(7 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, when I first looked at this Bill, the first word I wrote down was “privacy”—which may be a legacy of recent Home Office Bills. Then I wrote down “housing market London” and then “reputation”. My noble friend Lady Bowles referred to the fundamental agreement with society. The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, reminded us—picking up points made by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford—of the importance of engaging the public without the deterrence of bureaucracy, which I am not alone in the Chamber in having suffered from. I should perhaps have first written “transparency”, which goes hand in hand with—I stress this—the accessibility of information, because the antithesis of transparency is not privacy but secrecy. So I will not be defensive if, from time to time during the passage of the Bill, I apply in a moderate way the lens of privacy.
What might seem, at first sight, a rather dry subject on only a very little reading turns out to be the stuff of a page-turning thriller—possibly accompanied by coffee and Sachertorte, as the noble Lord, Lord Dear, reminded us, as lunchtime comes and goes. Sadly, it is not fiction that apparently more than £100 billion of dirty money goes through the UK system each year, so far as one can tell—ironically, as my noble friend said, equivalent to twice the size of Panama’s economy.
The criminality that is the subject of the Bill does very real damage to the UK’s reputation and to individuals. The noble Baroness, Lady Stern, referred to the penetration of grand corruption and gave your Lordships a very vivid picture of the impact of corruption. The noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, referred to the importance of the restoration of funds. We have been briefed by organisations outside this House on the evidence of the cost to developing countries of corruption and of the use of tax havens.
Of course, it is all around us. You do not have to go on a kleptocracy tour to see it in London. Transparency International said:
“For those in possession of corrupt funds, a property in the UK can provide a secure investment, but also help bestow prestige, respectability and a bolthole when the going gets rough at home. Most importantly, property in the UK can be acquired anonymously through companies registered in secrecy jurisdictions and anti-money laundering checks can be bypassed with relative ease”.
That is a pretty quick canter through many of the issues that this Bill gives rise to—one could quote very much more from Transparency International on this subject.
I resent, on behalf of those who struggle to find housing in London and those who are affected, perhaps slightly less directly but still pretty directly, by corruption, the fact that property in my city is available to corrupt individuals. There are some developers at the high end who are selling London. I welcome the steps taken to tackle the situation. I dare say that, from these Benches, we will be pressing the Government for more, while also unpacking how appropriate and effective the measures in the Bill will be. Some of this will be detail, but important detail. For instance, is £100,000 the right threshold for unexplained wealth orders? How big should be the identifiable tip of a possibly very substantial iceberg?
The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, referred to safeguards. I am sure that we will want to satisfy ourselves about those. I confess to feeling a little discomfort, which perhaps in the context is inappropriate, about a civil rather than a criminal standard of proof applying in this area. No suspicion is required in the case of a non-UK or EEA politically exposed person. That is a hook on which to ask about progress on the definition of PEPs domestically, possibly in writing, after this debate. My noble friend Lady Kramer alerted me to the possibility of guidance being given by the FCA, I think, under the recent Bank of England and Financial Services Act. It is quite clear that there are issues around domestic PEPs.
Like everything else, new legislation depends on enforcement. Would it be indelicate to inquire whether the Minister wants to say anything on the sharing of information and co-operation with other EU states, post Brexit? There are 27 states, of course, like the 27 fragmented supervisors who have been referred to. Comments have been made about the number of SARs now; quantity can hinder effectiveness. One must worry about the NCA’s capacity to deal with super SARs, though I note the reference of the noble Lord, Lord Dear, to the description of systems that are in use.
I am anxious about the extension of seizure and forfeiture powers, but not perhaps as the Minister may expect. Why extend them only to specified items? I appreciate that the list of items in question can be extended, but why not to all items now—certainly all items of personal property, if not real property, such as land?
I noted the extension elsewhere in the Bill of powers to immigration officers, which will take my noble friend Lord Paddick and me back to comments we have made on previous legislation about the disappearing distinction between immigration officers and the police. We may also want to probe a little on the supervision and powers of civilian counterterrorist investigators. My noble friend Lord Sharkey, who cannot be here today but will, I know, join us at a later stage, wants to probe the operation of deferred prosecutions and will have suggestions about money being held in escrow until the agreed sum is paid, given the problems of collection of cash—because it seems that pockets and wallets are sensitive to depletion in a way that, apparently, deprivation of liberty cannot match. Prison seems to be merely an occupational hazard to some people.
I mentioned the damage to individuals. Corruption and the infringement of human rights go hand in hand. I welcome the Magnitsky amendment. The Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member, commented on the issue. The committee is currently looking at business and human rights, including issues of strict liability, civil remedies and reporting and transparency. There is quite a lot of read-across here.
My noble friend Lady Kramer rightly mentioned the issue of whistleblowing, while the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, the noble Lord, Lord Watson, and others mentioned corporate liability—but I will come back to where I started, with transparency. There is a clear will to spend some time in Committee on the implementation of public registers of beneficial owners in British overseas territories. It was the focus of the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, though we heard a contrary view. The UK has led the way and we have heard about steps being taken elsewhere in the European Union. Let us acknowledge that Montserrat has committed itself to introducing a register, though we do not know when, and use our influence—or, if necessary, power—over what are, after all, British overseas territories: further and faster, as the right reverend Prelate said.
The term “open for business” is used quite a lot at the moment, in the context of the UK being open for business. None of us wants to be open for the business of being used as somewhere to bleach some very dirty laundry.
(7 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as we conduct our negotiations, it must be a priority to regain more control of the numbers of people who come here from Europe but also to allow British companies and British public services to employ people with the correct skills, and companies to trade with the single market in goods and services.
My Lords, does the Minister agree with the statement in the recent CBI report that we need,
“a system informed by business rather than imposed on business”,
and that this is,
“essential to the future economic growth of the UK”?
Are the Government talking and listening to employers? What have they had to say about the £1,000 levy about which we have heard today?
My Lords, the Prime Minister has made it absolutely clear that she wants to hear from all sectors and from anybody who is interested in the subject of Brexit. All opinions and cases made to her will be listened to, and she will form her views accordingly.
(7 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendments 1 and 2 deal with the same issue and are amendments to clauses requiring people to state their nationality when an immigration officer or constable suspects that an individual may not be a British citizen. Underlying our amendments is a concern that these powers may be exercised on the part of law enforcement officers in a discriminatory fashion. Suspecting that someone “may” not be British is a low hurdle.
At the previous stage, the Minister said that,
“it is already the case that officers may only ever act on reasonable grounds when exercising their powers”.—[Official Report, 12/12/16; col. 1012.]
That sounds all well and good, but if that is the case then why, in closely comparable provisions in Section 43 of the Immigration Act of this year, is there the formula:
“if the officer has reasonable grounds for believing”?
That formula is used in the case of requiring someone to provide a driving licence if he is suspected, or, as I say, if there are reasonable grounds for believing him to be not entitled to drive in the UK. Belief, as in the Immigration Act, is, as I understand it, in itself a higher hurdle than “suspicion”, but earlier this year it was considered that the formula which I have quoted was appropriate—both belief and reasonableness.
I was grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, during the previous stage. He made a substantive point about the term “reasonable”. Given the constraints of Third Reading, my amendments today are based on what might be called a technical point: that there is, as a matter of legal construction, a lower test to be applied under the Bill than under the Immigration Act. Two provisions which mean the same thing should be expressed in such a way as to indicate that. If they are expressed differently, there must be an implication—I hesitate to say this, given other noble Lords who are sitting around the Chamber—that they do not mean quite the same thing. To be told that we should base the point about reasonableness on what I think comes from the relevant PACE code does not, I am afraid, satisfy me. I probably took the Minister by surprise by making this point at the previous stage, but I hope that she may be able to answer the point, or better still to agree to the amendment.
This amendment also enables me to refer to a commitment given during the passage of the Immigration Bill, when we discussed the provision to which I have just referred. My noble friend Lord Paddick and the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence of Clarendon, were very much involved with this issue and meetings were held with the then Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Bates. I think that he was as concerned at the possible misapplication of the provision as we were, and we had quite a long meeting to discuss it. He offered this in debate:
“I would … like to make sure, when the consultation document is published”,
on that provision and the piloting of it, “that we reconvene”, and that the noble Baroness and my noble friend should,
“meet with officials again … to get the noble Lord’s and the noble Baroness’s perspective on that. How the pilot scheme will be framed will also be looked at. Again, we would value the noble Lord’s and the noble Baroness’s perspective. We will make sure that that happens before they are brought forward and placed in the Library, and before the pilot commences”.—[Official Report, 15/3/16; col. 1772.]
At the last stage, we heard that the provisions under the Immigration Act on the production of drivers’ licences were to be piloted. It was not known at that time whether that would be a pilot in conjunction with the pilot which is provided for in this Bill. I hope the Minister can give us assurances about wide consultation, including about where the pilots should take place. She was able to tell the House that one pilot would be in Hampshire, which everyone to whom I have mentioned it has reacted by saying that it is not a very helpful place to show whether the provisions might be used in a discriminatory fashion. That is a substantive point and I hope the Minister can assist on it, but at this late stage of the Bill I base the amendments on the technical point of comparison with the Immigration Act. I beg to move.
We take the view that the police should always act in a reasonable way.
I think that encompasses our arguments.
With regard to the pilots, I am grateful for the noble Baroness’s assurances, but had there been consultation on the choice of Hampshire, she might have had some useful input.
I do not know whether the noble Baroness is in a position to tell us whether there is a distinction between an immigration officer or constable “suspecting” under these clauses in the Bill and an officer having “reasonable grounds for believing”. Are these different tests? It seems to me that suspecting and having reasonable grounds for believing are not the same, but I think she is telling us that they are. Does she have anything that she is able to add?
I am slightly muddled by what the noble Baroness is saying. Could she explain that a bit more?
I take the point that different formulae are used in different parts of immigration law, but the Immigration Act to which I have referred provides for an officer to have “reasonable grounds for believing” something, while under this Bill, he simply has to “suspect” something. “Reasonable grounds for believing” seems to me to be a much tougher test than simply suspecting. The noble Baroness may have something she can share with the House on that.
Suspecting and believing are slightly different words, obviously. Perhaps I had better write to the noble Baroness with more clarification.
My Lords, I wonder whether this is something that we can add to the discussion or consultation on the pilots. If one is going to pilot two provisions in the same place, carried out by the same officers and prompted no doubt by the same observations, it would be quite interesting to have them either able or not able to require documents from the same people, but not able to do so because in one case the ground applies and in the other it does not. I realise we are getting into very fine detail, but it will be very real detail in the application. It is not the noble Baroness’s fault, but I can see that we are not going to be able to make further progress on this today. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, Amendment 12 is in essence the same as our Amendments 12 and 14 on Report, which we withdrew in the light of the Minister’s response. In accordance with that response, I have since received a letter from the Minister that covers guidance on a PCC’s business case and consultation arrangements, and on the terms and conditions of fire personnel transferring to PCC fire and rescue authorities and to chief officers under the single-employer model.
My purpose in tabling this amendment at Third Reading is to ask the Minister to cover the content of her letter to me in her response today so that it is on the record in Hansard. The letter said that government Amendment 11 on Report meant that,
“the PCC would always be required to publish a response to their consultation, regardless of whether they have local agreement or not”,
and, crucially, that,
“the guidance will fully reflect the issues covered by your amendments 12 and 14”,
on Report, which are now reiterated in Amendment 12, which we are now discussing at Third Reading. The letter also said:
“Whilst this guidance will be owned and issued by APACE”—
the Association of Policing and Crime Chief Executives—
“Home Office officials are part of an advisory group that has been set up to steer the development of the guidance and are working closely with the authors to ensure that it reflects Government’s expectations”.
In other words, the guidance reflecting the Government’s expectations will fully reflect issues covered by our Amendments 12 and 14 on Report, which are repeated now in Amendment 12, which we are now discussing at Third Reading.
If the Minister can place on record in Hansard the key parts of the letter that she sent me following Report, then from my perspective that would achieve the purpose of this amendment. In particular, confirmation of the points that I have just made, and which are referred to in the letter, about the guidance fully reflecting the issues covered by my Amendments 12 and 14 on Report, and the fact that the guidance will reflect the Government’s expectations, would be extremely helpful.
My Lords, I am glad that the noble Lord has dealt with the matter as he has and has sought to have the points put on record. I wonder whether, in replying, the Minister can confirm that in paragraph 3(d), the requirement on the commissioner to publish,
“in such manner as the commissioner thinks appropriate”,
is consistent with the description that the noble Lord has just given—and that, within statute, one cannot think something “appropriate” without it also being “reasonable”.
(7 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I join the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, in his expression of regret. I was for some time a member of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee and can confirm his characterisation of the restraint it uses in its reports. It does not use extreme language and reports to the House only when it is very necessary to do so. My regret goes wider than the process but the committee is to be thanked for that process. It is dogged in its pursuit of detail and in reminding departments of the requirement to maintain the necessary standards as regards the mountain—it is a mountain—of instruments which are put before Parliament.
I shall say a few words about these regulations but I want to make a broader point. The likelihood must be that, in connection with exiting the European Union, Parliament will be asked to approve, or not to oppose, very large quantities of secondary legislation. I think of the great repeal Bill as a great reinstatement Bill because it will repeal one thing but it is likely to provide a mechanism for reinstating a very great deal of our current legislation, as an awful lot of legislation will have to be reinstated in domestic law. It is critical—I do not use that term lightly—that those instruments have the highest standards and do not require the sort of pursuit of detail, or indeed of meaning, that characterises this instrument.
I have more of an objection to these regulations than the committee has, and I guess that it would have been outside its remit. The undesirability of regulations which require guidance for them to make sense is an issue. The committee says that guidance should be available in draft when the regulations are being considered so that Parliament can in effect treat them as part of the scrutiny process. It should not be necessary to rely on guidance to understand the kernel—the fundamental issues raised by regulations. That is not only because, like regulations, guidance is unamendable by Parliament but because it can so easily be changed without reference to Parliament.
The committee in this instance quite rightly advises the House that the interpretation of specific terms and how decisions are made should be set out clearly in this instrument. I note that it says:
“A fundamental tenet for new legislation is that it should not make work for the courts by using loosely worded provisions”.
That is particularly notable since the Government so much object to what they perceive as judge-made law.
These regulations deal with particularly sensitive subjects, so the issue of redaction, raised by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is of concern. Paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 is about integration—a topical and concerning issue. Paragraph 7 of Schedule 1, to which the noble Lord referred, attempts to define, although not exhaustively, the “fundamental interests of society”. The best that can be said about them is that may be a better term than “British values”. The committee says:
“We are surprised that so significant a change should be implemented by a negative instrument, and also”—
as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said—
“that it was undertaken without any prior consultation”.
I could imagine this House spending at least two days debating the fundamental interests of society, and probably not coming to a conclusion. Academia could spend months and years over it. To see them listed, or purported to be listed, in the schedule to unamendable regulations, is therefore bold. I will not attempt to analyse and critique the list, but I cannot resist mentioning the conjunction of a sub-paragraph about “protecting public services”, which is right up against,
“preventing the evasion of taxes”.
Although it would not be relevant to this, you cannot think about that without the context of how services and taxes relate to one another. Perhaps more importantly, the people who will be affected by this and who see that conjunction of issues may well wonder what fundamental interests—or interest—society has in their position, and the way they will perceive these regulations will not be a happy experience. We support the Motion.
My Lords, I thank both noble Lords who have made comments during this debate.
Following the public’s vote to leave the European Union and until exit negotiations are concluded, all the rights and obligations of EU membership remain in force and the Government will continue to apply and implement EU legislation. It is important to continue to make this point at the outset. At present, the rights of EEA nationals and Swiss citizens to live and work in the UK have not been affected by the referendum.
It is the free movement directive that mainly sets out those rights, and it is implemented in the UK through the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006, as amended. These regulations were amended in 2009, 2011, twice in 2012, twice in 2013, three times in 2014, and in 2015 to reflect developments in immigration policy and to give effect to relevant case law. As noble Lords will therefore appreciate, this has resulted in a legislative framework that has become quite fragmented and complex.
The new 2016 regulations, which are the subject of today’s debate, do not significantly change the Government’s policy and legal position as set out in the 2006 regulations. Their main effect is to revoke and replace the 2006 regulations, consolidating the previous legislation, modernising the language used and simplifying terms, where possible, in line with current drafting practice.
The Government have also taken this opportunity to address issues concerning the practical application of the 2006 regulations and to clarify our approach in key areas such as criminality and the abuse of free movement. These changes are not about restricting the free movement rights of law-abiding EEA nationals and their family members who make a valuable contribution to society but about making sure that we are in the strongest possible position to deal with those who come here and do not abide by the rules.
I totally agree with noble Lords that it is undesirable to have regulations that are broad and open-ended in nature. That is precisely why we have made some of these changes. For example, the 2006 regulations stuck closely to the wording of the free movement directive, simply providing for a person to be expelled from the UK on public policy and public security grounds where their conduct represents a,
“genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society”.
That wording clearly covers a wide range of scenarios and could be criticised as being too broad and overarching, possibly giving rise to a lack of certainty, either for individuals or for the courts, as to what behaviour might meet that threshold.
European Court of Justice case law in this area is clear: member states have a margin of discretion to determine the fundamental interests of their society. Therefore, the 2016 regulations are now significantly clearer by providing further descriptions and examples of matters of public policy and public security, and they provide more detail about what the Home Secretary considers to be in the fundamental interests of the United Kingdom in respect of taking such decisions under these regulations.
The changes clarify that we can take deportation action in a broad range of cases, including against those who abuse their free movement right by facilitating illegal immigration or engaging in immigration abuse—for example, through sham marriage—or those who undermine our public services through tax evasion or benefit fraud. The regulations also make it clear that it is not only high-harm criminality that threatens the fundamental interests of the UK but persistent low-level offending as well.
As noble Lords can see, the new regulations do not significantly change the legal position; rather, they spell out the detailed factors that decision-makers and the courts should take into account when considering whether the deportation of an EEA national is in the fundamental interests of society. The new drafting approach in the 2016 regulations merely sets out a fuller range of circumstances and interests that fall within the term “public policy”. However, this range always fell within the meaning of that term, even under the 2006 regulations, so there has been no extension of the term.
Clearly, there is a very broad and varied array of circumstances in which an individual may pose a threat to public policy concerns, so it is quite impossible to draft in a way that specifically deals with each possibility but still provides comprehensive coverage in a single document that is not excessive in length. To ensure comprehensive cover in a manageable document means it is inevitable that some of the provisions are somewhat broad in nature. Although I am all for improving clarity and providing extra detail, having to describe in legislation every possible circumstance would be neither practically possible nor indeed helpful, given the number of provisions this would need and the changing threats that UK society faces.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, queried the sorts of persistent low-level offending that will be aggregated to qualify a person for removal. As is very much the case now, and as is required under both the 2006 and the 2016 regulations, all decisions taken on the grounds of public policy and public security will be made in accordance with the principle of proportionality, will take into consideration the personal circumstances and will be based exclusively on the conduct of the individual concerned. For this reason, there is no prescribed list of offences, nor a threshold for the number of offences which must be committed in order for a decision to be made on the grounds of public policy or public security to combat persistent offending—a matter which is of significant concern to the public.
I note the noble Lord’s concern about the level of scrutiny that Parliament has been able to afford these new regulations. I hope that the reassurances I have given as to the modest evolutionary rather than revolutionary nature of the 2016 regulations will serve to explain why, as was the case with the 2006 regulations and their very many amendments, the Government considered that the negative resolution procedure was the appropriate mechanism. The noble Lord also raised the issue of consultation. We of course consulted other government departments where substantive policy changes were made; for example, implementation of the Upper Tribunal case of Sala, removing a right of appeal from applicants seeking recognition as an extended family member.
I understand the reasonable point made by noble Lords that it would have been helpful if the guidance had been published when we laid the regulations, to assist their scrutiny. We did publish detailed guidance on GOV.UK regarding Regulation 9 when it came into force on 25 November, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said. Detailed guidance on the remainder of the regulations will be published when they come into force on 1 February. However, I am afraid that we are not in a position at this point to provide additional information on the remaining regulations. The noble Lord also mentioned that the guidance on Regulation 9 relating to the genuineness of residence included several redacted sections marked “For Home Office Use Only”. As is usual with redacted sections of guidance, disclosure to the court will be considered on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the relevant procedural requirements or court order.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said that the new, more specific drafting gives rise to concern that a different approach would be adopted across the country due to the terms being somewhat general and non-exhaustive. As I think I have mentioned, the new drafting substantially improves on the drafting of the 2006 regulations, and in the 10 years they have been in effect there has been no complaint about differing geographical application even though, based on the above argument, surely the risk was so much greater given that all this was covered in one sentence in the 2006 regulations but is now covered by many times that number of words.
Schedule 1 seeks to replicate the existing position in the 2006 regulations but in a clearer way by providing extensive language to describe the scope of things such as the fundamental interests of society in relation to public policy.
The noble Lord also asked what the procedure was for acting on these reports and at what level. A parliamentary team will bring the various reports to the attention of relevant units within the Home Office, and the directors of those units are responsible for ensuring that the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee is considered and taken account of at the relevant time and in relation to future practice.
I hope that I have covered all points that noble Lords raised. I am sure that they will intervene if I have not.
My Lords, I shall accept that invitation. This is not a point that I have raised before and I do not expect the Minister to have an instant answer, but I make a plea. I would not have found the guidance had I not seen a reference to the date when it was published. Even then, it took me some time to navigate the GOV.UK website to find it, by which time I did not have very much time to look at it. There seemed to be no cross-reference to the number or title of the regulations, and I think the guidance may well cover more than just these regulations. I really think that that website could do with the uninitiated doing some mystery shopping on it.
I will certainly take that point back because, if the noble Baroness cannot find it, lesser mortals would really struggle.
In conclusion, the Government believe that the changes made in the 2016 regulations do not fundamentally change the legal position set out in the 2006 regulations and that the measures are proportionate. I hope with those words and with my explanation on the noble Lord’s questions, that he will feel free to withdraw his Motion.
(7 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I extend my thanks to the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs for its advice, which has informed the order. I also congratulate Dr Owen Bowden-Jones on his appointment as the new chair of the council, as announced in yesterday’s Written Ministerial Statement.
This order relates to methiopropamine, commonly known as MPA, as well as to its simple derivatives. This compound has been controlled under a previous temporary class drug order—a TCDO—which expired on 26 November 2016. If this order is made, MPA, as well as its simple derivatives, will be subject to temporary control under Section 2A of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 for a further 12 months. This will allow the ACMD to gather and consider more evidence in order to make a substantiated recommendation for permanent control under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.
MPA is a stimulant psychoactive substance which is similar in its chemistry to methamphetamine and has similar effects to that substance, such as stimulation, alertness and an increase of energy and focus. Side-effects reported include abnormally fast heart rates, anxiety, panic attacks, perspiration, headaches, nausea, difficulty breathing, vomiting, difficulty urinating and sexual dysfunction.
The ACMD has reported that MPA initially emerged as a replacement drug for the methylphenidate-based compounds which had been temporarily controlled under a previous TCDO. Of particular concern was the potential high risk of bacterial infection and local tissue damage due to MPA being injected.
The ACMD notes that the initial TCDO has been effective in halting the problematic proliferation of MPA since it was first introduced in November 2015. The effectiveness of the TCDO has been particularly evident in areas of Scotland where instances had been reported previously. Although anecdotal, the evidence indicates that the prevalence and the use seen prior to the TCDO seem to have abated, particularly in relation to intravenous injection. Notably, Police Scotland, which initially alerted the ACMD to the possible displacement of MPA from ethylphenidate has reported reduced instances of injecting MPA; the number of phone call and database inquiries to TOXBASE—part of the National Poisons Information Service, which provides NHS healthcare professionals with a 24-hour, year-round clinical toxicology information service—regarding MPA have reportedly decreased; and there has been a reported decrease in the availability of MPA in online markets.
Parliament’s approval of this order will enable UK law enforcement to continue action against traffickers and suppliers of temporary class drugs while the ACMD gathers evidence. The order also sends out a clear message to the public, especially to young people, that these drugs carry serious health risks. We know that the law cannot, on its own, deter all those inclined to use or experiment with these drugs. However, we expect the TCDO to continue to have a notable impact on the availability of and in turn the demand for these drugs.
As well as our legislative response, we continue to take action to reduce the demand for drugs and ensure that those who become dependent have access to the support that they need to recover. We will continue to update our public health messages to inform the public of the harms of new psychoactive substances using the latest evidence gathered from early warning systems. With that, and apologies for the use of so many acronyms, I beg to move.
My Lords, I have one concern, which I did not expect to have until I read the Explanatory Memorandum. This is of course the second temporary order in respect of MPA, and the memorandum tells us:
“The Secretary of State has received a recommendation from the ACMD that an order should be made on the basis that this substance is a drug that is being misused”—
we have heard about that—
“and that the misuse is having harmful effects”.
However the Explanatory Memorandum goes on to report the ACMD’s,
“difficulty in finding any significant data relating to harms, seizures and prevalence”,
of MPA since the first order. Can the Minister comment on that? I do not of course advocate the use of any drug, but if the ACMD has not been able to show evidence of harm, is there a danger that by banning this drug we might be pushing people towards harm from another drug that is used instead of it, rather than protecting them from it? It seemed an interesting pairing of comments, if you like, in the Explanatory Memorandum. Since we are talking about temporary orders, and the first temporary order has not apparently provided the opportunity to do what we would have expected it to do, it would be helpful to have a comment on that on record.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her explanation of the purpose of the order, which we support. As has been said, it replaces the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Temporary Class Drug) (No. 3) Order 2015. That order provided for temporary controls on the drug methiopropamine, known as MPA, which made it an offence to produce, import, export, supply or offer to supply it. The 2015 order expired after 12 months. This order replaces that 2015 order and continues the controls for another 12 months.
As has been said, the Secretary of State has the power to make a temporary class drug order as long as two conditions are met: first, that the drug is not yet classified as a class A, B or C drug, and, secondly, that the Secretary of State has consulted with or received recommendations from the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs and has determined that the drug in question is being or is likely be misused, has harmful effects and should be subject to controls.
MPA is a psychoactive substance similar to methamphetamine. Controls were placed on MPA at the recommendation of the ACMD. The ACMD’s assessment was that MPA was dangerous and had side-effects including anxiety, panic attacks and difficulty breathing, and had apparently been implicated in 22 deaths between 2012 and 2015. The ACMD also reported that MPA had become an injecting drug of choice. Following 12 months of temporary controls, however, the ACMD has reported anecdotal evidence that usage has declined. Police Scotland has reported reduced instances of injection, and the ACMD has pointed out a number of other reasons for believing that its use may be in decline, to which the Minister has already referred and which I do not intend to repeat.
The ACMD has also reported that currently there is insufficient evidence on harms, seizures and prevalence of MPA for it to make a permanent recommendation. That is why it has recommended that the drug, in all its variations, be subject to another 12 months of temporary control to allow it to gather and consider more evidence before it makes a substantive recommendation.
I hardly imagine that the point I wish to make is one that the Minister will be able to answer, but I will raise it nevertheless. We support the order, as I say, but we do not appear to have been provided by the ACMD with any reason why it believes, since sufficient evidence has not come to light in the first 12 months of an order, that sufficient evidence is likely to come to light in the next 12, which this order would cover. I merely put that point to the Minister but I imagine that, quite justifiably, she will say that that is something for the ACMD to comment on. Still, it seems a slight weakness in the letter from the ACMD to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, which contains its recommendation, that it remains rather silent on why it believes that that evidence may become available in the next 12 months, bearing in mind that it has not been available in the 12 months to date.
(7 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I too thank the Minister for her careful explanation. I will not oppose the order, but this is a moment for reminding ourselves of the distinction between distasteful and, in a non-technical sense, offensive speech and the promotion of terrorism and other actions which are the criteria for proscription. In that connection, I would like to remind myself and the House of the importance of freedom of speech.
The Minister described some of the activities of National Action. I have read of its advocacy that, when it assumes power, those who promote liberal values, tolerance and multiculturalism will be “in the chambers”. She referred to photographs taken in what had been gas chambers. It has used the phrase “Hitler was right”; it is quite clear what it means by “the chambers”. When one of its members was jailed for a series of anti-Semitic tweets against the Member for Liverpool Wavertree, National Action led a campaign to have him freed. It clearly supports violence to achieve its political goals and has gone well beyond the bounds of free speech, into advocating violence and engaging in acts to “compel, coerce or undermine” the Government, which is engaging in terrorism.
However, that is a stronger definition of terrorism than in the current legislation. This definition was first advocated by my noble friend Lord Carlile of Berriew in 2008, when he was the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. It was supported by David Anderson, the current reviewer, in 2014. National Action clearly falls within both the legal and recommended definitions of a terrorist organisation, but I wonder whether the Minister has anything in her brief about these recommendations. David Anderson also recommended that proscription should be for a limited period and subject to renewal. I would be grateful if the Minister could say whether this order is time-limited or in some way subject to review.
As the Minister said, this is the first order against a right-wing organisation that advocates terrorism. I understand—I think these figures are from the National Police Chiefs’ Council—that the number of far-right referrals to the Prevent programme increased from 323 in 2014-15 to 561 the following year, which must be the most recent year for which we have figures. Does the Minister have any comments on that?
These Benches support freedom of speech and this proscription, and it has occurred to me, listening to this debate, that an organisation such as this infringes the right of free speech for the rest of us.
I thank noble Lords for their constructive comments. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, asked about the freezing of funds. As I outlined in my speech, it is entirely possible and we freeze assets, but we do not comment on whether individuals are being considered for an asset freeze. If that were the case, it would be an operational issue for the police and the Treasury.
On how easy it is to get round the order if an organisation is renamed or a new organisation is set up, if organisations change their name, they remain proscribed. We can, of course, also lay a name change order to clarify that they remain proscribed. We most certainly keep extreme right-wing groups under review, as we would with any other type of proscribed organisation, but we do not routinely comment on whether an organisation is under consideration. I hope that answers noble Lords’ questions. I thank noble Lords for their comments.
(7 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I often feel when I have the first amendment after Questions that I should explain to Members of the House that it may not be the showstopper that they will be expecting later in the afternoon. Also in this group are government Amendments 180 and 181, which also relate to the requirement to state nationality. I thank the Government for their amendments. I will leave the Minister to decide whether I am insufficiently grateful or was simply asleep on the job when we debated this previously.
Amendment 179A deals with the new section to the UK Borders Act introduced by Clause 144. The requirement to state nationality is not a casual inquiry. It will be a criminal offence not to give nationality in the circumstances set out and it will carry sanctions of a fine and imprisonment. We propose in this amendment that the requirement should be made only if the immigration officer or police officer concerned reasonably suspects the individual not to be British. Amendment 179B contains a similar amendment to the requirement to produce a nationality document. We regard this as appropriate if one is to have these provisions at all and believe they should reflect the Immigration Act of earlier this year in which provisions about searching a person or premises for a driving licence require,
“reasonable grounds for believing that a person … is not lawfully resident in the United Kingdom”.
Inserting a requirement of reasonableness seems entirely appropriate.
Government Amendment 180, which responds to an amendment proposed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member, seems a little narrower than that proposal, which referred to,
“alternative documents sufficient that such a document would normally be issued by the relevant authorities”.
Our Amendment 180A takes what amounts to documents that enable the establishment of nationality a little further than what would normally be sufficient to establish it. It occurred to us, for instance, that when a person’s country is in a state of conflict it may not be possible to follow through to the establishment in the way that the government amendment requires. In other words, it would not be possible to fulfil the requirement.
Amendment 181 with regard to pilot schemes is welcome. Can the Minister tell the House where the pilots will take place, how long they will last and, especially, what is “effectiveness”, which is referred to in the amendment? The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has commented on this amendment, which it calls “a sub-delegation of power”—which is one for the real aficionados of constitutional niceties—and said that it,
“would expect to be given a compelling justification for any such power of sub-delegation, why it is needed and how it is intended to be exercised”.
It very delicately made the point, about which I will not be so delicate:
“The scope … is potentially significant and could … allow the obligations … to be targeted on different classes of persons”.
As the Minister will be aware, we are concerned about the possibility of discrimination in the application of the provision.
The DPRRC went on to say that,
“‘piloting’ generally means that powers are being conferred to apply new statutory provisions unevenly and temporarily on an experimental basis. For this reason, we usually expect certain standards to be met in relation to pilot schemes”,
which it sets out as:
“the intended purpose of the pilot regulations”;
use of the affirmative procedure; a requirement on the Secretary of State to “consult interested parties”; to,
“provide on the face of the Bill for the maximum duration of any pilot regulations”;
and to require the Secretary of State to report on their “outcome and effectiveness” and lay the report before Parliament. The committee makes recommendations to that effect. The Minister will obviously be aware of the DPRRC’s report. I hope she will respond to each of those items.
Amendment 181A reflects our concern that it will be only too easy for the clauses to allow for racial and ethnic discrimination. It would not be the first time that assumptions have been made by law enforcement officers. The Home Office under the previous Home Secretary was particularly aware of the importance of stop-and-search powers not being applied in a discriminatory fashion and disproportionately. Our amendment would require an assessment in this regard. Amendment 181B would require a report on that assessment—not just on possible discrimination, but on effectiveness.
Amendment 181BA is on the same theme. We were concerned—I was going to say on these Benches, but it was not only on these Benches—during the passage of the Immigration Bill about what I have heard badged as the “offence of driving while black”: in other words, somebody subject to discrimination who is required to produce a driving licence or documents to prove he is entitled to drive. We suggest in this amendment, admittedly in deliberately quite short order, that the review should focus on the application of the provisions in the relevant clauses in this Bill and the sections in the Immigration Act, the effects of which focus in particular on ethnicity and nationality.
The Minister may regret putting the pilot scheme into the Bill rather than just announcing it, having all these questions asked of her, but we welcome the careful approach she has signified. We are keen to follow it through, as I hope our amendments and my remarks indicate. I beg to move.
I will write to the noble Lord to clarify that point.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. When the noble Baroness writes, perhaps she can also explain this about what the Government did in the Immigration Act 2016. For this purpose, I simply refer to Section 43, which introduces a new paragraph in Schedule 2 to the 1971 Act providing for power to be exercised only if the authorised officer has “reasonable grounds” for believing that, in this case, the driving licence is on the premises. The very fact that that terminology is used in legislation which we passed a mere few months ago must raise the question of why it is not included in the comparable clause in this Bill. I know that the noble Baroness cannot answer this at the moment, but I hope that as well as writing, she might be able to discuss this with officials. It is an intrinsically important point, but also a technical one, as to why it should not be included in this Bill. Perhaps we can come back to this at Third Reading. I am not of course expecting her to do anything other than nod sympathetically, as she is doing.
The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee will no doubt consider the Government’s response, but I note that on the question of the affirmative procedure, the Minister said that she did not think that these regulations should be subject to parliamentary procedure. The committee also suggested, or would require, that the Secretary of State should consult interested parties before making the regulations. I am not sure—I might have missed it—whether she referred to the maximum duration of pilots. I accept that there will be post-legislative reviews, and that everything has to be kept under review, but it is the importance of the subject matter which led us to raise the point about requiring an ad hoc review.
I do not know whether the Minister has any information as to whether the pilots and guidance under the Immigration Act are going to be introduced in tandem with, and in the same areas as and so on, the pilots under this Bill. Does she have any information about that?
I think that is still under discussion at the moment with various authorities.
My Lords, we will see, but I am glad to note the Home Office’s acceptance of the importance of the issue, which I never had in doubt. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, this amendment is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Paddick. In Committee the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, proposed an amendment which is now in the Bill as Clause 155. Our amendment is not to challenge the clause but to ask for clarification. I have two questions. It became clear after the clause was agreed that the issue is more contentious than I had appreciated. It is about ending the automatic requirement for an inquest for those detained in the circumstances that are the subject of the provision. It is not about there being no right to an inquest; the noble Baroness made that entirely clear.
However, there seems to be a wider issue about the application and impact of deprivation of liberty safeguards—DoLS is the acronym. I was asked, as other noble Lords no doubt were, by Liberty to table an amendment to remove the clause. I said: “No: that is not only inappropriate but our procedures would not allow it”—but it seems right to ask two questions.
The Government are aware of the first question. The Liberty briefing suggested that cost saving was at the heart of the amendment to the legislation. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, described the emotional stress for families, and I do not think she came anywhere close to cost savings. I would be grateful if the Government could tell us what cost saving is likely to be achieved by the change, or otherwise allay that fear. The second question, as is obvious from the amendment, is: what consultation did the Government undertake before the amendment that they supported on the previous occasion? I beg to move.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for raising this important issue. The Government take seriously their responsibilities to the very vulnerable group of people in society whom this amendment concerns. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for her deep knowledge of this issue, and for the words that she has spoken this evening.
Coroners in England and Wales play a critical role in investigating the deaths of persons where there is a suspicion that death may have resulted from violence or unnatural causes, or indeed where the cause of death is unknown. Coroners will continue to have this duty with regard to persons who have been deprived of their liberty as authorised under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. There is no restriction on when or by whom deaths can be reported to a coroner. Indeed, the registrar of deaths has a duty to report deaths to the coroner where he or she considers that the coroner’s duty to investigate may apply.
The Government recognise that there is a need to improve the scrutiny of deaths that are not investigated by a coroner. The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 contains provisions to introduce medical examiners who will contact the deceased’s family and those involved in the deceased person’s care to identify any concerns as part of a reformed death certification process.
We consulted on our proposals earlier this year and aim to publish our response to the consultation in the new year. This will of course be particularly relevant to vulnerable people in hospitals and care homes, regardless of whether they are being deprived of their liberty. Medical examiners will not just be responsible for scrutinising individual deaths not investigated by the coroner but will have a role in analysing data on deaths across their area. They will identify patterns and contribute to lessons that will reduce avoidable deaths. They will also have a duty to report to coroners deaths for which a coroner’s investigation may be required.
The effect of Clause 155 will be that the death of anyone subject to a deprivation of liberty safeguards authorisation, or an appropriate Court of Protection order, will no longer trigger an automatic coroner’s investigation. We supported this change in the law in the light of views expressed by the then chief coroner, his honour Peter Thornton QC, in his 2015-16 annual report. He called for immediate action to remove deprivation of liberty safeguards cases from the definition of “in state detention”—a point that, just prior to his recent retirement, he reiterated to the Minister for Victims, Youth and Family Justice.
The issue here is not simply one of the resources needed to undertake these inquests. The then chief coroner had addressed this to some extent through his 2014 guidance, revised in 2016, which set out a streamlined process. But, as he has said, these inquests “serve no good purpose”. It cannot be right that more than 20% of inquests undertaken each year are unnecessary, with all that that implies in terms of added anguish for bereaved families.
I thank the noble Baroness for raising the profile of this important issue, but I hope that she will accept that the Government’s recently completed consultation on reforming the death certification process will, when its proposals are implemented, complement and support the work of our coroners who investigate suspicious deaths.
I think that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked who we consulted in the consultation. The Ministry of Justice consulted the former and current chief coroner. Having said that, we consider that this removes any further need for further consultation on the coroner’s statutory duties, and I hope that the noble Baroness will therefore be content to withdraw her amendment.
I thank the Minister, but I cannot restrain myself from observing that her answer has been that there has been a consultation and that the Government will publish their response to it next year. I say that as nicely as I can, because clearly a lot of work has gone on with regard to this—and I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, as well, for filling out the information that she gave pretty comprehensibly to the House on the last occasion. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I will be brief, but my name is attached to most of the amendments which we are now addressing. A victims’ rights Bill was introduced in the other place last year by the then shadow Home Office Minister, Sir Keir Starmer, and it had all-party support. As the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has said, victims’ rights are largely covered by entitlements in the victims’ code and affected by various other initiatives in recent years. However, the key thing is that the code is not legally enforceable and feedback from victims suggests that it is not applied by the relevant agencies. Maybe that is because they are aware that a failure to provide the service does not make a service provider liable to any legal proceedings. Lack of information and support to victims are the major areas of concern, with victims prioritising the right to information, protection, treatment and support as the highest priorities. These amendments place victims’ rights in a statutory framework and place a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to publish and implement a strategy to provide training for all relevant professionals and agencies on the impact of crime on victims. In essence, these amendments lay down what support should be offered to victims, how that support is managed, what training is necessary to put it into place and how complaints can be pursued. These amendments have our support.
My Lords, I hope that my noble friend will understand that, given the further business to which the House has to attend tonight, I will confine myself to saying that we on these Benches enthusiastically support her amendments.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for meeting with me, and for tabling these amendments again so that this House has a further opportunity to debate the important issue of victims’ rights.
Some of the amendments seek to place aspects of the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime on a statutory basis. This is a statutory code, provided for by the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004, and as such all criminal justice agencies are required to provide the services victims are entitled to under it. Many of the entitlements for victims included in the proposed amendments are already in the code. Some are for all victims of crime, while others are enhanced entitlements for the most vulnerable victims of crimes such as stalking and domestic and sexual abuse. Placing them on a statutory footing separately will not ensure compliance, nor guarantee that those entitlements are delivered effectively. The effect would merely be symbolic, and make amendment and updating of entitlements more difficult.
As I said before, we recognise the importance of training for professionals who work with victims. Under the police educational framework and national curriculum, police officers and staff receive training on the code throughout their careers. Officers and staff can receive training on the code at various stages of their careers. This training is supported by a new online package launched by the College of Policing. All Crown Prosecution Service staff who attend court have been given face-to-face training on the new Speaking to Witnesses at Court guidance and on how to interact with victims and witnesses at court without undermining the fairness of the trial. This is supported by a comprehensive package of e-learning, which barristers who appear for the CPS in court are expected to complete.
We also appreciate that more can be done in relation to certain categories of crime. That is why, for example, the College of Policing, as part of reviewing its guidance on stalking and harassment investigations, is looking at whether police officers fully understand the offences and are receiving appropriate training. It is also why Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate are carrying out a joint inspection to assess the effectiveness of police forces and the CPS in dealing with cases involving stalking and harassment, and to examine the service received by victims. The CPS is developing a training package for its prosecutors to improve the quality of charging and review decisions in stalking and harassment cases.
There has also been a concerted effort to improve the response of the police in domestic abuse cases. In its most recent national thematic inspection of the police response to domestic abuse, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary found improvements in police attitudes towards victims and front-line officers’ understanding of the importance of dealing with victims in a supportive way. Since 2014, every police force has published a domestic abuse improvement plan, new guidance has been published by the College of Policing, new training has been successfully piloted and for the first time, police are now collecting data against a national standard on all domestic abuse recorded crimes. A joint police and CPS witness care review is looking to identify clear performance measures which would include timeliness of communication of information to witnesses as set out in the code. In addition, Her Majesty’s Courts & Tribunals Service is undergoing an audit by the Government Internal Audit Agency on the effectiveness of arrangements in place for victims and witnesses, against requirements in the victims’ code and the witness charter. Results are expected in the first quarter of 2017.
In order to determine what is required to strengthen further the rights of victims of crime, we are looking at available information about compliance with the victims’ code, and considering how it might be improved and monitored. We are also looking carefully at the range of proposals that have been made by the Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses and others. We are focused on making sure we get this work right, and ensuring that any future reform proposals are evidence-based, and an effective and proportionate approach.
Finally, in relation to Amendment 188, which seeks to provide a direct route of complaint for victims to the Parliamentary Ombudsman, I should add that on 5 December the Cabinet Office published a draft public service ombudsman Bill. The Bill will improve access to the ombudsman’s services by allowing for all complaints to be made with or without the help of a representative and in a variety of formats to meet the digital age. When the Bill is brought before your Lordships’ House, it will provide a further opportunity for noble Lords to test whether the measures I have set out are delivering the improvements to the experience of victims in their interaction with the criminal justice system that we all want to see.
I hope that, having further debated these issues and received greater detail of the work that is being undertaken both by the Government and by the criminal justice agencies, the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.
(8 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 219D, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Rosser, would be an important step in enabling police and crime commissioners to tackle online abuse of children. Only once local police forces begin systematically collecting these data can we know the prevalence of the issue. Only once the prevalence of the abuse is known can commissioners begin to tackle it and to provide adequate resources and appropriate services. Digital technology has fuelled an explosion in these crimes over the last two decades, including children being forced to commit sexual acts online and children being groomed online for the purpose of abuse and exploitation in the real world. The impact of these horrendous crimes can be devastating, and children can be repeatedly revictimised as images of their sexual abuse are viewed online by offenders all over the world.
At a national level, progress on tackling these crimes has been made, such as the Child Abuse Image Database. The centralised expertise of the National Crime Agency also plays a key role in keeping children safe in the most severe cases, but we remain concerned about the ability of police forces to respond adequately to online offences committed against children at a local level. The recent HMIC child protection report found that there is a huge local variation in the response to these offences, including delays of up to 12 months in forensically examining devices. Such delays can have serious implications for the safeguarding of children, including children not being promptly identified and safeguarded and reoffending taking place while a device is still being analysed.
An NSPCC freedom of information request found that police use of cyberflags to monitor online sexual crimes against children is worryingly patchy. A small number of forces said they were not using this or did not know about mandatory cyberflags. It is imperative that this failure to cyberflag offences is addressed. Requiring local forces to collect these data, in addition to the data collection outlined in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, could help address this variation and help to build a local picture of prevalence.
In June, Operation Lattise, Police Scotland’s first national operation to crack down on online child sexual abuse, brought the scale of the problem into sharp focus and demonstrated what can be achieved when there is a focused response. Running for six weeks, the operation resulted in 77 people being arrested and charged as a result of 134 investigations. This led to more than 30 million indecent images of children being recovered.
As police and crime commissioners develop their local plans, the Government must ensure that the police focus their attention on this area, and this amendment would help to do that. I beg to move.
My Lords, no one would suggest that the issues to which the noble Lord has referred are not hugely important, but I shall make a point which may not be wholly popular. There is a limit to what legislation can do when—to me and I think to my noble friend Lord Paddick, with whom I have consulted very briefly—it is a matter of culture and practice.
I believe that police and crime commissioners have made a start on sharing information. I suspect there is a long way to go and that most of them would say that there is a long way to go, but to provide that everything that is good practice—I am probably arguing against an amendment that I have already proposed on a different issue, and more that I will propose—and that culture and practice can always be enshrined in legislation, which requires the issue to go up to the Home Office and then come down again, is something that I would not go so far as to say I am instinctively against, but I feel instinctively needs to be questioned.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for bringing this forward and drawing attention to what is a very important issue. Exploitation of, and offences against, children, whether online or offline, are appalling and this Government are committed to tackling such criminality very robustly. The internet has opened up a wealth of opportunities for young people, but it has also exposed them to new dangers.
The Government are committed to improving the safety of children online and have a strong track record of working with the internet industry and the charitable sector to achieve it. However, we also recognise that our understanding of the scale and nature of the problem is far from complete, and in many ways we almost feel that we are running to stand still.
Our starting principle is that what is illegal offline is illegal online and criminal offences typically apply in both environments. However, recognising that the picture is less clear in relation to offending online, the annual data requirement on forces includes a requirement to flag offences where the reporting officer believes, on the balance of probability, that the offence was committed, in full or in part, through a computer, computer network or computer-enabled device. This online flag has been mandatory since April 2015, and all 43 forces in England and Wales have provided data since then.
The NCA’s annual strategic assessment of child sexual exploitation and abuse, published in August, found that the visibility of the threat was improving, but that there remained significant intelligence gaps in relation to the overall scale and prevalence of the threat. The NCA works continually to improve our understanding of the threat. I reassure the noble Lord and the noble Baroness that our response to the threat is rightly robust and includes law enforcement agencies taking action against online offenders, developing new capabilities to find and safeguard victims and working with the internet industry to remove illegal images.
For example, all UK police forces and the NCA are now connected to the Child Abuse Image Database—otherwise known as CAID—which reduces the time taken to undertake investigations and identify the victims. A new victim identification suite has been established by the NCA with access to CAID. In 2015-16, UK authorities identified over 450 victims from abuse images, more than double the number of any previous year and, in a recent case, the Child Exploitation and Online Protection command of the NCA was able to use CAID to review one of its largest ever seizures within six weeks. Based on the case size, before CAID this would have taken a minimum of six months to review.
In 2015-16, the NCA received £10 million of additional investment for further specialist teams to tackle online sexual exploitation. This enabled a near doubling of its investigative capacity to tackle child sexual exploitation. An NCA and GCHQ joint operational cell has also been established to target the most technologically sophisticated offenders. In 2015, 2,861 individuals were prosecuted for offences involving indecent images of children—a 27% increase on the previous year.
I hope I have persuaded the noble Lord that we are working to improve our understanding and our response to the threat and that he will withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, to add to what I said before, I think that there is a very important role for the Home Office, working in conjunction with the police and many others, on the consistency of the data, to which this amendment refers but perhaps a bit obliquely. It seems to be an issue that comes up time and time again. Yesterday a report was published by ECPAT and Missing People on young people going missing from care and one of the recommendations was about achieving consistency of data.
It might please the noble Baroness to know that I have become the Minister for data and therefore anything that she can feed into the job that I will be doing will be most appreciated.
My Lords, as the Minister said, understanding the overall scale, complexity and prevalence of the threat is crucial. I am pleased to learn what the department and the police are doing. It is important we understand this.
I accept the point about data that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, made. I also accept her point on legislation. This is such a complex problem. We do not quite know what we have here, as unfortunately new things are developing all the time, so it is worth trying to explore and make sure that our legislation is correct.
However, I am very happy at this stage to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, young people aged 16 and 17 are still children although they are legally able to consent to sexual activity, get married and undertake a number of other matters and be deemed responsible for their behaviour. Amendment 220, in the name of my noble friend Lord Rosser and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Bristol, seeks to put a new clause in the Bill to create a new offence of the abduction of a vulnerable child. Most 16 and 17 year-olds are not well protected, with a tiny minority subject to the protection of the Children Act or in police protection. Children of this age can get themselves into all sorts of problems and can be targeted by adults who seek to exploit their vulnerability. The amendment seeks to create a specific offence.
Amendment 222 would require police forces to collect annually the number of child abduction notices issued, the number breached and the number of sexual risk orders and sexual harm prevention orders issued following such a breach. This information would have to be laid before Parliament in the form of a report. This would provide valuable data to both Parliament and the Government so we can see what is happening and make specific policy and legislative changes with relevant information to hand, if deemed necessary. I beg to move.
My Lords, I can sum up my comments really as, “as above”. The points I made on the previous amendments are relevant, although the report I have just mentioned called Heading Back to Harm is particularly relevant here. There are so many associated issues that I would prefer the focus to be on practice—I will add it to my point about data—including trust in authority. In some situations, lack of trust in authority is a big component in young people who have been rescued going missing again. I do not underestimate the importance of the issues at the heart of this. Can the Minister give the Committee any information about the success of child abduction warning notices, where they apply, now, before we seek an extension?
My Lords, Amendment 220 would create a new offence of abduction of a vulnerable child aged 16 or 17. The offence would be in addition to the existing offence in Section 49 of the Children Act 1989, which already makes it an offence to abduct a child in care, including those aged 16 and 17. The new offence would also be in addition to Section 2 of the Child Abduction Act 1984, which makes it an offence to abduct any child under the age of 16. The new offence would extend only to children aged 16 and 17 who are considered to be vulnerable and therefore in need of additional protection.
The criteria for being considered vulnerable are set out in subsection (2) of the new clause and cover a range of circumstances defined in the Children Act 1989 and Housing Act 1996. These criteria potentially encompass a wide range of individuals and raise concerns that they would have very wide effect. For example, as drafted, the offence would cover all disabled young people of that age. The children it extends to are often in need of services such as housing and education but are not necessarily in need of special protection, as opposed to others of that age.
The Government completely share the objective of the noble Lord and the noble Baroness of ensuring that young people are protected from sexual exploitation and other abuse. That is why, in March last year, we introduced new civil orders to protect the vulnerable and disrupt offending at the earliest opportunity. We believe that providing the right powers to the police is the way forward. Our priority is to prevent offending, so making better use of these orders is a more precisely targeted response than creating a new criminal offence.
As noble Lords will be aware, a similar new clause was tabled in the House of Commons and there have been amendments to previous Bills on this issue. We remain unpersuaded that the proposed new abduction offence is the way forward. Young people aged 16 and 17 are generally deemed capable of living independently of their parents and of exercising their free will, notably on sexual matters. As noble Lords have said, we therefore need to achieve the right balance between additional protection for young people in this age group and recognition of relevant rights and responsibilities. Creating a new offence would raise difficult issues about where we draw the line, and it would not help young people who are older than this age group but are also very vulnerable.
That is why we believe that sexual risk orders provide appropriate powers for the police. I do not have the figures or any information on how the child abduction warning list is working; it might be in my pack. I apologise—I am getting quite tired at this stage of the day. I will write to the noble Baroness. The preventive civil orders are relatively new and we will therefore keep under review whether they fully address the kind of predatory behaviour to which the amendment refers.
Turning to Amendment 222, it is very important that we get the right balance in national reporting of data. This Government have already introduced a new mandatory requirement for all forces to collect data on child sexual abuse and child sexual exploitation offences as part of the police annual data requirement, and from next April we will be expanding that requirement to include non-crime incidents related to CSE as well. This means that for the first time, we will have all child sexual abuse and exploitation-related crimes and incidents recorded by the police. This will allow for all sexual offences against children to be identified; for example, it was previously not possible to identify obscene publication offences that are specifically related to victims aged under 18.
We are working closely with the police to monitor and review the use of the new sexual risk orders, as well as child abduction warning notices, in order to ensure they are effective in protecting children who are at risk of sexual harm. I think that is precisely the noble Baroness’s point. As child abduction warning notices are part of an administrative process, the police do not regularly record the number issued. This means that, in practice, this amendment would place a significant and disproportionate new burden on the police manually to interrogate their systems.
We agree on the need to do all we can to disrupt predatory behaviour before it causes lasting harm to children and young people. The Government remain unpersuaded that the approach proposed in these amendments is the right way forward. In order better to understand the issues raised and to create an evidence base for the use of existing powers—that is the important thing here—we have set up a working group that will monitor the use of sexual risk orders so that we can fully evaluate whether there are gaps in police powers to disrupt at the earliest opportunity. I expect this group to report to Ministers in the autumn of next year, and we will consider its findings very carefully.
I hope the noble Lord will feel content to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, we on these Benches support our noble friend Lady Brinton. I do not want to detain the Committee so will make just a couple of comments. When discussing matters such as trafficking and slavery, I often hear that these issues are where domestic violence was 20 years ago. It is very concerning to hear about the treatment of women—and men—who have suffered domestic violence in the way that my noble friend has described. That is not progress over the past 20 years.
There is another argument for my noble friend’s various amendments, which I do not think she mentioned; that is, obtaining the best evidence from victims who are also witnesses. These are very sensitive issues and one hears of very good practice by some police forces and some members of the judiciary. It is a question of spreading that good practice. There is an awful lot raised in these amendments, including the very delicate issue of ticketing for the judiciary dealing with certain cases. This is not the moment to go into that but the implications of the amendments need to be taken on board over a very wide area of practice. The Committee should be grateful to my noble friend and the noble Lord for ensuring that they are raised. It is a pity that, coming to the end of Committee, we are not able to do them the justice that we would all like to do them.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and other noble Lords who have spoken, for raising the important issue of victims’ rights.
It is crucial that the needs of victims of crime are given proper consideration at every stage of the criminal justice process. We published a revised Code of Practice for Victims of Crime, which came into force in November 2015. As a result, victims of all criminal offences, not just victims of more serious offences, are entitled to support under the code. The code provides victims with a range of entitlements, including information about their case, interpretation and translation, and for them to be treated in a respectful and professional manner without discrimination of any kind. Furthermore, the code requires police and other service providers to have a complaints procedure. If victims are dissatisfied with the outcome, they are able to refer their complaints to the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman via their Member of Parliament.
It is essential that victims receive the best possible support to help them cope with and recover from what they have been through. We have a raft of arrangements in place which ensure that victims have access to a wide range of emotional, practical and specialist support determined by and tailored to their needs; wherever possible, this support is accessible locally. We are committed to ensuring that victims get the support they need and have protected the overall level of funding for victims across the spending review period, with over £95 million being provided in 2016-17 to fund crucial support services, including £7 million for the provision of support for victims of child sexual abuse, in recognition of increasing demand. Of the £95 million, we allocated over £67 million in grant funding to police and crime commissioners, who are using that funding to commission local services. The Justice Secretary has recently agreed to extend grant funding to all the nationally funded organisations for 2017-18 while we consider the current mixed model of commissioning national and local services.
We recognise the importance of training for professionals who work with victims. Organisations are responsible for ensuring the highest-quality training for their staff to ensure that victims receive the best possible service and support. However, we also recognise that more can be done. That is why we are working to place victims and witnesses at the heart of a justice system that works for everyone. We recently announced the national rollout of pre-trial cross-examination in 2017 to improve the support available for vulnerable witnesses. We are also investing close to £1 billion to reform and digitise our courts and tribunals. This will improve the experience for all court and tribunal users, including vulnerable victims and witnesses. Furthermore, we have committed to introduce further measures to strengthen the rights of victims of crime. It is important that we take the time to get this right, and we will announce our plans in due course.
Finally, the proposal for homicide reviews is also unnecessary. If the family of a victim has concerns about a closed homicide case, this can be looked at again under the Crown Prosecution Service’s recent guidance, Reviewing Previously Finalised Cases, to determine whether or not a review should be conducted.
Having had this opportunity to debate these important issues, and in the knowledge that the Government will be bringing forward proposals to strengthen the rights of victims, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
(8 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Clause 114 concerns defectively deactivated weapons. As we have heard, we have some of the toughest firearms laws in the world, and I am very pleased about that.
In this grouping the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, has given notice of his intention to oppose Clause 114 standing part of the Bill, although he did not speak to that. However, I do not agree with his opposition to the clause. I think that we would want deactivated weapons to be sold or gifted to people only when they met the highest standards available. If people want to sell these weapons within the EU, they should be certified to the appropriate standard. That is the answer to the problem—not to delete the whole clause.
However, the noble Earl’s amendments raise important points that need to be considered carefully and responded to by the Government. My general position on firearms is that our legislation has had a positive effect and we should always keep matters under review, with a view to seeing where updates or amendments can be made, so that we never relax our tough approach. Having said that, I see the point the noble Earl is making—if you inherit a weapon, potentially an offence can be committed. We need to look at that, although I am not sure that we should do as he suggests.
The noble Earl also made the important point about transferrals to a body corporate, which can be used as a way of getting round legislation. I am not sure what effect the last amendment in the group would have, but he has raised some very important points and I look forward to hearing what the Minister says.
My Lords, when the Minister introduces Amendment 203K, which is about extending the period for considering an application for the renewal of a certificate, can she say whether this is being proposed because there are problems generally or in particular forces? In other words, are there just a few difficulties or is this a widespread issue, in that the police do not find eight weeks sufficient? I raise this because of the concern that 16 weeks might easily become the norm, given the opportunity to extend.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for outlining his amendments. As he suggests, I will first explain the government amendments in this group.
Amendments 203J and 203K respond to amendments tabled by Geoffrey Clifton-Brown at Commons Report stage. They seek to make two improvements in the operation of the licensing arrangements under the Firearms Act of 1968. Amendment 203J would remove some of the unnecessary administrative requirements that currently apply to the possession of expanding ammunition.
Expanding ammunition is designed to expand predictably on impact and was prohibited initially in relation to pistols in 1992. In 1997 the ban was extended to all such ammunition, even though it is in universal use for pest control and is required for deer-stalking under the Deer Act and Deer (Scotland) Act.
The current legislation does allow for expanding ammunition to be possessed, in order to carry out specific activities such as the lawful shooting of deer, estate management, the humane killing of animals or the shooting of animals for the protection of other animals or humans. However, the legislation also requires that the individual possess a suitably conditioned firearm certificate for these activities.
The amendment would allow for the possession, purchase, acquisition, sale or transfer of expanding ammunition for rifles where the individual is in possession of a valid firearm certificate or a visitors firearm permit. The effect is—and I hope this goes some way toward answering the noble Baroness’s question—that the police will no longer have to include additional conditions on a certificate or permit, thereby removing some of the administrative burden that the current regime places on them.
Amendment 203K is intended to address the issues that currently arise with an application for the renewal of a firearms certificate that has been made prior to the expiry of the certificate but has not been determined by the police in time. Police forces have developed two different approaches in these cases. The first is to allow the applicant to remain in possession of the firearm, shotgun or ammunition, which means the applicant is in breach of Section 1 or Section 2 of the 1968 Act until the application has been processed. The second is to issue a temporary permit using the power in Section 7 of the Act.
I am sure noble Lords will agree that it is not appropriate for certificate holders to be at risk of arrest and prosecution for an offence under Section 1 or Section 2 because the police have failed to process applications in time. Equally, it is not appropriate for the police to issue temporary permits to individuals whose substantive applications may subsequently be refused. The issuing of such permits also places an increased administrative burden on the police.
Amendment 203K will bring greater clarity in such circumstances by automatically extending the validity of firearm and shotgun certificates past their expiry date for a limited period of up to eight weeks. This will apply only where an application for renewal has been received by the police at least eight weeks prior to the date of expiry of the certificate.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked whether the problems were widespread or localised to particular forces. There were different levels of performance across different forces, and performance varies across some forces, meaning that some are better that others—so this is force-led.
Amendments 234A and 234B are consequential amendments to the extent clause.
I trust the Committee will agree that the two new clauses make sensible changes to the firearms regime and in doing so reduce the administrative burdens on the police without compromising public safety.
As my noble friend explained, his amendments relate to Clause 114, which strengthens the controls on deactivated firearms and thereby enhances public protection. I was pleased to meet my noble friend to discuss his concerns about this clause and I know that he has had a useful follow-up meeting, as he explained, with officials and one of the proof houses.
My noble friend has pointed to some of the difficulties that have been identified with the EU deactivation standards. The UK has some of the toughest gun laws in the world and some of the most robust deactivation standards in Europe. The need for consistent, robust deactivation across member states has been the driving force for EU implementing regulation.
While the new EU deactivation specifications have been introduced, we have recognised that we need to strengthen deactivation measures for certain firearms. We now require additional measures that will align the EU standards with the exacting standards for deactivated weapons already in place in the UK. We have agreed this position with the European Commission. Moreover, the Commission has set up a small group of technical experts to help interpret and, if necessary, revise the standards, and the UK is represented on this group.
Some noble Lords may argue that, following the referendum result, we should drop this provision from the Bill. However, on leaving the EU we will still want to ensure that individuals comply with the relevant deactivation standards that we have in place. To that end, I am ready to explore future-proofing the definition of a defectively deactivated weapon as used in the clause.
I hope I have been able to reassure my noble friend that the offence in Clause 114 is necessary to strengthen our firearms controls, and that, having aired this important issue, he will be content to withdraw his amendment and support Clause 114 standing part of the Bill—and the Government’s amendments in this group.
My Lords, Amendment 209 provides for a new offence of possession of pyrotechnic articles at live musical events in England. The amendment is in response to one tabled by Nigel Adams on Report in the House of Commons. The misuse of fireworks, flares and smoke bombs at festivals and other live musical events by members of the public is an increasing and deeply concerning problem. Fireworks and other pyrotechnic articles covered by the amendment are dangerous when misused. Fireworks can burn at in excess of 2,200 degrees centigrade; flares can reach temperatures of 1,600 degrees centigrade and can burn for as long as an hour. Smoke bombs also burn at high temperatures, and in enclosed or crowded spaces the thick smoke that they release can cause breathing difficulties, particularly for asthma sufferers.
In the 1980s, it was recognised that the misuse of pyrotechnic articles in crowded football stadia posed a specific public order risk. As a result, the Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc.) Act 1985 provides for an offence of possession of fireworks and flares at a football match. However, current firework and explosives legislation does not provide the police or prosecutors with an appropriate offence to tackle the possession of pyrotechnic articles at music festivals. While the majority of festival organisers have their own rules banning festivalgoers from bringing fireworks and other pyrotechnic articles on to festival premises, no statutory regulation exists. There is no offence for the use of a firework, flare or smoke bomb in a crowd on private property unless it can be proved that it was used with the intent to cause injury or that its use was likely to endanger life or seriously damage property.
Amendment 209 therefore makes it an offence for a person to be in possession of a pyrotechnic article at a qualifying musical event in England. The offence has been so constructed as to apply also where a person is in possession of such articles at a point of entry into, or exit from, the place where a qualifying musical event is taking place, or at a campsite provided for those who are attending the event.
A qualifying musical event will be defined in regulations, subject to the negative procedure. The amendment itself provides that such musical events must involve live musical performances and, in defining a qualifying event, we will want to further target the offence at those events where there is evidence of harm being caused by the misuse of fireworks, flares or smoke bombs. The maximum penalty for the offence is three months’ imprisonment, which is the same as that applicable to the existing football-related offence.
The effect of Amendment 234 is that the offence extends to England and Wales. As I indicated, it applies to England only. However, we are considering further its territorial application in consultation with the Welsh Government. Amendment 245 makes a consequential amendment to the Long Title.
This offence will help prevent the harm that can come from the misuse of such dangerous articles and allow everyone to enjoy live music events safely. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am grateful to officials for explaining the origin of the amendment to me. They commented that the Government’s view is that we should not extend the criminal law unless there is a well-founded case for doing so. I agree with that, but I have instinctive concerns about this proposal. First, what consultation has there been with the entertainment industry? This must be a matter of widespread interest. I cannot say that I go to musical events usually held in the open air—I go to rather staider events—but a lot of people will feel that they are being targeted by the measure. What consideration has been given to, first, whether there should not be a focus on the venue organiser rather than the individual, as this seems to be a matter of crowd control? Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, is there no other way than creating a new specific offence? If fireworks and flares are dangerous—I accept that they are—is this not about the misuse of fireworks rather than the place or event where they may be misused? As for it being a musical event, which is to be determined by regulations, that seems to raise all sorts of problems.
I appreciate that this comes from legislation about football matches, although the 1985 Act cited by the Minister seems a little narrower, unless I have misunderstood it, because the places where the person is found to be in possession are very closely defined, including an area,
“from which the event may be directly viewed”.
When looking up that section, I came across a petition to Parliament to legalise the use of pyrotechnics at football grounds. I could not find its date, but it was rejected on the basis that it was,
“a matter for individual Local Authorities”.
That confused me even more, but I wonder what relation that point has to the amendment.
I am sorry to throw a number of questions at the Minister, but I am sure that the Government considered them before proposing the amendment.
My Lords, I am not sure whether the thrust of the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, was to broaden or narrow the scope—
I did not express myself very well. I was not concerned about travel to the event. I was comparing the amendment with Section 2A of the Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc.) Act 1985, under which the offence applies when a person,
“is in any area of a designated sports ground from which the event may be directly viewed”.
I was comparing the two matters. That probably highlights the fact that musical events are different.
After hearing the response, I cannot help thinking that this is a matter of how people may use or misuse fireworks and flares in a much more general way. Does the noble Baroness know whether the regulations will address the definition of a qualifying musical event, or will they actually list particular events? She referred to the national policing lead for musical events; I had not realised there was such a post. By definition, that officer will not have given comments about events that are not musical events. If the noble Baroness has no further information—I appreciate that she may not, as we are becoming quite detailed—perhaps it is a matter for another day. But they are not invalid questions.
I might have inspiration from over my left shoulder. The offence will apply to a campsite adjacent to a festival and the regulation-making power will include a generic definition of a live musical event.
(8 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I hope that this amendment can be dealt with very quickly. It takes us to the provisions for live links with people in detention and, in particular, the definition of a “vulnerable adult”. When I read the definition, I was unsure whether the phrase,
“may have difficulty understanding the purpose of an authorisation”,
extended to understanding its implications or outcome. It seemed to me that the word “understanding” was rather narrow.
I was asked yesterday by the Bill team whether I could explain what I was getting at. Once I had a look at the drafting, I realised that I had put the words in the wrong place, and I apologise to the Committee for that. However, I was assured that the wording in the Bill extends to understanding the implications or outcome of a decision, and I am moving the amendment simply in the hope that the Minister can confirm that from the Dispatch Box. I beg to move.
I thank the noble Baroness for her comments. Amendment 188A would amend Clause 73 to alter the definition of a “vulnerable adult” in new Section 45ZA of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. That new section would enable a superintendent to authorise the extension of pre-charge detention using a live link, rather than being physically present in the police station. In the case of a vulnerable adult, consent to the use of a live link must be given in the presence of an appropriate adult, and the amendment seeks to alter the definition of a vulnerable adult for those purposes.
I understand that the noble Baroness is seeking an assurance that the definition provided for in the Bill would include a person who had difficulty understanding the implications or outcome of a decision by a superintendent to authorise the extension of pre-charge detention from 24 to 36 hours. I am happy to provide such an assurance and, on that basis, I hope that she will be happy to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, my name is on the amendments in this group. My noble friend mentioned the importance of ensuring parity between physical and mental health services, and we will continue to raise that until parity is achieved. She also mentioned stereotyped assumptions as to links between mental health and criminal offending and racial stigma in mental health matters.
It occurs to me that the arrangements for using police stations as a “place of safety”—like others, I put that term in quotation marks—must be very difficult for police officers. They are not health professionals who can deal with physical health problems or mental health problems. We should not expect them to respond to a situation for which, however well intentioned, they are not qualified.
My noble friend also mentioned the question of funding. Inevitably, the reliance on increasingly stretched local authorities is an issue. Given that a place of safety includes residential accommodation provided by local social services, we need to recognise the importance of local authorities’ funding for new places of safety. The Government’s investment in that is a positive step. As with so many issues, this is not something that can be put in one pigeonhole and left there.
My Lords, this group of amendments addresses the crucial relationship between mental health and the criminal justice system. I make it clear at the outset that I support the objective of banning the use of police cells as a place of safety for adults. My comments are in the context of my own independent report published in 2009, which reviewed people with mental health problems and learning disabilities in the criminal justice system.
In the report I made over 80 recommendations for change, at least two of which are relevant to this debate. First, I recommended the establishment of multidisciplinary liaison and diversion teams composed of people with a variety of skills, including psychiatric nurses, learning disability nurses, drug and alcohol workers and many others, all working alongside the police in police stations to identify and assess vulnerable people and to support the custody staff at the first point of contact with the criminal justice system. This programme is being rolled out nationally. Currently, 55% of the country is covered. Additional money from the Treasury was allocated in July of this year to enable 75% of the country to be covered by 2018-19, with a view to 100% coverage by 2020-21.
Alongside this, and now properly integrated with liaison and diversion teams, is street triage. That is where the police and NHS staff work together in their local communities. It works best where there is a dedicated vehicle and they sit together, often with their separate laptops—we hope to link technology at some point—so that they can immediately assess the needs of vulnerable persons and stop them hitting against the criminal justice system. These are often the people who may be sectioned under Section 136 of the Mental Health Act, and this is where the second recommendation in my report is relevant today. I said then that, “All partner organisations”—by which I meant principally the police and the NHS,
“involved in the use of Section 136 of the Mental Health Act 2007 should work together to develop an agreed protocol on its use. Discussions should immediately commence to identify suitable local mental health facilities as the place of safety, ensuring that the police station is no longer used for this purpose”.
The recommendation was accepted by the then Labour Government and each subsequent Government—we are on to the fourth now—have committed to this objective.
My Lords, the amendment would ensure that people are really only detained under the Mental Health Act for up to 24 hours. To achieve that, the clock needs to start when the decision is made to detain someone and not when they arrive at the place of safety. If the Government want people to be detained only for up to 24 hours, Amendment 192 is needed. This is the only way to ensure that we are not detaining people for longer than 24 hours during what is often a distressing and alienating experience for people in crisis. They may be detained on the street in one of the special vehicles that have been mentioned or in another public place. They may be kept in a police car until a suitable destination is found. Wherever it is, distress will ensue for the person concerned.
We need to look at the position in parallel with that of a person with a physical illness who calls an ambulance. When ambulance services are assessed, the clock starts ticking from the moment the ambulance is called and not from the moment the patient is picked up. This is a matter of parity between physical and mental health.
When discussing these parts of the Bill, it is crucial that we remember that people detained under the Mental Health Act have not committed any crime. They are unwell and require health support. That is why I beg to move.
My Lords, I support the amendment. From the point of view of the person detained the detention starts at the point described by my noble friend Lady Walmsley. It is not a question of that being some sort of limbo; that must be how it feels. If a person is on the way to a place of safety, they are being detained, held and controlled as much as they would be when they reached their destination.
My Lords, I have great sympathy with the points just made. The clock should start ticking when a person is taken into custody and not when he or she arrives at the place of safety.
My Lords, I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and my name is on the amendment. I will make two points. First, the Government’s argument is that using the term “appropriate adult” causes some sort of stigma. I cannot speak for the committee or my noble friend whose amendment it is, but you can call that person what you like—it is the job that needs to be done, and that is what the amendment is driving at. Secondly, I wish to draw attention to the provision of subsection (1) of the proposed new clause, which is,
“the right to have access”.
Rights should be in legislation.
I agree with my noble friend on that point and on all the points she made. I thank the Minister for her comments, which I will of course consider between now and Report. I do not agree with her that the person formally doing the mental health assessment can be regarded as the appropriate adult, for the reason that I gave in my opening remarks; that is, that person is in control of what happens next to the person being assessed. It is important that the person has a right—they may not choose to use it—to consult somebody else about whether that is the right thing for them and how they feel about it.
Of course, the Minister is right that the number of people detained in police stations in these circumstances is going down very rapidly. If my Amendment 189 was accepted, it would become zero very quickly. In those few cases—many fewer now—where a person is in that situation, I still think that they should have a right to choose if they feel the need to have somebody else there to advise them. However, this is Committee so I will withdraw the amendment.