Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments and / or reasons
Thursday 16th April 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

That this House do not insist on its Amendments 256 and 257 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 257A and 257B in lieu.

257A: Page 99, line 24, at end insert the following new Clause—
“Taking down intimate image content
(1) The Online Safety Act 2023 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 10 (regulated user-to-user services: safety duties about illegal content) after subsection (3) insert—
“(3A) A duty to operate a service using proportionate systems and processes designed to take down—
(a) content in relation to which an intimate image content report is made to the provider (see section 20A(2)), and
(b) any other content identified by the provider as the same, or substantially the same, as that content, as soon as reasonably practicable, and no later than 48 hours, after the provider receives the report (unless subsection (3B) applies).
(3B) This subsection applies if the provider considers that—
(a) the content is not intimate image content, or
(b) the person making the report is not—
(i) the subject of the content, or
(ii) a person acting on that person’s behalf.”
(3) After section 20 (duty about content reporting) insert—
“20A Reporting of intimate image content
(1) The duty in section 20(2) includes a duty to operate a service using systems and processes that allow users and affected persons to easily make an intimate image content report to the provider.
(2) An “intimate image content report” is a report which—
(a) declares that content present on the service is intimate image content,
(b) declares that the report is made by—
(i) the subject of the content, or
(ii) a person acting on that person’s behalf,
(c) declares that the report—
(i) is made in good faith, and
(ii) to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person making the report, is true,
(d) provides sufficient information about the content for the provider to identify it,
(e) provides contact details for the person making the report, and
(f) complies with any other requirements specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about how the requirements in subsection (2)(a) to (e) are to be met.”
(4) In section 21 (duties about complaints procedures) after subsection (2) insert—
“(2A) The duty in subsection (2) includes a duty to operate an expedited complaints procedure in relation to complaints within subsection (4)(a), (b)(i) or (b)(ii) that—
(a) are made by users or affected persons who have made an intimate image content report (see section 20A(2)), and
(b) are about the content to which the report relates.”
(5) In section 27 (regulated search services: safety duties about illegal content) after subsection (3) insert—
“(3A) A duty to operate a service using proportionate systems and processes designed to ensure that individuals are no longer able to encounter—
(a) search content in relation to which an intimate image content report is made to the provider (see section 31A(2)), and
(b) any other search content identified by the provider as the same, or substantially the same, as that content, as soon as reasonably practicable, and no later than 48 hours, after the provider receives the report (unless subsection (3B) applies).
(3B) This subsection applies if the provider considers that—
(a) the search content is not intimate image content, or
(b) the person making the report is not—
(i) the subject of the content, or
(ii) a person acting on that person’s behalf.”
(6) After section 31 (duty about content reporting) insert—
“31A Reporting of intimate image content
(1) The duty in section 31(2) includes a duty to operate a service using systems and processes that allow users and affected persons to easily make an intimate image content report to the provider.
(2) An “intimate image content report” is a report which—
(a) declares that search content is intimate image content,
(b) declares that the report is made by—
(i) the subject of the content, or
(ii) a person acting on that person’s behalf,
(c) declares that the report—
(i) is made in good faith, and
(ii) to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person making the report, is true,
(d) provides sufficient information about the search content for the provider to identify it,
(e) provides contact details for the person making the report, and
(f) complies with any other requirements specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about how the requirements in subsection (2)(a) to (e) are to be met.”
(7) In section 32 (duties about complaints procedures) after subsection (2) insert—
“(2A) The duty in subsection (2) includes a duty to operate an expedited complaints procedure in relation to complaints within subsection (4)(a), (b)(i) or (b)(ii) that—
(a) are made by users or affected persons who have made an intimate image content report (see section 31A(2)), and
(b) are about the search content to which the report relates.”
(8) In section 59 (meaning of “illegal content” etc) after subsection (10) insert—
“(10A) “Intimate image content” means content that amounts to an offence under section 66B(1), (2) or (3) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sharing intimate image of a person without consent).”
(9) In section 133 (confirmation decisions: requirements to take steps)—
(a) in subsection (4) after paragraph (c) insert—
“(ca) specify which of those requirements (if any) have been designated as intimate image content requirements (see subsections (7A) and (7B)),”;
(b) after subsection (7) insert—
“(7A) If the condition in subsection (7B) is met in relation to a requirement imposed by a confirmation decision which is of a kind described in subsection (1), OFCOM must designate the requirement as an “intimate image content requirement” for the purposes of section
138(3A) (offence of failure to comply with confirmation decision).
(7B) The condition referred to in subsection (7A) is that the requirement is imposed (whether or not exclusively) in relation to—
(a) a failure to comply with a provision listed in column 1 of the table, which
(b) where there is an entry for the provision in column 2 of the table, is in respect of a matter listed in column 2.

Provision	Failure in respect of
Section 10(2)(a)	(1) Intimate image content (2) Priority illegal content which includes intimate image content
Section 10(2)(b)	(1) An offence under section 66B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (2) Priority offences which include an offence under that section
Section 10(3)(a) Section 10(3)(a)	(1) Intimate image content (2) Priority illegal content which includes intimate image content
Section 10(3)(b)	(1) Intimate image content (2) Illegal content which includes intimate image content
Section 10(3A)
Section 27(3)(a)	(1) Intimate image content (2) Priority illegal content which includes intimate image content
Section 27(3)(b)	(1) Intimate image content (2) Illegal content which includes intimate image content
Section 27(3A)”;

(c) in subsection (10) after ““CSEA content”,” insert ““intimate image content”,”.
(10) In section 138 (offence of failing to comply with requirements imposed by confirmation decision) after subsection (3) insert—
“(3A) A person to whom a confirmation decision is given commits an offence if, without reasonable excuse, the person fails to comply with an intimate image content requirement imposed by the decision (see section 133(7A) and (7B)).””

257B: Page 99, line 24, at end insert the following new Clause—
“Taking down intimate image content: consequential amendments
(1) The Online Safety Act 2023 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 10 (regulated user-to-user services: safety duties about illegal content)—
(a) in subsection (4) for “and (3)” substitute “to (3A)”;
(b) in subsection (5)—
(i) the words from “each paragraph” to the end become paragraph (a);
(ii) at the end of that paragraph insert “, and
(b) subsection (3A).”;
(c) in subsection (7) for “subsection (2) or (3)” substitute “subsections (2) to (3A)”.
(3) In section 23(5) (record-keeping and review duties) for “or (3)”, in the first place it occurs, substitute “, (3) or (3A)”.
(4) In section 27 (regulated search services: safety duties about illegal content)—
(a) in subsection (4) for “and (3)” substitute “to (3A)”;
(b) in subsection (7) for “subsection (2) or (3)” substitute “subsections (2) to (3A)”.
(5) In section 34(5) (record-keeping and review duties), for “or (3)”, in the first place it occurs, substitute “, (3) or (3A)”.
(6) In section 59(14) (meaning of “illegal content” etc) for “and “priority illegal content”” substitute “, “priority illegal content” and “intimate image content””.
(7) In section 71(2)(a)(i) (duty not to take down content except in accordance with terms of service: exceptions) for “or (3)” substitute “, (3) or (3A)”.
(8) In section 136(5) (confirmation decisions: proactive technology)—
(a) in paragraph (a) for “or (3)” substitute “, (3) or (3A)”; (b) in paragraph (c) for “or (3)” substitute “, (3) or (3A)”.
(9) In section 237 (index of defined terms) at the appropriate place insert—
“intimate image content (in Part 3) section 59”.
(10) In Schedule 4 (codes of practice)—
(a) in paragraph 9(1) for “or (3)” substitute “, (3) or (3A)”;
(b) in paragraph 9(3) for “or (3)” substitute “, (3) or (3A)”;
(c) in paragraph 13(3)(a) for “or (3)” substitute “, (3) or (3A)”;
(d) in paragraph 13(3)(c) for “or (3)” substitute “, (3) or (3A)”.”

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, in moving Motion G, I will also speak to Motions H, J, K, L, M, W and Y.

I will start with the collection of intimate image abuse-related amendments in lieu. These all flow from the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen of Alderley Edge, on Report. I say once more, with feeling, that I thank the noble Baroness for engaging with us over the past few weeks, which she has done extensively. It is in the best traditions of your Lordships’ House. We have worked together to ensure—I hope—that the Government have taken the right direction with these amendments across the piece.

I turn to the take-down powers. Amendments 257A and 257B in Motion G build on the Government’s existing provisions. They do that by making failure to comply with an Ofcom enforcement decision relating to the new take-down duties a criminal offence. That means that senior executives of the service could be personally criminally liable for the failure. Alongside that enforcement approach, the Government are also strengthening safeguards against malicious reporting. We will bring forward regulations that will enable Ofcom to scrutinise both the speed of intimate image removals and how clearly and effectively platforms enable users to report such content. We are determined that victims of non-consensual intimate image abuse should see swift action, clear routes for redress and transparency from platforms.

Therefore, in addition to these amendments, the Government are working with Ofcom to create a clear route for reporting complaints regarding compliance with the NCII duty, signposting to specialist organisations. We will also use existing powers under the Online Safety Act to strengthen transparency, enabling Ofcom to require services to report on and publish their average NCII take-down times. I reiterate my thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, for her continued advocacy on this important topic.

I turn to deletion orders and Motion H. The Government recognise the serious harm caused by perpetrators retaining copies of intimate images. We have listened to the will of the House on Report, which is why we have brought forward a new deletion order that will be available on conviction for a broader range of offences. This new order can be made for all intimate image abuse offences, including breastfeeding voyeurism recording and the new sharing of semen-defaced images offences, which I will refer to throughout my speech as “intimate image-related offences”.

It will enable courts to order the deletion and destruction of all copies of a relevant image. It does that by requiring the court to give reasons if it declines to make a deletion order for images related to the offence. This mirrors the criminal law in relation to compensation orders. It strikes the right balance between protecting victims and preserving judicial discretion in appropriate cases. Importantly, it will enable courts to order the deletion and destruction of all copies related to a specified offence in the offender’s possession or control, as well as any other relevant images of the same victim. Breaching such an order will be a separate criminal offence, itself carrying a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment.

On hashing and the non-consensual intimate image register, the Government will give statutory backing to a register of non-consensual intimate images. Amendments 260A to 260D in Motion J enable the Government to designate a trusted flagger—which will most likely be the Revenge Porn Helpline—and, following a scoping exercise, to make further provisions by regulations about the operation of a statutory register. That includes provisions for the Secretary of State to impose requirements on providers to share hashes and any other information deemed necessary with the register. As Lords Amendments 260A to 260D recognise, proceeding by regulations will enable us properly to evaluate the requirements necessary to ensure a register operates as effectively as possible.

I turn to the question of pornography. I again thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, for the time she has taken over the past few weeks to meet many Ministers, who really are grateful to her for the time she has spent with us, making sure that we get this right. I stress to your Lordships that the changes to which I now turn are just the start, and the Government mean it when we say that we look forward to working with the noble Baroness even more in future.

I will speak briefly to the parity sprint. This is a key piece of ongoing work that will build on the provisions in the Bill, and the discussions have already started. This work will identify the best way to fix the gap between the regulation of pornography online and offline. It will address content that is not caught by our proposed offences that would otherwise be illegal offline. This could include, for example, pornography where there is a suggestion that a person is under 18, a relationship is portrayed as abusive, or there is a clear exploitative power imbalance or breach of trust, including some examples of depictions of step-incest between adults, or a teacher and a student. At the end of this work, the Government are fully committed to implementation. If regulators need to be assigned, this will happen. If legislation is needed, this will happen. This Government are serious about this.

In a similar vein, on the verification of age and consent, we agree with the sentiment that underlies the amendment: non-consensual intimate images and child sexual abuse have no place online, and the tech platforms need to do more to prevent this type of illegal content. Having said this, further work is needed to identify the most effective approach. For this reason, the Government’s amendments in lieu, Amendments 264A to 264F in Motion L, provide for a further statutory sprint to test which mechanisms will be most effective for tackling this kind of content. It will also place a duty on the Secretary of State to report to Parliament within 12 months of the Bill receiving Royal Assent on the outcome of this work and will provide a power to make regulations to give effect to its outcome.

Given the existing criminal and regulatory legal frameworks, we need carefully to consider the gaps and how best they can be addressed. Upon completion of the review, we have the option of putting in place regulations to impose new duties on providers of internet services relating to verification of age and consent. The power would allow the appointment of a regulator to oversee these duties.

With regard to adults role-playing as children in pornography, we have listened to the concerns that were raised. We must protect the legislative regime that protects actual children from harm, which is why we cannot support Lords Amendment 265. However, we absolutely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, that content that mimics child sexual abuse must be tackled. That is why we have brought forward amendments in lieu, Amendments 265A to 265H in Motion M, which will criminalise the possession and publication of pornographic images portraying sexual activity between persons where one person is or is pretending to be under 16. This will be a priority offence under the Online Safety Act. Our intention with these amendments is clearly to signal that content which mimics, and thus risks normalising, child sexual abuse is totally unacceptable and should not be available online.

I need to make clear what the provision criminalises. It includes pornographic depictions of any sexual activity where one party is pretending to be under 16. It is intentionally wide and will capture harmful content that we know exists. I apologise for being graphic here, but there is no way of avoiding it. I can see the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, laughing as I say this—I am here again talking about rather graphic acts. This provision will capture images such as an actor role-playing as an underage girl, where, for example, her underwear has been moved aside, or male genitals are in shot.

As I have just said, this offence is just the start. Content that is illegal offline but not caught by this offence will be addressed through the Government’s work on parity.

Similarly, in relation to pornography depicting incest, we have listened to the concerns about the extent to which the Government’s Lords Amendment 263 should cover other troubling relationships, such as sex between step-relations. We completely agree with the need to curtail the depiction of step-incest pornography in cases where it portrays conduct that is illegal in the real world. To that extent, the Government’s amendments in lieu, Amendments 263A to 263G in Motion K, will restore and extend the new offence of possession and publication of incest pornography. They will list the relevant family relationships and expand this to include step-parents and children, step-siblings and foster parents, and children where one of the persons is or is pretending to be under the age of 18. Where there are grey areas, such as step-relationships over 18, that show a clear power imbalance and would be illegal offline, this will be addressed through the parity sprint, about which I have already spoken.

Through Lords Amendments 255 and 395, the Government are criminalising the making, adapting and supplying of the nudification tools and are bringing chatbots into the scope of the Online Safety Act. This means that the requirements of the Online Safety Act will kick in. Social media services will be required to take down content that supplies nudification tools, and search engines will have to reduce the visibility of search results linked to these tools. When chatbots come into the scope of the Online Safety Act, they will also have to ensure that illegal nudification tools and images cannot be made, supplied or appear on those services. Taken together, these measures will deliver an effective ban on nudification tools.

Given this, we do not believe that a separate possession offence, as provided for in Lords Amendment 505, would make a meaningful difference, not least as many such tools are not possessed in the technical legal sense, but rather are accessed online. For this reason, we are seeking its removal via Motion Y, but we are very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, for engaging with us on this and for supporting the approach that we have discussed at length with her and finally fixed upon.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friends Lady Owen and Lady Bertin, on behalf of all noble Lords on the Conservative Benches, for their sustained efforts on these important issues. Their work and amendments will surely help to protect women and girls, whether through legislation on the taking down of intimate images or greater protection for age verification in pornographic content. I also thank the Government, particularly the Minister, for their continued engagement on these topics. These Motions are evidence of what this Chamber can achieve through collaborative and productive dialogue.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions not just today but during the passage of this Bill, and for the thoughtful and constructive way in which everybody has engaged with these issues.

I shall be brief and address only one or two of the points that were raised. The first is in relation to Motion G1, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. Motion G strengthens accountability where platforms fail to comply with their duties to deal with non-consensual intimate images. Regarding Motion G1, we recognise the noble Baroness’s concern and want transparency beyond just the biggest platforms. That is why every regulated user-to-user service must be clear with users about how it is meeting the 48-hour takedown duty, while Ofcom can require detailed reporting where it will make the biggest difference. Through Schedule 8, the Online Safety Act allows Ofcom to require detailed information about how providers identify, deal with and take down illegal content. We will amend this through regulations to make it clear that these requirements cover compliance with the new NCII takedown duty, including average takedown times.

Turning to the verification of age, again the Government recognise the concerns raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. We are not intentionally delaying these important changes for the sake of it. I think that the noble Baroness recognises that we all agree that this issue is important, but we cannot shy away from the complex legal and practical issues that it presents. These considerations must be made alongside and flowing from the existing six-month review into parity, closing the gap between regulation of online and offline pornography. For this reason, the 12 months is needed to ensure that we get it right. We are grateful to the noble Baroness for supporting this approach.

On the issue of adults role-playing as children and the question of step-incest, in relation to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, as to the differential in age, it is to ensure that the online offences mirror the underlying offline criminal offences so that there is parity between the two. I should stress that for both these offences, adult role-playing and the extension to step-incest offences, this is a first step. The provisions in this Bill create significant changes already in the criminal law and the parity work to which we have all referred will build on this to address the grey areas where it is illegal offline but difficult to address online via the criminal law.

It remains for me only to thank once again the two noble Baronesses, Lady Bertin and Lady Owen. I genuinely look forward to continuing to work with them in future.

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

I thank the Minister for her response and am assured by it. I beg leave to withdraw Motion G1.

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Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 258 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 258A in lieu.

258A: Page 99, line 24, at end insert the following new Clause—
“Image deletion orders
(1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.
(2) In Part 7 (financial orders and orders relating to property), after Chapter 4 insert—
“CHAPTER 4A
IMAGE DELETION ORDERS
161ZA Image deletion orders
(1) In this code “image deletion order” means an order under this Chapter which—
(a) is made in respect of an offender for an offence,
(b) relates to a photograph or film which is in the offender’s possession or under their control, and
(c) requires the offender to take steps specified in the order to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that the photograph or film is put beyond use.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(c), a photograph or film is put beyond use if—
(a) in the case of a physical item, it is destroyed;
(b) in the case of data stored by any means by or on behalf of the offender, it is deleted;
(c) in the case of content on an internet service, it is removed from the service or permanently hidden.
(3) For the purposes of this section—
(a) something is “deleted” if it is irrecoverable;
(b) “content”, in relation to an internet service, has the meaning given by section 236(1) of the Online Safety Act 2023;
(c) “internet service” has the meaning given by section 228 of that Act (and section 204(1) of that Act applies).
161ZB Image deletion orders: availability
(1) This section applies where a person commits an offence under any of the following provisions of the Sexual Offences Act 2003—
(a) section 66AA (sharing semen-defaced image);
(b) section 66AA (taking or recording intimate photograph or film);
(c) section 66AD (creating a copy of intimate photograph or film shared temporarily);
(d) section 66B (sharing or threatening to share intimate photograph or film);
(e) section 66E (creating purported intimate image of adult);
(f) section 66F (requesting the creation of purported intimate image of adult);
(g) section 67A(2B) (recording a person breast-feeding child).
(2) This section also applies where a person commits an inchoate offence in relation to an offence specified in subsection (1).
(3) The court by or before which the offender is convicted of the offence may make an image deletion order in respect of—
(a) a photograph or film to which the offence relates, and
(b) any other photograph or film—
(i) which shows, or appears to show, a person who is the subject of the photograph or film to which the offence relates in an intimate state,
(ii) which is a semen-defaced image of a person who is the subject of the photograph or film to which the offence relates, or
(iii) which shows a person who is the subject of the photograph or film to which the offence relates breast-feeding a child.
(4) The following provisions of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 apply for the purposes of this section—
(a) section 66AA(2) (meaning of “semen-defaced image”);
(b) section 66D(5) to (9) (meaning of “showing, or appearing to show, another person in an intimate state”);
(c) section 67A(3A) and (3B) (meaning of references to a person breast-feeding a child), ignoring references to the intention of the person who recorded the photograph or film.
(5) In relation to an offence under section 66F of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, a photograph or film is a photograph or film to which the offence relates for the purposes of this section if—
(a) it appears to be of a person who was the subject of the request to which the offence relates (whether or not it is what was requested), and
(b) it was in the offender’s possession, or under the offender’s control, as a result of that request.
(6) An image deletion order is not available if the offence was committed before the day on which section (Image deletion orders) of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 comes into force.
161ZC Period for complying with requirements
(1) An image deletion order must specify, in respect of each step the order requires the offender to take, the date by which the step must be taken (and different dates may be specified in respect of different steps).
(2) Where the order requires the offender to take a step in relation to a photograph or film that would result in the offender being unable to recover the photograph or film—
(a) the order must not require the step to be taken before the end of the period for giving notice of appeal against the conviction or order, and
(b) where notice of appeal against the conviction or order is given, the offender is not required to take the step until the appeal is finally determined or withdrawn.
161ZD Offence of failing to comply with an image deletion order
(1) It is an offence for a person in respect of whom an image deletion order made under this Chapter is in force to fail without reasonable excuse to comply with any requirement included in the order.
(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court, or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or a fine, or both.
161ZE Image deletion orders: interpretation
(1) This section applies for the purposes of this Chapter.
(2) “Photograph” includes the negative as well as the positive version.
(3) “Film” means a moving image.
(4) References to a photograph or film also include—
(a) an image, whether made or altered by computer graphics or in any other way, which appears to be a photograph or film,
(b) a copy of a photograph, film or image within paragraph (a), and
(c) data stored by any means which is capable of conversion into a photograph, film or image within paragraph (a).”
(3) In Chapter 5 of Part 3 (duties to explain or give reasons), after section 55 insert—
“55A Duty to give reasons where image deletion order not made
Where—
(a) a court is dealing with an offender for an offence, and
(b) an image deletion order is available, the court must give reasons if it does not make an image deletion order in respect of a photograph or film to which the offence relates (see section 161ZB(3)(a)).””

Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

That this House do not insist on its Amendments 259 and 260 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 260A to 260D in lieu.

That this House do not insist on its Amendments 259 and 260 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 260A to 260D in lieu.

260A: Page 99, line 24, at end insert the following new Clause—
“Intimate image material: reporting and registration
Schedule (Intimate image material: reporting and registration) makes provision about the reporting and registration of intimate image material.”

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Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 263A to 263G.

263A: Line 20, leave out from “think” to the end of line 22 and insert “what is set out in subsection (1A) or (1B).
(1A) That A and B were related, or pretending to be related, such that A was related to B as parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, brother, sister, half-brother, half-sister, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece.
(1B) That—
(a) A and B were related or had been related, or were pretending to be related or to have been related, such that A was or had been related to B as step-parent, step-child, stepbrother, stepsister, foster parent or foster child, and
(b) at least one of A and B was, or was pretending to be, under 18.”

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Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 264 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 264A to 264F in lieu.

264A: Page 99, line 24, at end insert the following new Clause—
“Online pornography (age and consent verification): duty to review and report
(1) The Secretary of State must conduct a review of the role of providers of internet services in—
(a) verifying the age of individuals appearing in pornographic content published or displayed on their services;
(b) verifying whether individuals appearing in pornographic content published or displayed on their services consent to the content being published or displayed.
(2) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament, and publish, a report of the review.
(3) The Secretary of State must comply with subsections (1) and (2) before the end of the 12 month period beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.
(4) In this section the following terms have the same meaning as in the Online Safety Act 2023—
“internet service” (see section 228 of that Act);
“pornographic content” (see section 236 of that Act);
“provider”, in relation to an internet service of any kind (see section 226 of that Act).”

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Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 265 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 265A to 265C in lieu with the following amendments to Commons Amendment 265A—

265A: Page 99, line 24, at end insert the following new Clause—
“Pornographic images of sexual activity with child under 16
(1) After section 67G of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 insert—
“67H Possession or publication of pornographic images of sexual activity with child under 16
(1) It is an offence for a person (P) to be in possession of an image if—
(a) the image is pornographic, within the meaning of section 63,
(b) the image portrays, in an explicit and realistic way, a person (A) engaged in sexual activity with another person (B),
(c) a reasonable person looking at the image would think that A and B were real, and
(d) a reasonable person—
(i) looking at the image, and
(ii) taking into account any sound or information associated with the image, would think that at least one of A or B was, or was pretending to be, under 16.
(2) It is an offence for a person to publish an image of the kind mentioned in subsection (1).
(3) Publishing an image includes giving or making it available to another person by any means.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (1)(d)—
(a) the reference to sound or information associated with the image is—
(i) when subsection (1)(d) applies for the purpose of an offence under subsection (1), to sound, or information, associated with the image that is in P’s possession, and
(ii) when subsection (1)(d) applies for the purpose of an offence under subsection (2), to sound, or information, associated with the image that the person in subsection (2) publishes with the image, and
(b) a person is not to be taken as pretending to be under 16 if it is fanciful that they are actually under 16 in the way pretended.
(5) In this section “image” has the same meaning as in section 63.
(6) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to excluded images, within the meaning of section 64.
(7) Proceedings for an offence under this section may not be instituted except by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
67I Defences to offences under section 67H
(1) Where a person is charged with an offence under section 67H(1), it is a defence for the person to prove any of the matters mentioned in subsection (2).
(2) The matters are—
(a) that the person had a legitimate reason for being in possession of the image concerned;
(b) that the person had not seen the image concerned and did not know, nor had any cause to suspect, it to be an image of the kind mentioned in section 67H(1);
(c) that the person—
(i) was sent the image concerned without any prior request having been made by or on behalf of the person, and
(ii) did not keep it for an unreasonable time;
(d) that—
(i) the person directly participated in the act portrayed as person A or person B mentioned in section 67H(1)(b),
(ii) the act did not involve the infliction of any non-consensual harm on any person, and
(iii) neither A nor B was under 16.
(3) Where a person is charged with an offence under section 67H(2), it is a defence for the person to prove any of the matters mentioned in subsection (4).
(4) The matters are—
(a) that the person had a legitimate reason for publishing the image concerned to the persons to whom they published it;
(b) that the person had not seen the image concerned and did not know, nor had any cause to suspect, it to be an image of the kind mentioned in section 67H(1);
(c) that—
(i) the person directly participated in the act portrayed as person A or person B mentioned in section 67H(1)(b),
(ii) the act did not involve the infliction of any non-consensual harm on any person,
(iii) neither A nor B was under 16, and
(iv) the person only published the image to person B or A (as the case may be).
(5) In this section “non-consensual harm” has the same meaning as in section 66.
67J Penalties for offences under section 67H
(1) A person who commits an offence under section 67H(1) is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or a fine (or both).
(2) A person who commits an offence under section 67H(2) is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine (or both).”
(2) In section 68 of that Act (special rules relating to providers of information society services), after “67E” insert “and 67H”.
(3) In Schedule 14 to that Act (special rules relating to providers of information society services), in paragraphs 3(1), 4(2) and 5(1) after “67E” insert “or 67H”.
(4) In Schedule 34A to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (child sex offences for the purposes of section 327A), after paragraph 13ZB insert—
“13ZC An offence under section 67H of that Act (possession or publication of pornographic images of sexual activity with child under 16) in relation to an image showing a person under 18.”
(5) In Schedule 7 to the Online Safety Act 2023 (priority offences), in paragraph 29 after paragraph (c) insert—
“(d) section 67H (possession or publication of pornographic images of sexual activity with child under 16).””

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, this group of amendments illustrates exactly how sensitive and difficult these cases are, does it not? In some of the amendments, noble Lords are saying that firearms officers should be held to a different standard than the rest of the population, but, in the others, it is being argued that even a small additional protection for them and their families is too great a differential in treatment.

Against that background, I start with Amendments 393B to 393F, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I met the noble Lord, together with the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Black, and the News Media Association, and I thank them all for the interesting and constructive conversation that we had. The Government have considered the noble Lord’s amendments with great care. We understand, and entirely support, the principle of open justice and freedom of the press, but what is in issue here is trying to find the appropriate balance.

I am really sorry to have to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, whom I admire greatly, but the Government firmly believe that firearms officers face very real and specific risks from organised crime groups and violent offenders, and that this requires there should be a presumption that only their personal details should be withheld up until such time as they are convicted—and if they are acquitted, that their identity will remain protected.

In doing so, we recognise that firearms officers who are being prosecuted for discharging their firearm face a unique situation, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said. The threats they face before and after the trial are real and, unlike most defendants, if acquitted, they are simply unable to return to their old lives as innocent people. Firearms officers and their families have targets on their back, even if they are cleared of any wrongdoing.

This special set of circumstances requires a tailored response, and we believe that the Government’s proposals achieve the correct balance. Those who are opposed to establishing a presumption of anonymity until conviction have twin concerns: first, that there is insufficient evidence that this is necessary; and, secondly, that it represents the thin end of the wedge. I want to deal briefly with each argument in turn.

First, on the evidence that this is needed, there is no doubt that the threat faced by firearms officers is not theoretical. There are very real risks. As I set out in Committee, and will not repeat in detail, firearms officers can face serious death threats and other forms of intimidation, which also extend to their families. As evidence for the need, there is real concern that the revelation of the identity of police officers who are being prosecuted is having a negative effect on the recruitment and retention of these essential officers. I am not sure that these are exactly the same statistics that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has, but certainly those from the document on armed policing attrition and retention record that, since 2019, there has been a loss of 583 armed officers, or an 8.8% reduction. This is a very real concern.

What is important is that this measure does not force the courts to issue an anonymity order. It will not cause secret trials. Judges must still consider the interests of justice and they have an active duty to uphold open justice. Even if no party challenges the anonymity, they still must, in considering the interests of justice, assess whether a reporting direction is necessary and proportionate. Even when anonymity is granted, the proceedings will remain public and the evidence will be tested in open court.

I am afraid the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, is under a misapprehension about what this involves. The only restriction is removing the identity, so they will be referred to throughout all proceedings as Officer A. Everything else will be reported, and, in the event that they are convicted, anonymity will be rescinded and their identity will become known.

A further concern has been the ability of the media to challenge the making of such an order. The Government absolutely understand the point, and we offer the following reassurances. First, by virtue of Criminal Procedure Rule 6.2, courts must actively invite media representations whenever anonymity or reporting restrictions are under consideration, and the judge must create the opportunity for scrutiny.

Secondly, HMCTS has delivered a package of reforms to strengthen media access and support open justice in criminal courts. As part of this reform, every criminal court now has a new circulation list called the reporting restriction application notice list. This list includes contacts from the media distribution list who have specifically agreed to have their details shared with applicants for advance notice. They will be added as mandatory contacts to all reporting restriction application notice lists held by criminal courts to ensure service on their members. In addition, HMCTS has established a media engagement group to improve processes to better serve media professionals in criminal courts.

Thirdly, the law grants the media the right to appeal any decision to make a reporting direction or an anonymity order to the Court of Appeal. But here is one of the most important points: if a judge refuses to make an anonymity order, the prosecution and the defendant have no right of appeal. That is one of the reasons that the Government have decided that the starting point should be a presumption that anonymity is granted.

Would this be the thin end of the wedge? These are unique circumstances. The number of trials is tiny. In the past 10 years there have been two criminal trials for murder or manslaughter as a result of a fatal police shooting. By way of comparison, there have been 13 fatal police shootings since 2019-20. Clauses 168 to 171 have been carefully drafted to strike a lawful and proportionate balance between fundamental rights and the need to protect our firearms officers and their families.

I turn to Amendment 394, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and spoken to powerfully also by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. It is one of two amendments that take the opposite view to that advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

While we acknowledge, once again, the importance of firearms officers and the debt that we owe them, the Government are unable to support this amendment, for these reasons. It would fundamentally alter the basis upon which prosecutorial decisions are taken by introducing a statutory presumption against prosecution for a particular group of citizens, who in this case happen to be police officers. Without doubt, this would create a two-tier approach to prosecutions in the criminal justice system. All public prosecutorial decisions, as we have heard frequently this evening, are made in accordance with the Code for Crown Prosecutors, which has statutory force. Its two-stage test has stood the test of time.

The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, suggests that the CPS is getting the decisions wrong because of the number of acquittals. With respect to the noble Lord, that rather misses the point. The CPS test is not to decide whether it prosecutes somebody who is guilty. If we knew they were guilty, we would not need the jury. The test is whether there is a realistic prospect of conviction. That is an exercise of judgment as to whether it is more likely than not that there will be a conviction. If so, and if the public interest stage is satisfied, the case is put before a jury, who decide whether or not they are actually guilty.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

I thank the Minister for giving way. I understand and accept the distinction that she makes. Over the past 20 or 30 years, the concern for the police officers involved is that, on every occasion that the decision has been made, it has been wrong so far as the jury is concerned. It has left the officers believing, sometimes, that the way that the CPS has discharged its problem—with a public outcry about the shooting—has been to test it in a court, rather than making its own decision for which it should be accountable. I understand the distinction that the Minister makes, therefore, but it is spooky that on every occasion the CPS has got it wrong so far as juries are concerned.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, again, that is a fundamental misunderstanding. If the CPS had got it wrong, the judge would have withdrawn it at half-time. It would never have got as far as a jury. The two things —one of them being the fact that the jury has acquitted—simply do not correlate.

The noble Lord’s amendment gives no indication as to how this proposed test would fit with the Code for Crown Prosecutors, save that we would then have a two-tier system, with one rule for the police and another for the citizens they police. It is hard to see how such a situation could command public confidence.

As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said, the unique position of firearms officers will be taken into consideration at both stages of the full code test. In cases involving fatal police shootings, the Crown Prosecution Service already considers whether the officer’s actions were necessary and reasonable in the circumstances, as the officer honestly believed them to be, recognising how difficult it can be to make fine decisions in the heat of the moment. It is the same law that applies to every citizen. Prosecutions in these cases are very rare, reflecting the high threshold already applied; an additional statutory presumption is neither necessary nor appropriate.

Lastly, I turn to Amendment 403 from the noble Lord, Lord Carter, which was, as ever, attractively advanced by him. The Government’s position remains as it was in Committee: there cannot be a separate criminal law for police officers in homicide cases. The current legal framework already offers robust protection for those who act under a genuine and honest belief, even if that belief later proves to be mistaken. In any event, the Law Commission is considering the offence of homicide, and the Government will consider its report carefully in due course.

I am grateful for the debate that we have had today. It is clear that there are strongly held views on both sides, but the Government believe that they have struck the right balance to protect our highly valued armed police officers while not standing in the way of the principles of open justice and a single-tier justice system. For that reason, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by placing on record my gratitude to all the noble Lords who have led the campaign on this important issue, none more so than the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, who has so ably championed this cause. I think it self-evident that we all acknowledge the harms that phones and social media are doing to our youth. I speak as a father of teenage children who are grappling with these very issues day to day.

This is most tragically brought to the fore when phones and social media lead to the death of children. Parents who face this unimaginable tragedy should be able to know what their child was accessing, and the evidence from these awful incidents should prove to the general public that steps have to be taken. I see no argument for why the police should not be required to collect evidence relating to potential digital harm, as indeed they are required to do for general causes of death. Similarly, if social media has in part led to the death of a child, the bare minimum that providers should do is to retain the data relating to the victim.

I too express gratitude to the Minister for considering the arguments raised in Committee and acting upon this. I understand that many in your Lordships’ House believe that Amendment 429A does not go far enough and that it does not place the desired duties on police forces. However, I welcome at least the start that this represents.

There is a tension, I fear, between what the Government are doing in your Lordships’ House—rightly, making concessions on the issue—and, at the same time, in the other place voting against further protections from online harms. The Minister’s amendment today places duties on providers. It is a short step from mandating data retention to enforcing age limits. This is not the time for that debate in its entirety, but it is worth putting it on the record. I reiterate my gratitude to all Members of your Lordships’ House who have campaigned on this important matter.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government remain grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and to the bereaved families who have raised concerns about the effectiveness of the existing framework for the preservation of online material that may be relevant to understanding a child’s death. I reiterate what I said in Committee: the loss of any child is a profound tragedy, and the Government are clear that we must take every possible step to safeguard children online.

I pay tribute to all the campaigners on this issue. Of course, I would be delighted to see Ellen Roome. I had the opportunity to meet her briefly; she was introduced to me by the noble Baroness, Lady Shawcross-Wolfson, outside the Chamber. It would be good to organise something formally and to include the noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron and Lady Barran. I will do what I can to find out what is happening with the inquest. Obviously, I cannot commit my noble and learned friend the Attorney-General to anything, but I will do what I can to find out what is happening.

I promised in Committee that the Government would consider how that framework could be amended to ensure that data preservation is applied consistently and as quickly as possible. We have done that: we listened and we have acted. I am delighted today to bring forward government Amendments 429A, 454A and 467AB, which require speedy data preservation in every case involving the death of a child aged five or above. The only exceptions to that will be where the child’s online activity is clearly irrelevant to their death or an investigation is plainly not necessary.

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for her constructive engagement on the development of this provision. Our most recent meeting was this afternoon, where we did our best to move things forward; I will return to that in a moment. As I have emphasised to her, the Government’s firm intention is that a DPN request becomes the default and should be made in every case, unless the coroner is very clear from the outset that online data is not relevant to a child’s death. We will ensure that this expectation is clearly set out in the Explanatory Notes to the new provision. I will write to the Chief Coroner, asking her to consider issuing guidance for coroners on the application of the mandatory requirement and, crucially, the circumstances in which an exception may be appropriate.

The Government thought we had done enough and that we had done what was wanted of us, because we all agreed with the objectives. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has reservations, and I understand them. I hope that we can continue to discuss this, so that we can reach a position where everybody is happy that we are doing what we have set out to do.

On the time limit, this now mandatory policy will entail the preservation of a much greater volume of data, including that of third parties, than at present. As it preserves the data relating to the dead child, it will also sweep up those on the other end of the interaction—the third parties are the issue here. To ensure that it is proportionate, we are therefore reducing the initial retention period—not the overall retention period—to six months, which, in the majority of cases, should provide sufficient time for the coroner to decide whether the online evidence is relevant. It is not related to when the inquest takes place, because the coroners all start working on this long before the inquest actually opens. It is simply putting it in place so that they have time to make the decision. There is a provision to extend it. The coroner does not have to apply to extend it; it is much simpler than that—they simply have to decide to extend it. Therefore, more time can be secured by the coroner if it is not yet clear.

We will work with the Chief Coroner and operational partners to ensure that coroners are clear that a positive decision is needed at the six-month point on whether or not to extend a DPN. If there is any doubt, the default position should be to extend the DPN to ensure that the data is preserved until the inquest.

These amendments will make a minor change to the existing regulation-making power in Section 101 of the Online Safety Act, so that regulations setting out the kinds of services that will automatically receive a DPN can refer to ongoing research. That means they will remain current and will capture any new and emerging services that become popular with children.

Amendments 431 and 432, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, would, as we are all aware, basically give effect to the same issue as the government amendments, but they include preserving data where online activity is not relevant to a child’s death. The reason for the difference is that the government amendments carve this out to reduce delay and diverting resources away from relevant cases. For that reason, we cannot accept the noble Baroness’s Amendments 431 and 432, as they would require a disproportionate retention of third-party data, which would risk breaching Article 8.

Finally, on Amendment 404 and the consequential Amendment 405, also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, we agree that it is essential that the police both understand the powers available to them and can use those powers consistently to access all relevant information when investigating these cases, including digital material or content held on social media platforms. As the noble Baroness knows, the National Police Chiefs’ Council is developing guidance to improve awareness and to promote uniform use of these powers, and the Home Office is committed to working with the police on this issue.

I know how concerned your Lordships’ House is about the pace of change in some of these newer technologies. That is exactly why, for guidance to remain practical and effective, it must be able to evolve alongside the fast-changing technological developments and legal frameworks. That is why it is preferable not to set this guidance or its detail in primary legislation but instead to continue working with the police to ensure that this guidance is delivered soon and to a high standard.

For the reasons I have set out, I ask the noble Baroness not to press her amendments. I thank her again and thank all other noble Lords who have spoken for their collaboration and engagement on this important issue.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

I thank all noble Lords who have supported this, not just tonight but on previous occasions, and I thank the Minister. Earlier this afternoon, we were looking for the perfect words. When she stood up, she said “clearly irrelevant” to the death of a child, and that would have been the perfect phrase to have in the Bill. I say it on the record. Maybe she can come back with a surprise at Third Reading.

I very much appreciate the work of the department and where the Government have met us, and I accept the point about the police. I say for one final time that, unfortunately, we have been round this three times. If this does not work, we will be back again with fury. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading
Wednesday 4th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

338: After Clause 121, insert the following new Clause—
“Domestic abuse protection orders(1) The Domestic Abuse Act 2021 is amended as follows.(2) In section 35 (provision that may be made by orders), after subsection (5) insert—“(5A) A domestic abuse protection order may require P to participate in an assessment to determine whether P should be required to participate in a programme of activities.(5B) A domestic abuse protection order may provide that if, following an assessment required under subsection (5A), the person carrying out the assessment determines that P should participate in a programme of activities, then P is required to participate in that programme of activities.”.(3) In section 36 (further provision about requirements that may be imposed by orders), omit subsections (2) to (7).(4) In section 44 (variation and discharge of orders), after subsection (3) insert—“(3A) A magistrates’ court may of its own motion vary a domestic abuse protection order made by a magistrates’ court acting in the local justice area in which that court acts.(3B) The Crown Court may of its own motion vary a domestic abuse protection order made by the Crown Court.””Member's explanatory statement
This new clause adds participation in an assessment and programme of activities as examples of requirements that a domestic abuse protection order may include, and allows the criminal courts to vary domestic abuse protection orders of their own motion.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 338 responds directly to what we have learnt from the domestic abuse protection order—DAPO—pilot, which is currently rolled out across Greater Manchester, Cleveland, North Wales and the London boroughs of Croydon, Bromley and Sutton.

We know that positive requirements such as behaviour change or substance misuse interventions are vital tools in tackling perpetrator behaviour, but the current legislation makes it extremely difficult for criminal courts to impose these requirements quickly, particularly in police-led cases where hearings must take place within 48 hours of a domestic abuse protection notice being issued. The changes we are bringing forward will remove those barriers and ensure that victims receive stronger, enforceable protection at the very first hearing.

The change will allow criminal courts to require a perpetrator to attend a suitability assessment as part of the original order, and if the assessment shows that a programme is appropriate, that requirement will apply automatically without the need for further hearings. These amendments are not needed in the civil and family courts as those jurisdictions already impose an assessment requirement as part of a DAPO. We are also removing the need to identify and name a programme provider up front for all courts—one of the key issues raised by operational partners in the piloting areas. Instead, we will set out the role of the responsible person in statutory guidance to ensure flexibility for local delivery.

Finally, we are also closing a gap in the legislation by giving criminal courts the power to vary a DAPO of their own motion, bringing them into line with the civil and family courts. Together, these changes will streamline the process of imposing a positive requirement condition in a DAPO, reduce unnecessary adjournments and ensure that victims of domestic abuse benefit from quicker, more consistent and more effective protection across all court jurisdictions. I beg to move.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the Minister and from these Benches we support the changes set out in her Amendment 338. My Amendment 361A says that if

“there is reasonable suspicion that a death by suicide has been preceded by a history of domestic abuse committed against the person by another person, the relevant police force must investigate that suicide as if it were a potential homicide”.

My honourable friend Marie Goldman MP has talked with a number of domestic abuse campaigners who have become increasingly concerned that police and CPS procedural policy should include this presumption, because sometimes it is missed. Pragna Patel from Project Resist launched a Suicide is Homicide campaign last year, and the group Advocacy After Fatal Domestic Abuse has been calling for this for many, many years. Frank Mullane, its chief executive, said to the Guardian that doing this would guard against evidence being destroyed or lost,

“for example where police have returned the victims’ phones and laptops”,

after an assumption of suicide has been made, thus losing key evidence that might be needed at a later date.

On Monday, the Scottish courts convicted a man of killing his wife after she took her own life. There was a history of domestic abuse right from when they first got together, which included his choking her. There was considerable evidence that he had continued to coerce and pressure her, which eventually forced her, very regrettably, to take her own life. This news from Scotland is good, and I am very grateful for the discussions with the Minister, but I hope she will look favourably on this and reassure your Lordships’ House that the Government will consider putting it into practice.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Government and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for their amendments in this group. I do, however, have some concerns about the Government’s Amendment 338. We on these Benches believe that domestic abuse protection orders are a very important civil tool; indeed, they were introduced under the previous Conservative Administration. However, they are not, and should never become, a substitute for proper criminal justice consequences. Amendment 338 will expand orders to include mandatory participation in assessments and activity programmes. With respect, I do not believe that the answer to domestic abuse lies in programme participation; it lies in firm sentencing and, where appropriate, immediate custody.

I raise these concerns in the wider context of the Government’s sentencing policy. During the passage of the Sentencing Bill, this House divided at Report on a Conservative amendment that sought to exempt domestic abuse offences from the new rebuttable presumption against short custodial sentences of 12 months or less. Noble Lords on these Benches, in particular my noble and learned friend Lord Keen, argued that domestic abusers should not benefit from an assumption in favour of suspension. When the issue was pressed to a vote, the Government resisted that exemption.

Noble Lords are therefore now faced with an uncomfortable contradiction. The Minister will no doubt say the Government are determined to be tough on violence against women and girls; yet, when given the opportunity to ensure that domestic abusers would not fall within an automatic presumption against immediate custody, they declined. Against that backdrop, it is difficult to accept that expanding programme requirements within civil protection orders represents a meaningful, tough stance against domestic abuse. Real deterrence requires certainty of punishment.

Turning briefly to Amendment 361A, I have sympathy with its intention. Where suicide may have followed a history of domestic abuse, investigation must be rigorous and sensitive. However, requiring all such cases to be investigated as if they were homicides raises practical and legal concerns. Police investigations must follow clear evidential thresholds, and homicide procedures carry significant procedural and resource implications. A rigid statutory instruction risks unintended consequences and may not in practice deliver better outcomes. It is for officers and detectives who arrive at the scene of a crime to determine, on the basis of the available evidence, how to investigate that death. Prescribing in law how to advance an investigation in specific circumstances is not an appropriate course of action.

In conclusion, I am not persuaded that expanding the scope of domestic abuse protection orders is a legislative solution to the problems women and girls face daily. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I genuinely thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Doocey, who is not in her place, for Amendment 361A. As I find is so often the case with the noble Baronesses, there is very little between us on the principles involved. The Government agree that it is vital that police officers understand the link between domestic abuse and suicide; the only issue is how it is most effectively to be achieved.

There are three reasons that the Government cannot support the noble Baroness’s amendment. The first is that this is about the effective enforcement of police standards and, in our view, primary legislation is not the right place for this to sit. The second is a concern that it would not work, because there are no consequences contained within the amendment for not doing what the amendment requires one to do. If police forces are not inclined to do it anyway then an amendment that does not have any consequences is unlikely to make a difference.

The third and real reason is that, as we say, we are already on it. I will explain why we say that. The Government are already taking steps to improve police responses to suicides, including for cases where victims have taken their own life following domestic abuse. First, last year, the College of Policing published new national guidance for officers which highlights the importance of considering any history of domestic abuse and applying “professional curiosity” at the scene of these deaths. Secondly, the Home Office is working with the police to monitor the implementation of this new guidance, and has since commissioned five deep dives with select police forces to examine how the police are responding to suicides and unexplained deaths that follow domestic abuse. Thirdly, the Tackling Violence Against Women and Girls Strategy, published in December 2025, sets out that the senior investigating officer training programme for police officers will, going forward, cover deaths that follow domestic abuse, including suicides.

Fourthly, the Government are continuing to build the evidence base on suicides that follow domestic abuse through funding research developed by the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s domestic homicide project in order to capture information on these deaths from all 43 police forces in England and Wales and identify how the response can be improved. Fifthly, the Home Office is working with the domestic homicide project to explore the possibility of expanding the project’s scope in future years to encompass all suicides that occur in the context of violence against women and girls. This will enable deeper analysis and a more comprehensive understanding of every suicide resulting from these forms of violence and abuse.

Lastly, in relation to the criminal law, the previous Lord Chancellor asked the Law Commission to undertake a review of homicide law, including the use of manslaughter offences where abuse may have driven someone to suicide. Its final report is scheduled for publication in 2028. I know that your Lordships have expressed concerns before about this particular review, but this is the Law Commission’s own time frame and it is a serious piece of work.

I completely understand and acknowledge the impact that these deaths have on families; it is absolutely devastating. Supporting them is central to the Government’s approach. That is why the Home Office funds the organisation Advocacy After Fatal Domestic Abuse to provide specialist support to families bereaved by suicide following domestic abuse. The Government are clear that the police must respond effectively and comprehensively to suicides following domestic abuse, and the programme of work that we are already undertaking will ensure that they have the knowledge and the tools with which to do so. In the light of the Government’s ongoing work, I hope that the noble Baroness will be content not to press her amendment.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell, for supporting government Amendment 338 today. With the greatest respect to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, we are not here to re-debate the Sentencing Act all over again. The point is that this is only one tool in the toolbox of domestic abuse protection orders, and many of the other tools are much more punitive in nature. We have to remember that some of these people will go on to have other relationships in the future, and we want them to stop doing this. We want to make sure that these things are effective. The use of DAPOs is being evaluated by an independent research organisation. With that in mind, this is an important change. I am grateful that it has been welcomed by your Lordships, and I commend the amendment to the House.

Amendment 338 agreed.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 25th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, as in Committee, these Benches oppose Clause 40 standing part of the Bill. I will briefly remind the House of the background. Clause 40 repeals Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, which was inserted into that Act in 2014. Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Court Act provides that, where a person is charged with a shoplifting offence but the value of the stolen goods is under £200, the offence is triable only summarily. Accordingly, low-value shoplifting cases will be heard only before a magistrates’ court and will not go before the Crown Court. That is the current position.

The Government now propose to do away with this and make low-value shoplifting triable either way. In its criticisms of the status quo before the general election in 2024, the Labour Party suggested that the status quo had created,

“effective immunity for some shoplifting”.

That was the wording in the Government’s manifesto.

As I have said previously, this is incorrect. There never has been effective immunity for any shoplifting offences. If making an offence a summary offence is akin to granting immunity, then it follows that we have given immunity to anyone who commits common assault, battery, theft of a car, drunk driving, dangerous cycling, being drunk and disorderly, and harassment, to name but a few offences. The truth is that there are hundreds of summary-only offences. Do the Government think that they create immunity and should become triable either way too?

There are two other matters that demonstrate further the contradictory and, indeed, damaging consequences of this clause. Essentially, the question hinges on the interaction between this clause and two other measures that this Government are pursuing with perplexing enthusiasm: their Sentencing Act and their proposed court reforms.

In the Sentencing Act, the Government have introduced a presumption of a suspended sentence where the sentence is less than 12 months. I know that the Government do not like these Benches making an ongoing critique of their sentencing reforms but, given their negative future impact, we shall continue to do so.

The average custodial sentence for shop theft is two months, meaning that, in future, it is likely that all shoplifters will be spared prison time. If you wanted to look for effective immunity, this is where you will find it. Permitting those charged with low-value shoplifting to seek a Crown Court trial may very well lead to a collapse in the prosecution of those offences, as the CPS will determine that prosecution is simply not worth it.

Coupled with the presumption of a suspended sentence order for all sentences under 12 months, there is a significant likelihood that, under this Government, the vast majority of shoplifters will avoid prison entirely. Furthermore, the Government’s court reforms will see more cases moved away from the Crown Courts, the curtailing of jury trials and an increase in the sentencing powers of magistrates’ courts.

The Government say that this is necessary to tackle the backlog. They have argued that offenders are trying to game the system by electing for Crown Court trials, knowing that they will take longer to go to trial and that the case may collapse. So, on the one hand, they are reducing the number of either-way offences because the Crown Courts are overwhelmed and yet, on the other hand, they are making low-value shoplifting triable either way. This makes no sense whatever.

If the Minister will not listen to my arguments, she might perhaps listen to those of her own colleague, Sarah Sackman, the Courts Minister, who is quoted in a Guardian article as asking:

“Do we think that someone who has stolen a bottle of whisky from a minimart should receive the right to trial by jury?”


I quite agree with Sarah Sackman. I do not think that a person who steals a bottle of whisky should go before the Crown Court, but that is exactly what could happen if Clause 40 becomes law.

For all these reasons and, essentially, because in our view the Government’s position here is completely contradictory, I beg to move.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, Clause 40 delivers on a manifesto commitment made by this Government. I am very happy to note that I and the noble Lords, Lord Cameron of Lochiel and Lord Davies of Gower, share the same overall objective: to reduce the backlog in the Crown Court by reserving jury trials for the most serious cases. I am delighted to hear that they agree with the Government, so I look forward to their support for our proposals to do exactly this when your Lordships’ House considers the Courts and Tribunals Bill, which was introduced in the other place earlier today.

The low-value shoplifting provision was always a curious beast and quite unlike other criminal offences because shoplifting was, and still is, charged as theft, which is always a “triable either way” offence. This meant that, although there was a presumption that if the goods were valued at less than £200 the case would remain in the magistrates’ court, a defendant who wanted a jury trial could still choose—or “elect”, to use the formal term—trial in the Crown Court. It is nonsense to say that this keeps it in the magistrates’ court, because Section 22A still allows defendants to elect trial in the Crown Court if they want to do so. The reality is that hardly any of them did; I will return to this shortly.

This was an administrative provision designed to reduce the burden on the Crown Court. In reality it had very little impact on that, but it did have a very undesirable effect that was entirely unintended. Although multiple factors have contributed to rising retail crime, one persistent issue is the perception in many quarters that low-value theft has no real consequences. Some regard it as having been, in effect, decriminalised. It does not matter whether that is in fact true; it is the perception that is damaging.

Section 22A created the perception that those committing theft of goods worth £200 or less will escape any punishment. Clause 40 rectifies that—and it really matters. Evidence from the Association of Convenience Stores shows that only 36% of retail crime is even reported. Many retailers choose not to do so because they think it is a waste of time; they believe that the police will not do anything. Once again, it does not really matter whether they are right about that; that is what they believe.

This underreporting masks the true scale of the problem and leaves businesses vulnerable. We must act decisively to support retailers facing this growing challenge and scourge of shoplifting. Clause 40 does exactly that. It closes a critical gap by sending a clear and unequivocal message: theft of any value is a serious criminal act and will be treated seriously.

I hope noble Lords will accept that probably no one is more concerned than I am—as one of the only people who has actually lived through what it has meant in practice, when I sat as a circuit judge—about remedying the position of the backlog in the Crown Court. As I have already said, jury trials for these cases are a very small proportion of the Crown Court’s workload. In the year ending in September 2025, almost 50,000 defendants were prosecuted for shoplifting goods valued at £200 or less, but only 1.3% of those cases were committed for jury trial in the Crown Court. The vast majority of them had been sent there by the magistrates, with only a very small proportion of defendants electing trial themselves.

Returning the situation to the previous law, where the offence is triable either way, therefore carries no greater risk to the Crown Court than already exists under the existing provision. But it sends a clear message to perpetrators and would-be perpetrators: this crime will not be tolerated and will be met with appropriate punishment. We are signalling to retailers that we take this crime seriously, that they are encouraged to report it and that the police will take it seriously.

The happy news for the noble Lords who tabled this amendment, and any others concerned about the backlog in the Crown Court, is that once we pass the Courts and Tribunals Bill, low-value shoplifters will no longer be able to game the system by choosing jury trial because in all cases the decision on venue will be made by the magistrates’ court, not by defendants. As I have already said, I look forward to the noble Lord’s support on this. In the meantime, given that this is a manifesto commitment, I make it absolutely clear that the Government are determined that it shall pass. I hope I have been able to persuade the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister, but I am afraid I am not quite persuaded. The Government have been attempting to appear tough in a so far unsuccessful attempt to demonstrate that they are cracking down on crime. Yet, as we know from the latest crime statistics, in the year ending September 2025 there were 519,381 recorded incidents of shoplifting, which is a 10% increase on the previous year. To make matters worse, they are now proposing measures that will not see a soul go to prison for shoplifting and, via Clause 40, will allow offenders to string out their trials through the Crown Court, all while they pursue the polar opposite outcome for other offences through their court reforms. If this is the policy of a Government who are serious about tackling shoplifting, they have a strange way of showing it. We are not prepared to allow shoplifters to go unpunished, and I therefore have no option but to test the opinion of the House.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 5th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I cannot confirm that, but I will certainly have a look at it.

The question is not whether children should be protected but whether removing the ability to intervene criminally until 14 years old would make children, victims or communities safer. I do not believe that it would. The current system already prioritises proportionality and rehabilitation, while retaining the capacity to act when it is absolutely necessary. For those reasons, I cannot support this amendment.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti has a long and honourable record of raising issues on behalf of some of the most vulnerable in society. She and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, make a formidable team when moving this amendment. I am very grateful to them for ensuring that this important issue remains at the forefront of every Government’s mind, including this one.

It was about a fortnight ago that your Lordships’ House debated this issue in response to my noble friend’s Oral Question. I said at the time, and repeat today, that the age of criminal responsibility is a complex and sensitive issue. I want to take this opportunity to set out in a bit more detail than the Oral Questions format allows why the Government believe that we should keep the age of criminal responsibility at 10 years old.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 486 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, raises an issue that has long troubled the criminal justice system. I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord for giving me sight of his speech in advance.

The criminal liability of secondary parties is an important but sometimes controversial concept in the law, and the Government acknowledge the anxiety over the consequences for those prosecuted and convicted as a result of the application of the rule. On the one hand, there are very real and understandable concerns. First, we recognise the anxiety that this has a disproportionate effect on young people and on those from certain ethnic groups. Secondly, it is a matter of serious concern that the law is widely misunderstood. For example, I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, in relation to her powerful speech, but in fact she said several things that were not quite right. For example, we have no law of collective responsibility, and mere presence without more is never enough to convict. Even lawyers and judges sometimes struggle with the application of this concept, as any of your Lordships who attempted to follow the limpid explanation of the law in this area from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, may well understand.

On the other hand, and seriously, it must be remembered that the reason why the rule exists is to ensure that it is possible to prosecute those who take part in group crimes—often, but not always, crimes of violence. Please remember that if your son or daughter was attacked by a large group, one of whom may have held the weapon, but others of whom were assisting and encouraging, you would want the entire group to face justice—more so if, because it was not possible to distinguish which of the many feet was kicking the victim, you could not prosecute any of them because you could not show which foot in fact delivered the fatal blow among the others which contributed to it. This is what, among other things, the doctrine of joint enterprise is there to cover.

I appreciate that the noble and learned Lord’s amendment is intended to probe the Government’s position. While the intention behind the amendment is understandable, as drafted, we believe that there are flaws in it which mean that it is not acceptable and would cause more difficulties than it solved for the courts which have to apply it. The issues about which the Government have concerns include the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, about what would count as “significant”. For example, is purchasing the weapon or acting as a lookout significant? What about shouting encouragement or driving the getaway car? You could not just leave this to a jury to decide, because then there would be a real risk of unacceptable disparities in decisions made on the same facts. In one part of the country, acting as a lookout could mean you were guilty of murder, but in another part, on the same facts, you would be acquitted. You could even get those results in courtrooms next door to each other in the same building. Such uncertainty would make prosecutions in group violence cases pretty much impossible, as well as leading to verdicts which would not command public confidence.

There are further issues, one of which has been identified by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, in relation to the magistrates’ court, but the amendment does not apply to the full range of offences because it does not address how it interacts with other forms of secondary liability, such as encouraging or assisting a crime under the Serious Crime Act 2007. The noble and learned Lord’s summary of the development of the law pre and post the landmark case of Jogee in 2016 illustrates, I venture to say, the great complexity of this area, but I reassure your Lordships that the Government are listening.

Mention has been made of the few important pieces of work that are going on in this area. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, has said, the Law Commission’s review of homicide offences and sentencing for murder is considering the implications of the current law on joint enterprise. I note the noble and learned Lord’s concerns about the length of time, but I should make it clear that the Law Commission is an independent body—in a sense, that is part of the point of it—which decides how to run its projects. It is not looking at joint enterprise on its own but at how joint enterprise is related to homicide offences and sentencing. One of the things it is considering is whether we should adopt a first and second degree murder to reflect the different roles played in sentencing, if not necessarily in conviction for a particular offence. As the noble and learned Lord will know, there is a significant interaction between the categorisation of homicide offences, the impact of partial defences and mandatory sentencing requirements, which makes separating out of these aspects of the report more complex.

Secondly, the Law Commission’s review of criminal appeals is examining if or how historic convictions are considered, which is a key area of concern for many people. Thirdly, the CPS has been consulting on its policies on gang-related prosecutions. This includes the controversial use of drill and rap music as evidence. It is also improving data collection on joint enterprise cases. As a number of your Lordships have referred to, last September, the CPS published its first annual data report on joint enterprise homicide and attempted homicide cases. The Government also recognise the important work of the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Miscarriages of Justice and the Westminster Commission, in which the noble and learned Lord is involved. I need not remind him that it is in the process of taking evidence and considering reform of joint enterprise, and we look forward to its report.

So, while the Government recognise the concerns about joint enterprise, and work is under way to address these issues, we cannot support this amendment today for the reasons I have given, and I invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

Can I just ask the Minister to reconsider, or at least explain, her argument that it is significant in this regard that different juries might come to different conclusions on the same or similar facts in different parts of the country, on one day or another? Is not her experience as a judge that that is an everyday event? Does she not consider that that is one reason why juries do not give reasons and are not asked for their reasons for any given decision that they make? Because it is a fact of life that we all accept.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

Not giving reasons is of course one of the criticisms that is sometimes made of jury trials. In the Government’s view, the wider and broader concept in the current law of an act of assistance or encouragement, combined with the intention to assist or encourage, gives a broad enough scope to allow juries to look at the conditions in every different case—whereas, when you are saying a “significant contribution”, it would be a matter of value judgment for particular juries as to whether they thought that a lookout was a significant contribution or not. For that reason, we think it would introduce significant uncertainty and significant risk of disparity in verdicts.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. It has been, for me, an interesting and educational 55 minutes and I hope that the Government will have found it so as well. Although the Law Commission is of course an independent body, I dare say it might be sent a copy of this evening’s debate, which might encourage it to accelerate the way in which it is looking at this admittedly difficult and complicated question. I do not think that any of us who have spoken this evening thinks it is an easy question.

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox and Lady Brinton, and my noble friend on the Front Bench Lord Davies of Gower for their thoughtful and useful—I do not say “useful” in a demeaning way; I genuinely mean it—contributions to this debate, because it is, as I have said, difficult. The Minister was the first to accept that. She and I—and perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and others—will have summed up to juries and directed juries on the question of joint enterprise in one case or another. I dare say, at Snaresbrook Crown Court, there were probably quite a lot of difficult cases that had to be dealt with. However, I do not accept the Minister’s suggestion that juries would find it difficult, or that it would create other sorts of difficulties, to work out what “significant contribution” means.

Juries can work out, following proper direction from the judge, how to deal with actions taken in self-defence. You could get a different set of facts which would allow the defence to run, whereas, in other cases, it would not. Significant contribution is not a difficult concept, and it is not one that 12 members of a jury, when properly directed by the judge and having heard arguments from the lawyers for the respective parties, the prosecution and the defence, could not grapple with. They could. One has to think not just about “significant contribution”: let us work out what “no contribution” means. What does “insignificant contribution” mean? It strikes me that by simply posing those questions, one should not be frightened of the “significant contribution” question.

As I say, I understand the public policy, I understand the politics and I understand that my Government in the past, and now this Government, are worried about being seen to be weak on crime. For goodness’ sake, we have heard that record played year in, year out. But I hope that this evening’s short discussion will encourage others outside Parliament to keep pressing their arguments, both in court and academically. I hope that those who have taken part in this debate will continue to press for reform in this area. And I hope that the Law Commission, if it is listening, will accelerate its process.

It is now nearly 7.15 pm on a Thursday and it is almost a capital offence to talk in Committee stage on a Thursday at this hour. So I will bring my remarks to a conclusion by finally repeating my thanks to all those who have taken part. I beg the leave of the Committee to withdraw my amendment.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for tabling these amendments and I thank her and many others in the Committee who have given cogent and compelling arguments for their inclusion in the Bill.

It does indeed feel like the dial is starting to shift with regard to the protection of our children from online harms. I am very pleased, for instance, that your Lordships’ House supported my noble friend Lord Nash’s amendment last week in voting to ban under-16s from social media. The amendments before us today are in many ways an extension of that argument—that social media is not appropriate for children, it is causing irreparable harm and, in the most severe cases, as we have heard today, is leading to death. As the father of teenage children who, like so many other children, face a world of online temptation, pressure and influence, these issues are very personal. There is a lot to be said for creating further duties when there is the death of a child.

As has been said, the issue was in live consideration in the previous Government’s legislation, which included a clause that created a data preservation process. I am aware that the text of Amendment 474 is different, but the fundamental issue is the same: at their heart, these amendments contain the simple objective to ensure that coroners can access the social media data or the wider online activity of a deceased child where the death is suspected to be linked to that activity. In that scenario, it is plainly sensible to ensure that that data is not destroyed, so that coroners can access it for the purposes of investigations.

I have nothing further to add, given what has already been said. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s reply.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am sure that your Lordships will all agree that we have a great deal for which to be grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and her work in relation to the online space and its regulation when it comes to our most vulnerable citizens. It is so obvious that all child deaths are harrowing and deeply distressing for bereaved families that to say so seems almost trite. However that may be, I start my remarks by acknowledging this to make the point that the Government have this both front and centre. Anything I say this afternoon should be seen in that context.

I pay tribute to every brave family who fought to understand the circumstances that led to the death of their own child. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for telling me that some of the families are in the Gallery; I have not had an opportunity to meet them yet, but I extend the invitation to do so now. I also understand that for most, if not all, of them, this is not just about the circumstances of their own child’s death but about trying to ensure that this does not happen to other families.

We know that the data preservation provisions in Section 101 of the Online Safety Act continue to be a focus, both for bereaved families and parliamentarians who do not think that the process is quick enough to stop services deleting relevant data as part of their normal business practices. We agree that it is a proper and urgent objective to make sure that Ofcom has the powers to require, retain and provide information.

Section 101 was originally introduced following the campaign and amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, during the Bill’s passage through Parliament. In order to support both coroners and services, in September, both the Chief Coroner and Ofcom published guidance on this new provision. Ofcom consulted on the draft guidance in parallel and published its finalised guidance in December 2025. The Chief Coroner’s guidance encourages coroners to consider requesting a data preservation notice early in the investigation if the relevance of social media or another in-scope service cannot be ruled out. This should safeguard against automatic deletion of the data by service providers due to routine processes.

The Government brought forward the commencement of data preservation notices, which came into force on 30 September 2025. Since then, Ofcom has issued at least 12 data preservation notices. On 15 December 2025, the guidance for Ofcom was updated in relation to information-gathering powers, including new guidance on data preservation notices themselves. The Government are therefore working closely with Ofcom and the Office of the Chief Coroner to understand how effectively these are working in practice, but we have heard the concerns about the speed and efficiency of this process.

Against this background, I begin with Amendments 438ED and 438EE. The police themselves accept that there should be better guidance for the application of powers to preserve and access digital evidence in investigations of child deaths in order to ensure consistency across forces. Forgive me, I have a bad cough.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

The Home Office and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology are already working with the police and the National Police Chiefs’ Council to create guidance to raise awareness of and promote the consistent use of powers available to the police to preserve and access data following the suspicious death of a child. Officials in the Home Office have been supporting this work where appropriate. That said, we can see why the noble Baroness’s idea of updating statutory guidance is attractive.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I can start again; I am very grateful to my noble friend for taking over. I say now that I would welcome a conversation with the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, as she and I discussed when we met briefly the other day. The Government do have concerns that being too prescriptive in legislation may create more problems than it solves because the legislation would need to be amended every time there were changes in technology or in operational practices. Your Lordships will be well aware, given our many late nights spent scrutinising primary legislation, of which tonight may be another, how clunky, cumbersome and time-consuming it can be to keep amending primary legislation.

For this reason, it is the Government’s view that our shared objective can be achieved using non-statutory guidance. Police forces are well used to applying and following guidance in a range of areas, from missing people to information sharing. Having said that, I make the point that I would welcome a conversation with the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, to see whether we can find a way through this by working together to do so.

I turn to Amendments 474 and 475. Again, this is an issue that the Government take very seriously. I reassure your Lordships that we are carefully considering the issues that these amendments raise and are grateful for the continued engagement of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the bereaved families. Taken together, these amendments would require coroners to notify Ofcom within five days of a child’s death, triggering a standard form to request data preservation.

Once again, we can see the appeal of such a requirement. The problem is that it would apply to all cases of deaths in the over-fives, regardless of whether social media may be relevant to their death. So, for example, where a child died as a result of a road traffic collision or of cancer, it is unlikely in most cases that social media retention would be of use to the police or the coroner. Therefore, while the Government are sympathetic to the aims of these amendments, it is our view that we need carefully to consider any possible unintended consequences.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

On that point, does the Minister have the number of children over five who die in other ways, just so the Committee can understand how much of a burden that might be?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I cannot give the noble Baroness the answer now, but I can write to her with that data.

Our view is that we need carefully to consider any possible unintended consequences; the need not to place a disproportionate burden on those investigating; and how such a provision might be drafted so as not to capture deaths which are outwith the scope of the amendment.

To conclude, we are not saying no. What I am saying is that I understand the noble Baroness’s concern that the existing statutory provision for the preservation of a deceased child’s social media data should operate as effectively as possible and we will consider carefully what further steps could be taken. As I have just mentioned, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and I spoke briefly and agreed to meet, and I am happy to extend that to include Ministers from both the Home Office and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology.

I look forward to updating the House on Report on this important topic. I cannot update the Committee in relation to the issues with the United States now, but I will write to the noble Baroness in relation to that. In the meantime, I hope she will be content to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

I start by accepting all the various offers to meet the Minister and thank her for her tone in her response and for expanding it to the other departments as necessary. Before I withdraw the amendment, however, I want to make a couple of things very clear.

First, this sits in the broader issue of failure to have the Online Safety Act implemented properly. It sits in the broader issue of why children are dying at all. Moreover—I think I have to say this both on my own behalf and on behalf of the bereaved parents—I am very grateful for everybody’s gratitude, but we do not want gratitude; we want action. I am sorry, but on the actual points—six months, the same letter about the guidance that never comes—I do not accept that there cannot be a way of exempting sick children, and I would like to know how many children died in car crashes because someone was on the phone.

I do not think it is an excuse, and I really feel at this point that officials and Ministers are way too comfortable with unintended consequences. How about the House starts with dealing with the intended consequences of its legislation that are not being properly implemented? With that, and the promise to come back on Report, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for tabling this amendment and all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I also express my thanks for the diligent work of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. Its report into the vulnerabilities of our undersea cables is a brilliant piece of work and makes for sobering reading.

As the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, said, these are perilous times and there never has been a more important time to consider the measure proposed, given that cables are the invisible backbone of much of our economy, security and everyday life. As we have heard, they carry the vast majority of international data traffic, underpin financial transactions, connect critical services and link the UK to our international partners.

The committee’s report underlined that while the UK has plenty of cable routes and good repair processes for what it phrased as “business-as-usual breakages”, there are distinct vulnerabilities particularly where multiple cables cluster, or connect to key landing stations, and in the links servicing our outlying islands. I represented the Highlands and Islands region in the Scottish Parliament for eight years or so, and that last point is very real to me on a personal level because these are not abstract concerns. They are very real. Damage to a cable connecting the Shetland Islands in 2022 disrupted mobile, landline and payment services for days.

As we have heard, despite these vulnerabilities, the legal framework has not kept pace with the security environment. The principal instrument remains the Submarine Telegraph Act 1885. The deterrent effect of criminal sanctions matters. As the committee observed, the UK cannot simply assume that hostile actors would refrain from targeting these cables in a future crisis, and the Government have to be prepared for the reality that hostile states or proxy actors may exploit these vulnerabilities deliberately.

In conclusion, I add that increasing penalties is certainly not the only measure the Government should be taking. The threats we face are far more wide ranging than simple criminality. There is a need for a whole of government approach to protecting critical infrastructure such as submarine telecommunications—that would involve the MoD, DBT, DESNZ and the Home Office. But this amendment is a start, and I hope that the Minister will listen and take action.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, this Government take the security of our subsea cables extremely seriously. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, for raising this issue. It is crucially important and right that it is debated and achieves the attention it deserves.

As the noble Baroness said, the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy recently conducted a public inquiry into the security of the UK’s subsea cables, and it shone a spotlight on this issue. Following that inquiry, in November 2025 the Government formally committed to increasing penalties for those who damage subsea cables where the activity cannot be linked to a hostile state. As the noble Baroness rightly says, where it can be linked to a hostile state, a life sentence is available through the National Security Act.

I hope that the noble Baroness, for whom I have a great deal of respect, will understand why the Government are not able to support her amendment today. I am sure she will readily agree that penalties are not the only issue here. It is essential that any strengthening of the law is done carefully and not piecemeal, with full consideration for our fishing and wider maritime sectors. Any potential changes would need to be proportionate and workable for those sectors, and that requires proper consultation.

One further aspect about the non-criminal elements of this that may reassure your Lordships’ Committee is that cable breaks happen regularly in UK waters, given the busy nature of our shallow seas. But the UK’s international connectivity is highly resilient, and we have a well-developed system of civil litigation that ensures that cable owners are reimbursed when a break occurs. I hope that, for all these reasons, the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, it is late, but I am grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, the noble Earl, Lord Russell, and my noble friend the opposition spokesman Lord Cameron of Lochiel, with his compelling Scottish perspective.

Given the vulnerabilities that have been identified, and identified successively, most recently by the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy’s report—which nobody is disagreeing with—it is important that something is done. The Minister rightly refers to the possibility of civil litigation. However, for something of this seriousness, given the scale of the threat that we now have in the waters around our country, that is not good enough.

I will reflect, but I hope the Government will take this away and perhaps come forward with their own amendment. That would obviously be ideal. Perhaps we can have some further discussions about how we solve this problem sooner rather than later. I note the point that the Minister made about fisheries and so on, but that feels like an excuse. I have been a Security Minister and, normally, when you have a big security issue, you try to take steps to mend matters as quickly as you can, as has been done with previous legislation. For today, I will beg leave to withdraw the amendment, but I might come back to this on Report.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for giving notice of his opposition that Clauses 152 to 155 stand part of the Bill, and the noble Lord, Lord Black of Brentwood, for introducing the clause stand part debate and allowing this important and interesting discussion. I acknowledge from the outset that the Government agree these are not easy issues.

Clauses 152 to 155 largely stand or fall together, creating a bespoke system for a very small and discrete category of defendants in criminal trials; namely, authorised firearms officers charged with offences arising from the discharge of their weapon during the course of their official duties.

Notwithstanding the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, about lawyers—of which, of course, I am one—made during the course of the debate on the last group, I agree with much of what he has said. The starting point for the Government is that armed police officers perform a unique and high-risk role. They are trained to use lethal force, on behalf of the state, to protect the public, often in fast-moving and dangerous situations. This puts them personally at risk of death or serious injury every day in the course of their duties. They deserve our thanks and admiration for putting themselves in harm’s way to protect the public—and that, a point made by many of your Lordships, includes you and me. Because many of those with whom they engage are involved in serious crime, it exposes them and their families to the risk of retribution. That is the Government’s starting point.

There is another equally important principle in play: we do not have secret trials in this country. The principles of open justice and the ability for the press to report on cases continues to be one of our proudest and most carefully and jealously guarded traditions. I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, for whom I have the utmost respect, for putting in impassioned terms the importance of freedom of the press and freedom of speech.

So why then have the Government decided to introduce a presumption of anonymity in trials for authorised firearms officers? This limited presumption is being introduced due to the unique nature of firearms officers’ roles and the risks that arise from them being identified during court proceedings. What marks them out from other categories of defendant is that these are not risks merely to their reputation but to their lives. These are not theoretical risks. Firearms officers who have been charged with an offence can face serious death threats and other forms of intimidation. The threats do not stop with them but extend to their families as well. The real and present nature of this danger cannot be ignored.

I want to give two illustrations of incidents which demonstrate how extreme the consequences can be for those who serve as firearms officers. In one case, a contract for murder was issued against an officer who had acted in the line of duty and who was later found to have acted entirely within the law. In another, a bounty was placed on an officer who, as things turned out, had been lawfully carrying out their responsibilities. The threat is not theoretical; it is a stark reality. The safety of our officers and those they love must not be compromised. Some of these officers may later be found not guilty by a jury, but if they and their families have faced real and credible threats, by then the damage is done.

The time has come for action to be taken. The National Police Chiefs’ Council has said that firearms officers are fearful of the consequences and processes for them if they are involved in a death or serious injury case because of what has happened to colleagues, mostly so because of how it has played out in the media.

The noble Lord, Lord Black, and the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, made the point that the courts already have the power to order reporting restrictions in a case where the court judges that disclosure of a defendant’s identity would give rise to a real and immediate risk to life, and asked why a presumption is necessary. Our answer is this. It must be remembered, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, pointed out, that police officers volunteer for armed roles and they are not compelled to undertake such duties, nor are they paid more to do so. Data from armed policing shows the start of a slow decline in the number of those wishing to serve as armed officers. The armed policing attrition and retention document records that, since 2019, there has been a loss of 583 armed officers. That is an 8.8% reduction. Everyone hearing this should be worried. We rely on these officers to keep us and those we love, as well as our fellow citizens, safe. We, a Labour Government, are persuaded and have decided to act.

We have concluded that we need to strike a balance between the safety and security of our brave firearms officers, who are presumed innocent unless or until convicted by a court of law, and their families and our inviolable principles of open justice and freedom of the press. I venture to suggest that this is what these provisions achieve. The most important things to note are that these. First, once a jury has decided that the defendant is guilty then of course their identity will be made public. Secondly, these provisions establish only a presumption of anonymity during the trial. The judge at any stage has the ability to order that part or all of the defendant’s identifying characteristics should be revealed. It changes only where we start, not necessarily where we end up. Thirdly, the media and others will be informed, as is usual, of cases where there is a reporting restriction in place. Journalists and others will be able to make representations to the judge as to why they say that the identity should be known at an early stage, to help the judge decide where the balance should be struck in any individual case.

I remind your Lordships of the old truism about the difference between what is in the public interest and matters in which the public are interested. It is judges who make decisions of this kind every day and are best placed to do so. I add the reassurance that, where a judge concludes that narrower steps will suffice, the court will order only the minimum necessary. I can say to your Lordships from my own experience, and knowing my former judicial colleagues as I do, that they take the freedom of the press to report trials very seriously indeed. I venture to say that the two distinguished former judges who have spoken in this debate—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—have shown just that.

Open justice remains the starting point. This measure introduces a narrow, rebuttable presumption for a small, clearly defined cohort. Proceedings will remain public, evidence will be tested in open court, and judicial reasons are given. Only the defendant’s details may be withheld, where necessary, until the point of conviction. It expressly allows the court to lift anonymity wherever it would be

“contrary to the interests of justice”

for the anonymity to remain.

I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, that this is a difficult issue that needs to be approached with care and that everyone should be moderate in the way they approach it. However, this measure does not compromise transparency or judicial independence. All it does it ensure that officers are not exposed to undue risk before the facts have been tested and decided upon by a court. It is about fairness, safety, and maintaining confidence in policing and justice.

I hope that my explanation of these clauses has gone some way to reassuring your Lordships. It would, as always, be a pleasure to meet the noble Lords, Lord Black and Lord Faulks, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, again—I think this is the third time in 48 hours that I have offered to meet him—as well as representatives of the News Media Association, who have written to me at least twice on this important topic. I would be more than happy to discuss all of their concerns. In the meantime, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Black, to withdraw his opposition to the clause standing part.

[Lord Black of Brentwood (Con)]

I thank the Minister very much for her comments and the offer to meet. I suspect she is involved in a large number of meetings at the moment, and we will try not to add too much to the burden.

This has been a very good debate on a difficult subject, but one, as we have heard from a number of people, that is of profound importance. We have to get the balance right, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said, and that is what this debate has shown.

I will make three quick points, if I may. First, to underline what we heard a number of times in this debate, of course we all have huge admiration and respect for firearms officers. They are a very brave group of people who do a great deal here to protect us, and we are in their debt. They deserve protection. The points we have tried to make are that they have it at the moment. The difficulty with these clauses is that it is made automatic. That means, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said, it is not always going to be easy to rebut.

There is an issue, as far as the media is concerned, that a presumption of anonymity could mean that the media is not put on proper notice and therefore is unable to challenge the presumption, if indeed those media outlets possess the resources to do so. If it is left to potluck that reporters become aware then open justice erodes, because the media has not got a chance to consider whether it should contest the presumption.

Secondly, the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and others have said that, thankfully, it is a very small number of cases such as this that ever come to court. It is not about that; this is a matter, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said, of high principle. In my experience, open justice and press freedom do not perish because of obvious assaults against them but because of apparently innocuous incremental changes such as this and the provision of special cases. The point, as my noble friend Lady Cash said, is that if anonymity becomes the default, openness has to be justified. That is the end of a very slippery slope, which is one of the things the Minister and I can talk about when we meet.

Finally, to echo a point that the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, made, at the end of the day, this is about state power and the exercise of state power. We chip away at the scrutiny of that at our peril. To do so, we should have overwhelming evidence. I appreciate what the Minister said in summing up, but I still do not believe that the case has been made. A number of noble Lords have said that we have time before Report to consider this further. It is a matter of huge importance, so let us take the time before Report to do so. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my opposition to the clause.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 17th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Sugg and Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for tabling Amendments 353, 354, 355, 355A and 356. I thank all noble Lords for what has been a powerful, moving and interesting debate on this subject. Honour-based abuse is a dreadful thing. I add my voice to those who want to thank all the survivors for their courage and determination in speaking out.

I remember that, when I received judicial training, we were told that we as judges should refer to these horrible crimes as so-called honour-based abuse to make it clear—as was noted by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra—that there is nothing to do with honour about them. That said, the Government have listened to the preferences of survivors and the specialist sector, and for this reason I will refer to it only as honour-based abuse. I can see the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, nodding her head.

The amendments seek to ensure that front-line professionals such as the police, social workers and teachers properly understand and spot this abuse and accurately record and store this information. We absolutely share that objective. As your Lordships will be aware, the Government have already committed, as the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, has reminded us, to introducing multi-agency statutory guidance on honour-based abuse, alongside a statutory definition. We recognise that doing so is a vital step towards providing a clear framework for professionals with statutory safeguarding responsibilities as to how they should identify honour-based abuse. To that end, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, for meeting me last week to discuss Amendments 353 and 355. I thank Natasha Rattu of Karma Nirvana, whom I met this morning.

I congratulate your Lordships on the strength of feeling about getting this measure on the statute book as soon as possible. The Government agree that swift action is needed to ensure that professionals have a strong foundation for tackling honour-based abuse, but I would just say that this is an extremely nuanced and complex form of abuse. We need to ensure that the range of abuse experienced is captured and that we do not build in any unintended consequences, to use the phrase used powerfully by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. To that extent, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir, and we are happy to work with her to ensure that we have covered all eventualities.

We must do this once and we must get it right. We owe that to the victims and survivors who have suffered. I am not able today to give a timeline for this commitment or say whether this Bill will be used as a suitable legislative vehicle, but I assure your Lordships that we are getting on with this work and are doing so quickly. My speaking note said “at pace”, but I asked the officials to take it out because it tends not to gain favour in this House. We are doing it quickly, and I can confidently commit to the Government updating the noble Baronesses and the noble Lord on the progress of this work ahead of Report. I hope that provides reassurance to various Members who raised the question of timeliness.

I now turn to Amendment 355A, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, which makes the important point that we need to ensure that data collection and storage by statutory agencies is consistent and accurate. The Home Office already requires all police forces to share data on criminal offences that have been flagged as related to honour-based abuse. This is published annually. But I agree with the sentiment of his amendment and can confirm that, in developing the multi-agency statutory guidance, the Government will consider how to ensure that data in relation to suspected and confirmed criminal offences related to honour-based abuse is properly recorded and stored by front-line agencies.

Amendments 354 and 356 seek to add honour-based abuse as a statutory aggravating factor. As your Lordships are aware, doing so would require courts to treat such offences as having increased seriousness because of the presence of this factor. We completely agree that in principle this is a good thing but, as both noble Baronesses correctly anticipated, we do not believe that creating a statutory aggravating factor is either necessary or desirable.

The reason we think it is not necessary is that the specific elements that make honour-based abuse so serious are already covered in the sentencing guidelines. Judges are already required to treat the fact that an offence involved an abuse of trust or that the victim was vulnerable as aggravating factors. In cases where the abuse is part of a domestic relationship, there is the entire overarching guideline specifying additional factors, which explicitly mentions honour-based abuse. These amendments would therefore unnecessarily duplicate existing guidelines, which the courts are required by law to follow.

I said it was neither necessary nor desirable; I turn now to why it is not desirable. I also speak from experience when I say that the workload of a Crown Court judge is an extremely heavy one, in large part due to the backlog in the Crown Courts inherited by this Government. Adding to the list of statutory aggravating factors significantly adds to the workload of judges when sentencing. For every new aggravating factor, the list of items that a judge needs to state that they have considered, and their sentencing remarks, get longer and longer. I therefore feel strongly that we ought not continually to increase this list, especially when existing guidelines already apply.

The noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, alluded to the fact that I had said this in relation to another group of amendments earlier in the week. These two proposed aggravating factors are the sixth and seventh time that new aggravating factors have been debated in this Committee so far, and I know that there are more proposals for different aggravating factors yet to come. As I hope your Lordships will appreciate, our judges already have a huge undertaking as part of the sentencing process. We wish to avoid unnecessarily burdening them or the process any further, because to do so would risk lengthening individual sentencing hearings, just at the time when we are trying to reduce the backlog in the interests of the very victims we are discussing, among others.

That said, the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, makes a powerful case and I would welcome further discussion with her as to how we can achieve the objectives, even if not necessarily by adding a further statutory factor—I mention both noble Baronesses in that context. This Government’s priority is to strengthen identification and response through robust statutory guidance and a clear definition, ensuring that professionals have the tools they need to tackle this complex form of abuse effectively. So, on the understanding that we will consider Amendments 353 and 355, which I know are the top priority for the key stakeholders, ahead of Report, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Sugg (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for taking part in this debate. As I said, it is slightly later than hoped but really is much appreciated. I am grateful for the Minister’s reply and, as I said earlier, her openness to engage on these issues.

On the aggravating factor, I will consider carefully what the Minister had to say and look forward to having ongoing conversations on that. On the definition and statutory guidance, I very much agree that we must ensure that it is fit for prosecution, but we also need to make sure it works for interventions to protect earlier, ideally before any crime is committed. The definition really needs to be survivor-grounded: it needs to reflect their lived experiences and must recognise the impact of multiple perpetrators, the presence of community dynamics, layered coercion and collective control.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir, for her contribution. I know that everyone involved in developing the definition and, crucially, survivors themselves are very keen to engage directly with her.

We have been discussing this for many years. The definition and the guidance are the crucial amendments, as they would act as the foundation for the systemic changes we need to see, and this Bill really is the right place to do that. I very much hope that the Government will bring back a revised definition and guidance amendment on Report that is agreed by the sector and survivors. I will do all I can to help on that. If that is not the case, I reserve the right to return to this again, but, on that basis, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 15th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I fully appreciate the general principle behind these proposals. This is an incredibly serious subject, and I appreciate the sincerity with which the noble Baronesses have approached the debate.

On the amendment in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Blower, everyone wants to reach a scenario where all possibilities are accounted for, and there are no loopholes through which those who either encourage or abet self-harm can jump. It is for that reason that I cannot offer my support for proposed subsection (6) in the noble Baronesses’ amendment. First, I am sceptical of the need for more aggravating factors. The general offences that fall under loosely defined so-called honour-based abuse are crimes themselves, so I am unsure why there is a need to create an aggravating offence when a criminal will already be able to be tried for those offences individually.

Primarily, though, I do not think this is the right time to be incorporating new definitions into our legal framework. There is guidance for Crown prosecutors as to what might fall under honour-based abuse and examples as to how that might look, but it is yet to be enshrined in law and it is a rather broad and non-exclusive term within our law. That is not to say that it is not easy to spot—it often is—but it should have its own delineated legal definition before it is made an aggravating factor. I agree with the noble Baroness that honour-based abuse is an increasing issue that we must tackle head on, but that cannot be done with a single amendment. However, I offer my support to the principle behind proposed subsection (6)(b).

I welcome the sentiment behind Amendment 335 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. Policy rooted in pragmatism is crucial, and consultation and guidance are one of the primary ways to achieve that. The Government should base all the policy that they bring forward on the testimonies of people who dedicate their lives to the subjects that we legislate on, and that it is especially important for a policy in such a sensitive area as this. I hope the Minister agrees, and I look forward to her response.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for tabling Amendments 334A and 335 respectively.

I am aware of the cases that have motivated the desire to have an amendment such as Amendment 334A, and I completely understand; the stories that the noble Baroness outlined cannot fail to move anyone listening to them. Having said that, the Government will not be supporting either of these amendments today, for the following reasons.

I shall deal first with the amendment by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. When a defendant has previous convictions, including those relating to a history of domestic abuse, that is already recognised as a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing. In addition, aggravating factors that are associated with honour-based abuse, such as abuse of trust or targeting vulnerable victims, are already covered in the domestic abuse guidelines. The presence of aggravating factors such as these should therefore already result in the sentence reflecting those factors, and in my experience it always would. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, about not adding an ever-increasing list of statutory aggravating factors. This is certainly the third group of amendments that I have dealt with that has proposed different forms of offences.

On the second aspect of the amendment, proposed subsection (6)(b) raises a sensitive and important issue. The Government wholeheartedly agree that, when it can be proved that suicide was the result of abuse or encouragement, the abuser should be held accountable. There are existing offences that cover this situation, such as manslaughter or encouraging or assisting suicide offences, which have maximum penalties of life imprisonment and 14 years’ imprisonment respectively. However, imposing a requirement for the court to sentence the defendant in those circumstances as though they had been convicted of murder, when in fact they have not been convicted of murder, would be at odds not only with the current sentencing approach but with the principle that people are sentenced only for matters that have been proved to the satisfaction of the court. I also make the perhaps obvious comment that there is no range of sentences for murder; there is only one sentence, which is life imprisonment. For those reasons, amending Clause 102 in this way would not be appropriate.

However, I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that the Law Commission is currently undertaking a review of homicide offences and of sentencing for murder, and this will include a review of the use of, and the obstacles to using, manslaughter offences where abuse may have driven someone to suicide. I hope that the noble Baroness will understand why the Government are reluctant to make any piecemeal amendments in advance of the Law Commission reporting.

I turn to Amendment 335, from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I thank the noble Lord for his welcome of the offence. As to the guidance that he proposes in the consultation, as many in this Committee are aware, I was principal legal adviser to a rather well-known former Director of Public Prosecutions—I spent five years working for the Crown Process Service—so it is important to me to emphasise that it is in fact for the independent Crown Prosecution Service to update guidance on prosecuting offences under this new provision. It may well be that many noble Lords know this but, while the statutory Code for Crown Prosecutors governs in general terms how prosecutors make decisions on which cases to prosecute and which not, sitting underneath that is a raft of legal guidance that is published and publicly available. It exists for two reasons: the first is so that members of the public can see the basis on which the CPS makes its decisions, but the second is so that the CPS can be held to account. If it fails to follow its own guidance, that will often provide a ground for challenging the decision made.

I understand that the noble Lord’s amendment aims to ensure that legitimate support or therapeutic activity is not criminalised, so I reassure him that the offence has been carefully drafted to avoid capturing vulnerable individuals or those providing mental health support. The offence as drafted in the Bill was recommended by the Law Commission in its 2021 malicious communications report and contains two key safeguards: first, that the person must intend to encourage or assist serious self-harm and without such intent no offence would be committed; and, secondly, that serious self-harm is defined as harm amounting to grievous bodily harm. These safeguards ensure that the offence targets only the most serious and culpable behaviour and protects those who are, for example, sharing personal experience or discussing self-harm but not encouraging it.

The offence also does not cover the glorification or glamorisation of self-harm. The Law Commission found that that was too broad and would potentially capture vulnerable people who might then be exposed to prosecution: so, taking on board the commission’s comments, the Government have not included that.

In our view, this approach ensures that the offence is necessary, proportionate and focused on genuinely harmful acts. There is also a further protection for the vulnerable, which is provided by the public interest stage of the full code test. This requires that, even where there is sufficient evidence, prosecutors must consider whether or not a prosecution is required in the public interest, and plainly the vulnerabilities of the potential defendant would come into play at that stage.

I hope that the reasons I have provided clearly set out why the Government do not support either of these amendments today, and I ask that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, do not press their respective amendments.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I thank the Minister, who has carefully taken us through three limbs, as far as I tell: first, there will be CPS guidance in terms of the specific offence, in the way that it decides whether or not to prosecute; secondly, the way that the offence itself has been drafted; and, thirdly, the public interest test. However, will she engage with the organisations that are concerned about the offences? I think I understand what she is saying about intent, grievous bodily harm and the other limbs that mean we will not see the kinds of prosecutions that people are concerned about, but will the MoJ engage with the organisations that have concerns?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. As far as the first of the three protections is concerned, obviously I cannot bind the Crown Prosecution Service—the whole point about it is that it is independent of government. However, based on my own experiences, where there are areas of the law that plainly need clarification as to when the Crown Prosecution Service would prosecute and when it would not, it usually issues guidance. As regards engaging with the organisations, of course, it is sometimes not easy to explain the law and the thinking behind it. It is in everyone’s interests that the organisations which are concerned for vulnerable people understand that the Government have those interests very much at heart. I would welcome the opportunity to explain to them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to the amendments in this group concerning the important issue of child abduction. I am very grateful to noble Lords for their contributions this evening. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for bringing forward Amendments 335A and 335B, which raise important questions about the interaction between Clause 104 and the lived reality of victims of domestic abuse. The amendments probe how the new offence will operate where a parent has acted out of fear for their own safety or that of their child, and they touch on the wider issue of how the criminal law recognises coercive, controlling and violent relationships.

We very much support the principle behind the noble Baroness’s amendments and the safeguarding concerns that they highlight. I look forward to hearing from the Minister about how the Government intend to ensure that the operation of Clause 104 does not inadvertently criminalise vulnerable parents acting in desperation to protect themselves or their children.

Government Amendments 336, 496, 521 and 549, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, create and support a parallel offence in Northern Ireland relating to the detention of a child overseas without consent. I recognise the importance of maintaining consistency across jurisdictions and ensuring that children in Northern Ireland benefit from equivalent protections. I would be grateful if the Minister can set out how the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland intends to exercise the new regulation-making and commencement powers. What discussions have taken place with relevant agencies to ensure that the offence can operate effectively in practice? I look forward to the Government’s response on these points.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I too thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for tabling Amendments 335A and 335B. Her amendments have been grouped with the modest collection of government amendments—336, 496, 521 and 549—tabled in my name, which extend the provisions contained in Clause 104 to Northern Ireland.

I note the concern raised by the noble Baroness and the noble Lords, Lord Meston and Lord Davies, my noble friend Lord Hacking and the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, that Clause 104 will criminalise parents who are fleeing domestic abuse where the detention of the child is primarily motivated by the intention of keeping themselves and/or the child safe. I reassure your Lordships that this absolutely is not the intention of the existing Clause 104. Indeed, in developing the provisions, very careful consideration was given to the implications of potentially criminalising a parent who has detained their child abroad.

Before I turn to the reasons why the Government will not be supporting these amendments today, I want to explain a little more about the purpose of Clause 104’s inclusion in the Bill. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for her clear and even-handed explanation of her understanding of the reason why the Government included it in the first place. The clause seeks to implement the Law Commission’s 2014 recommendation that the Government should close a small gap in the law by making it a criminal offence for a parent, or person with similar responsibility to a parent, to detain a child abroad without appropriate consent, once the original consent has expired.

I am sure that I do not need to explain to anyone that the abduction of a child by a parent is an extremely distressing experience for everyone involved. For any Government, the aim is to safeguard children from abduction by preventing the unlawful removal of a child, ensuring their swift and safe return when they have been taken and upholding custody rights through international co-operation and legal enforcement. The new measure is intended to be consistent with the existing criminal framework, to stand as a deterrent and a backstop where we know that a gap in the law is being exploited, even if by very few people. Some of those who have not returned a child are themselves abusers; they are abusive parents seeking to evade the law. We cannot leave that gap unclosed.

However, I have listened very carefully to the concerns raised by your Lordships this evening, and to some sent to me by organisations with an interest in this area. I remain satisfied that there is no risk of vulnerable parents who have been victims of domestic abuse being criminalised. I hope I shall be forgiven for setting out my reasons in a little more detail; I alluded to them earlier in relation to an amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, but that was in a slightly different context, and I think I need to give more detail.

Many of your Lordships will be aware that there is a two-stage test for the Crown Prosecution Service to apply when deciding whether a prosecution should be brought. The first is an “evidential sufficiency” test but, even if that stage is passed and it is felt that there is sufficient evidence to bring a prosecution, that is not the end of the matter. The second stage is the “public interest” test, which asks whether the public interest requires a prosecution to be brought. It is this stage of the test that is often applied in, for example, assisted dying cases. This is important, including in a domestic abuse context, because it means that prosecutors must consider the background, including whether the alleged offender was acting from benign motives or was themselves a victim of domestic abuse, before deciding whether a prosecution is required in the public interest. Additionally, and importantly, a third test applies for the new offence in Clause 104 which adds an additional safeguard: that the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions is required for a case to proceed.

Prosecutorial discretion remains a key safeguard, and evidence of domestic abuse would be a highly relevant factor in any decision to prosecute, or in whether the Director of Public Prosecutions would give his consent in addition. Factors that are relevant to the public interest do not require proof to the criminal standard. It is a much more “in the round” assessment than would be required if bringing some kind of criminal proceedings.

To be clear, in answer to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, the Government continue to believe that the civil courts remain best placed to deal with child abduction cases. That is why we support international co-operation and recourse to the 1980 Hague convention as a civil mechanism for facilitating the safe return of children. The UK continues to work with other state parties and the Hague Conference, especially in cases involving domestic abuse, to ensure that the convention operates effectively. The noble Lord, Lord Meston, said, and the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, in effect agreed, that this prosecution should be the act of last resort. We agree. We are conscious, however, that criminal proceedings may be needed in some cases. It has been suggested that some parents see detaining a child abroad following any earlier consent as an easier route to keeping their child permanently outside the UK with no criminal charges or police involvement. That clearly circumvents the law. This change to the criminal law is intended to sit alongside and supplement existing civil remedies, rather than filling the courts with people who have retained their child abroad.

The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, asks whether the Government would be prepared to add a domestic abuse defence, in effect. The law on defences, including those relevant to domestic abuse, is highly complex. It requires definitions and decisions about where the burden of proof lies and what the standard of proof will be. It is precisely because of this complexity that the Law Commission is currently reviewing defences in domestic abuse cases as part of its wider project on homicide and sentencing. While the primary focus of its review is on homicide, the findings are likely to have broader implications for how defences operate in domestic abuse contexts and could be relevant across a broader range of offences. A bespoke defence of domestic abuse in the offence created by Clause 104 could have implications far beyond the child abduction framework.

I hope that the noble Baroness will accept from me that the Law Commission’s findings will be carefully reviewed before any changes to the law are considered, in order to ensure that any legislative changes are informed by evidence. In the meantime, we are exploring ways to strengthen our understanding of how defences operate in non-homicide cases by gathering more robust data. For these reasons, it would be premature to legislate before the Law Commission has completed its work, but I take the point about the equality impact assessment and the gendered nature of some of these offences. I will, if I may, write to the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, and, obviously, to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, as well.

I turn very briefly to government Amendments 336, 496, 521 and 549. Until now, the provisions in Clause 104 extended to England and Wales only. However, at the request of the Northern Ireland Executive, these provisions will now also apply to Northern Ireland. I note the concerns raised by the two amendments brought forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies, but I hope that, for the reasons I have set out, the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment at this stage. I hope your Lordships will join me in supporting the government amendments in this group.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am very grateful to all those who have spoken. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Hacking and Lord Davies, for their implied support. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, for their detailed responses to the amendment and the debate we are having. They rightly confirmed that criminal proceedings must be a last resort, and that we should always aim for these cases to be settled via the family court and through the Hague process.

I am particularly grateful to the Minister for her detailed response on the two-stage test, especially the public interest test. If that is where domestic abuse issues can be assessed, that is good. I am also grateful that she has repeated that the consent of the DPP must be obtained, and that this is not up to the criminal standard. That is very reassuring.

It is always difficult when the Law Commission is working on something, because one cannot say “When is it going to be done?” I hope that it will not be too long. If issues remain after the Law Commission reports, I hope that the Government, or a future Government, will be prepared to discuss this at that point. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

336: After Clause 104, insert the following new Clause—
“Child abduction: Northern Ireland(1) The Child Abduction (Northern Ireland) Order 1985 (S.I. 1985/1638 (N.I. 17)) is amended as set out in subsections (2) and (3).(2) In Article 3 (offence of abduction of child by parent etc)—(a) after paragraph (1) insert—“(1A) Subject to paragraphs (2A) to (3A) and (7), a person connected with a child under the age of 16 commits an offence if—(a) the child is taken or sent out of the United Kingdom with the appropriate consent, and(b) at any time after the child is taken or sent, the person detains the child outside the United Kingdom without the appropriate consent.”;(b) in paragraph (2A)—(i) in the words before sub-paragraph (a), after “United Kingdom” insert “, or by detaining a child outside the United Kingdom,”;(ii) in sub-paragraph (b) (before its substitution by paragraph 4(3) of Schedule 3 to the 2022 Act), after “United Kingdom” insert “, or detains the child outside the United Kingdom,”;(iii) in each of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) (as substituted by paragraph 4(3) of Schedule 3 to the 2022 Act), after “United Kingdom” insert “, or detains the child outside the United Kingdom,”;(c) in paragraph (2B), after “United Kingdom” insert “, or detaining the child outside the United Kingdom,”;(d) in paragraph (3A), in paragraph (b) after “out of the United Kingdom” insert “, or detaining the child outside the United Kingdom,”. (3) In the Schedule (modifications of Article 3 for children in certain cases), in each of the following provisions after “paragraph (1)” insert “or (1A)”—(a) paragraph 1(2)(a);(b) paragraph 3(2)(a) (before its substitution by paragraph 5(2) of Schedule 3 to the 2022 Act);(c) paragraph 3(2)(a) (as substituted by paragraph 5(2) of Schedule 3 to the 2022 Act);(d) paragraph 4(2)(a).(4) The amendments made by this section apply only in cases where the taking or sending of the child out of the United Kingdom takes place on or after the date on which this section comes into force.(5) In this section “the 2022 Act” means the Adoption and Children Act (Northern Ireland) 2022 (c. 18 (N.I.)).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes it an offence in Northern Ireland for a parent etc to detain a child under 16 outside the UK without appropriate consent.