Lord Taylor of Holbeach
Main Page: Lord Taylor of Holbeach (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Taylor of Holbeach's debates with the Home Office
Serious Crime Bill [HL]
Lord Taylor of Holbeach Excerpts(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My understanding is that it would require that information, because it asks for,
“his or her assets and liabilities”.
However, if there is any deficiency in the wording I would be happy to see an amendment tabled to make that point even clearer.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)
My Lords, I was expecting that we might have a longer debate on this issue—but it is good to see that there is much agreement about the need to strengthen the effectiveness of the Proceeds of Crime Act. It is good that the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, shares the Government’s views on that necessity, and I welcome her speech.
As we have heard, Clauses 1 and 2, and Amendments 8, 13 and 14, all deal with the determination by a court of the extent of a defendant’s interest in named property. By extension, the provisions also deal with any third-party interests in the relevant property. The Serious and Organised Crime Strategy sets out a number of proposals to strengthen the Proceeds of Crime Act by, among other things, ensuring that criminal assets cannot be hidden with spouses, associates or other third parties.
Confiscation orders are the principal method used by law enforcement agencies for the recovery of the proceeds of crime. It is open to the defendant to pay off the order from whatever assets he or she has available. A confiscation order specifies the amount to be paid; it does not itemise particular assets that are to be forfeited. Third parties making claims on assets that are part of the available amount can delay satisfaction of confiscation orders. These claims also reduce the amount of money available for recovery, as the noble Baroness said. Of course, some of these claims may be perfectly legitimate but others will be spurious, designed simply to frustrate the confiscation process.
To tackle such abuses, which were clearly described by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and to help speed up the confiscation process, Clause 1 confers on the court a power to make a determination as to the extent of the defendant’s interest in particular property at the confiscation hearing. Currently, any claims on property are dealt with at the enforcement stage, which can complicate, lengthen and impede the confiscation process. Clause 2 augments the provisions in Clause 1 by introducing a requirement, as part of the confiscation process, for the prosecutor and defendant to detail any known third-party interest in property associated with the defendant in their statement of information and provision of information respectively.
Amendments 8, 13 and 14, tabled by the noble Baroness, seek to bring the determination of third-party interests forward in time even further to the commencement of a criminal investigation or to the point at which a restraint order is made. The amendments also seek to impose on the defendant the obligation to disclose the extent and location of their assets and any third-party interests in those assets. Under Amendment 8, a failure fully to comply would be a criminal offence.
To protect legitimate third-party interests, the provisions in the Bill afford third parties who have, or may have, an interest in the property the right to make representations to the court about the extent of their interest. The right to make representations also extends to the defendant. This will allow the court to consider the evidence presented, assess its credibility and come to a decision.
There are currently no express provisions for the court to deal with any third-party interests in any of the property that the court takes into account when determining the amount of a confiscation order. The legislation does, however, make provision for third parties to make representations where they have been affected by a restraint order. Third parties also have the right to make representations when an enforcement receiver is appointed by the court. Enabling a court to make a determination on a defendant’s interest in property at the earlier confiscation stage will strengthen the operation of the asset recovery process by closing loopholes in the Act that allow third parties to delay the confiscation process.
We do not consider that it is appropriate to bring the determination of third-party interests back to the restraint stage or, indeed, earlier, as is proposed in the noble Baroness’s amendments. Not all defendants will be made subject to a restraint order. For example, where a defendant owns only a house in the UK, it may not be cost-effective to apply for a restraint order when it can take time to sell a house. The relevant law enforcement agency would be made aware of any attempt to sell the property without the need for a restraint order.
Moreover, not all restraint orders lead to confiscation orders. If the subject of a restraint order is not convicted, the restraint order will be discharged. In such cases, it would be a wasteful use of limited judicial and prosecutorial resources to require the court to make a determination as to third-party interests in restrained property. It is for these reasons that the Bill provides for third-party claims to be considered at the confiscation hearing stage.
None the less, third parties may have an interest in restrained assets, and in such cases it would be appropriate for the court to be able to assess such claims—for example, if a third party contests a restraint order on the grounds that it is freezing property wholly owned by that person rather than by the defendant. Therefore, on the face of it Amendment 13 might be beneficial, in that it would confer a power for the court to order the defendant to provide information at any time under a restraint order.
Specifically, the court would be able to require the defendant to provide details of any third-party interests in property. However, this power is already available to the court under the existing restraint order provisions. The court can make any order it believes is appropriate to ensure that a restraint order is effective. This would include a power to order the defendant to provide information, including information concerning his or her and any third-party interest in property. It can be done at restraint order stage. Where a restraint order is not in place, a defendant can be made subject to the provisions of a disclosure order under the investigation powers that are in Part 8 of POCA. Such an order can be made at the start of a confiscation investigation and compel a defendant to answer questions or disclose information specified in the notice.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I am opposing the Question that this clause stand part of the Bill simply to probe. I hope that nothing I say will take the Minister by surprise. I would like to use this opportunity to thank him and his officials for the factsheets that we have had and, in particular, for the Keeling schedules. I discovered that in my pile of copies of statutes, I had a copy of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. I then rapidly discovered how out of date that print was, so the material that we have been sent is very useful indeed.
This debate is closely tied to the previous one—still on third parties’ interests. Clause 4 is about receivers, and proposes an addition to the Proceeds of Crime Act involving proposed new Section 10A of that Act, which is inserted by Clause 1 on determining the extent of an interest in property. Essentially, the purpose of this stand part debate is to ask who deals with what, and when. How would all this operate? Who determines whether and when there has been no,
“reasonable opportunity to make representations”,
or whether there would be,
“a serious risk of injustice”?
I am of course quoting from proposed new Section 51(8B) —whereas proposed new Section 10A(1) in Clause 1 provides that the court, not the receiver, determines the extend of a defendant’s interest,
“if it thinks it appropriate to do so”.
My request, therefore, to the Minister is simply for him to explain the procedure.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, it was kind of my noble friend Lady Hamwee to thank those who are supporting me at official level in the Bill; I am supported by a very fine team, and I am grateful. I am also grateful for the fact that a number of noble Lords have taken time to talk to me about the Bill. That has helped us all to get an understanding of a complex measure. Those Keeling measures are needed in order to have the faintest idea about what is going on. Noble Lords will therefore understand the complexity of the matter and why the excellence of my officials is important to me.
Clause 4 deals with the circumstances in which an individual affected by a determination of interest may make representations to the court appointing an enforcement receiver. A court can confer certain powers on an enforcement receiver, including the power to realise property. This power is accompanied by a requirement to allow persons with an interest in the property a reasonable opportunity to make representations to the court.
As we discussed in the previous debate, the basic principle is that an appeal against a Section 10A determination as to the extent of the defendant’s interest in a property will be permitted only where the person was not given an opportunity to make representation to the judge who made the determination, or there is a serious risk of injustice. In cases where there is no receiver, the Court of Appeal will hear the appeal in the normal way. In cases where the court appoints a receiver, however, it is not bound by the determination and can hear representations. It is in effect hearing an appeal.
As interested third parties will generally have had an opportunity to make representations to the court prior to it making a determination of interest in property, the changes made by Clause 4 limit to certain circumstances the right of such parties to make further representations to the court appointing the receiver. As I have explained, it is not a right of appeal at large and does not allow representations to be made that are inconsistent with a determination, except under the two circumstances I described: first, when the affected party was not given a reasonable opportunity to make representations to the Crown Court before it made its determination; and, secondly, where the court considers that the determination would result in a serious risk of injustice to the person. These two circumstances mirror those in Clause 3, which set out the grounds under which the Court of Appeal may hear an appeal against a Section 10A determination.
So that we are in no doubt as to what it means, the “serious risk of injustice” will include an instance where an innocent third party with no links to criminality has an interest in a house that is to be sold to satisfy a confiscation order against a defendant. The innocent third party may have been out of the country when the determination was made and, consequently, had not received notification of the hearing. By contrast, it would not include instances where there has been an inconvenience to a third party—for example, if they had to move out of rented accommodation that was to be sold to satisfy a confiscation order. A serious injustice is not anticipated to be such a rare instance that it would be considered to be an exceptional circumstance. It will be a matter for judicial discretion, based on the facts of the individual case.
The clause enables an interested third party to make representations where their interest in the property came to light only after the Crown Court had made its original determination. Subject to the court’s consideration of any such representations, and to the outcome of any appeal, a determination made by the court is binding on the receiver. As I have said, in cases where there is no receiver appointed, any appeal will be dealt with by the Court of Appeal. This represents an equitable balance between the effective enforcement of confiscation orders and the important rights of third parties. On that basis, I beg to move that Clause 4 stand part of the Bill.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, that is very helpful. I commented to my noble friend when we discussed Part 1 that flow-charts might be quite useful. As he has described the sequence of events, it occurs to me that flow charts or some sort of fairly straightforward step-by-step explanation would be particularly helpful to third parties who get caught up in these proceedings. A defendant will be likely to have legal representation and advisers who can assist with what happens at what stage. A third party may suddenly find that he or she is affected and they ought to be able to find out what steps are available to make representations and how they should be made, without necessarily having to go to the expense of instructing lawyers themselves.
The right thing to do would be to make this user-friendly to people, about whom we should not assume any degree of guilt or their being reprehensible at all. I just use this opportunity to air that thought and of course I am not going to resist Clause 4.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
The three amendments in this group are concerned with recovering money from overseas or in response to such requests from overseas jurisdictions. Many investigations into stolen assets parked in this country do not get off the ground because the Home Office routinely fails to respond, or is unable to respond, to requests for help from other countries. The Home Office has shown in Parliamentary Answers that, despite UK courts freezing more than £200 million at the request of overseas jurisdictions, not a single penny of this has been repatriated to the country asking for the money. Since 2010, it seems that only two bilateral agreements have been signed with overseas jurisdictions to ensure co-operation on mutual legal assistance.
Last year, the former head of the UK financial intelligence unit—part of the National Crime Agency—indicated that when an investigation was initiated from the victim country, and moneys were suspected to be in the UK, the request went out through all the proper channels but there was no great keenness to comply, as there was a mindset that we could just be giving ourselves a headache. Assuming that is a fair analysis, such an approach does not help foster greater reciprocity at international level and cannot help us in securing co-operation when we want it from overseas jurisdictions. The Minister may well contest this analysis, since it suggests there are somewhat different reasons for the problem from those given in the Government’s impact assessment.
It would be helpful if the Minister could provide information on the number of asset recovery requests received from foreign authorities over the past three years, how many have been referred to investigative bodies and how many cases are pending. The World Bank estimates that, each year, developing nations lose between $20 billion and $40 billion through corruption. Between 1994 and 2009 only $5 billion of stolen assets were recovered globally—which is apparently less than 2% of the lowest estimate of the amount stolen, according to an analysis by the World Bank and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
Amendment 22 in this group requires the Secretary of State to set up,
“an independent review of the effectiveness”,
of our mutual legal assistance arrangements,
“with overseas jurisdictions in cases concerning the proceeds of crime”,
since the figures that are available, the comments made by people who have been on the inside and, indeed, the rather different causes of the problem that are set out in the Government’s impact assessment all strongly suggest that everything is not well. Criminals here also seek to hide their ill gotten gains overseas, and a significant proportion of unpaid Serious Fraud Office confiscation orders are thought to relate to funds located overseas. Criminals put their assets where the UK authorities find it hardest to recover them, which usually means a jurisdiction with which we have no standing mutual co-operation arrangements. Even where this is not the case, without mutual recognition of confiscation orders in the jurisdiction where the assets have been hidden, those charged with enforcing the orders effectively have to relitigate the issue abroad, which can be hard, slow and not very effective.
In Clause 7, proposed new Section 13A provides that in every confiscation case the court will be required to consider making an order to ensure that a confiscation order is paid. In particular, it will have to consider placing a “restriction or prohibition” on the defendant’s overseas travel to prevent that defendant travelling abroad to dispose of his or her assets. Perhaps we ought to consider going further. At the moment, there is nothing the courts can do about people who sell overseas property funded through proceeds of crime because it is in another jurisdiction. We consider that a court should be in a position to fine or jail someone, possibly by making it a contempt of court, if he disposes of property based overseas that is subject to a freezing or confiscation order. Amendment 2 provides for Clause 7, on compliance orders, to be amended to that effect.
We also consider that there should be a consultation on introducing a legal obligation to repatriate liquid assets that are subject to a restraining or confiscation order and which appear to have been moved overseas. Amendment 21 in this group provides for a consultation along these lines. I hope the Minister will be able to give a helpful response to the amendments in this group, since we are at one in seeking to make sure that crime does not pay.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, Amendment 2 relates to compliance orders. Under the provisions in Clause 7, the court will be required to consider making, in every confiscation case, any order it considers appropriate to ensure that a confiscation order is paid. Under the new order, the court will be able to impose any restrictions, prohibitions or requirements it believes appropriate to ensure that a defendant pays a confiscation order and that the order is effective. A compliance order will normally be made at the time that a confiscation order is granted. If the court determines that a compliance order is not necessary at that confiscation hearing, the prosecutor will be able to apply for an order any time afterwards as long as the confiscation order remains unpaid. This type of order is not new to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, as the Act already confers on the Crown Court the power to make any,
“such order as it believes is appropriate for the purpose of ensuring that the restraint order is effective”.
Amendment 2 would require the court to consider attaching to a compliance order a restriction on selling overseas property that is the subject of a confiscation order. It is, however, already possible to impose such a restriction as part of a restraint order, as the noble Lord will understand from what I have just said. A restraint order can be obtained at a significantly earlier stage in an investigation—for example, before the defendant has been charged. Such a restriction may also be added to a compliance order where there is no restraint order in place. As such, it is not necessary to make express provision for the court to consider such restrictions or prohibitions. The court already has that discretion. It is worth adding that, once a confiscation order has been made, it may be necessary to sell property to enable the order to be paid off. In high-value cases, this may fall to a court-appointed receiver. In addition, not all defendants will have assets overseas so it would not be necessary to require the court to consider imposing such a restriction in every case.
Amendment 21 seeks to confer on the court, when making a restraint or confiscation order, a power to require the defendant to repatriate liquid assets held abroad back to the UK. The Proceeds of Crime Act already allows the court to make any order that,
“it believes is appropriate for the purpose of ensuring that the restraint order is effective”,
as I have already said. That could include, for example, a requirement for liquid assets to be returned to the UK. Breach of the terms of a restraint order, including selling property that is frozen under the terms of the order, will be a contempt of court and, as such, punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to two years.
Finally, Amendment 22 calls for a review of mutual legal assistance. The movement of money and assets quickly across borders means that it is essential that the UK seeks the assistance of its international counterparts so that it can quickly freeze and recover the proceeds of crime, and it can likewise assist jurisdictions that ask the UK for assistance. Historically, international co-operation on asset recovery has been poor, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said. We depend on other countries to enforce our orders on our behalf, but these orders may not be given priority. Some countries are witting or unwitting safe havens for criminal assets.
Lord Rosser
I thank the Minister for his reply on this group of amendments. As I understand it, the Minister was saying that, as far as Amendments 2 and 21 are concerned, the current legislation already gives the power to do what is set out in those amendments—at least, I think that was the thrust of the Minister’s reply. Obviously, at least if I have understood the essence of his reply, I just wish to leave the matter in the context that clearly I will wish to read in Hansard the details of the Minister’s response.
On his response to the last issue, on mutual legal assistance, I am sure that the Minister will understand if I say that I will want to read it, since he gave some statistics and information on the current situation. I shall read that with interest when Hansard appears.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
The noble Lord asked me some questions about numbers, which I did not have to hand in my papers. I am willing to see whether I can find further information which I can give him, because I agree that it is an area where a modest improvement in performance could lead to considerable improvement in the amount of money that we recover.
Lord Rosser
I am grateful to the Minister for those comments. I suppose that part of the reason for my saying that I would want to see the detail of the figures that he gave was to see whether he had in fact responded to the questions that I asked, but if he, too, is going to look at that, and if there are parts to which he did not respond on which he will write to me, I will be grateful. In view of that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I have been trying to think of a nice adjective to describe the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey. I know that he did not really like me calling him mischievous. However, this amendment has been very worth while because it has enabled the House to discuss this matter. The noble Baroness is absolutely right; along with other noble Lords, I was not particularly aware of the working of this mechanism, so it has been useful to have this debate. The description the noble Lord, Lord Harris, gave of how the system works is absolutely right; it is dealt with under the asset recovery incentivisation scheme, ARIS, which was introduced in 2006 to replace the previous police incentivisation scheme.
The objective of the scheme is to provide law enforcement agencies with incentives to boost asset recovery as a contribution to reducing crime and delivering justice by giving them a direct stake in the proceeds they generate from that work. The speech by the noble Lord, Lord Deben, was very useful; I do not care whether his sentences are short or long, they are of high value. It was an extremely interesting contribution, as were the contributions of all noble Lords, including that of my noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury. They were very much to the point, because making the most of the potential of this money is really important. The scheme is a non-statutory mechanism which has advantages for returning to law enforcement, prosecution agencies and the courts a proportion of the assets they recover. Public bodies with the functions of an investigator, a prosecutor or an enforcement authority can use the powers within POCA to recover criminal assets and can become part of the scheme thereby.
It is also important to remember that the scheme does not just apply to money recovered under confiscation orders but also, as the noble Lord demonstrated, to assets recovered through the other routes to recover assets provided for in the Proceeds of Crime Act, such as the seizure and forfeiture of cash, the civil recovery scheme and the taxation of criminal proceeds. Under the existing scheme, for assets recovered by means of a confiscation order, the Home Office retains 50% of the recovery receipts and returns the remainder to investigation agencies, which receive an 18.75% share of the receipts, prosecution agencies, which also receive an 18.75% share of the receipts, and enforcement agencies—in most cases this is the Courts Service—which receive a 12.5% share of the receipts. For cases where cash has been forfeited under the cash seizure powers in the Proceeds of Crime Act, the Home Office retains 50% of the receipts and the investigative agency—in the majority of cases this is the police, but it is not always so—retains the other 50%.
The use to which each agency decides to put the money received under the scheme is a matter for that agency. Because amounts received through asset recovery are unpredictable, and given that it depends on the nature of the cases dealt with by each agency each year, we have not laid down any specific guidance on the use of such money. However, we have previously expressed a desire that the money should be reinvested in asset recovery work to drive up performance. I sense that noble Lords would feel that that is the right thing to do. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, made clear her support for the needs for resources to drive up performance. My noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury felt that that was a primary objective for this money. But also, when appropriate, it can fund local crime-fighting priorities on behalf of the benefit of the community.
The Home Office has monitored the scheme annually since its inception. The results of that monitoring show that more than 90% of money distributed through the scheme is reinvested in asset recovery work, such as the recruitment of financial investigators. If we get more money, we will be able to have more investigators—and I think that everybody can see that this vicious circle could be a virtuous circle, if we implement it correctly. As the noble Lord, Lord Harris, said, these investigators carry out the recovery work, and there is a balance that can be spent on police operations and community projects. Some examples of the community work that has been paid for include alcohol awareness and crime reduction projects, mentoring programmes and assistance for elderly and vulnerable people. The noble Lord, Lord Harris, gave a classic example of community work in the confiscation of money. His own field case, which he also mentioned, is a very good example.
Over the past three years, more than £238 million has been returned to front-line agencies. However, we believe that the proposed changes that are being made in the Bill will ensure that agencies are able to apply for and enforce more orders more successfully. This in turn should lead to more funds being received by front-line agencies through the scheme. The share of the money that is retained by the Home Office forms part of the department’s core budget line and, as such, is put towards the delivery of front-line services through mechanisms such as police grant.
One key objective of the Government’s criminal finances improvement plan, which was published on 19 June, is to ensure that the Asset Recovery Incentivisation Scheme works effectively for front-line agencies. It is with that in mind that the review has been set up, and we intend to complete it by the end of the year. I hope that it will please noble Lords to note that the emerging findings from the review will be presented to the board in September, so if this Bill takes its normal course we should be able to update the House on Report on how that review is going.
The noble Lord asked about the terms of the review. The whole purpose is to investigate the process and see how we can make it better. It is being developed with the aim of ensuring that the scheme works effectively for all agencies charged with asset recovery responsibilities. All will be involved. For example, the Local Government Association will be a consultee within the process, with anyone else who is currently involved in the asset recovery process.
I was asked—or rather, challenged, “Is it appropriate to leave an organisation for distributing money on this non-statutory basis, or should we consider a statutory alternative?.” I think that the debate has shown that there are ways of making the process work well without a statutory basis. But of course, that is the sort of thing that any review should properly consider.
I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Harris, will be generous and withdraw his amendment. We in our turn are grateful to him for giving us the opportunity of describing the working of ARIS, and the review that we have in mind.
Lord Harris of Haringey
I am grateful to the Minister for that response. I am also grateful to the other noble Lords who have contributed to this short debate, especially the noble Lord, Lord Deben, for his comments on hypothecation. I have always appreciated—although this may be a difficult thing for someone with his religious commitment to hear—that he is something of a heretic in such matters. His is a heresy that I share, in terms of making things happen, and in the belief that a bit of hypothecation can sometimes mean that we achieve results all over the place.
Some of the points that have been made require a moment’s clarification. I do not think that the identification of neighbourhoods, which the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, mentioned, is necessarily a problem. As the Minister has made clear, 90% of the money distributed through the incentivisation scheme is ploughed back into financial investigators; the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, also made that point. Only a small proportion goes beyond there, and the authorities concerned, whether they are local authorities or the police, make good use of it. I was involved with the board of the Safer London Foundation, which made very good use of the Proceeds of Crime Act moneys that the police received, in connection with local community projects around London. The authorities concerned spend a great deal of time in deciding what is and is not an appropriate use of those resources.
The important point behind the amendment is the need to think carefully about how we maximise the money recovered, and I hope the review will do that. I know that the Minister is part of a wing of the Government that is committed to the reduction of taxes, but in this context there is, essentially, a 50% tax, because the money goes into either the Home Office or the Treasury, depending on the precise route—although I rather suspect that the Home Office does not “feel” the money that comes back to it, because it all disappears into the Treasury and goes through into the main funding of the Home Office.
If 50% of the money is retained by the Home Office or the Treasury, there may be little incentive for the agencies concerned to pursue complicated financial investigations that are not essential to achieving a conviction but are additional to achieving a conviction. If the proportion distributed through the incentivisation scheme were higher, substantially more money might be recovered, because people would be incentivised, and would say, “This really is worth investing those resources in”. The Home Office and the Treasury might then find that they got more resources rather than less. I hope that the review will consider these issues, and I look forward to hearing—perhaps by Report—about its developing findings. On that basis I am happy to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Dear (CB)
My Lords, I rise to re-emphasise the wording of subsection (1) of the amendment:
“The Secretary of State must consult on ways to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of confiscation orders”.
For many years, and bearing in mind my previous service in the police and my contact with it since, I have been concerned that the prosecution authorities generally do not pursue property that is the subject of crime nearly as rigorously as they should. That has gone on for years, although all the agencies concerned will deny it. It is a fact, however. I could produce evidence from recent personal experience but will not weary the Committee with that, other than to say that the police have always been, and still are, judged on reducing crime and gaining convictions. The CPS is also judged on its ability to gain convictions. It is not judged, by and large, on its ability to chase back money and other property.
I simply endorse the main thrust of subsection (1) of the amendment. There must be ways in which the efficiency of those two organisations can be enhanced, not by rewarding them—although rewards are involved, I suppose, particularly in the reapplication of assets that we have been discussing—but simply by recognising that efficiency is not just detecting crime or getting convictions but also recovering property and money. When all is said and done, in the upper echelons of crime, in particular, the criminals are in it for the money. If the money is not chased, it is eventually there for them to use later when they come out of prison, or when they have paid off the fine or whatever else. This is a plea to underline the wording of subsection (1) of the amendment, which I endorse.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, this has been a short but very useful debate. I am pleased that the noble Baroness has reiterated that her objective in tabling these amendments has been to seek ways in which we can improve the effectiveness of recovery and confiscation of money. The noble Lord, Lord Dear, graphically described how important that is. It is perhaps true that there has been little focus by those who should be undertaking this task. There are two reasons why this mission is important: first, because money has frequently been taken from society and should be returned to it; and, secondly, if this money remains in the hands of criminals they will have every incentive to carry on with criminality as a way of life, and all the costs that it brings. That lies behind where we are on this. All these amendments are concerned with improving effectiveness, and I think that the whole Committee would support that notion. In dealing with these amendments I hope to show that the measures proposed in the Bill will address the issues that the noble Baroness raised. I am grateful to her for bringing them forward. Indeed, it is quite proper that we should consider their effectiveness.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, as we have already said today, under this Government around £746 million of criminal assets have been seized under POCA, which is more than ever before. Around 60% of confiscation orders for sums up to £500,000 are discharged within six months, but it is clear that we need to do more to ensure that confiscation orders, particularly the higher-value orders, are robustly enforced. That is what lies behind the measure that the amendments seek to address.
A key mechanism in POCA for incentivising prompt payment of confiscation orders is the availability of default prison sentences where somebody fails to pay. It is clear that for lower-value orders default sentences have the desired effect, with nearly 90% of orders under £1,000 being discharged. But at the other end of the spectrum, just over 18% of orders over £1 million are settled in full. There is anecdotal evidence that serious and organised criminals would rather spend a few extra years in prison in the knowledge that they can enjoy the fruits of their crimes when they come out. It is clear that we need to provide further incentives to persuade these hardened offenders to pay up. It is with that in mind that we are legislating. Clause 10 accordingly increases the length of default sentences for higher-value orders. For orders between £500,000 and £1 million, the maximum sentence is increased from five to seven years, while for orders over £1 million the maximum sentence will increase from 10 to 14 years.
In addition to increasing the maximum default sentences for higher-value orders, we have looked again at the early release arrangements. Current provisions allow for automatic release at the halfway point of a default sentence. Early release reinforces the view of certain offenders that a default sentence is worth serving in order to retain criminally acquired assets—I think that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, made the same assessment when introducing his amendments. Unconditionally releasing offenders at the halfway point of their default sentence seriously impairs the intended deterrent effect of the default sentence, particularly for the highest-value orders. So this clause will also end automatic early release for those serving a default sentence for failing to pay an order valued at over £10 million. The combined effect of these changes will mean that, in such a case, an offender will serve up to 14 years in prison rather than five years, as now. This is a significant increase which will make offenders think long and hard about serving the time rather than paying their confiscation order.
The noble Lord quite rightly asked why we set the threshold for ending early release at £10 million and not, let us say, at £1 million or £500,000, as Amendments 6 and 7 propose, or indeed at any other level. What is the rationale behind the Government’s decision? As I have said, evidence suggests—I have given figures earlier—that the existing default sentences do not have sufficient deterrent effect for the highest-value orders. We have therefore focused the changes made by Clause 10 on the upper end of the scale.
As a responsible Government, and as the noble Lord will know, we are committed to eradicating the deficit which we inherited from the previous Administration. We naturally took into account the potential cost of changes to the default sentencing arrangements. As we have set out in the financial effects section of the Explanatory Notes, the combined cost of the changes made by Clause 10, all other things being equal, is £1.78 million, or 60 prison places, by 2033. Ten of those extra prison places are attributable to the ending of early release for default sentences for confiscation orders of more than £10 million. The cost of these provisions should not be viewed in isolation. Elsewhere in the Bill, the new participation offence will cost some £6.6 million, including some 45 additional prison places.
I was intrigued by the arguments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. He seems to have reined in the Opposition’s ambitions, because the proposals put forward by the shadow Home Secretary and shadow Attorney-General as recently as May stated:
“Labour would end early release for criminals serving default sentences who refuse to pay”.
I wonder whether the noble Lord can tell us what the cost of such a proposal would be. If not, I can tell him. Again, if there was no change in offender behaviour, such a policy would require an additional 900 prison places, at a cost of some £25 million per annum by 2033, although the great majority of those costs would kick in by 2020. This of course assumes that the capacity will be available within current prison facilities. However, given the impact of this proposal, it is likely that further facilities will need to be provided, which will result in a considerably higher total cost. It is therefore reasonable to ask the noble Lord where the money would be found to fund the proposals as set down in his amendments.
We have made a judgment. Our view is that the changes made by Clause 10 represent a well judged package. It is our expectation that the increases in default sentences and the ending of early release will lead to a change in offender behaviour. Faced with 14 years in prison, rather than five as now, we believe that an offender with a confiscation order of more than £10 million will not be so ready to serve the time rather than pay up. Fourteen years is a long time in prison.
However, it would be prudent to test that proposition before we go further. That is why the clause contains two order-making powers. The first will enable us to change the structure of default sentences, including by further increasing maximum sentences and introducing minimum sentences. The second delegated power will enable us to lower the £10 million threshold for ending early release. We will keep the changes made by Clause 10 under close review, and if they are having the desired effect then we will not hesitate to exercise these order-making powers.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked whether the Government had considered alternatives to the £10 million threshold. The answer to that is yes. I do not propose to get into a debate about whether we considered this threshold or that. Suffice it to say that Ministers considered a range of options and came down in favour of the proposition in Clause 10. I can tell the noble Lord that we estimate that the cost of ending early release for orders of £500,000 and over would be approximately 180 prison places, costing an estimated £5 million per annum by 2033. Ending early release for orders worth £1 million and over would lead to an increase in the prison population of approximately 70 places by 2033, costing an estimated £2 million.
The Government have considered this carefully and concluded that it would not be appropriate to lower the threshold for ending automatic early release until it was proven that it resulted in improved payment and was an effective deterrent, and that it was affordable to do so. We therefore believe that the provisions in Clause 10 are the appropriate way forward, while building in flexibility for the future.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked about the Government’s attitude to the conclusion of the Delegated Powers Committee that it would be inappropriate to introduce minimum default sentences through secondary legislation. We are considering carefully the points made by the committee about this order-making power, and in doing so we will want to take into account the points that the noble Lord made in today’s debate. Accordingly, I cannot take up the noble Lord’s suggestion that I respond to the report today, but I can undertake to reply to the Delegated Powers Committee report in advance of the Bill’s Report stage in the autumn.
In view of that commitment and the fact that I have valued the opportunity to explain the way in which the Government arrived at our judgment to introduce the measures in Clause 10, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Rosser
I thank the Minister for his reply and for giving the information about the projected increase in the size of the prison population if the figure were £1 million or £500,000, and indeed what the increase would be if there were no threshold figure at all.
If the Minister thinks there has been a change in our policy, I shall put his mind at rest. I shall requote to him what I said in my contribution: our view is that criminals who do not meet the requirements of the default sentence for not paying the terms of a confiscation order by the due date should not be allowed out of prison early. That is our approach. I said it in my contribution. I also made it clear that our two amendments are probing amendments to find out why the Government believe that the threshold of £10 million is appropriate.
We shall consider what the Minister has said, but I think that with regard to the £1 million threshold he said that the figure was 70 additional places at a cost of £2 million; I think he said that for the £500,000 threshold the figure was 180 additional places at a cost of £5 million; and for no threshold the figure was 900 prison places at, I think he said, the cost of £25 million. I just want to ensure that I have understood correctly what he said.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I would like to reassure the noble Lord. I emphasise that I said that 10 of these extra places would be attributable to the ending of early release from default sentences for confiscation orders over £10 million. I actually said that as part of my presentation to the noble Lord.
Lord Rosser
But I think I am right in saying that the impact assessment assumes no change in the behaviour of the criminals concerned. I think, and perhaps the Minister will confirm this, that the figures he has given of an increase of, respectively, 70, 180 or 900 places and increased costs as a result also assume no change in criminal behaviour, and therefore no more money coming back in as a result of the ending of automatic release at the halfway point of a default sentence. A lot of people would find that an extremely unlikely assumption on which to base the impact assessment and the Minister’s figures.
However, I will leave it at that. I thank the Minister for the information and for his comment that we will have the Government’s response to the Delegated Powers Committee before Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, I am pleased that my noble friend Lady Hamwee has raised these issues. We do not take the impact of restraint orders lightly and we fully understand her points. However, these orders effectively freeze property to prevent it being dissipated before a confiscation order is made. This is important in effective use of the Proceeds of Crime Act. The property is then available to sell, which helps to satisfy a confiscation order which may subsequently be made.
The intention of the Proceeds of Crime Act was to introduce the ability to obtain a restraint order as early as possible in the investigation to remove any possibility that a criminal will become aware, as a result of the investigation, that their assets are at risk and so move or hide them. We have been discussing this for much of the afternoon. Restraint orders are, therefore, available from the earliest stages of a criminal investigation. As I have already said, and as my noble friend is aware, the current test for obtaining a restraint order in all circumstances is that there is a “reasonable cause to believe” that the alleged offender has benefited from his criminal conduct. This is a proportionate test in circumstances where a defendant has been charged and is being prosecuted. In this case there will be available evidence to meet the test of “belief”.
However, the operational experience of our criminal justice colleagues in relation to this issue has shown that, at the early stage of an investigation, it is very hard to prove belief. The reality is that at that stage of an investigation there may be limited evidence, simply because the investigation has not yet had time to gather it. It is notable—as the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, has said—that the number of restraint orders has fallen since 2010-11, despite the Government’s push for more asset recovery action. The number of restraint orders obtained had been increasing and reached a peak of nearly 2,000 in 2010-11 but has dropped every year since then, with fewer than 1,400 restraint orders being made last year.
Delaying the obtaining of a restraint order until there is sufficient evidence to meet the “reasonable cause to believe” test can provide suspected offenders with an opportunity to dissipate or hide their assets to protect them from seizure. The amendment we are making to POCA in the Bill therefore revises the test for restraint in the earliest stages to “reasonable grounds to suspect”—I emphasise “suspect”—that the alleged offender has benefited from his criminal conduct. It is also of note that the amendments include a requirement for the judge making the restraint order to set a date for the matter to be returned to the court so that it can consider whether sufficient progress has been made with the investigation or give reasons for not arranging such a hearing. This reflects current practice of the court when it makes a restraint order in the absence of the person who will be the subject of the order. Making the practice mandatory will ensure appropriate judicial oversight of restraint orders made during a criminal investigation.
It is important that the Committee understands that Clauses 11 and 31 are not breaking new legal ground. “Suspicion”, as opposed to ‘belief’, is a test in other similar matters. Within POCA itself, a judge has to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a defendant has benefited from their criminality in order to issue a production order. Also, under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, a police officer may arrest without a warrant anyone whom he or she has “reasonable grounds for suspecting” has committed an offence. So, at the early stages of a criminal investigation, it is appropriate that the court uses the threshold of suspicion, rather than belief. We think that this is a direct parallel supporting the amendment we are seeking to make in Clause 11.
This was one of the issues considered by the Joint Committee which undertook pre-legislative scrutiny of the Modern Slavery Bill. In its report, the Joint Committee made the following comment:
“It is imperative that law enforcement authorities should be able to freeze relevant assets at the earliest possible stage in an investigation, and rarely, if ever, more than 24 hours after arrest. We therefore strongly recommend that the test for obtaining a restraint order be amended to make it less stringent. We note that the Government has already committed to reducing the test from ‘reasonable cause to believe’ to ‘reasonable suspicion’. We approve of this formulation.”
I hope the Committee will do so too.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee asked what would happen if a defendant were able to make an application to a court to lift a restraint order. A court may discharge a restraint order, on application, where the investigation has not progressed to its satisfaction. That freedom is available to a defendant, who may also apply to the court to vary a restraint order. It must do so if the investigation has not progressed satisfactorily. I hope that noble Lords will be happy with my explanation and that my noble friend will be content to withdraw her amendment, in the light of my comments.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am glad to hear about the judicial discretion which might be applied. I would like to think that the reduction in the number of restraint orders or applications for them is because of a problem with the legislation and not something inherent in the new arrangements with, for instance, those concerned not directing their minds to the lower test. That can always be an issue and changing the test does not change it. I am, of course, happy to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
Amendment 19 would remove paragraph (b) of new subsection (7A) in Section 67 of POCA. Amendment 20 would make an order under this new subsection (7B) an affirmative order. Having had the benefit of a discussion with the Minister, I know what is meant by the phrases,
“money that is represented by”,
and “may be obtained from” as distinct from money actually obtained from. It was an interesting discussion, but it would useful to have the information on the record.
On the order which is required, what is proposed by the Government is quite significant, and it seems to me that an affirmative order would be more appropriate in this case. I beg to move.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, Clause 14 amends Section 67 of the Proceeds of Crime Act with a view to speeding up the confiscation of funds held in bank accounts. In addition, the clause enables, through secondary legislation, the powers in Section 67 to be updated to include other realisable cash-like financial products, such as share accounts and pension accounts that may be held by banks or other financial institutions.
Currently, seizure powers under Section 67 of POCA apply only to money in its traditional form held in an account with a bank or building society. Money can also take the form of, or be represented by, innovative financial products. This includes digital currencies whereby the user obtains goods or services by virtual means rather than a physical or electronic exchange of funds.
Currently, it is not possible to realise such instruments for the purposes of seizure under Section 67 of POCA. The extension of powers to encompass other financial products may require modifications to Section 67 to provide for such financial instruments or products to be converted into cash. The new subsection (7B) of Section 67, inserted by Clause 14(3), provides the power to make such modifications.
Clause 14(3) also applies to money that may be obtained from a financial product that is something other than a standard current or savings account. I shall give examples of this, and I am grateful to my noble friend for giving us the chance to put this on the record. An example of such a product would be a pension plan that has yet to mature but will pay an annuity and a lump sum on retirement. Other examples could include a share account or a virtual currency such as Bitcoin. Essentially, therefore, the clause provides for the capture and realisation of instruments with an economic value. I hope that that explains to my noble friend the use of the term “represented by” a financial instrument or product in Clause 14(3).
By virtue of Clause 14(5) an order made under new Section 67(7A) of POCA will be subject to the affirmative procedure. New Section 67(7B) simply amplifies the scope of the order-making power in new Section 67(7A)—it is not a second free-standing order-making power. I hope that I have made that clear. Accordingly, it is not necessary to refer to new Section 67(7B) in Clause 14(5). That being the case, I hope that my noble friend will agree that her amendment is, strictly speaking, unnecessary. However, it has served a useful purpose in that I have been able to explain the purpose of the provisions in Clause 14. In the light of that explanation, I hope that my noble friend will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am afraid that it occurred to me only while I listened to my noble friend’s explanation that I have not pursued the issue, where it is digital currency or an annuity under a pension plan, of how that will be assessed in cash terms at the point when the cash needs to be calculated. I assume that that must be somewhere else in the legislation—probably in existing legislation. However, that is an issue. We heard recently about how bitcoins are fluctuating in value. Therefore the point at which the calculation is made is very important. Also, we all know that there are issues around the value of an annuity. Therefore I realise, listening to my noble friend, that there is a lot more to this to be thought about than I am afraid I had thought about. Of course, I will beg leave to withdraw the amendment at this point, but—
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I will willingly write to my noble friend. I am not in a position to be able to tell her the process of valuation of those things from the Dispatch Box today, but I am sure that it would be of interest to the House to know how those valuations occur. I do not suppose that that is the only circumstance in which those things have to be valued.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am grateful for that; I did not seek to put my noble friend on the spot today. However, as I said, there is a lot more to that than might appear in the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“Conditions for exercise of search and seizure powers
(1) In section 127B of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (conditions for exercise of powers), in subsection (2)(d), for “is reasonable cause to believe” substitute “are reasonable grounds to suspect”.
(2) In section 127G of that Act (“appropriate approval”), before paragraph (b) of subsection (3) insert—
“(ab) in relation to the exercise of a power by a National Crime Agency officer, the Director General of the National Crime Agency or any other National Crime Agency officer authorised by the Director General (whether generally or specifically) for this purpose,”.”
“Conditions for exercise of search and seizure powers
(1) In section 195B of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (conditions for exercise of powers), in subsection (2)(d), for “is reasonable cause to believe” substitute “are reasonable grounds to suspect”.
(2) In section 195G of that Act (“appropriate approval”), before paragraph (b) of subsection (3) insert—
“(ab) in relation to the exercise of a power by a National Crime Agency officer, the Director General of the National Crime Agency or any other National Crime Agency officer authorised by the Director General (whether generally or specifically) for this purpose,”.”
“(5B) In the case of money held in an account not maintained by the person against whom the confiscation order is made, a magistrates’ court—
(a) may make an order under subsection (5) only if the extent of the person’s interest in the money has been determined under section 160A, and(b) must have regard to that determination in deciding what is the appropriate order to make.”