Baroness Smith of Basildon
Main Page: Baroness Smith of Basildon (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Smith of Basildon's debates with the Home Office
(10 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberI shall also speak to Clause 2 stand part and Amendment 8, which says that there should be a consultation on whether the court can require full disclosure from a suspect of his or her assets and liabilities. Amendment 13, to Clause 11, provides the court with the power when making a restraint order to require the defendant to provide specific information, particularly concerning his and any third-party interests in property. Amendment 14, also to Clause 11, has a similar intent.
As I said at Second Reading, we support many of the measures in the Bill because they address the issues that we agree should be addressed. The role of this Committee is now to examine whether the proposals brought forward in the Bill fully address the problems that have arisen and become evident, or if more can be done to tackle the specific problem of improving enforcement. As I said then, nothing brings the law into disrepute more than poor enforcement of a law. I know that the Minister agrees with me on that point.
It is relevant here to say something about the background and to set the clauses and amendments in context. In 2002, the then Labour Government introduced the Proceeds of Crime Act with new powers for the police, prosecutors and courts to freeze and confiscate the assets of criminals. It was innovative and ground-breaking, providing a wide range of civil and criminal recovery methods, but the use of the legislation and the changes over time have revealed its limitations. Improvements can be made.
The National Audit Office has issued a highly critical report on confiscation orders. It found that only 26p in every £100 of criminal profits was ever confiscated and that the total amount of outstanding debt on confiscation orders is £1.46 billion, a shocking level. In addition, the cost of recovering these ill gotten gains is very high. The estimate from the National Audit Office is that investigation, prosecution and enforcement costs 76p in every pound collected. The value to the Government is just £31 million and just 2% of offenders paid in full. The amount collected and the number of confiscation orders and restraint orders has fallen in recent years, as identified by the National Audit Office report. There is now a seriously worrying trend with the number of orders falling and the outstanding amount of debt increasing. It is clear that some criminals are running rings around the system and making a mockery of what we want to see, which is that crime does not pay.
Another factor in addressing the issue is the age of austerity, although I dislike the phrase. Police and prosecutors are finding it tough. They are having difficulties with resources and need to make greater use of the proceeds of crime as a source of income. We need to examine the reasons why the system has become so ineffective. The reasons are varied—there is no one particular reason—but it is clear that the evidential threshold for freezing a suspect’s assets is very high; criminals often move their money overseas; confiscation orders can be an afterthought; and the penalties for non-payments are not enough of a deterrent. It is also clear that there is a lack of leadership and a lack of strong incentives for the agencies involved in applying for and enforcing confiscation orders.
Are the measures proposed adequate and the best we can do to address this problem or can we be more effective? We have tabled a number of amendments to address these issues. The reason for tabling clause stand part debates—as the Minister knows, since I discussed this with him—is to allow for a slightly wider debate. We consider that there is room for improvement in the Bill and the Minister may be able to provide the reassurances we seek. This first group of amendments regards third-party claims. I stress that they are all probing amendments. As I say, although we have tabled clause stand part debates, we are clearly not opposed to Clauses 1 and 2. If the Bill goes far enough on third-party claims, will the Government go far enough to ensure early disclosure? There are three further amendments on the same theme, but slightly different. I hope that through these amendments we can probe the issue in debate and get a response from the Minister on the substance and ideas, rather than on the specific wording. We are not wedded to any particular form of words—it is the issues that we would like to discuss further.
My Lords, may I ask the noble Baroness whether subsection (2) of the proposed new clause will be adequate to force the person concerned to reveal assets owned by a company that they own? Today, the classic way of avoiding liabilities is to have a series of companies that own each other, and I am anxious in case the wording would not require the person who is required to give information to provide information on all the companies in a string of corporations.
I am not sure which amendment the noble Lord is referring to.
I beg the noble Baroness’s pardon. I am referring to Amendment 8, which would insert the proposed new clause entitled, “Restraint order: determination of extent of defendant’s property”. I mentioned in particular proposed new subsection (2), which would require the suspect to disclose,
“the full extent and location of his or her assets and liabilities”.
I am concerned that that would require someone to disclose only the fact that they have, for example, a company in the Netherlands Antilles, but not the fact that that company is owned by another company, and so on.
My understanding is that it would require that information, because it asks for,
“his or her assets and liabilities”.
However, if there is any deficiency in the wording I would be happy to see an amendment tabled to make that point even clearer.
My Lords, I was expecting that we might have a longer debate on this issue—but it is good to see that there is much agreement about the need to strengthen the effectiveness of the Proceeds of Crime Act. It is good that the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, shares the Government’s views on that necessity, and I welcome her speech.
As we have heard, Clauses 1 and 2, and Amendments 8, 13 and 14, all deal with the determination by a court of the extent of a defendant’s interest in named property. By extension, the provisions also deal with any third-party interests in the relevant property. The Serious and Organised Crime Strategy sets out a number of proposals to strengthen the Proceeds of Crime Act by, among other things, ensuring that criminal assets cannot be hidden with spouses, associates or other third parties.
Confiscation orders are the principal method used by law enforcement agencies for the recovery of the proceeds of crime. It is open to the defendant to pay off the order from whatever assets he or she has available. A confiscation order specifies the amount to be paid; it does not itemise particular assets that are to be forfeited. Third parties making claims on assets that are part of the available amount can delay satisfaction of confiscation orders. These claims also reduce the amount of money available for recovery, as the noble Baroness said. Of course, some of these claims may be perfectly legitimate but others will be spurious, designed simply to frustrate the confiscation process.
To tackle such abuses, which were clearly described by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and to help speed up the confiscation process, Clause 1 confers on the court a power to make a determination as to the extent of the defendant’s interest in particular property at the confiscation hearing. Currently, any claims on property are dealt with at the enforcement stage, which can complicate, lengthen and impede the confiscation process. Clause 2 augments the provisions in Clause 1 by introducing a requirement, as part of the confiscation process, for the prosecutor and defendant to detail any known third-party interest in property associated with the defendant in their statement of information and provision of information respectively.
Amendments 8, 13 and 14, tabled by the noble Baroness, seek to bring the determination of third-party interests forward in time even further to the commencement of a criminal investigation or to the point at which a restraint order is made. The amendments also seek to impose on the defendant the obligation to disclose the extent and location of their assets and any third-party interests in those assets. Under Amendment 8, a failure fully to comply would be a criminal offence.
To protect legitimate third-party interests, the provisions in the Bill afford third parties who have, or may have, an interest in the property the right to make representations to the court about the extent of their interest. The right to make representations also extends to the defendant. This will allow the court to consider the evidence presented, assess its credibility and come to a decision.
There are currently no express provisions for the court to deal with any third-party interests in any of the property that the court takes into account when determining the amount of a confiscation order. The legislation does, however, make provision for third parties to make representations where they have been affected by a restraint order. Third parties also have the right to make representations when an enforcement receiver is appointed by the court. Enabling a court to make a determination on a defendant’s interest in property at the earlier confiscation stage will strengthen the operation of the asset recovery process by closing loopholes in the Act that allow third parties to delay the confiscation process.
We do not consider that it is appropriate to bring the determination of third-party interests back to the restraint stage or, indeed, earlier, as is proposed in the noble Baroness’s amendments. Not all defendants will be made subject to a restraint order. For example, where a defendant owns only a house in the UK, it may not be cost-effective to apply for a restraint order when it can take time to sell a house. The relevant law enforcement agency would be made aware of any attempt to sell the property without the need for a restraint order.
Moreover, not all restraint orders lead to confiscation orders. If the subject of a restraint order is not convicted, the restraint order will be discharged. In such cases, it would be a wasteful use of limited judicial and prosecutorial resources to require the court to make a determination as to third-party interests in restrained property. It is for these reasons that the Bill provides for third-party claims to be considered at the confiscation hearing stage.
None the less, third parties may have an interest in restrained assets, and in such cases it would be appropriate for the court to be able to assess such claims—for example, if a third party contests a restraint order on the grounds that it is freezing property wholly owned by that person rather than by the defendant. Therefore, on the face of it Amendment 13 might be beneficial, in that it would confer a power for the court to order the defendant to provide information at any time under a restraint order.
Specifically, the court would be able to require the defendant to provide details of any third-party interests in property. However, this power is already available to the court under the existing restraint order provisions. The court can make any order it believes is appropriate to ensure that a restraint order is effective. This would include a power to order the defendant to provide information, including information concerning his or her and any third-party interest in property. It can be done at restraint order stage. Where a restraint order is not in place, a defendant can be made subject to the provisions of a disclosure order under the investigation powers that are in Part 8 of POCA. Such an order can be made at the start of a confiscation investigation and compel a defendant to answer questions or disclose information specified in the notice.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation. However, I will also say that I am disappointed. I have sat in his place, albeit in the other place, and I know that he will have a folder that contains my amendments with bold print at the bottom that says “Resist”. We have all been there. However I had hoped that with this Bill, where there is such a large amount of agreement between us on the objectives that we seek, there might be a little chink that would allow the Minister to open the door a little and say that this is something that we can look at and discuss. These amendments are not proposed in order to oppose what the Minister has said, as I have made clear. I do not doubt that the proposals before us in the Bill are better than the current situation; they improve on it. But are they the best that we can do?
I will withdraw my amendments today, but I ask the Minister to reflect further. His impact assessment refers to the delay in the process of identifying third-party claims as one of the reasons that some criminals are able to maximise, shall we say, the assets that they can hold onto. I hope that between now and Report the Minister and his officials will reflect further on the points that I have made today and understand why I proposed them, which was merely and only to seek to do things, not just better, but as best we can.
My Lords, I, too, will speak, albeit briefly, with some words of caution about this amendment. I do not think anybody could resist the seductive arguments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, on the need to fund programmes. However, at present the asset recovery incentivisation scheme allows agencies to get back 50% of what they recover from the Home Office. That scheme is flexible in its application, and allows the money to be spent to drive up asset recovery and, where appropriate—those words are important—to fund local crime-fighting priorities for the benefit of the community. I know that the intention of the noble Lord was entirely benevolent and helpful; his example of Latin-teaching in Hillingdon as a sort of cheerleader for the Secretary of State for Education demonstrated that. However, the words “where appropriate” are extremely important.
If one looks at the wording of the noble Lord’s amendment, it is prescriptive. It provides for a three-way split of the proceeds for reinvestment in the communities and neighbourhoods affected by the relevant criminal action. There are no ifs, no buts, and no discretion. Sometimes that would work, and sometimes not. My noble friend Lady Hamwee referred to a situation relating to drugs where it would not. However, that is also true, in spades, of something like insider dealing. That is and should be a crime, but there is no classic victim in the personal sense. The victim, if anything, is the Stock Exchange or the City of London. Under this amendment, we might find that the noble Lord is funding the livery companies or Mansion House. I am sure that he does not intend that, but there is a danger with the way in which the amendment is phrased.
Therefore I have great sympathy with what he seeks to do. However, given that a review is being conducted at the moment, the appropriate thing is to wait to see what that review throws up. I also look forward to hearing what the Minister says about that review. Then would be the time to look at this to see how we can get more money used in crime-fighting rather than by means of something as prescriptive as is the wording of this amendment, which has no discretion at all.
My Lords, I have noticed, in debates on Home Office legislation, that my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey seems to attract adjectives. In the previous Bill we looked at he was described by the Minister as being “mischievous”, and today the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, described him as “beguiling” and the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, described him as “seductive”. I dread to think where we will go as the debate continues.
The issues the noble Lord raises are interesting and go to the heart of transparency on this issue, which is about how we want to engage the public and for them to understand what happens to money brought in by the Government. The noble Lord, Lord Deben, made an interesting point on hypothecation, which comes down to trust. The public want to know not just where their taxes go but what happens to money that is brought into the Government.
I was struck by my noble friend Lord Harris’s examples from the education sector. I was not aware of those examples; I do not know whether the Minister was aware before taking the Bill forward. If neither he nor I were aware, were his officials aware? Who does know what happens? This amendment does us a great service, serving to remind us that we have a duty to make this clear to the public. If we are trying to engage them in support of legislation that involves confiscation, fines, et cetera, there is an obligation on Governments and on Parliament to ensure that the public are aware of where that money goes. I hope that the Minister will take some of those comments on board and that it is something that we can return to, in terms of a wider public understanding of what happens to the money and how it is used for the public benefit. That comes to the heart of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Deben, and by the amendment of my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey.
My Lords, in moving Amendment 4, I wish to speak also to Amendments 9, 11 and 12. Amendments 4 and 9 are similar: both require a consultation on ways to strengthen confiscation orders and restraint orders respectively. Amendment 11 addresses the disposal of assets. At present, one of the conditions of obtaining a restraint order is for the prosecution to show that there is a real risk that the defendant will dissipate his or her assets. These amendments would remove this requirement. As regards Amendment 12, although restraint orders are ex parte, many defendants then appeal against the orders and incur significant defence costs. If they win the appeal, their costs are reimbursed by the state. However, these can be high and can act as a disincentive for prosecutors to get a restraint order in the first place. Our amendments propose that any costs recoverable by the defendant would have to be capped at legal aid rates. These amendments seek to strengthen the confiscation and restraint orders. All these issues are linked. Indeed, I think that all the issues we are debating today around the proceeds of crime are linked, but this matter is at the very core of the process.
In its report, the National Audit Office said that the confiscation of criminal assets is “just not working at the moment”. Amyas Morse, the head of the National Audit Office, also said that,
“The use of confiscation orders to deny criminals the proceeds of their crimes is not proving to be value for money … nor … a credible deterrent to crime”.
That is a pretty sorry state of affairs and one which this Bill and the debates we are having in your Lordships’ House should seek to address. Whatever the reasons for that situation, those criticisms place a duty on your Lordships’ House to address the problem, to see whether legislative changes are needed and to question whether the law as it stands is being effectively and properly enforced, as the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, who is no longer in his place, said a moment ago. When criminals get to keep £99.74 in every £100, there is clearly a significant problem and it is right that this should be addressed and we support the Government on that.
In 2012-13, 6,392 confiscation orders were made, seeking the return of £318 million from a total pot, as it were, of £1.6 billion that had been illegally acquired. Eventually, only about £133 million was recovered and, although there are still some outstanding debts, the amount recovered will not rise significantly above that figure. I am curious and concerned about that issue. I hope that the Minister will comment on that and give an assurance that this issue has not been deprioritised by the Government. I hope that the Minister will also comment on the reasons why we have seen a slight reduction in the number of confiscation orders, which compounds the problem of getting money off the criminals once the orders have been issued. As I said, in 2012-13, only 6,392 orders were made, down slightly from 6,431, whereas we might have expected to see an increase in that figure.
However, this is not about just the number of orders; the most crucial point is compliance with the orders. I welcome the fact that there are now moves afoot to remedy this situation, close some of the loopholes and strengthen compliance with confiscation orders. However, I made a similar point in the earlier debate on third-party claims—namely, given the scale of the problem we are facing, can we not think bigger about this and try to do better? In our previous debate, the Minister said that the situation had improved. However, I put it to him that, if we are looking to improve matters, we should do the best we can, seek to be as strong as we can and close any loopholes.
I wish to address a number of issues. The first is the time limits for payments. The Proceeds of Crime Act currently provides that a confiscation order is payable immediately upon the making of the order unless a defendant can show that there are exceptional circumstances why this should not be the case, in which case they are given up to 12 months to pay, as we heard earlier. We recently highlighted the problems with this blanket approach. Some assets—this was referred to in an earlier debate and the Minister reaffirmed this—for example, money in bank accounts, are much easier to realise than other assets, which simply increases the likelihood of the defendant distributing or hiding their assets.
We are grateful to the Government for taking those points on board and for proposing action on this matter. Clause 5 now makes it clear that the full amount ordered to be paid must be paid on the day on which the order is made unless the court is satisfied that the defendant is unable to do so and includes a restriction on the circumstances under which an extension can be granted. That is welcome and there was a helpful explanation on that earlier. We also welcome the fact that Clause 7 requires the court to consider making an order that it considers appropriate to ensure that the confiscation order is paid. As discussed earlier, this includes placing a ban on overseas travel.
However, we want to probe other ways in which confiscation orders can be strengthened. Our amendment calls for a consultation on this. I hope that the noble Lord will be more sympathetic towards our proposals, given that we are proposing consultation. The areas that we would like to look at concern whether the court should be able to compel a suspect to return to the UK any realisable asset that is located overseas, to jail or fine someone who sells property that is subject to a confiscation order or to require a defendant to disclose any interests in property. Of course some of this touches on issues that have already been discussed. We would also welcome discussions on other ways to improve the orders; the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, earlier raised the issue of an individual’s assets being owned by a company that owns a company that owns a company, so that they are hidden in a labyrinth of financial dealings.
One way of strengthening the system generally is to strengthen restraint orders. The effect of a restraint or freezing order is to freeze the assets of a defendant, so preventing them from dissipating all or some of their assets before a confiscation order is made. Investigators and prosecutors agree that this is the most critical stage of the process. Early freezing of assets, at the outset of an investigation, minimises the risk that assets will be dissipated or disposed of. However, according to the National Audit Office, the number of restraint orders secured by prosecutors is falling sharply. I quote from the NAO report:
“Only 1,368 restraint orders were imposed in 2012-13, down 27 per cent from 1,878 in 2010-11. Many stakeholders believe opportunities for successful restraints are being missed and that the Crown Prosecution Service is too cautious in applying for restraint orders”.
The report also outlines that:
“Throughout the criminal justice system there is insufficient awareness of proceeds of crime and its potential impact. Within law enforcement and prosecution agencies, few officers and staff have good understanding about proceeds of crime legislation. In many cases effective powers, such as restraint orders, are applied late or not used at all, and specialist financial investigators are introduced to cases when audit trails have already run cold”.
Given that such orders can be applied for as soon as a criminal investigation is started, that would seem to address the problem. However, the current test is too high, because it must be shown that there is reasonable cause to believe that a defendant has benefited from his or her criminal conduct and that there is a risk that assets may be dissipated. Earlier this year, we called for the threshold needed to gain a restraint order to be lowered, with the onus to be placed on the suspect to show why assets should not be restrained, rather than on the investigating agency.
We therefore welcome the fact that Clause 11 reduces the test from “reasonable cause to believe” to “reasonable grounds to suspect” that a defendant has benefited from their criminality, which aligns it with the test for an arrest under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The Bill also provides that a restraint order can be kept in place against a defendant for a reasonable period between the quashing of a conviction and the start of the proceedings for a retrial, and it closes the loophole that the restraint order is removed while the retrial proceedings are commenced, during which time the defendant’s assets are at risk of being dissipated.
However, the amendment that we have tabled today goes further than this, as we think that it should be up to the defendant, not the prosecution, to establish that there is no risk of dissipation. Alison Saunders from the CPS referred to this in her evidence to the Public Accounts Committee, saying that it was,
“quite a high test to look at”.
Another issue, of course, is the cost to the CPS. One of the key things raised to us by practitioners is that when an application is unsuccessful—particularly on appeal, as the original is often ex parte—the prosecution is liable for the legal costs of the defendant. Given that the CPS is undergoing cuts of 27% to its budget during the course of this Parliament, prosecutors understandably want to minimise the risk of expensive failure. Alison Saunders alluded to this also in her evidence. We have therefore tabled other amendments that do the same thing. Because they are probing amendments, we are not wedded to the wording but the intent is to try to tackle the disincentive. We are suggesting that a defendant should be able to recover costs only at a legal aid rate. It may be that that is covered by the LASPO Act but we wanted to raise this issue because it has often been raised with us. We are aware that there is a problem, and there is a way of dealing with this. Of course, there is unfairness in requiring an individual who has succeeded in setting aside a restraint order to pay his or her costs, but the alternative is to put all the cost risk on to the prosecutor. Capping costs at legal aid levels, as happens in other cases, could help lessen the disincentive to tackling large-scale restraint orders.
It would be helpful if the Minister could give a view on that. I hope that he will not just refer to his notes and resist the amendments because the whole purpose of Committee—I hope he understands the tone with which we have approached this—is not just to do better but to do the best we can. If he cannot accept these amendments, I hope that he will take them away and perhaps discuss this issue further with us, so we do not continue a situation in which we are unable to get at assets because they have been taken out of the country or removed and defendants do not come forward to say what their assets are. There is a way to deal with this and I hope the Minister can respond positively to these amendments. I beg to move.
My Lords, I rise to re-emphasise the wording of subsection (1) of the amendment:
“The Secretary of State must consult on ways to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of confiscation orders”.
For many years, and bearing in mind my previous service in the police and my contact with it since, I have been concerned that the prosecution authorities generally do not pursue property that is the subject of crime nearly as rigorously as they should. That has gone on for years, although all the agencies concerned will deny it. It is a fact, however. I could produce evidence from recent personal experience but will not weary the Committee with that, other than to say that the police have always been, and still are, judged on reducing crime and gaining convictions. The CPS is also judged on its ability to gain convictions. It is not judged, by and large, on its ability to chase back money and other property.
I simply endorse the main thrust of subsection (1) of the amendment. There must be ways in which the efficiency of those two organisations can be enhanced, not by rewarding them—although rewards are involved, I suppose, particularly in the reapplication of assets that we have been discussing—but simply by recognising that efficiency is not just detecting crime or getting convictions but also recovering property and money. When all is said and done, in the upper echelons of crime, in particular, the criminals are in it for the money. If the money is not chased, it is eventually there for them to use later when they come out of prison, or when they have paid off the fine or whatever else. This is a plea to underline the wording of subsection (1) of the amendment, which I endorse.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for taking the time to address, in order, the points I made—and perhaps some that I did not make. I think I was very clear that the initial restraint order hearing is ex parte. That is not what I was suggesting in terms of costs; it was the appeal, which can involve significant costs. Again, with regard to the test for restraint orders—“reasonable grounds to suspect” rather than “reasonable cause to believe”—I suggested that we were quite happy and supportive of the Minister in that. That is a later amendment, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.
I will read Hansard carefully and look again at what the Minister said. I am disappointed that he seemed to be saying that he will not consider our amendments, other than the final one on capping, not because they are not worthwhile and not worth pursuing but because the Government are making improvements to the legislation. As the noble Lord, Lord Dear, said—I hope he will forgive me for saying that he speaks from experience on these matters; from the right end of the law, not the wrong end of the law, I hasten to add—there are cases where the law has not been enforced as effectively as we would like. The consultation the Minister spoke of—he rejected our suggestion of having further consultation on this issue—would help draw out some of the issues that the noble Lord, Lord Dear, and I addressed.
I repeat that we are not suggesting for one second that what the Government are proposing in the Bill does not improve the position. We are just saying that we think consideration should be given to improving it further—we could do better. We should do the best we can, not just aim for an improvement. It would be disappointing if the Minister was to leave this debate without thinking that he could reflect on the points we had made, to make the Bill as tight as it can be and ensure that those who gain from criminal activities are not allowed to keep as much of their ill gotten gains as they are at present.
I listened carefully to what the Minister said. I did not quite understand how some of it addressed the points I had raised. I will read Hansard carefully and make a decision on whether or not we wish to bring some of these matters back on Report for further consideration by your Lordships’ House. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.