mechanisms of the convention—we are not talking about whether we should be in the convention or not. I remind the House that the UK has the best record of all member states within the convention; we are a party to, I think, seven United Nations conventions on human rights; we are very active in the Council of Europe in a number of respects; we fully support the ICC in its reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine; and there is no question of this fine tradition being mitigated, let alone abandoned.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
The Minister is quite right that we need to be clear but unfortunately, only two of the five remaining candidates for the Tory leadership have been clear that they would not leave the convention. Liz Truss, who is still in the Government, has said that she would be prepared to leave the ECHR. Rishi Sunak and Kemi Badenoch have failed to clarify their positions. Can the Minister be confident about the position of the Government from September, when he even has present Cabinet Ministers who do not agree with him?
Lord Bellamy (Con)
The Government have set out their position in the manifesto upon which they were elected. There is no change to that manifesto.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I, for one, am very grateful to the Minister for the clarity of his Answer. However, I am concerned that the more popular of the two candidates in the Conservative race for the premiership who have committed to staying in the ECHR has been subject to an absolutely disgraceful campaign of smearing in the right-wing press. Can the Minister give some fatherly advice to these candidates that when they launch Islamophobic and misogynistic attacks on each other, and when they attack human rights, it is bad for his party and for the country?
Lord Bellamy (Con)
I am not in a position to give fatherly advice to anybody. The Government do not support misogynistic or Islamophobic attacks on anyone. I have set out as clearly as I can the Government’s policy, and I shall doggedly pursue that policy unless and until instructed to the contrary.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, it must be obvious that our suspicion stems from having had a lot of legislation come through this House that has shown no concern for human rights or political freedoms, which is what the ECHR is all about. How can we be sure about the next Prime Minister—a Tory party Prime Minister from the collection of leadership candidates that we are all horrified about?
Lord Bellamy (Con)
The aim of the proposed legislation is to restore public confidence in the UK judiciary, to improve democratic accountability, to strengthen the right to free speech, to preserve the right to jury trial and to better protect journalists’ sources. I defy anyone in this House to vote against those objectives.
Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)
My Lords, can the Minister confirm that the trade and co-operation agreement which this country has with the European Union is contingent, from the European Union’s point of view, on our remaining in the convention on human rights? Can he give us the names of countries which have withdrawn from that convention?
Lord Bellamy (Con)
The noble Lord is correct that there are references to the European Convention on Human Rights in the trade and co-operation agreement. We are not withdrawing from the convention—I do not know how many times I must say it before people understand the Government’s position. Since we are not withdrawing, the question of who has withdrawn or been expelled does not arise.
Lord Lexden (Con)
Does my noble friend agree that the European convention should be regarded as particularly precious by Conservatives, given the part that Winston Churchill and Lord Kilmuir played in devising it?
Lord Watts (Lab)
What do the Government mean by “mechanisms”? It seems to add something to the Minister’s answer that he is not categorically ruling out changes. What are those mechanisms?
Lord Bellamy (Con)
The provisions in the Bill are designed, in the words of Clause 1(2), to clarify and rebalance. The relevant mechanisms are to make clear the respective roles of the UK judiciary and the Strasbourg court, of the judiciary and Parliament, and of rights on the one hand and responsibilities on the other. Those are the mechanisms which I hope we will debate in detail in due course.
Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Lab)
My Lords, I recognise and acknowledge that the Minister has indicated that there will be no withdrawal from the ECHR. However, can he give an assurance to your Lordships’ House today that he, along with other Ministers, will work to ensure that we remain within the ECHR, because any withdrawal from it would be a flagrant undermining of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement, which is hardwired into the ECHR?
Lord Bellamy (Con)
I will happily give the noble Baroness that assurance, and I assure your Lordships that I will work with any or all of you to ensure that this Bill meets such concerns as you may have, in so far as it is within my power to do so.
Baroness Wheatcroft (CB)
My Lords, the Minister is reassuringly adamant in his commitment to the convention. Can he assure the House about how he defends the export of asylum seekers to Rwanda in the face of the convention?
Lord Bellamy (Con)
We are entirely satisfied that the Government’s policy on asylum seekers is in compliance with the convention. In this context, I do not think that I can add to that answer.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)
My Lords, it is right to look at the draft put forward by the Lord Chancellor, which makes it absolutely plain that the intention of the Government in that document is that we stay in the European Convention on Human Rights. The preciousness of that is absolutely clear, and I feel certain that a Conservative Government—and, I believe, a Labour Government—are unlikely to move away from it.
Lord Bellamy (Con)
I respectfully agree, and I am particularly delighted to pay my personal respects to my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern following one of his last interventions in this House.
Noble Lords
Human Rights Act 1998
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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)
My Lords, I thank and pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, for bringing this very important debate to this House, and indeed to all your Lordships who have spoken so eloquently this afternoon.
First, I note that there seems to be a remarkable degree, perhaps to one’s surprise, of common ground. The Government entirely agree that the domestication of the Human Rights Act was an extremely good thing. We have heard today many good examples of the positive impact of the domestic Human Rights Act. I want to make it clear that we do not want to throw those out of the window, as has been suggested. We are not “abolishing a jurisdiction”; we are not “withdrawing”; we are not “ripping up”. We are remaining in the convention; the convention rights continue to apply; public authorities continue to be bound. Once that premise is accepted, we can perhaps get on to the more pertinent debate, which is exactly how we balance the various competing considerations that arise in the application of the Act. I say again: the Act itself and the principle are fully accepted. I associate myself with the tributes paid earlier to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, who introduced the Bill, to my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern, who was closely associated with the development of human rights in this country, to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, who was also extremely prominent, to the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, and to a large number of other people here and elsewhere who have contributed, rightly, to the development of a human rights culture.
I am happy to accept the invitation from the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, to pay tribute to the work of the British Institute of Human Rights. Much of what is good about the Human Rights Act comes from its everyday application, in which training and guidance by the BIHR and many other organisations have been vital. That training will continue to be applicable to the Bill of Rights, as we want to ensure that the positive enjoyment of human rights in this country continues unabated.
Having, as it were—I hope—cleared away that ground, perhaps I may next refer to the pertinent question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, as to exactly what the timing of the Bill now is. As your Lordships are aware, the parliamentary timetable has in recent days become somewhat squeezed. As I understand it, the Second Reading in another place is now planned for September, so that detailed consideration of the Bill in this House is unlikely before the autumn. It is true that, by then, a new Prime Minister will be in post—we do not yet know who—but, as of today, I am unaware of any relevant change in the Government’s plan to bring the Bill forward as I have just outlined.
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab Co-op)
Has the Minister given further consideration to the proposal by a number of committees in both Houses that there should be pre-legislative scrutiny?
Lord Bellamy (Con)
Not as far as I am aware, is the direct answer to the noble Lord’s question. The original Bill of Rights was not subject to pre-legislative scrutiny as far as I know. However, I would myself like to use the extra time we now have in a process of outreach to your Lordships’ House and to other interested organisations—I saw Sir Peter Gross yesterday; I have plans to visit each of the devolved legislatures shortly—to explore and understand all these points and see how far we can narrow the differences between us. I respectfully suggest that there are issues that we need to grapple with here and we need to grapple with them sensibly. This Bill clearly arouses very strong feelings and quite a lot of anxieties, but I hope that we can resolve a lot of them and quite a lot of other problems in the course of sensible and reasoned debate.
At one end of the spectrum, there seems to be an almost entrenched view that the 1998 Act is more than perfect and that the slightest change will bring the whole edifice crashing down, or at least give rise to unacceptable risks. At the other end of the spectrum, which has been mentioned several times, there is the point of view that we should withdraw from the convention altogether. The latter is not the Government’s position, and whatever may be said by someone in their capacity as candidate for the leadership of a political party is not relevant for today’s purposes. The position of the Government is quite clear: to stay in the convention and to reconfirm the rights that flow therefrom that are clearly set out in the Bill. From the Government’s point of view—
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
Would the noble and learned Lord be kind enough to help Members of your Lordships’ House, Members of another place and, above all, the public by informing the remaining candidates for leadership of the Conservative Party of what he has just said so that they get it right during the TV debates that will start tomorrow?
Lord Bellamy (Con)
With respect, I do not think that I have any channel of communication with the candidates for the leadership of the Conservative Party, but what I have just said is on the record and may be referred to. That is the Government’s position.
As your Lordships have observed, I personally find myself—as do the Government—with cannons to the left and cannons to the right. So in the valley of calm reasoned debate in this House, I would like to explore with your Lordships the centre ground to which this Bill is directed. In my repeat of the Oral Statement on the Bill on 23 June, I used the phrase “constructive balance”: balance between the roles of the legislature and the judiciary; balance between the domestic courts and the Supreme Court, on the one hand, and the Strasbourg judges, on the other, having regard to subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation; and balance between rights and responsibilities. To that theme of balance, I add three related themes: constitutional clarity, the separation of powers and reinforcing the fundamentals that underpin human rights.
I will address constitutional clarity first. After 25 years of the Act in operation, it is important, in the Government’s view, to restate certain basic principles. These include the following: that the convention rights are an integral part of the domestic law of the United Kingdom; that the ultimate judicial authority in interpreting those rights is the Supreme Court, taking into account our domestic legal traditions in particular; and that the possibility of divergence from Strasbourg is recognised—that is not in dispute; it has always been there, as has been pointed out already. Those basic principles are effectively recognised in Clauses 2 and 3 of the Bill, which are declaratory of the existing position.
It is important that the convention retains a very special and unique constitutional status: no other Act of Parliament provides a machinery where another Act of Parliament, even a subsequent Act of Parliament, can be subject to a declaration of incompatibility under Clause 10. However, when that arises, it is the Government’s view that the separation of powers must prevail. At the moment, under Section 3, we have this curious provision whereby the courts can read down the Act to have a different meaning to that which Parliament intended. The Government wish to clear up that constitutional muddle, if I may put it that way, and put the responsibility for bringing the legislation in question into line with the convention back where it belongs—that is to say, the legislature that first enacted the legislation in question.
Baroness Donaghy (Lab)
I apologise for taking up the House’s time but just to clarify: the Minister is referring to a balance, but it seemed to me to be a balance between the judiciary and the Executive, and the role of Parliament was not clear in what he was saying. I wonder whether he could clarify that. It seemed to be a power grab for the Executive.
Lord Bellamy (Con)
My understanding is that, in these circumstances, any necessary change to the legislation will be brought back to Parliament through the machinery of a statutory instrument, and required to be laid before the House by affirmative resolution. There is every ability for Parliament to determine what should then be done, so it is a balance between the legislature and the judiciary, and not, in the Government’s view, between the judiciary and the Executive, but let us explore that point further in due course.
Secondly, public authorities remain bound by the convention, as is set out in Clause 12. The main change here is in relation to this question of “positive obligations”; that is a conceptual issue which is being addressed in Clauses 5 and 7. Essentially, the underlying issue is: should human rights law under the convention develop a kind of de facto legislative or quasi-legislative content, with potentially serious implications for public expenditure or giving one policy objective priority over another, or are those kinds of decisions for the elected Members of the legislature? Where does the balance lie between the electorate, the whole process of elections, and democracy, on the one hand, and, as it were, judicial interventions on the other hand? That is, in my submission, a conceptual issue, which we should in due course grapple with. That is going to be, and is, the issue of the separation of powers.
Finally, in this brief response I draw attention to a third theme, hardly mentioned today, which is the reinforcement in the Bill of the Government’s commitment to freedom and human rights in the widest sense: freedom of speech under Clause 4, jury trial under Clause 9, the protection of journalists’ sources under Clause 21. There are many points that could be made, but I hope that that brief and admittedly high-level summary at least helps convey why the Government argue for the constructive balance that the Bill aims to achieve. It is not, in the Government’s view, weakening human rights; it is enhancing public confidence in the whole structure. One has to realise that not everybody is as convinced of the value of the Act as it now stands as are some of the noble Lords who have spoken today. This will, in the Government’s view, enable greater public confidence to be maintained in the human rights structure. This is not a new issue—
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)
To what would the Minister ascribe this lack of public confidence? Is it the sayings of the Lord Chancellor, or of Suella Braverman? Why is there a lack of public confidence in human rights in this country?
Lord Bellamy (Con)
There is, as far as one can tell, an important part of public opinion that is very doubtful about the role of this legislation and the Strasbourg court in our constitutional settlement. Why that is the case is not for me to speculate, but it does seem to be difficult to say that it is not the case that there are sections of the public that have less confidence in this legislation than Members of this House.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I am grateful to the Minister for the patience and courtesy with which he is responding to this debate, but I am concerned about one very important element. The Minister said that the Government’s position is that we stay in the ECHR and that we are committed to it; that is the Government’s position, which cannot be overturned by a leadership candidate. But what if that candidate happens to be the current Attorney-General of England and Wales and legal adviser to Parliament and the Cabinet? That is not any old candidate, is it? Ms Braverman surely speaks for the Government, as their Attorney-General. In due course, would the Minister address my question about all these recent powers in the police Act, Nationality and Borders Act and so on, which were justified to us from that Dispatch Box by Ministers who said, “Don’t worry: there is the Human Rights Act as the safeguard, and these powers will have to be exercised in a manner compatible with that”.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
In further testing the patience of the Minister, and no doubt the House, does he really think that the constant repetition over decades of certain politicians and sections of the press that it was only undesirable people who were getting the benefit of human rights law—criminals and whoever—has had no effect whatever? That and the lack of civic education in schools about the benefits of the Human Rights Act has helped us arrive at this situation. Perhaps there is only a slight silver lining to the pandemic, which otherwise, obviously, has been horrible: that while not being able to visit their relatives in care homes, some people might have realised or had perhaps a glimmer of understanding of the relevance of human rights to protect family life, the right to life and all those other issues.
Lord Bellamy (Con)
To take the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, about the Attorney-General first, we seem have a somewhat unusual constitutional position here. It appears that the convention that all government Ministers speak collectively on behalf of the Government is de facto in suspense when there is a leadership contest going on. I am not really able to comment any further, except to say that it is a very curious position that has arisen. If I may, I will leave that point there.
On the general question of where all this disquiet comes from, I would say that this issue is not new. In 2008, Jack Straw, the very Home Secretary who introduced the Act, commented that it did not seem to have a very good balance between rights and responsibilities. There is no greater doughty fighter for liberty in this House than the late Lord Lester of Herne Hill, who favoured a domestic Bill of Rights. A number of retired judges—Lord Sumption, to mention only one—have expressed concerns. The Brighton declaration, which was effectively brought about by the United Kingdom under the chairmanship of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Clarke of Nottingham, and assisted by my predecessor, the noble Lord, Lord McNally, to whom I also pay tribute, was intended to address this question of exactly how the margin of appreciation and doctrine of subsidiarity worked. It has now taken 10 years for even that modest step to finally come into force. So it is not accurate to say that there have not been rumblings in the background about this Act. The Government’s purpose is to try to put the existing Act on to a better footing.
On the important points that have been made in relation to Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, it is perfectly accepted that the relevant consents of the devolved Administrations should be sought. We are particularly concerned about the position in Northern Ireland and to make sure that, so far as possible, all those concerns can be satisfied. I am embarking on discussions with the various devolved Administrations in that regard. They do not agree with the Government at the moment; we shall see how we get on, but that is the position and we are well aware of that problem. The convention rights remain embedded in all the devolution enactments. It is certainly the Government’s position that what is being put forward is compatible with the Good Friday agreement and that the suggestions in this Bill of Rights do not in any way put the United Kingdom in any breach of its international obligations.
To sum up, once the tumult and the shouting die down, the fact is that the UK remains in the convention. We are taking action to restore or enhance public confidence in the existing framework, to strengthen free speech and associated rights, and to have an open debate about the balance between elected power on the one hand and judicial power on the other. The noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, referred to Pip in Great Expectations. I am sure that Nicholas Nickleby, David Copperfield and Oliver Twist would have greatly welcomed a Human Rights Act had it existed at that stage of the 19th century. I commend to the House the Government’s expectation that this Bill will produce a better balanced and enhanced respect for human rights than is currently the case.