Health: Neurological Conditions
Earl Howe Excerpts(12 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Walton of Detchant
My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper. In so doing, I declare an interest as a former neurologist holding honorary positions with many neurological charities.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Earl Howe)
My Lords, we will be providing a detailed written response to the National Audit Office report Services for People with Neurological Conditions in due course. While some progress has been made, we acknowledge that there is more to do to improve care for people with neurological conditions. Work is under way to develop a new outcome strategy for long-term conditions and to introduce more personalised care, including piloting of personal health budgets.
Lord Walton of Detchant
My Lords, I thank the noble Earl for that reply. This report was extremely critical in demonstrating serious inequalities in the standards of care for patients with various neurological conditions, not least Parkinson’s disease, multiple sclerosis, neuromuscular disease and many more, in different parts of the UK. That is highlighted by two major inquiries conducted by all-party groups demonstrating serious deficiencies in the care of patients with parkinsonism and neuromuscular disease. Is it not time that the Government appointed a neurological tsar to oversee the situation and to recommend improvements?
Earl Howe
My Lords, I pay tribute to the noble Lord’s extensive work in Parliament on behalf of those with neurological conditions. We have taken the view that the appointment of a tsar or a clinical specialist in this area should be one for the NHS Commissioning Board. It is satisfied with that position and we must await its determination on that.
Baroness Hussein-Ece
My Lords, the report also highlighted important indicators that the quality of care for people with neurological conditions in some instances had worsened. For example, the number of people admitted to hospital as an emergency had increased significantly and, indeed, emergency readmissions after spending a night in hospital have increased for patients with Parkinson’s disease, multiple sclerosis and motor neurone disease, to give three examples. What are the Government doing to address this?
Earl Howe
My noble friend is quite right. We know that people with long-term neurological conditions are high users of NHS services and, as the NAO report identifies, they often have high levels of unplanned admissions to hospital. To help to provide personalised care and to support better-planned care, there is quite a deal of evidence—of the generic kind, but nevertheless very useful—out there for neurological patients. It focuses on the individual, on planning, on supported self-care and on how patients themselves can improve their own outcomes. We are building a strategy on that model to set out how local authorities, the voluntary sector and government agencies can work together to prevent the kind of emergency admissions to which my noble friend refers.
Baroness Masham of Ilton
My Lords, does the Minister agree that specialised nurses working on these very complicated neurological conditions are very important? Would he see to it that their services are not cut but increased?
Earl Howe
The noble Baroness is quite right that specialist nurses provide an important source of support and advice to patients with a range of neurological conditions. They enable patients to manage their own condition effectively, as I mentioned just now. Guidance issued by NICE is clear on the important role that specialist nurses can play in the provision of effective services for those living with a range of neurological conditions.
Baroness Gardner of Parkes
Has the Minister seen the reports in the newspaper today about the worry that people have about the shortage of medication for those with Parkinson’s disease, for example? Is it a worry more in the press than in reality? How can the Government ensure adequate supplies of necessary medication for these cases?
Earl Howe
There have been shortages of certain medicines over the past two or three years for a number of reasons; there is not a single reason. The Department of Health is working with the medicines supply chain established under the previous Government, and is doing very effective work. It is liaising with manufacturers, wholesalers and the pharmacy trade to ensure that medicines are available when needed. I have not seen the article to which my noble friend refers, but we are not of the view that there is any need for undue concern. However, we are keeping the position under review.
Baroness Thornton
My Lords, it has been suggested that the UK currently does not have enough neurologists—that there should be one neurologist per 40,000 people, and at the moment we have one neurologist per 125,000 people. How will the Government increase the number of neurologists; and how will they do that under the current proposals for the reform of the NHS? Who will drive that increase?
Earl Howe
As the noble Baroness may remember, the National Service Framework for Long-term Neurological Conditions set out as a principal requirement the need for an appropriately skilled workforce to manage the care of people with long-term neurological conditions. At the moment that is the responsibility of primary care trusts. The good news is that full-time equivalent numbers of consultants have been rising steadily. According to the Information Centre census, there were 523 in 2010, an increase from 517 the previous year and from 449 in 2004. To answer the latter part of the noble Baroness’s question, I can say that the Centre for Workforce Intelligence will feed into Health Education England, which will in turn inform the local partnerships that we intend to establish under the reforms, so that there is both a national and a local input on workforce numbers and the numbers we need to train to deliver the service that patients require.
Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville
My Lords, in the context of the all-party report to which the noble Lord, Lord Walton of Detchant, referred, is my noble friend aware that, of the time invested in the production of that report, some 97 per cent was provided by Members of your Lordships’ House? Does he think that that has any relevance in the context of discussion about the future of the House of Lords?
Earl Howe
I am sure that my noble friend will introduce that and other considerations when we come to debate House of Lords reform. I will observe that, when I was on the opposition Benches and used to attend all-party group meetings on neurological conditions, practically the only people there were Members of your Lordships’ House.
Health and Social Care Bill
Earl Howe Excerpts(12 years, 2 months ago)
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Baroness Wheeler
My Lords, we had a long debate on this very important issue of the duty of candour before the Recess, and I do not intend to take up very much of the House’s time on this amendment by responding to the issues that we covered then, or by repeating our views on why we are concerned that the Government’s current proposal for a contractual duty will not address the need for the huge cultural change in the NHS that has to take place in order to ensure openness and honesty when things go wrong in the care and treatment of patients.
Nevertheless, I hope that the Minister will accept the case for regulations on including the duty of candour in commissioning contracts. We on these Benches emphasise our commitment to trying to help to make the contractual duty work. I therefore place it on record that we welcome the Minister’s reassurance during the previous debate that he will come back to the House on the outcome and actions resulting from the current government consultation on the contractual duty. I also hope that he will be magnanimous in the victory that he had before the Recess in the vote rejecting statutory requirement by standing by his assurances on a future review of the effectiveness of the contractual duty, after an appropriate period, and whether its effectiveness is being held back by the lack of statutory provision. My third hope is that the NHS Commissioning Board will issue clear and strong guidance to assist CCGs in this matter, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Earl Howe)
My Lords, this has been another very good debate on the duty of candour. As we have discussed previously, the Government’s position is that the NHS contracts are the most appropriate mechanism through which to implement a further requirement for openness. Amendment 38A proposes that the contractual duty of candour should be given a specific reference in primary legislation. I hope that I can satisfy the House on this and that the undertakings I am about to give the noble Baroness from this Dispatch Box will reassure her sufficiently to enable her to withdraw the amendment.
I give an assurance to the House that the Government propose to use the provisions in Clause 19 relating to the standing rules to specify that the contractual duty of candour must be included in the NHS standard contract, developed by the NHS Commissioning Board. If that assurance is accepted, as I hope it will be, a specific reference is not required to ensure that a contractual duty of candour is imposed. The question, therefore, is whether, despite my assurance, it is necessary or appropriate to include a provision in Clause 19. I have given this proposal substantial thought, and I admit that it is one which on the surface has some appeal. I have spent a good deal of time discussing the matter with noble Lords as well as with Professor Sir Bruce Keogh, the NHS Medical Director.
Let me explain where my deliberations have taken me. At present there is a very wide range of issues that we incorporate into the standard contract. These include issues of paramount importance to the quality and safety of healthcare. For example, the contract is used as one of the mechanisms that we are using to drive improvements in prevention of venous thromboembolism, or VTE. It has been estimated that every year 25,000 people in England die from VTE that they have contracted in hospital. We also use the standard contract for driving improvements in cancer treatments and referrals in healthcare-associated infections in issues such as consent and many other areas.
As the Bill stands, it does not contain a list of the requirements which are to be included in the standard contracts, and for good reason. The Bill should not contain unnecessary detail. On top of that—and I think that this is perhaps a more important point—there should be sufficient flexibility for the Secretary of State and the board to consider and draft appropriate terms and conditions and adapt them to changing circumstances.
The question I pose to myself is this: if, through a reference to the duty of candour, we are to start down the road of specifying particular quality and safety contractual requirements in the Bill, then where do we stop? Just including the few issues that I have briefly mentioned, without any others, means that we will almost certainly land up with a cumbersome and unwieldy list. There are many other areas besides those which some might see as having a similarly valid claim to be mentioned. We should not use primary legislation to cherry-pick priorities to the detriment of other equally important areas.
We have further concerns about precisely what the amendment would require the Secretary of State to provide in the standing rules. We are still looking at what the appropriate contractual term should be in the light of the recent consultation that was mentioned. Imposing a duty in the Bill to adopt a specific formulation, as the amendment would have us do, constrains our ability to take proper account of the consultation and the engagement that we have had with stakeholders—it risks forcing us to implement an inappropriate requirement—and from easily improving it in the future, if the evidence supports that.
I was struck by the very powerful speech of my noble friend Lord Faulks during our last debate on this topic, and indeed by his words today, when he challenged the House to consider the difficulties involved in drafting a duty which adequately encapsulates these obligations. The noble Lord, Lord Winston, was very wise in what he said. For example, how would we specify the types of incidents to which any contractual requirement would apply? The contractual duty and provision in the regulations must be neither too wide nor too narrow in order to be effective and proportionate. We need the flexibility to consider this in more detail.
The noble Baroness’s amendment would have us require particular steps to be taken in particular defined circumstances and adopt a particular definition of the incidents to be covered by the duty of candour. I am extremely uncomfortable with that. Apart from anything else, we specifically asked this question in the public consultation, so we would be undermining that process if we were not properly to consider the responses we received. I really think, therefore, that it would be better to let that consultation guide us as to the precise way in which the duty should be framed. It is for those reasons that, after considerable thought, I can tell the noble Baroness that I do not think it would be wise for us to accept Amendment 38A.
The noble Lord, Lord Walton, asked about the duty placed on individual doctors within a trust. Doctors are expected to follow the code of practice laid down by the GMC, as he will know, and failure to do so may lead to action against a doctor by the regulator in the exercise of its statutory powers. I can confirm to the noble Lord that the code is not just words; it is backed up by real regulatory force. Indeed, I have the wording of the code in front of me:
“If a patient under your care has suffered harm or distress, you must act immediately to put matters right, if that is possible. You should offer an apology and explain fully and promptly to the patient what has happened, and the likely short-term and long-term effects”.
There are similar provisions in the Nursing and Midwifery Council code as well.
Earl Howe
My Lords, this has been a very good debate indeed and I thank noble Lords for the careful consideration that they have given to how CCGs should best manage conflicts of interest. I have listened carefully to the various points raised and it is clear that this is an area of key concern. I hope that the House will therefore forgive me if I start by setting out the position on this issue before I turn to the detail of the amendments before us.
At the heart of the Bill is an intention to balance autonomy with accountability. We are giving freedom to those best placed to take decisions in the interests of patients to do so, but we will also hold them to account, not only for the outcomes they achieve but also for their managing this responsibility effectively, transparently and with integrity.
CCGs will be the guardians of significant amounts of taxpayers’ money, as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, rightly pointed out, so it is only right that there are strict requirements in terms of governance, probity and transparency of decision-making. We must balance the benefits of the clinical autonomy of doctors with a robust management of potential or actual conflicts of interest. It is essential to get this right, and that means a proportionate and reasonable approach.
I reinforce the point that the Bill already provides very real safeguards in relation to conflicts of interest. The CCG must make arrangements in its constitution for managing conflicts and ensuring the transparency of its decision-making process. The CCG must have appropriate governance arrangements, including a governing body with lay members and other health professionals. These arrangements will be scrutinised by the NHS Commissioning Board as part of the process of ensuring that a CCG is fit to be established as a commissioner.
Let me be clear that this is not just about declaring conflicts of interests, which of course is vital, but also about putting in effective and appropriate arrangements to manage these conflicts where they arise. There is not, and cannot be, a one-size-fits-all approach to managing conflict, as it depends on the interest itself and where it may become a conflict. However, likely methods may include absenting the person from decisions in that area, or bringing in others—for example, the independent lay members—to oversee the process for decision-making in a particular area. The key factor here is that they cannot avoid the need to manage the conflict and to be clear about how they are going to do so.
The provisions around conflict of interest apply to all aspects of a CCG’s commissioning activity, which means that they would apply to how it worked with a commissioning support organisation. I appreciate that there is apprehension and, in some cases, misunderstanding about the role of commissioning support organisations, so I shall set out the facts about this issue for the benefit of noble Lords today, in particular my noble friend Lady Barker, to whom I was grateful for referencing the brief on this issue provided by Professor Allyson Pollock.
Commissioning support organisations are not intended to act on behalf of a CCG in making decisions. They provide support, which might take the form of analysis of performance or finance data, supporting procurement or the management of a contract, and back-office functions. Let me be clear: at no point can they take decisions for the CCG or assume responsibility for a CCG’s statutory duties. It would be unlawful for a CCG to sub-delegate its commissioning responsibility to another organisation.
I am, however, conscious of the concerns, particularly those raised by my noble friend Lady Barker, about whether members of commissioning support organisations could sit on a CCG governing body. I give noble Lords a commitment today that we will prohibit any representative of a commissioning support organisation sitting on a CCG governing body through our secondary legislation-making powers under new Section 14N.
I should also like to explain some of the other safeguards in the Bill relating to management of conflicts of interest. Under Clause 73, the Secretary of State may make regulations which we intend will impose specific requirements in relation to the management of conflicts of interest. They will also confer on Monitor various powers to investigate the actions of a CCG and take remedial action. Monitor will be required to issue guidance on these regulations.
The NHS Commissioning Board may also provide guidance on conflicts of interest. This renders unnecessary any additional amendment requiring the Secretary of State to issue guidance on conflicts of interest, as Amendments 86 and 93 would do, or to issue a specific code of conduct or financial interest rules, as Amendment 38B requires. I shall return to that point in a moment.
The Bill is also clear on the transparency and accountability of the decision-making process. Schedule 2 provides that the CCG constitution must specify arrangements for securing transparency about the decisions of the CCG and governing body. The NHS Commissioning Board will be able to issue guidance on the publication of minutes and will ensure that the constitution meets these requirements. This meets the intention behind Amendment 92. We cannot accept the amendment because it might not always be appropriate to publish details of all decisions made by a governing body.
Transparency and accountability must not be achieved at the expense of the effectiveness of the commissioner. PCTs are not required to discuss all matters in public now and we should ensure that CCGs are not subject to more onerous requirements. Amendment 91 may well prevent CCG governing bodies discussing potentially commercially sensitive issues relating to contract values or performance without the public being present, which could pose difficulties.
I can fully understand the intention behind Amendment 102, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, to ensure that local knowledge informs the work of the CCG. However, we have always maintained that the presence of health professionals on a CCG governing body is not intended to be a means for the CCG to obtain advice to inform its commissioning decisions. The non-GP members of the governing body are there to provide an independent perspective, informed by their expertise and experience, in the body responsible for ensuring that the CCG adheres to the principles of good governance. They must have no conflict of interest in relation to the clinical commissioning group’s responsibilities. Amendment 102 would mean that a CCG could have only local professionals in the governing body. This would obviously limit the CCG in its choice of governing body members and risks a conflict of interests. I urge the House not to accept that amendment.
GPs in CCGs have to meet the ethical standards set by the General Medical Council in good medical practice. That includes provision to avoid conflicts of interest. Anyone may raise a concern that a doctor has failed to meet the conditions of their registration with the regulator. However, a failure to meet the conditions which Amendment 93 would impose would not necessarily mean that a GP had been in breach of their conditions of registration, and the duty which Amendment 110 would place on the board would be disproportionate. I know that there is a real concern among some noble Lords and that it is felt that this is a necessary sanction, but it is far better to ensure the robustness of the approach that CCGs take and that it is appropriately overseen. It is more appropriate for an independent monitor to police the transactional behaviour of CCGs and to be able to take effective remedial action where it discovers evidence that a CCG has not followed regulations in relation to procurement and the management of conflicts of interest, which is the approach taken in the Bill.
I similarly urge that we do not place in legislation an indiscriminate requirement, as Amendments 38B, 93 and 116 would do, that people with an interest withdraw from the relevant decision-making process of the CCG. Clearly, that is often going to be the most appropriate means to manage a conflict of interest, and that is made clear by the NHS Commissioning Board Authority’s guidance, Towards Establishment, which was published recently. However, it should not lead us to impose on CCGs a blanket ban on individuals being involved in a decision-making process or sitting on the governing body in all circumstances in which they have an interest. It ignores the fine line that can be drawn between situations in which withdrawal is absolutely necessary and those in which it would be more effective for the CCG’s exercise of its commissioning function for the conflict to be managed, carefully and with external oversight, in a different way that maintains the integrity of the CCG.
I listened with great care in particular to the speeches of the noble Lords, Lord Warner and Lord Walton, on this theme. The best example of the second category that I mentioned is where a CCG is commissioning for local community-based alternatives to hospital services and it determines that the most effective and appropriate way to secure these is from all local GP providers within its geographic area. There are already inherent safeguards in the legislation to help manage conflicts in this scenario. The CCG would have to declare its commissioning intentions as part of its annual commissioning plan, on which it would consult the public, and it would engage with health and well-being boards in developing; and that makes the proposal transparent. It enables the health and well-being board and others to challenge the proposals. CCGs could similarly secure additional involvement in the decision-making process—for instance, by involving members of the health and well-being board or, indeed, other CCGs or members of the CCG’s audit committee. There is a choice. We have not identified one single right way of doing this. We think it is important to allow best practice to evolve rather than trying to pin it down in legislation. If all GP members of the CCG had to withdraw from the decision-making, it would be extremely hard for the CCG to actually make a valid decision, as it could not be delegated to the non-GP members of the governing body or a similar arrangement. It is only in certain circumstances that we would expect individuals with a conflict not to withdraw absolutely, but we have to keep this option open in legislation.
For the same reasons, I cannot support the proposals of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, in Amendment 38B, which would either require a CCG not to contract with a provider in which any member of the CCG had an interest, or require them to secure an exemption from this rule from the NHS Commissioning Board. The conflict and financial interests rules, which this amendment references, already require an individual to withdraw from any part of the decision-making process with a provider in which they have an interest. It is hard to see why it would be necessary also to prevent the CCG from contracting with such a provider or undergo a cumbersome—I have to say cumbersome—exemption process. That approach would make the board have to scrutinise individual procurements and generally police the transactional behaviour of CCGs. It would not allow for alternative local arrangements for quality-assuring the openness and transparency of a CCG’s approach. It should not have to be the board only that can ensure the probity of the commissioning decision. As I have suggested, the health and well-being board might provide a suitable external view, as might another CCG.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
I am grateful to the noble Earl for giving way so freely. I understand what he is saying about the bureaucratic process. However, will he not accept that the reason for that is that the corporate governance processes around the clinical commissioning group are so weak? For instance, why is there not to be a majority of independently appointed non-execs, as there would be on any other public board?
Earl Howe
I will come to that point in a moment. I do not agree with the noble Lord that the governance arrangements are weak. As I have said, one of the things that the board will have to do when authorising CCGs is to assure itself that there are fit and proper governance procedures in place.
I turn to the question of sanctions, which has been raised by a number of noble Lords. It is essential that patients and clinicians remain confident that members of clinical commissioning groups will always put their duty to patients before any personal financial interest. It is important that CCGs take all possible steps to avoid conflicts of interest. We foresee that the guidance that Amendment 79A requires the board to produce would set out the need for CCGs to make clear in their conflict of interest policy that any member of a CCG found to have failed to declare an interest may face a number of possible sanctions and individuals may also be referred to their professional body, which is a serious matter. The noble Lord, Lord Walton, was quite right in all that he said. I am very drawn to the provision of Amendment 79A, and I will come on to that more fully in a moment.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I think that that is a very disappointing response. The noble Earl, Lord Howe, said that clinical commissioning groups will balance autonomy with accountability, and he acknowledged that they will be guardians of billions of pounds of taxpayer’s money. He went on to say that there were three safeguards: the constitution, transparency and the governing bodies. However, he still fails to respond to the fundamental gap, which is the lack of proper corporate governance around clinical commissioning groups. Looking at other public sector bodies—NHS trusts, for instance; not foundation trusts, but NHS trusts—how would we feel if the Government came forward with proposals stating that the board of an NHS trust would consist of executive directors and one or two lay members? It is just possible—but it is not certain—that one of those lay members will be the chairman of the trust, or they could, indeed, be the chief executive. That, in essence, is what the Government are proposing for the governance of clinical commissioning groups. A group of GPs will sit round the table. They will have a couple of lay members who presumably will be appointed by the clinical commissioning group, because the Government consistently fail to say whether there will be an independent appointments process. The noble Earl never responds to me on this point. They will be deciding how billions of pounds should be spent. The noble Earl refuses to acknowledge that these GPs are business people who run businesses which depend mainly on contracts—
Earl Howe
My Lords, I realise that I did not answer the noble Lord and I apologise to him. It may be helpful for him to know that we intend to work with patient and professional groups and with emerging clinical commissioning groups to determine the best arrangements for appointing members of governing bodies. We will be issuing regulations in due course setting out in more detail the requirements for appointing clinical—that is to say, non-GP—members to the governing body.
The report that we had from the NHS Future Forum stated that it would be unhelpful for clinical commissioning groups’ governing bodies to be representative of every group under the sun. We agreed with that. Requiring a bigger group of professionals on the governing body itself, or expanding it in any way at all, would not really mean that a broader range of interests are involved in designing patient services. It would just lead to governing bodies that are too large and slow to do their job well. However, we think that it is important for clinical commissioning groups to be led clinically. That is the point.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl. However, that ultimately means that a majority of the people on the board of a clinical commissioning group will potentially be able to take advantage of the commissioning decisions of that group. That is why the corporate governance is so concerning. I accept that my amendment might be regarded as rather lengthy. However, I am pushing this forward because I am trying to replace the lack of effective corporate governance.
The noble Earl says that sanctions will be contained in guidance, but I do not think that that is sufficient. The potential for conflicts of interest are so great and the amount of public money involved so considerable that we should have in the Bill a clear commitment to sanctions. I do not agree with the noble Earl that this is something that can be left to professional bodies. My noble friend Lord Warner was absolutely right to mention that case. It shows some of the risks of what essentially was, in that person’s case, a managerial issue being pursued by a regulatory body. I do not think that that is the right way of dealing with GPs who, it was alleged, had pursued actions in breach of whatever guidance was issued.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I am sure that Monitor will play an extremely useful role, but surely it would be much better to give further and clear guarantees that these matters will be dealt with effectively. I believe that we need more provision in the Bill specifically on sanctions. I should like to test the opinion of the House.
Baroness Thornton
My Lords, I am not going to attempt to answer the noble Baroness’s question. I shall leave that for my noble friend Lord Warner or the noble Lord, Lord Patel. The noble Lord, Lord Patel, and my noble friends Lord Warner, Lady Pitkeathley and Lord Turnberg made a very good job of introducing these amendments, stressing the importance of joint commissioning, the work of the Health Select Committee in the Commons and its recommendations, and indeed the vital nature of tariff reform. This is a modest but very important amendment that strengthens the Bill.
Every time we meet on Report on this Bill we are in a different world. The world we are in today is not the same one we were in 10 days ago. As we speak, the Royal College of Physicians has decided by a majority of 80 per cent to ballot its members about how they feel about the Health and Social Care Bill. By my counting that leaves only two royal colleges which have not consulted their membership so far. We all know what the results of the consultations have been, but still we plough on with this Bill.
The remarks of the noble Lords, Lord Mawhinney and Lord Newton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, together underline the defects of this Bill. Why are we having a debate about integration at this point in the passage of this Bill? It occurred to me that perhaps those debates should have been had before we had the Bill. However, because you cannot achieve everything does not mean that you should not try to achieve something. That is what these amendments do and that is why we on these Benches are very keen to support them. It seems to me that through all the many definitions of integration that we have discussed in this House, the one that is going to have the most effect on budget and finance is in these amendments here before us today. I hope the Minister will accept these amendments because they will improve this Bill.
Earl Howe
My Lords, integration has been a consistent theme throughout our debates on the Bill and the noble Lord, Lord Warner has made a number of highly informed speeches on this topic, as indeed have many in your Lordships’ House. The noble Lord, Lord Warner, made a powerful case for taking action for further integration. There is no disagreement between us on this. It is why the Government have already taken a number of steps to do precisely what he is asking and I name a selection only. We have put duties on commissioners to promote integration. We are creating health and well-being boards, bringing together health and social care commissioners and their representatives—one of the main manifestations of joined-up thinking in this Bill. We are strengthening the duties in relation to pooled budgets. We are placing specific duties on Monitor to support integration and tabling an amendment prior to Report giving Monitor express power to do that. We are working with the Future Forum, the King’s Fund and the Nuffield Trust in a whole range of non-legislative measures. This is not as the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, put it, something the Government have put into the “too difficult” box. We are determined that we need to tackle this. I hope no one in your Lordships’ House is left in any doubt about our commitment in this area.
There are numerous examples of the non-legislative things we are already doing. We agreed with the Future Forum’s recommendations that the board should produce commissioning guidance for CCGs that focuses on how to meet the needs of different groups of people who may have multiple problems such as the frail elderly. By April 2012 the department will put in place new metrics that bring together existing data on patients’ experiences at the interface between services. We are working with the NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement to identify and spread examples of good practice in local measurement and improvement of pathways of care. Through the NHS operating framework for 2012-13 we are asking all PCTs to work with their local authority partners to look at how integration can be better achieved. I have a whole string of other examples.
As I have said, the commitment of the Government in this area should not be doubted. I was very pleased to see the King’s Fund and the Nuffield Trust in their report to the Future Forum recognising that,
“integrated care lies at the heart of”
this Bill,
“to put patients first, improve health outcomes and empower health professionals”.
That is exactly right. While there is clearly work to be done to make this a reality, the Bill will, for the first time, create duties for NHS bodies to promote and encourage the commissioning and provision of integrated services. It is a difficult concept to define. While the noble Lord, Lord Warner, is to be congratulated on the attempt he has made in his amendment, my fear is that the amendment will not actually take us very far. The precise term “integration” is used only in headings in the Bill and the concept of integration is applied in a number of different contexts so a fixed definition of this kind may not be appropriate in every case. It may be too narrow in some cases—some noble Lords have alluded to that point. It is also a somewhat circular definition, referring as it does to integration meaning the delivery of integrated care. That serves to illustrate the real difficulties with this approach.
I am not convinced that it is necessary to try to describe what integration means. Integration is a broad concept. It could encompass a range of measures. As the recent King’s Fund and Nuffield Trust report noted,
“integrated care means different things to different people. At its heart, it can be defined as an approach that seeks to improve the quality of care for individual patients, service users and carers by ensuring that services are well co-ordinated around their needs”.
Yes that is right and the duty on the board in new Section 13M is absolutely consistent with that approach.
We were very grateful to the Future Forum for its recent work on integrated care. We welcome its recommendation that the entire health and social care system should share a clear and common understanding of the value of integration as a means of putting patients at the centre of their care. However, it was also clear that rather than being an end in itself, integration is,
“a means to achieving better outcomes for people”.
That is surely right. There must be the scope for integration to be adaptable to the needs of local communities and individual patients. The noble Lord’s definition holds,
“improving the delivery of integrated care and treatment to individual patients”
as the objective in itself when improving outcomes and reducing inequalities should be the ultimate objectives.
Very recently, I was advised of a paper produced by the World Health Organization in 2008, Integrated Health Services - What and Why? It starts off by stating that integrated health services mean different things to different people. It lists a whole variety of interpretations of what integrated healthcare means and says that it is in essence very difficult to boil these things down to a definition that is going to please everybody. It also casts doubt—I do not want to make too much of it—on the empirical base for claiming that integration is the answer in every set of circumstances. In making that point, I do not want to imply that the Government are anything other than fully committed to integration, because we certainly are, but the paper’s conclusion is:
“‘Integration’ is used by different people to mean different things. Combined with the fact that this is an issue which arouses strong feelings, there is clearly much scope for misunderstanding and fruitless polarization”.
For the World Health Organization to come to that conclusion tells a story. In drafting the various duties and powers in relation to integration, we have consciously avoided a fixed definition to allow for a measure of flexibility and innovative thinking. We have focused on the purpose—the “why” rather than the “how”.
I recently met front-line staff when I visited the NHS on the Isle of Wight to look at how they were delivering an efficient, integrated, urgent care service. I made a point of asking them whether they thought that a definition of integration in the Bill would be helpful. I received a resounding no in response. They felt that something like that would stifle their ability to apply fresh thinking and to come up with inventive solutions of their own as to how best to provide integrated care. We are clear that we should not put clinicians, who know the needs of their patients best, in a straitjacket by defining integration in the Bill.
Clearly, it will be important that the board and CCGs are held to account for delivering against these duties. They are already required to set out in their annual reports how they have exercised their functions, including how they have met the various duties placed on them.
Amendment 38C also makes particular reference to the board and Monitor developing tariffs that will support integration. On that point, I reassure the noble Lord that the duties on the board and Monitor to promote integration would apply in relation to their functions in relation to the tariff. The clauses on the tariff allow a high degree of flexibility for the board to adopt different approaches to tariffs, including “bundles” of services or pathways, and we are committed to extending these. They also allow scope for local flexibility in how the rules are applied where necessary. The noble Baroness, Lady Wall, provided considerable insight into what is needed here. Perhaps it would be helpful if I gave an example of a pathway tariff.
In 2012-13, we are introducing a “year of care” tariff for funding cystic fibrosis services, developed with the support of the Cystic Fibrosis Trust. This includes all the care for cystic fibrosis patients for a whole year. The price is broken down into different “bands”, depending on the complexity of the patient. The tariff will cover the care undertaken by specialist centres and local hospitals, but it will be paid only to the specialist centre thereby promoting better joint working between specialist centres and local hospitals. We are confident that the board, with support from Monitor, will continue to develop and increase the scope of bundled service tariffs where it is clear that tariff design of that kind is appropriate and will deliver benefits to the patient.
Lord Winston
I am sure that the Minister will want to answer my question because it is not aggressive or political; it is really to find out how this Bill will work. When somebody goes to casualty after a month with a broken nose and complains, “Look, my main problem is the pain in my sinuses which I have had for a long time”, and is told by the doctor when they had already waited six hours, “I’m afraid the sinuses are a different department. You’ll have to make another appointment”, that is a problem with integration. How does the Minister think we might accomplish better integration with this Bill?
Earl Howe
It is a very interesting question from the noble Lord. When I visited Oldham a few weeks ago, I saw for myself how they were getting around that problem in the context of musculoskeletal services. Instead of patients being shunted from pillar to post, they had a system whereby the patient could move seamlessly and immediately from one specialist to another. They did not have to be referred; they could ring up the centre and ask to see a particular person. That is the kind of integrated model that we need to see rolled out more generally in other services. I recognise the issue that the noble Lord raises, but it is one that we are seeing inventive solutions arising to address. I hope that the work being done will do that.
Lord Warner
My Lords, there have been some extremely powerful speeches of support for this amendment for which I am extremely grateful. I am grateful in particular to my co-signatories and I noted the powerful speeches of the noble Lords, Lord Owen and Lord Sutherland, and the noble Baroness, Lady Young. They have made the case for an amendment of this kind to the Bill.
I was disappointed by the Minister’s response. That was not just because I got only a B- for my definition—I expected to have my homework marked by officials in the Department of Health and was not expecting to get a high score—but because I think that the definition meets the needs that we have. I find it very difficult to see how the Minister can stand up and say, “Well, we’re going hold people to account; we’re going to monitor their performance”, if we do not have a definition against which we are going to monitor their performance.
The definition proposed by the amendment moves us away from a preoccupation with integration as organisation and process change to delivery of services to the individual. I do not see how the Minister can say, “We’re concerned about outcomes for individuals”, if we do not integrate delivery. You are highly unlikely, I would say as a jobbing ex-public sector manager, to get good outcomes if you have not orchestrated the delivery of the services to the individual that meets their needs.
Earl Howe
I would not want the noble Lord to believe that I was dismissive of the point that he has just made. I recognise that it is important that we somehow give the meaning of integration a clearer explanation, whether that is through the guidance issued by the board or, indeed, the Explanatory Notes to the Bill. I am just wary of putting something in the Bill. That is all.
Lord Warner
I guess I am more of a risk taker than the noble Earl and I believe that we could put a definition of this kind in the Bill. It would cause no confusion—indeed, it would remove it—in the minds of many people working day in, day out in the NHS. As to those who have asked, “What is the purpose of some of the other changes?”, the noble Lord, Lord Owen, powerfully made the point that we need to give strong signals to these new players in the game. We want them to start off knowing that they will be held to account in their annual reports for monitoring their progress on integration. We want that: it is deliberate. We want them to know that Parliament put that in the Bill for a purpose. I am not satisfied with the Government’s response and I beg leave to test the opinion of the House.
“( ) Subsection (1) does not apply to any function of the Secretary of State of making an order or regulations.”
Baroness Thornton
My Lords, I support these amendments, and I do so because I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Patel, that there was a grave omission from the Bill that would allow strategic reconfigurations to take place that are not based on failing institutions. It was certainly not clear to us—and I rest on the authority of my noble friend Lord Warner on this—how, with the abolition of the SHAs from April 2013, strategic reconfiguration of specialist services would take place. Ministers have said, “Oh no—it’s all going to be okay”, but they have not explained how you would reconfigure the stroke services in London, as the noble Lord, Lord Patel, said, after the abolition of the strategic health authority. We support the amendments and hope that the Minister will do so as well.
Earl Howe
My Lords, we have had several lively debates on the importance of redesigning services if the NHS is to become more personalised and productive, and the noble Lord, Lord Warner, speaks with great insight and passion on this issue. He has tabled further amendments on this topic, which we will have an opportunity to debate in detail at a later stage.
The Government are clear that, as a basic principle, the reconfiguration of services is a matter for the local NHS and that decisions about service change should be driven by local assessment of need. The reconfiguration of services works best when there is a partnership approach between the NHS, local government and the public. What matters is that strategic decisions are taken at the right level. We believe that our reforms will enable commissioners to make the changes that will deliver real improvements in outcomes for patients and the public. The Bill places clear duties on the Commissioning Board and clinical commissioning groups, which will underpin a locally driven approach to service redesign, clinically based and framed around the needs of patients. That includes duties to promote the NHS constitution and the involvement of patients as well as duties to secure continuous improvement in the quality of services and to reduce inequalities. These duties set important guiding principles against which the commissioning system will develop and oversee service redesign and reconfiguration. In addition, the NHS will continue to assure reconfiguration proposals against the four clear tests set by the Secretary of State, which are that proposals should have support from clinical commissioners; should be based on robust patient and public engagement; should be underpinned by a clear evidence base; and should be consistent with current and prospective plans for patient choice. The Bill and the four tests will ensure that any proposals for service change are based on a thorough assessment of local need, underpinned by clinical insight and developed through dialogue between commissioners, providers, local authorities, patients and the public. Of course, the board will have an important role in providing support and assurance to local commissioners, but we will not be replicating layers of top-down management.
With the clear legal duties set out in the Bill, the four tests and the support and assurance that will be available, there should be no need for the Secretary of State to prescribe through the mandate how the commissioning system should prioritise and determine the design of services. To do so would cut right across the clinically led local commissioning, which is at the heart of the Bill. Nevertheless, I recognise the importance of getting these arrangements right, and between now and Third Reading I commit to working with the noble Lord with a view to finding a formula designed to address the concerns that he has articulated. We are looking at a range of options. I hope to be able to say more about this when we reach his later amendment on the subject. I hope that for now he will find this rather broad assurance sufficiently strong to enable him to withdraw that part of the amendment.
I hope that the noble Lord will be able to withdraw the rest of Amendment 42 as well, because it also raises another issue. It is vital, especially in the current economic climate, for the NHS to provide financial support for adult social services where possible in relation to those services at the interface between health and social care. Here, I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Warner, who has been a tireless advocate of social care at numerous stages of our proceedings, to ensure that this element of the equation—and that part of the Bill’s title—is not overlooked.
The noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, has tabled Amendment 148B with a similar aim in mind. We are all, I think, aware of the impact that such services can have in helping people to live independently in their own homes and in reducing unnecessary hospital admissions—which is, of course, better for the individuals involved and relieves pressures on the NHS. The last spending review included a commitment to provide £648 million in 2011-12, rising to £700 million by 2014-15, for these purposes. Early indications are that this funding has helped to promote integrated working between social care and health commissioners. We want this to continue. I can reassure the noble Lord and the noble Baroness that by virtue of paragraph 130 of Schedule 4 to the Bill the NHS Commissioning Board and CCGs will inherit the powers that primary care trusts currently have under existing legislation to make payments to local authorities towards expenditure on community services.
Generally speaking, our approach in this Bill has been to give NHS commissioners maximum autonomy in how the NHS budget is used. However, I have sympathy for the argument that it is legitimate that the Secretary of State should be able to determine the proportion of NHS funding that is to be transferred to local authority community services in order to secure closer working between the NHS and social services. I am not sure that the mandate is the right vehicle for this. However, I can see very considerable merit in the approach that the noble Baroness has taken with Amendment 148B. This amendment would give the Secretary of State additional powers to direct the board on the minimum amount that it should transfer to local authorities in a given financial year. The Secretary of State would be able to specify in the directions the bodies to which those payments should be made, the amount that should be paid to each body and the functions in respect of which the payments must be made, and to amend these instructions if necessary. It would essentially enable the current arrangements to continue.
The noble Lord, Lord Warner, asked whether the amendment was wide enough to cover adult social care; whether it was within vires; and whether the Treasury is content. The answer to all those questions is yes. Indeed, I am advised that the amendment would enable funding to be transferred to other community services, such as housing, if necessary.
The approach taken is in line with current practice, which is approved by and agreed with the Treasury. Importantly, this would represent only a minimum. The board would retain the power to make additional payments over and above those required by the Secretary of State if it chose. The CCGs would also retain their powers to make such payments. Although I think it makes sense for it to be the NHS Commissioning Board that makes these payments, it would also be vital that there is a dialogue between local authorities and clinical commissioning groups as to how the funding could be best used. Of course, both will be involved, as members of health and well-being boards, in setting the strategic framework for health and social care commissioning through the joint health and well-being strategy. In addition, the existing powers in Section 256 for the Secretary of State to give directions on the conditions that should apply to such payments would apply. This is helpful because it would provide a mechanism for ensuring that the agreement of the health and well-being board is obtained as to how funds are spent.
The noble Lord, Lord Warner, has spoken with great conviction about the Bill’s importance, including the tangible duties to act to ensure that integration moves from being just an aim to being a reality—as, indeed, the Future Forum has emphasised that it must. I think that Amendment 148B meets all the criteria to ensure that that will be the case. I shall therefore be happy to support it if the noble Baroness should decide to move it. I hope that my noble friends will join me in supporting the amendment; I would urge them to do so. Given that commitment, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Warner, will be prepared to withdraw Amendment 42.
Lord Warner
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his explanations and reassurances. I certainly think that Amendment 148B is a better amendment than my provision on social care in Amendment 42. I am very happy also to accept his broad assurances that we will have a discussion and dialogue to see whether we can move forward on, in effect, a version of a pre-failure regime, while recognising the Government’s commitment to local decision-making on redesigning and reconfiguring services. On that basis, I am happy to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I would like to echo my noble friend Lord Rea and noble Lords from the Cross Benches on the importance of this group of amendments. At its best, primary care can be brilliant, but at its worst it can be absolutely appalling. The variation in primary care is probably wider than in any other part of the National Health Service. As the changes take place we can see that this may cause many problems in the future.
We are all agreed about the need for an integrated approach and for a smooth patient pathway. Clearly, primary care potentially has a very important role to play. However, it needs to step up to the plate. If acute hospitals are to reduce the scale of their operations, more will be expected of primary care. Yet acute hospitals are open every hour of the day: primary care is not. Indeed, there are often very big issues about how primary care can be accessed out of working hours. The out of hours services are not always as effective as they might be, and there are some practices where patients know that it is very difficult to get attention unless they turn up at the convenience of the doctor, and so they then end up at the accident and emergency department. As I read where the NHS is going, this is no longer going to be acceptable. If money is being taken away from acute care and more money is being spent on primary care, which must be the logical outcome of clinical commissioning groups, unless those clinical commissioning groups can ensure that GPs do what is necessary to ensure that primary care takes up the responsibility, we are going to end in great difficulty, where acute care services will continue to be demanded by patients and money is being spent on primary care but it is not doing the necessary job. Therefore issues around the monitoring and performance management of primary care become very important indeed.
The Government have decided not to place the contracts of GPs within clinical commissioning groups. I understand that because clearly there is another potential conflict of interest. They are to be held at the local offices of the national Commissioning Board. However, there are real questions to be asked about how bureaucrats, as the Government seek to call them—I like to think of them as managers—are going to handle those contracts. What will happen within a particular clinical commissioning group if there is a group of GPs who simply will not do what is required of them to make a contract work with a local hospital? For instance, there may be a risk-share arrangement with a local hospital, where essentially agreement is made on the contract price, but part of it is very much about demand management, where there is a risk share between the clinical commissioning group and the acute trust. That will depend on all the GPs within a clinical commissioning group doing what is necessary, playing their part and contributing to demand management measures. Frankly, there are a lot of GPs who will not have anything to do with that. We know that at the moment. It is happening everywhere, up and down the country, with GPs who do not give a damn about anything to do with demand management. What will happen? Who will be able to intervene in those circumstances? Clinical commissioning groups do not have many levers when it comes to poor performance among general practitioners. I suspect that the national Commissioning Board will not have the expertise either. That is why this group of amendments is so important. We all know that primary care can make a huge contribution to a good NHS in the future, but we have to admit that, of all parts of the NHS, we can probably also find the poorest quality of service as well. That is why we are looking for reassurance from the noble Earl that this new system will be able to deal with those poor performers.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Kakkar and Lord Patel, for their contributions to this debate and, indeed, to other noble Lords who have spoken. We have heard some very powerful and persuasive arguments. I have listened very carefully to them.
Amendments 43A and 43B highlight the concerns that I expect all of us in this Chamber share in relation to the need to ensure high-quality primary care for all patients. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, made some very telling points in that regard. Of course, there can be no doubt that good primary care contributes to good healthcare outcomes overall. I fully agree that the NHS Commissioning Board should be held to account properly for its performance in commissioning primary care. I do not think, however, that the right way to achieve that is to prescribe that this must be part of the mandate. Our aim is that the mandate should have at its heart the NHS outcomes framework, which covers the range of care that the NHS provides. I make the simple point that good primary care will be essential to improvement against the NHS outcomes framework.
More widely, the department will be keeping under review the performance of the board and the way that it carries out its functions, including its direct commissioning. What matters here are the accountability mechanisms and how those in the system are monitored and held to account. Just as the board will have a commissioning outcomes framework to hold CCGs to account for the quality of their commissioning, it will be important to have robust and transparent information to assess the quality of what the board commissions itself.
We come back to what the Bill already says: it places duties of quality on the Secretary of State, on the board and on CCGs, requiring each of them to exercise functions with a view to securing continuous improvement in the quality of services provided to patients. The Bill also sets out robust arrangements for holding those bodies to account for delivering quality improvement. As noble Lords will be aware, the Bill already requires the board to submit a business plan setting out how it proposes to exercise its functions, and a report setting how it has exercised its functions, to the Secretary of State on an annual basis. In turn, CCGs must also submit their commissioning plans and annual reports to the board. Both the board, in reporting to the Secretary of State, and CCGs, in reporting to the board, will be expected to demonstrate how they have fulfilled their quality improvement duty, including in relation to primary care. Consequently we expect, for example, that both the board and CCGs will wish to monitor the standard of care and services provided by all primary medical services providers in fulfilling their duties.
It is possible that we will need a dedicated objective relating to primary care in the mandate—I am not ruling that out. It would be better, though, not to prescribe that in primary legislation. What matters is that there are clear and effective accountability arrangements, and the Bill as it stands provides flexibility to ensure just that.
The noble Lords, Lord Kakkar and Lord Rea, asked about the QOF. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, that the QOF is a separate issue, but I can say that the whole of the QOF is kept under review in consultation with the profession to ensure that it reflects the best available evidence and supports continuous improvement in the quality of care for patients. Over the coming months we will continue to discuss with the profession and its representatives how to focus the QOF on securing better healthcare outcomes and what that means for existing GP contractual arrangements.
I turn to the final amendment in this group, Amendment 95A. The Bill already ensures that the board has the information that it needs to demonstrate how it has fulfilled its duties. CCGs are required to provide information to the board in the form of the annual commissioning plan and annual report. In addition, the board and CCGs are under a duty to co-operate. In the normal course of business we expect this to involve the sharing of information as necessary but, in the event that a CCG might have failed, be failing or fail to discharge any of its functions, the board’s powers enable it to require any information or documents that it considers necessary from CCGs.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, posited the situation that there might be reluctant GPs who did not fulfil their part of the bargain, whatever that was, with the acute sector. There needs to be a way of investigating allegations that actions by GPs in their practices are adversely affecting a clinical commissioning group. Where a general practice is operating in such a way that it is a barrier to a clinical commissioning group meeting its functions, it will be for the commissioning group to work with the members of that general practice to support it to improve and contribute to the work of the commissioning group as a whole. Ultimately, if it is unable to do so, a clinical commissioning group may need to refer such cases to the NHS Commissioning Board, along with the evidence of the failure of the practice and details of any support that the commissioning group has provided to the practice to help it overcome any perceived difficulties.
Among other matters, the board may wish to consider if the practice’s actions are in breach of the practice’s primary medical services contract. Separately, the NHS Commissioning Board will have the power to investigate the suitability of individual GPs under the medical performers list provisions. As the noble Lord will know, this power is currently with primary care trusts.
In a nutshell, therefore, the Bill already imposes a duty on CCGs in respect of the mandate and allows the board to ensure that CCGs fulfil it. Further specific requirements in relation to providing information to the board are therefore unnecessary, so I hope that what I have said reassures the noble Lords, Lord Kakkar and Lord Patel, sufficiently to enable them to withdraw their amendment.
Lord Kakkar
My Lords, I thank the Minister for, as always, his thoughtful response and consideration of the amendments. I remain somewhat anxious about whether there is going to be sufficient attention and opportunity to deal with the question of performance in primary care and the management of that performance to ensure that the very best clinical outcomes are achievable for all patients across the country.
I welcome much of what the Minister has said with regard to potential further consideration of how mechanisms other than a specification in the mandate on the question of primary care performance might work. I wonder whether it might be possible for him to enter into further dialogue on this matter so that there can be clarity. It would be unhelpful for the future if a great emphasis were placed—in fact, if there were a momentum—on moving practice from the secondary care environment, where there is a relentless evaluation of clinical outcomes and which has done so much to improve clinical outcomes for our patients because of the attention paid to those matters, into a primary care environment where an objective assessment of outcomes was not always possible and where, as a result, what we all hope will be achieved through the Bill—a health gain for patients and population—might therefore inadvertently be lost. With the opportunity to have a further conversation with the Minister prior to Third Reading, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“( ) Requirements included in the mandate have effect only if regulations so provide.”
“( ) Revisions to the mandate which consist of adding, omitting or modifying requirements have effect only if regulations so provide.”
Health and Social Care Bill
Earl Howe Excerpts(12 years, 2 months ago)
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Baroness Wheeler
I am pleased to speak in support of the Government’s Amendments 56, 97 and 98, which take an important step along the route of making the Bill more explicit on the duties of the NHS Commissioning Board and clinical commissioning groups to promote patient involvement in decisions about an individual’s care and treatment. We particularly welcome the requirement for the board to publish guidance for CCGs on the patient involvement duty. We argued strongly for this in Committee. It will go some way to ensuring that CCGs are clear about what is required of them to meet the duty of involvement of each patient. We know that the evidence shows that many commissioners are currently unaware of the increasing evidence that involving individual patients in their care and treatment is proven to be more clinically effective, provides better patient experience and makes better use of healthcare resources. The guidance will enable strong signals to draw commissioners’ attention to the proven interventions that they require from their providers.
CCGs will need considerable help and support to bring about the changes we need, so clear and explicit guidance to them will be crucial. For individuals, participation must mean involvement in care planning and support for patients who manage their conditions. Sharing in the choice of treatment involves major cultural changes in the behaviour, approaches and attitudes of key professionals from across the specialisms. As we have stressed before, this means changing the way that patients and clinicians, in particular, relate to each other, and changing the way that the NHS relates to patients in terms of, for example, information provision, the organisation of clinics and the style of consultation that professionals have with patients.
Amendment 142 underlines the importance of the provision of information to patients and is supported by us. It includes the participation of the patient in monitoring systems that measure the impact of service delivery or the range of services available, and this is welcome. My noble friend Lord Harris has commented on Amendments 49A and 94A, and I endorse those comments.
In Committee, noble Lords strongly supported the call from patient organisations and other key stakeholders for a definition of patient and public involvement to be included in the Bill. The guidance to CCGs will need to address this issue. I hope that the Minister will also ensure that it focuses on ways in which patients will be genuinely engaged during the development of the commissioning plans rather than just consulted on plans after they have been drawn up. Guidance will help patients, carers and their representatives make informed decisions. This group of amendments form the basis for moving forward. We look forward to the Government also looking favourably on the subsequent amendments, which would also provide real impetus to the patient involvement agenda that we need.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Earl Howe)
My Lords, we have spent a good deal of time in debate on this Bill discussing the issue of patient involvement, and for good reason. Patients rightly expect to experience responsive health services where they are treated as individuals. It is central to the Government’s vision for the NHS for patients to become genuine partners in decisions about their health and treatment, with services designed around their needs. The Bill will lay the foundations to achieve that. So I understand completely the motivation behind my noble friend Lady Williams’s suggestions in Amendment 49A and 94A to place an additional duty on commissioning bodies when taking decisions to put the interests of patients above all other considerations, as far as resources allow. On the face of it, this sounds obvious, and I am deeply sympathetic to the principle. However, I think that I am going to have to seek to persuade my noble friend that it would be extremely hard to get this right.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, this is a useful debate and I hope that the noble Earl, Lord Howe, will be able to describe how he thinks specialist services and services for less common conditions will be protected in the new arrangements.
We know that there have been problems with the current commissioning arrangements by primary care trusts, the issue being that if they are dealing with services that cover only a small group of patients they do not have the experience or expertise to commission services effectively. The possibility exists that clinical commissioning groups that cover even smaller areas than PCTs will have the same challenges to face. We know that the NHS Commissioning Board will be commissioning some services at a national level. It would be helpful if the noble Earl, Lord Howe, could explain the distinction between those services that will be deemed to be of national importance but there is clearly concern that CCGs will not be able to have the critical mass to commission locally, and so they fall to be commissioned nationally. Where will the line be drawn? There is a powerful case for highly specialist services and those that are known as services for less common conditions to be given some protection in the system.
Amendment 64ZA is rather different but it comes back to the point raised by my noble friend Lord Walton in our debates in Committee on the need for strategic direction on reconfiguration issues. I am sure that he is right, as indeed was the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, to point out that decisions on emergency care and specialist networks are very difficult to make. We know that we probably have too many hospitals providing emergency care at the moment, but we also know that it has often been very difficult to reach local consensus. I know that the thrust of the Government’s legislation is for local determination but that is asking a lot. If you take a region you are asking for a huge number of clinical commissioning groups to come together and sign up to some kind of reconfiguration process which would lead to a more integrated approach in relation to emergency care. Without strategic health authorities and unless the local outposts of the national Commissioning Board are actually going to take an assertive role, there is a risk that we will not have the mechanism for making the kind of hard decisions that need to be made.
I am convinced that some strong, national leadership is required if you are to get movement on better emergency care and an acceptance that the current arrangements in some parts of the country simply will not do. It is interesting to see the debate in Mid Staffordshire following the problems in that trust and the recent publication of letters sent by the local clinical commissioning groups about the future of that hospital, causing a furore in the area. It shows some of the problems of an individual clinical commissioning group seeking to come to a view about the kind of reconfiguration of acute services. Of course, CCGs will need an input, but some external view and leadership would be very helpful to enable us to get better provision of services. As my noble friend Lord Walton says, one of the best examples of this is in relation to stroke services. The experience in London has shown, without any doubt, that pooling stroke services together in a limited number of acute centres has led to hugely enhanced outcomes. As a result of the London experience the strategic health authorities are requiring the same to be done throughout the rest of the country. The question I put to the noble Earl, Lord Howe, is: under the arrangements in the Bill, how can we ensure that that kind of national leadership will continue?
Earl Howe
My Lords, this has been another excellent debate. It is worth saying at the outset that I fully appreciate the importance of the board and CCGs paying due attention to the way they commission specialised services and services for less common conditions and indeed emergency services. I fully endorse the importance of services being delivered in an integrated way when that is in the best interests of patients. I listened very carefully to the case put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, on Amendment 50A. She made a very persuasive case about the importance of only ever commissioning specialised services with a close acquaintance with the relevant guidance and evidence base. I could not agree more with her on that. Commissioning of specialised services requires specialist skills and this is precisely why we feel that the Commissioning Board is the right body to commission such services. The board will be able to draw on a great deal of expertise in doing so. I hope the noble Baroness recognises our shared commitment in this area. Very shortly we will be publishing a consultation document as a UK response to the EC recommendation on rare diseases. We hope to be able to do that within a few days. The consultation document and responses will form the basis of the UK’s plan. She will see in it that a great deal of thinking is going into how these services should be commissioned.
The noble Lord, Lord Walton, spoke with his customary authority about Duchenne muscular dystrophy. He may like to know that all regional specialised commissioning groups have undertaken reviews of neuromuscular services in their localities. Improvements to services are already being put in place. For example the NHS has invested in care co-ordinator posts which can reduce emergency admissions and readmissions. The national specialised commissioning group has also included neuromuscular disease as a priority in its 2012 work plans and it has been looking at emergency admissions as part of that work.
The noble Lord, Lord Winston, referred to rarer conditions, including those of genetic origins, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Masham, in relation to neuroblastoma. I identified closely with all that they said. Many of these conditions are extremely rare, fortunately. It is not possible for all health professionals and carers to have detailed knowledge of conditions which they will see only very rarely in their working life. However, already we are addressing this through such initiatives as NHS Choices. It is one of a number of initiatives that we have developed to provide comprehensive, clinically accredited information about health and health services. Comprehensive information to support clinical decision-making is also included on NHS Evidence, the new web-based portal hosted by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence. It provides access to a range of information, including primary research literature, practical implementation tools and guidelines. I am not suggesting that it is the total answer to this conundrum but it is certainly a demonstration of the direction of travel. We want to see much more information available to commissioners at a local level.
I think there has been consensus in this debate as to the need to think long and hard about how and at what level particular services should be commissioned. I completely agree with that. It is not always clear cut and it does require careful thought. The Bill says that certain services will be for the board alone to commission. We expect these to include certain highly specialised services—I direct that assurance particularly to the noble Lord, Lord Walton. Other services will be by and large for CCGs to commission, but in collaboration if need be with other CCGs and supported by the board.
I appreciate the keenness of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, to ensure that the board’s commissioning of highly specialised services pays due regard to NICE guidance. However, we would prefer not to impose a blanket requirement on the board to exercise its functions in respect of specialised services, or any of its commissioning functions, in accordance with NICE guidance. NICE guidance will undoubtedly be relevant to specialised commissioning—that is obvious—but the amendment could well have the effect of requiring the board to have regard to it at the expense of other authoritative sources of advice. I have already referred to a couple. In exercising its duty to obtain expert advice, we would expect the board to draw on as wide a range of professional expertise as possible and not be constrained into prioritising that of NICE, valuable though that would be.
It is important for us to remember that CCGs must be competent to commission all services to meet the reasonable needs of all those for whom they are responsible. This includes services to meet the needs of patients with “less common” conditions, as Amendment 63A points out. CCGs will need to be well supported in developing as commissioners and the Bill provides a framework for just that. It provides for collaborative working, in Section 14Z1, between CCGs. The NHS Commissioning Board must publish guidance on commissioning, to which the CCG must have regard, which could also cover issues relating to commissioning for less common conditions.
The clinical senates and networks will be overseen by the board to ensure that CCGs can access specialist advice. Clinical commissioning, by giving responsibility for ensuring services meet the reasonable needs of patients to the very clinicians who deal with those patients daily and understand their needs, provides a far stronger basis for ensuring that commissioning caters to the needs of those with less common conditions than the current commissioning arrangements. GPs will be able through their membership of the CCG to seek to ensure that commissioning takes account of the less common conditions, which might not be of great significance across an entire geography but which are of great concern at the level of the individual GP practice.
I can assure the noble Baroness that the NHS Commissioning Board will be required to have a robust authorisation process to ensure that CCGs have made appropriate arrangements to discharge their functions competently, including consideration of the extent to which CCGs have collaborative arrangements for commissioning with other CCGs or local authorities as well as any appropriate commissioning support.
However, while I completely recognise the importance of commissioning services for this particular group of patients, I am afraid that I would prefer not to single out a requirement for authorisation to look at specific groups of conditions in the Bill. It would not make the NHS Commissioning Board’s process any more effective, but it might lead emerging CCGs to add undue weight to this if it was the only part of the services that CCGs will be responsible for commissioning that was specified in relation to the authorisation process.
I hope that it is recognised by your Lordships that in opposing Amendment 64ZA I do not wish to suggest that the concerns of that amendment, to ensure the quality of urgent and emergency care and the integration of its different elements to the benefit of patients, are unimportant—indeed, quite the opposite. The framework in the Bill for ensuring the competence of commissioners, securing continuous improvement in the quality of care and ensuring the promotion of integration applies to emergency and urgent care services every bit as much to as other areas of care. Commissioners will use the expert advice from senates and networks, and from other sources, to determine the best approach to commissioning integrated approaches to the delivery of urgent and emergency care, and within the context of a far-reaching national programme. As the House will know, we already recognise the importance of integration across the health service, particularly in urgent and emergency care. The introduction of NHS 111 will act as a driver for the redesign of local urgent and emergency care systems to create a more integrated system that is easier for patients to access and understand.
(a) the prevention or diagnosis of illness in the patients, or(b) their care or treatment.”
Baroness Wheeler
My Lords, we strongly support the amendments in this group, which underline the importance of the NHS Commissioning Board and CCGs seeking advice from healthcare practitioners from across the patient care pathway, including local clinical specialists and allied health professionals, and going beyond professional input to seek advice from organisations with expertise in the experience of patients.
We hope that the Government will recognise the strong case put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and other speakers to these amendments for also recognising the expertise of patients’ organisations in the Bill and ensure that commissioners seek their advice as well as that of health professionals. By this we mean patients’ organisations not just being consulted but being genuinely involved in helping to co-design or co-produce services. Many patients’ organisations, such as the Stroke Association for example, are key providers of local services such as reablement or information, advice and support services to stroke survivors, carers and family members across the country. They have first-hand, direct experience of the issues that matter most to patients across the whole care pathway, hospital and community. Involvement of patient groups would also help the patient voice in the clinical senates and networks, which the noble Baroness, Lady Masham, also mentioned. To remind the Government, this approach was supported by the clinical workstream of the Future Forum, round one, but was overlooked in the Government's response. Now is a good opportunity to address this issue.
Amendment 65, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Patel, and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, deals with information collected by the board on the safety of services provided by the health service being made available to healthcare providers, the Care Quality Commission and HealthWatch England, local authorities and professional organisations in healthcare. We fully support this, along with the caveat provided by Amendment 66 that the information should be freely available without charge. I hope that the Minister will accept the need to make progress on this important issue and reassure the House about the involvement of healthcare professionals and patient organisations in developing the commissioning plans.
Earl Howe
My Lords, this has been an interesting and worthwhile debate and I appreciate the concern that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and other noble Lords have demonstrated throughout the Bill’s proceedings to ensure that the board and CCGs benefit from as wide a range of advice as possible. The Government have been clear that everyone with a role to play in securing the best possible services for local people should be able to do so. The NHS Future Forum recommended that we strengthen the legislative duties to help achieve this, which is why the duties on the board and CCGs to obtain appropriate advice were strengthened in another place to incorporate the wording used to define the comprehensive health service and to ensure that it was clear that such advice should come from persons who, taken together, have a broad range of professional expertise.
I mentioned clinical senates on the last group of amendments. Of course we envisage a role for clinical senates in the arrangements for how these duties are fulfilled, providing not just clinical but multidisciplinary advice from professionals from public health and social care alongside patient and public representation and other groups as appropriate. The noble Baroness, Lady Masham, asked me specifically about clinical senates. They will be established as strategic advisory bodies, with a clear focus on quality improvement and improving outcomes. They will bring together clinicians with strong clinical credibility, drawn from across the disciplines, as I have mentioned. They will include patients and members of the public as well. They will have a role, too, in advancing public understanding of health and healthcare.
Why do we need clinical senates? Commissioning is at its best when it is a collaboration of professionals, based on a shared drive for continuous quality improvement. Maximum participation will be key here. The Future Forum report showed:
“There was universal agreement that people would be”,
better served if their,
“care were designed around their needs and based on the input of the public, patients and carers, health and social care professionals”,
the voluntary sector, “and specialist societies”. The exact detail of who will be part of the clinical senates, the number that will exist and the roles that they may have are all to be determined through a process of discussion and engagement, but I hope that I have outlined, at least in broad terms, what they will be there to do.
Earl Howe
My Lords, they will come under the aegis of the NHS Commissioning Board. They will be part of the board.
Having said all that, I remain unconvinced that imposing specific duties as to where advice should come from, including specifying particular sources of advice such as in Amendments 57 and 99, is the right way forward. I am afraid that if we were to do that, there would be then justifiable demands to include in the Bill other clinicians and groups of people who commissioners should seek advice from when exercising this duty. My view is that this is horses for courses, and that it is appropriate that the board and CCGs should have the freedom to determine what advice it is appropriate to seek in each instance. That is why the emphasis in the duties as they stand is rightly placed on ensuring that the commissioner obtains “appropriate advice” from people with a broad range of professional expertise. It is that breadth of expertise which is important, not the particular professionals involved.
Amendments 58 and 100 are admirable, if I may say so, in that they seek to require that the advice should come from across the care pathway. I have every sympathy with the noble Baroness’s intentions there. Again, however, I think that this is already provided for in the duty which—in its reference to expertise in the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of illness, and the need to obtain advice from persons who, taken together, have a broad range of professional expertise—is designed to be of maximum scope, and I am confident that it will be interpreted as such.
We have also just discussed the important role that both patients, and the organisations that represent their interests, can bring to the commissioning process. However, I think that Amendments 59 and 101 are unnecessary. Let us be clear that while these duties refer to obtaining advice from people with expertise in relation to the health service, this is not confined to clinical expertise. There is nothing to prevent the board or CCGs securing advice from patients’ organisations, or those with expertise in the patient experience. The board can also draw on the advice of national and local healthwatch as a conduit for such advice. CCGs, similarly, are able to draw on the advice of local healthwatch.
However, to reiterate the point that I made in Committee, there is a risk in becoming too prescriptive. In reality, we have to trust them to build these relationships themselves and judge them on the outcomes that they achieve. If we commission for good outcomes, we will, as night follows day, secure the appropriate knowledge and advice to enable us to do that.
It will also be an important part of the board’s remit to produce advice and guidance to prevent the recurrence of incidents that jeopardise patient safety, just as the National Patient Safety Agency does now. It is important that the board is able to share relevant information relating to patient safety. The noble Lord, Lord Patel, is absolutely right that information that can inform and enhance patient safety in the NHS should be made available to all those who would benefit from it. The NPSA, as he will know, currently shares this information with a number of bodies with a particular role in relation to patient safety—for example, the MHRA and the CQC—and this will continue to be the case. Indeed, if it did not make important information available to those who it thought could reasonably benefit from it, the board would be in breach of its duty.
In addition to NHS bodies, this information is currently also used to develop products for use by non-NHS organisations, by the devolved Administrations and international organisations, for which the board may determine it appropriate to charge a fee. It is for those reasons that we have framed the duty to share information in broad terms, and we would not want to be more prescriptive in the way that Amendment 65 proposes. Neither would we want to prevent the board charging a fee when appropriate, as would be the effect of Amendment 66. I think that it is reasonable for the board to determine how and in what circumstances it may impose charges for the information it provides. The power is intended to allow the board to seek adequate compensation for the services that it provides to other bodies where there would otherwise be no benefit to the health service. However, there is no scope for the board to charge for the advice and guidance that it would be required to provide for the purpose of maintaining and improving patient safety, and although there is provision for the board to impose charges, Clause 22, which inserts new Section 13Q(4), makes it clear that the board must give, not sell, advice and guidance to appropriate bodies to maintain and improve the safety of the health service. I hope that that is reassuring to noble Lords.
The noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, asked me about the monitoring of advice and what happens if they fail on that duty. CCGs will have an annual performance assessment by the board, which would assess how well they discharge their functions, including this duty to obtain advice. If a CCG fails to perform any of its functions, effectively the board can intervene and can take action. I hope that the clarification I have given is helpful and that I have sufficiently reassured noble Lords to enable them to withdraw their Amendments 57, 58, 59, 65 and 66.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
I thank the Minister very much. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Thornton
My Lords, I support this group of amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, which call on the NHS Commissioning Board to promote research supported by the health service for the purpose of protecting the public from disease and other dangers to health. These amendments also include the need for the board’s business plan to explain how it proposes to discharge its duty in respect of these issues to promote the NHS constitution and for the annual report, in particular, to contain an assessment of how effectively it has discharged this duty. We support these too.
The amendments underline the importance of embedding research in the NHS and we welcome the introduction of a research duty on the Commissioning Board and the intention to ensure that research is genuinely an integral part of the health service, as my noble friend, Lord Turnberg, and the noble Lord, Lord Willis, said. This is one part of the Bill which has genuinely been recognised and improved on by the Government. However, ensuring that the intention of their duty is clearly understood and sufficiently comprehensive is crucial. These amendments are designed to ensure this. Amendment 66A would ensure that there are clear commitments to research for which the board is accountable and Amendment 67AA requires the board to explain activity relating to the research duty. Both these provisions ensure that there are important monitoring mechanisms in place in the board’s business plan and annual report. As the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, has stressed, they address an apparent anomaly which requires the board to report on improvement in the quality of services and on public and patient involvement but not on research, as the noble Lord, Lord Willis, said. We hope that the Government will accept these amendments in that spirit.
Earl Howe
My Lords, we had a very positive debate on the importance of research at an earlier stage of Report. I was grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, for the support she expressed for the changes the Government have made to the Bill. I am more than happy to respond to these amendments this evening. I sympathise and agree with the noble Baroness’s championing of research in this Bill. She and my noble friend Lord Willis have been particularly vocal and well informed on this subject. Nevertheless, I am afraid I am reluctant to agree that the Bill needs yet more amendment. Having said that, I hope I can reassure the noble Baroness going forward.
On Amendment 60A, the duties on the Secretary of State, the board and CCGs to promote research and the powers to conduct research all apply to the health service in its widest sense. This encompasses both NHS and public health services under the 2006 Act. In relation to the board’s duty in new Section 13L, the duty to promote research on matters relevant to the health service already covers public health protection. Public health protection is a function of the Secretary of State under Section 2A of the 2006 Act and therefore part of the health service.
There are also other clauses in the Bill that focus specifically on research into health protection. Clause 10 lists research and other steps for advancing knowledge and understanding as examples of action that the Secretary of State may take under his wider duty in relation to protecting public health. Public health and health protection in particular will, of course, be predominantly the responsibility of Public Health England rather than the board. It is not therefore necessary for the board’s functions to cover such matters but there will, of course, be close working between them and there are powers under Clause 21 for the Secretary of State to arrange for other bodies, including the board, to undertake any of his public health functions if necessary.
Turning to Amendments 66AA and 67AA, we have had a number of debates about exactly what the board should give particular attention to in its annual business plan and its annual report. I would like to remind your Lordships that the board is already required to set out in these documents how it intends to exercise its functions including how it will meet the various duties placed on it under the Bill.
The Bill emphasises a very few key duties that the board must look at in particular in its business plan, annual report and performance assessments, and that CCGs must look at in their commissioning plans and annual reports. We feel that we have chosen the right duties in each instance. As to the board’s and CCGs’ annual reports, it is more important that they focus on the outcomes that have ultimately been achieved through the provision of services, rather than on the way in which those services are being delivered. On the whole, that is the distinction we have tried to draw.
My noble friend Lord Willis asked about Dame Sally Davies and her reporting lines. I am sure my noble friend will remember that I wrote to him on 17 November and briefly covered this point. In short, as he knows, the National Institute for Health Research is and will remain part of the Department of Health. Its budget is held centrally by the department. The Chief Medical Officer is and will remain responsible for the NIHR and its budget. In her capacity as Chief Scientific Adviser and head of the NIHR, she will report to Ministers and the Secretary of State, but she will be there to give advice to the NHS Commissioning Board if asked to do so on matters relating to research. Similarly, in her capacity as CMO, she reports directly to the Secretary of State, but will be there to provide advice to Public Health England. I hope that that is of help to my noble friend.
The noble Lord, Lord Turnberg, asked me how the local authority role in promoting research would be assisted and how that would manifest itself in practice. I should like to write a letter to him on that point because the planning on that is, if I can put it this way, work in progress and I hope that I will be able to tell the noble Lord a little more in writing in a few days’ time.
Lord Willis of Knaresborough
Before he sits down, will my noble friend tell the House whether he has made it clear in his remarks that the chief executive of the Commissioning Board will not have a direct relationship in terms of research, and will not have responsibility that will, in fact, be with the Chief Scientific Officer—the head of the NIMR? If that is the case, how on earth will the Commissioning Board have a relationship with the commissioning groups in terms of their duty to promote research?
Earl Howe
My noble friend is not correct. The board will have a duty to promote research, and we have debated that point. What it will not have is the budget for the National Institute for Health Research, which is held centrally. I think that noble Lords have welcomed that because it will mean that that budget is held separately from the board’s own budget. However, that does not absolve the NHS Commissioning Board from responsibility for promoting research. Indeed, it will do that and have responsibility in particular for ensuring that the health costs of research carried out in NHS establishments are covered under the various tariffs. That will be a major part of the board’s work.
I hope that I have reassured the noble Baroness sufficiently to enable her to withdraw her amendments, but I should of course be happy to talk to her outside the Chamber if there remain points that she would like to raise with me.
Baroness Morgan of Drefelin
There is one matter on which I should be really grateful for the noble Earl’s help. In his helpful response to this debate, he said that there will be some key duties on which the Commissioning Board will need to report in particular. Will he also remind us that the Commissioning Board should report on all its duties, because I am not feeling that reassured at the moment?
Earl Howe
I apologise to the noble Baroness. I thought I had made it clear that of course there will be a duty on the clinical commissioning groups to assure the board that they have fulfilled all their functions. We fully expect that research will be covered in that. These particular duties have been mentioned in the Bill only either because they are absolutely integral to the delivery of outcomes, or because they relate to a fundamental strand of accountability—namely, the duties to reduce inequalities, to improve the quality of services, and to promote public involvement and consultation. These really are central to everything that the board and CCGs will do. It is not because there is any greater obligation on the board to comply with them than there is in respect of any of their other duties. The same applies to CCGs.
Baroness Morgan of Drefelin
I thank the Minister, not only for giving me double reassurance in this debate, but also for the work that I know he has done personally to ensure strengthening of the research duty in the Bill in the first place. I also thank all noble Lords who took part in this debate. I withdraw the amendment.
“13LA Duty as to promoting education and training
The Board must, in exercising its functions, have regard to the need to promote education and training for the persons mentioned in section 1E(1) so as to assist the Secretary of State in the discharge of the duty under that section.”
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I warmly congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Mawson, not only on the substance of his amendments but on his sense of timing, because we are now very familiar with complaints from the voluntary and community sector in relation to the welfare-to-work programme. It was anticipated that the sector would be heavily involved in helping to place people into work, but, in practice, we have seen most of that endeavour carried out by much larger companies, with the sector playing a very limited role. It is precisely to avoid that outcome that the noble Lord has tabled his amendments. In particular, I am attracted to and wholly support subsection (2) of the new section proposed by Amendment 64A, which would confer on the board the capacity to,
“take specific action to support the development, including capacity building, of the voluntary sector, social enterprises, co-operatives and mutuals”.
That seems to me the kernel of the two amendments, which we very much endorse. In a mixed economy of provision, that sector needs to be developed and supported.
A further potential opportunity is raised by new Section 13W, on page 23 of the Bill, which confers on the board a power to,
“make payments by way of grant or loan to a voluntary organisation which provides or arranges for the provision of services which are similar to the services in respect of which the Board has functions”.
That may be implicit in subsection (2) of the amendment, although new Section 13W appears to limit that power to grant or loan to a voluntary organisation, which would not necessarily include the social enterprises, co-operatives and mutuals referred to in the noble Lord’s amendment. Perhaps the Minister, if he is sympathetic to the amendment, will look at whether the provision about grants and loans in new Section 13W might be expanded.
It is never too late for a little pedantry. I want to raise with the noble Lord, Lord Mawson, a couple of questions about the wording of parts of his amendments. Proposed subsection (1) of the new section proposed by Amendment 64A refers to the board exercising its functions,
“so far as it is consistent with the interests of the health service”.
I think that he means the interests of patients, rather than the service as such, which I would have thought more consistent with the general approach.
There is also a potential problem with subsection (3), which seeks, understandably, to provide that the board should take such steps as might produce,
“a level playing field between providers … meaning that one sector of provision is not more disadvantaged than another and relative benefits can be taken into account”.
That seems potentially to conflict with Clause 146 of the Bill, which would appear to rule out such a deliberate adjustment in favour of the sector. That is one good reason why my noble friend Lady Thornton will move an amendment to delete that clause and I hope that the noble Lord will support it.
A further question concerns a matter touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Newby, and relates to the second amendment, which, I confess, I do not quite understand. The amendment provides that the board may promote the inclusion of weightings in the procurement process,
“which reflect wider social, economic and health outcomes for each local health area”.
Does that relate to the conditions that exist at the time of the procurement rather than outcomes? I do not see how outcomes would fit and I am not clear what the weightings are. They cannot be only financial weightings. Is it to be a consideration to encourage the letting of contracts to the voluntary and social enterprise sector because of the particular nature of the locality? It is not clear and perhaps when the noble Lord replies he will—at least for my benefit— touch on that.
Interestingly, the two amendments relate to the part of the Bill dealing with the functions of the National Commissioning Board but purely to the health service provision, whereas proposed new Section 13M on page 19 refers to both health and social care provisions. I can understand why the amendment is limited in the way that it is, but I assume—again perhaps the noble Lord will confirm this—that he would envisage ultimately the same principle being applied to the provision of social care services. Is it not an illustration of the failure to develop the social care part of the Bill, which we touched on earlier?
Having said that, I strongly support the thrust of the noble Lord’s amendment and repeat my congratulations to him.
Earl Howe
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Tyler was quite right because the noble Lord, Lord Mawson, has spoken compellingly, as he always does, and I, for one, am grateful to him for the insights that he gave us.
I begin with an observation which I hope is incontrovertible: voluntary organisations, staff mutuals, co-operatives and social enterprises all play vital roles in delivering innovative, high-quality, user-focused services within their local communities. The Government firmly believe that such organisations have a strong role to play in the health and social care system. This is due to the experience, expertise and insights that they can offer to commissioners and the system more widely.
As I hope your Lordships will recognise, the Bill shows the Government’s commitment to fair competition that delivers better outcomes and greater choice for patients and better value for the taxpayer. We want to see providers from all sectors delivering high-quality, person-centred health and care services: we do not want to favour one type of provider over another.
The Government are also supportive of everything that the noble Lord said about the importance of social value and the key role that social enterprises and other organisations can have in building and promoting it. On my visit a few months ago to the Bromley by Bow Centre with the noble Lord I was able to see first hand the excellent work that Andrew Mawson Partnerships has done in reviving and stimulating the local community. One cannot fail to be impressed by this model and vision, which we know works and want to see more of.
Having said that, we need to pause and reflect because these amendments are unnecessary. Amendment 64A is not appropriate because it cuts directly across the role of the NHS Commissioning Board. Simply put, the role of the board is to be a commissioner, not to build providers. We are clear that no provider, whether due to its size or organisational form, should be given preferential treatment in the new system. The provisions introduced by Clause 22 prevent the board, and the Secretary of State and Monitor likewise, giving preferential treatment to any particular type of provider, be they public, for profit or not for profit.
I know that this has generated some concern among voluntary and community organisations. I would like to assure noble Lords and the sector that the board will still be able to make grants and loans to voluntary sector organisations. It will not be able to do that for the sole purpose of increasing the proportion of services provided by the voluntary sector. The board could, however, invest in voluntary organisations where they bring the credible voice of patients, service users and carers to inform commissioning and the development of care pathways, or where the sector’s expertise could contribute to the commissioning support required by CCGs and the board. Those are just some examples. The power—which we included in the Bill through an amendment in Committee in another place—mirrors the power that the Secretary of State has now under Section 64 of the Health Services and Public Health Act 1968, which is exercised by strategic health authorities and PCTs. Equivalent provision is also provided in the Bill for CCGs in Clause 25, inserted as new Section 14Z4 of the National Health Act 2006. Voluntary organisations should therefore have no reason to fear that they will be unduly affected by the new system. However, as drafted, Amendment 64A would disadvantage NHS trusts and foundation trusts for profit providers. As a result, I cannot accept it.
Lord Beecham
I thank the Minister for giving way. Could he clarify the situation? Does the voluntary sector, as he has described it, relate also to social enterprises, co-operatives and mutuals, or are they regarded as being in a different category and therefore not eligible to receive grants and loans under the provisions of the Bill as it now stands?
Earl Howe
My Lords, as regards grants and loans, we are clear that voluntary sector organisations and social enterprises—and I include bodies of that kind in the same grouping—are and will still be eligible for grants. The key is that those grants must not be given solely because they are voluntary sector organisations or social enterprises. It is a nice distinction, but really it means that voluntary sector organisations and social enterprises will still have to compete fairly for a contract on a fair playing field with other providers. As I have indicated, that means that NHS providers and others are not disadvantaged in the market for NHS-funded services. Nevertheless, the scope will still be there, and they are indeed classed as voluntary sector.
I am also grateful to the noble Lord for raising the important issue of social value. I can assure him that the Government are sympathetic to these principles. That is why the NHS procurement guide already enables NHS commissioners to take account of social and environmental outcomes in their procurement. The Department of Health has also, through its social enterprise fund, invested more than £80 million in the health and social care sector. To answer my noble friend Lord Newby, I am also fully aware of the support for these principles in the Public Services (Social Value) Bill currently being considered by noble Lords. Put simply, if that Bill receives Royal Assent, Amendment 64B will not be necessary. The Public Services (Social Value) Bill will make NHS organisations have regard to economic, social and environmental well-being in procurement, and the Government welcome that. The NHS procurement guide, as I said, already enables NHS commissioners to take into account other outcomes in procurement, and we will continue to encourage them to do that, so I think, in the NHS at least, commissioners will notice little change in the guidance that is given to them. Make no mistake, we see a valuable role in the future healthcare system for voluntary sector organisations, social enterprises, staff mutuals and co-operatives. However, that cannot be at the expense of other types of provider, including particularly NHS providers. I hope very much that your Lordships will agree that these two amendments are therefore unnecessary.
Lord Mawson
My Lords, I am most grateful to the Minister for what he has had to say. I am trying not to be difficult but to be practical. The future of the health service depends on practical details being got right in the machinery of the NHS, which is where I seek to draw the Minister’s attention. For me it is not about words about whether it is the health service, or patients, or words in an amendment; it is about what is actually going on in the machinery. I fear that the practice is still too little understood and that there is more work to be done here. I know that this is the beginning of a journey and that we have further to go with the various elements of the jigsaw.
The purpose of the amendments was really to draw the attention of the Minister and the Government to this and to encourage them to focus on the detail, and to encourage colleagues within the NHS to spend a bit of time with practical entrepreneurs who have to try to make this work. We want them to examine in a few details some real pieces of work where people have attempted through weightings and other mechanisms a level playing field—because people like me do not want special favours, but we do want a level playing field. All that I can say is that in practice it is not level. The Government aspire to a broader involvement in the health service with social enterprise and others in the voluntary sector but, unless those practical details are better understood and addressed, I fear something quite different will happen.
Having said that, I thank all those who have taken part in this debate and who helped me with the amendments—particularly the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, who is not in his place, but who has been very helpful. The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, has also been very helpful. This is not a party-political debate; it is a practical matter that seeks to help to move the NHS on into new, more patient-focused reality. The amendments are simply an attempt to flag up yet again the issues. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Health: Smear Tests
Earl Howe Excerpts(12 years, 2 months ago)
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Baroness Hussein-Ece
To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether they have any plans to reduce the age at which women in England first undergo smear tests, to bring it into line with that in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Earl Howe)
My Lords, there are no plans at this time to extend cervical screening in England to women who are aged under 25. In England, cervical screening starts at age 25 in line with the recommendations of the World Health Organisation and the independent advisory committee on cervical screening.
Baroness Hussein-Ece
I thank the Minister for that reply. He will be aware that in Scotland and Wales the age when women are first called for a smear test remains 20. Is he further aware that around 1,000 women a year die from cervical cancer? Does he think that there is a real problem that not going for cervical screening is one of the biggest risk factors in developing this cancer, and almost half the women who develop it have never had a cervical screening test? Does he agree that while it is not possible to lower the age at this time of budgetary constraints, far more needs to be done to raise awareness to ensure that more women survive and these deaths are prevented?
Earl Howe
My Lords, I should make clear that it is not budgetary constraints that have prevented a lowering of the age but clear clinical advice. However, my noble friend is right about uptake. We are working with the NHS cancer screening programmes and stakeholders to refine the information that we provide to women when they are invited for screening so that all are fully supported to make an informed choice to attend. To tackle the issue of low uptake among women, particularly younger women aged 25 to 29, the National Institute for Health Research health technology assessment programme has recently commissioned a study, the strategic trial, to determine which interventions are effective at increasing screening uptake among women receiving their first invitation from the programme. This is work in train and we await the results with interest.
Lord Patel
Does the Minister agree that what might be important for reducing the incidence of cervical cancer is not so much the age when the screening starts but the vaccination against HPV in younger girls? I understand that the uptake of that is now rising.
Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall
Following that question, will the Minister tell the House how widespread uptake is and to what extent there is any difference between the various groups of young people in being prepared to take up the offer of vaccination? This is clearly the best hope that we have of bringing down the incidence of cervical cancer in the long term.
Earl Howe
The latest figure I have is that there is around 82 per cent uptake among eligible girls. However, for screening the uptake is lower. The figure I have for 2010-11 is that 78.6 per cent of eligible women had a test result in the past five years and 3.4 million women were screened. In the case of screening, it depends on whether the women themselves respond to the screening call. In the case of vaccination, it will depend on the attitude of parents and medical advisers.
Baroness Tonge
My Lords, will the noble Earl remind the House of what arrangements are being made for cervical cytology should the Health and Social Care Bill ever become law? Will he also reassure us that the excellent cervical smear campaign will not fall foul of the competing interests of local authorities and the clinical commissioning groups?
Earl Howe
My Lords, inoculation is not being offered to boys as part of the national programme. As I am sure the noble Lord knows, the aim of the programme has always been to prevent cervical cancer in women. Clearly, the best way to do that is to vaccinate girls and young women. However, these vaccines can be purchased privately and health professionals should exercise their clinical judgment when prescribing products for specific indications.
Baroness Hollins
My Lords, will the Minister explain what efforts are being made to ensure that uptake of both vaccination and cervical screening is good among girls and women with learning disabilities, particularly given their low awareness of the risk of cervical cancer and the high rate of sexual abuse among this population?
Earl Howe
My Lords, as ever, the noble Baroness raises an extremely important point about those with learning disabilities. I will need to write to her because my brief does not contain an explicit reference to them. However, I feel sure that the work to which I referred earlier—the strategic trial—will incorporate work to embrace all sections of the female population. I will write to the noble Baroness about that.
Health: Stroke Care
Earl Howe Excerpts(12 years, 2 months ago)
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Baroness Wall of New Barnet
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the consistency of care for stroke patients across England, and whether the progress made in London will inform the development of their policy on stroke care.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Earl Howe)
My Lords, stroke patients are getting faster and better treatment than ever before. The latest data show that more than 80 per cent of stroke patients spend the majority of their hospital stay on a stroke unit—a 20 per cent improvement since 2009. We want the stroke community to share and learn from what works, such as the London model of providing stroke services. The stroke improvement programme plays a central role in disseminating this knowledge.
Baroness Wall of New Barnet
I thank the Minister for his response. I remind him of the debate on stroke that we had very recently. The evidence is very clear that early intervention with stroke, as with many other diseases, plays a key part in ensuring that the cure is of longer standing. The noble Earl will know that last year’s CQC report highlighted the huge differences and inconsistencies in what happens. It would be good if we could have an assurance that the London model will be rolled out and taken on board by the national commission.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I agree with the noble Baroness that the London model has, indeed, been a model for others to follow. All Londoners now have 24-hour access to hyper-acute stroke care regardless of where they live, and London has one of the highest rates of thrombolysis for any large city in the world. It may not be appropriate to replicate precisely a model of care which works well in a densely populated capital as regards more rural areas, but that is where the expertise of the stroke improvement programme is essential in working with stroke networks across the country, sharing best practice and improving outcomes for stroke patients.
Baroness Gardner of Parkes
My Lords, is the Minister aware that although the London system is good, London has not always been at the forefront of this area? As the noble Lord, Lord Walton of Detchant, is not here to make the point, is the Minister aware that thrombolysis—the “clot busting” system—was introduced in Newcastle and was used there very effectively long before it reached London?
Baroness Gould of Potternewton
I, too, refer to the debate that we had recently on stroke. The Minister greatly praised the work of an organisation called Connect. I declare an interest as my daughter is a director of it. It is a third-sector organisation which works across the country but mainly in rural areas. Connect and many other third-sector organisations are worried that, in light of the squeeze on local authority and NHS budgets, their funding will cease and this wonderful and vital work will be lost.
Earl Howe
My Lords, we are well aware of the issue raised by the noble Baroness. Indeed, it was raised during the listening exercise last year. PCT commissioners are identifying all their clinical contracts as part of a stocktaking exercise and over the next year will be using the information collected to identify those contracts that are due to transfer to the new commissioning organisations next year. We will work with both providers and commissioners to ensure that there is a smooth transition and continuity of care for patients and service users.
Lord Clinton-Davis
Is the Minister able to give an assurance that stroke care networks and the help given by the NHS stroke improvement programme will survive after the current review undertaken by the Government?
Baroness Barker
My Lords, have the Government monitored the impact of individual health budgets which were introduced by the previous Labour Government? What effect have individual health budgets had on the commissioning and delivery of stroke services?
Earl Howe
My noble friend is right: individual health budgets have enormous potential in the case of stroke patients. I do not have any specific data on that in my brief, as it is still relatively early days for the personal health budgets. However, if I have further information to give her, I will gladly write.
Baroness Wheeler
My Lords, the CQC report highlighted huge problems for stroke patients in consistency of care and support after hospital discharge and for long-term stroke survivors in the community. Early supported discharge from hospital involves the majority of rehabilitation taking place at home and is therefore geared to the home setting, yet it is available in only 37 per cent of PCT areas. This is such an important area for progress and obviously a key way of refocusing resources into the community. How will the Minister ensure that this situation is addressed now and under the new health structures? Can he confirm to me that the CQC will continue to monitor the progress of the national stroke strategy and produce further special reviews, given that I understand the team which delivered this last report has now been disbanded?
Earl Howe
My Lords, the unwarranted variations in services are quite clearly unacceptable. The value of the CQC report is that it shines a spotlight on where variations in care need to be addressed. We believe that that will help all stakeholders involved in improving opportunities for people who have experienced a stroke. As regards post-hospital care, on which the noble Baroness rightly focuses, the accelerating stroke improvement programme, which is quite new, is already doing very good work. It was developed specifically to improve care in areas where progress needs to be faster, and that work will most certainly continue.
Lord Reid of Cardowan
My Lords, has the Minister yet had a chance to reflect upon this morning’s report that illustrates that survival rates and the reduction in the death rate from strokes, cancer, heart attacks and many other serious diseases have improved considerably over the past few years? By any standards, when comparing productivity in terms of quantity and quality, there has been a huge increase in productivity. Since the premise behind the Health and Social Care Bill was that there had been little or no increase in productivity in the National Health Service, will he share with us his reflections on that report?
Earl Howe
The premise of the Health and Social Care Bill is rather different from the one that the noble Lord cites. We believe that there is a damaging and avoidable variation in care across the country. Of course the outcomes in many areas of clinical care have improved immeasurably, as he rightly says, over the past few years—not least in heart attack and stroke. However, we still have some way to go and clinical commissioning, we believe, will take us in the right direction. Stroke features in two of the domains in the NHS outcomes framework, representing work that we have put in train: domain 1, “Preventing people from dying prematurely”; and domain 3, “Helping people to recover from episodes of ill health or following injury”. It is those measures to which the NHS will be held to account.
NHS: Management Consultants
Earl Howe Excerpts(12 years, 2 months ago)
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Baroness Royall of Blaisdon
My Lords, I beg leave to ask a Question of which I have given private notice.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Earl Howe)
My Lords, the Health and Social Care Bill and all related programmes require input from a wide range of civil servants, lawyers and other experts. Management consultants have been assisting Monitor, the developing Commissioning Board and others on specific issues. Consultancy spend has reduced very substantially since before the election. We have been transparent around spend of over £25,000 and on hospitality received by Ministers and civil servants. We have also answered all Parliamentary Questions and FOI requests on these issues, showing our commitment to openness.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl for that Answer. Following recent press reports, I want to ask him about a specific management consultant, McKinsey. What payments has it received since May 2010 from the Department of Health and all other taxpayer-funded health bodies? If he is not able to tell the House that now, will he undertake to place this information in the Library of the House? Given that McKinsey seems to be setting the rules of the game in relation to the Government’s health Bill and then benefiting from the outcome, can the Minister declare unequivocally that there is no conflict of interest between McKinsey’s role in advising the Government on their health reforms and its commercial relationships with other clients?
Earl Howe
My Lords, I received notice of this Question just over an hour ago so I do not have precise figures about McKinsey. What I can say is that whereas the previous Administration in 2008-09 spent £100 million in the Department of Health on consultancy, my department has spent under £10 million on consultancy this year—very considerably less.
I read the article in the press this weekend which probably prompted the noble Baroness’s Question. I think we need to be careful before casting doubt on the integrity of public servants—and, indeed, of McKinsey. The article referred to Monitor. Those at Monitor are bound by very strict rules and procedures to ensure transparency and openness in all their dealings and to avoid any possible conflicts of interest. They follow those rules and procedures to the letter.
Lord Laming
My Lords, does the noble Earl take from this important Question the significance of having in place a robust implementation strategy should the Bill become law, because translating the aspirations of the Bill into day-by-day practice will be a considerable challenge? Can he assure the House that that will be attended to in the proper way?
Earl Howe
Yes, I can. The reform of the NHS is a major project. Frankly, it would be irresponsible if the Government were not to commission expert professional advice in undertaking a project of this kind. Consultancy, if used judiciously, can be highly cost-effective. I assure the noble Lord that the implementation of the Health and Social Care Bill is occupying our minds night and day and, so far, I am pleased to report that it is going well.
Baroness Jolly
Can my noble friend tell the House how many reports were written for the Department of Health by McKinsey between 1997 and 2010?
Earl Howe
I do not have the figure that my noble friend asks for. I do have a figure for the spend by the previous Administration between 2006 and 2010 on consultancy from McKinsey. That amounted to nearly £30 million. In 2005-06, just one year, the previous Government spent more than £170 million on consultancy services with Accenture plc.
Lord Campbell-Savours
Have civil servants been sharing information during the course of meetings with McKinsey people which McKinsey has been giving to its corporate clients? In other words, has McKinsey been discussing what has been going on in the formation of the Bill and the potential business benefits which arise from the Bill with its corporate clients? Have civil servants at any stage received any sponsorship for their travel or entertainment from McKinsey during the development of the Bill? Is it true that some meetings with civil servants and McKinsey have taken place at McKinsey headquarters in Jermyn Street in London? Does not that whole area of activity by McKinsey suggest that there is a conflict of interest which the public should know about at this stage in the development of the Bill?
Earl Howe
The noble Lord is, I think, insinuating some impropriety on the part of McKinsey and, perhaps, on the part of civil servants. I know of no such impropriety. Indeed, as I said earlier, there are clear and strict rules about transparency and openness. Declaring hospitality received is something that all civil servants and Ministers have to do. The results are published regularly. I will of course ask the question of McKinsey, which I have not yet had time to do. If I discover that there is any substance to the questions that the noble Lord has asked, I shall of course write to him and place a copy in the Library, but I very much doubt that I shall find any substance to them.
Lord Naseby
My Lords, as the Question refers to consultants and not to any specific consultant, is it not a fact that consultants provide a good interim role of management, suggestion or policy for consideration for Her Majesty's Government rather than their taking on ever more central staff? Is that not particularly appropriate, bearing in mind that the Prime Minister held a consultation on the whole of the Bill, as a result of which, as I understand it from listening to the debates in this House, changes have been made to the Bill which will have to be implemented pretty quickly? One can understand why consultants are brought in at the centre of the National Health Service. Surely on the whole it can only be healthy to have consultants there to speed up the implementation of this very important Bill.
Earl Howe
My noble friend is quite right. As I said earlier, the use of consultants—provided that that use is judicious and they are engaged in open competition processes—can be very cost-effective. It is a very flexible way of obtaining high-class advice without incurring long-term costs.
Lord Hughes of Woodside
Has McKinsey been given access to the risk assessment studies, which have been subject to some controversy in this House?
Lord Hamilton of Epsom
My Lords, surely one of the problems of the National Health Service is the wall of money that was thrown at a totally unreformed NHS by the last Government? Do we not need management consultants now to show us the way forward on the savings that need to be wrung out of the NHS so that it can survive into the future?
Earl Howe
Yes, we do, my Lords. Part of the benefit of the modernisation programme will be to streamline the architecture of the NHS so that year by year we will be saving £1.5 billion in administration costs and £3.2 billion net during this Parliament. We need good advice in order to achieve that.
Lord Winston
My Lords, the noble Earl said that this Government have spent less on consultants than the previous Government. Does he agree that, perhaps had they spent a bit more, we might have had a Bill that damaged the health service a great deal less?
Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville
My Lords, is my noble friend aware of the age-old aphorism among management consultants, of whom I was once one, although not at McKinsey, that 10 per cent of the work is diagnosis and 90 per cent is persuading the client to accept the advice?
Health and Social Care Bill
Earl Howe Excerpts(12 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I support Amendments 13 and 16. This debate follows on from our useful discussions on education and training last week. Once again, we see a tension between the need for a national strategy on education and training and the need for local ownership. Amendment 16 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Patel, gives us that, and I hope that the noble Earl will be sympathetic to it.
We all know about the problems that have arisen in the past where there has not been sufficient national leadership. Decisions about training places have been left to local bodies and the budget has been squeezed, the result being that a few years later there have not been enough people coming into the National Health Service, which has had a very damaging impact. I think there is unanimity in your Lordships' House that there has to be a very strong national strategy.
I very much take the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Emerton, that there must be co-ordination in workforce planning between Health Education England, as the national strategic body, and commissioners, but I would add providers because it is they who will employ the staff who have been trained. It is essential to get our workforce planning and our commissioning at a national level into sync. It is more an art than a science, and I suppose that it has never been achieved to 100 per cent satisfaction. None the less, that is what we should strive to do. Speaking as a foundation trust chair, I say to noble Lords who have discussed the national element of this that it is vital that NHS trusts and foundation trusts play a full part in the discussions. At the local level, the local education boards have a crucial role to play.
I very much support the argument of the noble Lords, Lord Patel and Lord Kakkar, on independent chairs and transparency. That is important, but it is also important that the education providers feel sufficient challenge from local NHS bodies when it comes to the quality of their education and training. I am sure that we will come later to the issue of nurse education and training. There are some real issues about the quality of nurse education and training in our universities. It is important that the local education bodies and employers provide sufficient challenge to the work of the universities. I hope that in accepting the need for an independent chair, noble Lords will agree that there should be no cosy relationship between commissioners, who ultimately have no real responsibility for the employment of staff, and universities. Unfortunately, the current system has led to too cosy a relationship. I look to the noble Earl, Lord Howe, for recognition that NHS trusts and foundations have to be very much around the table.
It would be useful if the noble Earl replied to the noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, and gave some sense about where postgraduate deans are to be placed within the new structure. I also hope that postgraduate deans will be able to recognise that in the new circumstances they can have a huge impact on NHS trusts and foundation trusts when it comes to their visitations. I also hope that clinical commissioning groups will recognise that if they are going to start shifting resources away from NHS bodies, that might have an impact on their capacity to provide education and training in the future.
That brings me to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, about whether private providers will have contractual obligations with regard to education and training. It is important that there is a level playing field. If the Government insist on more contracts being placed with private sector providers in the future, there will have to be obligations on the part of providers. It would be grossly unfair and in the end it would not lead to the establishment of a national coherent system if private sector providers did not pay their fair share.
On governance, again, the noble Lords, Lord Patel and Lord Kakkar, made some substantive points about local education and training boards. It would also be helpful if the noble Earl responded to the point raised about academic science networks. We all agree that we must make the most of the fantastic basic education and science capacity in this country, and the links with the provision of patient care and the pharmaceutical industry. They have great potential. It would be useful to know how the noble Earl thinks they will fit into the new structure and particularly how they will link to the postgraduate deans and the academic science network. Overall, I am sure that the noble Earl will be able to come forward with a constructive response and I certainly hope that he is prepared to accept Amendments 13 and 16.
Earl Howe
My Lords, as I set out in our previous discussion on education and training, the Government are putting in place a strong national system for education and training, with a strengthened focus on quality outcomes.
We have introduced a clear duty on the Secretary of State to ensure that such a system is in place, and are now making good progress with establishing Health Education England and the local education and training boards. We are acutely aware of the importance of a safe transition to the new system and are proceeding with care and at a sensible pace to ensure the new system is fully up and running by April 2013.
As noble Lords will be aware, we have confirmed that we will set up Health Education England as a Special Health Authority in June 2012, so that it can take on some operational functions from October 2012 and be fully operational from April 2013, when it will take on the strategic health authority education and training functions. I repeat those assurances today. It will have an independently appointed chair and non-executive appointments. For this reason, we do not think that that part of Amendment 16, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Patel, and others, which would place a duty on the Secretary of State to set up Health Education England as a new special health authority, is necessary.
I hope that the undertaking will be sufficient by way of reassurance to noble Lords on that score. Nevertheless, in addressing the more detailed issues set out in that amendment, it would be helpful to elaborate a little on what I was able to tell the House last week.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
On that welcome news, I assume that would mean that it would also not involve having a higher education chair and that, in fact, to have an independent chair means that they should be independent of commissioning, providing and university providing.
Earl Howe
That is a logical inference but, if I can get further and better particulars for the noble Lord, I would be happy to do so. Each local board will set up local advisory arrangements to reflect the breadth of local interest and ensure that its decisions are informed by clinicians, clinical networks and education providers. My noble friend Lord Willis and the noble Lord, Lord Winston, asked about “any qualified provider” and whether non-NHS providers will have to play their part. Yes, indeed; all providers of NHS services will be expected to participate in education and training activities, and Health Education England will invest only in organisations which do that. The answer to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, is indeed yes. He is correct.
By April 2012, we expect the strategic health authorities to establish sub-committees that will develop the emerging local education and training boards. The role of strategic health authorities to lead on education and training has been extended until April next year. When Health Education England is fully functional as a special health authority from April 2013, it will then, as I have explained, take on the responsibility for hosting the local boards. There are plans for a safe and effective transition to the new system, which will ensure that the strategic health authority functions for education, training and workforce planning, including the work of the postgraduate deaneries, are continued. LETBs will take on these education and training functions and it is expected that many SHA and deanery staff will migrate to the local boards to ensure continuity and essential skills and knowledge for the future, subject to affordability.
As I emphasised in our earlier debate, postgraduate deans will continue to be a critical part of the medical training arrangements. We expect LETBs to be able to demonstrate that their postgraduate deans will be able to act independently so as to be able, among other things, to provide challenge where necessary—a point raised, quite rightly, by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. There will be systems and indicators in place to hold local education providers to account for the quality of education delivered by individual providers. Postgraduate deans will have all the powers that they have now to respond to any concerns about the quality of training, and to take action where required to improve standards and to assure the professional regulators, and indeed Health Education England, that poor performance is being tackled. In the new system, they will have support from the LETBs themselves and, if necessary, from Health Education England to challenge poor quality and behaviours.
Our proposed funding mechanisms reinforce that focus on quality by putting responsibility for education and training decisions in the right place, to be transparent so that funding follows the student on the basis of quality and value for money. The MPET budget will, as now, be predominantly provided to support the next generation of clinical and professional staff. Local boards will have some flexibility to invest in innovative approaches to continuing professional development and the education and training of the wider workforce. Health Education England will be responsible for developing a more transparent allocations policy for distributing education and training funding to local boards.
Now that the policy framework has been worked out, we need to push on and get the foundations of the new education and training system in place. We are doing that by establishing Health Education England and supporting the development of the emerging LETBs. It remains our intention to consolidate the functions of Health Education England by establishing it in primary legislation as a non-departmental public body. That will enable it to operate on a permanent statutory basis at arm’s length from the Department of Health while remaining accountable to the Secretary of State.
We want to do all this on the basis of consensus. We want to ensure that people with an interest have the opportunity to comment on and feed into the design of the new system, ahead of bringing forward the primary legislation in a second Bill. With that in mind, we intend to publish draft clauses on education and training for pre-legislative scrutiny in the second Session to ensure that the legislation is fit for purpose and to give Parliament an additional opportunity to scrutinise the proposals. I add that our vision for an education and training system that gives greater responsibility to employers and health professionals has been warmly welcomed.
As noble Lords will see, we have tabled amendments to strengthen links with the wider system. We have already discussed government Amendments 61 and 104, which would place duties on the board and on CCGs to promote education and training. These amendments were accepted in a previous debate. They are designed to ensure that commissioners of NHS services consider the planning, commissioning and delivery of education and training when carrying out their functions. The noble Lords, Lord Patel and Lord Warner, have tabled the very similar Amendments 62 and 106, and I hope that they will be reassured by the amendments that we have tabled and will feel able to withdraw them.
The noble Lord, Lord Patel, has tabled Amendment 13 on the role of providers. I say straight away that I am sympathetic to his intentions and I have given the amendment significant thought since it was first put down. In the beginning I thought that an amendment might not be needed, given that, in order to be established, LETBs will need to demonstrate that they meet robust authorisation criteria set by Health Education England, including demonstrating that all providers of NHS-funded services are fairly and properly represented in the LETB’s business.
At this point I shall answer the question posed by my noble friend Lord Mawhinney about the estimated costs of the amendment. I understand that Amendment 13 would be delivered by requiring commissioners to place a duty of this kind in their commissioning contracts. We do not anticipate any additional costs as a result of the amendment. Employers have told us and the Future Forum that they are keen to participate and play a leading role in the planning and commissioning of education and training through the LETBs, and of course we plan to legislate further for education and training, which will provide the opportunity to consider any duties that might be required of providers.
However, the amendment is satisfactorily drafted. In the light of what the noble Lord and others have said today in support of it, and in recognition of the strength of feeling on the issue, I can tell the noble Lord that I am willing to accept his proposal and support the amendment.
Lord Patel
My Lords, how can I put this? I am enormously content with all the things that the Minister has said about Amendment 16, which was badly drafted and defective but he has answered all the questions. I hope that all noble Lords who supported me will feel content that he really has been helpful. As far as Amendment 13 is concerned, I would much rather win it this way than by going through the Lobbies. I thank him enormously.
“( ) this Act,( ) the Health and Social Care Act 2008,( ) the Health Act 2009, and( ) the Health and Social Care Act 2012.””
Baroness Wheeler
My Lords, on behalf of these Benches, I would like to support Amendment 17 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Masham, to which I have added my name. As we did in Committee, we have again had an excellent debate, which I believe has gone a long way towards addressing the concerns expressed by some noble Lords during Committee and during this debate about making the duty of candour statutory, as well as demonstrating why the Government’s approach of relying solely on a contractual duty will not work or lead to the sea change in culture in the NHS that is needed to ensure openness and honesty when things go wrong in the care and treatment of patients.
The case for the introduction of a statutory duty has been forcefully made by the proposers and supporters of the amendment, and I shall not go over the issues again in detail. The amendment from Committee has now been substantially redrafted to ensure that there is no duplication or clash with the professional regulation and that the duty of candour applies only to actual patient-safety incidents, as already defined in statute. Thus we would no longer face the problem of how to define whether or not an incident is serious or harmful or whether it could lead to potential harm in future, a consequence feared by some noble Lords and by the Minister in his response to the Committee debate. Instead, our amendment would amend the current Care Quality Commission (Registration) Regulations by drawing on the actual text used in those regulations, requiring patient safety incidents which cause harm to patients to be notified to the CQC. The effect would be to place a statutory duty on any organisation registering with the CQC to,
“take all reasonable steps to ensure”,
openness with patients when things go wrong and cause harm. The definitions of harm and the organisations to which the duty would apply are exactly the same as those currently used to require notification of incidents to the CQC.
The Government's main arguments against statutory duty of candour are threefold: first, that implementing the contractual duty would suffice, and bring the responsibility for requiring openness closer to patients and with clinician-led commissioners; secondly, that the current consultation exercise on the contractual duty has only just closed and the Government need to analyse the responses—not much of an argument when the Government ruled out introducing the statutory duty in that consultation; and, thirdly, that existing provisions including the professional codes of practice, National Patient Safety Agency policy guidance and the requirements of the NHS constitution, with the new contractual duty, will address the problem.
However, as noble Lords have said, existing provisions exhorting NHS organisations to openness and health professions to openness and disclosure are not changing the culture of denial, obfuscation and blame that is so deeply embedded in many parts of the NHS when things go wrong. The instances of serious failure in care and treatment that have led to the campaign by patients’ organisations are, as we have heard, deeply shocking and tragic. Expecting CCGs to have the strength and will to take on powerful providers that have failed to be open and to enforce remedial measures without the support of a statutory authority will not achieve the changes we need.
On the role of the CQC, noble Lords have more than answered the Government's reservations. It is an appropriate role for the regulator and the new duty of candour would not require detailed monitoring of individual incidents or communications with patients, but could be reinforced by the CQC by using its guidance already in existence and setting it alongside all the other essential standards of quality and safety which have statutory force. I hope the Minister will reconsider his position and accept in principle that the duty of candour should be statutory, and incorporated into the Bill.
We of course recognise that there would need to be considerable work and consultation undertaken with all stakeholders to introduce and implement the statutory duty of candour. The work around implementing the contractual duty could be put to good use in this effect, as it would complement the statutory duty. Moreover, putting the principle into the Bill and working out later how it is to be implemented has been a central feature of most of the Bill's provisions, so it can be applied in this case. Tuesday’s letter in the Daily Telegraph from all the leading patient organisations emphasised that the introduction of a statutory duty of candour,
“would be a historic step forward for patients’ safety and rights”.
On these Benches we endorse this, and I hope that the Minister will now reconsider his position and accept this amendment.
Earl Howe
My Lords, this has been an excellent debate and I would like first to pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Masham, for her tireless advocacy of the need for openness and transparency in the NHS. She spoke very powerfully. What struck me from the debate is the consensus that there seems to be on all sides of the House on three key points. First, there is agreement on the importance of openness and candour in healthcare, and I think we would all accept that the NHS could only call itself a world-class health service if it embraced openness wholeheartedly. Secondly, there is agreement that at present there is significant room for improvement, the story of my noble friend Lady Hussein-Ece being a case in point. While areas of the NHS, such as Barnet and Chase Farm, are already providing exactly the transparency we wish to see, that is not by any means universal. Thirdly, there is agreement that something needs to change.
I, too, am in complete agreement with those points. I agree that we must do all that we can to encourage the development of a culture within the NHS that supports people to disclose where errors have occurred, so I am at one with the noble Baroness in her intention in tabling her amendment. The question before us is not whether we should do something but what we should do. We need to ensure that the route that we choose gives that good intention the best chance of succeeding. I note from today’s debate that opinion has not been all one way.
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, is not the point that the contractual obligation that the Government are proposing would in effect be triggered only by the reporting of an incident to the CQC? Is it not also the case that the contractual obligation that the Government are talking about would not apply to primary care?
Earl Howe
I will move on to primary care in a moment, but I do not agree with the noble Lord at all on his first point. What we see happening from a contractual requirement is a process of culture change taking the form of conversations between management and clinicians about the fact that this was something that the organisation had to focus on. I do not agree that it will arise simply by reason of reported incidents.
As I said, any disagreement that I have with the noble Baroness is not out of any difference of intent; it is because of a difference of opinion about what we feel would work. Her amendment would require the Secretary of State to act with a view to securing that any CQC-registered organisation providing healthcare was required—we should perhaps log that word—to take all reasonable steps to ensure that a patient or their relatives were informed of a serious patient safety incident.
The key points here are around a requirement in relation to CQC-regulated healthcare. Any requirement must come with enforcement, otherwise it is not a requirement. The amendment as drafted would extend to providers of purely private healthcare—that is, non-NHS-funded healthcare—which suggests that any requirement would have to be enforced by the CQC. I and my officials have spoken at length with CQC colleagues regarding this. In response, the CQC has clearly stated that it would not be able to routinely monitor and enforce such a duty. This is not due to attaching less importance to this issue than to the others areas that they regulate. It is the very nature of openness that when errors occur, it is not easy to detect routinely where a lack of openness has occurred. When a patient or their relatives are not told of an error and the incident is not reported, it is often very difficult to discover that there has been a failure by an organisation to be open. The only way to fulfil this requirement would be to verify that openness was happening and, given the very nature of the issue, that would not be possible for a national regulator. It would require it to prove a negative—in this case, that people were not told about something going wrong with their healthcare.
Lord Harris of Haringey
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way again, but I am now genuinely confused about why this is different. His argument seems to be that a contractual arrangement—we will come back in a moment to the question of who that will cover and whether it will cover primary care—would magically produce a change in culture but that a statutory obligation, applying to all providers registered with the CQC, somehow would not. This is not about requiring the CQC to monitor every interaction with a patient; it is about creating that culture change and a clear sense of obligation—you cannot be registered as a provider with the CQC unless you are committed to doing this.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I hope that the noble Lord will allow me to remind him very respectfully that we are on Report and not in Committee. I am trying to work through my arguments, which I hoped would have a flow to them, but my flow has been interrupted. I am getting to what I hope he wants me to get to.
I was saying that the amendment would effectively require you to prove a negative—in this case, that people were not told about something going wrong with their healthcare. If they were not aware of the error, they would not be aware that they had not been told about it, and the volume of incidents is such that a single national body could not possibly verify compliance with that requirement.
I know that the noble Baroness advocates that the CQC should not routinely monitor this duty and instead should require organisations only to provide evidence that they encourage openness through having appropriate procedures and policies in place. Unfortunately, what that creates—this point was made by my noble friend Lord Ribeiro—is a tick-box exercise. Organisations can provide all the assurances in the world that processes are in place and therefore they are considered to be compliant, when in actual fact it could be that patients were still not being told about errors in their care. That is not acceptable and would not deliver the culture change that we need. We must have a requirement that ensures that patients are told of errors, not one that pays lip service to this and allows organisations—
Baroness Young of Old Scone
I was not intending to speak on this amendment but, as the former chairman of the Care Quality Commission, I have to make a point.
Baroness Young of Old Scone
I merely want to ask the noble Earl what the material difference is between this requirement being laid on organisations by the CQC and many of the other basic requirements that are laid on organisations by the CQC. Those organisations are not inspected in detail on an ongoing basis, but the requirement is intended to seek from providers of health or social care an outline of how they intend to deliver that requirement, without their being inspected regularly in all cases.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I hope I have already explained that. In our conversation with the CQC, it made very clear that this would not be like any other requirement placed upon it. A requirement to prove candour will require the CQC to engage in a much more continuous and intensive process of monitoring than some of its other requirements. That was the distinction that it made and that is why it said that it did not have the capacity to fulfil this duty if it were built into the Bill.
I am afraid that the amendment would not be effective in meeting our shared objective. That is my problem with it. I have listened to the arguments put across by noble Lords in relation to primary care. I want to see openness in primary care as much as I do in secondary care. However, we still need to consider which requirements would work best in primary care.
Baroness Kingsmill
Can the Minister explain the distinction and why we cannot have both? It seems that culture change is best reinforced by legislative change, and the contractual point that the Minister made is a good idea.
Baroness Northover
For clarification, can I point out that only the mover of an amendment or the noble Lord in charge of a Bill should speak after the Minister on Report, other than for short questions of elucidation to the Minister or where the Minister speaks early to assist the House in debate? As this makes very clear, it is possible for a noble Lord to ask a short question about what the Minister has just said, but he or she should not introduce other speeches.
Earl Howe
The question of the noble Baroness relates back to something that I said some time ago. The answer is that we believe that culture change stands the best chance of happening when you bring home to those with direct responsibility for patient care that it is in the contract of the organisation that it must be candid. There are different views about this. I do not disagree with the noble Baroness that, in some cases, regulation is the right way to go. I will say a little more about that in a moment, as I wind up.
I was just talking about primary care in sympathetic terms. We need to remember that other requirements for openness still apply to all NHS services. All primary medical service contractors must have regard to the NHS constitution, professional codes of conduct, any guidance issued by PCTs or the Secretary of State and so on in relation to openness. Once they are registered with the CQC, a failure to be open with patients contravenes clear expectations set out in CQC guidance. The CQC can then take action. Therefore, primary care contractors currently have no excuse to avoid telling their patients about things going wrong with their healthcare. However, I acknowledge the concern of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and others that primary care contractors will not be covered by the current proposals for a duty of candour in the NHS standard contract. Any contractual amendment in relation to primary care contractors is a more complex process, requiring amendments to secondary legislation, among other things. Specifically because of this, we asked for views on this in our recent consultation, which closed at the end of last month. I can confirm to the House today that we are giving further thought to the issue of primary care and the duty of candour in light of the consultation responses we have received. They are complex issues. I hope noble Lords will understand that I cannot prejudge the careful analysis that is already under way in deciding how we go forward in this area. However, it is something that we are actively considering.
Earl Howe
My Lords, during the passage of the Bill we have had much discussion about the importance of freeing front-line professionals from needless bureaucracy and ensuring that they are able to focus on patient care—not least when we considered the duties of autonomy. This is one area where the House is in agreement. Certainly one aim of the Bill is to reduce bureaucracy and micromanagement, prevent politicians in Whitehall second-guessing the decisions of doctors and nurses, and streamline the architecture of the NHS.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, indulged himself in one of his occasional rhetorical forays, which I enjoyed. However, the amendment is rich coming from him. Perhaps I should remind the House that the previous Government did to management costs what the noble Lord accused us of doing. Since 2002-03, the management costs of PCTs and SHAs have increased by more than £1 billion—a rise of more than 120 per cent. The Bill aims to get a grip on a problem that under the previous Government simply got out of control. The noble Lord will know that my department has confirmed an overall running-cost budget of £492 million. That represents a 50 per cent reduction in costs and staff compared to the current cost of functions that will transfer to the board. At board level, the work previously done by 8,000 people will be done in future by approximately 3,500 full-time equivalent people. That is a major reduction.
The amendment tabled by the noble Lord seeks, first, to introduce a new duty on the Secretary of State to prevent bureaucracy and, secondly, to minimise the layers of management tiers within the Commissioning Board. The noble Lord produced a confection of arguments to bolster his case that bureaucracy in the NHS is increasing rather than diminishing. I can tell the House that the opposite is true. In saying that, I should stress that I am not in any way denigrating NHS managers. I have never done that and I will never do it.
Setting aside the noble Lord’s knockabout routine and getting back to earth, I agree with the principle behind this amendment. Noble Lords will already be aware of the autonomy duties, which we have recently amended, in no small part due to the Constitution Committee. Those duties ensure that proper consideration is given to whether any requirements or objectives set by the board or the Secretary of State will place unnecessary burdens on the health service or distract from good quality patient care. In addition, the Bill places duties on the NHS Commissioning Board, CCGs and other bodies to exercise their functions effectively, efficiently and economically. That is in new Section 13D of the National Health Service Act 2006 for the board and new Section 14P for CCGs. Together, I believe that these provisions ensure that the duty to maximise efficiency and minimise bureaucracy is embedded throughout the system. We do not need anything further.
The noble Lord, Lord Warner, asked me a question that I have been asked before in these debates. It concerned why we did not simply reform the PCT model. We chose not to try to reform the PCT model because it would not have delivered the empowered clinical commissioners we want to see and, indeed, the Opposition want to see. This Government supported the principle of practice-based commissioning, but there is one thing to say about practice-based commissioning: it was not working. It did not live up to the ambitions that people had for it. Central to this was clinical commissioners’ lack of autonomy. Only by conferring functions directly on clinical commissioners, as this Bill does, can that autonomy and responsibility be properly established.
Subsection (a) of the noble Lord’s amendment refers rather bafflingly, as my noble friend Lord Fowler pointed out, to a minimum level of management tiers. I am not quite sure how that would be interpreted by the courts, but I believe that the noble Lord is drawing attention to the published proposals for the board’s organisational structure. In line with the vision we set out in the White Paper, the proposals put forward make clear that the board will be a single nationwide organisation that will work across the country to improve quality and outcomes. However, there are some who have focused on the board’s proposal for a maximum of five layers of management, claiming that this represents some sort of increase rather than a reduction in bureaucracy. That is not the case. The structure proposed by the board is based on sound and well recognised principles of effective organisational structure. The proposed organisational structure for the board is designed above all to support it in its overarching role to improve health outcomes. What surely matters is the board’s efficiency and effectiveness. In fact, as I have already said, the board will operate with a 50 per cent reduction in running costs in comparison with the current system. I am not attracted to the part of the amendment that requires the Secretary of State to influence the number of management tiers in the NHS Commissioning Board. Apart from being inappropriate, it is unnecessary. The Bill already makes clear that the Secretary of State sets the resource limit for the board and new Section 223E of the 2006 Act allows him to impose a cap on administrative spend. Together these provisions ensure that financial limits are placed on the board, which will necessarily influence the way in which it is structured. However, I believe it would be inappropriate for the Secretary of State to go any further than this in influencing the organisational design of the board. The board is the body best placed to determine how to organise itself in the most effective and efficient way. It is therefore our intention to allow it as much autonomy as possible in determining its own membership, structures and procedures.
All our proposals for modernising the NHS, including the provisions in the Bill, are designed to minimise bureaucracy, micromanagement and unnecessary waste to enable the whole system to focus on what really matters, which is patient outcomes. For example, the outcomes framework will directly link quality improvement and outcomes with commissioning; clinically-led commissioning groups will be judged, through the commissioning outcomes framework, on whether they improve patient outcomes and experience rather than process targets; the NHS Commissioning Board will hold GP commissioners to account for their performance against NICE indicators; and CCGs will hold providers to account for driving up quality improvement using contracts and incentives. It is quality and outcomes that matter and with the safeguards already in place to limit administrative spend throughout the system, I believe that the noble Lord’s amendment is unnecessary. I hope that he will feel able to withdraw it.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
I must say that I am really rather disappointed by the noble Earl’s response to my constructive amendment. He does not seem to have answered the charge that is being made. First, I think we are all agreed that when we talk about bureaucracy we are not talking about the fine managers that the NHS has to whom we owe so much. This is an argument about the structure, the layers and the cost of a market that the Government wish to bring in to the health service. It is not about managers in the health service.
The fact is that the Secretary of State and his colleagues, including the noble Earl, have continued to intervene in the health service on a daily basis. They have yet to explain how, if this Bill eventually receives Royal Assent, at that point, magically, Ministers are going to step back and simply let this new system continue. I do not believe a word of it. What I believe will happen is that on the one hand you will have this complex structure where the mantra is that it is all arm’s length, it is all down to the clinical commissioning groups, the market and the gentle guidance of Sir David Nicholson and his colleagues at the national Commissioning Board, and Ministers can simply step back. It will not happen. What we will have is the system that the Bill enacts, if it is enacted, and Ministers continuing to micromanage. It is inevitable that Secretaries of State are accountable to Parliament, and they will be required by the very process of parliamentary democracy to continue to intervene and to take a close interest in what is happening. That is the charge I put to the Government as to why I believe that this is going to be a very complex situation indeed.
It is always good to debate with the noble Lord, Lord Fowler. Twenty years ago, I enjoyed debating with him issues mainly to do with the funding of the National Health Service. I think the National Association of Health Authorities and Trusts was a very modest organisation. It was very lean and certainly not subject to the strictures of the noble Lord who suggested that it was part of the bloated bureaucracy that I think he was implicating me in. He does not like the idea of declaratory law. That is all very well, but what is Clause 4 but a declaratory statement: “The Secretary of State’s duty as to promoting autonomy”? Indeed, the noble Earl, Lord Howe, referred to it in his winding-up speech. I have to say to him that if the duty of autonomy were currently on the statute book, I do not think that he could have brought this legislation in under it because it states that,
“unnecessary burdens are not imposed on any such person”.
This whole edifice is going to impose enormous burdens on many such people within the National Health Service.
The noble Lord, Lord Fowler, referred to the Griffiths report—at 24 pages, it was a remarkable letter which had a long-term impact on the health service. He will recall that we were very strong supporters of the introduction of general management. I am very concerned about the structures that are now being brought in because they may well inhibit the kind of leadership and clinical engagement that we saw as a result of the Roy Griffiths management inquiry.
I have to say to my noble friend Lord Harris that the description of Sir David Nicholson as the chief inquisitor was a little unfair.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, Amendment 19 comes back to a theme which takes us to the overriding responsibility of the Secretary of State for a comprehensive health service and to the relationship between the Secretary of State and the national Commissioning Board. I do not want to go over the ground that we went over in the previous debate but I want to make just two or three points.
The Minister will recall that in Committee we debated the whole question of the concurrent power being given to the national Commissioning Board in relation to the Secretary of State’s responsibilities in Clause 1. Given Clause 1 and our really important debates on it, and the welcome agreement on the first day on Report regarding the way in which an amendment was accepted to make clear that the Secretary of State is accountable to Parliament for NHS provision, I remain concerned as to whether it is right that a body such as the national Commissioning Board should carry such responsibilities as well—that it should have a concurrent responsibility and duty.
Surely, ultimately, the national Commissioning Board is a secondary body as compared to the Secretary of State. The very fact that there is a mandate in which the responsibilities and duties of that board are laid down on a regular basis by the Secretary of State reinforces the proper relationship between an unaccountable body, such as the national Commissioning Board, and an accountable person, such as the Secretary of State. I should be grateful if the Minister would give further reflection as to whether a concurrent power really is the appropriate way in which that relationship should be set out.
Of course, that is associated with the power of intervention by the Secretary of State. It seems to me that in the end, since the Secretary of State is accountable to Parliament for provision and for ensuring a comprehensive service, if he feels that the national Commissioning Board is not doing the right thing or that there is a matter which requires the intervention of the Secretary of State, it is right that that intervention can be taken out without obstruction or legislation. In my view, that would lead to a confusion of role as between the Secretary of State and the national Commissioning Board.
When we discussed this issue in Committee, I asked the Minister what would happen if there was an issue. Let us take, for instance, some of the recent interventions by the Secretary of State. He has expressed concern about the way in which primary care trusts have manipulated waiting lists. Rightfully, in my view, he sought to intervene. How would you do that under the new arrangements if clinical commissioning groups or some individual clinical commissioning groups were not doing what the Secretary of State thought to be appropriate?
From our debate in Committee, I had the impression from the Minister that in those circumstances provision could be made in the mandate set for the board by the Secretary of State. I can see that every so often you can alter the mandate to deal with an issue like that. But sometimes he will need to intervene rapidly rather than have to wait for the process of a mandate to be set. I also suspect that there is a risk that the mandate could become very detailed and prescriptive—in other words, the micromanagement that the Minister is so keen not to see introduced. There will be issues that arise during the year which might not have been envisaged when the mandate was drawn up.
The noble Earl may well say that we will have the intervention powers set out in proposed new Section 13Z1 set out on page 24. My problem with this is that the wording constrains the intervention because it has to be based on a failure to discharge or a failure properly to discharge any of its functions, and the failure is significant. Of course, the intervention none the less is based on what the Secretary of State himself considers, and no doubt he would always be properly advised by his officials and, in extremis, the Government Law Officers. But I can envisage situations in which the NHS Commissioning Board actually rejects the Secretary of State’s view and where it would be deemed that the issue is not one that comes under the auspices that could lead to intervention under Section 13Z1. I think that there should be a clear right in the Bill for the Secretary of State to have a power of direction.
In the end the sole accountability of the national Commissioning Board has to be through the Secretary of State and thus to Parliament. The board is not elected; it is an appointed body. There has to be full accountability, and for me, one element of that accountability is that the Minister responsible to Parliament has the right to tell that body what to do. I feel very uncomfortable with a body that is floated off. Okay, we have the mandate, but in the end it is not an accountable body except through the relationship it has with the Secretary of State, so it is right that the Secretary of State should issue direction powers without being fettered as I believe he is in Section 13Z1.
I do not think I need to mention the other two amendments at great length. Amendment 23 merely tries to encourage the noble Earl to say that clinical commissioning groups have the function of safeguarding the comprehensive provision of NHS services. It is very important that within all the autonomy that the Secretary of State wishes to give the clinical commissioning groups, it is made clear that they must, none the less, sign up to the overriding responsibility of anyone involved in the NHS to ensure that comprehensive provision is safeguarded. Amendment 70 is really consequential on Amendment 19. I beg to move.
Earl Howe
My Lords, Amendments 19 and 70 seek to reintroduce the Secretary of State’s powers to direct the health service. I have listened with care to what the noble Lord has said, but I continue to believe that this would be a retrograde step on every count, not least that of transparency. Under the Bill as it stands, the Secretary of State will be able to set objectives and requirements both through the mandate and through “standing rules” regulations under Clause 19, but unlike directions, these would be subject to full scrutiny, and the Bill creates a clear expectation that they would be set only once a year in order to provide certainty for planning. Ministers would also have robust intervention powers in the event of significant failure, as the noble Lord mentioned.
The system we are creating is designed to be predictable, transparent and structured, and will provide stability for the health service. I think that this is a better approach than allowing the Secretary of State to direct the health service whenever he wants, which risks returning us to the unpredictability and opaqueness of the current system. The noble Lord described the Commissioning Board as “unaccountable”. I must scotch that myth. The Secretary of State will have wide-ranging powers over the Commissioning Board, most prominently through the mandate and the standing rules, which will enable the board to be held rigorously to account. In addition, the board will have to meet in public, produce a business plan and an annual report, both of which will have to be laid before Parliament. Further, I would remind the noble Lord of Clause 51, which covers the,
“duty to keep health service functions under review”.
The process of holding the board to account is not a once-a-year task. In turn, the Commissioning Board will hold CCGs to account for the quality outcomes they achieve and for financial performance—and, again, will have the power to intervene where there is evidence that CCGs are failing or likely to fail to fulfil their functions. If the Commissioning Board fails to hold CCGs to account, the Secretary of State could then direct the board to do so. If the board failed to comply with that instruction, the Secretary of State could either discharge the function himself or make arrangements for another body to do so on his behalf. So it is quite wrong to say that there are no levers available to the Secretary of State.
I turn now to Amendment 23, which emphasises the need for clinical commissioning groups to safeguard,
“the comprehensive provision of NHS services”.
Noble Lords will recall that the House has already agreed an amendment to Clause 12 which explicitly requires CCGs to act consistently with the discharge by the Secretary of State and the Board of their duties to promote the comprehensive health service, and with the objectives and requirements in the mandate.
I fully appreciate and support the intentions behind this amendment, and I hope that the discussion we have already had and the amendment we have already discussed to Clause 12 will offer the noble Lord a reassurance that the effect of this amendment is already covered in the Bill. In the light of what I have said, I hope that he will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Howe, particularly for his remarks in relation to Amendment 23. Clearly we are not going to agree about this matter. I do wish that the late Lord Marsh could still be present because he would have enjoyed these debates. I think that he would have reminded us of the traditional relationship between the chairman of the board of a nationalised industry and the Minister responsible to Parliament. Although we have lost those nationalised industries, in one sense the Department of Health is now busily engaged in setting up the kind of structure that in many ways is akin to those industries. That is because the chairman and chief executive of the national Commissioning Board are, in essence, being handed a huge amount of power by the Secretary of State. They are to be given the budget, the mandate and the standing rules, and are to be told to get on with it. If we go back to our experience with the nationalised industries, of course it never worked because there was a continuous tension between the board of a nationalised industry and the Minister which arose from the fact that the Minister was accountable to Parliament for the running of the railways, iron and steel and the coal board.
That is exactly what we are constructing today. We have the myth that simply by having a mandate and standing rules, we can say to the national Commissioning Board, “Get on with it. I as a Minister will no longer intervene unless in extremis”, under the circumstances set out in Bill. Life is not like that. Parliament will continue to debate the health service, issues will arise and Ministers will make pronouncements. I do not believe for a minute that the 12 or so pronouncements we have heard from Ministers over the weeks that this Bill has been in your Lordships’ House will not be followed by similar pronouncements under the new structure. They will be forced to do so because Parliament will require it. That is the risk and why I believe it is such a complex system. On the one hand there is a structure which is based on an arm’s-length relationship, a market, with clinical commissioning based on a mandate, while on the other hand there is still the Secretary of State who will be fully held to account in Parliament. There will be enormous tension and great confusion within the National Health Service. For that reason, there is a strong argument for accepting that, in the end, the Minister is accountable and ought to have a power of direction. Saying that this can be done through a mandate and standing rules is not realistic, and no doubt, if the Bill is enacted, we will see this played out. I do not think anyone should be under the misapprehension about the fact that we are building into these arrangements a very unstable situation. But we have had a good debate, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Health and Social Care Bill
Earl Howe Excerpts(12 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Rea
My Lords, I have a question for the noble Earl on this amendment. What will be the relationship of Public Health England, the national body that will take over the functions of the Health Protection Agency and other areas, to the national Commissioning Board? I wonder whether the noble Earl can guide me to the statutory framework for Public Health England, as it does not seem to be in this long Bill, although it is possible that I am just incompetent and have not spotted it. It seems to me that the chief officer—I hope that he will be a highly qualified public health specialist—who is the senior officer in Public Health England, should have a seat on the national Commissioning Board. That should perhaps not necessarily be permanent, but he should be consulted frequently by the Commissioning Board.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Earl Howe)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and all noble Lords who have spoken in another excellent debate. I understand the arguments that have been put forward in favour of these amendments. It is important for me to say at the outset that the Government’s general approach is to allow the NHS Commissioning Board as much autonomy as possible in determining its own membership, structures and procedures. It is our firm view that the board is the body best placed to determine how to organise itself in the most effective and efficient way. We would not want to undermine that.
It is also worth restating that, looking across government, it is the responsibility of all departments to ensure that public appointments to arm's-length bodies are open, transparent and made on merit. However, it is not government policy for such appointments to be subject to Select Committee approval—in this case the Health Select Committee. These are ministerial appointments. The Secretary of State is ultimately accountable to Parliament for the performance of the health service as a whole, as we have made clear through amendments to the Bill. The current process under which some posts are subject to pre-appointment hearings by a House Select Committee does not represent a power of veto, which the amendment would amount to. Of course, noble Lords will be aware that we followed this process, as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, reminded us, in the recent appointment of Professor Malcolm Grant as the chair of the NHS Commissioning Board Authority. When we discussed this last in Committee, I was pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, said that he thought that this process ensured proper and effective scrutiny of that appointment. I gently wish to hold him to that view. He raised the comparison of the Office for Budget Responsibility, saying that the NHS Commissioning Board was just as important. Importance is not the issue. The Office for Budget Responsibility has a unique role because it has dual accountability to both government and Parliament directly. The NHS Commissioning Board is accountable to government and, through Ministers, to Parliament, which is somewhat different.
I turn to Amendments 21, 21A and 22. We recognise that the Bill strikes a fine balance between giving the board as much autonomy as possible in how it operates, and providing the necessary accountability. It is important to strike that balance accurately and consistently. If we were so prescriptive in the Bill as to set out further requirements for the board's membership, we would be moving too far away from that necessary autonomy. It is right that it should be up to the board to decide whether it has a vice-chair or a senior independent director, as Amendment 21 suggests. Of course, a vice-chair or deputy chair, were they to be appointed, would have to be non-executive.
Likewise, while I agree that it will be key to the effectiveness of the board for it to involve and obtain sufficient advice and input from public health experts, and to have public health well within its purview, it would not be right to specify that it must have a public health specialist as a member, as Amendment 21A proposes. Again, I am sorry to disappoint my noble friend Lady Williams in particular, but we think that the board will be best placed to determine whether it has the right structure and range of skills, knowledge and experience appropriate to the issues that it will face. In the material that David Nicholson published he made it clear that, rather than making token appointments, he intends that clinical leadership will run right through the organisation. That is a very reassuring statement.
Amendment 22 takes the Secretary of State out of the loop of appointing the chief executive. That moves us too far away from one of the key principles that most of us have signed up to: the necessary accountability of the board to the Secretary of State. It also seems at odds with the ethos of other amendments proposed by the noble Lord, such as Amendment 19, which we debated on the first day of Report and which sought to make every other aspect of the exercise of the board's functions subject to direction from the Secretary of State.
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top
My Lords, there is some confusion outside the House about the relationship between the Secretary of State, the chief executive and the other senior appointees. The chief executive’s appointment was made before there was a board and a chair, but seems to be permanent. It is very unclear what the process will be for appointing directors. Have the Government a view on the governance of those sorts of arrangements, because the governance in this case does not seem to match what people expected in other areas of policy?
Earl Howe
My Lords, I will attempt to answer the noble Baroness in a moment. She is right that the chief executive designate, Sir David Nicholson, was appointed before the establishment of the NHS Commissioning Board Authority. My right honourable friend felt that not only was it a sensible and good appointment, as we think very highly of Sir David—as most people do—but that it would provide continuity for the NHS. I hope that the noble Baroness accepts that it was a rational decision. As I outlined, Malcolm Grant, too, was the Secretary of State’s appointment, as was appropriate. I will probably have to come back to the noble Baroness on the non-executive directors because I am not aware of the precise timescale or mechanism for doing that, but I will enlighten her as soon as I possibly can.
The noble Lord, Lord Rea, asked me about the relationship between the board and Public Health England. Public Health England will be an executive agency carrying out functions of the Secretary of State with relation to public health. Those functions are conferred on the Secretary of State primarily through Clause 10. As regards the relationship between the two bodies, the simplest way of putting it is that they will work very closely together on public health issues. I have no doubt that there will be a number of ways in which Public Health England will commission public health services from the board in one or other of the aspects of its health protection role.
To get back to what I was saying before the intervention, the Official Opposition at one moment want the Secretary of State to be hands on and at another moment to be hands off, so perhaps I am entitled to feel a little confused about the direction that they are coming from here. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, questioned the rationale for the Secretary of State appointing the chief executive. As I said in Committee, the requirement for the Secretary of State to consent to the appointment of the chief executive of the board is included for the very important reason that the chief executive of the board will be the accounting officer for the commissioning budget—more than £80 billion of public money—for which the Secretary of State is accountable to Parliament. It is entirely appropriate in our view that the Secretary of State should approve his or her appointment. It is quite usual for chief executives of non-departmental public bodies to be designated as the accounting officer by the department to which they are accountable.
I hope the noble Lord will agree on reflection that we have struck an appropriate balance between autonomy and accountability in the current provisions for appointments to the board and that he will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Howe. He thinks that I am being inconsistent with some of my amendments, but I still believe that at this stage it is appropriate to put forward probing amendments. If I am inconsistent, I am trying to point up the inconsistency in the Government’s approach, which is that on the one hand we are told that the national Commissioning Board is to be at arm’s length from the Department of Health and Ministers, but then we find that it is at such arm’s length that the chief executive has to have his appointment approved by the Secretary of State.
On parliamentary hearings, the noble Earl said that the Office for Budget Responsibility is rather different from the national Commissioning Board because it has a unique role in being dually accountable to government and to Parliament. My argument is that the national Commissioning Board is different from many other public bodies because of the concurrent powers it is given in Clause 1 and the fact that, unlike many bodies, it does not have a straightforward ministerial power of direction, as we have discussed. The Government have deliberately sought to put it on a different plane. For that reason, it would have been useful for them to have followed the example of the Office for Budget Responsibility and given the appropriate Select Committee a veto over the appointment of the chairman. As I said earlier, I accept that the Government have certainly gone halfway in the sense that Professor Grant appeared before the Health Select Committee. That is very welcome, and I am sure it sets a precedent for the future.
On public health representation on the board, for which my noble friend Lord Beecham and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, argued, I hope that the national Commissioning Board will take account of the views expressed in your Lordships' House to ensure that there is strong public health input at the NCB level.
The first point the noble Earl made was that the national Commissioning Board is to have as much autonomy as possible. If it is, then it jolly well has to show that it is going to be accountable. I hope that the NCB will give parliamentarians a regular opportunity to discuss with it its programmes and the way that it is going to work in the future. I would be very concerned if, through the autonomy philosophy, Ministers in one way or another resisted debates or interventions in relation to the actions of the NCB and the NCB itself proved not to be open to having debates with parliamentarians. That is where the problem may well arise.
We will have to see but I for one hope that the national Commissioning Board will accept that it has been given enormous power—albeit with some constraints, which we have discussed today—and that it has to show it is going to be properly accountable for it. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
“( ) After subsection (1E) insert—
“(1F) In exercising its functions under this section and section 3A, a clinical commissioning group must act consistently with—
(a) the discharge by the Secretary of State and the Board of their duty under section 1(1) (duty to promote a comprehensive health service), and(b) the objectives and requirements for the time being specified in the mandate published under section 13A.””
“( ) In section 272 of that Act (orders, regulations, rules and directions), in subsection (6) before paragraph (za) insert—
“(zza) regulations under section 3(1D),”.”
Earl Howe
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 39 and 40, 74, 137 to 140 and 149.
The Government have accepted all the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee’s recommendations for amendments to the secondary powers in the Bill. This group of amendments makes most of the changes necessary to fulfil those recommendations. The others will be included in later groups. I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Crosby
My Lords, I shall speak briefly to this group of amendments. We are very pleased that there should now be acceptance of the detailed suggestions of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. That gives a much stronger underpinning to parliamentary accountability, which we appreciate.
I should like to ask my noble friend a couple of questions. At this hour of the night I may be misinterpreting some of the wording in the amendments but I should like to address two of them in particular. The first is Amendment 35, to which I have added my name. I simply want to ask a little more about the effect of this amendment on inclusivity. As my noble friend will know, there have been many attempts to make inclusivity part of the Bill, and from time to time we on these Benches have expressed concern on the issue. I should be grateful if he could explain the effects of the Secretary of State’s ability to have a commissioning group determine when a patient can be excluded from the overall effect of the directions under Amendment 35. I assume that that would be because they come under the board rather than the CCGs but my noble friend may be able to give me a slightly purer view of the exact meaning.
My second question relates to Amendments 137, 138, 139 and 140. What are the effects of the Secretary of State’s ability, as I understand it, to proceed with orders and regulations without that effectively being the case in the Bill? In other words, could the Secretary of State, in certain circumstances, simply override what is in primary legislation by passing orders and regulations or would he effectively have to fall back on regulations and orders at a later stage?
I apologise for asking these two questions at this late hour but they are asked in all good faith. I think it is important that the public and Parliament understand exactly what is intended by the amendments. Because they are rather complicated, I may have got it wrong but I hope that I have not.
Earl Howe
My Lords, on Amendment 35, Section 3 of the National Health Service Act 2006, as amended by the Bill, states that CCGs have responsibility for persons provided with primary medical services by a member of the group and persons usually resident in the group’s area who are not provided with primary medical services by a member of any CCG. Regulations under subsection (1D) enable the Secretary of State to specify that this would not apply for persons of a prescribed description, or in prescribed circumstances—for example, for persons registered with an English GP who were resident in Scotland. As currently drafted, these regulations would be subject to the negative procedure in Parliament. Following the recommendation of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, the amendment would make these regulations subject to the affirmative procedure.
Amendments 137 to 140 are linked to Amendment 39. They would make clear that the Secretary of State is not able to delegate his function of making orders or regulations specifically relating to the provision of primary medical, dental or ophthalmic services and any functions relating to local or other pharmaceutical services to the NHS Commissioning Board, a CCG, a Special Health Authority or to such other persons or bodies as may be prescribed. The amendments would make it clear that the Secretary of State cannot delegate the function of making orders or regulations to other bodies under Clause 48.
If that short explanation represents an over-abbreviated one, I shall be happy to write to my noble friend after this debate, but I hope that that is helpful.
Baroness Thornton
My Lords, it is important that the Minister can give us some satisfaction in answer to the remarks made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, particularly in view of the tireless pursuit of these issues by the noble Lord, Lord Rix. This small suite of amendments aims to start at the top as it talks about the Secretary of State’s power to require the board to commission services including for those with profound and multiple learning disabilities. It then puts a duty on the board to reduce inequalities, which will involve collecting data on the experiences and outcomes of patients with these disabilities. It also sets out that there should be no upper limit on the length and type of advocacy support that must be provided by local authorities. Therefore, it aims to provide a suite of amendments that address the whole system and the interventions that will be necessary to provide the right framework under the new regime for some of the most vulnerable people in our country.
It was interesting that, on a more general matter concerning children and the Bill, the NHS Confederation deputy policy director, Jo Webber, said recently that the Government's plan to recruit 4,200 extra health visitors by 2015 was leading to a loss of staff in other vital roles in some areas. For example, many established and successful children's health teams are being rearranged or in some cases disbanded simply to employ more health visitors. Ms Webber’s report claimed that the Government should replace the health visitor target with one that focused on the outcomes for children rather than on the numbers of staff in place. That was a very wise remark.
I turn to the children with the most complex difficulties and the question of how under this framework they will receive appropriate assessment and treatment that will address their individual needs. At best, there will be problems with the transition to the new system, and if there are gaps in the service for vulnerable children and learning-disabled patients who perhaps have GPs with limited experience, and doubts about how GP consortia will react to the situation, that is an issue of great concern. Historically, there has been an imbalance whereby people with learning disabilities have lost out when compared with those, for example, with mental health problems—who have also lost out. Therefore, how this group of children and young people are catered for will be a way of testing whether these things will work at all.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, for her typically knowledgeable contribution to today's debate. I hope she will accept that the Government are committed to improving the health of people with learning disabilities, to help them both to live longer and to stay healthier for longer. The Bill aims to drive improvements in outcomes by establishing clinically led commissioning, by giving patients a stronger voice and by embedding quality improvement and a reduction in health inequalities at all levels of the system.
We debated these amendments in Committee and I have since exchanged correspondence with, and met, the noble Lord, Lord Rix. I understand and share his concern, and that of the noble Baroness, that there should be robust arrangements for commissioning services for people with profound and multiple learning disabilities, and for people with complex needs or challenging behaviour. I am afraid that it may disappoint the noble Baroness to hear that I still believe that the amendments are unnecessary. However, in saying that, I hope that I can reassure her about the reasons why.
On Amendment 37, the regulation-making powers in new Section 3B are already broad enough for the Secretary of State to require the board to commission these services. The current intention is that the regulations under subsection (1)(d) will be used to give the board responsibility for commissioning specialised services for rare and very rare conditions. The current specialised services national definitions set will form the basis for the services included in these regulations. These will include a number of services for people with profound and multiple learning disabilities, and people with complex needs or challenging behaviour. The services that are not considered specialised will be commissioned by CCGs, although in practice there will need to be close collaboration between the board and CCGs to ensure that patients receive a seamless service.
Baroness Jolly
Certainly local government will play a key role in all this, so the scrutiny committees would seem to be a sensible place to take information from, which would then work in with their local healthwatch.
Earl Howe
My Lords, let me begin by setting out what we intend for the standing rules. We intend to use the rules to replicate core elements of the current system that need to be maintained in the future. For example, the standing rules will be used to provide the legal basis for certain patient rights as set out in the NHS constitution. Amendment 38, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, will do three things. First, it seeks to require the Secretary of State to make standing rules as opposed to enabling him to do so. Secondly, it would require rather than enable him to update the standing rules no less than once a year; and finally, the Secretary of State would be obliged to share the standing rules with the relevant committee of the House of Commons for consideration at least two months before they are laid in Parliament. I hope that I can help the noble Lord here.
It is already our intention to make standing rules and to review them on an annual basis alongside the mandate. Where it is necessary, the Secretary of State would update the standing rules. Imposing a requirement on him to produce regulations regardless of whether an update is necessary will introduce what I believe is a needless administrative and bureaucratic burden on the system, and we surely do not want that. The amendment would also set out a requirement in legislation for the Health Select Committee to examine the proposed standing rules. I hope that I can reassure him that the committee would have the opportunity to examine proposals, and that Ministers in the department would engage constructively with the committee on any inquiry. However, I do not think that it is usual practice for legislation to set expectations as to the subject that Select Committees should examine or what areas committees should focus on. I should also remind the House that any regulations laid in Parliament are also considered by the Merits Committee of your Lordships’ House, as well as the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments.
I turn now to the remaining issues. I think that it would be helpful to set out what we aim to achieve with the mandate. The mandate will bring with it an unprecedented degree of transparency, scrutiny and accountability to government policy for the NHS. For the first time, the Government’s core objectives for the NHS commissioning system will be subject to full public consultation.
A number of the amendments in this group, both government and from your Lordships, focus on the parliamentary scrutiny of the mandate. Amendments 41 and 46, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, would make the mandate subject to the affirmative resolution procedure and require the Secretary of State to lay the mandate in Parliament in draft. I hope that I can reassure your Lordships that we have already built in sufficient parliamentary scrutiny of the mandate to render the amendments unnecessary.
Following the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee’s recommendations, the Government have tabled Amendments 45 and 47, to which I now speak, to allow specific parliamentary scrutiny of the “requirements” within the mandate by providing that they can be brought into effect only by regulations subject to the negative resolution procedure.
However, making the mandate as a whole subject to the affirmative procedure would go too far. Parliament will set the parameters that the NHS will operate within, through this Bill and the legislation that will support it. This is a Bill that takes many powers away from Ministers and gives them back to Parliament, but it should be for the elected Government of the day, not for Parliament, to set specific policy objectives within that legislative framework following full consultation.
Of course, parliamentarians will have an interest in the mandate, and will have the opportunity to debate and influence it in the usual ways. As Clause 1 of the Bill makes clear, following our debate last week, the Secretary of State retains his responsibility to Parliament for the health service; and Parliament has the right to hold him to account for the health service, including the setting of the mandate.
Amendment 43, tabled by my noble friend Lady Williams and three of my other Liberal Democrat noble friends would require the Secretary of State to explain how the mandate supported his cross-cutting duties. I think that part of the motivation for the amendment is a concern to ensure that the mandate is not simply about financial issues. I hope that I can reassure my noble friend Lady Williams in particular on this point. It is our firm belief that the mandate should focus on the strategic outcomes and policies that the Government wish the NHS Commissioning Board to achieve. At the heart of this should be objectives for improvement against the NHS outcomes framework. The mandate will also be an opportunity for the Government to set specific objectives about the policies that we have set out in the NHS White Paper and the government response to the NHS Future Forum; for example, about extending patient choice and enabling clinical commissioning groups to flourish.
While the mandate will set the budget for the board and could include objectives relating to efficiency or financial management, it definitely will not be primarily about financial controls. Of course financial controls are essential, but the Bill has separate provisions for these under Clause 23. The mandate will not be a narrow and technical financial document which requires a separate justification of how the Secretary of State has fulfilled his legal duties; rather, it will visibly embody his duties. So I do not believe that an extra reporting requirement in the Bill is necessary.
Amendment 49 would require the board in consultation with the Secretary of State to set standards for the management of commissioners’ and providers’ accounts to enable efficiency comparisons. This comparison would be published annually by the Secretary of State. I understand the concerns which have led to the tabling of the amendment, but it would be an unnecessary and perhaps bureaucratic imposition on NHS providers and commissioners, distracting them from improving outcomes for their patients and the wider QIPP challenge.
It is important to be able to make comparisons of efficiency, but the board and, in turn, CCGs should be given the autonomy to decide whether and how to do this. I happen to know that work is currently proceeding in this area.
Monitor’s role currently includes the oversight of the financial management of foundation trusts, and the Trust Development Authority will do the same for non-FTs, so this information is already available for providers.
My noble friend Lady Jolly referred to HealthWatch England. It is specified in subsection (8) of new Section 13A as someone the Secretary of State must consult in developing the mandate. HealthWatch England will be able to feed in the views of local healthwatch as well.
Amendments 48 and 293, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, would require parallel mandates to be set for Monitor and the Care Quality Commission. Again, I hope that I can persuade him that that is not necessary.
Monitor and CQC are independent regulators, with clearly defined statutory functions. Their core role is unchanging and regulatory, rather than about achieving a series of evolving policy objectives. Therefore, there is far less reason for the Government to set them a specific mandate. The fact that there is a statutory mandate in the Bill for the Commissioning Board reflects the different nature of the board’s role.
As with any arm’s-length body, there is a framework agreement between it and the sponsor department, which is used as the basis for monitoring the body’s ongoing performance. That is the approach that the department uses and will be using for all of its arm’s-length bodies, including CQC and Monitor. That will be underpinned by formal reviews of each organisation’s capability, at least every three years.
The department will retain overall stewardship, system leadership and accountability for ensuring that the different national bodies are working as Parliament intended. As I have mentioned on previous occasions, the Secretary of State will have formal powers to intervene in the event of significant failure. I hope that that reassures the noble Lord, and that he will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I thank the noble Earl for a comprehensive response to the interesting amendments that have taken us to the duly appointed hour. He has given quite some assurance about the fact that parliamentary Select Committees will have an opportunity to scrutinise both the mandate and the standing rules, and that is to be welcomed. I urge him even now to reflect on whether the parliamentary scrutiny might not be beefed up somewhat by some reference in the Bill alongside some of these amendments.
The noble Earl has said that the process will be transparent. That is to be welcomed. But in the end, if Ministers are determined to hand off power to the national Commissioning Board, it seems only sensible and right that the mandate in the standing rules under which that should be done should be subject to decent parliamentary scrutiny. I very much hope that the Government will give that further consideration.
This has been a good debate to round off tonight. I am most grateful and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Health and Social Care Bill
Earl Howe Excerpts(12 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Owen
My Lords, before the House agrees that the Report should be received, I would like to raise some important constitutional questions. On 4 April, the day the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister embarked on their “listen and explain” experience and the legislation was paused, I wrote to the then Cabinet Secretary, Sir Gus O’Donnell—now of course the noble Lord, Lord O’Donnell—and raised with him the fear that, because of the long drawn-out legislative process, discussion of the Bill in this House could be pre-empted. I also told him that I had consulted the clerks in Parliament and it appeared that there was no written convention that guides the Government on what is or is not acceptable to take in advance of Royal Assent. Obviously they cannot implement the legislation in full.
Many of my concerns since then have been more than justified. I received a letter on 7 April from the then Cabinet Secretary that said:
“The Treasury guidance on ‘Managing Public Money’ sets out how, in some circumstances and if … conditions are fulfilled, departments can incur expenditure on the measures contained in a bill prior to Royal Assent. In addition, a department may take steps to prepare for implementation using existing statutory powers. I have therefore discussed your concerns with Una O’Brien, as Accounting Officer, in the light of this guidance. She has confirmed”—
this is important—
“that the work currently underway is taking place under the broad powers of the Secretary of State and NHS bodies under existing legislation. For example, the arrangement of PCTs into management clusters and the creation of pathfinder consortia are possible under existing powers in the National Health Service Act 2006. In addition, some of the changes currently taking place would be required regardless of the Health and Social Care Bill. For example redundancies in PCTs reflect the longstanding challenge, which pre-dates the Bill, to deliver up to £20bn of efficiencies across the NHS over the next four years for reinvestment in frontline services”.
As a result of that, there has been broad acceptance in this House that on these controversial questions, some of which are already agreed, the Government are proceeding under existing legislation.
On 16 September I was informed by the chairman of the Constitution Committee that that committee had briefly discussed the pre-legislative disappearance of PCTs, and had in front of it my correspondence with the Cabinet Secretary, which I had made available to Professor Tomkins, one of its advisers. I was asked whether I would provide more information about changes that had been introduced following Second Reading of the Health and Social Care Bill but prior to it coming to the House of Lords. I enclosed an up-to-date document in great detail that had been sent out for consultation by the Midlands and East Strategic Health Authority, which I thought gave a pretty clear indication of the anticipated massive changes to the whole architecture of the NHS, many of which seem as if they will be introduced despite the fact that the full legislative process was continuing.
I also drew attention to a speech that had been made in the other place by a Member of Parliament that had again raised the question of whether it was proper to stop the legislation when so much was already being done and so much pre-emption had occurred. Today I have written to the Constitution Committee on this question because an MP drew my attention to a letter that says that people,
“are absolutely terrified of the chaos that will apply if the Bill is dropped altogether now. Restructuring is a nightmare, un-restructuring could be even worse!”.
On today’s “World at One”, the chief executive of the Foundation Trust Network warned of a no-man’s land if the Bill did not go through.
This raises pretty big questions for legislation that is still to go through all its stages in this House, and it is a matter of great concern to this House when it considers reform. These conventions will become very much more important if we have an elected House of Commons—which of course we have—and an elected House of Lords, which I personally would like to see. There is no question that these conventions are important.
There are two important points here. First, the House should be aware of the fact that the Constitution Committee is seized of the problem and may well wish to make judgments on it. Secondly, we should not feed the idea that legislation can reach us but we cannot do anything about it because it has already been pre-empted. Whatever our views on the Bill, and it is controversial, it is important on democratic grounds that we maintain the position that legislation does not have full authority until it has gone through all its processes. That point needs to be reaffirmed. We should give no comfort to the opposite view in what we say in this House in the remaining stages of the legislative process.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Earl Howe)
My Lords, of course, the noble Lord, Lord Owen, had no obligation to give the Government advance notice of the issue that he has just raised. Nevertheless, I am sorry that he did not. I just say to him that everything that has happened to date in my department’s implementation of the transition programme has been done under the Secretary of State’s powers under the 2006 Act. This is all proper and lawful. However, this can go only so far. It is not a permanent solution, hence the need for the primary legislation that we are now debating.
It has been the practice of successive Governments, once a Bill has passed through the other place, to do as we have done and make preparations for that Bill’s implementation. The previous Government did it on a number of occasions and we are doing so as well. Furthermore, we are doing so in a measured and structured way. It is not an overnight process—it never could be. It is being done over a period of years. It in no way pre-empts the will of this House, which has made its views, to which the Government have listened very carefully, known on a number of issues.
While thanking the noble Lord for raising this concern, which I shall of course consider very carefully, as I always do, I hope the House will feel that it is unconstrained in how it presents amendments to the Government and how it argues for them. We, in our turn, will respond in a constructive manner, as I hope always to do.
Lord Howarth of Newport
My Lords, has the noble Lord, Lord Owen, not drawn our attention to a particularly egregious example of a problem that is, however, long-standing? Have successive Governments not taken the will of Parliament for granted following Second Reading of measures and begun to spend money and implement transitional arrangements on that basis? Has it not always been improper, and should Governments not be particularly careful when they are well aware that the policies embodied in their legislation are highly contentious? I hope that we may hear some considered reflections by the Government on the generality of this practice, as well as on this particular incidence. It may be that the relevant Select Committees of both Houses of Parliament will want to consider this problem.
Earl Howe
My Lords, in answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, there is no suggestion that the Bill could be withdrawn. We are clear that it is the right thing to do. Reform of the NHS is necessary and in the national interest, and the measures in the Bill represent the best way forward.
The noble Lord, Lord Warner, asked me about the powers of delegation. All I can say to him is that the delegated budgets to which he referred are delegated under existing powers, so there is no issue in law if that is what he was implying. However, I will endeavour to write to him if I have any further details for him on the subjects that he talked about.
The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, suggested that the Government were beginning to spend money. In one sense he is right because there have been redundancies in the NHS, but in another he misses the point. We have started to save a great deal of money. These measures will save £1.5 billion every year from the end of this Parliament and around £3.2 billion during this Parliament. We have begun to implement efficiencies and improve patient care at the same time. I hope he will look at these issues in the round.
Earl Howe
My Lords, we have had an excellent debate to mark the start of Report and I am very pleased—and, I must say, unsurprised—that the spirit of our debates in Committee has continued. I am particularly pleased that we have started with a topic as important as the parity of esteem between mental and physical health.
Amendment 1, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Patel, would ensure that the reference to “illness” in the description of the comprehensive health service refers to mental as well as physical illness. I am grateful to all noble Lords for the powerful case they have made for this amendment. I very much understand why this issue is of such importance to noble Lords, and why they believe that there is a declaratory value in inserting these additional words at this point in the Bill. As the noble Lord, Lord Patel, will be aware from our recent mental health strategy, achieving parity of esteem for mental illness is a priority for the Government. Therefore, I do not dissent in the slightest from the central principle being argued for here.
The question I have asked myself since Committee is whether the addition of these words would achieve what noble Lords intend, and whether they would add real value. In a strictly legal sense, they will not add value because legislation already makes it clear, through the definition in Section 275 of the National Health Service Act, that any reference to illness in the Act shall include both mental and physical illness. Therefore, wherever in the Bill the word “illness” appears, it already refers to both mental and physical illness. However, as my noble friends Lord Eden and Lord Alderdice said, what is required here—what really matters—are not words but concrete actions that will result in changes in attitudes and behaviours.
Before I tell the House which way I am leaning on the amendment, I will set out the steps that the Government have taken to that end. First, we are using the Bill to enhance the role of the NHS constitution. This plays an important role in emphasising the prominence and importance of mental health. It already contains a strong opening statement about mental and physical health. It declares that the NHS is there,
“to improve our health and well-being, supporting us to keep mentally and physically well, to get better when we are ill and, when we cannot fully recover, to stay as well as we can to the end of our lives”.
Current legislation requires all NHS bodies and providers to the NHS to have regard to the constitution. The Bill creates new duties on the NHS Commissioning Board and clinical commissioning groups not just to have regard to it but to promote it. This is why we feel that NHS bodies, staff, patients and the public will in future be much more aware of, and hence responsive to, the NHS constitution and the parity of esteem that it champions. Therefore, I am afraid that I cannot agree with noble Lords who implied that the Bill is silent on parity of esteem. We are giving greater prominence to the NHS constitution precisely because we want to see greater awareness of the values, including parity of esteem, that it contains.
Secondly, we have used a range of operational levers to drive forward the importance of improving mental health. Mental health is featured prominently in the NHS operating framework. We have updated the NHS outcomes framework to include indicators for mental health outcomes in a holistic context. The public health outcomes framework has a set of key mental health and well-being outcomes identified for national and local action.
Thirdly, our mental health outcomes strategy makes it crystal clear that mental health services should have parity of esteem. We said in the document that it is our ambitious aim to mainstream mental health in England. Furthermore, as noble Lords know, we titled the strategy, No Health Without Mental Health. I can tell the noble Lord, Lord Patel, that we are going further still by looking to publish a full implementation framework for the strategy in April this year. This will be co-produced and jointly owned by national mental health organisations in partnership with government. Work is under way to develop the content of the framework, including consultation with a wide range of partners. My conclusion is that much work is afoot, as well as levers already in the Bill, to deliver the parity of esteem between mental and physical health that we all want to see in clinical practice.
I turn to the amendment. Should the noble Lord, Lord Patel, invite the House to add these words to the Bill? I am afraid that I have concluded that the noble Lord should resist the temptation. Having reflected very hard on these words, I believe that they could be positively unhelpful to his case, as well as to the business in which we are jointly engaged, which is the drafting of clear, economical and unambiguous legislation. “Illness” is already defined in the Act and, for me, these words are not only legally superfluous, they also suggest that there is a divide between mental and physical illness rather than a convergence.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, that is a very good point. As I say, it is always helpful when noble Lords point out errors and omissions in the drafting of amendments. Amendment 2 refers to “health care professionals”, and I am clear that nurses must be embraced within that definition.
On Amendment 62, I would not detract from the use of,
“education and training of the healthcare workforce”.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, the noble Earl, Lord Howe, has kindly reminded me that we are not debating Amendment 62. It will be debated in a later group, which allows me a little time to reflect on the point raised.
Earl Howe
My Lords, this has been a very useful debate. Perhaps I can begin with a clear statement that the Government are committed to the education, training and continuing development of the healthcare workforce. This is fundamental in supporting the delivery of excellent healthcare services across the NHS. I am pleased that so many noble Lords share that view.
We are, however, in the rather odd position of having before us two groups of amendments on education and training. Given that we still await a further debate on the subject today, I should like to reserve some of the detail of my remarks, if I may, for that debate, when I address one of the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Patel. However, to begin with, and for now, I think that it will be helpful if I set the scene.
First, I confirm to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, that we made it clear in Liberating the NHS: Developing the Healthcare Workforce—From Design to Delivery, which was published recently, that we are committed to a national framework for education and training, with Health Education England providing national leadership and being directly accountable to the Secretary of State.
Health Education England will ensure that the healthcare workforce has the right skills, behaviours and training, and is available in the right numbers to support the delivery of excellent healthcare and health improvement. It will work with a range of key partners, including the medical royal colleges, professional regulators and the academic and research sectors. The national input and oversight will be there in all the areas which, rightly, the noble Baroness is concerned about. Health Education England and the wider education and training system will, as I said, remain accountable to the Secretary of State, who will have a duty to secure an effective system for the planning and delivery of education and training in the NHS. Employers and healthcare professionals will play a leading role in workforce planning and development through the establishment of local education and training boards, working with the education and research sectors. I shall have more to say about that in a moment.
I can reassure noble Lords straight away that postgraduate deans will continue to be a critically important part of the medical training arrangements. The Government listened to the concerns expressed in Committee by a number of Peers that the Bill did not go far enough in safeguarding the future education and training system. In this group of amendments, which I shall speak to shortly, we have tabled a number of proposals designed to address the gaps that noble Lords identified.
On Amendment 2, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, the Government have already introduced a duty for the Secretary of State to maintain an effective system for education and training. Our duty is more comprehensive than this amendment in that it applies to the whole healthcare workforce and not just doctors. The noble Baroness asked about the scope of Clause 6. Our duty applies to people who are employed, or who are considering becoming employed, in an activity which involves or is connected with the provision of services as part of the health service in England. This covers healthcare professionals at the centre of delivering healthcare, including doctors, dentists, nurses, midwives, pharmacists, healthcare scientists and the allied health professions. It includes registered and unregistered professions. It also covers non-clinical staff who are involved in, for example, the commissioning or administration of services. In the light of that, I hope that the noble Baroness will feel reassured to some extent and feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Williams of Crosby
My Lords, perhaps I may respond very briefly. The real argument that we should be having is almost certainly on the next group of amendments, and I have no intention of taking away from that debate in which, as we know, the noble Baronesses, Lady Jay and Lady Thornton, and other noble Lords—although unfortunately not my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay today—will take part. It is an important debate that symbolises for me something of crucial significance, and that is that in this House we have moved towards all-party agreement on the constitutional underpinning of the National Health Service; that is a great achievement.
I shall not take further from what the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, will want to say—except that perhaps I shall follow her on this issue—beyond saying that I am deeply saddened that over the past day or two we have seen what I believe to have been a far-reaching and radical attempt in this House to try to present an all-party consensual underpinning for the National Health Service being turned into what one can only describe as the most petty of political rows whose seeming intention is to try to acquire political balance for one side or the other. That is a great shame.
I think that many of us believe that the wording which has been accomplished—although I note the commitment of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, to the word “provide”—means that we can be satisfied with the constitutional group. We do not need to change the wording and what is now set out in the Bill after this long exercise is in fact legally watertight. I say that because some of the most distinguished lawyers in this House were part of the drafting process, including on the Labour side the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland. On the Conservative side we had the outstanding figure of the former Lord Chancellor, my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern, and on my side, among others, my noble friends Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames. All these lawyers put their heads together in order to establish a basis on which we could agree, and I would suggest to the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, for whom I have a great deal of respect, that if the word “provide” did not surface during that exercise, it is because it is to a great extent at odds with the facts at the present time as to who actually provides services for the NHS, and of course that has changed radically in recent years. It has changed radically because of steps taken not only by the present Government but also by the previous Government, when a great deal of provision came from newly established elements in the private sector, including intermediate treatment centres. Efforts were made to bring about an extensive network of hospitals to look at how far private treatment could be accepted and it was done on the basis of trying to bring new providers on the scene, which the noble Lord, Lord Darzi, among others, has talked about. I am probably one of those who are more “old-fashioned” in their view of the privatisation of the NHS, which I certainly would not support. That is not the same as talking about the competitive providers who under the previous Government and the present one have made some contribution to the services of the NHS.
I say with great respect to the noble Baroness that this pair of amendments is unnecessary. I think that, legally, the existing wording now stands up and has the precious boon of having been supported by all parties in this House and those who sit on the independent Cross Benches. We should therefore move on to the next group of amendments and be able, among other things, to celebrate our achievement, which I hope will enable the National Health Service to flourish and survive into the rest of this century.
Earl Howe
My Lords, as my noble friend has correctly reminded us, the next debate will give us the opportunity to discuss the package of amendments designed to clarify the Secretary of State’s accountability for the health service. I recently completed a series of meetings with Peers from across the House to understand their concerns about this and related issues. Thanks to the efforts of so many here today, including the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, I am pleased to say that we have sufficient consensus to table a series of amendments on this matter. I very much look forward to discussing them when we reach subsequent groups.
Amendments 3 and 4, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, seek to reinstate the duty to provide. I do not wish to dwell too long on what I have said on previous occasions, but the noble Baroness will be aware that we are retaining the wording of the NHS Act 1946, where appropriate. For example, the Secretary of State retains his duty to,
“continue the promotion in England of a comprehensive health service”,
and his duty to,
“secure that services are provided”.
The reason for our removing the 1946 duty on the Secretary of State to provide services himself is that it fails to reflect the reality of the way that NHS services are delivered. In general and for many years, the Secretary of State has not himself exercised functions of providing or commissioning services. The functions are delegated to SHAs and PCTs. Under the Bill, however, this function will be conferred directly on a dedicated NHS Commissioning Board and CCGs.
Indeed, as my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern has pointed out previously, there has never been a straightforward duty to provide services. The requirement was framed as a duty to,
“provide or secure the … provision of”,
services. In practice, Ministers or the NHS bodies responsible for exercising the Secretary of State’s functions have usually exercised the second option, securing the provision, rather than the first, actually providing. The Secretary of State—that is, the Department of Health—has not provided NHS services directly for many years. Our policy is that the Secretary of State should neither provide nor commission NHS services.
It is clear from these amendments that the Opposition are harking back to a centralist, top-down approach. They sometimes say that they want clinical commissioners, but these amendments contradict that. They would not create a system of clear responsibility but instead one where Richmond House was always right. That model has been tried to the point of exhaustion and has been found wanting. In contrast, the Bill establishes a framework in which the Secretary of State no longer has the powers to provide or commission NHS services. Instead, those functions are conferred on other bodies in the system. An amendment to Clause 1 to impose a duty on the Secretary of State to provide services—or a duty to exercise his functions so as to provide them—is simply not consistent with that framework.
When this issue has been debated previously, one of the main arguments against losing the duty to provide was that it would result in reduced accountability to Parliament for provision. Although that has never been our intention, we have, as I said, tabled amendments to put beyond doubt the matter of ministerial accountability. Given that the Secretary of State does not provide services directly, and that the amendments we will debate shortly clarify beyond doubt the Secretary of State’s continued accountability to Parliament, it is not clear what an amendment to reinstate the duty to provide would achieve in practice.
If these amendments are about ensuring that the Secretary of State takes the steps required to secure the proper provision of NHS services, I simply reassure the noble Baroness that the Bill already does this. It requires the Secretary of State to,
“exercise the functions conferred by this Act so as to secure that services are provided”.
That is a strong and onerous duty, sufficient to ensure that the Secretary of State discharges his responsibility for the NHS.
In explaining these amendments, the noble Baroness repeated her call for the Bill to be withdrawn on the grounds that nobody supports it. I acknowledge that there are opponents of the Bill but she must also acknowledge that many in the medical community and in the wider public support our reform programme. We know that clearly from the listening exercise last year when many thousands of people contributed their views. Those views about the principles of what we are trying to achieve came through loud and clear. In the main, the concerns revolved around implementation. We believe that we have addressed those concerns in amendments to the Bill and in other announcements that we have made that are non-legislative in nature. We continue to believe that our plans for modernisation are essential if we are to put the NHS on a sustainable long-term footing. I will explain a few ways in which that is true, and will try to do so in clear, layman’s language without resorting to departmental technical speak.
Without the Bill, Ministers would remain free to continue to micromanage the NHS. There would be no legally enforceable duties to tackle health inequalities as the Bill introduces such duties for the first time in this country. There would be no legally enforceable duties on quality improvement because it embeds quality improvement throughout the system. There would be no duties on NHS organisations to involve patients in decisions about their care. Failing organisations would continue to be propped up using taxpayers’ money—the Bill tackles that problem in a creative way. Governments would be able to prioritise the private sector over the NHS—the Bill ensures that such behaviour is prohibited. Patients would continue to lack the means to hold the NHS to account because the Bill gives patients real power by establishing HealthWatch so that the interests of patients and the public can be championed throughout the NHS. Withdrawing the Bill would cause disruption and chaos at a time that the NHS most needs certainty about the future. As has been said today, the NHS is already in a state of change. That cannot be sustained indefinitely because it puts additional strain on management capacity and creates additional cost.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
Does my noble friend agree that one of the vices in the amendment is that it would encourage judicial review proceedings and legal uncertainty? I say that as somebody who has taken advantage of the old wording to bring successful judicial review proceedings in Northern Ireland. The advantage of what we now have in the Bill is that it will not place judges in the position of seeking to run the health service, instead of Parliament, Ministers and the health authorities themselves.
Earl Howe
I defer completely to my noble friend, who is right to point out that one thing that we wish to avoid is a charter for a legal action and judicial review. I believe that we have avoided that because of the way in which accountability is now described in the Bill—or will shortly be described, when the amendments are passed. It is accountability primarily through the Secretary of State to Parliament. I thank the noble Lord for his observations.
Baroness Jay of Paddington
The Minister has clarified the difficulty that I was in, partly because of the intervention from the noble Lord, Lord Lester, but also because of what the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, said. As I understand it, all their remarks are posited on the basis that the subsequent amendment, Amendment 5, will be accepted by the House. When they refer to the terms of the Bill, they are referring to the Bill as it now stands and not as it will, I hope, be amended in the conclusion of our next debate.
Earl Howe
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, who is of course quite right.
I have been handed a note which says that when I said that there would be no legally enforceable duties on quality improvement, I should have clarified that that would have a follow-on. I should have said, “across the NHS system”.
The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, referred to potential privilege responses from the Commons. My noble friend the Leader of the House made a Written Statement last Thursday about the financial privilege of the House of Commons in which he drew attention to a paper by the Clerk of the Parliaments, available in the Library. I think that questions about procedure may be best directed to my noble friend, but I shall do my best to assist. The Clerk of the Parliaments makes it clear in his paper that,
“until the Commons asserts its privilege, the Lords is fully entitled to debate and agree to amendments with privilege implications”.
That is what we should do. I would much regret it if the House thought that I was trying to restrict its role of revision. The Marshalled List sets out more than 100 amendments in my name, tabled in response to debate in Committee, and if the House agrees to those amendments I can assure noble Lords that the Government will encourage the other place to accept them.
The essence of the noble Baroness’s question is about privilege reasons for the Commons rejecting amendments proposed by this House, and on that I can say two things. First, any amendment with implications for public expenditure might involve privilege, but that is a matter for the Commons alone. Decisions on financial privilege are for the Speaker of the Commons on advice from the Clerks of that House. If the Commons reject a Lords amendment in which the Speaker has determined that privilege is engaged, the only reason that it can send this House is a privilege reason. There is no discretion.
Secondly, this debate is by its nature premature. I hope that our debate and dialogue will lead to this Bill being sent to the Commons in a form that that House will accept. Until we see how Report unfolds, it is too early to speculate on the reaction from the Commons. One cannot have a reply to a question until the question has been asked.
Baroness Thornton
My question was actually about the Government’s intentions. That was a very enlightening and helpful remark about privilege. The Speaker of the Commons will not presumably, by and large, take a view on privilege unless the Government ask him to. So my question was about the Government’s intention on this matter.
Earl Howe
I have taken advice on this, and I believe that what I am about to say will not mislead the House as I have been given this advice on authority. It is not for the Government to do anything; it is not within our power to do anything. The noble Lord, Lord Martin, who spoke last week on this matter, is par excellence an authority on this. A view is taken by the Clerks in another place on the amendments passed in this House as to whether privilege is engaged. The Speaker is then advised. The Government have no role in that process at all; it is a Commons privilege, not the Government’s privilege.
I hope that what I have said will persuade your Lordships that the course down which the Opposition would wish to take us is the wrong one. The Bill, once amended—if that is your Lordships’ wish—through the amendments that have been jointly agreed on a cross-party basis, will therefore be fit for purpose in clarifying beyond peradventure the Secretary of State’s accountability for the health service and the exercise of his powers. With that, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Thornton
I thank the Minister for that response. I made it clear in my opening remarks that I would not seek to push the amendments to a Division, although the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, and the Minister made me wonder whether I ought to do so, because certain things that were said were not justified.
First, the noble Earl took us through a list of things that without the Bill would not be happening. On almost every single one, I thought that without the Bill you could do all those things. You do not actually need this Bill to do most of the things that the noble Earl listed as being desirable objectives. I am sure that we would agree about most of them being desirable objectives.
The noble Earl mentioned the listening exercise as being proof that this is not the unloved Bill that I would suggest it is. Only yesterday, a former special adviser to Downing Street said that the listening exercise was a tactic as part of managing the Bill. Frankly, I was horrified by that. If I had been Professor Steve Field or one of the 40-odd people who, with every good intention of doing a public service unpaid, gave their time to take part in that listening exercise, I would think that it was really shocking. So I think that the noble Earl should be careful about praying the listening exercise in aid in explaining how loved or unloved this Bill is.
It is time that we moved on. I intend to reserve my praise for the next debate and leave my criticisms in this debate. I intend to withdraw my amendment, even if the noble Earl will not withdraw the Bill.
“( ) The Secretary of State retains ministerial responsibility to Parliament for the provision of the health service in England.”
Earl Howe
My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 5. As noble Lords will be aware, and as I stated during our discussion on the previous group of amendments, a number of concerns were raised in Committee over the clauses relating to the Secretary of State’s accountability for the health service. Since our collective discussion in November to withdraw amendments on this issue, pending a period of discussion and reflection, I have been meeting noble Lords to understand their concerns. Alongside the conversations that I have had with Peers, both individually and in groups, we have held two all-Peers seminars to try to reach consensus on what changes might be made to bring clarity. I am very grateful to all those who invested time and effort in this matter, which I know so many are passionate about.
I would particularly like to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, and her colleagues on the Constitution Committee, who articulated their concerns about ministerial accountability so coherently in their two reports and proposed amendments. I believe, as had been suggested already, that the process that we have gone through has revealed the House of Lords at its best—working together to improve the Bill and achieve common ground. This amendment deals with the overarching accountability of Ministers for the health service, as set out in Clause 1. At this stage, we are taking this amendment on its own, but there are further amendments on related themes to follow. We should perhaps look at this amendment in that context.
However, I think I am right in saying that Clause 1 has attracted the most attention from Peers, and quite rightly so. It gives the Secretary of State a duty to,
“continue the promotion in England of a comprehensive health service”,
wording that can be traced back to the original 1946 NHS Act. Amendment 5 makes it clear that the Secretary of State will retain ministerial responsibility to Parliament for the health service. It has been this question of ministerial responsibility that has been such a cause of concern, and I am sincerely grateful to the noble Baroness and the Constitution Committee for drafting this amendment which, I hope, should serve to put everyone’s minds at rest on this issue.
Noble Lords will recall the original suggestion made by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay, which used “ultimate responsibility to Parliament”. I should explain that we have gone with the formulation “ministerial responsibility to Parliament” because it more clearly refers to the constitutional principle of ministerial responsibility. That is to say: Ministers are responsible, accountable and answerable to Parliament for their policies, decisions and actions—and, indeed, those of their departments. The principle is recognised by Parliament and the courts, and, as the Constitution Committee notes, in the Ministerial Code. The amendment reflects the position that as a result of the principle and the duties and powers imposed by NHS legislation, the Secretary of State for Health is responsible and accountable to Parliament for the health service in England, even if he or his department do not directly provide or manage NHS services. It has never in fact been the Government’s intention to diminish ministerial responsibility to Parliament, so I can offer my wholehearted endorsement of and support for this amendment. I hope that your Lordships will feel able to do so as well.
Baroness Jay of Paddington
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for the way in which he introduced this amendment because, as he graciously expressed, this is not really a government amendment but an amendment by the Constitution Committee, which it invites your Lordships to agree. Of course, with a government Minister at the head of those supporting the amendment, I hope that will in itself be unarguable. It is right that the Constitution Committee’s position should be explained a little more in the context of this first amendment in relation to the Secretary of State's responsibilities, and I am glad that it has been put in a group on its own. It is a very significant amendment, and not just because it alters fundamentally the expression of the Secretary of State's responsibilities from the original Bill. It is also significant because of the process by which it has been reached—the Minister has already alluded to this, and I certainly express my enthusiasm for the process—and in which the House has undertaken this work.
The terms of the amendment are simple but very powerful:
“The Secretary of State retains ministerial responsibility to Parliament for the provision”—
that is always the difficult word—
“of the health service in England”.
It is simple but powerful because, frankly, so is the concept of ministerial responsibility, although we argue about it all the time. It is a basic concept which, as the Minister has said, has been expressed in all NHS legislation, and quite rightly in my view, since the first Act 60 years ago. Without wishing to appear to give a civics lesson to the House, it is worth saying that the Constitution Committee has agreed that, in its terms, individual ministerial responsibility means that Ministers must be accountable and answerable to Parliament for their—and their departments’ and agencies’—policies, decisions and actions. I think that is widely accepted. There is no constitutional distinction between ministerial responsibility, accountability and answerability; they are all aspects of the same constitutional fact.
This Bill was worrying, because it was the first in which there was not an explicit provision on political and legal accountability. The Constitution Committee, as the noble Earl said, raised serious concerns about this in the initial report that we gave to the House before Second Reading. There we said that the Bill, if enacted in its present form, risks,
“diluting the Government's constitutional responsibilities”,
for the NHS. It is worth reminding your Lordships that those responsibilities which the Minister should retain embrace the accountability to Parliament for the vast public expenditure that the NHS undertakes, and the provision of its multitude of services.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I think that it only remains for me to thank noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I listened with care and respect to the noble Baronesses, Lady Pitkeathley and Lady Young, as I always do. I understand their concerns. I think that some of them are misplaced but they are right that any transition brings with it uncertainty and a certain amount of disruption. That is regrettable but all I can say is that the picture painted by the noble Baroness, Lady Young, is not representative of the whole of the NHS. She is right; there are difficulties. However, we are very confident that they can be resolved in short order.
The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, asked me whether the Secretary of State believes that this amendment makes a difference. Yes, he does because he recognised that this House perceived a lack of clarity in the Bill. He welcomes the fact that this situation has been resolved by means of consensus. Therefore, I reassure her on that point. I thank all noble Lords who have spoken so supportively in favour of this amendment, especially the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, whose work, along with that of her committee, proved so indispensable to the consensus to which I have just referred. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Owen, for all that he said. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Laming, for his contribution not just today but in his role of chairing the all-Peer seminars that brought us to this conclusion. I thank my noble friends Lord Newton and Lord Mawhinney and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, for their wise and generous observations; and, indeed, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, once again. I commend the amendment.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, the government amendments on health inequalities are welcome. I take this opportunity to ask the noble Earl about clinical commissioning groups. Has he given further consideration to the links between health and well-being boards and clinical commissioning groups? He will recall the debate in Committee, when what I thought was a persuasive argument was made that to ensure that the links between clinical commissioning groups and local authorities taking on public health responsibilities were as strong as possible, it would be a good idea if a local authority nominee from the principal local authority served on the board of the clinical commissioning group.
My noble friend Lord Harris suggests in his comments about population coverage by clinical commissioning groups that there will be a grammar school-type impact, a creaming off of patients by some clinical commissioning groups so that the remainder will be left in other clinical commissioning groups. There will be areas of a city or locality where the health inequalities and morbidity and fatality ratios will cause a great deal of concern. It would be good to hear some assessment of that from the noble Earl. We have seen mapping of clinical commissioning groups in different parts of the country and they look weird and wonderful. They are not aligned to electoral wards and it will be very difficult to plan sensible provision of services because there is no geographical alignment.
I also ask the noble Earl, Lord Howe, to follow on from the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. We hear very little about primary care performance in our debate, but when I think back to the original speeches made by Mr Lansley, the whole purpose of the reforms is about GP performance. The argument is that GPs are responsible for most expenditure through referrals or prescribing, and that if you give them the budget, they will therefore be much more responsible in their behaviour. We have yet to be told how a clinical commissioning group will influence the behaviour of GPs within it. I know that that is a concern among the leaders of clinical commissioning groups.
If, for example, a clinical commissioning group has reached an agreement with providers, NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts, on a shared risk approach to demand management—which I hope will be the outcome of most of these agreements—what on earth do you do if some GPs do not exercise responsibility over their referral or prescribing performance? We know that the variation in quality among GPs is very wide. What are the levers that will bring poorly performing GPs to the table? The leverage that clinical commissioning groups have is very limited. On balance, I think it would have been better if they had had the contracts of GPs. I know that there is an issue about Chinese walls and conflicts of interest, but the fact is that the contracts of GPs will be with the branch office of the national Commissioning Board. Therefore, the levers that the clinical commissioning groups have are likely to be very limited.
Then we come to the issue of, for example, prostate cancer. I very much agree with and support my noble friend Lady Royall on the need for quality standards and I hope that NICE will get a move on in relation to this. However, as my noble friend Lord Harris said, underpinning an argument about prostate cancer is the question of how you make such a standard work at the local level. If there is to be a quality standard, I doubt very much whether it will simply be confined to what an NHS hospital, a clinical commissioning group or a GP is expected to do. The quality standard will look at an integrated approach at the local level which will straddle various features of the architecture of the NHS locally. It might even have some regional aspects too where an input needs to be made.
Therefore, the question is: who on earth at the local level is supposed to sign that off? Who is going to take the leadership role? The clinical commissioning groups will be far too small to do that within a locality, so either they will come together and agree a strategy that will cover a sufficiently large population or, as I suspect, the national Commissioning Board will have to do it itself. I think that we will come on to these debates when we deal with the role of the national Commissioning Board. We have all been highly entertained by the paper produced by Sir David Nicholson showing the less bureaucratic approach that the Government have adopted in relation to the health service with the various layers of bureaucracy that are being brought in. However, I am still left completely clueless about who at that sub-regional level, where so many critical decisions have to be made, is going to take responsibility. We know that in relation to prostate cancer much more needs to be done.
The noble Earl will remember the debates that we had on prostate cancer 10 years ago. He will remember the controversy over testing and how noble Lords were very keen to put their point of view across. That has rather gone away and I think that it has been replaced by a much more informed debate about a cancer on which we know we could do very much more and on which we know there has to be education in the public domain.
I very much support my noble friend in what she is seeking to do but it also raises the issue that the noble Earl’s amendments touch on—that is, the architecture surrounding how a quality standard is implemented in the future, assuming that NICE is able to produce that standard as quickly as possible.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for some very valuable contributions to this debate, which has ranged quite widely. I think that the first thing we can all do is agree on the importance of reducing health inequalities and developing NICE quality standards, which was where we began with the noble Baroness, Lady Royall. She is right that the Bill presents a major opportunity to drive up quality in the NHS, not least through the development of NICE quality standards.
The noble Baroness expressed her concern about the time that it is likely to take for this library of quality standards to be rolled out. I completely understand her desire to have NICE working quickly and effectively in producing quality standards. Against that, I simply say that we have to balance the need for speed with the need to produce standards of a high quality. We have already set NICE a challenging programme to produce the quality standards and we have to recognise that, if it is to do the job well, it cannot be done in a hurry.
However, we continue to believe that the programme is ideally placed to deliver a steady stream of quality standards over the agreed timescales. That will lead to a comprehensive library of quality standards, to which she referred, within five years. Of course, I understand that that timescale is disappointing. However, I simply say that, while the quality standard for prostate cancer, in particular, is clearly important, there are many things that we can do, and are doing, to improve the care of cancer patients in the NHS, and we have recently debated some of those in your Lordships’ House.
Lord Harris of Haringey
I just want to make sure that I understand the point that the Minister is making. Let us compare two localities in London. I mentioned Tottenham, so compare that with, say, the residents of Totteridge. They are very different socioeconomic groupings with very different health outcomes. What is the mechanism for addressing health inequalities between Tottenham and Totteridge? Who will be responsible for addressing inequalities between areas that are just a few miles apart but which have very different characteristics and very different social outcomes? The health and well-being boards are borough-based. Tottenham is in the London Borough of Haringey and Totteridge is in the London Borough of Barnet—neighbouring boroughs that are very different in composition. What will be the overarching structure that addresses those inequalities?
Earl Howe
Localism lies at the heart of our approach to these issues. Although I have no doubt that conversations and comparative analyses will take place between different health and well-being boards and different local authorities, in the end it is the responsibility of health and well-being boards to look to their catchments. As I said, the outcomes that are published, both in terms of the NHS performance and public health and social care, will in themselves incentivise improvement, if the local authority and the health and well-being board work together as they should. This is a joint enterprise between public health, social care and the NHS.
We shall no doubt experience the effect of comparative work between local authorities once the early implementer groups have bedded down and begun their work. Both the board, however, and the Secretary of State will have duties in relation to inequalities. They overarch everything that happens and I suggest that that will ensure that a system-wide and strategic approach is taken, for example, through setting objectives in the board’s mandate in relation to inequalities. These could feed down very easily to CCGs through commissioning guidance issued by the board. I hope that that gives the noble Lord a summary, or at least a flavour, of how we envisage this working.
Lord Harris of Haringey
May I just clarify? Will there be nothing between the board at national level? Will it look right across the country and say, “We will address these inequalities”? Will there be nothing, for example, at the London level, to address inequalities between different parts of London or will it simply be driven nationally? That is a recipe for not necessarily making the best decisions in particular areas.
Earl Howe
The noble Lord will know, because the NHS Commissioning Board authority has published its proposals, that the board will be represented sectorally. There will be field forces in all parts of the country. My vision of this, and that of Sir David Nicholson is that in the areas in which the board operates it will take a view across a region and look at how outcomes vary between local authority areas. The board will be very powerfully placed to influence the kinds of inequalities that the noble Lord has spoken of. It is important for noble Lords to understand that the board will not be a collection of people sitting in Leeds. The majority of its staff will be a field force. I hope that that is helpful.
Lord Rea
Does the noble Lord accept that to smooth out inequalities costs money? Therefore, the CCG in Tottenham should get more per capita than the CCG in Totteridge. At the moment allocation is made according to an index that takes deprivation into account to some extent, but not enough. How will that be administered under the new system?
Earl Howe
The advisory committee for resource allocation which exists at the moment will advise on the allocation of resources according to a very detailed formula. That applies to the NHS and public health. There will be a separate ring-fenced budget that specifically takes account of deprivation. That budget will be held by Public Health England and passed down to local authorities to use at a local level. We are very clear that deprivation and health inequalities must be reflected in terms of the budgets that CCGs and local authorities receive. I hope that I can reassure the noble Lord on that point.
Government Amendments 68, 112 and 144 set out a requirement for the Secretary of State, the board and CCGs to report annually on their work to reduce health inequalities. We had a great deal of helpful and interesting discussion on reducing health inequalities in Committee and as a result of those discussions, we felt that it was important to bring forward three amendments on the reporting requirements. Amendment 144 requires the Secretary of State to include in his annual report an assessment of how effectively he has carried out these duties, meaning that Parliament will hold him to account. I have tabled parallel government Amendments 68 and 112, which require the commissioning board and CCGs to report on how effectively they have fulfilled their inequality duties. We believe that this will ensure that our objectives to reduce health inequalities and improve quality of care are embedded throughout the system from top to bottom. I hope that noble Lords can support those amendments when I move them.
Baroness Morgan of Drefelin
I wonder whether the Minister could clarify something for me. I very much support the line of argument around the amendments. However, I am interested to know whether, if the Secretary of State has a duty to report back on the exercise of these duties, does that say anything about the importance of reporting on his other duties? Is a hierarchy being created? That is a point for clarification.
Earl Howe
There is no hierarchy but the Secretary of State will be bound to report to Parliament and, in doing so, he must show that he has exercised his functions in a way that fulfil his statutory duties under the Bill. Parliament will no doubt hold him to account for having done so. He must demonstrate across the piece that he has had regard to those duties.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Howe, for his reply, and for the support for my amendments around the Chamber. I have a couple of comments. First, in terms of quality standards, like the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, I wonder about a GP’s ability to fulfil his duties both as a clinician and a commissioner. Currently GPs often find diagnosis quite difficult and I am concerned about them having to commission as well as diagnose. If they do not fulfil their tasks as both clinicians and commissioners, the patients will suffer.
My noble friends Lord Hunt and Lord Harris asked who takes the leadership and responsibility for ensuring that quality standards are adhered to when they are brought forward by NICE. The Minister said that localism is one of the answers. I find that a frightening prospect rather than a reassuring one. I think it is a recipe for chaos rather than quality, but perhaps that is a personal view.
I pay huge tribute to NICE, which I think does excellent work, but I recognise that it is very stretched. It has immense burdens and responsibilities. I hope that this very short but excellent debate will be a catalyst for swifter action in terms of quality standards, but I recognise that there is always a balance to be struck between quality and speed. However, in five years, an awful lot of people can die while waiting for quality standards. Having said that, I am grateful to the Minister for his response, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Health and Social Care Bill
Earl Howe Excerpts(12 years, 3 months ago)
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Baroness Thornton
My Lords, I am very pleased to put my name to this amendment and I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, on his tact and diplomacy in getting us to this point, and in getting agreement to have the constitution mentioned in the Bill, and in such a prominent part of it. In preparing a few supportive remarks, I had a look at the constitution because I was working for my noble friend Lord Darzi in a similar role to the one the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, has—as his support and his Whip—when we were working towards the constitution, and when it was discussed and adopted across government and Parliament.
The importance of having it in the Bill is there in various key parts of the constitution, which are worth mentioning on the record here because we need to remember them as we move forward to discuss this Bill in all its glory in the next five or six weeks, or however long it takes us. The constitution says:
“The NHS is founded on a common set of principles and values that bind together the communities and people it serves—patients and public—and the staff who work for it”.
It goes on to say that it,
“establishes the principles and values of the NHS in England. It sets out rights … and pledges which the NHS is committed to achieve”.
It says:
“All NHS bodies and private and third sector providers supplying NHS services are required by law to take account of this Constitution in their decisions and actions”.
That is a very important part of why this needs to be in the Bill.
The final part which I would like to draw to your Lordships’ attention is point 6 of the guiding principles in the constitution, which is a commitment,
“to providing best value for taxpayers’ money and the most effective, fair and sustainable use of finite resources. Public funds for healthcare will be devoted solely to the benefit of the people that the NHS serves”.
That is exactly right. It is not the shareholders of companies and not individuals who might seek to make a profit but the people whom the NHS serves, and the taxpayer.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Earl Howe)
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, for tabling these important amendments and for the eloquent way in which he introduced them. As he said, they seek to require the Secretary of State to have regard to the NHS constitution when exercising his functions in relation to the health service. I say to him in all sincerity that I very much welcome his contribution throughout this debate. I identify myself entirely with the enthusiastic remarks that he addressed towards the constitution itself, which is a most succinct and inspiring document, and I agree with him that we have reached a very workable and satisfactory outcome to the question that he originally posed to me and to the House.
I fully support these amendments. It is right that we continue our commitment to the principles set out in the NHS constitution. I hope that these amendments together provide noble Lords with reassurance of the Government’s continued commitment to the core principles and values to which the noble Lord and the noble Baroness have referred. I commend them to the House.
Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe, for their kind remarks. Earlier, a noble Lord—I forget who—thought we were mired in the treacle of consensus. All I can say is: long may we be stuck in this particular pot of treacle.
Lord Northbourne
My Lords, I intervene briefly to support the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, because I believe that there will be real problems. The immense complexity of the Bill will lead to tremendous delays and a great deal of misunderstanding among people who feel, rightly or wrongly, that they have failed to get the service or treatment to which they are entitled. I hope the Minister can say something about the possibility of some sort of short-circuit response, whereby people who feel that they have been ill treated can, if necessary, have some kind of help and encouragement to make contact with the right people to resolve their problem.
Earl Howe
My Lords, this has been a very useful short debate. As the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, said, her amendment seeks to provide appropriate recourse for individuals who believe that the commissioning of services for either their condition or their locality is inequitable. It would insert a new paragraph in the Secretary of State’s inequality duties. The noble Baroness spoke with considerable persuasiveness on this amendment but I will suggest to her that it is unnecessary and explain why.
The Bill and existing legislation already provide a number of mechanisms for exactly the kind of recourse that the noble Baroness seeks. She foresaw that I would talk about local healthwatch and I will. Local healthwatch, which will replace local involvement networks from April 2013, will provide local people with the opportunity to have their views on their needs and experiences made known to commissioners and providers of health and social care services and others. One of the roles of local healthwatch will be to make reports and recommendations about how local care services could or ought to be improved. To ensure that these have real clout, the Bill requires the people who receive such reports and recommendations, such as the NHS Commissioning Board, to have regard to them in exercising any function relating to care services.
We then have a further avenue for recourse because HealthWatch England will also provide the NHS Commissioning Board, among others, with the views of people on their needs for, and experiences of, health and social care services and on the views of local healthwatch and others on the standard of provision of services and on whether or how the standard could or should be improved. Where the board is provided with advice, it must inform HealthWatch England of its response, or proposed response, to the advice.
However, if an individual feels that a CCG, or the board, or any other body in the future health service, has neglected their responsibility with regard to tackling inequalities, they can do several things. They may raise the matter directly with the organisation itself, specifically by pursuing a complaint through the NHS complaints procedure. Where not satisfied with the response at a local level, they may refer the matter to the Health Service Ombudsman. As a last resort—I emphasise “last resort” because I do not want noble Lords to feel that this process would be run of the mill—as the NHS constitution makes clear, should an individual feel that local resolution has not been possible, and in the event that the Secretary of State or an NHS body is failing to comply with its legal duties, there would be a right to seek legal redress by means of a claim for judicial review.
There is a central issue here. CCGs will be under a statutory obligation to arrange for provision of care to meet the reasonable requirements of the people for whom they have responsibility. The local authority’s health and well-being board, the membership of which will include the CCG or CCGs, will assess local population needs, and will develop a strategy to meet those needs. Local healthwatch will also be a member of that board and be able to input into the strategy. There will be a duty on the CCG, the local authority and the NHS Commissioning Board to have regard to the relevant assessment and strategy when exercising functions. This would include the function of preparing commissioning plans. The NHS Commissioning Board will have a duty to perform an annual assessment of how well each CCG has fulfilled its duties in the previous financial year. This will include, in particular, an assessment of how well it has taken account of assessments and strategies under Section 116B of the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007.
My noble friend Lord Willis rightly said that we should expect that there will be differences between CCGs in their commissioning policies. Of course he is right, because each CCG will be bound to formulate policies for commissioning that reflect the needs of their constituent populations. I do not think that we should shy away from variation that is considered and that genuinely reflects that diversity in population. What we do not want, clearly, is postcode and random variations which have no relationship to the needs and requirements of local patients.
We should not forget either that the Health Service Commissioner has power to investigate complaints that are not resolved locally and to make recommendations as a result of those investigations. It is very rare for those recommendations not to be implemented but, in extremis—and this is not often done—the Health Service Commissioner is able to lay a report before Parliament.
We believe, therefore, that there is already a clear system of recourse where patients are concerned that an equitable service is not being commissioned either for their condition or their locality, and the Bill strengthens the ability of patients to make their views heard. The Bill also introduces, for the first time ever, duties on the Secretary of State and commissioners to have regard to the need to reduce inequalities, and amendments we have tabled would ensure that they would have to report on how they had fulfilled those duties.
With those remarks in the round, I hope that the noble Baroness is perhaps more reassured than she was at the outset of the debate, and that she will be willing to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Jolly
Before the Minister sits down, will he clarify whether the same processes that he has just outlined would apply to people in receipt of specialist services that are commissioned by the NHS Commissioning Board, not by local CCGs?
Earl Howe
My Lords, where a service is commissioned by the NHS Commissioning Board—and let us imagine that it is a specialised service—the patient’s recourse should be to the board. However, of course, the board will be represented at a local level rather than only centrally, and we expect that the board will be represented in health and well-being boards and in the discussions that take place there. It would therefore be possible for a patient to address their concerns, in the first instance, to the health and well-being board, which would have the ability and power to communicate directly with the NHS Commissioning Board, if that was felt to be appropriate. However, as I said, the patient would be able to go straight to the board in those circumstances.
Lord Harris of Haringey
I appreciate that this is very bad manners, given that I missed most of the debate. The Minister has just said—although perhaps I misinterpreted him—that the NHS Commissioning Board will have a representative on every local health and well-being board. If so, how will those individuals be known or accountable? Is that not the most extraordinary bureaucracy? He seems to have made a most extraordinary statement.
Earl Howe
My Lords, we are at Report stage and I hope that the noble Lord will forgive me if I do not reply at length. The point I was seeking to make was not about representation on the board but involvement in the health and well-being board’s wider deliberations. It is entirely open to a health and well-being board to invite a member of the Commissioning Board to be a permanent member, but I am not saying that we are prescribing that.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
Perhaps I may seek a tiny bit of clarification. The noble Earl spoke about the ombudsman as being almost a final port of call. Will the Minister confirm that the ombudsman would have the ability to investigate any organisation that is providing services to patients if it is in receipt of any NHS money whatever—not only if the care for an individual patient is commissioned from it but if it is receiving a block grant? In particular, I have in mind services such as those provided by hospices that may be receiving a block grant but do not have a specified contract per patient, and it may be that its patients want to question what is going on or that they have a concern that they wish to express and take further. Apart from the local complaints service within the organisation, it is really important that such patients have the same ability as other patients to have oversight through the ombudsman. I know that we have discussed this previously, and I am seeking clarification today on that issue.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
This is Report; I do not want to and fro. I will assume that that covers part-funding of care by charities as well as where care is fully funded by the NHS, so the same will apply.
I am grateful to the Minister for setting out the processes so clearly. It will be very helpful for patients, patient groups and charities in particular to see that laid out. For clarification, of course there will be local variation, different drug regimes and different ways of doing things. Equipoise is around the evidence base. The problem is where there is no provision or gross differences. That is where patient groups are concerned. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 9, 34, 53 and 54.
This group of amendments deals with the role of the Secretary of State in the health system. As noble Lords will be aware, our proposals for the NHS involve a fundamental shift in the balance of power away from politicians to patients themselves and to doctors and other professionals. Greater local autonomy is one of the key things that will enable local front-line services to become more responsive and innovative, in turn delivering greater efficiency and quality. The Bill makes clear that Ministers are responsible, not for direct operational management, but for overseeing and holding to account the national bodies in the system—backed by extensive powers of intervention in the event of significant failure.
The amendments we are debating here cover some of the key concerns raised by the Constitution Committee and Peers from across the House, as part of our wider discussions about ministerial accountability. These are the autonomy duties on the Secretary of State and the Commissioning Board and the link between the functions of clinical commissioning groups and the Secretary of State’s duty to promote the comprehensive health service. I will speak to each of the amendments tabled in my name, as well as the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, which seek to remove the duties of autonomy on the NHS Commissioning Board and the Secretary of State.
Amendments 8 to 10 and 52 to 54 concern the autonomy duties placed on the Secretary of State and the board. Government Amendments 8 and 53 re-phrase the duties of autonomy on the Secretary of State and the Commissioning Board as duties to,
“have regard to the desirability of”,
autonomy, rather than duties to,
“act with a view to securing”,
such autonomy. The desirability of autonomy is therefore a factor for the Secretary of State and the board to consider when exercising their functions, rather than an end which they must seek to secure or promote. That should allay the fears of those who felt that the autonomy duties would prevent Ministers and the board intervening when they needed to.
In addition, changing to a duty to have regard necessarily means that the autonomy duties are subsidiary to the primary duties of the Secretary of State in Section 1 of the NHS Act: to promote the health service and to exercise his functions so as to secure the provision of services. To that extent, there is no further need to state that the duties of autonomy are “subject to” his Section 1 duties. However, government Amendments 9 and 54 make a further change to address this point. Rather than simply say that the autonomy duty is “subject to” the duty of promoting the comprehensive health service, they set out an explicit test, which makes clear that promoting the health service and securing the provision of services takes priority over autonomy, if there is ever a conflict between the duties. We think that this more clearly indicates how the Secretary of State and the board should resolve any tension between autonomy and the interests of the health service. I hope that noble Lords will agree that this provides helpful clarity and avoids any possible doubt.
Having said that I would address the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, I think that on reflection it would be discourteous of me to do so before she has introduced them. I shall therefore retain my remarks for later in the debate if she chooses to speak to those amendments. Meanwhile, I beg to move.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, perhaps I may explain why I support the Government’s amendments on the autonomy clauses to which I have added my name—that is, Amendments 8, 9, 53 and 54.
The autonomy clauses were at the heart of the Government’s consultation with other noble Lords about the Secretary of State’s duties. During Committee and thereafter, at the very helpful discussions that we have had with my noble friend the Minister and with Peers across the House and, indeed, at the meeting of lawyers in which I took part with my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, and the lawyer advising your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, a substantial consensus was reached.
The concerns that we sought to address, which I regarded then and still regard as significant, were twofold. The first was that I believed there would be an inherent conflict between, on the one hand, the Secretary of State’s duties under Clause 1 to promote a comprehensive health service and to exercise his functions so as to secure services and, on the other hand, an unfettered duty to promote the autonomy of others. Secondly, if the Bill went unamended, there would exist a risk that a Secretary of State who was unwilling to intervene when things went wrong would be handed a justification for inaction. Such a hands-off Secretary of State could say, “I will not intervene because I am bound by my duty to promote autonomy”. In my view, with the Bill as it stands it would be very difficult to mount a successful legal challenge to such a failure to intervene.
Those were the two flaws in the Bill that the amendments were required to address. In relation to the board, the unamended Bill was flawed in exactly the same way as it is in relation to the Secretary of State.
The consultations that we held outside the Chamber during Committee led to the formulation of the Government’s amendments. As the Minister has pointed out, the effect of Amendments 8 and 53 is that the duty to act with a view to securing autonomy is reduced to a duty to have regard to the desirability of securing it. That is still subject to the limitation that the duty applies only so far as it is consistent with the interests of the health service. Therefore, what is currently an absolute duty to follow the autonomy line is to be replaced with a more nuanced and, I suggest, a more appropriate obligation to accord to the desirability of autonomy its proper place in the balancing exercise which all discretionary decision-making involves.
However, it is Amendments 9 and 54 that are decisive in addressing the concerns that we identified. Those two amendments provide that in the case of conflict between the Secretary of State’s or the board’s duties in relation to autonomy and their overarching duties under Clause 1 or the board’s overarching duties to secure the provision of services, those overarching duties will prevail. Those four amendments taken together fully address the two flaws of which I spoke and, I suggest, completely resolve the issues that they pose.
I turn now to the two amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, directed at deleting the two autonomy clauses. Indeed, at the earlier stages of this process, I believed that the autonomy clauses could and should be deleted from the Bill. However, my view now is that with the problems that they presented having been addressed, we should support the government amendments and retain the two clauses as amended. Promoting autonomy is, in principle, to be welcomed as many who have spoken from all sides of the House both on Second Reading and in Committee have stressed. It is fundamental to the architecture of the Bill, and its great merit that it establishes a clear, decentralised structure for the health service. It is entirely welcome that future commissioning decisions, in particular, will be made locally to meet local needs, locally assessed.
Baroness Thornton
My Lords, when we were having our negotiations on this part—on which I was very happy to take part, even if I was regarded on some issues more as grit in the oyster than as co-operative help—they were about these issues, including autonomy. I have not changed my view. I shall speak to Amendments 10, 36 and 52.
We have no problem with the concept of autonomy. In principle our position is that autonomy has to be earned, and that it should be able to be taken away as well. That formed the principle and the basis on which the foundation trusts were established. However, we part company with the Government on their view of autonomy, and we are not completely convinced by the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames. On first sight of the Bill it seemed that autonomy was to be presumed and that each part of the service would be subject to less interference from the other parts in a way which could be detrimental. There would therefore be less performance management, and giving various bodies more powers with less need to sign off an agreement could mean that there would be less co-operation. Bodies acting in their own interests via a market process will mean that the motivation could be something that does not have the NHS and patients at its heart, and that there is less planning and system management, which sometimes actually is required. That is how you deal with things like postcode lotteries. You have to collect the information, compare it between different parts of the country experiencing different levels of deprivation, and then you have to take decisions which are about planning how to use your resources to ensure that people are not disadvantaged. So there are some very good reasons why planning and systems need to be in place.
The original briefing on the Bill stated that CCGs would not have PCTs or SHAs above them to performance manage them and that the commissioning bodies were not meant to performance manage but only to step in if there was a danger of failure. Again, that was the original briefing. It is not surprising that when we first discussed this in Committee there was general agreement across the House that the Bill would be better off without Clause 4 and what was then Clause 10 but is now Clause 12.
Since then the Constitution Committee has done what I think is really rather a good job. Although I was not deliriously happy about it, I was prepared to live with the draft produced by the committee. However, I do have problems with the draft that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the Minister have brought to the House. The provisions are not strong enough and some of the dangers that we originally expressed about problems with the autonomy clauses still exist. Furthermore, I take very much to heart the questions that both of my noble friends have raised. From different points of view they have asked pertinent questions and shown up the problems with the autonomy clauses. That is why, certainly in the process of our negotiations on Clause 4, I reserved my position to come to the House and explore whether what we actually wanted to do was delete it completely at this stage. On Clause 12, for the sake of consistency we feel that it should also be deleted. However, I have to say that because of the amendments that were accepted in the process of our negotiations, we feel less strongly about it.
I am not any more convinced as a result of this debate that our original position is not the right one—that if we cannot have the Constitution Committee’s version of Clause 4, we should delete the whole clause. Obviously I will listen to the Minister’s summing up of the debate, but at the moment I remain convinced that our position is indeed the correct one.
Earl Howe
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, has spoken to Amendments 10 and 52, which, as she has said, would remove altogether the autonomy duties on the Secretary of State and the board. The noble Lord, Lord Harris, asked me what the problem is that the Bill is trying to solve in this regard. The duty is intended to promote a culture of fostering local autonomy rather than to outlaw specific practices; but without a focus on autonomy, it is possible that the mandate from the Secretary of State to the board or the framework document from the board to CCGs could impose disproportionately burdensome requirements on the system. The Government believe that local operational autonomy is essential to enable the health service to improve the outcomes of care for patients, provided that autonomy is within the framework of clear ministerial accountability.
The noble Baroness will be aware, because I have said it before, that we are aiming to free those closest to services to take decisions that are right for patients, free from central micromanagement by either the Department of Health or the NHS Commissioning Board. The amended duties, with the caveat that the interests of the health service take priority, achieve the right balance between autonomy and accountability. Without the clause, a future Secretary of State could choose to ignore one of the fundamental principles of the Bill, which is that those closest to patients are best placed to take clinical decisions. Without the clause, a future Secretary of State would be free to use his extensive powers to micromanage the NHS. The autonomy duty is a necessary part of the Bill, placing a duty on the Secretary of State to consider the expertise of those in the health service while recognising that there will be circumstances—
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, the noble Earl seems to be saying that you cannot trust your own Secretary of State not to micromanage unless they are effectively forbidden from doing so. We have all talked of the Secretary of State’s accountability to Parliament. Surely the principle is that an accountable Secretary of State will be under enormous pressure from Parliament not to micromanage. If it is such a central issue of policy, Secretaries of State should simply be told not to do it, rather than requiring an Act of Parliament.
Earl Howe
I challenge the noble Lord to think of one Secretary of State, with the distinguished exception of my right honourable friend Mr Lansley, who has not succumbed to the temptation of micromanaging the NHS. No Secretary of State has been able to resist that temptation because, frankly, Parliament expects them to do it. That is what the system has expected of the Secretary of State. This is a burden on commissioners and clinicians, and, in the end, it does not well serve the interests of patients. It is all very well for the noble Lord to say, “Well, just stop”, but the system encourages it and the duties on the Secretary of State are there to encourage it.
Baroness Thornton
I cannot resist saying that the noble Earl’s right honourable friend Mr Lansley has dabbled and intervened on at least 12 occasions since the Bill started. He is on the record as saying on one of those occasions that certain managers should be sacked. Is the noble Earl saying that that will cease when this Bill is on the statute book?
Earl Howe
I am saying that the Secretary of State will not have the ability to micromanage the health service as he does at the moment. Whether the examples cited by the noble Baroness constitute micromanagement, if my right honourable friend is just expressing a view, I rather question.
The autonomy duty is a necessary part of the Bill because it places a duty on the Secretary of State to consider the expertise of those in the health service while recognising that there will be circumstances in which they must be able to step in to protect the interests of health service patients. That is the balance that we are trying to strike.
The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, asked whether the autonomy duty would allow a clinical commissioning group to justify not commissioning the full range of services. The autonomy duty does not apply to CCGs; it is a requirement on the board and the Secretary of State. If a CCG chooses not to commission services and the board considers that this is not consistent with the interests of the health service, the board can intervene to direct a CCG. If the board fails to intervene when necessary, the Secretary of State has power to intervene. Finally, the Secretary of State can set out services which CCGs must commission, and he can do that in the standing rules if he considers it necessary. The CCG’s key duty is to arrange services as it considers necessary to meet all reasonable requirements of the population that it is responsible for, and the amendments do not change that in the slightest.
Baroness Jay of Paddington
The noble Lord may be surprised to hear me ask this question because, as he kindly said, I have been very determined that the provisions on accountability and parliamentary responsibility et cetera should be strengthened in the Bill. However, I listened to what my noble friend Lord Harris said about what he described as the “increasing tentacles” of these links between the various providers and the Secretary of State. Is the Minister not becoming concerned—as I would in his position—that all this new accountability and these links undermine the basic policy positions of the Bill? That is why, for example, my noble friend Lady Thornton suggested that it would be cleaner—if that is the word—to remove the whole of Clause 4 from the Bill. The complexities that are being set up and strengthened, as the Minister has agreed, make the whole thing so incredibly complicated and bureaucratic that the underlying policy positions are being totally distorted.
Earl Howe
I do not share that view at all. I do not think that the autonomy and accountability arrangements are as complex as the noble Baroness seems to suggest. Autonomy and accountability are two sides of the same coin; one confers autonomy in exchange for accountability. That is the model that we have adopted and the one that I would hope that Parliament would wish us to adopt, given that substantial sums of public money will be at the disposal of commissioners throughout the NHS. I therefore do not see that the metaphor of tentacles employed by the noble Lord, Lord Harris, is actually very appropriate. It implies that there is an organisation holding those in the health service in a grip. That will not be the case. The role of the board is to support local commissioners; it is to be there as a resource to promote guidance, supported by the quality standards that we were debating earlier. It is not—I repeat not—a replica of the kind of line management that the NHS has seen to date.
“( ) If, in the case of any exercise of functions, the Secretary of State considers that there is a conflict between the matters mentioned in subsection (1) and the discharge by the Secretary of State of the duties under section 1, the Secretary of State must give priority to the duties under that section.””
Earl Howe
My Lords, we come to an issue that exercised us on more than one occasion in Committee—the issue of health-related research and the use of research evidence in the health service. My noble friend Lord Willis and others urged me to look again at the Bill’s drafting, having expressed a concern that there was a need to strengthen the duties on the Secretary of State, the NHS Commissioning Board and CCGs to promote research, and the use in the health service of evidence obtained from research when exercising their functions.
Government Amendments 11, 60 and 103 are a response to that concern, and I hope that they will be welcome. The Government are absolutely committed to promoting research throughout the health service. By tightening the wording around the duties, we believe that the amendments send a powerful signal of that commitment. I beg to move.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, from the opposition Benches we too welcome the amendments, which very much reflect the debate that we had in Committee on the importance of research. The Chief Medical Officer has paid a visit to Birmingham over the past two days; he gave a lecture at Birmingham University and visited my own trust to discuss research and the role of the NHS in it. My noble friend Lord Warner has put his finger on it: the question to the Minister is how we make sure that the NHS makes a sufficient contribution in future to the development and support of research. The Minister will know that the Chief Medical Officer is a passionate advocate of research and excellence in the NHS, and that is to be warmly welcomed.
There are some issues that need to be tackled. We have already heard about the issue of getting approval for clinical trials. We still have the problem, which has been with us for many years now, of local committees taking far too long and repeating work by other committees. I understand that there are some issues around the fact that, because foundation trusts are separate legal entities, they have to go through the process themselves, but if they join a clinical academic network some of that work can be reduced. I know that there is to be an announcement at, I think, the end of March about how these clinical networks are to be developed in the future. That is a very important way of enhancing research.
There is no question that the more we do in research, the better the outcomes not only for patients but for the UK’s reputation and economic well-being. Healthcare research is surely an area to which we need to give great priority. The noble Earl, Lord Howe, is of course responsible and we are very glad that he is leading this work. However, there is no doubt that, welcome though these amendments are, we should be given some assurance that the Government will now take them forward into the new situation with enthusiasm.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I begin by saying how much I agree with the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. There are two very good reasons why research needs to be promoted in the NHS. The first is that it is for the good of patients. The other is that it is potentially for the good of UK plc. If we can attract investment in translational and clinical research to this country, it will be a major advance. The sad truth is that in recent years the UK has been slipping back in the international league table as a location for clinical research. The Government are determined to reverse that trend, as were the previous Government. We are trying our best to build on the foundations that the previous Government set.
Noble Lords have asked me to explain how the Secretary of State’s duty to promote research will work in practice. I shall try to do so in a few words. The Secretary of State will use the mandate to set priorities for the health service, based on his legal duties. One of those duties is to promote research within the health service, which is shared by the board and CCGs. What are the tools at the Secretary of State’s disposal? The National Institute for Health Research—the NIHR—which is headed by Professor Dame Sally Davies, provides transparent, competitive funding to support clinical and applied health research, the training and development of health researchers, systems to support research and the NHS infrastructure for research. The NIHR will continue to be part of the Department of Health. Its budget of £1 billion is held centrally by the department. The Chief Medical Officer will remain responsible for the NIHR and its budget.
The second main route that the Secretary of State uses, and will continue to use, to support research, is through the NHS. Since the NHS was established, its patient care budget has funded the patient care costs of patients who are taking part in research in the NHS, as set out in existing guidance. In the future, the NHS Commissioning Board and clinical commissioning groups will ensure that these costs continue to be met through these arrangements. The research costs of these studies are paid by the Government and charity research funders such as the Medical Research Council, the NIHR, Cancer Research UK and the Wellcome Trust. The NHS benefits greatly from the evidence provided by this research.
Let us not forget, too, that the Secretary of State will be held to account for what he does. He must report annually to Parliament on the performance of the health service. There is an expectation that he will report on how he has fulfilled his statutory duties.
That brings us to the duties placed on the board. In the document we published, Developing Clinical Commissioning Groups: Towards Authorisation, we set out the early thinking on the authorisation process. The document highlights that as part of the process CCGs will need to demonstrate how they will exercise important functions, such as the duty to promote research, and the NHS Commissioning Board will seek consistency in the way in which CCGs exercise these duties. Furthermore, a CCG’s commissioning plan, and its annual report, as well as the board’s annual assessment of the group’s performance, will cover the exercise of all the CCG’s functions, including the duty to promote research.
I hope that that has given noble Lords a clear outline of how this is all going to work. We regard these duties as extremely important. These amendments are extremely important, as my noble friend said. I am in no doubt that both the health service and its patients will be better off as a result of them.