Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments and / or reasons
Thursday 16th April 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, Motions C, D and E relate to the several amendments on fly-tipping the Conservatives tabled on Report. I thank the Government for their amendment on points on licences for fly-tipping offences. Although our previous arguments in support of this policy were opposed by the Government, I welcome their Amendments 10A and 10B, even if it has taken us some time to get to this point. I also thank my noble friend Lord Goschen for his Amendment 12. We on these Benches wholly agree with the principle that it should be the responsibility of and the burden on the offenders who fly-tip to clean up the waste they deposit.

I was disappointed to see the Government tabling Amendment D opposing the amendment that provides police the powers to seize vehicles involved in fly-tipping offences. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, pointed out on Report that this is a business. That is why we need to disrupt the business model by confiscating the means to conduct this criminality. I simply cannot understand why the Government remain reluctant to take firm and decisive action on fly-tipping. They were reluctant to impose penalty points for the offence until they were defeated on Report. It is deeply disappointing that it is their intention to resist my amendment which would put into statute powers for the police to seize vehicles used for fly-tipping. If the Government oppose my Motion D1, I will test the opinion of the House.

On the issue of knife crime, Amendment 15 increased the maximum term of imprisonment for the new offence of possession of a bladed article with intent to use unlawful violence from four to 10 years. As I explained in Committee and on Report, the offence of simple possession of a bladed article under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 carries four years, so it did not make sense to create a new, more serious offence of possessing an article with the intent to do harm to another that carried the same maximum sentence. For both offences to carry the same maximum sentence would be entirely inconsistent with how the criminal law has always approached the issue of intent. That is why we sought, successfully, to amend the maximum term of imprisonment on Report. However, since then the Government have tabled an amendment in lieu that would increase the maximum term of imprisonment for the offence of possessing an article with the intent to harm another to seven years. I thank the Minister for recognising the arguments that the Conservatives made both in Committee and on Report.

I thank my noble friend Lady Buscombe for tabling her amendment regarding closure notices on Report. Recent investigations have exposed businesses that plague our high streets, selling counterfeit and illegal goods as well as unregulated products. In doing so, she has raised important issues which have clearly resonated with your Lordships. It is therefore welcome to see that, despite opposing my noble friend’s amendment on Report, the Government now recognise the importance of this issue, and their amendment in lieu would give the Secretary of State powers to change the maximum duration of closure orders, as well as the maximum period for which such an order may be extended. They also recognise that different provisions may be required for different circumstances, such as whether a building is commercial or residential, so I thank the Government for their Amendment 333A in lieu and I look forward to when the Secretary of State uses the powers conferred by this amendment to lay regulations on closure notices.

As previously stated, if the Government oppose my Motion D1 concerning seizure of vehicles involved in fly-tipping, I will test the opinion of the House.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for the contributions that have been made in response to this group of amendments, both those in lieu from the Government and the amendments tabled by Members here today. I stress that the Government agree with the sentiments behind the amendments in this group. On Amendments 2D and 2E, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, I assure the noble Lord that while the amendments say that the statutory guidance “may” include guidance about the issue of fixed penalty notices, it is our firm intention to issue such guidance. Indeed, I will be happy to share a copy of the guidance in draft form with the noble Lord at an appropriate time when it is ready.

The issue of fly-tipping has permeated through the discussions we have had in the last half an hour or so and I understand the strength of feeling on all sides of your Lordships’ House. That is why we have tabled the amendments in lieu to introduce penalty points for fly-tippers and I emphasise again to noble Lords that, in relation to Amendments 6 to 11, local authorities already have the power to seize vehicles used for fly-tipping, and courts can already impose cost orders on those convicted of fly-tipping. I should add, if I may, that Defra, with the support of the Home Office, is going to explore how the Environment Agency’s powers to address waste crime can be bolstered. We are going to consider how additional measures within the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, the Proceeds of Crime Act and other relevant legislation could achieve this. This work will ensure that the Environment Agency has much stronger powers and tools to bring criminals to justice, intervene earlier and disrupt criminal finances undermining the waste system.

Again, I am sympathetic to Amendment 12 in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, and I understand and welcome the comments from the noble Earl, Lord Russell, in relation to the Waste Crime Action Plan. We are looking at how we improve enforcement around fly-tipping. However, as I have mentioned and as I think the noble Viscount acknowledged, the amendment breached Commons financial privilege, and I thank him for accepting those arguments and not pursuing the amendments further.

I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for accepting Amendment 15A in lieu.

On Amendment 333, it is right that the Government fully consult on any changes to closure powers before making significant changes, and our amendment in lieu does that. Again, I thank the noble Viscount and the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, for their pressure in raising these issues, because it is important. I confirm what I have said to the noble Viscount already, which is that the issue is not how but when we strengthen those closure powers.

I hope I have been able to offer reassurances to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on his amendments and to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, on his. I suspect that I may not have done to the extent that they would wish, but I can only try. We have moved significantly on some of the areas in this group. I welcome the support for the changes that we have made, but I do hope that, in moving Motion A, noble Lords will listen to my wise counsel and not press their amendments.

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Motion D1 (as an amendment to Motion D)

[Lord Davies of Gower]

Moved by

leave out from “House” to end and insert “do insist on its Amendment 11.”

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, fly-tipping is a scourge on our society. We on these Benches recognise it, the public recognises it and landowners recognise it. We consider that the addition of vehicle seizure is an important one, so I beg to move Motion D1 and test the opinion of the House.

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We cannot let the best be the enemy of the good. Let us make no mistake: these amendments to the Bill are a huge victory for the noble Baroness and all victims and campaigners in this field. I very much hope that the noble Baroness receives the assurances from the Government that she is seeking.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friends Lady Owen and Lady Bertin, on behalf of all noble Lords on the Conservative Benches, for their sustained efforts on these important issues. Their work and amendments will surely help to protect women and girls, whether through legislation on the taking down of intimate images or greater protection for age verification in pornographic content. I also thank the Government, particularly the Minister, for their continued engagement on these topics. These Motions are evidence of what this Chamber can achieve through collaborative and productive dialogue.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions not just today but during the passage of this Bill, and for the thoughtful and constructive way in which everybody has engaged with these issues.

I shall be brief and address only one or two of the points that were raised. The first is in relation to Motion G1, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. Motion G strengthens accountability where platforms fail to comply with their duties to deal with non-consensual intimate images. Regarding Motion G1, we recognise the noble Baroness’s concern and want transparency beyond just the biggest platforms. That is why every regulated user-to-user service must be clear with users about how it is meeting the 48-hour takedown duty, while Ofcom can require detailed reporting where it will make the biggest difference. Through Schedule 8, the Online Safety Act allows Ofcom to require detailed information about how providers identify, deal with and take down illegal content. We will amend this through regulations to make it clear that these requirements cover compliance with the new NCII takedown duty, including average takedown times.

Turning to the verification of age, again the Government recognise the concerns raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. We are not intentionally delaying these important changes for the sake of it. I think that the noble Baroness recognises that we all agree that this issue is important, but we cannot shy away from the complex legal and practical issues that it presents. These considerations must be made alongside and flowing from the existing six-month review into parity, closing the gap between regulation of online and offline pornography. For this reason, the 12 months is needed to ensure that we get it right. We are grateful to the noble Baroness for supporting this approach.

On the issue of adults role-playing as children and the question of step-incest, in relation to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, as to the differential in age, it is to ensure that the online offences mirror the underlying offline criminal offences so that there is parity between the two. I should stress that for both these offences, adult role-playing and the extension to step-incest offences, this is a first step. The provisions in this Bill create significant changes already in the criminal law and the parity work to which we have all referred will build on this to address the grey areas where it is illegal offline but difficult to address online via the criminal law.

It remains for me only to thank once again the two noble Baronesses, Lady Bertin and Lady Owen. I genuinely look forward to continuing to work with them in future.

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Certainly, the British Government’s position, which we support, is that we oppose the war in Iran because it is illegal. Certainly, we take the view that the position taken by the US Administration is inconsistent, misconceived, and entirely and dangerously wrong. However, those are not legitimate reasons for voting in a way that appears to condone the behaviour of the Iranian IRGC-supported regime. We have plenty of good reasons for disagreeing with the United States on Iran. I do not see why, in this Parliament, we should refuse to take a step showing our position on the IRGC and its associated organisations. By doing so, we would further antagonise the US needlessly and for no good reason, when we have plenty of other reasons for disagreeing with the President of the United States and his Administration.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for returning with her amendment. I understand the Government are offering to include alternative interventions in youth diversion order guidance, but I agree with the noble Baroness that these considerations should be consistently applied to ensure proportionality. We therefore support the original measure.

Motion U1, standing in my name, returns once again to the issue of proscription of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the IRGC. I am sure that the Minister will once again attempt to use the fact that the last Government did not proscribe the IRGC as a justification for this Government’s position, and I recognise that fact. But the international situation is radically different now from that when we left government. Before this war even started, it was clear that the Iranian regime was ramping up its aggressive activities. At home, it wilfully oversaw the murder of over 40,000 protestors. Overseas, it continued to extend its influence through its backing of terrorist cells. In the UK alone, in 2025, security services tracked more than 20 potentially lethal Iran-backed plots.

This threat has only been exacerbated following the outbreak of war. Just last month, an Iranian man suspected of being a regime spy was arrested for attempting to break into a nuclear naval base in Scotland. We have seen the streets of our capital city filled with regime apologists on so-called Al-Quds day, leading to 12 arrests and countless lost police hours. Proscribing the IRGC would not only give the police more powers to counteract these actions but would send a signal that we do not bow to pressure from oppressive and authoritarian regimes.

I once again anticipate that the response from the Minister will be that this is constantly kept under review—but that is now not good enough. We know what this group is capable of, especially when it has the apparatus of an OPEC state behind it, and now with the current war, we must strengthen our resolve further. The Iranian regime is blocking the Strait of Hormuz, erratically attacking neighbours and, most importantly, influencing—if not sanctioning—potential attacks on British soil.

Quite independently of our national approach to the United States, this Iranian regime is one for which we should have no regard and no tolerance. The Government must now be pragmatic. Their policy must now reflect the international situation—they must undertake this review and proscribe the IRGC. If the Minister still does not agree with this conclusion, I will seek to test the opinion of the House.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for the discussion we have had to date on these matters. As I made clear in my opening remarks—for those who heard them, at least—the Government cannot accept Amendment 311 as drafted. I fully appreciate the work of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, on these issues, but as I have set out to the House already, and as I set out to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, in particular, the independent reviewer has made clear his view that this would undermine the existing proscription regime. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, also recognised that, and I say also to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that this was the position. With the review of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, coming forward, it is right that this amendment not be accepted today. I particularly welcome the recognition of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, of that. That is not to undermine the arguments he has made, but we are where we are at the moment.

On Amendment 359, I stress that both this and previous Governments do not comment on organisations that are being assessed for proscription. As I mentioned in my opening remarks—for those who heard them—we have sanctioned 550 Iranian individuals, including members of the IRGC, so we are holding the Iranian regime to account. We have also put them in the foreign influence registration scheme.

If I may say so, I take objection to the suggestion from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that our not proscribing the IRGC somehow supports the Iranian regime—it does not. I will not accept that we should give a running commentary on proscription. With due respect to the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, they have not had intelligence in front of them on these issues from the intelligence services. We are making judgments as a Government, and we are not going to give a running commentary on what and when we proscribe, because that is a very dangerous position to take.

I remind the House—without commenting on the IRGC in particular—that any eventual proscription order on anybody is voted on by both Houses of Parliament, where it can be tested at that time. I am not in a position today to give a running commentary on the possible proscription of the IRGC, nor will I accept in principle the fact that both Opposition Front Benches think it right to do so. That may be their view, but the Government have to take a view on these matters in due course. It is not for us to give a running commentary on those matters. I say that to the House as a whole.

I stress again that I understand and accept the concerns that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, put before the House today. We will make it clear in statutory guidance that authorities must consider a range of options and interventions before deciding whether to apply for a youth diversion order. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, also stressed that it was important to do so. I stress to both noble Baronesses that the police are under a duty to consult multi-agency youth offending teams, which comprise health, education, probation and police services. I am happy to share a draft of the guidance with the noble Baroness in due course, but at the moment I cannot accept the amendment.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, for her work on her amendment on glorifying terrorism, and for giving her own personal experiences. It is very difficult to do that, and I understand the circumstances that she and others find themselves in. I support the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Polak, on glorification in general. On the incident in Finchley that has been mentioned today, individuals are under arrest and in custody for the alleged offence. We should obviously allow the police to do their job and determine whether charges should be put forward to the CPS for consideration. None the less, that type of incident—whether or not the individuals under arrest are responsible—is simply not acceptable. The Government and others should stand with the community as a whole.

I was pleased to hear and welcomed the contributions of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, and the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, but I cannot accept the Motions in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. I ask—in anticipation and hope rather than aspiration and agreement—that they be content not to press their Motions. In the meantime, I beg to move my Motion N, and I hope the House will agree to it.

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[Baroness Brinton (LD) [V]]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, has set out his reasons for insisting on his Motion Q1, which would delete records that the police hold non-crime hate incidents in certain circumstances which he outlined, even when the police had a concern about the pattern of behaviour and that it might lead to a crime.

I take issue with the comments that the noble Lord has made in that the whole Motion talks only about this very narrow area of what should be held and reviewed. The concerns that we have from these Benches are about the repetition of proposed new subsections (1) and (2), which say that non-crime hate incidents

“must not be recognised as a category of incident by any police authority in the United Kingdom”,

and that:

“No police authority or police officer may record, retain or otherwise process any personal data relating to a NCHI”.


Noble Lords will remember that we were lucky enough to have the noble Lord, Lord Herbert, with us after the College of Policing report was published, and he pointed out that there is a balance between free speech and the targeting of vulnerable people. Other noble Lords spoke movingly about this balance too, including the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, from her and her family’s own experience. So from these Benches, we were pleased when the Government laid their amendments on Report, which set out that balance between freedom of speech, which must be protected, and threats to vulnerable people. Their proposal to use anti-social behaviour mechanisms to record in the future is understandable and appropriate, and we hope that it will work out well. We will wait and see whether it really works.

We on these Benches believe that the combination of the Government’s amendment that is now in the Bill and the new guidance in the College of Policing report provide the balance that is needed to ensure that there is freedom of speech. However, the police will have the capability under the anti-social behaviour legislation to protect the most vulnerable in our community, especially if they are targeted by someone whose behaviour is escalating and the course of that pattern of behaviour could in itself become a crime such as harassment or, even worse, just progress more severely into an actual crime.

If there was nothing on any records up to the moment that a crime was committed, the police would not have been involved. For many vulnerable people who have harassment and other things going on, waiting that long deters and delays police action. There is a difference between that and passing the information on about the files. I believe that the Government’s amendments have dealt with that. On these grounds, we will not support Motion Q1.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Young of Acton for returning to the important issue of NCHIs. Our position as a party has not changed. With 60,000 annual police hours and a quarter of a million cases recorded, which is over 65 a day, this is the extent to which our police forces are having to go to record non-crimes.

The Government have stated that they are not accepting my noble friend’s amendment, as the College of Policing has now published its review into the instrument, complete with recommendations. I welcome this review and that the Government have accepted its conclusions, but it bears no requirements for action. Similarly, while the statutory code of practice addressing the recording of NCHIs has been revoked, there is little reassurance that this will be replaced by a more satisfactory system. This amendment seeks to commit the Government to necessary action now. This measure needs to be on the statute book. Should my noble friend wish to test the opinion of the House, we will wholly support him.

My Amendment 339B in lieu is a redrafted version of the amendment that I tabled on Report concerning the investigation of police officers for misconduct. I thank the IOPC for its engagement with me concerning this amendment. The version before your Lordships now is a more comprehensive drafting, but the underlying point remains the same. Where police officers are acquitted of criminal charges, all misconduct proceedings concerning that specific offence should be dropped.

I want to be clear about how this amendment would operate in practice. It would not mean that acquittal would shield an officer from any potential misconduct proceedings. For example, if the police officer was acquitted of manslaughter, he could still be liable for misconduct proceedings if due process was not followed on a related procedural matter such as filling in correct paperwork concerning the incident. However, the amendment would mean that the police officer, where he is acquitted of criminal charges concerning the use of force, could not then be subject to misconduct proceedings on that same question. As I said on Report, it is wrong that in the absence of my amendment, police officers can be investigated by the IOPC, referred to the CPS, dragged through the courts, acquitted only then to be reinvestigated. If it is the Minister’s intention to oppose this amendment, I will seek to test the opinion of the House.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I moved Motion Q at the beginning of the debate but was, I confess, slow out of the blocks. I should have spoken to Motion Q before Motion Q1 was moved, but I was concentrating on the Marshalled List and missed my opportunity. But the principles are the same.

The Government cannot support Motion Q1 but will support Motion Q, because there has been careful consideration on the recording of non-crime hate incidents since Report. I have appreciated the opportunity to engage formally and informally with the noble Lord. However, he will know that since your Lordships’ House last considered this matter on 31 March, the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council published their joint review of non-crime hate incidents, a review that was commissioned by the UK Government as well. The review recommended ending the current system and replacing it with a new national standard for incident recording and assessment. Under that approach, non-crime hate incidents would no longer exist as a stand-alone category. Instead, hate-related behaviour short of the criminal threshold would be recorded only where there are clear policing purposes within the established anti-social behaviour framework. The threshold for recording would be higher, more tightly defined and supported by trained police assessment and triage practices.

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Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

At end insert “, and do propose Amendment 339B in lieu—

339B: After Clause 151, insert the following new Clause—
“IOPC investigations where officer acquitted
(1) The Police Reform Act 2002 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (5).
(2) In section 13B—
(a) in subsection (1), at end insert—
“but this is subject to the exception in section 13BA.”;
(b) in subsection (2), at beginning, for “The” substitute “Unless the exception in section 13BA applies, the”.
(3) After section 13B, insert—
“13BA No re-investigation on acquittal for the same conduct
(1) Where this section applies, the Director-General may not make a determination under section 13B(2) to re-investigate the complaint, recordable conduct matter or DSI matter.
(2) This section applies where—
(a) the Director-General, appropriate authority or relevant review body (as the case may be) has made a determination under paragraphs 23(2)(c), 24(2)(b) or 25(4G) of Schedule 3,
(b) as a result of the determination mentioned in paragraph (a), the Director of Public Prosecutions has brought criminal proceedings against the relevant person, and
(c) the relevant person has been acquitted in those criminal proceedings.
(3) The exception in subsection (1) does not apply only if—
(a) the relevant authority has come into possession of new and compelling evidence relating to the conduct that was the subject of the investigation, and
(b) the relevant authority is of the reasonable opinion that the new evidence would, if considered, be likely to lead to a finding of misconduct or gross misconduct.
(4) In subsection (3)—
(a) evidence is new if it was not adduced in the proceedings in which the person was acquitted (nor, if those were appeal proceedings, in earlier proceedings to which the appeal related);
(b) evidence is compelling if—
(i) it is reliable,
(ii) it is substantial, and
(iii) in the context of the outstanding issues, it appears highly probative of the case against the acquitted person.
(5) For the purposes of subsection (4)(b)(iii), the outstanding issues are the issues in dispute in the proceedings in which the person was acquitted and, if those were appeal proceedings, any other issues remaining in dispute from earlier proceedings to which the appeal related.
(6) For the purposes of subsection (3), it is irrelevant whether any evidence would have been admissible in earlier proceedings against the acquitted person.
(7) In this section—
(a) “relevant person” means the person to whose conduct the investigation related;
(b) “relevant authority” means the Director-General, appropriate authority or relevant review body (as the case may be).”
(4) After paragraph 24C of Schedule 3, insert—
“Investigation where person acquitted in criminal proceedings
24D(1) This paragraph applies where—
(a) an investigation of a complaint, conduct matter or DSI matter (“the index investigation”) under paragraphs 16, 18 or 19 has concluded,
(b) the final report has been submitted to the relevant authority under paragraph 22,
(c) the relevant authority has made a determination under paragraphs 23(2)(c), 24(2)(b) or 25(4F),
(d) as a result of the determination mentioned in sub-paragraph (b), the Director of Public Prosecutions has brought criminal proceedings against the relevant person, and
(e) the relevant person has been acquitted in those criminal proceedings.
(2) In this paragraph—
(a) “relevant person” means the person to whose conduct the index investigation related;
(b) “relevant authority” means the Director General, appropriate authority or relevant review body (as the case may be).
(3) Where this paragraph applies, the relevant authority may not—
(a) initiate a new investigation,
(b) re-open an investigation,
(c) continue an investigation, or
(d) order a re-investigation under paragraph 25,
against the relevant person in relation to the same complaint, conduct matter or DSI matter that was the subject of the index investigation.
(4) Sub-paragraph (3) does not apply only if—
(a) the relevant authority has come into possession of new and compelling evidence relating to the conduct that was the subject of the investigation, and
(b) the relevant authority is of the reasonable opinion that the new evidence would, if considered, be likely to lead to a finding of misconduct or gross misconduct.
(5) In sub-paragraph (4)—
(a) evidence is new if it was not adduced in the proceedings in which the person was acquitted (nor, if those were appeal proceedings, in earlier proceedings to which the appeal related);
(b) evidence is compelling if—
(i) it is reliable,
(ii) it is substantial, and
(iii) in the context of the outstanding issues, it appears highly probative of the case against the acquitted person;
(6) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4)(b)(iii), the outstanding issues are the issues in dispute in the proceedings in which the person was acquitted and, if those were appeal proceedings, any other issues remaining in dispute from earlier proceedings to which the appeal related.
(7) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4), it is irrelevant whether any evidence would have been admissible in earlier proceedings against the acquitted person.”
(5) In paragraph 25—
(a) after sub-paragraph (4D) insert—
“(4DA) The Director-General may not direct that the complaint be re-investigated under sub-paragraph (4C)(b) if paragraph 24D applies in relation to that investigation.”;
(b) after sub-paragraph (4E) insert—
“(4EA) The local policing body may not make a recommendation to the appropriate authority that the complaint be re-investigated if paragraph 24D applies in relation to the conduct to which the investigation related.”
(6) The Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 are amended in accordance with subsections
(7) to (10).
(7) In regulation 23 (referral of case to misconduct proceedings)—
(a) in paragraph (3)—
(i) in sub-paragraph (b), for “(whatever the outcome of those proceedings)”, substitute “and the officer concerned has been found guilty”;
(ii) before second “regulation” insert “regulation 23A,”;
(b) in paragraph (9), after “10(3)” insert “and regulation 23A”.
(8) After regulation 23, insert—
“Prohibition on misconduct proceedings where officer has been acquitted
23A.—(1) This regulation applies where—
(a) the appropriate authority has made a determination that misconduct proceedings should be brought against the officer concerned under regulation 23(1)(b), (2)(c) or (3),
(b) the misconduct proceedings have been suspended by virtue of regulation 10(3),
(c) any criminal proceedings have concluded, and
(d) the officer concerned has been acquitted in those criminal proceedings.
(2) This regulation also applies where—
(a) the Director General has given the appropriate authority a direction to bring misconduct proceedings against a person under paragraph 23(5A)(e) of Schedule 3 to the 2002 Act,
(b) the appropriate authority has brought misconduct proceedings against the officer concerned in compliance with the direction mentioned in sub-paragraph (a),
(c) those misconduct proceedings have been suspended by virtue of regulation 10(3),
(d) any criminal proceedings have concluded, and
(e) the officer concerned has been acquitted in those criminal proceedings.
(3) Where this regulation applies—
(a) regulations 23(3) and (9) do not apply,
(b) the Director General must withdraw the direction to the appropriate authority to bring misconduct proceedings against the officer concerned, and
(c) the appropriate authority must direct that the misconduct proceedings be withdrawn.
(4) The Director General must withdraw the direction to bring misconduct proceedings under paragraph (3)(b) as soon as the Director General receives notification that the officer concerned has been acquitted in any criminal proceedings.
(5) The appropriate authority must terminate the misconduct proceedings under paragraph (3)(c) as soon as the Director General receives notification that the officer concerned has been acquitted in any criminal proceedings.
(6) Paragraph (3) does not apply only if—
(a) the appropriate authority or the Director General has come into possession of new and compelling evidence relating to the conduct that was the subject of the investigation, and
(b) the appropriate authority or the Director General is of the reasonable opinion that the new evidence would, if considered, be likely to lead to a finding of misconduct or gross misconduct.
(7) In paragraph (6)—
(a) evidence is new if it was not adduced in the proceedings in which the person was acquitted (nor, if those were appeal proceedings, in earlier proceedings to which the appeal related);
(b) evidence is compelling if—
(i) it is reliable,
(ii) it is substantial, and
(iii) in the context of the outstanding issues, it appears highly probative of the case against the acquitted person;
(8) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (7)(b)(iii), the outstanding issues are the issues in dispute in the proceedings in which the person was acquitted and, if those were appeal proceedings, any other issues remaining in dispute from earlier proceedings to which the appeal related.
(9) For the purposes of paragraph (6), it is irrelevant whether any evidence would have been admissible in earlier proceedings against the acquitted person.”
(9) In regulation 49 (referral of case to accelerated misconduct hearing)—
(a) in paragraph (3)—
(i) in sub-paragraph (b), omit “(whatever the outcome)”,
(ii) after “determination,” insert “subject to regulation 49A”;
(b) in paragraph (4), after “10(3)”, insert “and 49A”.
(10) After regulation 49, insert—
“Prohibition on referral of case to accelerated hearing where officer acquitted
49A.—(1) This regulation applies where—
(a) the appropriate authority has made a determination that is within paragraph (2),
(b) the appropriate authority has referred the case to an accelerated misconduct hearing under regulation 49(4) or (7),
(c) the accelerated misconduct hearing has been suspended by virtue of regulation 10(3),
(d) any criminal proceedings have concluded, and
(e) the officer concerned in those criminal proceedings has been acquitted.
(2) A determination is within this paragraph if—
(a) it is a determination that the special conditions are satisfied under regulation 49(1), or
(b) it is a further determination that the special conditions are satisfied under regulation 49(3).
(3) Where this regulation applies—
(a) regulations 49(3) and (7) do not apply, and
(b) the appropriate authority must withdraw the referral of the case to accelerated misconduct proceedings.
(4) Paragraph (3) does not apply only if—
(a) the appropriate authority has come into possession of new and compelling evidence relating to the conduct that was the subject of the investigation, and
(b) the appropriate authority is of the reasonable opinion that the new evidence would, if considered, be likely to lead to a finding of misconduct or gross misconduct.
(5) In paragraph (4)—
(a) evidence is new if it was not adduced in the proceedings in which the person was acquitted (nor, if those were appeal proceedings, in earlier proceedings to which the appeal related);
(b) evidence is compelling if—
(i) it is reliable,
(ii) it is substantial, and
(iii) in the context of the outstanding issues, it appears highly probative of the case against the acquitted person;
(6) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (5)(b)(iii), the outstanding issues are the issues in dispute in the proceedings in which the person was acquitted and, if those were appeal proceedings, any other issues remaining in dispute from earlier proceedings to which the appeal related.
(7) For the purposes of paragraphs (4) to (6), it is irrelevant whether any evidence would have been admissible in earlier proceedings against the acquitted person.”””

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I beg to move and test the opinion of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

Leave out from “House” to end and insert “do insist on its Amendment 359.”

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I listened very carefully to what the Minister had to say about the intelligence that the Government have, but I think the evidence has been very clear, on our news channels, about the terror that the IRGC has caused in its own country. The threat to the UK from the IRGC is evident to all but the Government, it seems, so I wish to test the opinion of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

Leave out from “House” to end and insert “do insist on its Amendment 439.”

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

Motion X1 is consequential.

Motion X1 (as an amendment to Motion X) agreed.