Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Wednesday 28th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Sharp of Guildford (LD)]

Amendment 103A is the first in a series of amendments relating to Part 5 of the Bill, which relate also to the Prevent strategy and its partner, the Channel programme. Part 5 seeks to make statutory for participants in these two programmes actions and duties that have until now been voluntary. That switch from co-operation to co-option raises a whole range of issues for those involved. The universities in particular are very unhappy, about both the threat to their autonomy and the conflict that this creates with their duties under other legislation to promote debate and safeguard freedom of speech.

The provisions in the Bill and its accompanying guidance also pose problems for other educational institutions: schools, further education colleges and sixth-form colleges, which provide for the younger—and arguably more impressionable—adolescent age group. Generally, there is considerable concern that these provisions may backfire and, far from helping to improve the present position, may well serve to make matters worse. To date, all these educational institutions have co-operated voluntarily and willingly with the Prevent strategy, accepting and developing it to suit their specific circumstances within the framework of their safeguarding policies. They worry that making these duties obligatory and pushing through this legislation with relatively little consultation will not only leave teachers and administrators with a considerable bureaucratic burden, but will also alienate those on whom those burdens fall as well as those whose activities it seeks to monitor.

In this context, Amendment 103A is a probing amendment; I am not suggesting that this wording is in any way appropriate. Essentially, it seeks to draw attention to the lack of clarity in the terminology used in the Bill and, in particular, in the draft guidance, which was issued alongside the Bill. The Bill itself is very careful to use the term “terrorism” and the duty specified in Clause 21(1) is,

“to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”.

Clause 33 states that,

“‘terrorism’ has the same meaning as in the Terrorism Act 2000”,

which is a definition that has been around for some 15 years, so presumably the courts are reasonably happy with it. The definition of “terrorism” in the Terrorism Act 2000 relates to the “threat of action”, which involves violence against people and property, endangers lives, constitutes a serious risk to health or safety, or seriously disrupts an electronic system. It is less clear, and more subjective, what “being drawn into terrorism” —the words used in the Bill—means. The difficulty arises from the draft guidance that was issued.

The guidance makes it clear that the purpose of the legislation is,

“to exclude those promoting extremist views that support or are conducive to terrorism”.

In turn, paragraph 5 of that guidance defines terrorism as,

“vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs”.

Further, those caught by Clause 21(1) are required to assess how far their students or pupils are at risk of being drawn, not only into violent extremism, but,

“non-violent extremism, which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism”.

An article in Times Higher Education suggested that that could apply to those using non-violent techniques such as sitting in a road to block the passage of equipment to be used for exploring fracking. As the Joint Committee on Human Rights pointed out, the terminology is so vague as to leave much discretion in the hands of the police and other members of the local panels being set up under Chapter 2 of this part of the Bill, whose task it is to decide whether those reported as being drawn into terrorism, or vulnerable to being so drawn, should be put on a support programme. I have a great deal of sympathy with the Association of School and College Leaders, whose briefing to us pointed out that the lack of legal certainty over definitions of terms such as “extremism” will make it extremely difficult for schools and colleges to know whether they risk being in breach of this new duty. The association remarks:

“A number of members had received the Prevent training in their schools and colleges, and while some found it helpful, others found that it was so vague in respect of what to look for that they felt even less confident about the duty after going through the training”.

It seems very difficult for us to impose these duties on such a wide body of institutions if there is such uncertainty over what this duty involves. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 103B in this group is in my name. Widespread concerns have been expressed about Prevent becoming a statutory duty, and it has been suggested that Clause 21 be left out of the Bill. My preference would be for it not to become statutory, but I recognise that the Government have thought about that carefully and come to a view. I declare an interest as one of three joint presidents of London Councils, the umbrella organisation for the London boroughs. Like others, it is concerned.

I have two main, and rather different, points to make about the amendment. It would mean that the duty would not apply to any of the specified authorities—those listed in Schedule 3, and any more that are added,

“unless the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a report regarding the operation of the duty”.

I shall come back to the term “operation” in a moment.

My first point is to ask whether imposing the duty is appropriate to all specified authorities, and for all the functions of those authorities. My second point is about funding, particularly in the case of local authorities. As my noble friend has said, authorities will have a statutory duty, as set out in Clause 21, to “have due regard”—and in talking about activities leading to terrorism, she has identified an important issue. My amendment would require each authority to be considered separately. The authorities are different, and they operate differently. That is why I have used the term,

“the operation of the duty”.

The scheduled authorities range from local authorities through a great variety of educational institutions, the police, prisons, health services and health service providers. Even if the duty is appropriate for a higher education institution—we will be paying a good deal of attention to that aspect today—is it appropriate for a primary school or a nursery school?

Of course, preventing people being drawn into terrorist activities is immensely important. However, I wonder whether our great arts institutions, which get a lot of public funding—although not as much as most of them would like—have more opportunity than a nursery school does to deal with this issue. A nursery school may have a responsibility, but it is a responsibility to make kids aware of the difference between violence and talking about things. That is much more important than closing off the issues.

I do not think it is enough to say, as I suspect the Minister may suggest, that there will be a proportionate light touch, because having the duty creates work and bureaucracy, and requires record-keeping. The Secretary of State will have the power to issue directions and, in the case of educational institutions, Ofsted will apply them. As has been suggested to me by some of those concerned—especially by those from the Muslim community, although my concerns are not limited to that—the records may then show that there is disproportionate criticism of schools in areas with a large Muslim population. That will give the alienating message—I believe “alienating” was the term my noble friend used—that we are concerned about.

I suspect that others will talk about the principle of applying a statutory duty to local authorities, as distinct from a function and a power, as has been the case, and would be the case. I want to ask my noble friend about services that are contracted out by local authorities, as many services are. If an authority is in the middle of a contract, it cannot change it; it certainly cannot change it unilaterally. How should it deal with that? New and renewed contracts would have to tie organisations into the new duty. That is in part why I have used the term “operations”, because I am unclear how this will work in practice.

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[Lord Bates]

My noble friend has great legal expertise in the terms being used here. We are saying that, clearly, if you put anything on a statutory footing—even to “have due regard to” the guidance—then there must be a consequence should you fail to have due regard or are found not to have due regard; and that that must be specified in the legislation. That is all we are doing here. I am sure we are all of the view that such a measure would be used only in extreme circumstances. We fully expect that all universities will do what the best universities are doing already, which is to have their systems and procedures in place for this. As I have said, I am very conscious that we will be returning to this in further groups; but in the mean time I would be grateful if my noble friend might consider withdrawing the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, before my noble friend responds, I had degrouped that amendment from my, rather than from anybody else’s, amendments. In replying, my noble friend the Minister has relied a great deal on Clause 24 on guidance. However, that does not seem to me to justify the ability of Parliament to consider, authority by authority and function by function, the application of this duty, which is a much more significant duty—on that I am very much with my noble friend Lord Phillips—than the words “due regard” in everyday speech might suggest. If I were to see Hansard by the time we reach Clause 24 today I might think that my noble friend had given me quite a lot of material to press my amendments to that clause, because he has said an awful lot that supports what I am arguing should go on to the statute book. We will come to that, but I wanted to make it clear that my point is about Parliament’s role in this; it is not about consultation on guidance.

[Baroness Sharp of Guildford]

I thank the Minister for his response to my amendment and other noble Lords who have participated in this very interesting debate. It was supposed to be a relatively minor probing amendment to clarify the definitions and to make the point, which I think still needs to be made, that where there is not clarity in definition, it leaves a great deal to the judgment of those expected to implement these duties. That in itself poses problems, both for those in the process of implementing them and those who, perhaps further down the line or on the panel, will have to make assessments about those seen to be vulnerable to terrorism. And what does “being drawn into terrorism” mean? There are problems here for those who need to interpret the legislation.

We have had a much wider debate than just about definitions. It has been a very interesting debate about, as I said in my introduction, whether the Prevent strategy should be statutory. I am very much of the view taken by my noble friends Lord Phillips and Lady Hamwee, that in fact the subsequent clauses—24, 28 and 30—make the whole business of being statutory fairly rigorous.

The effectiveness of the Prevent programme, whether we need to review it, whether it is sensible that the programme should be statutory, or whether we should not continue to rely on the voluntary participation of the institutions are all questions that we will undoubtedly come back to, both later today and on Report. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the world of local government, in its kaleidoscopic way, is changing at the moment with new groupings of authorities, such as the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities. Although the duty is expressed as a duty on each individual authority, will the Government be open to authorities seeking to find ways for neighbours to provide services to fulfil the duty? This has only just occurred to me, but it seems that one should be open to practical ways of dealing with this sort of thing.

Separately, I ask whether my noble friend is able to address my points about the contracting-out of services, which I raised in the first group of amendments. I do not know whether he has any notes on that. It is mentioned in Amendment 106 in the Minister’s name, which caused me to go on a hunt for Schedule 36A to the Education Act. That is only about education and there are many other services which are contracted out. I asked London Councils whether I was barking up the wrong tree in worrying about this. Its answer was that I was not and that this is something worth pursuing.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, I suspect that my noble friend’s amendment highlights the fact that this is a list which has been cobbled together with some speed and that perhaps, in trying to ensure that all the bases were covered, the normal diligence of the Home Office has fallen apart. As to the specific point about unitary authorities, my noble friend Lord Rosser suggested that perhaps a county council could act on behalf of a unitary authority. The very point about unitary authorities is that you cannot do that. That would raise some very interesting and wide issues so I assume that that is a simple omission. Regarding the list on criminal justice, while I assume that the duty is placed on the individual institutions, there is nothing said more generally about the role of headquarters bodies or contracting bodies like the National Offender Management Service.

There are a couple of other possible anomalies that the Minister might want to address. I note that community health councils, which still exist in Wales although they have been long abolished in England, are listed, but that the successor of the successor of the successor bodies for community health councils in England, Healthwatch organisations, are not included. Will community health councils in Wales have a Prevent duty that does not apply to the bodies which now fulfil many of those functions in England? Finally, I do not see the Ministry of Defence Police in the list of police organisations.

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[Lord Scriven]

If it is a function across health professionals and health services, the proportion of people who come into contact with an acute trust is significantly small. Why have the health service and GPs been excluded from the duty, yet consultants who see the minority of patients have been included? What is the significant difference in order for the Government to be making that delineation of clinicians?

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, if the Minister is going to come back to us on various points, perhaps he can include something on patient confidentiality.

[Lord Bates]

As I sat down to take that intervention, further inspiration came to me on this matter. We are consulting GPs on their role in this, and we will have regard to the important points relating to patient confidentiality to which the noble Baroness referred.

Finally, Amendments 119 to 122 would allow the Government to make changes, through regulations, to Schedules 3 and 4 at any time after the Bill is granted Royal Assent, and before such time as the rest of this part commences. The amendments ensure that, in the event that there are additional bodies to which the Prevent duty should apply or which should be partners to Channel panels, then those bodies can be added to the appropriate schedule with as much notice as possible before the duties on them commence. This is clearly in the best interests of those bodies because it will give them time to prepare. This has particular relevance to the addition of Scottish bodies. The Government have made clear that it is our hope and intention that Scottish bodies will become subject to the Prevent duty, and we are currently discussing this with the Scottish Government.

We still wish to make the changes to the schedules as soon as possible after Royal Assent, and to have the duty commence for all specified authorities in England, Wales and Scotland at the same time. Therefore, I invite the Committee to agree these government amendments and trust that, in the light of my earlier clarification, the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

112BA: Clause 24, page 15, line 13, at end insert—
“( ) Guidance issued under this section shall in particular deal with equalities issues.”

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, Amendment 112BA is grouped with a number of other amendments, most of which relate to Clause 24. The amendments in this group in my name and those of my noble friends have been tabled to enable me once again to raise issues about equalities and concerns about discrimination.

It has been put to me that Prevent is regarded as a security prism through which all Muslims are seen and that Muslims are suspect until proved otherwise. The term “siege mentality” has also been used. We have discussed the dangers of alienation arising from the very activities that should be part of the solution, not part of the problem, and of alienation feeding violence. I have said to the Muslim organisations that have contacted me, and I think I have said in the Chamber, that because the current context for this legislation is the war in Syria and since most Britons, not all, who are drawn into fighting there are Muslims—I am not saying that they come from the same ethnic background; that is, of course, quite different—it is inevitable that Muslims will make up the great majority of those who are the subject of, or some might say subjected to, the provisions of this Bill.

We have laws about equalities and they apply to this legislation as to every other piece of legislation. I doubt that much can be done in legislation to address the concerns I have just summarised but what can be done should be done: in legislation, in practice and in providing safeguards against discrimination. Transparency is a very important tool and it occurred to me today that, the more transparency there is about how these provisions are operated, the more ammunition—if that is not an indelicate word in the context—the Government can give themselves to counter those concerns.

I have mentioned the current context. The counter- terrorism strategy and policy of course are also directed to dealing with other extremism manifested in violence—for instance, right-wing extremism. I am told that freedom of information requests for basic statistics about Prevent are routinely denied on the basis of national security. It seems to me that we should be looking for ways of providing information that do not endanger security. For instance, I wondered how many individuals are in a programme because of anti-Semitic violence. Over the last day or two, I have been pondering what it would look like if one substituted “Jewish” for “Muslim” in the briefings and descriptions we have had. The issue is not just how I would see it as a Jew—not a very observant Jew but one who is aware of her background and heritage—but also whether other people, who might be resistant to some of the points I have been making, would see things differently if it were a different group interposed in that way. I think that if this were aimed at the Jewish community or communities, I might feel targeted rather than protected. I say all that by way of some introduction and can go through the specific amendments fairly quickly.

I said earlier this evening that I think—although I am going to have to read the debate to check—that the Minister in his answer on the first group implied more support, at least for the thoughts that lie behind these amendments, than I suspect he is going to articulate now and he also implied more consultation than the clause spells out. The clause deals with revised guidance as well as the first issue of guidance. If one accepts the Minister’s point about how well the Government have conducted the process so far for the purpose of the argument, nevertheless the issues I am raising will be important for the revision of guidance as well.

The first of my amendments, Amendment 112BA, states:

“Guidance … shall in particular deal with equalities issues”.

I think that that speaks for itself.

Amendment 112BB would insert that there must be consultation with,

“the specified authorities subject to the guidance”,

as well as with, as stated in the Bill, the Welsh and Scottish Governments. The clause then goes on to include the very wide catch-all—although it could be a very narrow “catch-few”—of,

“any person whom the Secretary of State considers appropriate”.

It must be right for those who are going to be the subject of this guidance to be consulted.

I then take that a stage further with Amendment 112BC by providing that, before responding to that consultation, a specified authority should,

“consult its local or other relevant communities”.

It comes pretty naturally to most local authorities to consult their own communities when they are proposing to do something, although not always. However, I do not just mean residents as a kind of amorphous bunch. There are communities within communities. We are all members of more than one community, and the specified authorities can identify their communities as they see fit under what I am proposing.

The next of my amendments, Amendment 112CB, relates to Clause 24(7), under which the Secretary of State can make minor revisions to the guidance without going to Welsh and Scottish Governments if the,

“Secretary of State considers that the proposed revisions … are insubstantial”.

I would like to see that as an objective test so that it could be challenged—in other words, I would like to change this subsection so that the consultation provisions have effect unless they are insubstantial.

Amendment 112DA is an amendment to Clause 25. It must be the case that authorities have the opportunity to make representations before directions under this clause are given—this being the clause which takes us to the sanction for failing to comply with the duty. I would hope that that would be automatic. It is perhaps a matter of general law but, again, I think that it should be spelled out.

Amendment 112F also relates to the directions clause provisions. It would insert that the Secretary of State should report to Parliament on any direction given. Giving a direction in this way is a pretty substantial action, and I think that it should be reported to Parliament with the reasons for it.

I hope that I have covered everything that is in my name. My noble friend tells me that I have, so I beg to move Amendment 112BA. As I do so, I realise that each of the amendments is on what might be thought to be a small point but, in my view, they amount to trying to find a way of addressing concerns which are clearly very real in the minds of those who have been looking at this legislation.

[Baroness Brinton]

My Lords, I should like to speak to Amendments 112C and 112E, which are in my name. I start by apologising to the Minister. I am sorry that I could not manage to get to his meeting last week. I know that my noble friend Lady Hamwee expressed my concerns and I am grateful for the Minister’s letter on some issues which has been referred to considerably since we started today’s session.

These two amendments are important and my noble friend Lady Hamwee ended on that point. After going to war, the right to curtail freedoms is one of the most important decisions that a Government have to take. The one thing that is missing at the moment on some of the key directions, particularly on guidance and on where the Secretary of State gives a direction to an authority, is any sense of accountability and transparency.

I shall take the amendments in order. Amendment 112C says that if guidance is issued,

“the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament … the proposed guidance or proposed revisions”,

and it should be done by an affirmative instrument of both Houses. As I have said on earlier amendments, guidance also needs to be combined into one document with any other parallel guidance that will ease matters for those having to use it. The duty in the Education Act 1986 is absolutely clear and I believe that the guidance has been brought forward in haste. The Commons has not managed to see the draft guidance and the consultation does not end until tomorrow. I am grateful to my noble friend for some of the changes that he has made but I see nothing in his letter that relates to this issue of transparency and accountability to Parliament. It is important on such a sensitive issue that goes to the heart of the freedom of people in this country that Parliament at the very least should have the right to examine any changes that the Secretary of State wishes to lay.

Amendment 112E asks for the same scrutiny for the Secretary of State should she or he direct under the terms of this provision. It is important that we as Parliament understand how and why an appropriate authority has failed, partly so that we can amass the evidence that my noble friend talked about earlier, but also because we as Parliament need to know exactly what is happening. Amendment 112E also provides that:

“A copy of any such report must be sent to—

(a) the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights;

(b) the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation; and

(c) any other person whom the Secretary of State deems appropriate”.

It is also important that the relevant sector sees what is going on so as to understand the issues, a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. The three bodies mentioned also deal with some of the wider issues around terrorism, freedom and liberties. It would be inappropriate for them not to comment before such matters were discussed in Parliament.

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[Lord Harris of Haringey]

Before the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, makes that decision, I revert to the question of what it is that is being required and one of the reasons why that might imply that it is better to have more consultation about it. One of the reasons why some of the previous Prevent programmes failed, and fell into disrepute with the communities concerned, was that they were not seen as about preventing people from going down the road to become dangerous, violent extremists. Rather, they were seen as being programmes that put a series of spies in the camp and were about reporting individuals to the authorities for action to be taken against them. Speaking personally, I am all for mechanisms that identify people who are a danger to the rest of us and make sure that appropriate steps are taken, but this was perceived as being the authorities intervening and getting the data. We are going to come to this subject in a minute, but when I questioned the Channel panels as to why the intelligence services were not specifically listed as an agency involved in that, the argument given at that stage was that it was because it would make it look as if the Channel panel process was part of a process of ratting on individuals to the authorities.

It is important to get this guidance in a form where the communities understand that it is not about pointing the finger at individuals in a way that might lead them into trouble with the authorities, but is a way of supporting individuals and preventing them going down that road. That is why this distinction of whether this is about “prevent” or “pursue” is so important, as is getting public and community buy-in to the way in which this is enforced.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, my noble friend might not be too pleased to know that I was scribbling quite a lot during his reply, but he will be pleased to know that I can hardly read what I have written. However, I am sure that this is something that we are going to want to come back to next week. It strikes me that a lot of this debate has been on the premise of what the situation is here and now. Even with the reassurance that my noble friend Lord Carlile is so heavily involved in this, I do not suppose that he is going to want that to be for ever and a day. There might come a time when he finds other things that he will apply his energy to.

Leaving that aside, I made the point earlier that what we are talking about here is not only the guidance that we will see fairly shortly. The noble Baroness said that we will not see it until after Committee; in fact we will not see it until after the end of the Bill or even, as far as I understand it, until after enactment. There is also the question of revisions to the guidance, which is surely going to have to be changed; it is very unlikely to be exactly what is required in its first incarnation. It is the sort of guidance that needs time for individual organisations to have their own internal discussions and for umbrella organisations to trickle down the consultation—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (LD)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for allowing me to interrupt her. The Minister, during the course of his speech a few moments ago, mentioned the Prevent oversight board on a number of occasions and kindly referred to my involvement. Does he agree with me that, if the Prevent oversight board is to have a realistic oversight role, it should meet reasonably often; it should be able to choose what it reviews from time to time; and it should be heavily involved in the quality control of Prevent schemes around the country rather than, as at present, meeting very rarely and not really carrying out a great deal of detailed scrutiny?

[Baroness Hamwee]

I am not sure whether that was a question for me; I assume it was, although it seems to be beyond the amendments that we are dealing with here. In making that point, though, I think my noble friend is pointing to the breadth, depth and complexity of this issue and to the need to keep everything under review and to be open to making changes as it becomes apparent that they are needed. This sort of guidance needs time for those who are affected to trickle down consultations, sweep up the responses and reflect back—perhaps this goes to my noble friend’s point as well—experience on the ground.

Like the noble Baroness, I mentioned nurseries in the first group and said rather more about the bureaucracy involved, which would be inappropriate for small organisations such as the nurseries, pre-schools and primary schools that we are talking about. It is about the substance as well as the bureaucracy. I was reminded by her anecdote of the six year-old son of a friend who was being visited by a German family. The child came downstairs going—I do not know how Hansard can reproduce this—“Rat-a-tat-tat”. He was asked, “What are you doing?”, and replied, “I’m killing dirty Germans”. That is exactly the same sort of experience, but how should one react to that?

On the individual amendments rather than the generality, I am glad to hear that the Government will consider equalities issues. What the Minister was given to read was that the Government will, “consider any equalities issues that have arisen since we published the draft for consultation”. There will be issues, I think. I will not get into a discussion at this time of night on the philosophy of consulting the population of prisons, although I think there is quite an interesting debate to be had about that.

Under my Amendment 112CB, the Secretary of State would have to take the decision about whether or not proposed revisions to the guidance were substantial, but that should be by an objective test, not a subjective one.

In summary, I come back to two words: transparency and safeguards. I will of course consider the detail of what my noble friend said, but it is quite clear to me that, with perception being so important as well as reality, we have to reduce the opportunity for incorrect perceptions as well as everything else.

Amendment 112BA withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

115AA: Clause 28, page 16, line 32, after “police” insert “or the responsible local authority”

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, Amendment 115AA takes us back into Chapter 2 and the Channel programme. Clause 28 deals with local panels for assessment and support. The Bill provides that a chief officer of police can refer an individual to a panel. I was requested to raise the first of my amendments in this group by London Councils to allow local authorities as well as the police to make direct referrals in order to access specialist support for individuals who are identified as vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. London Councils is concerned that the provisions might have the effect of limiting the access of public bodies other than the police to a key source of support. It gives as an example a teacher who may spot a pupil who has been accessing extremist materials and refer that pupil to the local authority under the school safeguarding policy. The local authority might conduct an assessment under safeguarding and child protection legislation, agree that the pupil is vulnerable to radicalisation and decide that the sensible next step would be for the case to be considered by the panel in order to access appropriate support.

London Councils is also concerned that, as drafted, an unbalanced relationship between the police and local authority would be created. The local authority of course would chair the panel. Another concern is that cases that come up before a panel are “deconflicted” by the police to ensure that the person concerned is not subject to an active investigation before a support plan can be put in place. I would be grateful if my noble friend could respond to that offer from local authorities to be even more active.

Amendment 115AB takes us to what the support plan would include. It returns to points that I have already made about discrimination, grassroots, bottom-up and perceptions. I suggest a reference to people,

“who will be consulted in keeping the plan under review”,

in order to ask about the role of the local community, religious leaders, the family and so forth and how they will be recognised.

Amendment 115AC is about the support that the panel may put into place. We are told that it must consider reference to a provider of health or social care services. Those are not the only services. I seek to add the words “or other”; for instance, housing. I know that Ministers have referred to Jobcentre Plus and so on. There are a number of other services which might be appropriate for an individual. I do not whether counselling would come within local care, but certainly that is also one which should be considered.

The last of my amendments in this group is Amendment 118ZA. It would amend Clause 32, which is about indemnification. We are told that the Secretary of State may agree to indemnify a support provider against reasonable expenses. I think that that should be “shall”. We have already more than touched on necessary expense and good investment but nevertheless there is concern about the expense of the sorts of programmes we have been discussing today. The authorities that will be required to undertake these various duties and activities will be very stretched to find the money for them and questions of prioritisation will arise. If I can be told that “may agree to indemnify” actually means “shall” in the odd way we sometimes seem to go about drafting legislation, that is fine, but I am certainly looking for some sort of reassurance. I beg to move.

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[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

There is a reason why we want to put the local authorities’ duties on a statutory footing. If the Secretary of State is doing everything that the noble Lord wants her to do, I do not see any particular benefit in putting that on a statutory footing. However, rather than going backwards and forwards on this, I am prepared to take this matter back. If there is more information that I can provide to the noble Lord, I will do so.

All providers are bound by a service level agreement with the Home Office that sets out the terms and conditions of their appointment, including conduct. In addition, as part of their co-ordination role, the police regularly review progress made against any interventions commissioned. Any misconduct will be treated seriously, with the option of terminating an agreement with a provider. It would be unusual—and we think unnecessary—to provide for these matters in the Bill.

Finally, I would like to address my noble friend’s Amendment 118ZA, which seeks to ensure that the Secretary of State must indemnify a support provider against any costs and expenses incurred in carrying out functions as a provider. I would like to reassure noble Lords that the costs for each case would be considered and, where the case was deemed appropriate, those reasonable costs would be indemnified. However, there might be some cases where it would not be appropriate to indemnify costs. One of the key reasons for resisting making the indemnification clause a blanket duty, required in all cases, is that it is included in the Bill to plug a gap that might not arise in all cases. The gap is the absence of reasonably priced insurance in the open market for risks that might arise for intervention providers. Depending on the precise nature of the support the provider is giving, there may or may not be sufficient availability of cover in the market. The intention behind Clause 32 is to allow the Secretary of State, only where a provider cannot get adequate cover, to step in with an indemnity. We do not want the Secretary of State to have to indemnify if a product is available on the market. The Secretary of State should therefore have discretion to decide which costs or expenses would be indemnified, but, as I have said, it is the intention that reasonable costs would be indemnified.

I hope that my responses have addressed the concerns raised by these amendments during this debate, and on that basis, I invite noble Lords not to press the amendments.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the reference to insurance leaves me—I have to confess—rather bemused. That was not at all what I thought this clause could be about. However, I will not take time expressing my bemusement. The Minister started his response by using the terms “practical” and “effective”. Those are criteria for me as well. Unfortunately, as it happens, I am not wholly convinced that we identified the same ways of arriving at that conclusion.

I am particularly grateful to my noble friend Lord Carlile for expanding the point about housing. Of course, he is absolutely right: local authority housing supply is minuscule, almost disappearing. However, the role of housing providers in this area can be very significant. I will think about the detail of the Minister’s response and perhaps come back to it. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 115AA withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

115AE: Clause 28, page 17, line 30, at end insert—
“( ) Guidance issued under this section shall in particular deal with equalities issues.”

[Baroness Hamwee]

I will try to move this amendment in under one minute, and not only because the Chief Whip is here. The amendments in this group more or less replicate, word for word, amendments made in respect of the Prevent programme. This part of the Bill is about the Channel programme. The Minister has been stressing the importance of guidance—which makes me think that my amendments are important. I simply invite him at this point to make any further or different comments or responses to those which he gave when I moved and spoke to similar amendments earlier this evening. I was just under a minute, I think. I beg to move.

[Baroness Brinton]

The noble Baroness has set a racing example, and I, too, will try to be extremely brief. My name is on Amendment 115B, which repeats the request found in two earlier clauses in the Bill through my amendments that when the Secretary of State issues or revises guidance she should make sure that Parliament has sight of an affirmative instrument in both Houses. I repeat, for the third time, I think, today, that where guidance is in parallel with other guidance, it should be issued as a single document.

The principal reason for this amendment is exactly the same as that for the other amendments: the Secretary of State has taken to herself and her successors a right to take decisions on guidance on sensitive issues. It is extremely difficult to assess which people are vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. I am sure Parliament would want to have sight of this guidance and be able to review in future. As with my other comments, I hope that the Minister will be able to provide some reassurance that Parliament will be able to assess the guidance before it is given.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

My Lords, we have had a very brief debate on this part of the Bill. I am grateful to my noble friends for tabling this amendment. I fear that I may not be able to satisfy them. Amendment 115B seeks to make the guidance under the duty in Chapter 2 subject to approval under the affirmative procedure. Noble Lords should be aware that Channel is already an established programme across England and Wales and those who participate in the programme follow existing non-statutory guidance. The Channel programme has been in place since April 2012.

The current guidance for local authorities’ panels is being amended, in consultation with those involved in the programme, and will be reissued on a statutory basis. Guidance of this sort is not routinely made subject to parliamentary scrutiny, and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has not recommended that it should be in this instance.

Amendment 115AF seeks to ensure that local authorities are consulted on any guidance issued for panels. Amendment 115E aims to ensure that partners of panels, or their representatives, are consulted before any guidance is issued. I can assure noble Lords that local authority panel chairs, panel members and police practitioners are being consulted about the revised guidance. Panel members invited to a meeting are likely to be those panel partners who have shared relevant information in relation to a referred individual and therefore will also be consulted at a local level. The consultation process will ensure that the views of all relevant stakeholders are taken account of and that the guidance is meaningful for those to whom it is issued. Their experience and expertise is invaluable in achieving this.

I hope that reassures my noble friend and that she will withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I suspect that as with the equivalent group on the previous provisions, we may want to come back to these issues. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 115AE withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord. That is extremely helpful. Of course I have no intention of pressing the amendment. I look forward to hearing what he says next week on Report. I ask him to reflect not only on the recommendation of the Joint Committee that the remit of the independent reviewer should be expanded but also, as the Minister mentioned, the other part of the Joint Committee recommendation—paragraph 7.8 of their report—that the Government should make available to the independent reviewer resources necessary to perform his task effectively. In particular, David Anderson has explained that it would help considerably if he were assisted by a security-cleared junior counsel. That seems a very good idea to me. I do not think that the provision of such assistance would need statutory authority, but I hope that the Minister can reflect on that. Other noble Lords may wish to intervene in relation to this debate.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am glad to hear what the Minister has said. Reference has been made to the Work Programme. My amendment extended beyond the remit to the question of the frequency of reporting, which is a point that the current independent reviewer raised. Less frequent reporting on some matters will free up time to focus on others, responding of course to the current situation. There is also the question of specific statutory powers for access to classified information and to gather information. He has said that he has not had a problem but that he feels that it would be appropriate for the matter to be dealt with in statute. I wanted to ask that those points be among those that the Government are considering and, like others, I look forward to seeing the amendment on Report.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, I will add a few words of support for what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and my noble friend. I feel very grateful to my noble friend the Minister for taking the initiative in this group of amendments. David Anderson has set out very clearly and correctly the additional support that he needs and the programme of work that it would be in the public interest to have in his hands. The Minister seems to agree, provisionally at least, with David Anderson’s representations as articulated by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in particular, and I feel that we can now await next week with some confidence.

--- Later in debate ---

Our amendments are a way forward to seek clarity and improvement. Questions remain about how the Government view the relationship between the board and the reviewer and why they have brought forward this proposal. Will the reviewer chair the board? Will he have a role in appointing the board? Will he be expected to report to the board and if so, how? What will be the level of security clearance for the board? Could it damage the independent reviewer’s ability to seek information and have candid discussions if those who provide information to him consider he has to share that information with the board, depending on his relationship with the board? It would be helpful if the noble Lord could address some of the issues I have raised. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I have Amendments 118G and 118K in this group but I want to say on Amendment 118J that I take the noble Baroness’s point about the impact on communities. The point has been raised with me as well and rightly so.

The first of my amendments in fact builds on the consultation paper. Under the section headed “What would the … Board do?”, it sets out in bullet-point form a number of core objectives. In most of the cases it uses the terminology that the subject of the consideration is,

“sufficient to meet the threat and adequately take account of privacy and civil liberties concerns”.

I think that I would prefer to see the word “properly” rather than “adequately” take account of privacy and civil liberties concerns. It is essential that that aspect is set out in the consultation paper, and I would hope to see it spelled out in the remit for the board in the statute as well. If it is not there, it is not there, and it will be difficult for the board to pursue that. My amendment is quite mild in that it seeks to provide advice to Ministers on that aspect of legislation. I have used the word “adequately” to reflect the consultation paper, although, as I said, I would prefer proper account to be taken of those concerns by that clear purpose being put on the face of the Bill.

My other amendment is about the chairmanship of the board, to which the noble Baroness referred. My amendment would give flexibility around whether the independent reviewer should chair the board. Mr Anderson has made his views clear about this being a possible diversion of his time and energy. I have a lot of sympathy with that, and the JCHR also took the point. The independent reviewer could still have an extremely central role in determining membership and the work programme without being the chair. I am not saying in this amendment that he—or, in future, she—should not chair the board; I am leaving it open for further consideration.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

I have an amendment in this group. It may be a miserable little amendment suitably to be looked at at 11.20 pm. It says simply that any regulations under the clause should be by way of affirmative resolution.

Perhaps I may say something a little more widely about the group. When I looked at Clause 36, the first question that came to my mind was: what is it for? You do not get very much out of the wording. It seeks to provide advice and assistance to the independent reviewer. Why and for what purpose? Then we look at what the regulations are to contain. They may include provision about,

“particular things that the board may or must do”.

This lack of clarification about the purpose of the clause is reflected in the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and my noble friend Lady Hamwee.

I was quite interested in Amendment 118F because it contains provisions which I think would have shocked to the core the Home Secretary in the previous Government—the thought that these wide-sounding provisions should be given to a board. On the other hand, my noble friend stresses that this should be about privacy and civil liberty concerns. I think that if it were about privacy and civil liberty concerns, we would understand a little more about it. However, as it is, the lack of clarity about what it is for means that we are about to have the anvil dropped from a large height by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Carlile. I trust that we will hear a little more in clarification from the noble Lord in reply.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Monday 26th January 2015 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

70: Clause 13, page 8, line 28, after “restrictions” insert “and what restrictions to impose”

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 70, I shall speak also to Amendment 71—slightly less fast-tracked legislation than that which my noble friend the Chief Whip sought to take through the House just now.

Under the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, the Secretary of State can impose restrictions on an individual leaving a specified area—the so-called “travel measures”. Clause 13 provides that the Secretary of State must publish factors to be taken into account when deciding whether to impose such restrictions on an individual. My amendment would add not only the restrictions but “and what restrictions to impose”. The area to which I have just referred is not defined, quite understandably, but it could be anything from a small postal district to a very large region. This is a probing amendment, seeking reassurance about the factors that will be applied to the decision as to what the area is, as well as whether to impose the travel measure. I appreciate that the Secretary of State’s decision will have to be a reasonable one, but I am looking to find a way not only to make the criteria objective, but as far as possible, transparent.

Amendment 71 would add to proposed new subsection (1A) of Section 23 of the 2011 Act the provision that, where there is a travel measure, an individual who breaches it is not guilty of an offence—because breaches of the TPIMs measures are offences—if he contravenes the measure,

“with reasonable excuse and in exceptional circumstances”.

I have in mind, again in probing, how an individual who leaves a fairly confined specified area will be dealt with if, for instance, there is a medical emergency involving either himself or a family member living with him, or if there is a sudden severe illness of a family member who is living at the family home and not at the place where the individual has been relocated. Quite understandably, he will want to get there as fast as possible and not have to take time seeking a permit allowing him to do so. It is a humanitarian and reasonable matter that one might well have in legislation. If my noble friend gives me assurances about how these things have been dealt with in the past—they are not new—and understanding has been shown so that a prosecuting offence has not been pursued, I will be happy with that. I beg to move.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Bates) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for tabling these amendments, which allow us to have a discussion on the travel measure that can be imposed on a TPIM subject.

Amendment 70 would amend the requirement for the Secretary of State to publish factors to take into account when deciding whether to impose restrictions under the travel measure. This would add an additional requirement to publish factors on “what restrictions to impose”. The purpose of the requirement in the Bill is to indicate the types of factors that the Secretary of State may consider when deciding whether to impose the travel measure. In each instance the location and size of any boundary will depend on the individual case. The factors that the Secretary of State may consider could include: national security considerations necessary to prevent or restrict involvement in terrorism-related activity; the original location of the TPIM subject, and by virtue of that, their family connections; the ability to access services and employment; the proximity to airports or ports; and the proximity to other TPIM subjects or prohibited associates. Any restrictions would have to be necessary and proportionate, as the noble Baroness rightly reminds us. The Secretary of State will publish these factors at Royal Assent and a copy will be placed in the Library.

Amendment 71 would allow a TPIM subject to use a “reasonable excuse” in exceptional circumstances to justify leaving the United Kingdom. In such circumstances, a prosecution for breaching the TPIM notice could not be brought. All other breaches of a travel measure—or any other measure—already allow for a reasonable excuse. The reality is that, if a TPIM subject leaves the UK without permission, they will be absconding from their TPIM notice. This is a very serious matter, as I am sure the noble Baroness would agree. It was the problem of absconsions which led to the creation of TPIMs as a successor to control orders. These individuals may very well pose a danger to the public in this country or overseas. We maintain that there is no reasonable excuse for leaving the UK without permission.

If a TPIM subject has a legitimate need to leave the UK, they can seek permission from the Secretary of State. There should be no circumstances where they leave the country without prior agreement. This morning, I discussed with officials the length of time that such measures might take. The experience is that these exchanges, permissions and interactions tend to take place on a very speedy basis. In the circumstances, we would not anticipate that there would be a problem in securing that permission.

I trust that, with that explanation and those reassurances, my noble friend may feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, that is very helpful. I wondered whether my noble friend might refer to the need to have a passport to travel outside the UK, which would probably have been dealt with as part of the arrangements for the individual. I will read through the list of considerations which my noble friend gave in response to my first amendment. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 70.

Amendment 70 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

72: Clause 15, page 10, line 3, at end insert—
“( ) The individual may request a person or persons to be specified in place of the person or persons previously specified.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, in moving this amendment I will speak also to Amendment 74. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, also has an amendment in this group.

Clause 15 deals with appointments which an individual can be required to keep. Following comment from the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, this takes advantage of the legislation in order to require individuals to attend appointments, for instance, in connection with deradicalisation. I really do not like that term: perhaps I might say appointments that would help the individual return to or lead a more comfortable and normal life. Amendment 72 would add that the individual could request somebody other than the specified person.

Different individuals respond in different ways to different counsellors, if I can use that term in a very wide sense. This work has to be dealt with case by case, and it would be a pity if it were to fail because of the individual and his counsellor simply not getting on and there not being a sensible opportunity to change the personnel. We all know of people who we simply cannot rub along with for reasons that sometimes we cannot even quite identify.

Amendment 74 would provide, in connection with such appointments, that the Secretary of State would be deemed to have given permissions for travel to enable the individual to attend appointments and, crucially, will not unreasonably withhold permissions to attend appointments relating to deterring other people from involvement in terrorist-related activity. We are all aware—it is a matter of common sense—that returning fighters may have a positive role in deterring other people. In the debate on Thursday on the latest proscription order that has been introduced, the noble Baroness gave an example of a woman trying to return to this country who was disillusioned with what she had found—I think—in Syria. That sort of disillusionment should be harnessed, and I would like to find every way of making this legislation positive as well as inevitably negative. I hope that my noble friend can assure the Committee in that connection.

I gave the Bill team notice of this matter this morning—if it has not yet reached the Minister, I will understand if he cannot answer—and will pick up an issue that the independent reviewer raised. This matter was also taken up by the JCHR: the question of privilege against self-incrimination. The Government’s response to the independent reviewer’s report was to say that this would not be appropriate. The Government referred to a “blanket approach”. Can the Minister unpack that a little today? I beg to move.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, our Amendment 73 is in this group. As has been said, Clause 15, on appointments for people on terrorism prevention and investigation measures, allows the Secretary of State to require an individual to attend meetings with such persons as the Secretary of State may specify, at such locations and at such times as the Secretary of State may by notice require. The specified persons may choose the time and place of the meeting. The clause is expressed in general terms and the purpose of the amendment, which is a probing amendment, is to give the Government the opportunity to say more about what kind of meetings an individual would be required to attend, for what purposes or objectives and over what period of time. It would also be helpful if the Minister could say if assessments will be made of the outcome of these meetings and to whom the assessments, if they are made, will be given.

Our probing amendment provides for the Secretary of State to be able to instruct an individual on a TPIM to attend deradicalisation programmes, since we think it is important that the Secretary of State should be able to require people to attend Channel meetings and appointments and possibly those relating to other parts of the Prevent programme. However, I hope that in his response the Minister will not only address the specific point covered in this probing amendment but talk in more depth about how the Government envisage using powers under Clause 15.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am grateful for the response. On the last point which is not the subject of an amendment, I am glad to hear that questions of reassurances about evidence are and will be dealt with case by case. I had perhaps not understood the context of this, and that that might be the case. I am glad to hear it.

I hear what my noble friend said on my other amendments in the group and I do not think that it is necessary to detain the Committee, other than to comment that a change of counsellor/mentor/adviser will be within the provisions for review, which I think is how my noble friend explained how a change might be made. It is useful to understand that that might be the procedure. However, I am glad to see that it is appreciated that, for this to be successful, it must be a very personal matter. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 72 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I wish to add just a small point in support of what my noble and learned friend Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood has said, and that is to stress the word “legitimacy” which he used in the course of his address. It is crucial that this particular system should not be open to challenges in the court to any extent; one must try to the maximum to minimise the risk of challenges. This is a very difficult area, as shown by these cases to which the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, just referred. It is the interaction between Article 3 of the Convention on Human Rights, which deals with detention, and Article 8, which deals with respect for the family life of everyone. Where you get these human rights in play, it opens up the possibility of arguments being raised by way of challenge to orders of this kind.

The strength of the amendment which is being suggested is that it cuts back the open door—if I might put it this way—to challenges, and limits them in the most sensitive of all areas, which is the kind of relocation to which the noble and learned Lord has drawn attention. It is right that this is not a probing amendment. It is actually a very important point to try to secure these TPIMs in a way that makes them robust enough to stand up against possible challenges which, if the amendment was not made, would be very likely to come.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, my support for the noble and learned Lord’s amendment is for real, to use his own term. I was reading a little—obviously I do not have the experience of other noble Lords, including my noble friend—about control orders at the time they were to be abolished and TPIMs introduced. One could not help but feel quite disturbed by some of the experiences undergone and the impact, as has been said, not only on the individuals subject to the orders but on members of their families so, as I say, I support this amendment.

I have just one question for the noble and learned Lord. It is about whether it is necessary—he must consider it is because he has included them—to have the words about the individual having “no connection”. As I read it, but I might have missed something, the amendment to Schedule 1 to the 2011 Act takes out the references to having a connection with a locality because the 200-mile limit is being introduced. If that is so, and we are losing references to there being a connection in the Schedule, is that reference necessary in the amendment?

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (LD)]

My Lords, I think noble Lords on all sides of the Committee have acknowledged that, because of the situation in which we presently find ourselves, powers of this sort are regrettably necessary. However, as noble Lords have said, their legitimacy is critical, and the rigour with which conditions are examined before they are imposed and the nature of that imposition itself are of the utmost importance. For all those reasons, I support the noble and learned Lord’s amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rooker]

I do not want to delay the Minister, but let us not beat about the bush. I do not speak for anybody other than myself, but I listened to every single speech, and those opposed to these amendments seem to be in favour of them being amended in line with the views of the committee that looked at the draft Bill. Will the Minister go back to the Home Secretary after this debate and make the request on behalf of this House for us to see, if not the draft Bill, the amendments to the amendments by Wednesday or Thursday this week, so that this House can make its mind up as to whether or not it wants to debate them and ask the other place? At the end of the day, Parliament has to decide but, as he knows, we are up against a time limit. Will he go back and say to the Home Secretary—these need not be his views, as he can just say he is the Minister with the message—that the House has asked whether it can see this information in time to do something with it?

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, before my noble friend responds, and without making any comment about whether we should or should not be shown things, I do not think it is appropriate to characterise all the opposition to these amendments as solely being about the way in which they have been put. My noble friends have made points of principle which we should not ignore.

[Lord Bates]

I also acknowledge the noble Lord’s experience as a former Minister—I am surrounded by former Home Office Ministers and Security Ministers in this debate. The specific point is whether there could be further provisions. The noble Lord says we should not beat around the bush. The issue here is that we are contemplating measures at a fairly late stage in a Bill which contains a number of measures which we desperately want to make sure get on to the statute book. We do not want to risk this Bill and all the provisions in it at present, as we think they are vital. In fact, we consider that they are more vital than the simple addition of these amendments—as desirable as we may see them individually—to the Bill. We do not want to do anything which would jeopardise the process. There has to be a recognition that the other place—I am sure the noble Lord, as a distinguished former Member, would recognise this—would feel that it was being required to look at 21 amendments, running to some 19 pages in a 53-page Bill, on a fast track and with ping-pong between the two Houses on consideration of Lords amendments. It might feel, rightly from a constitutional point of view, that that would be a difficult thing for it to agree to. I am simply airing the issues.

The noble Lord asked specifically whether the draft Bill which has been shown to the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Armstrong, can be shared more widely. I have undertaken to the noble Baroness that I will go back to the department and discuss that, and I will certainly come back with an answer as to whether that is possible. However, for the reasons which I have articulated—while recognising and appreciating the spirit in which these amendments have been put forward, which we absolutely share—I ask the noble Lord to consider withdrawing his amendment at this stage.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Tuesday 20th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, as the Minister has said, the amendment provides for legal aid for proceedings before a district judge in the light of an application for an extension of the 14-day period. We fully support the Government’s change of heart on this point about legal aid. As the Minister mentioned, the amendment states that its provisions are subject to the exclusions in Parts 2 and 3 of Schedule 1 to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. So that we are clear on exactly what those exclusions mean, it would be helpful if the Minister could clarify what their impact would be in reality, in respect of legal aid being provided, or not, in applications for an extension of time for retention of travel documents, which is the issue covered by the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I too am glad that the Government have addressed the matter of legal aid. There was clearly going to be a call for that. My question, which is a sort of prequel, is about whether advice would be available to a traveller at the point when travel documents are seized and retained. Legal aid is becoming confined to proceedings rather than advice, but this is an important point in the whole process.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser]

As mentioned in the debate on the previous amendment, the group of amendments to which Amendment 3 belongs requires the Secretary of State to commission an annual report to be laid before both Houses by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation on the exercise of the powers contained in Chapters 1 and 2 of Part 1 and in Part 2, which relate to the seizure of travel documents and temporary exclusion from this country. The amendments also require the Secretary of State to publish annual figures on the usage of these powers, and for an annual review of the arrangements made by the Secretary of State under the powers in paragraph 14 of Schedule 1 to be published and laid before both Houses.

I think I am right in saying that in its recent report the Joint Committee on Human Rights drew attention to the fact that neither of the new powers in Part 1 concerning the seizure of passports and managed return are made subject to independent review. It seems that the Minister told the JCHR that the Government had considered independent review, but apparently they were satisfied that any review of the extensive new powers in Part 1 should not extend beyond that carried out by parliamentary Select Committees. The Joint Committee on Human Rights referred in its report to the fact that the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation had commented on this issue, saying that if the powers we already have under the Terrorism Act need independent review, then surely the new powers in Part 1 also need independent review. It could be said that if that review took place it might help to inform a discussion on whether the powers needed reviewing if there was a sunset clause in the Bill. The Joint Committee on Human Rights said that, like the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, it believed in principle that the operation in practice of the new powers to impose restrictions on the travel of terrorism suspects should be subject to independent review, and therefore it was recommending that the powers in Part 1 concerning passports and managed return should be subject to review by the independent reviewer.

In moving Amendment 3, I am also speaking to the other amendments in this group. I hope that the Minister will be able to give a positive response to them.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My noble friend Lord Carlile has already referred to the fact that the independent reviewer can, does and did look at far more than is spelled out in statute. My inclination would be to spell that out, but to spell out that the independent reviewer’s powers extend to all terrorism legislation. I have half a clause drafted to that effect for later in Committee stage. That does not mean to say, as these amendments suggest, that that should necessarily be annual. It may need to be done more than annually. Some legislation—I think it is the asset-freezing legislation—requires quarterly reports. As time goes on, subject to the eventual decision about a sunset clause, it may be not so necessary to report as frequently. Perhaps more importantly, I would prefer that a report was not subject to commissioning by the Home Secretary. A future Home Secretary might decide not to commission a report, and we can all see where that might go.

This is an important issue. I am glad that it has been raised, and it has been covered quite substantially already this afternoon. I am not convinced that this is quite the way to go about it. We need to look at the comments made by David Anderson on the scope of the role and the balance between its constituent parts, and not pick bits off in individual parts of the Bill.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee: these amendments raise a very important subject. For my part, I agree with paragraph 7.8 of the report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights that it is absolutely essential that the independent reviewer’s remit is extended to cover all terrorism legislation. I would be quite content to leave it to the independent reviewer to decide when it is appropriate to publish reports. It seems entirely unnecessary and inappropriate to require reports to be published annually.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

5: Schedule 1, page 26, line 24, leave out from “issued” to “by” in line 25

[Baroness Hamwee]

This is a probing amendment, picking up a point which I raised at Second Reading. The passport which can be seized is either a United Kingdom passport or, according to paragraph 1(7) to the first schedule, one issued by another country,

“or by or on behalf of an international organisation”.

It is the passports of other countries and the international organisations’ documents that I would like to ask my noble friend about. UK passports are not the property of the passport holder and I believe it is the case in some other countries that the passport remains the property of the state. Perhaps my noble friend can confirm the position. Therefore, the first and obvious question is: what international discussions have there been and what agreement, if any, has been reached about this provision? Are other states happy, or at least relaxed, about the seizure of their property? Might there not be occasions when they would themselves ask to have the passport back?

Some international organisations issue laissez-passer documents, of which I think the UN is one. Is this provision compatible with our obligations to those international organisations? As I say, this is a probing amendment, as, I think, are all our amendments today. I hope that my noble friend can assist. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bates]

That seems to be excellent legal advice and I am sure that it is absolutely correct. Certainly we will review it and, if that is not the case, we will write.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the point about not passing through immigration control occurred to me as well as noble Lords were speaking. Then my mind turned to the question of what would happen if someone was travelling on one passport but carrying the passport of another country and switched half way through the journey. All this goes to the workability of these provisions, which is really the overarching question that noble Lords are asking. I do not think that I am alone in finding it a little difficult to imagine quite how the powers will operate in some circumstances.

It is not always easy to probe something without suggesting the opposite of what one intends. There is another example of that coming up shortly. So the noble Lord is right: I was not trying to take the words out but merely probing.

I am not sure—I may have missed it—whether the Minister referred to international organisations other than quoting what is in the schedule. Perhaps I may look at that after today and, if necessary, have another word with him. It looks as though I may not need to withdraw the amendment quite yet.

[Lord Bates]

I am just looking for help in order to answer my noble friend Lady Hamwee. The answer that I gave on diplomatic immunity was that, under international law and treaties, diplomats may enjoy certain immunities, and this power could not be used in breach of those. Therefore, that is clear. In relation to the point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, raised on transit passengers, my briefing note says, reassuringly, “Yes, your answer was accurate”. That is helpful. There may be cases where it is appropriate to use this power against transit passengers and, in practice, these will mostly occur following prior information provided to the police about an individual’s intention to travel. The power can be exercised both air side and land side, including against passengers who do not present at immigration control. I hope that that is helpful to noble Lords.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, that depends on somebody knowing that the passengers are there if they remain air side. I may have this wrong and I accept that my amendment did not take out the reference to international organisations. They may have the equivalent of diplomatic immunity. I was not thinking of that; I was thinking of the large international organisations which issue a laissez-passer, as I understand it. Maybe that is something on which I could have a word with my noble friend. He nods; I am grateful for that. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 5 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

6: Schedule 1, page 27, line 13, leave out “or is intended to do so” and insert “either intentionally or recklessly as to the consequences”

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I shall also speak to Amendment 7. Amendment 6 is one of those probing amendments which may seem a bit unexpected or counterintuitive coming from me. It seeks to inquire whether the reference to intention in paragraph 1(10) covers recklessness. The words I have used are, “recklessly as to the consequences”. Will my noble friend share with the Committee the Government’s thinking on restricting the term to intentionality?

My second amendment, already trailed by the noble and learned Lord, refers to humanitarian assistance. This is another probing amendment to ask how the Government plan to deal with workers travelling out who are associated with reputable organisations such as the Red Cross. I accept that this is a difficult area because there can be individuals who are not with such organisations but who, in their own minds, are going out to provide humanitarian aid. They might be so closely associated with those who are fighting that they would be seen by others as providing something which is closer to military support than the broader humanitarian assistance.

We need to find a way through this difficult area, but at this stage perhaps my noble friend can explain the Government’s thinking on this issue and what work they have done with the big, overstretched—I am sure they could do without a further consultation, but there you go—humanitarian organisations working in the Middle East. I beg to move.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, as I hinted earlier, I wish to add a little more detail in support of Amendment 7, in the name of the noble Baroness. The background to what I am going to say comes from my experience chairing the Joint Committee on the Draft Protection of Charities Bill, which has been considering a clause which would seek to add offences under the Terrorism Act 2000 to the list of offences a conviction for which will result in automatic disqualification from being a trustee of a charity. That may seem a little bit removed from what we are considering this afternoon, but we have heard evidence on that issue from various witnesses speaking about the chilling effect of the risk of prosecution under the terrorist legislation on the efforts of those who seek to provide humanitarian assistance in areas which are under the control of, for example, proscribed organisations.

Among our witnesses was the chairman of the Muslim Charities Forum, who said:

“I go to difficult areas like Afghanistan, South Sudan and Chechnya. Recently, two weeks ago, I was in Iraq, in Baghdad. I have been in Somalia, in Mogadishu and other countries. I think counter-terrorism legislation is preventing us from having access to the neediest people. There are proscribed groups in those areas, and we know them. They are the gatekeepers. How can we go through the gatekeepers to reach the neediest people in Syria, Somalia or different parts of the world?”

That was the problem to which he drew our attention.

Among our other witnesses was the Independent Reviewer of Terrorist Legislation, David Anderson QC, to whom the noble Lord rightly paid tribute early this afternoon and I entirely endorse his remarks. He said that charities operating in these areas run the risk of falling foul of terrorism law—for example, by delivering relief to a general population which may include individuals or groups designated as terrorists. He suggested that increased risk could deter charities and their trustees from delivering humanitarian support. He was talking about the risk that would be created by extending the definition that disqualifies people from being trustees on conviction for these offences. As I mentioned earlier, we are talking about a rather softer mechanism, which is very important but depends on a decision taken by a constable at the point of entry.

One of the points to which David Anderson drew our attention was that there are examples in other countries where this issue has been addressed. The Minister might be interested to know that the kind of exception which the noble Baroness is suggesting can be found in connection with the broad definition of terrorism when one studies, for example, legislation in Australia or New Zealand. They have specific exceptions in terrorism law to meet that point, including that of association with proscribed organisations for the purpose of providing humanitarian aid. That is very important and it is rather odd that it is raised as a tiny, probing amendment in a debate on a temporary exclusion order. It runs right through the effect of the broad definition of terrorism, which Mr Anderson described as quite disturbing because of its breadth, and adds a great deal of force to the noble Baroness’s amendment.

I invite noble Lords to think carefully about that because the humanitarian effort is something all of us would wish to support. Given the amount of effort that the Government rightly put into providing aid overseas, it would be most unfortunate if it is being cut off because of this kind of measure. Of course, there are ways in which it can be done without embarking at all on this kind of risk area, but those who are right at the frontier in these very difficult areas should not be discouraged by legislation of this kind if it is possible to protect them against its effects. The humanitarian exception may be one of the more important issues that we are considering today. I would be very interested, and I am sure that the noble Baroness would be too, to hear how the Minister would wish to consider the point.

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[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

I completely agree that there is a difference between those two words, but they are not mutually exclusive.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, of course there is a difference and it is not just about mutual exclusivity, but I do not wish to pursue that at this point.

On the second of the amendments in this group, one never knows where one’s probing is going to lead. Although the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, may disapprove of my drafting, I am glad that I raised it. I do not think that it will necessarily be palpably obvious to an immigration official why somebody is seeking to leave the country. I accept that the point is not confined just to this schedule and I think it is worth consideration. I would be grateful to have a conversation with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, as to whether we can use the opportunity of this legislation to try to deal with the point more widely. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 6 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, with no such authority —neither mine nor anyone else’s—I wrote, against Amendment 8, “If it is reliable intelligence is it not already covered?”. Intelligence may be less than reasonable; evidence may be more than is reasonable. I am not clear what standard would be required by the provision as amended. The noble and learned Lord has made my point much more clearly and authoritatively.

I have a number of amendments in this group. Amendments 10, 12, 13 and 21 all provide for the giving of reasons for the suspicion and for allowing the person the opportunity to make representations at the different stages of the process. I hope that both those items are self-explanatory: there should be an explanation, at the very start and at each stage, and the person concerned should be able to make representations—make representations is about the right level; I am not quite saying make a case—and to state their position.

Amendments 17, 18 and 19—

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

Before the noble Baroness moves on, she said that she felt the arguments to be self-explanatory. Perhaps, for the assistance of the Committee, she could talk a little about what she means by the reasons. If you present an individual with the reasons, are you in fact asking that all the material that has led to that reasonable view being taken be presented? That could require the provision of intelligence material, which could have an implication for government. It would be helpful, therefore, to understand what the noble Baroness thinks would be sufficient to meet the requirement to provide reasons.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I do not think that the noble Lord was present when I said that all our amendments today, and no doubt on subsequent days, will be probing ones. I think he was here when I said that many of our amendments—not just the ones that I and my noble friends have tabled—are about the workability of these provisions. I am sure that the Committee would like to understand what will happen at each stage.

I do not of course expect an immigration officer to come out with the kind of address that might be made to the Bench at a later point, but there is a very great difference between that and seizing the document under the provisions in Schedule 1. I dare say that the code of practice—and any additional guidance—will deal with this. I hope that it does, because I think it ought to. I am going to talk later, under a different amendment, about perceived discrimination, which I am sure the noble Lord will be as concerned about as I am. That is, in part, addressed when those who are exercising powers are as clear as they reasonably can be at any given stage about why they are doing so.

One set of amendments would change the 14-day period to seven days. The Joint Committee on Human Rights raised this point and drew comparisons with other provisions, such as those relating to property rights under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, where an application must be made to a court to retain cash after 48 hours; equally, where a person is arrested under Section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 on reasonable suspicion of being a terrorist, a judicial warrant of further detention must be applied for within 48 hours of arrest. The JCHR recommended that seven days should be substituted for 14 days. I would have hoped that the committee did not make this point, but that would be adequate time to assemble the material that needs to be presented—and indeed to assemble the presentation—to the court, which in any event can extend the time.

The last of my amendments in this group, Amendment 28, amends Schedule 1(8). Under paragraph 8(4),

“the judicial authority must grant an extension if satisfied that the relevant persons have been acting diligently and expeditiously”.

My amendment would add a reference to “reasonable grounds”. In other words, it seeks to ensure that the judicial authority would apply the same test as under paragraph 2.

[Baroness Ludford]

My Lords, in relation to this group, without I hope stretching anyone’s patience, I will just repeat two questions that I asked at Second Reading, to which I do not think I got an answer. The first question, which may be very daft, is why it is not possible to use powers under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act to retain passports for up to seven days. Why can those not be used for outward travel? The Minister may not be able to instantly answer that. Secondly, how do you stop a rolling renewal? I gave the analogy of declaring the whole of Greater London a terrorism exclusion zone. How do you stop that just being renewed on a repetitive basis?

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I realise that there is plenty of material in the Minister’s response for us to read and think about. However, at the start of his response, he said that an officer should not have to justify his suspicion. I wondered whether he was equating that with gisting, which was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and others, because I do not think that they are the same thing. If he does not want to commit to answering that point now, perhaps I may have a word with him about that between now and the next stage.

[Lord Bates]

I am happy to expand further on that but, effectively, the justification I referred to was that the police officer would have had to have arrived at a position where he believed that there was a reasonable suspicion, and that the reasonable grounds test had been met. He would then have to justify that to a senior officer of the rank of superintendent or above and then, after 72 hours, that would have to be a chief superintendent and it would have to go to the chief constable, so it was in that setting that I was referring particularly to the justification rather than gisting.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

9: Schedule 1, page 28, line 25, after “possession” insert “or under his or her control”

[Baroness Hamwee]

Amendments 22, 42 and 43 in this group are also in my name, and Amendment 11 is in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.

Amendment 9 has rather an automatic, almost knee-jerk—or perhaps wrist-jerk—wording that anyone who has dealt with contracts for more than five minutes is likely to produce; namely, if something is in someone’s possession, does that adequately cover the situation or do you need to refer to the item as being under that person’s control? Again, this issue is about workability. I raised it with the Bill team some two or three weeks ago, before Christmas, and asked what would happen if it were not the individual but a companion who was holding the travel documents, and what powers would be available to get at those documents. When people are travelling as a pair or in a group, an individual does not always carry his own documents at every point. I understand that the amendment’s wording is wide enough because I think that the documents must always come into the individual’s possession, but I thought that it was worth getting clarity on that in Committee.

Amendment 22 seeks to amend paragraph 6(4). That paragraph states that on reviewing the retention of travel documents:

“The relevant chief constable must consider those findings and take whatever action seems appropriate”.

That is a wide phrase and I do not think the Minister will be surprised that my point boils down to whether he can share with the Committee what is anticipated to be within the range of “appropriate” and how this will be dealt with. Will it be covered by guidance, a code of practice and so on?

My other amendments in the group, Amendments 42 and 43, concern the perception of discrimination in the exercise of these powers—an issue that I have already raised today. I accept that this is an immensely difficult area; I have referred in the amendments to training, including equalities training, and recording the performance of the exercising of the powers. The latter is certainly covered by the draft code, which I saw after I had tabled the amendment. However, I will probably not be the only Member of the Committee who is aware of concerns about discrimination or who has received from one organisation a copy of a briefing to its members to make representations to MPs. It says:

“The proposed legislation could bear serious consequences for British Muslims including”,

and lists a number of items. It then states:

“This is a deeply troubling piece of legislation for British Muslims and will change our lives forever it is passed in its current form”.

I have no easy answer on how to deal with this but the Government must, I am sure, have been considering the perception, particularly in the light of the fact that those against whom it is sought to exercise those powers are likely—that may be the wrong word—to come disproportionately from Muslim communities. I felt that the matter had to be aired for us to seek some reassurance, which I hope the Minister will be able to give. I beg to move.

[Lord Rosser]

I have Amendment 11 in this group, to which I wish to speak. Schedule 1 includes the procedure for the authorisation by a senior police officer for the retention of a travel document, and states in paragraph 4:

“The document may be retained while an application for authorisation is considered. Any such application must be considered as soon as possible”.

The effect of my amendment, which is more a probing amendment, is to provide a time limit within which the application for authorisation must be considered—namely, within 12 hours—rather than leaving it somewhat open-ended, as provided for in the Bill.

No doubt, the Minister will indicate in his reply why it was felt desirable not to lay down a specific maximum time limit but to leave the provision without any time limit at all by using the phrase “as soon as possible”. The length of time taken for the application for authorisation to be dealt with is presumably—although I should be grateful if it could be confirmed or otherwise—in addition to the period during which the travel document can be seized, as laid down in the Bill. If that is the case, it is important that such authorisations are not delayed but are dealt with expeditiously. How long do the Government believe it will take for applications for authorisation to be considered, and how long do they consider is reasonable in that context? Who will decide whether it has been dealt with as soon as possible? Who can take any action, and through which channels, if they consider that the application has not been dealt with as soon as possible? How will they obtain the evidence for that?

I was going to ask the Minister: in what circumstances do the Government envisage that it would not be possible to consider an application within 12 hours? It may be that he will say in reply that he considers that an application should be dealt with in considerably less time than that but, bearing in mind my amendment, which aims to find out more about the reasons for the government wording, it would be helpful if the Minister could say what kind of factors leading to a delay—for example, beyond the period laid down in my amendment —the Government would believe were still compatible with dealing with the application as soon as possible. I hope that he will respond to these points, either now or subsequently.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I had intended to say a word about Amendment 11. Given that this is Committee, I may do so. I am sympathetic to the questions that the noble Lord has asked, although—as I suspect he may agree—12 hours is too long. However, the point that has been exercising me is whether it is a good idea to have a maximum period, or whether that might become the standard and efforts to deal with the matter as soon as possible will not be made. Perhaps the individuals will think, “I’ve got so long to deal with it and will therefore take that long”.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, I wish to comment on Amendments 42 and 43 in this group. I have to say that the grouping is slightly odd because it relates to a whole range of different issues. I assume that the purpose of the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, is to ensure, first, that the way in which the action of removing someone’s passport is carried out is mindful of equalities issues and the background of the people concerned; and, secondly, that a proper record is kept of what is done, so that any subsequent look at how the powers had been applied can show that they had been applied proportionately. I have no objection to that; indeed, it goes to the essence of the point about this power and the subsequent powers—the extent to which they will be exercised in such a way as to achieve their purpose but avoid a situation in which they alienate a particular community by reinforcing the narrative that suggests that that community is being oppressed or whatever.

In that context, it would be helpful if the Minister could indicate how frequently it is anticipated that these powers will be used? Are we talking about six, 600, 6,000 or 60,000 times a year? It makes a significant difference because if every time people from a particular community try to leave the country they have to go through these procedures—and these documents are held for a period, whether for six, 12 or even two hours—that will produce resentment. If the powers are to be used in a much smaller number of cases, it may be that the proportionality will seem to be more reasonable. It would be useful if the Government, in asking for these necessary powers, were to confirm how frequently the powers would be used. I am sure they have considered that. Perhaps the Government can say, having thought through the information and intelligence that has been available for, say, the past six months, how many times they think they would have sought to use these powers.

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[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

A lot depends, of course, on how many responses there are to the consultation. I am unable to make a firm commitment today but it will be as soon as possible and if I can get more and clearer information on the subject I will let the noble Lord know.

I hope noble Lords will feel some reassurance and I would be grateful if the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who made the points on equalities, discrimination, the perception of discrimination and so on far better than I did. There is, again, material to consider and perhaps I—and others—should be encouraging responses to the consultation on the draft code. The Government may not wholly welcome a shedload of comments but that is what consultation is about. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 9 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

35: Schedule 1, page 34, line 2, at end insert—
“12A A judicial authority shall have the power to direct payment of compensation by the Secretary of State to any person whose travel document is seized (whether or not retained).”

[Baroness Hamwee]

Amendments 35 and 40 relate to practical and legal provisions. The first, probing, amendment allows a judicial authority the power to direct the payment of compensation to a person whose travel document has been seized. I would not suggest that such a power might be used in anything other than the exceptional circumstances, but there would be disruption and damage—I think that is the right term—to a person whose travel documents have been seized and whose travel has been massively disrupted. If you miss a flight, you miss a flight. You might be delayed by some hours or, depending on your destination, by some days. You might miss some important engagement or event, even if you are delayed by only a couple of hours, because you miss a connection, and so on. I do not think I need to labour the point. Have the Government considered whether there should be a power to direct payment of compensation? If not, why not?

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[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

My Lords, we have had an interesting debate on this small group. I hope that I will be able to address most of the points raised by your Lordships.

Amendment 35 seeks to allow the court to direct that the Secretary of State should pay compensation to any person whose travel documents have been seized under Schedule 1. This is regardless of whether or not these travel documents have been retained. Protecting the public from terrorism is the central aim of this power. The power to seize and retain travel documents can play an important role in the detection and prevention of terrorism, and using the power fairly makes it more effective. The Government completely accept the dangers involved with minority groups, as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Harris, and my noble friend Lady Warsi in another debate, and the effect if this power is not used fairly.

However, if the power—this is exactly what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said—is exercised lawfully on the basis of reasonable suspicion, there is no legal requirement to pay compensation for any associated loss. This principle is consistent with the exercise of other police powers: if a power was exercised lawfully, there is no requirement to compensate the individual. I take completely the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Harris, that this can have effects that have wider ramifications but, to use the noble Lord’s own words, that would open up a mare’s nest. Therefore, we do not agree that we should change precedent so that compensation is paid in these circumstances.

Complaints about the conduct of examining officers or the treatment of an individual during the seizure and retention of travel documents may be directed to either the police or the Border Force, depending on which officer seized and retained the travel documents. The draft code of practice explains how an individual may complain. If an individual wishes to challenge the police officer’s decision, she or he may seek redress—again, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred to this—including compensation, from the courts. This is the appropriate avenue to challenge the police’s operation of this power and is in line with procedures in similar circumstances.

The noble Lord, Lord Hylton, asked about travel costs and whether the Government would compensate. As with the compensation principle generally that I outlined, if it is exercised in good faith, this would not lead to a requirement to pay compensation. However, at present, if someone’s flight is disrupted due to the use of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act and the police judge that no further action is required, they will often work with the individual and the airline to help them get on another flight, which happens reasonably often. They would do the same with this power where reasonably practicable. Under this Bill, we could also provide assistance to individuals who have had their documents seized, are not resident in the UK and do not have any means to provide for their continuing stay in the UK.

Amendment 40 seeks to illustrate the type of arrangements that may be made by the Secretary of State in relation to a person whose travel documents are retained under Schedule 1. The illustrative examples provided are to include payment for accommodation and making alternative travel arrangements. The power to seize and retain travel documents can play an important role and using the power fairly makes it more effective. The Government are clear: the power in Schedule 1 must be used fairly and proportionately, with respect for the person to whom the power has been applied, and must be exercised in accordance with the prescribed procedures and without discrimination. A failure to use the power in the proper manner will reduce its effectiveness. Amendment 40 is superfluous, as the power under paragraph 14 in Schedule 1 is deliberately broadly framed and could include the Secretary of State making arrangements which include payment for accommodation and alternative travel arrangements for those whose travel documents have been retained.

Protecting the public from terrorism is the central aim of this power, but it is right that we make such provisions to meet our obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. Therefore, if necessary, an individual who has no means to provide for himself or herself would be provided with basic support for the period that his or her travel documents have been retained. This would involve basic temporary accommodation and subsistence if the individual has no other means to support themselves.

However, we assess that the use of this power against those who do not already reside in the UK will be infrequent. In other cases, where for instance a UK resident has had their travel disrupted, if the power is exercised lawfully on the basis of reasonable suspicion, there is no legal requirement to pay compensation for any associated loss, which is consistent with the exercise of other police powers. For the reasons that I have set out, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the explanation given by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was exactly as I had understood the position to be. However, for the reasons covered by the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, I felt that it was important that we set out during our proceedings the reasons for compensation not being payable. I took care to use the phrase “very exceptional”. Perhaps that was not quite strong enough. As to the suggestion made by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford about the possibility of an ex gratia payment, one would not presumably need statutory provision for that by definition. However, it is an interesting suggestion.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

My Lords, I apologise that I did not refer to that in my reply. There is no provision at the moment. We have not decided or made any provision to make ex gratia payments.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I was suggesting that it would not need provision by virtue of being ex gratia. After today, perhaps we can think about whether specific provision would be needed to allow an ex gratia payment to be made. The examples given in paragraph 14 are helpful and some of the examples given in response to Amendment 35 probably were at least equally applicable to that paragraph. However, we are at Committee stage and, as I keep saying—I hoped that I was being reassuring—all our amendments today are probing. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 35 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

37: Schedule 1, page 34, line 27, leave out “is” and insert “and any accompanying persons is or are”

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, Amendments 37, 38 and 39 are also amendments to paragraph 14. They are probing amendments as to what arrangements the Government might have in mind for the companions of an individual whose travel documents are seized. The Minister may feel that he has covered the ground in his answer to the previous group of amendments but, to put it briefly, if there is anything more that he can say to flesh out the provision, I am sure that the Committee will be glad to hear it. I beg to move.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

My Lords, this will be a brief debate—in fact, hardly a debate.

The amendments in the names of my noble friends have allowed us to think about the implications of this power for the travelling companions of a person whose passport has been seized. Amendments 37 and 39 seek to extend the protections in paragraph 14 of Schedule 1 to any persons travelling with an individual whose travel documents have been retained. It would allow the Secretary of State to provide assistance to the accompanying persons during the retention period and would provide that his or her presence in the UK was not unlawful under the Immigration Act 1971 for the retention period.

As I previously set out, the police can exercise the power in Schedule 1 only based on reasonable suspicion. It is possible that the police may reasonably suspect the intentions of one person travelling in a family group but have no suspicions that the entire family is planning to travel overseas for the purpose of terrorism-related activity. In such a hypothetical circumstance, the accompanying family members may require means to lawfully remain in the UK with the stopped person while the police investigation was on-going and the person’s travel documents were retained. This may be particularly relevant if the power was exercised against a person who was under 18.

These amendments would also allow the Secretary of State to provide assistance to those accompanying an individual who had his or her documents seized, or were not resident in the UK and did not have any means to provide for their continued stay in the UK. I am grateful to my noble friends for shining a light on such a circumstance. However unlikely it may be to occur in reality, they have highlighted a potential gap in the current provisions and the Government are committed to considering this issue in greater detail.

Paragraph 14 provides protections to the individual that would apply during the period that his or her travel documents were retained and he or she was unable to leave the UK. Amendment 38 seeks to alter this to include where a person is “unable to make the journey to which the travel relates”. The additional wording is unnecessary, as being unable to make a journey to which the travel relates is captured in the current drafting, which is “unable to leave the United Kingdom”. However, as the amendment has raised some interesting points on how this provision could be applied, the Government are committed to considering this issue, too, in greater depth.

I hope that my brief reply has satisfied my noble friend and has done all that is required.

[Baroness Hamwee]

Yes, indeed. I wonder whether officials in the Home Office have been undertaking role-play as to all the different circumstances that might apply when these powers could be exercised, because, as I said, one of the concerns of the House is always about workability. I am grateful to my noble friend. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 37 withdrawn.

Debate on whether Schedule 1 should be agreed.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My noble friend is aware of this point—at least I hope that he is, because I sent an e-mail on it. Schedule 1 provides for the usual 40-day period in paragraph 19 and I had intended to ask the Minister to confirm that that period is suspended during the Dissolution of Parliament. However, the question now has a second limb, because the Government have tabled Amendment 45, which refers to a similar 40-day period but actually spells that out. I wonder why there is a distinction between these two. I am not objecting to this. The Statutory Instruments Act 1946 covers the point, but dealing with it in detail in the new schedule raises a question that needs to be sat upon with regard to the first schedule.

[Lord Bates]

I am happy to respond to my noble friend and to thank her for giving advance notice that she intended to speak on this. She asked whether the 40-day period described in paragraph 19 is suspended during Dissolution. I can confirm that the period would be suspended. However, in reality, our intention is for the code of practice to come into force the day after Royal Assent, using the affirmative procedure, as these powers are urgently needed by law enforcement. My noble friend noted that the new schedule in Amendment 45 suspends the 40-day period. It may not be possible to timetable the debate on the court rules necessary to implement the temporary exclusion order provisions by Dissolution. However, we are confident that the House will debate the code of practice on the exercise of the passport seizure provision before Dissolution.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I am grateful for that answer, but I am not sure that I entirely understand the procedure that the Minister referred to at the start of it. I wonder if he might write to noble Lords about how this would operate.

[Lord Bates]

I will give an undertaking to do that.

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[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

I think it would be better if I clarified that and came back to the noble Baroness. I do not want to say something that is incorrect on the precise details of this. I could make a guess, but I would rather not.

The noble Baroness’s amendment would mean that the Home Secretary would be required to have evidence that an individual has engaged in terrorism-related activity abroad rather than having a reasonable suspicion. The reasonable suspicion may well be based on intelligence, which is clearly not always the same as evidence. This change would greatly reduce the number of individuals against whom the Home Secretary could use this power. The result of this would be that the Government would not be able to control the return of individuals suspected of fighting alongside terrorist groups and would have fewer tools available to manage the threat these individuals posed to the British public.

Furthermore, where there is clear evidence that an individual is engaged in terrorism-related activity, it is likely that we would be in a position to seek their prosecution, which would be preferable to placing them under the conditions of a temporary exclusion order. Such a high test would also bring them within scope of the much stronger TPIM regime. Given the less stringent obligations of a TEO compared with the other measures, the Government’s view is that such a test would be disproportionate. On that basis, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am glad that my noble friend made those concluding remarks, referring particularly to prosecution where it is possible.

Should we be comforted by the distinction between the words in Condition A, “reasonably suspects”, with an emphasis on “suspects”—the noble Lord referred to “reasonable grounds for suspicion”, which we covered earlier today—as against, in Conditions B and C,

“the Secretary of State reasonably considers”?

That seems to require more of the Secretary of State. Conditions A to D must all be met, so we can look at them together and see an escalation of the seriousness of the Secretary of State’s views, if I may put it like that. I could understand the concerns of the noble Baroness if we were to look only at Condition A, but I do not think that we can look at it in isolation.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for trying to help the Minister but the purpose of the amendment was merely to probe the issues around the evidence base for “suspects”. She was taking me very literally on that.

I am grateful to the Minister for his response and glad that he will write to me on the point that I raised with him. Could he also write to me on the second point, which he did not address? This was about somebody who might have dual nationality and was fighting against terrorism, for instance. I gave the example of a British Iraqi Kurd who was fighting against ISIS. It would be helpful if he could clarify that.

The purpose of this amendment and my next, Amendment 56, is to tease out how this will work. The Government need to answer some of these complex questions. It is a big and important power, but we need to understand how it will work. I am grateful for the Minister’s help and his offer to write to me, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

56: Clause 3, page 2, line 22, at end insert after “include” insert “the Secretary of State’s reasons,”

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I wondered whether the noble Baroness was adopting this one.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

I apologise—mine is Amendment 59.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I think we are all being as co-operative as we can be on this: we are aiming at the same thing.

Briefly, Amendment 56 amends Clause 3, which provides that notice of the imposition of an order must include an explanation of the procedure for making an application under Clause 5. My amendment would provide that it should also include,

“the Secretary of State’s reasons”.

This is simply for the reasons that we discussed earlier: an individual affected needs to have an understanding, not necessarily—almost inevitably not—of the fine detail, but of the gist of the reasons why. This might not be the right term in this context, but in normal terminology it covers what I mean. Having knowledge of the procedure is not a great deal of use unless one knows the reasons for the Secretary of State’s decision. I did not quite keep that to under a minute but I beg to move.

[Lord Bates]

My Lords, I appreciate that this is the last group of amendments before we seek the permission of the House to break. I am grateful to my noble friend for raising this point, which relates to the information provided to the subject of a temporary exclusion order.

It is, of course, important that the individual is informed that they are subject to a temporary exclusion order—after all, that is the point of it—and that they are given some indication of why this is the case. However, I trust your Lordships will understand that it is not appropriate for the individual to be provided with detailed reasoning behind the Secretary of State’s decision, which is likely to include sensitive information, the disclosure of which could damage national security and put lives at risk.

Any notice given to the individual would state that the Secretary of State has reasonable suspicion that they have been involved in terrorism-related activity abroad. We believe that this is sufficient disclosure, which informs the individual of the basis for the decision while protecting sensitive information.

My noble friend was brief in moving her amendment. I have been fairly brief in responding to it but I hope I have answered the point she was making. I therefore ask her to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am conscious of the time. I think that was one of those answers that may raise further questions, which perhaps I will keep for another day. As there is another debate about to happen, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 56 withdrawn.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Tuesday 20th January 2015 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

57: Clause 3, page 2, line 32, leave out “when notice of its revocation is given”

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 62, 63 and 64. The Committee will be pleased to know that I am aiming to be extremely brief on all the amendments left in my name for today.

Amendment 57 is an amendment to Clause 3(6), which provides:

“If a temporary exclusion order is revoked, it ceases to be in force when notice of its revocation is given”.

I am intrigued to know why the effect of the order continues until notice is given. By definition, there is a delay between the decision to revoke and the notice of revocation. Although this is not the whole of the point I am making, I am not sure whether notice being given means a notice received or a notice, as it were, sent out. In any event, there is a time difference between the decision and the notice, and I should have thought that the revocation should take effect immediately.

Amendment 62 is an amendment to Clause 8, which provides for the obligations on an individual who returns under an order. Here, the notice imposes the obligations on an individual who is subject to the order and who has returned to the UK. Are there no obligations in a period before the return to the UK or is this something to do with the proceedings which have taken place in the UK? The status of somebody who is subject to an order but has not returned intrigues me. Are there no obligations which may apply to an individual before he returns to the UK? The obligations are backed up by Clause 9, which is about offences if restrictions are contravened. My question here is about status.

Amendment 63, also an amendment to Clause 8, is similar to Amendment 57. I note that the notice of the obligations comes into force when it is given and is in force until the order ends. Is there a point at which the notice is deemed to be given? My amendment will provide for it actually to be given. My noble friend will understand that I am seeking to understand when it comes into force.

Amendment 64, also to Clause 8, is similar to Amendment 57 in that the variation or revocation should come into effect immediately, not take effect when notice is given, and the same questions are raised as for the earlier amendment. I beg to move.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Bates) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for bringing forward these amendments, which provide an opportunity to put further information on the record as to how temporary exclusion orders will work in practice. Amendment 57 seeks to provide that a temporary exclusion order ceases to be in force immediately when revoked, not when notice of revocation is given. We believe it is important that notice of revocation is given and that this is the point at which the order ceases to be in force. It is right that the individual concerned is made aware that the restrictions and obligations imposed on them will no longer be in place.

Similarly, Amendment 64 seeks to ensure that any variation or revocation of the in-country obligations placed on an individual come into effect immediately rather than once notice has been given to that individual. In the same way, we believe that it is right that notice of revocation is given and that this is the point at which the obligations cease to be in force. It is important that the individual concerned is made aware that the obligations imposed on them will no longer be in place. More importantly, it is vital that the individual is informed of any variation to the obligations before these variations take effect to avoid an unintentional breach, which could lead to prosecution.

Amendment 63 seeks to provide that notice of any in-country obligations comes into force when an individual is actually given the notice. As the individual will have returned to the UK under the terms of the temporary exclusion order, we will usually know the whereabouts of the individual and, in practice, should always be able to serve the notice on them in person. But it may be expedient for an individual as well as for the authorities for notice of a variation, for example, to be posted to the individual rather than served in person. In addition, there may be circumstances in which an individual absconds and is therefore no longer at the contact address. In all those circumstances, it is right that notice can be deemed to have been given, provided proper procedures are followed. Parliament will be able to review those procedures, but I can assure your Lordships that they will be based on well established practice in relation to immigration decisions.

Finally, Amendment 62 seeks to allow the Secretary of State to impose the in-country obligations of a temporary exclusion order on an individual who is about to return to the UK, as well as on those who have already returned to the UK. The in-country elements of a temporary exclusion order cannot be imposed until the individual has returned to the United Kingdom, a point on which my noble friend sought clarification. This will allow law enforcement partners to assess the most appropriate measures to manage the risk posed by the individual at that time, which may be a matter of years after the decision to impose the order was originally taken. It may even be appropriate to arrest and prosecute the individual, rather than impose any in-country measures on them. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to apply the in-country measures to someone who is about to return. It is better to wait until the individual is in the UK and form an assessment about the in-country measures at that stage.

In terms of the obligations and when they come into effect before return to the UK, the obligations made against the individual will apply only when the individual returns to the UK. Before that point, the individual will be subject to the temporary exclusion order in that their return will be disrupted and controlled, and they may be subject to conditions under the permit to return. But they will not be subject to in-country measures until they return for the reasons that I have outlined. I trust that that is a helpful reply to my noble friend and I invite her to withdraw her amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bates]

I am grateful to my noble friend for seeking clarification on this issue. The clause follows the same procedures as apply to other measures that might be introduced, such as those concerning immigration. Clearly, we would like to serve the notice in person but, given that the person might be overseas and engaged in terrorist activities, that might not be possible. However, that cannot be a reason why the order cannot be deemed to have been served. Therefore, we have followed the same routes as in immigration cases and the notice would go to their last known address.

I am grateful to my noble friend for giving me the opportunity to expand on this point. The key issue is that we want the individual to get the message that they are subject to a temporary exclusion order because we want them to make contact with the authorities so that they can have a properly managed return to the UK. We do not want the risks which might occur of somebody turning up and seeking to board a flight and only at that point discovering that their travel documents have been invalidated. It would serve everyone’s purpose that the procedures are followed and that people are made aware. I hope that is helpful to my noble friend.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his reply. At the same time as he was saying that it is important that the individual knows—I absolutely go along with that—he also said that it is possible for there to be deemed notice. I need to read how those two fit together. I take the point that there is a distinction between variation of obligations and the revocation of an order. Of course, one is accustomed to a notice sometimes having to be served by post or whatever—there are many instances where a notice is deemed to have been given—because if that were not the case the prospective recipient of the notice could always avoid being given it by slipping around.

I was a little alarmed by my noble friend’s comment, if I heard him aright, on Amendment 62 that it could be years before an individual came back, which takes us back to earlier discussions. However, the Minister has covered the ground and I will do my best to cover his answer properly when I read it. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 57 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

58: Clause 4, page 3, line 15, after “individual’s” insert “material”

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, Clause 4(3) provides that an individual’s,

“failure to comply with a specified condition has the effect of invalidating the permit to return”.

My amendment would confine that to a “material failure to comply”. A deliberately absurd example would be if the individual was 10 minutes late for an appointment. There must, presumably, be some de minimis provision around this and I would be grateful if the Minister could flesh this out. In my view, minor or trivial breaches should not invalidate the permit to return.

Amendment 60 is on similar lines. It is an amendment to Clause 5 under which, specifically, the Secretary of State can refuse the permit if the individual fails to attend an interview. Amendment 60 proposes that the individual’s failure to attend should be an unreasonable failure—the bus is late or whatever. I am picking trivial examples in order to point up what I think needs to be pinned down.

Finally, Amendment 61 would leave out subsection (3) of Clause 5 which provides that the,

“return time must fall within a reasonable period after the application is made”.

I can see that we would not want the individual roaming the world for a year and going off the radar, but I would like to probe how this would operate. I am concerned, as much as anything, with the workability of the provision. At the end of the day, it would be for a court, but how is “reasonable” to be determined and who determines it? I beg to move.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde (Con)]

My Lords, this brief debate has discussed the permit to return which would be issued under a temporary exclusion order so that an individual can return to the UK. The amendments tabled by my noble friends seek to specify that a permit to return is invalidated only if the individual’s failure to comply with a specified condition is material and that the Secretary of State may not refuse to issue a permit to return for failure to attend an interview unless the individual unreasonably fails to attend that interview. I appreciate the rationale behind these probing amendments but I hope I can reassure my noble friends that they are not necessary in this instance.

Conditions will be put into a permit to return where the Secretary of State considers they are necessary in order to protect national security. Any failure to comply with a specified condition will therefore be material, on a common-sense definition of the word. Amendment 58 would have the effect of ensuring that a person is not criminalised by an inadvertent failure to comply, but this is already provided for by the “reasonable excuse” defence in Clause 9 and the amendment is therefore superfluous.

Amendment 60 seeks to provide that the Secretary of State may not refuse to issue a permit to return for failure to attend an interview unless the individual unreasonably fails to attend that interview. I can reassure your Lordships that, in such instances, the Government would exercise discretion on what constitutes a reasonable or unavoidable failure. The Bill already provides that the Secretary of State retains the ability to issue a permit to return even if she has required someone to attend an interview and the person has failed to do so. Clearly, in the case of a reasonable failure, the Secretary of State would be minded to allow the person to return in a controlled manner, which is, after all, the object of the exercise.

Finally, Amendment 61 seeks to probe the timeframe for return specified in a permit to return. The Bill provides that the return time specified in the permit must be within a reasonable period after the application is made. This is a key provision for the temporary exclusion power because it ensures that it meets our requirements under international law. What constitutes a reasonable period, which is what my noble friend Lady Hamwee asked, will of course be determined on a case-by-case basis, and it will need to take account of factors such as the frequency of flights to and from the country where the person subject to the order is.

On the basis of these explanations, I hope that my noble friend feels that I have addressed the issues being probed by these amendments. I invite her to withdraw Amendment 58.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, on the explanation about material failure and so on, it seems that there is a distinction between the consequences of failure under Clause 4, the situation under Clause 5, and the offences which are dealt with in Clause 9, to which the Minister pointed the Committee. There are other consequences to the failures which are the subject of my first two amendments. I would like to think about that a little further. I thought that I was going to get a reassurance based on case law as well as common sense, which do come together quite often. I had not quite expected to be pointed forward to Clause 9, so I will have a think about that after today. For now, certainly, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 58 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

I am winding up in the hope that the noble Lord has received inspiration from various sources. If he can answer my question, I would be grateful.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, at Second Reading it was clear that a number of us were finding it difficult to get our heads around how this would work at the point of the process that the noble Baroness has indicated. I wrote down a list of questions and I have crossed most of them out, because she has been so thorough in the questions that she has asked of my noble friend.

Whether in this form of amendment or something similar, it is immensely important that there is transparency and general understanding of what the processes are, and of how they should work. First, this is because of the civil liberties and restrictions inherent in all of this. Secondly, we want regular reports on how the process is working. We want the independent reviewer to be able to report and he probably needs criteria to report against. The issues that the noble Baroness has raised are hugely important. I am sorry to use the term “workability” again. Shall I slightly change the tune to “operability”? We want the operability to be satisfactory.

[Baroness Warsi (Con)]

I support this important probing amendment. I hope it will provide an opportunity to iron out some of this detail. With a provision such as this, especially when there are real concerns within certain communities about the motivation for it and the impact that it will have on them, transparency of process is essential. Therefore, the more that we can get in the Bill, and the more of detailed process that we can have, the more that will help to get what we want to achieve.

This amendment returns to the purpose of the exclusion orders. In many ways, the temporary exclusion order would probably have better been called the controlled entry order or even the managed return order. In that way, it would have been much more reflective of what the TEO is trying to do. It would have said what it was on the tin and would have dealt with some of the controversy that surrounds it. It may be that this is something that Ministers will want to reconsider. Maybe they will. It is general election year, so maybe they will not.

Following on from the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, on the importance of the detail of the process, I should like to ask one or two questions. Have we considered the implications of what we would be expecting other states to do in relation to our commitments under other international obligations? We can take the example that the noble Baroness gave, of someone being detained but subsequently tortured or mistreated somewhere overseas, wherever it may be. There is a lot of talk of places such as Turkey, but this person could be engaged in terrorist activity in Afghanistan and return via Pakistan. What are implications of this and what assurances about these countries would we have?

How would these people be returned? If a person is considered to be a dangerous individual who has in some way been involved in terrorist activity, I am not sure I would want to be sitting on a commercial flight back from Istanbul with them. Have we considered the implications of returning these people and the resource implications of having to pay for individual flights for them to be returned?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for giving way. I was not going to go back to the points I had made although my point about the independent reviewer having criteria against which to report is actually sort of overarching, picking up on the other points. I want to put to him that while we all understand that decisions have to be taken case by case, that does not negate the need for a structure and clearly understood procedures to which reference can be made for all the reasons given about not further alienating the subjects of orders, their families and so on. The noble Baroness was very clear about the dangers, as was the noble Lord, Lord Harris.

I am not, of course, dismissing the assurances that the Minister has given, but I do not think they are quite on the point that I have been alerted to by this debate about having a framework and procedures that are not made up on the hoof but which are known and understood before they are ever applied.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

67: Clause 10, page 7, line 3, at end insert “and generally with regard to the passport of an excluded individual”

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, Clause 10(3) provides:

“The Secretary of State may make regulations providing for legislation relating to passports … to apply … to permits to return”.

The amendment, which would rather inelegantly extend this by adding “and generally with regard to the passport of an excluded individual”, is designed to probe how a passport becomes valid again. If a passport is invalidated under Clause 3(9), what provisions will there be about the return of a passport on revocation or in the event of an unfavourable outcome of proceedings? In other words, there are more issues around passports than are dealt with in the relatively narrow provisions of Clause 10(3) and I hope that my noble friend will be able to add something to our understanding of how this will operate. I beg to move.

[Lord Bates]

My Lords, we have had a long day of debates which has benefited from the great insight, experience and expertise in your Lordships’ House. I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed.

Amendment 67 seeks to provide that regulations are made by the Secretary of State relating to passports of individuals who are subject to temporary exclusion orders. Under a temporary exclusion order, an individual’s British passport will be cancelled and invalid for travel. In the event that the order was quashed, revoked or otherwise came to an end, it would be open to the individual in question to apply for a further passport. There will be no need for the Secretary of State to make further regulations for circumstances in which the individual no longer had a valid passport as there is a well established process already in place for obtaining passports.

I hope this helps and reassures my noble friend and that she will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I confess that, stupidly, that had not occurred to me. If the individual applies for a passport, it will not be available instantly—they rarely are. However, most importantly, he should be informed that that is what he has to do. This takes us back to the points that have been made on clarity. I am glad now to understand how this will operate. However, as ever, it raises extra points—probably far more than I have mentioned—but the Minister will be pleased to know that I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 67 withdrawn.

Higher Education: Overseas Students

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Monday 19th January 2015 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Baroness Hamwee]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the impact on students, universities and international relations of requiring overseas students to leave the United Kingdom immediately upon graduating.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Bates) (Con)]

My Lords, our reforms have clamped down on the student migration abuse allowed under the last Government, while ensuring that our excellent universities continue to attract the brightest and best students. Ensuring that immigrants leave at the end of their visa is just as important as controlling who comes here to study in the first place.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I am sorry that the Minister used the term “abuse” in this context. There has been much criticism, including by eminent businesspeople and economists, about,

“shutting the door on some of the very individuals who help the UK’s unique global service economy to thrive”,

to use the words of the British Chambers of Commerce. I tabled the Question in the Recess, when the proposal referred to appeared from the Home Office—I am glad that it seems not to be making progress—but can the Minister tell us what current Conservative thinking is on visas for new graduates?

[Lord Bates]

I can certainly inform my noble friend what government thinking is on the position. In the same spirit, I reflect that it seemed to be the position of her party that we ought to count people in and count them out. Last year we counted 121,000 students in and 51,000 out. That leaves 70,000 people who were here without an appropriate visa, and we think that that is wrong. If you are here on a study visa, you should be studying. You should not be working. If you want to come here to work, you are very welcome but you ought to apply for the right visa to uphold that.

Terrorist Attack in Paris

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Wednesday 14th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

Taking the last point first, I certainly agree that information sharing needs to improve. That is why we signed up for the ECRIS security system data checks and the Schengen information sharing system and why dialogues are happening at this very time in the US—the Prime Minister departs soon for Washington to engage in conversations with our partners there—and elsewhere in Europe.

On the noble Lord’s first point about image, when people resort to violence and intimidation the result, as is so often the case, is exactly the opposite of what they try to do. They tried to divide and spread terror but instead they brought confidence onto the streets of Paris which was shared across Europe. That was a welcome sight and a very bold message to send to those who would challenge our liberties.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the view was widely expressed in yesterday’s debate that Prevent, and the Channel programme within it, is the most difficult and most important strand of the counter- terrorism strategy. I welcome the reference in the Statement to the investment of time, resources and money in the counternarrative. Money, time and energy are not unlimited. Do the Government agree that it may be more productive to apply these to quiet, informal, non-traditional and imaginative support and advice and will they remain open to not using up those resources on putting Prevent on a statutory basis?

[Lord Bates]

Some 45,000 people have had contact through the Prevent programmes but their provision across England and Wales is, one might say, patchy. The idea behind putting it on a statutory footing—something which the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson, supported—was to try to raise standards to ensure that we get better value for money from it. In doing that, it is important to work with those in the Muslim community. They are our partners and they want to work with Government and the wider community to identify people who pose a potential risk and to challenge the notion that these acts of terror are anything other than brutality and have absolutely nothing to do with their faith.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Tuesday 13th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, it is apposite today to refer to the words attributed to Voltaire:

“I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it”,

because it is sadly topical and neatly expressed. I start with the importance of language in both general discussion of the issues and the Bill. Messages are taken from tone and emphasis as well as from the detail.

The term “temporary exclusion orders” immediately made me think of Shakespeare’s words in “Richard II”, when two of Richard’s court are exiled after allegations of treachery:

“England’s ground, farewell;

Where’er I wander, boast of this I can,

Though banish’d, yet a trueborn Englishman”.

TEOs are not banishment; they are about the converse—managing return to the UK. I am worried about misleading language being misunderstood and suggesting something more aggressive and alienating than is intended. I refer to the tone at the start of the Bill, because the application of money often follows tone and because the softer measures, to which the noble Baroness referred, must not be relegated. The most effective dissuasion of individuals from going out to fight may come from those who return disillusioned.

The Minister indicated, and I very much welcome, that the House will have the chance to consider changes to the scheme, particularly judicial oversight. I hope that any revised scheme will address where decisions are taken as well as what the decisions are. It will be very difficult for a court in this country to consider action taken overseas. I am also concerned that an individual who comes back to this country on a permit should not be taken to have incriminated himself. That point is made by the JCHR with regard to TPIMs.

I confess that I have not got my head around quite how the TEOs will operate on the ground. The possibility of being picked up at an airport in Turkey on the way back from Syria to the UK will obviously quickly become known, but what if the individual books to, say, Frankfurt with a view to travelling through Europe, where there is free movement? My question underlying that concerns what discussion the Government have had with our European partners.

The same question occurs to me—I am sorry that I have not managed to give my noble friend notice of this one—about the power in Schedule 1 to seize a passport that is not a UK passport. UK passports are not the property of the passport holder. I assume that the same is the case with other nationalities. Are UK authorities entitled to seize them? If the individual is travelling to somewhere close to the war, or simply buying a return ticket to Frankfurt, great care will be needed to avoid both discrimination and the perception of discrimination. The individual must be given reasons for the exercise of the power under Schedule 1, and be given them immediately. It is a separate matter from there being reasonable grounds for suspecting an intention to become involved in terrorism-related activity and the judicial oversight of that.

I believe these powers should be statutorily subject to review by the independent reviewer and we should consider all the points that Mr Anderson has made so cogently about his remit, his powers and his resources. My admiration for the current postholder—this is not a comment on any predecessor of his—knows almost no bounds but, like the JCHR, I have not quite made the link between this specific power of TPIM relocation and a change in the nature of the threat other than,

“wider powers are always useful to deal with the challenges a growing threat might throw up”.

The JCHR also referred to Mr Anderson’s heavy heart on the topic.

On TPIMs, the increase in the maximum penalty for breach of the provision condition to 10 years seems harsh, given that there has been no conviction for an offence. The independent reviewer’s points about requiring attendance at meetings with probation and others resonate more comfortably with me. As he said, do not waste opportunities—there is a positive strategy of engagement to be used.

I want to dwell on engagement because not everything is capable of being dealt with in legislation. I am pleased that a number of my noble friends are speaking today and I know that others wanted to. At least two of my noble friends will mention data retention but I will simply say that for the agencies it must be not just a matter of powers but of resources.

There is less formal, more imaginative work that warrants a lot of our attention. How should we counter peer pressure, usually on young men but also, to a lesser extent—although it is still a significant number—on women? What is the impact of social media and how can they be used to dissuade people from going to fight for what they may wrongly see as a humanitarian mission, and to encourage those who have gone to come home? These people are a source of intelligence. They can provide an excellent counternarrative, and if we drive them away we may never solve the problems.

I have heard some interesting discussion about the need not just to talk the counternarrative but also to do it. Rather than focusing on taking down content from the internet—which is probably impossible to deal with completely because of the volume involved—we should put up content to dissuade people. I have heard that this can be effective and it is thought to be effective because of the material ISIS itself is seeking to put up in response. A lot of the propaganda is about lifestyle, not ideology, so those who have had experience of conditions on the ground can counter that.

The Prevent strategy of Contest and the Channel programme are in some ways bound to be the hardest. Prevent has lost funding and, perhaps, focus. I have considerable reservations about putting it on a statutory basis. There is, I have heard, some resentment from those who have been doing the job about the implication that they have not been doing it well. Those who have not been doing it well may need assistance rather than direction.

I declare an interest as one of the joint presidents of London Councils, which says that the boroughs are “ready to play their part” but asks for the comfort of on-the-record confirmation that the “new burdens” principle—that is, that new burdens will be funded—will apply to costs not covered by the Home Office, including costs that it expects to be revised upwards following consultation on the statutory guidance. They also make points about who can refer individuals to the panels, which is the sort of detail we can come to in Committee.

We are all aware of concerns in the education sector—not just in higher education—about whether the duties proposed are appropriate or practicable. My noble friend Lady Sharp wanted to speak on that. I will simply say that as a result of a crossed wire her name is not on the list, but she will make her points in Committee.

A number of different approaches have been developed across Europe to prevent potential foreign fighters leaving, to minimise the threat when they return, and to strengthen the knowledge and capacity of families and communities to play a proactive role. To give support to these approaches is not fluffy but hard-nosed and self-interested. The Hayat programme in Germany works at an ideological, pragmatic and effective level. It includes giving support to families who remain in touch with their children while they are in Syria and Iraq. It is said that parents are, in effect, negotiating for their children’s lives. Returnees often need support, which in itself is a prevention measure, and programmes of deradicalisation and disengagement, provided by people trusted by the recipient and everybody else involved, are invaluable. There is also the Aarhus model in Denmark, which is very structured and centralised. All this is very nuanced; it needs attention and effort and, as I say, it is not secondary.

Finally, on the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board, the independent reviewer made what I thought were very modest and moderate points about resourcing and support, and his comments on the proposals have been masterly in their understatement. The independence that comes from the postholder being part-time is not to be undervalued, although I suspect that his and his predecessor’s “part-time” is the equivalent to the aggregate full-time of several other people. However, it seems that there is not yet complete agreement over the role of the board, and we need to consider its relationship to the independent reviewer; what work it undertakes; its role as a check and balance on—let me put it this way—a currently hypothetical future reviewer who might need to be balanced or checked; and its role as a voice that might challenge assumptions within the wider decision-making process regarding legislation where civil liberties issues are at stake.

It is frustrating not to have the time to refer to all the provisions of the Bill, but we will of course have Committee. The Bill has come to us at a moment of high tension, so the task of careful, calm scrutiny is all the more important. I do not dismiss being tough, but we should be tough where there is evidence, other than very exceptionally and without forgetting proper process. Effectiveness is not the inevitable outcome of talking tough. What is even tougher is protecting our freedoms and creating an effective narrative of our own.

Modern Slavery Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Wednesday 10th December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, my Amendment 96 is in this group. I start by saying that I entirely support the idea of the previous speakers that we should have a statutory national referral mechanism, although perhaps with more felicitous wording, as the noble Lord, Lord Warner, has just suggested.

My proposal is much more modest. The reason for it is this. At the moment we have a very poor double system. There is the UKHTC in Birmingham, which provides, as we have heard, an 80% yes rate to victims, as opposed to the UKVI, which says that only 20% get through. Clearly, that is unacceptable. We also have two reviews from Jeremy Oppenheim which, in my view, are absolutely excellent. As I understand it, the Government have agreed in principle to the fundamental and radical changes that the second, final review has asked for. However, it seems to me that there needs to be some time for consultation, for arranging to get these panels around the country and for arranging how, in fact, a new, better described NRM should work.

My proposal is that the Secretary of State should have the power to make regulations to establish this statutory committee, leaving it to the Home Office to work it out. However, in order to keep them up to the mark, the Secretary of State must report to Parliament within 12 months of the Bill becoming law, in order to say that they will actually do it. At the end of the day, we undoubtedly need a statutory system. But I believe that we need some leeway to work out how it should be. That is why my amendments, in my view, are very modest.

If I may respectfully say so, it would be very unwise of the Government not to listen to this. We have the two reviews of the NRM and we have what the Joint Committee has said, which has been set out so well by the noble Lord, Lord Warner—of course, I was a member of the committee. I totally support the proposals of our Select Committee and of the two reviews. All I am saying is that the Government should have a bit of time to think it over, but not so much time that the matter goes into what is sometimes called the long grass, because this really has to come. The current situation cannot go on for much longer because it is so patently wrong. That has been set out very clearly in the two reviews of the national referral mechanism.

I hope that, at the least, the Government will accept my amendment. I would have no objection to the Government accepting either of the other amendments that have come forward. However, I have no doubt that, one way or another, within the next 12 to 18 months, we will need to have a statutory mechanism for dealing with victim identification and support.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I added my name to the noble and learned Baroness’s amendment for all the reasons that she has given. Never say never; in fact, let us say, “Let’s get on with it”—but let us get on with it in an appropriate way, which must include consultation. Jeremy Oppenheim’s review made very clear the lack of understanding of processes and the variability in standards across the mechanism. I found myself thinking, “Well, no wonder, because it is such a loose process that it is quite difficult to get to grips with”. When I first heard of it, a few years ago, it took me some time to understand just what this was about, given that it is so lacking in obvious governance arrangements and so in need of something against which one could appeal if one was dissatisfied with an outcome.

The two paragraphs—there may be more—of the NRM review that refer to the possibility of a statutory basis do not actually put it out of the question. Paragraph 8.2.14 says that,

“we believe strongly that to put the National Referral Mechanism on a statutory footing now would not guarantee”,

remedying the flawed system. At paragraph 8.3.1, it says:

“Although there is much support for … a statutory footing or providing a right of appeal, these may not be necessary if we have a well governed National Referral Mechanism”.

The prospect is certainly not dismissed by the reviewer.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I have tabled Amendments 88A and 91A in this group. I take the point about pre-emption, but the reason for my amendments remains, and will remain if the clause is amended only as the Government propose. At the heart of this is my concern that it should not only be a specified public authority with a duty to notify the Secretary of State, or whoever else it might be, if the authority believes that someone is a victim of slavery or human trafficking. The clause provides that there must be notification if the public authority has reason to believe that a person is such a victim. However, should not all public authorities have that duty, rather than just specified public authorities? If the authority has no reason to believe that a person is a victim, the duty to notify is not triggered—but even if an apparently unlikely public authority comes across a victim, should it not give notification?

When I was trying to think of an example, the Highways Agency seemed to be one of those authorities. In engaging a contractor to undertake work on a motorway, the Highways Agency might well be concerned that with some of those operating machinery or doing the heavy work, the contractor has engaged forced labour. We know that the construction industry is a sector which is at risk, if I can put it that way. Surely, then, it should have a duty, just as a local authority visiting premises—for example, for environmental health—would have the same obligation. I am quite concerned that without any good reason—because, as I say, the duty would not be triggered unless there was a reason to believe—the Government are unnecessarily narrowing the provision in the clause.

[Baroness Garden of Frognal]

I am grateful to my noble friend for speaking to her amendments, which gives me the opportunity to explain the Government’s approach on who the duty to notify will apply to. We thought carefully about how to define the duty to notify, and to which authorities it should apply. Modern slavery is a complex and hidden crime and we need to ensure that those who are charged with the duty to notify in the Bill have the appropriate expertise to discharge their responsibilities. If we extend the duty too widely, we risk placing a duty on public authorities that lack the necessary skills to identify victims of this complex crime.

We recognise that identification of victims is an area that needs further development. We have ensured that encouraging good practice in the identification of victims is part of the commissioner’s remit and have included statutory guidance on victim identification in the Bill. We will also work with public bodies to improve training and awareness of the issue. The flexibility of specifying public authorities to whom the duty applies means that when we consider that further public authorities have the expertise effectively to identify victims of modern slavery, they can be added to the duty.

The Government do not want to place a legal and administrative burden on public authorities unnecessarily. For example, requiring authorities which simply will not come into contact with victims to provide training to staff and set up data recording systems would not be an efficient use of public funds.

My noble friend mentioned the Highways Agency. If an authority such as the Highways Agency had concerns over modern slavery, it should call the police or voluntarily notify according to the process set out in the duty of notify, so it will have access to people who have more expertise in that area.

Given this clarification, I hope that my noble friend is satisfied that the Bill strikes the right balance between ensuring that the right bodies are subject to this duty and enabling flexibility for changes in the future. I hope she will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I certainly will not press the amendment today, but I wonder which is the chicken and which is the egg here. Of course, there is a concern about skills in identifying possible victims, but because this is an issue, it seems to me that it is all the more important that a duty to do something—maybe not to notify the Secretary of State, but to do something—ought to apply.

This is an unprocessed thought from when my noble friend was speaking. She said, rightly, that anyone who is concerned can go to the police. As we are talking about public authorities—and the Government have a relationship with public authorities—should we be thinking about guidance to all public authorities? As a minimum, it would say, “You may not have the skills, but all public authorities should be aware of this and if you have a concern, go to the police—if you think that there is nothing else you can do, always go to the police”. I think there is some scope—maybe not on the face of the Bill—for a bit more thought to go into the way we are operating our response to these issues.

I think that the Box has had time to process the thought that I did not. What I am saying is that I would be uneasy about leaving it there, because we have all identified that there is a problem that needs getting to grips with.

[Lord Hylton (CB)]

My Lords, may I help the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee? Perhaps the words she is looking for are “reasonable suspicion” rather than 100% identification?

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I was taking words from the Bill; “reason to believe” is what triggers the duty.

[Baroness Garden of Frognal]

Indeed, my Lords. In my reply I mentioned that we are working with public bodies to improve training in awareness of the issue. There will be guidance for public authorities on identifying victims. So my noble friend is quite right to raise this as an issue, but the Government are already working towards that end.

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[Baroness Kennedy of Cradley (Lab)]

My Lords, I, too, add support for the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Cox. This is a very important issue, affecting a group of extremely vulnerable workers, so it is right and fundamental that it forms part of the Bill. The change to the overseas domestic workers visa back in 2012, tying domestic workers to their employer, was too heavy-handed a response when you look at the number of domestic workers involved and the vulnerability of those workers. In 2010, visas issued to domestic workers accounted for just 6% of all employment-related visas issued. At the time of the change, the Government argued that this visa was a route to settlement that was abused. However, very few overseas domestic workers were granted the right to settle; between 2006 and 2010, an average of just 700 domestic workers a year were given the right to settlement. That figure taken as a percentage of the 2013 settlement figures represents less than 0.5%.

I understand, as the Government will argue, that because of their isolated working conditions this group of workers was vulnerable to, and suffered, abuse before the change in visa rules. But the research by Kalayaan, as others have said, has shown that abuse and exploitation has increased as a result of the new visa rules, figures that the Minister in the other place made clear are not disputed by the Government. This visa change has created the perfect storm, with work carried out in isolated conditions, employers having excessive power afforded to them and a legal system that offers absolutely no protection. It is therefore unsurprising that the abuse has increased.

The Minister will no doubt talk about having stronger pre-entry checks, a stronger written contract with explicit terms and conditions and more information given to overseas workers on their rights but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, said, the effectiveness of those provisions has yet to be proven in practice. Also, these actions are not mutually exclusive to any other action; it is not a choice between stronger support mechanisms or a change in the visa rules—we should be doing both.

The amendment has a lot of support inside and outside this Chamber. Three parliamentary reviews have supported a change to the visa situation for overseas domestic workers. I hope that the Government can support it too, and include this amendment, or a version of it, in the Modern Slavery Bill.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, it happens here—it happens even in Scotland, as we have heard, that most civilised country.

A number of noble Lords have used words such as “unimaginable” but, like the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, I can only too well imagine the card—and I share her concerns about the card itself—being slipped into the passport as it is handed over. Of course, the passport is then very often taken by the employer.

I do not want to repeat the very powerful speeches made by so many noble Lords. I was grateful to hear from a number of people, including, most strongly and emphatically, from the three workers themselves to whom the noble Baroness referred, and at the meeting that she organised with Virginia Mantouvalou, who has written a report. Clearly, it is far too long to read here, but one thing particularly struck me. She gives the history of the overseas domestic worker visa and the diplomatic visa. When the concession was originally introduced, it was from concern to enable workers who had been with a family overseas to come here. The comment was made that it was for “a humanitarian reason”—to look after the domestic workers—and look where we have got to.

At that meeting, Kate Roberts from Kalayaan explained how her organisation could no longer help workers who managed to find their way to it, which must be a tiny percentage, because the organisation has to explain the problem with the Immigration Rules. Indeed, it often cannot help because of threats from employers to workers about criminalisation.

A number of noble Lords have also said that we must remember the realities. Measures such as dealing more effectively at the port of entry are important, but they are not enough. One thing that occurs to me on that is that, at the border on exit, when there is suspicion that a girl is being taken abroad for a forced marriage—the border officials are trained to recognise this—there are arrangements whereby they can be taken aside to be interviewed. The noble Baroness is right to point to that. I do not see why it should not happen in the other direction. We need to think about the realities. What people seem to be able to do to get around formal systems is almost beyond our imagining, and it is the realities that we need to fix on.

[Lord Hylton]

My Lords, I happen to have been involved with this situation, which allows serious abuses of incoming domestic workers to happen, since the early 1990s. I have never known such universal support for the need for a reform as we have heard today. I leave it at that.

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[Lord Whitty (Lab)]

My Lords, I will intervene very briefly because I agree with almost everything that has been said. I was the Minister who brought in the Gangmasters Licensing Authority. At that time there was considerable scepticism as to whether we could use administrative means to clean up what was broadly recognised as an exploitative situation within horticulture and agriculture. I wished then that it had been slightly broader than that because, even more than 10 years ago, it was evident that some of these terrible practices extended to some other industries. Indeed, the same workers were being used. However, we decided to focus on horticulture and agriculture. The general message is that, although we have not entirely eliminated exploitation, bad living conditions and illegality from those sectors, they are a lot cleaner than they were. The effectiveness of the GLA is widely recognised.

The important point that has not really been emphasised is that the GLA has the ability to sanction the users of the labour. It is not just the gangmasters who are in the frame but the farmers and the horticulturalists as well, and that has driven a change of behaviour and attitude which has been backed up by those who use the produce—the retailers and the processors. There is a whole supply effect because the direct employer of labour that is being provided under these terrible conditions can be sanctioned.

This situation pre-eminently applies in parts of construction and it very evidently applies in catering and hospitality and in the care sector. If pressure is not put on the apparently respectable users of that labour then the sanctions, although not entirely ineffective, are less than complete. I recognise, as other noble Lords have done, the need for more information and more resources but we must use this legislation to enable the Government to extend this kind of approach to these other sectors at the appropriate point.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 97 tabled by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. It is clear that the Gangmasters Licensing Authority is widely respected and its role in preventing the increase in forced labour is very effective. The sectors that we are concerned about have all been mentioned and so I do not need to repeat points that have been powerfully made. It is not just a question of extending the sectors covered by the GLA. We should also not overlook its powers and duties. For instance, I understand that the GLA does not have the power to recover arrears of pay on behalf of workers. That sort of power or function might be one for further consideration.

The issue of resources arises. My noble friend Lady Suttie, who cannot be here at the moment, commented to me that there should be some sort of cost-benefit analysis of the extension of the sectors because of possible savings elsewhere. We know how hard this is in government. The DWP, the Department of Health and even the Home Office perhaps would not readily concede this, although they might be involved in some sort of analysis.

I am sorry to see that the CBI is reluctant to consider an extension. Its briefing refers to the GLA being,

“most effective in those sectors in which it currently operates”,

and to focusing on not extending work to “low-risk areas”. As noble Lords have said, construction, care, catering and hospitality are high-risk areas. The CBI is concerned about scrutiny of the compliant rather than action against the non-compliant. The obvious answer is that when there is compliance there need not be too much of a burden.

The British Retail Consortium takes a different view and has briefed a number of noble Lords about the GLA being an example of an effective body in helping to manage and mitigate the risks of slavery. It supports a review of the role and remit of the GLA, including extending its investigative powers, as long as it is sufficiently resourced, into other, as it puts it, high-risk areas. It is obvious that there is, if not unanimity, quite a lot of support. This surely must be something that the Government could at least leave on the agenda rather than exclude it.

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[Baroness Garden of Frognal]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Baroness for tabling this amendment, and to other noble Lords who have spoken with such concern about the issues around the Gangmasters Licensing Authority, particularly its remit.

This Government are committed to ensuring fairness in the workplace, tackling worker exploitation and encouraging and raising levels of compliance with workplace rights across all sectors. We are already doing this through the use of existing enforcement arrangements. We very much welcome the many comments that have been made in support of the GLA and its vital work. It has been operating for less than 10 years but it is a successful organisation doing excellent work in tackling harmful activity affecting workers who are particularly vulnerable to exploitation in the sectors that it currently covers.

We need to consider this carefully and ensure that in seeking to broaden the GLA’s remit, we do not risk undermining the good work that is being done already. As the noble and learned Baroness pointed out, it is a comparatively small body, with only 66 staff. It performs a targeted role in an effective way and has a positive influence in the broader fight against exploitation. We very much want that to continue.

Following the Red Tape Challenge exercise and the triennial review, the GLA is implementing changes that will lift unnecessary burdens on compliant businesses while enabling a stronger focus on enforcement action. It is important that both these aspects are developed and move forward together.

Amendment 97 provides for a very broad power, enabling expansion of the GLA’s scope, remit and powers. Changes in the scope or remit of the GLA may very well be sensible; that is something that we will wish to consider further and which the Government have said that they wish to keep under review. However, we are not convinced that Amendment 97 meets that need or is the appropriate way to deal with the issue at the moment.

The amendment is open-ended. The enabling power could be used to set up the GLA to tackle all forms of slavery, trafficking and exploitation far beyond employment. That is a very big step away from the GLA’s current remit, where it has been so effective. It would require a dramatically different organisational and funding model to achieve a much broader role, which would likely require further primary legislation, as has been alluded to. Amendments 97A and 101A focus specifically on the remit, enabling the current licensing regime to be extended to additional industrial sectors beyond agriculture and food. Noble Lords have mentioned a number of sectors where this would be particularly relevant.

I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, who introduced the Bill in 2004 that established the GLA as a body to carry out a licensing regime and to take enforcement action against unlicensed activities. We need to progress on both these fronts. It would be interesting to discuss with the noble Lord why he did not seek to extend the remit from the two sectors that were mentioned in the original Act.

We have concerns about extending the regime to new sectors without clear evidence that that represents the most effective and efficient approach. Licensing affects the compliant business and the rogue gangmaster alike. The majority of gangmaster businesses are highly compliant small and medium-sized enterprises that are generating employment and economic growth for the UK. We would not want to burden them unnecessarily with regulation.

Simply extending the current licensing regime into new sectors would not necessarily improve efforts to tackle exploitative employers who flout the law. We need to focus on seeking and bringing to justice serious criminals who enslave innocent victims. So we wish to see a GLA with a strong focus on anti-slavery and worker exploitation that will support the Government’s broader strategy on modern slavery. We are working for that through an approach that builds on the GLA’s already excellent work.

I will set out some of the work that is already happening to develop the GLA. Bringing it into the Home Office has already increased collaboration and capability through easier contact with other law enforcement agencies engaged in addressing and disrupting serious criminal activity, including human trafficking for worker exploitation in the UK. The GLA is playing a full part in the better business compliance partnerships—a programme that will begin operation shortly. These pilots will look at more efficient ways of bringing together a wide range of compliance and enforcement officers locally. We expect the GLA to bring knowledge and experience to the problems identified in these areas to tackle worker exploitation and illegal working.

The GLA is working with the University of Derby to devise training and to develop an anti-slavery training academy for use by supply chain businesses. This will build on the GLA’s excellent existing collaboration with business in its regulated sectors. The GLA is well placed to tackle the serious worker exploitation that lies between the more technical compliance offences that fall to be investigated by HMRC and the serious and organised crimes that are addressed by the National Crime Agency.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee raised the concerns of the CBI, which we share, about the appropriateness of this measure and the expansion not just into other sectors but of the remit of the GLA. We have a very good working agency in the GLA and it is tempting to extend it beyond its natural remit too quickly and without due consideration of all the factors that would be required to make entirely sure that any extension was appropriate and as efficient as the GLA.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, mentioned the inadequacy of the fines and the sentencing. Sentencing is a matter for the courts and there have been some low fines issued against convicted unlicensed gangmasters, but she may be reassured to know that the first custodial sentence for an offence under the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act was imposed in December 2013 when a Lithuanian national was given seven years for operating without a licence. He ran an organised crime operation in Norfolk and controlled scores of workers brought over from his homeland, using tactics including debt bondage, psychological and physical intimidation, and violence. We have heard from other noble Lords of some appalling examples of the way in which workers can be treated by gangmasters. Fines have been increased for magistrates’ courts and Crown Courts, depending on the seriousness of the offence, so hopefully the levity of the fines is currently being tackled.

I can assure the House that there is a great deal of work going on within government to improve the work of the GLA and to consider its future. We will, of course, ensure that today’s contributions are considered during that work and we will further consider whether it might be expanded in sector or in remit. For the moment we do not feel that this particular legislation and these particular amendments are the best way of moving forward, but obviously we will discuss this again and I hope that meanwhile noble Lords will feel able not to press their amendments.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am very pleased to hear of the work that is going on. I do not know whether I missed it but is any work being undertaken to obtain the evidence of the need for an extension of the remit and an extension into other sectors? Many of us have been told about this but more evidence is needed. Is work being undertaken by the Government to satisfy themselves in response to the sorts of concerns that have been expressed? I accept that the Minister may not have that information now but I think that it is a question which it is appropriate to ask at this point.

[Baroness Garden of Frognal]

It is indeed. I do not have that evidence directly to hand but it is probably something that the University of Derby will be considering in its work in investigating and reviewing this.

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[Baroness Goudie (Lab)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Rosser on this amendment. I feel extremely strongly about this as, throughout this evening, we have heard about not having enough money but we have to remember that we are talking about people. They are not robots or goods; they are human beings. It is really important to remember that when we talked earlier about the cost of implementing this, we are talking about saving people’s lives and ensuring that they have a life as good as we have, or even better.

The way I see this operating is that accountability in companies should be handled by their procurement department. Every large and small company has a procurement department or somebody who goes to the middle companies that they order from. We should not say that the middle people should be responsible. The companies should be able to tell us and, if necessary, go and inspect where and how the goods are made, and how the people are paid. They spend enough time on decorating, branding and PR, but instead of spending so much time and money on those things, they should spend it in their new procurement department. Some of them have these procurement departments; I see them as being as important as health and safety has become, thanks to the way that Governments have pushed that forward.

It is so that the companies can say, when the audit is done every year and in their annual report, that they have visited the factories and the building sites. It may be something that the construction industry here is responsible for in Bahrain, Beijing or Qatar. This should apply not just to companies but to government departments, when we are assisting as museums or parts of new universities are built abroad. What we are trying to say is that every company and organisation involved in labour or goods, abroad or here, should be audited and that the procurement department should be responsible. “May” is not strong enough; we have to say that this is to be done annually in the audit and that it can be inspected and questioned.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, at the end of Second Reading the Minister, referring to one noble Lord—but I think it might have applied to many of us—commented that he spent a minute welcoming the Bill and then several minutes asking for more. Clearly, this clause falls into that category.

I have tabled Amendments 97B to 97E, which come from a meeting that a number of us had with the Minister, after which we were looking for a peg on which he could hang the very helpful assurances given in that meeting. I appreciate that this is a developing area of work for the Government. As has been said, Clause 51 has not been in the Bill for very long. It is also clear that many colleagues feel that it needs to be strengthened. My amendments would provide a power for the Secretary of State to make regulations about the form of the statement and how it is to be reported—something that particularly concerned those who have spoken and features in briefings that we have had. They would also allow the Secretary of State to issue regulations about the duties imposed on commercial organisations, not just guidance.

Modern Slavery Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Monday 8th December 2014 Lords Chamber

Amendment 68ZZA seeks to address engagement with relevant civil society organisations, which we believe is vital in accessing expertise and knowledge and ensuring the effectiveness of the commissioner’s work but also in ensuring transparency. This is a facet of the work of national rapporteurs under the EU directive but would also ensure public confidence and thus help address the issue of perceptions that we discussed last week.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 67F in this group but, before I discuss it, I should say how much I agree with the thrust of everything that has been said this afternoon. I tabled some amendments which we discussed at the end of our proceedings last Wednesday, which went in the same direction as many of the amendments in this group. It is perhaps as well that the group was not made even longer by having those amendments in it.

The noble Lord, Lord Warner, asked why we should go to all this trouble and then constrain the commissioner’s remit and role. That seems to me to go absolutely to the heart of the issue. The commissioner should be able to take a holistic—I do not much like that word—viewpoint of everything that is going on that relates to trafficking. The issues are very complex and interrelated and our understanding of them is developing fast, so the commissioner should be allowed the scope that the commissioner designate has clearly identified. However, as others have said, we should not leave it to him to find ways round the legislation, as it were, which is what it sounds as if he is seeking to do, although I am sure that he would not put it that way.

Moreover, I wonder whether the Secretary of State should have a power to redact passages from reports in the interests of national security. I am not sure whether I am right about this, but I could not find a similar power for the Secretary of State in respect of the reviewer of terrorism legislation, where you would think that would certainly be needed. I think what this boils down to is that we have to respect the fact that the commissioners who are appointed will be entirely sensible.

My amendment picks up the point about data collection and would insert a power to collect, compile, analyse and disseminate information and statistics. The Government’s response to the report of the pre-legislative scrutiny committee, which argued for the ability to deal with data, did not, as far as I could see, address that. As Governments always do, they said that the scrutiny was welcome. However, the point was also picked up by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which commented:

“National human rights institutions … generally do not have the Ombudsman-type power to take up individual cases, but they do have a significant role in collecting data in order to monitor the State’s performance in observing the rights of individuals”.

If I can put it less assertively, may I ask my noble friend whether he can confirm that research, which is mentioned in the clause, covers the points which I have included in my amendment? Even if the role is restricted to enforcement, which I very much hope it is not, data collection is important in enforcement. Enforcers need to know what they are up against. I also ask my noble friend whether the Government will be producing a data-sharing protocol, which is recommended in the review of the NRM. There will be another point on data later, but if the Minister is able to answer, that would be interesting.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise in support of these amendments aimed at strengthening and broadening the remit of the anti-slavery commissioner, which is very much in the spirit of the recommendation put forward by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member. The JCHR concluded that the commissioner’s mandate,

“remains weak … and narrowly focused”.

Following questioning of the Government, the committee accepted the need to avoid any overlap or confusion with the role of the Victims’ Commissioner—I see that the noble Baroness is in her place—but we said that we did not consider this to be an inevitable result of broadening the role beyond its narrow focus on law enforcement.

Amnesty made the point in its briefing that the Home Secretary has emphasised the need for a co-ordinated and holistic approach, mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to tackling modern slavery. It said that this is why it is so important that the commissioner is properly resourced and empowered to look fully across the piece. I agree with that.

The JCHR recommended that the Government should follow the model of the Office of the Children’s Commissioner, which the noble Lord, Lord Patel, has talked about. When we discussed this at our last sitting, I commended the Government for having strengthened the position of the Children’s Commissioner and made it a much stronger body than it was. That was very much to the Government’s credit, although I would add that the Minister mentioned on Wednesday the fact that the Children’s Commissioner is housed in a Department for Education building, as if that meant that it was fine for this commissioner to be. The JCHR strongly recommended against that, because it impinges on the commissioner’s independence—but that is by the by.

Despite having set up this very good model of the Office of the Children’s Commissioner, the Government deliberately decided not to pursue that model for the anti-slavery commissioner. They then pointed out that this was reflected in the much smaller budget for this commissioner than for the Office of the Children’s Commissioner. I could not help but wonder whether this was partly about trying to save money. Are they trying to have an office of the anti-slavery commissioner on the cheap? The old proverb about a ha’p’orth of tar came to mind.

I want to return to a question I asked the Minister at our previous sitting, when perhaps I did not make myself fully clear. I asked the Minister why the Government do not see the anti-slavery commissioner primarily as part of the human rights machinery, as they told the JCHR. The Minister replied that the commissioner,

“is not a national human rights institution as defined under the Paris principles”.—[Official Report, 3/12/14; col. 1382.]

However, he agreed that it would play a key part in improving our human rights response to tackle modern slavery. In my speech last week I quoted from the exchange between Humpty Dumpty and Alice in Lewis Carroll, on how we understand the meaning of words. When I reflected on the Minister’s reply to me, I rather felt as though I had walked through the looking-glass. It was, of course, perfectly open to the Government to make the anti-slavery commissioner compliant with Paris principles. That was a political decision and choice. However, they chose not to.

So let me rephrase my question. Why did the Government choose to make the anti-slavery commissioner not compliant with the Paris principles? That is: why do they believe it should not be part of the human rights machinery—not why it is not technically part of the human rights machinery—when we are all agreed that it has this key role in improving our human rights response to modern slavery? I am baffled, I have to say.

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[Lord Warner]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 72D, 73B, 74AA, 74CA and 74DA in my name. These amendments are all designed to give the anti-slavery commissioner greater freedom of manoeuvre in dealing with the Home Office and to prevent endless procrastination over the release of reports submitted to the Home Secretary and the Home Office, particularly if they contain what I would call “unacceptable messages”. We have been over this ground in both sets of amendments at some length. This is all of a piece with some of our earlier discussions. We have certainly seen in real life how reports of other independent sources of inspection or advice can—how can I put it?—languish in government department in-trays. Some of these amendments attempt to address real issues.

I accept that my amendments are pale imitations of the more radical amendments moved and discussed by the noble Lord, Lord Patel, in the previous group. I would certainly withdraw some of mine if the Government were moved to accept many of his. That is not bargaining across the Table but a statement of fact; the noble Lord has some very powerful amendments which deliver more effectively than my amendments. I do not always travel hopefully about whether Home Office Ministers in this place are able to deliver changes, so I shall press on with my more limited amendments.

Amendment 72ZZA requires the commissioner to produce a three-year plan, not just a one-year plan. That enables him—sensibly, I think—to plan ahead for a reasonable period of time. Amendment 72B removes the detailed control of the Home Office over the plan, as prescribed in Clause 42(4), (5) and (6). These seem totally superfluous, given that Clause 42(1) already gives the Home Secretary the power of approval over the strategic plan. Why do we need these extra, more detailed control methods, other than to demonstrate what we have said for some time about the Bill: that it too often finds ways of controlling the room for manoeuvre of the anti-slavery commissioner?

Amendment 73B removes the detailed Home Office control over the nature of the commissioner’s annual report by removing Clause 42(9). It is another attempt to loosen the shackles, in the phrase I used earlier. Amendments 74AA, 74CA and 74DA are designed to ensure that Ministers do not delay in laying the commissioner’s annual report before Parliament, the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly. They all require the annual report to be laid within a month of receipt by the particular Ministers.

These amendments are in the best interest of the commissioner’s independence and safeguard the position of Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly. We have to remove some of these controls in order to give the commissioner more freedom of manoeuvre and to ensure that important reports are not delayed in reaching Parliament and public scrutiny. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I have Amendments 73ZA and 74ZA in this group and it would be very odd if I did not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Warner, given the debate we have just had. I do not think that I need to lay it on with a trowel. However, I will use this opportunity to refer to the duties of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, because Section 36 of the Terrorism Act 2006, to which my noble friend referred, has a mere six subsections, and that is it—and he gets on with it. I have still not been able to find the constraints on his report, which would take the form of redactions, to which my noble friend referred. However, as I said, I can understand the need for them for the commissioner as well as for the reviewer.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

76A: Clause 43, page 34, line 10, leave out subsection (4)

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I have two short amendments in this group. I will come back, outside the Chamber, to just what Section 36 says. I am not taking issue with the substance, in any event.

Amendment 76A would delete Clause 43(4). The clause is about the duty to co-operate with the commissioner. It provides that complying,

“does not require or authorise any disclosure of information which contravenes any other restriction on the disclosure of information (however imposed)”.

Looking at Clause 43(4) alongside Clause 43(3), which provides that disclosure,

“does not breach any obligation of confidence”,

I would like to ask my noble friend why one is accepted by the legislation and the other is not. Why does data protection, as I assume it is, apply but not confidential—I am not sure about privileged—information?

My second amendment, Amendment 77A, is quite different, but it is to enable me to ask a question. Clause 43(6) refers to regulations being allowed to be exercised by Scottish Ministers and by the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland. I have suggested that the Welsh Assembly Government be added to the list in order to ask my noble friend about the question of health. Health, after all, is one of the issues to which we need to have regard when we are looking at the needs of people who have been trafficked or enslaved. This seems to me very relevant. I do not know whether it is intended that Wales should come under Clause 43(6)(c), as “any other public authority”—I think that they might be a bit insulted if that were the case—or whether I have got it wrong that health is not intended to be covered in all of this. I beg to move.

[Lord Bates]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for moving this amendment and I will try to deal with the questions of clarification that she raised.

The effect of Amendment 76A would be to permit public authorities to provide information to the commissioner where it would otherwise contravene restrictions on the disclosure of information, other than those as a result of an obligation of confidence under the common law. Therefore, public authorities would, for example, be obliged to disclose information to the commissioner where such a disclosure would otherwise be restricted by statute or order of the court. While we want to ensure that the commissioner is able to gain access to information from relevant authorities to improve the UK’s response to modern slavery, in doing so we must ensure that we are not requiring those authorities to provide information in breach of existing restrictions on information sharing or permit authorities to disregard court orders, although we recognise that a balance has to be struck.

For this reason the public authorities and officials have been given a certainty that they will not be breaching any obligation of confidence under the common law when providing information to the commissioner. We consider that this subsection ensures that we achieve the right balance between respecting existing information safeguards and ensuring that the commissioner has the necessary powers to carry out the role effectively.

My noble friend’s Amendment 77A seeks to create a power for the Welsh Government to specify which Welsh public authorities are required to co-operate with the commissioner. The Welsh Government play a key role in the UK’s effort to tackle modern slavery. They are active participants in the interdepartmental ministerial group on modern slavery, and we have worked innovatively and determinedly to raise awareness of modern slavery and improve the response in Wales. We have worked closely with the Welsh Government on the development of the Modern Slavery Bill.

The focus of the commissioner’s work, and indeed of this entire Bill, is to combat crime and protect its victims, which are non-devolved matters as regards Wales. Engagement with Welsh authorities by the commissioner would seek to deliver on these objectives and any infringement on those authorities’ devolved functions is entirely incidental to, or consequential on, this purpose. It is therefore wholly appropriate, and consistent with the devolution settlement for Wales, for the Home Secretary to specify that a Welsh public authority is required to co-operate with the commissioner without the need for regulations made by the Welsh Government.

The Welsh Government have been regularly consulted on the role of the commissioner and it is worth nothing that they have not requested the inclusion of a regulation-making power within this clause. We will, of course, consult fully with them before specifying Welsh public authorities in regulations. I pay tribute to the good co-operation which is already taking place between the Welsh Government and the UK Government in relation to modern slavery issues.

Given this explanation, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I will, of course, do so. I felt that the response to Amendment 76A was more about “the what”, which I think I understand, than “the why”. However, I do not want to comment further without having had the opportunity to read what my noble friend had to say.

I am not sure that I am persuaded about Wales but that is perhaps not a discussion for now: we may have other opportunities to do so. I will think about that further and perhaps have a word with my noble friend about it. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 76A withdrawn.

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[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

Our amendment proposes a new clause to the Bill providing for the Director of Public Prosecutions to issue guidance on the charging of known or suspected victims of human trafficking, and for a prosecution of a trafficked, enslaved or exploited person to be reviewed by the Director of Public Prosecutions before going to trial.

The first part relating to guidance reflects a feeling from a number of groups and organisations involved in these cases that it is far from clear how the Crown Prosecution Service deals with the public interest test when looking at victims of trafficking. We need to reduce uncertainty about when victims will be prosecuted. A model for the clarity of guidance called for in our amendment is the DPP’s guidance in relation to a totally different issue—assisted suicide.

On authorisation for a trafficking prosecution, which is also addressed in our amendment, we want to establish the principle that prosecutions of trafficking victims should happen only in exceptional circumstances, which is why we wish prosecutions of those who have had a national referral mechanism decision or are awaiting one to be authorised at the most senior level, namely the Director of Public Prosecutions.

Trafficked victims can be badly damaged and vulnerable and can wait 12 months in remand before a trial goes ahead, which only adds to their problems considerably. Evidence from the Helen Bamber Foundation to the Joint Committee on the Bill referred to the need for women to feel supported—to feel that they would be believed and that they would not normally be prosecuted. Allowing prosecutions to go ahead goes along with what traffickers would have told their victims: that they would do better to stay with them than go to the authorities and be prosecuted and deported.

Similar evidence from the Poppy Project discussed the 55 women that it has helped in the past year who were identified as trafficking victims only once they were in prison, usually on remand. Another example from the Poppy Project involved an adult woman who had been underground for 11 years in a brothel. She escaped and used a passport that her trafficker gave her and that she thought was legal. It was not and she ended up being imprisoned for immigration offences, even though she was not the one who had committed the crime. No one, it seems, investigated the trafficker who had given her the passport and who was able to carry on recruiting and procuring more victims. While the crime the woman committed was not committed during enslavement, it undoubtedly arose from her trafficking.

One consequence of the examples to which I have referred is that it seems almost certain that more trafficking victims have been prosecuted in this country than traffickers. There is a need for all those coming into contact with people who have been or may have been trafficked to be able to recognise the offence and that we do not find such cases ending up in court unless authorised at the top level as being appropriate to prosecute. I hope that will also be the Government’s objective and that the terms of our amendment will be accepted.

Finally, I would like to raise one point on the issue that my noble friend Lady Kennedy of Cradley has so effectively raised in relation to the reasonable person test. My point is simply a query, since I shall await with interest the Government’s response to her amendments. On the reasonable person test in Clause 45(1)(c), I ask the Minister whether the reference to the reasonable person “in the same situation” as the slavery or trafficking victim means that the assessment of whether a reasonable person would have had no realistic alternative to doing the act which constitutes the offence will be based on a view of what a reasonable person who had had experience of suffering the same kind of traumatic experiences and effects as the victim would have done. If so, how many people, in the Government’s view, would be able to make that assessment?

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, like the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, I welcome the principal provisions, but I share her concerns. I thought that she was entirely clear in speaking to the amendments. Trafficking and slavery are trafficking and slavery. Not to be prosecuted for offences committed when one is trafficked or enslaved is a matter of human rights. Those rights should not be dependent on the individual’s characteristics; they are completely separate issues. I do not need to repeat everything that the noble Baroness said, but I will quickly refer—the title is probably longer than the reference—to Policy and legislative recommendations towards the effective implementation of the non-punishment provision with regard to victims of trafficking, by the Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings. She said:

“The penalization of a person for acts that they have committed as a cause or direct consequence of being trafficked must be seen in that context:”—

the context of human rights—

“not only does it unjustly punish and stigmatise victims of serious crime; it would also violate these human rights objectives”.

I come back to that. It is not a small point, but it is very specific and clear, and I fear that we will be muddying the waters if the wording remains as it is.

[Baroness Garden of Frognal]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions to the debate, and I am grateful that they felt able to welcome the government amendments.

I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of Cradley. As she set out, Amendments 80A and 82 would remove the “reasonable person” test for children and adults. Whenever any statutory defence is created, we must be very careful to ensure that the line is drawn in the right place so that the people who need it can access it, but also to avoid unfairness or injustice to potential victims of serious crime and to prevent the defence being abused by those seeking to escape justice.

The noble Baroness raised concerns that the reasonable person test would breach EU directive requirements, which would make it difficult for us to work in cross-border operations. However, it does not place the UK in breach of the directive. As the pre-legislative scrutiny committee identified, the UK is already compliant with all its international obligations. The test will have no impact on cross-border operations. However, I note what she said, and the comments of my noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. Perhaps we can agree to discuss this again before Report.

The reasonable person test is an objective test. The “no realistic alternative” formulation in the reasonable person test came directly from the case law that the noble Baroness mentioned. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, on whether the reasonable person would be someone who has suffered the same sort of experiences, that is indeed how that would be applied in these cases. People who have been enslaved or trafficked may commit criminal offences in a wide variety of circumstances. Such a defence may not be justified in every case. For example, the courts have consistently ruled that the defence of duress can never apply in cases of murder. We must not create a defence so wide that it amounts to a loophole in the law. It is important that we protect not just victims but society. An objective test plays a crucial role here: allowing a prosecutor or jury to consider all the circumstances, while also considering the accused’s characteristics, such as age and the other characteristics set out. We consider that removing the objective test would leave the defence dangerously broad.

Turning to Amendment 84A, which deals with Director of Public Prosecutions’ guidance on non-prosecution of victims, the Code for Crown Prosecutors is issued by the Director of Public Prosecutions. It gives guidance to prosecutors on general principles to be applied when making decisions about prosecutions. The code requires the prosecutor to complete two stages: is there sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction, and is a prosecution required in the public interest? It is not the case, and never has been, that just because there is sufficient evidence to bring a prosecution the public interest will require one. That discretion is a vital protection and helps avoid unnecessary or unjust prosecutions. The code is supplemented by a body of legal and policy guidance on specific offences and procedures, which includes guidance on suspects in a criminal case who might be victims of trafficking or slavery. This is updated on a regular basis to reflect case law or any other changes and is published on the CPS website.

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[Baroness Kennedy of Cradley]

In Schedule 3 there are very serious, violent crimes listed and it is understandable why they have been included. However, there are over 130 different offences to which the non-prosecution defence will not apply and along with the very serious—murder and rape—there are offences relating to immigration, criminal damage and theft. Schedule 3 has ramifications for victims, so the offences listed, and the existence of such a schedule, should not become law without a debate in this House. We should probe a little deeper and consider five issues with the Schedule.

First, does such a list help the trafficker? Evil minds work in evil ways. To a trafficker, Schedule 3 could be an escape strategy. It has been described, by Parosha Chandran, an award-winning human rights barrister, as a traffickers’ charter. It is a list of crimes that traffickers know the state will prosecute for—they just need to find victims to do them—and traffickers will make sure that victims know that the state will prosecute for those crimes. Will the Schedule therefore have the unintentional effect of dangerously exacerbating the vulnerabilities of those who are already enslaved or trafficked and lead them to become involved in more serious crimes?

Secondly, does such a list lead police and prosecutors to stop looking for the signs of slavery and trafficking for these offences? Despite clearly listing the offences most frequently committed by enslaved and trafficked adults and children, the guidance we already have has not been effective in stopping victims being prosecuted and convicted for these offences. There are a number of examples where no police investigation into the victim’s situation, as a trafficked or enslaved person, has taken place and the victim has been wrongly imprisoned. Even when crimes are flagged as frequent crimes of trafficked victims in the CPS guidance, there is still little or no investigation. So a list of crimes specifically for non-prosecution may never lead to an investigation into the trafficked or exploited situation of the victim. This means that, once again, the traffickers get clean away.

Thirdly, does such a list contain the right offences? As pointed out in the other place, the impact assessment of this Bill states that Schedule 3 is drawn from Schedule 15 to the Criminal Justice Act. However, immigration offences are in Schedule 3 but not in Schedule 15. As Michael Connarty MP rightly asked, how can we deny a trafficked victim the right to a statutory defence because they resist arrest? We know that children especially—and adults too—are suspicious of authority, because the traffickers have made them that way; they are scared and do not understand the language. Should this offence be included?

Fourthly, the crime that a victim is typically forced to commit today is not what they may be forced to commit tomorrow. Even though there is provision in the Bill for Schedule 3 to be reviewed, this takes time. In this time, victims are being criminalised by our system and the traffickers are making their escape.

Finally, the facts are established for each individual case, no matter what the crime. If a crime is committed, whether or not it is listed in Schedule 3, the police will investigate and the CPS will still consider whether the evidential threshold has been met, whether it is in the public interest to prosecute and whether the non-prosecution defence applies. If the police and CPS can satisfy themselves that they can secure a conviction by being able to prove their case beyond reasonable doubt, they will proceed to prosecute—whether the offence is listed on Schedule 3 is immaterial, as the child or adult will be prosecuted. If the offence is serious it would, inevitably, be in the public interest to prosecute. Why is the list of exceptions necessary? In Committee in the other place, Peter Carter QC, said:

“I think legislating by list of exceptions is a recipe for disaster and confusion”.—[Official Report, Commons, Modern Slavery Bill Committee, 21/7/14; col. 36.]

I agree. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I support the points made by the noble Baroness, who has pointed to unintended consequences, among other matters. This is a list of the most serious offences and there has not been much consideration of offences which may very often be committed in the context of trafficking. The noble Baroness rightly referred to the violation of immigration law. We heard this afternoon of an instance of false information relating to travel documents. To my mind—I am completely unbiased of course—this sort of thing is entirely understandable.

Looking at the list, I was interested in the inclusion of Sections 1 and 2 of the Bill, when we know that some victims of trafficking and slavery are forced into positions where they act on behalf of their own slave-masters in carrying out some of the acts which are comprised in those offences. But that is no different in substance from the concerns that the noble Baroness has raised about other matters. I share that concern. I do not think that by including the list we are doing anything other than creating difficulties for ourselves in applying the non-prosecution provision.

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[Lord Browne of Belmont]

My Lords, I am pleased to speak in support of Amendment 86H in the name of the noble Lord, Lord McColl, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Baroness, Lady Royall. I am sure that other Members of this House will want to thank the noble Lord and the noble and learned Baroness for their persistence and perseverance in repeatedly bringing the need for a child advocate for trafficked children before this House.

As we look today at Clause 47 of this Bill, which in some ways makes provision for child trafficking advocates, I am sure we can agree that we have come a long way on this subject from 2011. I am aware that the Government seek to justify the rather weak nature of the clause on the basis that they want to wait for the conclusion of the advocate trials before providing more detail. In some ways I think this argument stands up to scrutiny but in others I have to say that I find it wanting. No doubt important things will be learnt from the trials that will inform practical questions regarding matters such as implementation, but I do not accept that that should be used as a reason for not providing a clear and up-front statutory definition of the role of the advocate. It seems odd that we should sign up to the name “child trafficking advocate” in the Bill without signing up to a proper definition of the role.

There are at least two major problems. First, in terms of the basic definition of a child trafficking advocate, the definition is set out in numerous international best practice documents and confirmed by our own experience. The Still at Risk report, for example, recommends that an independent trusted adult should be appointed as soon a trafficked child comes to that authority’s attention. Amendment 86H makes it clear that this should happen. The Still at Risk report also says that that person,

“would ensure that all potential victims of trafficking are able to understand their rights, ensure that their voice is heard in decisions that affect them and are supported effectively through the different legal processes they are engaged in”.

I am very supportive of the principle of setting out the functions of the advocate in the Bill, as exemplified in Amendment 86H.

It is significant that this same definition and approach are also reflected in all the relevant international best practice documents developed by the EU, UNICEF and the UN. For example, the UNICEF guidance states:

“The role of a guardian is to be an advocate for the child in a wide range of discussions and decisions about what should happen to the child, in particular to ensure that the decision-making process primarily considers the best interests of the child. The role is also to be a link between the child and the various agencies the child comes into contact with, to ensure the child is kept informed of any relevant developments with respect to him or her, and to accompany the child in a physical way, in particular when she or he is moved between various places”.

It is also essential that the role of the advocate should be recognised by other public authorities, otherwise, as the noble Lord, Lord Henley, said just over three years ago,

“it risks creating confusion for children if plans for their care are not effectively co-ordinated”.—[Official Report, 25/11/11; col. 1282.]

The second reason for my belief that this is not a strong enough clause as it stands is observing the debate on guardians that has occurred over the past few months in Northern Ireland, which the noble Lord, Lord McColl, has referred to. Noble Lords may be aware that the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, has introduced a Bill on human trafficking to the Northern Ireland Assembly. He is sadly not able to give his own wisdom to the House today, as he is in Northern Ireland speaking on other matters on human trafficking before the Assembly. The key point is that, in another part of the United Kingdom, a clearly independent adult will be appointed to a child who has been or who is about to be referred to the NRM or to a separated child. That adult, an independent guardian, will be trained, qualified and supported in that role and the functions are set out in statute in Clause 21 of the Northern Ireland Bill, which will very soon now become law. That person needs to ascertain and communicate the views of the child, represent them, and liaise with other organisations involved in their care and making decisions in relation to the child—for instance, a court or tribunal. They will assist the child to obtain legal advice, keep the child informed about relevant proceedings, contribute to a plan for the long-term welfare based on an individual assessment of the child’s best interests, accompany them as necessary, and work to establish contact with the child’s family where it is in their best interests.

Interestingly, the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety may add to their functions as necessary by order so that if new functions arise they can be added. I suggest that this freedom to adjust provides a crucial model for the United Kingdom Government given that, on the one hand, it is simply not credible to include a child trafficking advocate provision in the Bill without a proper definition—especially when, thanks to domestic and international best practice, the definition is clear—yet, on the other hand, adjustment may be desirable in the light of the experience of the trials. It provides a mechanism whereby we could give child trafficking advocates a proper definition but not remove scope for that definition to be amended, although I stress that I think the real usefulness of the trials will pertain to practical matters of implementation rather than that of definitions. If I were to add anything to Amendment 86H, it would be the power to make such additions to the list of the advocates’ functions.

The other thing I should note about the Northern Ireland definition, like that of proposed new subsection (8) in Amendment 86H, is that it makes plain that other persons or bodies providing services or taking decisions about the child have to recognise the role of the guardian and provide the guardian with relevant information so as to allow the guardian to carry out their role effectively. In contrast, Clause 47(4) only enables the Home Secretary to issue regulations to this effect if she so wishes. It seems to me that the provision of child trafficking guardians in Northern Ireland goes much further than the current proposals in Clause 47. The reason we are rightly concerned to help victims of trafficking is because they are, without doubt, among the most vulnerable people in our society and that vulnerability is greatest when dealing with children.

Given their greater vulnerability, it seems very odd that the Government should have included such a weak clause in the Bill. While I am happy to celebrate that Northern Ireland will provide the best protection for child victims in the whole of the United Kingdom, it pains me to consider the many trafficked children in England and Wales who will not benefit from this greater protection. I am not satisfied with this, and I very much hope the Government will not settle for such an inequality. The good news is that Amendment 86H closes the gap. I very much hope that the Minister will accept it.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the determination of those who have pursued this cause is admirable. The noble Lord and the noble and learned Baroness are a formidable pair. I simply want to comment on one point in Amendment 86H, about legal representation. From my—now not very current—experience as a solicitor, I well know the importance of being able to take clear or reasonably clear instructions, and to be able to rely on those instructions. I take the point about the voice of the child but I do not think that that is inconsistent with the role of representatives.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

86J: After Clause 47, insert the following new Clause—
“Assessment of victims
A person suspected of being a victim of an offence under sections 1 or 2 shall be assessed psychologically during the investigation of the offence.”

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I have Amendments 86J, 86K and 86L in this group. Amendment 86J seeks to insert a new clause. I contacted a member of the Bar who practises in this area and asked him whether the provisions available to protect and support victims in court and in their dealings with the police were adequate, even if they were not always well used. In other words, should we be thinking of anything to go in the legislation or is it really a matter of guidance and practice? He came straight back to me with the thought which I have incorporated in this amendment.

Of course, protection in court is very much a matter of practice, in line with some legislation and with guidance. The practice needs a foundation. This would be a foundation for something quite wide. My counsel friend said:

“Every other measure follows from an assessment and those presenting a case will do so fully informed if they have the psychological assessment”.

The victims of slavery and trafficking are so very unlike others. There are many issues that befall them and their presentation in court is difficult. My counsel friend believes, as is obvious, that an assessment should be mandatory.

This is not about referral to the NRM; it is about investigation and prosecution as well as support. An assessment may say that there is nothing too much to be concerned about, but it may say that this individual is very damaged, very vulnerable and that the best way to investigate is as follows. Or, in court, someone with the appropriate knowledge can say, “The victim giving evidence is not able to articulate what, from my work with him, I believe he is feeling. A different line of questioning may be appropriate”. This is not just about support; it is also about the resilience to give evidence and to assist the police, and resilience in proceedings.

My other two amendments can be put very briefly. The first adds a reference to consultation to Clause 48 —the Secretary of State’s guidance on the items listed. I am suggesting that this should be after consultation. I hope that my noble friend will be able to reassure me that it will be after consultation. The second amendment—in order to get the grammar right, it requires a few more words—essentially changes “determining” to “identifying” in Clause 48(1)(c)—the arrangements for identifying whether a person is to be treated as a victim of slavery or trafficking. This is to probe whether this provision is about the NRM, where the term “determination” is used, but so is the term “identifying”. Determination has a whiff of formal proceedings which may be wider than the Government intend. As I say, this is a probing amendment.

Amendment 86M is probably the central amendment in this group and I do not want to steal any thunder by speaking to it, save to say that it is an extremely important amendment and I am very glad that it has been tabled. If we are establishing rights for victims, the logic is that those with the power to grant or deny the right must also be held to account—and that would be via a right of appeal. My first amendment is 86J and I beg to move.

[Lord McColl of Dulwich]

My Lords, I am pleased to introduce Amendment 86M in my name, that of the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, and that of the noble Lord, Lord Judd. I am grateful for the input of the charities involved in its development, including CARE, ECPAT and the Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group.

The amendment deals with what is, for me, a foundational aspect of any modern slavery Bill worthy of that name, yet it is not adequately provided for in the current draft. The Bill will be the foundation of legislation for all action on modern-day slavery for decades to come. As such, it must have the victims at its heart and make proper provision for them. I welcome the addition of Part 5 following the recommendations of the pre-legislative scrutiny by the Joint Committee on the draft Bill, of which I was privileged to be a member. However, I feel that Clause 48, which provides a mechanism for guidance on identifying and supporting victims, does not go anywhere like far enough to ensure that the Bill is victim-focused.

I thank the Minister for his comments in his letter sent to Peers following Second Reading, sharing the concern that we provide victims with the services that they need. I am pleased to know that the Government are considering the recommendations of the review of the national referral mechanism and hope that this will lead to a significant improvement in the identification of victims and the provision of support services. However, I do not share the view implied in the Minister’s letter that legislating for the NRM will make the system inflexible, nor do I believe that legislation is a distraction from the process of improvement.

In my opinion, Amendment 86M provides a much needed statutory foundation for operational and structural improvements, in response to the critique of victim identification and support in the review. The flexibility of guidance can be useful in responding to changing circumstances, but guidance is not the place to establish fundamental principles. It is my view that the fundamental principles for identifying victims and providing them with support and assistance should be laid out in legislation. Amendment 86M lays out these core principles. The clause relates broadly to two issues: first, the processes around identifying victims; and secondly, supporting victims—how long we should support them and with what types of services.

Let me first turn to the matter of identifying victims. Amendment 86M addresses the fundamental principle that the formal process for identifying victims and conferring on them a certain status that makes them eligible for services and support needs to be transparent through proposed new subsections (1) to (4). During our scrutiny of the draft Bill, the Joint Committee heard evidence from many NGOs that, because the national referral mechanism is established only in policy and guidance, there is a lack of transparency about decision-making. Anti-Slavery International described this as leading to,

“arbitrariness of application and access for victims”.

The 2013 report from the Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group, Hidden in Plain Sight, indicates that existing guidance relating to processes under the NRM does not seem to be consistently followed, which gives me great cause for concern over the Government’s proposal that guidance under Clause 48 will be sufficient to ensure the correct operation of the NRM process.

I welcome the review of the NRM that has been undertaken and I am pleased that the Modern Slavery Strategy states that the Government are giving serious consideration to its recommendations for a radical restructuring of the process. However, I believe that any such restructured process should ultimately be established in regulations. This was also the view of the Joint Committee, which said that the Home Secretary should set out the process for identification by order. This approach will provide the flexibility which the Minister mentioned in his letter, but equally allows for greater transparency in the process than exists at present.

Amendment 86M requires the Home Secretary to establish the identification process in regulations and to seek the input of an Independent Anti-slavery Commissioner on the guidance about the identification of victims. One key aspect of this transparency is the process for which Amendment 86M specifically provides. It is the creation of an internal and external appeals process. The current NRM process has no such formal mechanisms for review. Where individuals wish to challenge a negative decision, they must either make an informal request for reconsideration or seek judicial review. The informal process, relying as it does simply on the discretion of an official, is in no way transparent and provides no sense of security for victims when they enter the system. On the other hand, judicial review is extremely formal and costly and does not review the substantive merits of the person’s case. A formal built-in appeals process, with the possibility of a second-tier external review, is needed to provide appropriate transparency and accountability. This is why I have proposed new subsection (1)(c). I was rather disappointed with the response of the NRM review to this point. I am not convinced that its proposals for regional multidisciplinary panels will reduce the need for challenge, nor that the review’s suggestion—that another panel chair could offer a second pair of eyes when a review is requested—will be adequate to provide the transparency that is so important. I hope the Government will support my proposal for a more formal process set out in regulations.

I was also disappointed to read that the NRM review reported that the submissions from many NGOs showed overwhelming support for the preservation of the national referral mechanism solely for victims of trafficking. I am sorry, but I disagree. I recognise that international reporting structures and data comparisons mean we need the clarity of specific statistics on victims of trafficking, but we must ensure that there is a clear mechanism for the identification of victims of slavery who have not been trafficked. Without such a mechanism, we are left, once more, with the problems of transparency which I am seeking to address through Amendment 86M. As it stands, Clause 48 applies to victims of the offences under both Clauses 1 and 2, and this is right. Amendment 86M also applies to victims of slavery and trafficking offences and would require a formal mechanism for identification to be established in regulations.

Having set out the requirements for identification, I turn to proposed new subsection (5). This sets out how long the assistance must be provided for under the reflection and recovery period. There are two questions for your Lordships. First, how long should it be and, secondly, should we set this time period in statute? Those of your Lordships who have studied the European convention will know that our international obligation is to provide a so-called recovery and reflection period of at least 30 days. Such a period shall be sufficient for the person concerned to recover. The UK already has a recovery and reflection period of 45 days, so we are ahead of the minimum. However, I have heard NGOs say, time and again, that even 45 days is not long enough for a victim to properly reflect and recover and that 90 days would be far more appropriate. This is what I am proposing in Amendment 86M. Indeed, the NRM review says:

“Many to whom we spoke thought that victims ‘are failed’ at the end of the 45 day period”.

This is a very sobering assessment of how we are treating victims. Studies show that, during the first three months, a high proportion of victims of human trafficking display symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder and that longer reflection periods can greatly improve chances of providing substantial assistance to victims of trafficking. That is why I am supporting a 90-day reflection and recovery period.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bates]

My Lords, I am struck in these amendments by how prescient contributors are of the arguments I am about to deploy. I was wondering how it could be that people were so aware of this. The reality is that we have had a rather open and extensive consultation period. Indeed, the officials working on the team are constantly meeting with outside groups and talking to people. Alongside that, my noble friend Lady Garden and I have been trying to do the same with your Lordships’ House. Therefore, I suppose that it is not too much of a surprise that respective positions are known—but that does not mean that they cannot be moved on either side.

I take slight issue with one of the caricatures put forward, perhaps unintentionally, by the noble Lord, Lord Browne, that somehow victims’ protection in the United Kingdom may not be of the same standard outside Northern Ireland. I do not accept that. Not least, of course, we are going to have an Independent Anti-slavery Commissioner, who will cover Northern Ireland. I am sure that that would be a key part.

The other point is that, as I have said before, we are open to looking at the legislation and experience in Northern Ireland and to sharing best practices with each other. The notion that somehow victims are just a passing shot in the Bill does not stack up to the discussions we are having or the legislation, where we talk about victim reparation orders, enhanced access to legal aid—which has been widely welcomed—special proceedings in court to encourage victims to come forward, presumptions about age, child trafficking advocates, and statutory defence if they are involved in committing a crime. All the way through, we all shared a commitment that those who have suffered most should be considered most. At the same time, we recognise that one of the best ways that one can serve victims is by ensuring that others are not added to their number by making prosecutions.

Those points made, I am not quite sure I will live up to the creative billing the noble Lord, Lord Alton, urged on me, but I shall respond as best I can to the points made. I am grateful for the tabling of Amendments 86J, 86K, 86L, 86M, 102B and 102C, which deal with crucial issues relating to identifying and supporting victims of modern slavery and to legal aid. This is why the Modern Slavery Bill includes a provision requiring the Secretary of State to issue guidance to ensure that front-line professionals understand how they might encounter and identify potential victims of modern slavery and how they can help them to access the support they need.

This guidance will focus on the effective identification of both child and adult victims of modern slavery and will provide information to front-line professionals and others on potential signs that someone may be a victim and on what to do. It will also set out the assistance and support on offer to victims through the government-funded adult victim care contract, currently operated by the Salvation Army, and local authority child welfare and safeguarding arrangements, including the presumption about age provisions in Clause 49. The Independent Anti-slavery Commissioner will also have a key role in ensuring that victims can be quickly identified by all front-line professionals. We are fully intending to consult on this guidance so that we can get it right, and therefore I do not believe that the amendment is necessary.

Amendment 86J seeks to require all victims to be psychologically assessed during the investigation of a modern slavery offence as set out in Clauses 1 or 2. While I appreciate my noble friend’s intention of ensuring that an assessment of victims’ needs is undertaken at an early opportunity and her awareness of the often deep psychological trauma these heinous crimes can inflict, I do not believe that this amendment is the right approach to achieve those laudable aims. The amendment may force victims to undergo a psychological assessment, even if they do not want one. I am sure that that is the last thing we should do. Added to that, all the way through this victim-focused legislation is the idea that victims have to consent to all the actions taken on their behalf. Instead, I offer the following reassurance. Adult victims who are referred to the national referral mechanism are entitled to receive psychological support through the national victim care contract currently run by the Salvation Army. Any such support would be provided following an appropriate assessment of an individual’s needs.

I now turn to Amendment 86L, tabled by my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I believe it is a probing amendment in relation to the intention of Clause 48(1)(c), which sets out that guidance should include,

“arrangements for determining whether a person is to be treated as a victim of slavery or human trafficking”.

The purpose of this paragraph is to ensure that such guidance covers the national referral mechanism decision-making process to determine whether a person is to be treated as a victim of slavery or human trafficking. The wording of the Bill reflects the terminology used in relation to the national referral mechanism. “Determination” is used to describe the reasonable and conclusive grounds decisions by the competent authority, whereas “identify” is used to refer to the initial identification of potential victims by first responders. I reassure my noble friend that the paragraph as presently drafted covers both these elements of the national referral mechanism process, and I trust that the intention of the amendment is not to limit the scope of the guidance in any way.

Amendment 86M seeks to put a referral mechanism into statute which ensures that victims get at least 90 days’ support which is not conditional on the willingness of the person to act as a witness in any criminal proceedings. Although administratively we provide potential victims with a minimum of 45 days to recover and reflect, in practice many victims are supported for a much longer period. As noble Lords may know, we are currently retendering the contract for adult victim care services and have reflected on the national referral mechanism review recommendations in building the requirements for the new contract. That includes consideration of how we might provide ongoing support to victims once they have received a decision confirming that they are a victim of modern slavery. Our aim is to help these individuals move on with their lives so that they are not revictimised through being retrafficked.

Finally, Amendments 102B and 102C will enable the commissioner to exercise functions in relation to individual cases until amendments are made via secondary legislation to legal aid provisions. The Government are strongly of the view that it is not the role of the commissioner to champion individual cases or to track victims who receive support. Their role is to strengthen our collective response to modern slavery, working closely with law enforcement agencies and other stakeholders, including civil society organisations, to identify more victims and prosecute more perpetrators. We recognise the importance of understanding the longer term outcomes of victims. That is why we are considering how we can work with the victim care contractor to best achieve this. Of course, information from individual cases may help inform the commissioner’s work in this regard, but it is not for the commissioner to advocate for individuals.

Potential victims of trafficking currently gain access to legal aid following a positive reasonable grounds decision of the national referral mechanism. Legal advice is not necessary for an NRM referral. The reasonable grounds decision is generally made within five working days after an individual has been referred to the NRM, and the decision has a low threshold. This test is an important gateway to avoid abuse of a system that provides access to a range of support, including legal aid. We recognise that there are concerns about the operation of the NRM. That is why we commissioned a full review of the system and will be piloting a new approach to the NRM in response to that review. We will ensure that any wider changes to the NRM are reflected in the provision of legal aid.

I thank noble Lords for tabling these amendments and allowing us to discuss some crucial issues. I hope that I have addressed noble Lords’ concerns and that—with the undertaking, as with previous groups, that we will continue reflecting on the detailed comments that have been made—they will take that reassurance and not press their amendments.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I was looking to see if the noble Lord, Lord McColl, wanted to come in. I know that all noble Lords are very appreciative of the time and effort that Ministers and officials are putting in to meetings and discussions outside the Chamber. I hope that the teasing and the prescience does not deter them from continuing with that; I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Alton. My amendment about psychological assessment—I take the point about consent —is really not about the NRM or about support for victims and their recovery; that is obviously extremely important. I was seeking to pick up the role of psychological input into an investigation and prosecution. That is a different matter. It is clearly not appropriate now for me to expand on that any further, but if I can test the Minister’s patience, maybe this is something for outside the Chamber.

I note what the Minister said on my other two amendments—I am happy about those—and I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 86J.

Amendment 86J withdrawn.

Modern Slavery Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 36 in this group, and I have put my name also to the amendment moved by the noble Baroness. I shall take the amendments in the group in reverse order. Amendment 36 would provide that a compensation order could be made to reflect injury and so on resulting not just from the principal offence, if that is the way that one should describe it, but from other relevant offences taken into consideration by the court when it determines the sentence.

The amendment comes from Section 130 of the 2000 Act, which is the subject of Clause 10(1). When I read that section, I saw the reference to offences taken into account in sentencing and wondered whether it needed to be made explicit in the Bill. If it is implicit, fine; if it is not covered, it should be.

My comment on the noble Lord’s amendment is that while obviously we are on the same page as him, I would hope that any provision that results from this debate will allow for claims not only in the county court but in the High Court. The county court is the court for lower claims and the High Court for higher claims, as is the case with all civil claims. I think that we agree that the damage to individuals can sometimes be very great.

One of many reasons why a civil claim would be appropriate is that those who have survived forced labour, slavery or exploitation have different levels of vulnerability, different reactions and different responses. Some are more resilient than others. Current civil remedies may not provide a remedy for those who are resilient enough not to suffer an injury, such as a diagnosable psychiatric condition.

There are, of course, recognised bases for bringing civil claims in tort, contract and employment, but often they do not adequately reflect the gravity of the situation. I add to the mix the possibility of exemplary damages and perhaps civil remedies being available to be pursued against not only those who committed the offence but those who knew or ought to have known—I am picking up language from elsewhere—of the offence and who have benefited from it.

I conclude by saying that I am aware that, for some, the experiences they have suffered are articulated in comments such as, “Twelve years and no money”. That is the way that some victims are able to put it, because they cannot necessarily express everything that they have undergone, but many years for no pay is something keenly felt, and the noble Baroness’s amendment would meet that.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I wonder whether anything covered under Clauses 1, 2 and 4, creating these criminal offences, is not already, under the ordinary law, a civil wrong. If it is, it would carry a claim of damages and other remedies for civil wrongs with it, such as injunction. If I am wrong about that, this is a good move. On the other hand, if I happen to be right about it, the people who are wronged before this becomes law would have a right of action which the Bill cannot confer on them until it is enacted. I also wonder whether there may be more scope in the civil remedies that exist now in respect of the people who are involved in the perpetration—not the actual perpetrators, but those who organise it and are behind it; they are sometimes called the brains. Whether that is appropriate, I shall not comment. We need to think about that question in relation to this group of amendments. I am all in favour of having people who damage others under conduct which is made criminal by Clauses 1, 2 and 4 being subject to civil action. What I am wondering is whether that is not true already.

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[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I agree in principle with what lies behind the amendments but I would like to take up what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, has said. I am no civil lawyer but I believe that these are what are called in civil law torts; that is to say, civil offences. There is at least a very real possibility that they are covered by existing civil law. If they are so covered, there is no need for these amendments. I am afraid that I have not done any research on it, as I have not put forward an amendment, but some research needs to be done as to what is already covered before we ask the Government to accept these amendments.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, if I may respond, the point has been brought to us by several lawyers, both members of the Bar and solicitors, who are concerned that the remedies available are not adequate. The noble Baroness and I ought to ask the two noble and learned Lords if they would like to conduct a seminar before Report for those who have been briefing us.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Bates) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Young, for introducing this debate, and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and my noble friend Lady Hamwee for moving and speaking to their amendments, giving us the opportunity to discuss a very serious issue. I think we were all struck by the words of the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, about the delay that people are experiencing at present in getting compensation for the horrendous suffering that they have gone through in this process.

Before turning to the amendments, I want to make two points that deal with matters of principle. The first point, which runs through many of the groups that we have considered already, is that the Government’s view, right or wrong, is that we should make it a priority to secure an increase in the number of convictions of the people who have been guilty of these offences. We believe that it is a two-pronged approach. The first prong is the compensation and protection of the victims, but that is best done in the first instance by ensuring that the organised criminal gangs that are perpetrating this are brought to justice. Therefore, the second prong follows from that: we want to encourage victims, although it may be difficult and painful for them to do so, to go down the criminal justice route and secure those convictions. We have made provision in the Bill for protections and help, particularly for children and vulnerable adults, in making contributions and presenting their evidence before a court so that we can secure those convictions. That would be the first point that I would make.

Secondly—my remarks on this are of necessity briefer than they would otherwise be—I have been assisted immensely by the wise words of my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. They have very effectively made the case that we have arrived at; namely, the belief that civil remedies to the civil wrongs that have been cited in this case already exist. In the particular instance where there is a need for clarification on this, my noble friend Lady Hamwee asked—in fact, I think this is the purpose of Amendment 36—whether it was possible to have a reparation order and a compensation order. The answer is yes because they would be dealing with two distinct elements. Where an offence has been committed under the Modern Slavery Bill under the group of offences highlighted in Sections 1 to 3, there would of course be a reparation order. If, however, the person had been the victim of slavery and had been subjected to rape, for example, there would be additional compensation orders as well as the criminal charges that would be brought. So in that instance there would be a case for having the two together, and I hope that helps to clarify the situation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bates]

If I may, I will come back to the noble and learned Lord’s point and perhaps write to him in clarification, but the compensation orders and the reparation orders relate to criminal convictions. The position would be that they are separate and adequate civil remedies. I realise that does not answer the particular point the noble and learned Lord raised, but I will respond to that during the course of the afternoon.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the Minister says that they are, in effect, compensation for crimes. The particular concern that the noble Baroness and I have is that victims should be compensated—that word seems completely inadequate in the context, but noble Lords will understand it—without there necessarily having been a criminal conviction.

[Lord Bates]

I will come back to that, if I may. We have before us two proposed new clauses in Amendment 34, which was moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Young, and Amendment 35, which seek to enhance civil remedies by creating new torts equivalent to the offences to be created under Clauses 1, 2 and 4. I assure the Committee that civil remedies in tort already exist for victims of trafficking and slavery to claim damages from perpetrators through ordinary civil law and the Human Rights Act, which was raised by the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich. Damages can, for example, be recovered for loss or damage caused to victims under the torts of intimidation, harassment, assault, unlawful imprisonment, negligence and breach of duty. The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 retained civil legal aid for damages and employment law claims for trafficking victims to support them in making such claims. An amendment I have tabled would extend that legal aid provision to all modern slavery victims.

Amendment 35, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, further suggests that such compensation should be linked to the national minimum wage that an individual would have to receive in legal employment. I reassure the Committee on that point. Damages in civil claims are intended to make good the loss or damage caused by the wrongful act. The principle will apply to actions relating to slavery and trafficking. The actual amounts of the damages will be based on the individual circumstances of the case and may be higher than the level of wages that would have been paid, although this may be a factor considered by the court in assessing the amount of the victim’s loss. The cavalry coming to the rescue advises me that we have agreed to write to noble Lords on exemplary damages.

We are committed to doing as much as possible to enhance support and protection for victims of modern slavery, including ensuring that they receive compensation for the horrors they have experienced—although I accept, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, that one could never fully compensate someone for what they have suffered with a mere cash payment. However, we consider that existing law provides sufficient access to civil remedies for victims of slavery and trafficking. I hope that with those assurances and the undertakings that I have given today, the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

37: Clause 14, page 10, line 4, after “satisfied” insert “beyond reasonable doubt”

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, this amendment takes us to Part 2 of the Bill, which deals with prevention orders. My amendment deals with prevention orders and Amendment 52 with risk orders, on the same point.

The clauses provide that the court may make the orders if it is satisfied that there is a risk of commission of a slavery or human trafficking offence, and so on. As I say, this deals with two different clauses. I am aware of the assurance given by the Government in the Commons that the standard of proof required for the court to be satisfied is,

“akin to the criminal standard”.

This issue also arose when we debated the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill. I raised the same point in connection with anti-social behaviour orders, and the Government at the last knockings of the Bill agreed to put the words “beyond reasonable doubt” into the Bill.

I appreciate that there are differences between that Bill and this. There was a reference elsewhere in that Bill to the civil standard of proof relating to another action that might be taken. I am aware also that the current sexual offences risk orders do not have this spelt out. However, in its report, the Joint Committee on Human Rights did feel that this should be made clear in the Bill. It said, at paragraph 1.38:

“In our view, an explicit reference to the applicable standard of proof on the face of the Bill would enhance legal certainty”.

It, too, referred to the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 and said that that would be in line with the drafting of that Act. It went on:

“Statutory provisions for civil orders of this type should make clear on the face of the Bill that the criminal standard applies and we recommend that the Bill be amended to put this beyond doubt”.

I do not think it intended any pun in that. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Garden of Frognal (LD)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for speaking to this amendment and my noble friend Lady Hamwee for tabling it. It gives me the opportunity to explain the Government’s approach to safeguards in slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders, and in particular the standards of proof required for the orders to be made. The purpose of these orders is to ensure that law enforcement bodies and the courts have appropriate powers to restrict the behaviour of persons who are likely to cause harm to another by committing a slavery or trafficking offence. For the prevention orders in Clause 14 and the risk orders in Clause 23, the courts must be satisfied that there is a risk that the individual may commit an offence, and that the order is necessary to protect a person or persons from the physical or psychological harm that would likely be caused by that individual committing a slavery or human trafficking offence.

These amendments seek to ensure that the court is required in each of these circumstances to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, which is the standard of proof in criminal courts, as has been mentioned. The intention of these amendments is to ensure that safeguards are in place to protect the rights of individuals on whom these orders will be imposed. I recognise the importance of ensuring that these orders, breach of which would be a criminal offence, are not made lightly.

Reference has been made to the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I take this opportunity to pay tribute to the work of that committee. There has been mention of the report that it has published recently. The Government are reflecting on that report carefully.

In this context, protecting the rights of the defendant is important. We have sought to draft these provisions to provide these protections and reflect the need to protect potential victims and remove the risk of harm to them, which is paramount. Although the proceedings by which these orders are obtained are civil proceedings, I put on record that the high burden of proof which applies by virtue of relevant case law in this area ensures that the threshold must in any event be akin to the criminal standard, as my noble friend said. This is the position in respect of existing orders under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which have been used effectively for more than 10 years, and the new sexual harm prevention order and sexual risk order, and is therefore very well established. For these reasons, we do not believe that this amendment is necessary. Courts and practitioners are familiar with the existing evidential test. Departing from the established approach for these orders could cause uncertainty among practitioners and the courts, which may well reduce their effectiveness. There could also be a perception that, by expressly including a different and more rigid test in the Bill, we want these orders to be judged by a different standard from that applicable to the other orders, which would call into question why different approaches are taken in areas notwithstanding the similarities between them.

Under the system I have described, the court has flexibility in determining the standard to be applied and can take into account and balance all the circumstances of the case—for example, the seriousness of the risk posed by the defendant, the degree of relevance of each fact which must be proved by the applicant and the effect on the defendant of making the order. In the sex offending context, the courts have been able to carry out this exercise for many years in a way which protects the rights of both defendants and those persons at risk. Prescribing the standard as the criminal standard would deprive the courts of this necessary flexibility.

My noble friend made a comparison with the anti-social behaviour regime, to which she made a similar amendment. I think your Lordships will agree that, while anti-social behaviour can cause harm to both individuals and communities, it is not as serious as the horrific abuses of modern slavery. That is why we have modelled these orders on those which tackle sex offenders. Those orders do not prescribe the criminal standard of proof in legislation and were recently approved by Parliament.

I assure the Committee that there are several further safeguards as well as the standard of proof to ensure these orders are used appropriately. The type of harm to be prevented is specified and relates to very serious offences. Statutory guidance will be issued, which will describe risk factors and categories of restriction which may be contained in an order. In determining what measures are necessary, the court must have regard to the rights of both the person at risk and the defendant under the European Convention on Human Rights. The Government will also ensure that defendants have the same access to legal aid as is applicable to other civil order regimes.

Legal aid was raised on an earlier amendment. Individuals concerned will have the right to appeal the making, variation or extension of an order and apply to vary or discharge an order if circumstances change. Given that clarification, the substantial safeguards to ensure appropriate use of the orders and my assurance that we shall, of course, continue to reflect on the valuable work of the Joint Committee, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken on this amendment but hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw it.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I was not surprised by anything that my noble friend has just said; her reply was very much what I anticipated. However, given both the JCHR’s comments and the recent experience with another order considered by your Lordships, I felt that it was appropriate to flesh out the Government’s reasons. I entirely understand the point about case law and comparisons.

The one thing that troubled me about her reply, if I may say so, was the suggestion that because these offences are more serious than anti-social behaviour—I agree with that—it is therefore unnecessary to be clear about the standard of proof, in the way we were with anti-social behaviour. I hope that that does not in any way detract from what my noble friend said about the standard of proof being equivalent—her words were, “akin to”; but I understand that to mean “equivalent”—to the criminal standard of proof. I do not think that that was what was meant but it sounded a bit like it in one paragraph in the middle of her reply. If it is necessary to confirm that after today, I would be happy for her to do so.

[Baroness Garden of Frognal]

My noble friend is quite right. It was not the intention to imply that they were in any way worthy of less serious measures.

[Baroness Hamwee]

Then I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 37 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

38: Clause 14, page 10, line 14, at end insert “and notwithstanding the repeal of the offence following the conviction or finding”

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the defendant may have been convicted and served a sentence but this seems to be another sanction. I know that if one looks at this through a different lens, the focus is on the victim. However, I thought it appropriate to table the amendment and raise some questions about the prevention orders because, as I say, this is, in effect, another sanction for the defendant for a sentence that has been served.

Clause 14(5) relates to the list of offences that can prompt these orders, including many offences that have already been repealed or which will be repealed when the Bill is enacted. The purpose of my amendment is quickly to probe whether it is the case that if the legislation creating such an offence has been repealed the orders can, following the conviction or finding of the court, or whoever makes the finding, nevertheless be applied. Are the prevention orders exactly the same as those which apply under current legislation? I am not sure whether I should use the word “retrospectivity”, but will they be prompted in the same way as they would be by offences under legislation that is no longer in force?

Thinking about this from the point of view of the potential subject of an order, I assume that there will be no particular arrangements regarding court proceedings. I am thinking of potential publicity. I assume that this will be in open court and there will be no anonymity for a defendant who may not have been convicted of anything to prompt the application for an order in court. I beg to move.

[Baroness Garden of Frognal]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for moving the amendment, which aims to clarify this part of the Bill. Slavery and trafficking prevention orders are available in respect of individuals who have been convicted of a slavery or human trafficking offence and who pose a risk of causing harm by the further commission of such offences, which makes it necessary to obtain an order to protect the public from that harm. The provisions already have retrospective effect to the extent that the offence, on the basis of which a person can become subject to a slavery and trafficking prevention order, may have been committed before the coming into force of the Bill. As my noble friend has pointed out, this is reflected in the list of relevant offences in Schedule 1. It is important that these measures can be sought in relation to all relevant offenders and that we do not leave a gap in the availability of the new orders in respect of individuals who have been convicted of old offences or offences replaced by those in the Bill. The offences listed in Schedule 1 include old offences, as well as offences that will be repealed by the Bill, but which nevertheless relate to similar activities as their modern equivalents to ensure that the orders can be sought in respect of all offenders who pose a risk to the public, regardless of whether that offence is still on the statute book.

I understand that there may be concerns that defendants are not penalised again having already received, and possibly served, sentences from the court, but this is not novel. There is similar provision in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 in respect of the new orders dealing with sexual harm. While this does not amount to formal retrospection, the provisions have retrospective effect in that conduct committed prior to commencement will carry potential consequences that the person concerned may not reasonably have expected.

Moreover, as slavery and trafficking prevention orders are intended to be civil, preventive measures and not a punishment, Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits the retrospective application of a penalty, would not apply. This is supported by the approach taken by the courts to ASBOs and other similar civil orders where the courts have been satisfied that such orders are neither a conviction nor a punishment. In other words, these measures do not involve the imposition of a penalty.

My noble friend asked whether these orders would take place in open court. I can assure her that they would be in open court. The general public interest in the law not being changed retrospectively is firmly outweighed by the need to be able to tackle those involved in slavery or human trafficking as soon as these provisions come into force. With those assurances, I hope that my noble friend will feel free to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I am grateful for that. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 38 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

39: Clause 15, page 10, line 19, leave out paragraph (b)

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, this may be the longest grouping of amendments, but it may be one of the shortest debates. I note that the noble Lord and the noble Baroness opposite also have an amendment in the group. Amendment 39 and the other amendments in my name ask what place an immigration officer has, or should have, in instigating an application for a slavery and trafficking prevention order or a risk order. They are also to ask, if an immigration officer has this power, how it will work in practice. Are we talking about a suspicion at the border? If that is so, would it not be appropriate for the immigration officer to bring in the police, rather than for the immigration officer to start on this line of applying for one of these orders, even though, as the noble Baroness has said, it does not criminalise? Would the immigration officer have some power to detain linked with this?

I was prompted to table these amendments because of my concern not to confuse slavery and trafficking with immigration offences, at least to the extent of not letting it be thought that this is a problem that is being imported into this country—because, as in the title of the report from a year or so ago, it happens here. My questions are really about the operation of the provision and the place of immigration officers throughout these clauses, which is why there is such a long list of amendments. I beg to move.

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 39A in this group. Part 2 makes arrangements for slavery and trafficking risk orders and prevention orders. At present, Clause 15 makes provision for when a magistrate may make a slavery and trafficking prevention order against a person. A chief officer of police may make an application to the magistrates’ court, alongside an immigration officer or the director-general of the National Crime Agency. However, a chief officer of police may make such an application only in respect of a person who lives in that chief officer’s police area or who the chief officer believes is in that area or is intending to come to it.

We tabled the same amendment in the other place to question whether a chief officer may also be able to make an order with respect to someone who has previously been to their area or has had connections with the area. The current drafting of this clause does not cover that possibility. At present, it would be possible for a chief officer to apply for a trafficking prevention order for someone in their area but not for anyone who had previously been there and who may still have connections with the area through friends, family or business or in other ways.

I will adapt an example given by my right honourable friend David Hanson in the other place. At present, it is possible for the chief constable of Gloucestershire police to apply for a trafficking prevention order for someone who lives in the Forest of Dean, which is my area. She could also do that if she thought that they were in or would come to the area. There might be individuals who were previously involved in trafficking in my area but who are not currently resident in the area or intending to return there, but they might have connections with it through their family or business or in other ways.

I tabled the amendment because paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (4) do not cover every base, but the amendment could mean that the police would have full powers. To use my area of Gloucestershire again, it is quite possible that an individual could conduct activity that should be covered by a slavery and trafficking prevention order but the chief of police is not able to make an application for an order because the individual does not live in the area, is not in the area and does not intend to come to the area, although they have been to it previously or have connections with it.

In her response, the Minister in the other place said that in such a case the chief officer would be able to ask the National Crime Agency or the police force where the individual resides to take the appropriate steps to make an application for an order. In addition, the new Independent Anti-slavery Commissioner would be able to ensure that police officers could work coherently and co-operatively. While of course that is welcome, it is not certain, and the functions of the commissioner as outlined in Clause 41 do not reflect this.

Furthermore, the Minister was hesitant when asked what would happen if an individual left the area. The chief officer would not be able to take any action and would have to rely on other police forces to act. This could be dangerous, weaken the application of slavery and trafficking prevention orders and allow perpetrators to slip through the net. Personally, I do not see the harm in giving an extra power in this subsection to extend it to individuals who may not be covered in paragraphs (a) and (b).

In the Public Bill Committee in the Commons, the Minister, Karen Bradley, indicated that she was willing to reflect on this. It would be good to know whether the Minister was able to provide us with any reassurance on this issue.

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[Baroness Garden of Frognal]

I thank my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, for tabling these amendments. They raise the important issue of who should be able to use the slavery and trafficking prevention orders or slavery and trafficking risk orders proposed in the Bill, and indeed they relate to the powers of the police across different areas of operation.

The first orders have been designed to manage the risk of harm that would be caused by an individual committing a modern slavery offence. In developing the Bill, the Government have considered carefully who is best placed to be given the powers to apply for these orders and to be involved in the subsequent steps of the process, whether it is receiving the name and address details or applying for variations, renewals or discharge, or whether it is the persons for whom the guidance is intended.

The amendments, although not Amendment 39A, seek to remove immigration officers from the category of persons who can apply for an order. However, the cross-border nature of modern slavery means that it is often linked to immigration crime, and the individuals in the best position to deal with immigration crime are immigration officers. It is therefore appropriate for this group of law enforcement officers to have these powers. They already have law enforcement powers in this country and investigate and support prosecution of immigration and trafficking offences. Given the international nature of modern slavery, this power is appropriate, and to remove them from the list would restrict the role that immigration officers can play in dealing with traffickers and those likely to commit trafficking offences. It means that they would be required to call on the police to apply for the orders, which would add unnecessarily to the burden on the police and, of course, would cause delays as well.

I entirely understand that it is important to ensure there are safeguards in place so that immigration officers apply for these orders only in appropriate circumstances. The legislation is drafted using existing recognised legal persons, and the specific positions of more senior staff in immigration enforcement are not set out in legislation. However, I can assure the House that we will establish, through Home Office policy, that any decision to apply for a slavery and trafficking prevention or risk order by an immigration officer must be approved by the director of criminal investigations within the Home Office. I hope that those assurances will enable my noble friend to withdraw her amendment.

Amendment 39A seeks to include chief police officers for an area with which the defendant previously had a connection in the category of persons who can apply for an order. The role of the preventive orders is to look forwards to prevent the harm that could be caused by future crimes. The provisions about who can apply for an order reflect that. As the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, indicated, this was discussed in the other place and the Government’s position has not shifted from that. In cases where an individual no longer lives in an area, but the chief officer of police has reason to believe they are likely to return, there is a future risk of harm in that area and the chief officer can apply for the orders under the Bill as it stands. As the noble Baroness mentioned, in the few cases where an individual posing a risk is unlikely to return to an area, it would be appropriate for the police to inform the National Crime Agency, as it would be logical for it to take this forward across police boundaries, or indeed the police force for the area where the individual resides. Those two bodies would be best placed to manage the risk posed by an individual where they live now. We shall be coming on to discuss the role of the commissioner in more detail later in the Bill.

Clause 15 as drafted provides appropriate powers for the police in relation to slavery and trafficking prevention orders. For the moment we see no reason to take that further forward. We are satisfied that that will cover the cases in the Bill. Given that clarification, I hope that the noble Baroness will not press her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that reply. She said that the Government would not want to restrict the role of immigration officers. I still find it not so much confusing, but carrying the danger of muddling the issues in the way I explained. What intrigues me, in particular, and I am grateful for the assurance, is that the approval for an application would have to be made by the director of criminal investigation within the Home Office. If that is so, why cannot the police take the matter on and not involve the Immigration Service? I think I had better leave that question hanging and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 39 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

44: Clause 17, page 12, line 9, at end insert—
“( ) The Secretary of State shall by regulations specify the prohibitions which may be included in an order (including an interim order) or any variation of it.”

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, under the Bill the court can make a prohibition for any period, and the criterion is that the prohibition is “necessary to protect” a particular person or persons generally from physical or psychological harm likely to arise from slavery or a trafficking offence by the defendant. Obviously, that goes very wide in terms of the court’s powers. The Joint Committee on Human Rights made the point—I hope that I am not stealing the noble Baroness’s thunder again—that there should be certainty as to the prohibitions which can be applied and recommended that there might be, for instance, an indicative list of the sorts of prohibitions that can be imposed in such orders. Considerations of legal certainty should also be given prominence in the development of the statutory guidance. That statutory guidance will apply to the police, to immigration officers and the NCA. I am not sure where the courts stand in this and whether it is improper to issue guidance to a court. The police can apply for a particular prohibition order and the court will have unlimited discretion.

It seems to me that if these prohibitions are capable of being set out in guidance, they are capable of being set out more formally. My amendment proposes that they should be included in regulations rather than in guidance. That would provide certainty as to what prohibitions might be applied and give Parliament the opportunity to debate those prohibitions, and having regulations rather than primary legislation would allow for quite a degree of flexibility. Wishing to see certainty and not to provide completely unconstrained discretion without knowing until case law has developed what might be included in the prohibitions, I am proposing the use of regulations. I beg to move.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

My Lords, the noble Baroness has not stolen my thunder at all, and again I am most grateful to her for tabling this amendment. It picks up on the recommendations made by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I want to make one additional point on why this raises an important question of human rights. As we said in our report:

“In order to ensure compatibility with the right to respect for private life, any restriction must satisfy the requirements of legal certainty. It is essential that prohibitions contained in the orders are clear, as a breach of an order is a criminal offence”.

[Baroness Garden of Frognal]

My Lords, I thank both noble Baronesses for speaking to these amendments. They raise the important issue of the prohibitions that can be imposed by the slavery and trafficking prevention orders and risk orders. Prevention is critical to tackling modern slavery effectively and the purpose of these orders is to enable the courts to impose prohibitions on individuals who are believed to pose a risk of causing harm by the commission of a slavery or human trafficking offence. It is important that these orders provide law enforcement agencies and the courts with the ability to respond flexibly to the risks posed by an individual. Clauses 17 and 24 make it clear that slavery and trafficking prevention orders and risk orders will only contain prohibitions that the court is satisfied are necessary for the purposes of protecting people from the physical or psychological harms that would be likely to occur if the defendant committed the slavery or human trafficking offence. These prohibitions can be imposed anywhere in the UK or outside of the UK, they can be for a fixed period of at least five years, and some prohibitions may apply for longer than others.

To enable law enforcement agencies and the courts to respond to changing slavery and human trafficking practices and to tailor prohibitions to the specific risk posed by individuals, we have deliberately not specified the types of restrictions that can be included in the orders. This makes them flexible and capable of restricting any activities that a person undertakes if the court considers it necessary. The approach is in line with existing orders relating to the prevention of sexual harm. Making the amendment requested by my noble friend would restrict the flexibility that these orders need to have. We believe that we have already set substantial and appropriate safeguards to ensure that orders will only be used in appropriate circumstances when necessary to stop the harm caused by these very serious offences, by requiring that the court is satisfied that they and the prohibitions that they include are necessary.

I appreciate the power of the argument of my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and of the arguments of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to ensure that operational law enforcement partners are clear on the types of prohibitions that might be helpful. In line with the Joint Committee on Human Rights recommendation we shall ensure that the statutory guidance in relation to the orders will include guidance on appropriate prohibitions. With that assurance, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, of course I shall seek leave to withdraw it. I had hoped that by referring to regulations that I described as having a degree of flexibility I might have met the point that I anticipated would come. Wanting flexibility in the range of prohibitions that might be applied raises in one’s mind a concern that they might be changed quite frequently. That would go against the certainty that we are seeking. However, I hear what my noble friend has to say and a little more clarity in the guidance will certainly be welcome. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 44 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

My Lords, I support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Warner. As a member of the commission, I thought originally that the Government putting in the word “independent” was sufficient. I have to say that I have been reflecting on that, though. I have listened to what the noble Lord, Lord Warner, and the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, have said about this, and I have gone back to what was said by our Select Committee. The noble Baroness has set out many of the points that were made under Part 4 of our report, particularly in paragraphs 146 and 147. There was one quotation she did not make, though, which was from the Independent Police Complaints Commission. It stresses the importance to the commissioner’s independence of the freedom to appoint staff, saying:

“The perception of that independence, if not its reality, may be affected by its statutory closeness to the department. Unlike the Prisons Inspectorate or the IPCC (or indeed the Victims Commissioner)”—

really a very important part—

“the Anti Slavery Commissioner … will be unable to engage his or her own staff, or be located outside the department. He or she will therefore be relying on negotiating the right number and expertise of departmental civil servants, whose careers and ultimate accountability lie within the department. In my view, this is unfortunate, as it does not provide the Commissioner with any visible separation from the department”.

In our recommendation, we point out that failing to have sufficient protection for the commissioner’s independence in the long run will undermine the commissioner’s credibility and capacity to establish relationships based on trust with NGOs and other stakeholder groups, whose role in combating modern slavery is well recognised.

On Monday I made a point to the Minister about perception and the enormous importance of the Bill being seen as an iconic Bill that will lead not just in this country and Europe but across the world. I do not doubt the integrity of Kevin Hyland and have great respect for him, but the anti-slavery commissioner must have the ability to speak independently and a group of staff on whom he can rely to be responsible to him, rather than to the Home Office. If he does not have that, it will have a real impact, I regret to say, on the ability and willingness of NGOs to want to deal properly with the anti-slavery commissioner. This is a very important point, and the more I have thought about it, particularly listening to the two speeches that the Committee has just heard, the more I think that the Minister should take this matter away and reflect upon it. To have entirely Home Office staff appointed by the Home Office will not look good to NGOs.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I agree with everything that has been said on that last point. One can imagine that NGOs which the commissioner wishes to consult will find themselves going to Marsham Street to meet him. That seems entirely inappropriate.

I thought the term “friction”, which the noble Baroness used, was very delicate. I have written down other terms which might describe somewhere on the spectrum between tension and conflict. My first block of five amendments in this group seeks to establish a direct relationship between the commissioner and Parliament rather than for the reporting to be permitted by the Home Secretary. It is very important that there should not be or be perceived to be a block between the commissioner and his ability to have reports published and debated by Parliament. I have not sought to take out Clause 41(6), which allows the Secretary of State to direct the omission of material which would be against the interests of national security, might jeopardise safety or prejudice an investigation or prosecution. I am sure we will be told that the Home Secretary does not seek to censor reports from other commissioners and other independent persons, but this is about perception as well as reality.

Amendment 68A would take out the definition of a permitted matter, which follows from what I have just said, and Amendment 68B would allow the commissioner to publish without seeing whether the Secretary of State and the devolved authorities want to exercise other powers. I can see immediately that I have made a mistake here; clearly, I should have retained the reference to subsection (6) but I am sure that noble Lords will understand the general point I am making. Amendment 72A is an extremely clumsy way of trying to find some shorthand for deleting reference to the Secretary of State’s approval, but it all amounts to the same thing.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

My Lords, I support all these amendments, which aim to ensure the genuine independence of the anti-slavery commissioner and to establish a relationship with Parliament. As I said, they are very much in line with the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member. I am grateful to all noble Lords who tabled them; a very powerful case has been made. I apologise if I echo some of the arguments, but some of them bear repetition.

The JCHR welcomed the creation of the office of the anti-slavery commissioner as,

“a potentially significant human rights enhancing measure”.

However, whether it fulfils that potential depends very much on it being genuinely independent of government. As we have heard, a very constructive debate in the Public Bill Committee led to an amendment on Report which added “independent” to the statutory title of the commissioner, as my noble friend Lord Warner, explained. I welcome that, as it reflected the all-party consensus around the importance of the commissioner’s independence. As the JCHR observed,

“the post cannot be made genuinely independent merely by adding a label”.

We listed the provisions and omissions that mean that it cannot be described as independent in any meaningful sense, which are for the most part covered by noble Lords’ amendments, so I will not go through them.

In light of those severe limitations on the commissioner’s independence, we asked the Government in what sense the role is independent and why it is less so than the Office of the Children’s Commissioner. Their response was to accept that there were significant differences in the legislative framework governing the two bodies, but, as we heard, they maintained that both models produced independent bodies. Yet the widespread view both inside and outside Parliament is that that does not constitute independence because, as the JCHR said, the role would largely be controlled by the Home Office, serving simply as an adjunct to it. My noble friend Lord Warner spelt out very graphically what that might mean in practice.

This debate on what constitutes independence brings to mind the famous exchange between Humpty Dumpty and Alice:

“‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.’

‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you CAN make words mean so many different things.’

‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master—that’s all’”.

I thought that was rather appropriate in the context of a debate about slavery. Surely, ultimately, in deciding what constitutes independence here, Parliament should be the master, and the related concern of the JCHR, taken up in the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, was about the commissioner’s relationship to Parliament.

The JCHR has sought to strengthen the relationship between Parliament and a number of bodies which form part of the human rights machinery, including the Office of the Children’s Commissioner, and I very much commend the way the Government have strengthened and ensured the independence of that office. We stated in our report:

“In our view, the Anti-slavery Commissioner proposed in this Bill has the potential to be another part of that machinery with an important human rights role”.

However, we were surprised and disappointed, to put it mildly, by the Government’s statement that they do not see the commissioner’s role primarily as part of the national human rights machinery. I find it extraordinary that in one of the most human rights-enhancing Bills brought forward by the Government, the machinery to implement it is not seen as part of the human rights machinery. Can the Minister explain why, and does he accept that that rather diminishes the potentially human rights-enhancing role of the Bill?

We have heard from members of the Joint Committee on the draft Bill how that committee itself stressed the importance of the independence, which is crucial for both credibility and establishing the trust of NGOs and other stakeholders. I would add to that list, most importantly, the victims of modern slavery themselves. The committee heard from the Dutch equivalent, who said that,

“the long-standing effectiveness of her own role lay in its statutory independence and the trust engendered as a consequence”,

as my noble friend Lady Royall has said. It expressed sympathy with,

“those who cautioned against relying on either the good intentions of the holder of the office of Home Secretary”.

We all know and appreciate the commitment of the current Home Secretary on the issue of modern slavery. But when even the autonomy of the Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration has been undermined by the Home Secretary’s recent refusal to publish five inspection reports, leading to his recent warning to the Public Accounts Committee that the independence of his role has been compromised, that must send out warning signals for a role that has less statutory independence.

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[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon]

My Lords, I meant to mention one more point, which was the one made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, about the experience that he had setting up the Supreme Court. We probably got it wrong in that instance; we should have had more foresight. We put up our hands if we get things wrong. Now that we have that lesson before us, we should learn from the experience of the Supreme Court and not say, “Oh, well, we’ll see how it goes”. That is a great lesson and we should learn from it.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, we will come to the staff’s functions and powers next week, but we should not lose sight of the fact that some of them need to have experience that is far wider than and quite different from that of the Home Office: we are talking about health and the whole of the welfare system, at least. That point has been made in the context of the powers, but let us mark it in the context of staff as well.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

At the risk of overloading the Minister with questions, I asked a very specific question that I do not think he answered: why do the Government not see the office of the anti-slavery commissioner primarily as part of the human rights machinery?