Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage
Wednesday 2nd March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

I have two amendments in this group, but they are quite distinct from what has been debated so far and distinct from each other. One is concerned with Clause 32(5) and the other concerns Clause 36(1). Because the amendment to Clause 32(5) is a manuscript amendment tabled only today, if I may, I shall start with that to Clause 36(1), because your Lordships will be familiar with the background to that.

Clause 36(1) seeks to define, for the purposes of the convention, the meaning of coming “directly” to the United Kingdom from a country of persecution. The same definition was relevant to Clause 11, because that cross-refers to the provisions of Clause 36, so we have in Clause 36 as a matter of proposed domestic legislation and as a matter of interpretation of Article 31 of the convention the same definition of arriving “directly”. Your Lordships will recall that the issue was whether, as the Government contend, if an asylum seeker passes through an intermediate state on the way to the United Kingdom from the place of persecution—through a place considered to be somewhere they ought reasonably to have applied for refugee status—they have not come “directly”. In fact, the only way they could come directly, if they are surrounded by other countries—Ukraine is a good example—would be to fly.

The House rejected that definition, because it accepted the amendment to remove Clause 11. It expressly rejected that definition of arriving “directly”. Amendment 46 simply takes out the corresponding provision in Clause 36(1), which was incorporated in Clause 11 but would otherwise simply remain at large but, so far as I can see, would have no relevance whatever to anything else in the Bill. If I am wrong on that and there is some purpose in retaining Clause 36(1), although that interpretation of arriving “directly” was rejected by the House when it approved the removal of Clause 11, the House would want to know what it is being retained for: why it is being retained and in relation to what other provisions in the Bill. My amendment would remove Clause 36(1) from the Bill.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

This is another of those occasions when saying “From these Benches, we support” and not much more must not be taken as any lack of support for all the amendments in this group, nor any dilution of the points made.

I just want to register concern about Clause 32(2). The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, spoke to this and I record our support, particularly for the amendment that deals with what is meant by “a particular social group”: that you do not qualify unless the group in question is perceived as being different by surrounding society. As has been pointed out to noble Lords in briefings, a trafficked woman would need to show not only that her status as a trafficked woman is an innate characteristic but that trafficked women as a group are perceived as having a distinct identity in the country of origin. That is very difficult to show. Judged by the perceptions of the society in her country? It would be very challenging to find objective evidence on that, and on that being a distinct group. It is very dangerous to suggest that one can tell those things by looking—or, rather more accurately, perceiving.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I spoke at some length on the legal aspects of this group of clauses in Committee and, having had the advantage of being able to indicate an overall view of them in the newspapers earlier in the week, I really do not want to try the patience of the House, and I certainly do not want to weaken rather than strengthen the number of compelling arguments that have already been heard on them in the past few minutes.

However, they are such objectionable clauses that I cannot simply remain silent. I do not criticise the Minister for this, I am a great admirer of his, but on Monday, at 5.49 pm, in the middle of the debate, we finally got a seven-page letter that sought to argue—if only I were still a judge and could deal with the arguments conclusively by rejecting them—the Government’s case for redefining the requirements of the convention.

When we come to Clause 31, the Minister, very fairly, recognises that it would overturn 25 years—a quarter of a century—of settled jurisprudence of the clearest authorities in this country. That is how we have been dealing with it for 25 years. He does not say that it was a wrong approach to the convention; all he argues—as I say, I do not accept it—is that what they are doing provides another possible interpretation of the convention. Is this really the moment at which to reject our established jurisprudence and substitute for it what may or may not—I would say not—be an arguable alternative view of the whole of this.

Clause 31 rejects what has been accepted as the holistic approach: you look at fundamental question arising under Article 1(A) of the convention in the round, you take all circumstances into consideration and you apply the standard of proof of reasonable likelihood—because heaven knows that is the standard which you should be using. You do not carve it up and create endless difficulties, and then say, “Well, actually, part of it has got to be on the balance of probabilities”.

I have quoted this before, and I will end with this: Hugo Storey, a recently retired judge of the Upper Tribunal who has spent his life dealing with these sorts of cases and is the immediate past president of the International Association of Refugee and Migration Judges, said that this clause would produce prodigious litigation and endless problems, and that it is not compliant with the way that the UNHCR wants Clause 31 to be applied. I will not go into the arguments on Clauses 32, 34 and 36—they are all objectionable, for the reasons already given. We really must vote down as many of these as we can.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage
Monday 28th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I do not want to take the time of the House other than to say, with thanks for the letter, that I hope the Minister will accept that discretionary registration is qualitatively different from automatic citizenship, which is what we have been seeking, and understand my concern that the letter uses terms such as addressing

“exceptional cases in a flexible and proportionate way”.

This is vaguer than one would wish to see and a situation which I am sure is nobody’s fault but one of those unintended consequences of legislation not aligning.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, has reached agreement with the Government. I wish I could say the same.

I will speak to Amendment 21 to Clause 10, which requires the Secretary of State to be satisfied that a child aged between five and 17 cannot reasonably acquire another nationality in order to be registered under the stateless child provisions. The Government allege that parents were deliberately not registering the birth of their children and acquiring citizenship of the parents’ home country to wrongly claim British citizenship, by falsely claiming their children were stateless. We believe this clause should be taken out of the Bill.

In Committee the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, provided, at column 548, figures of five cases of this route being used in 2010, which peaked at 1,775 cases in 2018. The Minister concluded “I rest my case”, but this raised further questions: for example, were those 1,775 cases in 2018 the number of stateless children born in the UK who were granted British citizenship in total, legitimately or otherwise, or the number where parents had deliberately chosen not to register their child’s birth to take advantage of the system? The Minister assumed it was the latter but said that she would write, and she did so on Friday.

In Committee, I specifically asked the noble Baroness whether the 1,700 odd cases in 2017 that she referred to were the total number of stateless children granted UK citizenship, or the number of cases of deliberate abuse of the system that Clause 10 purports to tackle. The Minister replied:

“I assume … the latter, but I will write to the noble Lord with the details of the figures I have here”.—[Official Report, 27/1/22; col. 550.]


However, when the Minister wrote, the figures in the letter do not equate to those she gave from the Dispatch Box. Neither is there an answer to the question: of those cases, how many were a deliberate—or even a suspected—case of abuse of the system?

The letter goes on to talk about the sampling of over 200 stateless child applications received between 2015-2021, which on my calculations is about 1% of the applications received. It goes on to say that, in 96% of the sample, the parents were Indian or Sri Lankan and then:

“90% of Indian and Sri Lankan parents had been able to take steps to contact the High Commission to obtain a letter to show their child was in fact not a citizen of that country”


and, in brackets:

“(We do not have data on how many actually attempted to register the birth)”.





In summary, we have numbers in the letter that appear to be at odds with what the Minister said at the Dispatch Box, we have a sample of only 1% of all applications and we do not know how that sample was selected. In the sample, in 90% of cases the relevant high commission confirmed the child was stateless and the Government have no data to show whether parents attempted to register the birth at the time. Despite this, the letter concludes:

“This demonstrates a clear and conscious decision by the parents not to acquire a nationality for their child for at least 5 years”.


That conclusion cannot possibly, in good faith, be drawn from the facts, whichever sets of facts presented by the Government that the House chooses to believe—either the facts the Minister gave from the Dispatch Box or the alternative facts contained in the all-Peers letter.

If the Government cannot now determine how many cases are genuine and how many are the result of attempting to inappropriately acquire British citizenship, on what basis will the Secretary of State exercise her powers under Clause 10 to decide whether the child in question is able to acquire another nationality? Specifically, if, as in 90% of cases in the sample, the relevant high commission confirms the child is stateless, on what basis will the Home Secretary decide not to believe the high commission, decide that the child could acquire the relevant nationality and deny the child British citizenship? What happens to the child denied nationality by the relevant high commission and by the Secretary of State?

If, as the Government suggest, this route is being used inappropriately by parents to acquire British citizenship for themselves, the Government should bring forward legislation to prevent parents acquiring British citizenship through their children by this route, rather than making innocent children, born in the UK, stateless. I was hoping the Minister would write in good time, with a clear and unambiguous answer to the questions I put to her in Committee on 27 January. She did not and she has not.

I am reluctantly left with two options: either the Minister addresses the apparent discrepancies and presents the House with a clear case for Clause 10 now or he agrees to take this away and address our concerns at Third Reading—otherwise I will be forced to conclude that the case is not made for Clause 10 and will divide the House. We cannot leave UK-born children stateless at the whim of the Home Secretary. Clause 10 should be taken out of the Bill.

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[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

Not surprisingly, there is nothing I could add to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has said. We shall certainly be supporting this amendment if it ends up being put to a vote.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, from these Benches, I told the noble and learned Lord that we will be supporting him. He said that that was the right answer.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I signed this amendment for all the reasons that were given by the noble and learned Lord and because it is of vital importance, especially at this time, that the legislature makes it clear that it intends and requires that the Government comply with their international obligations.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Report stage
Monday 28th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My apologies; it is getting late.

I am very pleased to support this amendment. When we debated it in Committee with regard to children and families, the Minister said that there were no current plans to place them in accommodation centres but that if a child was destitute and there was a place for the night, she could not say that the child would not be so placed. However, she promised to think further on the points made and I hope that she has been able to do so. I have two reflections which build on what the right reverend Prelate has said.

First, the Minister suggested that a child in a family, who was destitute, might have to be placed in a centre, but given that she told us that such centres were only for people who are destitute anyway, I am not sure how much comfort to take from that. Can she elucidate further please? Can she also confirm that it would only be for a night, or possibly two, that a family would be housed in an accommodation centre as an exception, which was what she implied? Can she give us an assurance that no family with children will be placed in a centre for more than the briefest of time in an emergency?

The Minister also reminded us that unaccompanied asylum-seeking children would not be placed in such centres. As the right reverend Prelate said, it would be good to have absolute assurance to that effect. Can she tell us what will be the position of a child who turns 18? Might they be moved into such a centre at that point? It is impossible to consider this group without also taking into account the fears expressed by many organisations that the age assessment clauses, which we will debate later, could mean many more children wrongly being assessed as adults. Therefore, in practice, unaccompanied children might be housed in such accommodation, which clearly the Government rightly consider unsuitable for unaccompanied children. What safeguards can there be against that? In Committee, I also asked the Minister what assurances she could give us that the use of accommodation centres will be accompanied by more robust screening and protection than exists at present, to ensure that those with particular vulnerabilities are not housed in such centres.

However, no such assurances were given, other than the repeated statement that there will be individual assessment before placement in accommodation centres. None the less, it is clear from various sources of evidence that such an assessment does not exist at present nor is it providing effective screening for those with particular vulnerabilities. Indeed, the APPG on Immigration Detention, of which I am a member, has been told that, despite the June 2021 High Court ruling, there does not appear to be any significant improvement in such assessments. Charities report that people with particular vulnerabilities continue to be accommodated in Napier barracks. Therefore, can the Minister tell us what is being done to improve the assessment process?

Finally, as a fellow insomnia sufferer, the Minister said she would take back the point I raised about the impossibility of sleeping in Napier barracks dormitory-style accommodation because of the constant noise at night. I wondered if she had anything to report on that.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I do not make light of the difficulty of providing accommodation. Batting the blame between central and local government, as is sometimes done, is not going to advance the issue at all. As the right reverend Prelate has said, the debate in Committee focused on Napier. I thought it rather conflated accommodation of asylum seekers on arrival with long-term accommodation. Only a decade ago, my honourable friend Sarah Teather MP—as she was then—achieved very significant change, as a Minister, in both the law on, and the attitudes towards, the care of children with families in detention and subject to removal. More recently, we have had Stephen Shaw’s report on the impact on vulnerable people, and so on.

I accept that the Minister will say that the accommodation in question is reception and not detention. In a way, that is my point. The objective must be to receive people thoughtfully, humanely and in a welcoming and supportive way. Accommodation centres must not feel like detention. There was some discussion in Committee about whether people would be able to leave them—not for specific appointments, but because they felt like going out for a walk. The way that they are designed, organised and staffed is absolutely essential to their good working. The Explanatory Notes refer to “efficiency”. I do not think that this is incompatible with the approach that I have outlined, but they also refer to “compliance” and that worries me more. I wonder why that merits a separate mention.

This amendment demonstrates the concerns of the sector which arise from experience over a long period. I missed signing it by a couple of minutes on the day it was tabled by the right reverend Prelate. However, on behalf of these Benches, we support it.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I rise very briefly to offer Green support for this amendment and to address one specific point and one specific question. The right reverend Prelate, in introducing this, set out how little we know about what is proposed of these accommodation centres, and how much we know of their horrors. In Committee, the Minister and I discussed a particular horror with which I had personal contact during the Covid pandemic.

I also note that there is a continuing situation where the High Court ruled that people in hotels and other accommodation are entitled to £8 a week to meet some of their basic needs. This includes being able to afford a bus fare to attend an interview, or to buy some basic hygiene products. Looking at the list of people who the right reverend Prelate has included in this amendment, it is worth a question here. Imagine being a parent of a child and not ever being able to buy any sort of treat for your child. If the child really wanted some little piece of food, the parent would not be able to buy it. Instead, they would get only what is provided in the three meals a day in the canteen.

I know that we are still waiting for a description of what these accommodation centres are like. Can the Minister confirm, following the High Court ruling, that there will be at least a very small basic payment for people in the accommodation centres so that they can have some kind of choice and some kind of life?

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[The Lord Bishop of Durham]

My Lords, I fully support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, and my noble and right reverend friend behind me here supports it as well. I will speak to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and the two amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, which I fully support.

We may have 125,000 asylum seekers but let me focus on two. This is why I support both amendments. One is an asylum seeker who lives in my area who heard from the Home Office within the first three weeks of arrival then heard nothing for 12 months, in spite of inquiry after inquiry. That is why we need a code of practice. That is why we need better ways of working. It beggars belief what that says to him about how he is seen in our society and by our society. That is, of course, told time and again.

The second case is an Afghan who came out last summer on the planes and whose family is still in hiding in Afghanistan. Last week they were hunted by the Taliban; they escaped. He sent me through last week the letter he had just received from a Home Office official. It is four lines long, giving him the number that he has been allocated, with not one jot of sympathy about what he might be facing.

I accept that the official will not know or be able to verify the story that I have heard but the processes themselves do not treat people as people. They treat them as case numbers. We need the kinds of provisions that the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, has proposed and we need to deal with these cases much faster. That means we employ more people and we upskill them. That is why I support the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. The right to work falls away, as the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, noted. That is not going to happen in a hurry, so we need the right to work now but we also need the other provisions.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the argument from the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, seemed to be addressed more to refugees than asylum seekers and I think that almost everyone who has spoken about the right to work of asylum seekers has urged faster decision- making. I want to speak to the two amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, to which I have added my name.

The House has heard many noble Lords stress the importance of a trauma-informed approach and the difficulties of almost every asylum seeker, I would have thought, in telling their story almost as soon as they get here after dreadful experiences. It must be dreadful, even if the journey is quite straightforward, to tell the story coherently and fully. I fear the Home Office has not yet got it.

The Minister wrote to me last week on the interpretation of “without delay” and I thank her for that. She has had an awful lot of letters to write during the course of the Bill. The official who wrote this one said that

“if someone was fearful of acknowledging their homosexuality to the authorities, then it may be reasonably practicable for them to make a claim some time after arrival, as we recognise the extremely difficult process of coming to terms with one’s own sexuality.”

If an asylum seeker has experienced what we know in some countries people experience because of their sexuality, I do not think that “coming to terms with one’s own sexuality” begins to describe it. That is why these amendments are needed.

[Lord Green of Deddington (CB)]

My Lords, I will very briefly speak to Amendment 30 and say that I very strongly agree with the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, who I thought said some very valuable things.

I would like to say and make it clear that I am actually in favour of asylum. I believe that it is absolutely right in principle but I find in this debate and more generally that there is something of an assumption that all asylum seekers are genuine and, frankly, they are not. Indeed, the very careful process that they go through finds that nearly half of them are not accepted as asylum seekers.

The risk of moving this to 12 months is that some applicants—those who are not genuine, of course—would have an incentive to spin out their cases until they reach the six-month point, which would not be too difficult, and then they are here and that is it.

The noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, hit the nail on the head. First, what we must avoid is the possibility of work before acceptance as a genuine refugee. Secondly, that points to the need to speed up the process, which is what is causing all this difficulty. If we could get the cases resolved in a reasonable time, those who really deserve it would get it—and good on them—and those who do not would be in a queue to be removed.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 10th February 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

174: After Clause 67, insert the following new Clause—
“Migrant domestic workers
(1) The Secretary of State must amend the Immigration Rules to make provision for the matters the subject of subsection (2).(2) All holders of domestic worker or diplomatic domestic worker visas, including those working for staff of diplomatic missions, must be entitled—(a) to change their employer (but not work sector) without restriction, but must register such change with the Home Office;(b) to renew their domestic worker or diplomatic domestic worker visa for a period of not less than 12 months, provided they are in employment at the date of application and able to support themselves without recourse to public funds, and to make successive applications;(c) to apply for leave to enter and remain for their spouse or partner and any child under the age of 18 for a period equivalent to the unexpired period of their visa and of any subsequent visa;(d) to be granted indefinite leave to remain after five continuous years of residence in the United Kingdom if at the date of application their employer proposes to continue their employment.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would serve to reinstate the rights and protections that domestic workers originally had under the terms of the original Overseas Domestic Worker visa, in place from 1998 to 2012.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 174, I will leave my noble friends Lord German and Lord Wallace to speak to their Amendments 181 and 183. I received a message asking me to pass on the apologies of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Bristol, who signed this amendment; she is in her place, but I suspect that she is going to make a hasty exit at some point fairly soon. She is of course the bishop with safeguarding responsibilities. I have her speech on my iPad; we are not allowed to read out other noble Lords’ speeches, which is a pity because it is much more neatly set out than the rather scrappy notes that I have.

The very unhappy position of some—too many—overseas domestic workers and the appalling situations that many of them are in were explained very powerfully to many of your Lordships during the passage of the Modern Slavery Act. One of the things that remains in my memory is the thanks that we received after the discussion on the Bill, even though we had not achieved the changes that we sought. A number of women who had been treated as slaves and prisoners but who had escaped and have connections with the charities working in the sector, particularly Kalayaan, were very keen to get us all together after those defeats to say thank you and of course to continue the campaign. They presented each of us with a single flower, which felt very significant.

It was a cross-party effort at that time. At the end of the day, we did not succeed in amending the Bill, but the Government commissioned an independent review into the terms of the overseas domestic worker visa to see whether it facilitated abuse and, as a result of that, made some changes to the visa regime in 2016. I am advised that these remain, in practice, ineffectual. The Government accepted in 2015-16 that workers need an escape route and should not be trapped working for abusive employers, so they reinstated the right of workers to change employers, but it is limited to the time remaining on the worker’s visa, which is kept at six months—so in practice a worker has weeks or, rarely, months, but very little time remaining to find new employment. Of course, most employers need the certainty of having someone working for a longer period. Many workers do not have their passports and they cannot demonstrate that they have valid leave, so automatically they fail work checks.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I acknowledge all the points that the noble Lord has made and agree that there is more to be done here. I do not think anyone could deny that. The Criminal Finances Act was a start and there is more to be done in this space, most definitely, but I think I will leave it there. I hope, with what I have said, that the noble Baroness will be happy to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friends both made very powerful cases. I hope that my noble friend Lord Wallace will forgive me if I make only one comment on his amendment, in fact in response to what the Minister said about banks checking up: I wonder whether the banks check up on the holders of golden visas as often as they check up on noble Lords who are PEPs.

With regard to my amendment, like the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, I ask why we would have been asked to propose this amendment if there were no problem. I regarded the registration with the Home Office as a sort of olive branch, something that might make the Government feel a little more comfortable. The Immigration Rules are not working because there is not the distinction to which she and I have referred.

The noble Lord, Lord Berkeley of Knighton—how is “Berkeley” pronounced? I should know from hearing him on the radio—referred to the financial aspect of this and forcing people into the black economy. It is wider in respect of people who are here irregularly, of course, because it is hugely important. But it is exactly the same as the point made by the Minister that if the situation were changed it would provide a group of people who would be—I wrote it down—a cohort for traffickers, but that is exactly what the danger is now. I am puzzled and disappointed but clearly we are not going to make progress today, so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 174 withdrawn.

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[Viscount Brookeborough (CB)]

My Lords, I support the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie. I had not necessarily thought about saying anything, but she mentioned me in her speech. First, I declare an interest in that we are involved in tourism at home. Secondly, my brother is chairman of Tourism Ireland, a cross-border body that survives on funds from both the United Kingdom and Ireland to market the island of Ireland. Therefore, this particular regulation would make a complete fool of the whole practical implementation of it.

People ought to understand what the border really is—or, in fact, what it is not. We have come through all the Troubles. Before them, we had a border and we had to have certain papers to cross it. Then we all joined the European Union and that side was taken out of it. But then we had the Troubles so, in effect, the border was reinstated, albeit for a different reason. We do not have those border checks now; there is no border under the Good Friday agreement and everything since, including the protocol. That is the way it should be. Whether the noble Baroness and I are supporters of the protocol is neither here nor there; it is about the practical problems raised by this.

Whether tourists from another country cross the border, and who polices this, is of course an issue. In fact, they will not know whether they are crossing it, so it becomes rather ridiculous—on the whole, they do not have a clue. During the Troubles, there was a time when even our own British people—soldiers and police—did not know whether they were crossing it, so they used to draw yellow lines on it so that they knew when they were. A certain part of the population moved the yellow lines, so they still did not know where they were and then there were diplomatic incidents.

I live in County Fermanagh, which is one-third of the border in Northern Ireland. The border does not just affect it in terms of regulations—people cross it not just from day to day but time and time again in one direction or another to do very simple things. I know that you can use euros here if you are pushed, but every shop and business there uses euros and pounds. Therefore, half the time, no one has a clue whether they are in the north or the south, even when they walk into a shop. All the people working there, and of course the ones who are straightforward British or Irish, are not covered by this.

However, a wealth of people who are not British or Irish live and work within a few miles of the border and they do not think twice about it. If you cannot get a plumber very locally—we might get one from further afield anyway—you just ring up the nearest person. We are five miles from the border and he could well be from either side of it, and he might not be an Irish or British citizen.

I entirely support this amendment. I know that what I have said is not technical and I can only be very grateful to the noble Baroness, as we all can, for going into it in such detail because there is very little for us to say, except for the Government to sort it out.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I support the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, and spoken to by other noble Lords. I was grateful, too, to have been briefed by the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland and the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission. I did not need to be convinced of the importance of local journeys for work, education, health services, shopping, frontier workers and so on. I was lucky enough to be a member of the EU Select Committee of the House during the transition period, when we heard direct from people living and working in Northern Ireland about the concerns which the amendments in this group address.

I want to speak particularly to Amendment 175ZA. The points raised in it apply more widely than to the Northern Ireland/Republic of Ireland border. I certainly do not want to suggest that there is greater concern about criminals in the Republic than at other borders. I am not quite sure why these proposals come to be in the same group but I understand why there is a concern to get through the remaining amendments. The point is relevant to the border and there is a practical problem, as the noble Viscount just said.

My noble friend Lord Paddick is concerned about checks on the criminal record of an individual, now that we are no longer a member of the EU or have access to SIS II or ECRIS. We have to fall back on the Interpol database, which requires specific uploading of information and is not integrated with our police national computer or with member states’ national systems.

The report of the EU Security and Justice sub-committee on post-Brexit arrangements in that area is due to be debated on 25 February. I know that the Minister will deal with the points in the report then. I was going to say that I was sorry to see she does not get that Friday off, but it is never off for a Minister, is it? The points in it are relevant to Northern Ireland.

My noble friend Lord Oates has Amendment 180, which is not in this group, on physical proof of status. This amendment relates to the points that I know he will make and asks the very pertinent question: what happens when the digital system malfunctions? I am normally a glass-half-full person but that is pertinent to everyone, especially at this land border.

I noted, and think it deserves to be mentioned here, that the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House has reported in the following terms:

“The House may question why the detail of the Electronic Travel Authorisation scheme introduced under clause 71 is not set out in the Bill.”


It is because the scheme has not been worked up—at any rate not to completion, as I understand it. The report continues:

“If it is appropriate to make such provision in immigration rules, the House may expect it to be subject to a form of affirmative procedure, at least for the establishment of the scheme.”


The committee is saying much more delicately what I said the other day: we should not be expected to deal with criminal offences, as it was that day, arising from the scheme when we do not know what the scheme is. That also applies here.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick and Lady Suttie, for raising this issue, and I think some very good questions have been asked. I have a different question. In the absence of an electronic travel authorisation, are there problems in enforcing immigration, asylum or indeed criminal law? Can we be reassured that there would not be an incentive for people who want to come to the UK to come in large numbers through the Republic of Ireland? That would be my one concern in trying to address the very real issues across the border that have been identified, and which you see in other countries where you have borders—especially where there has been a practice of having no border.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

175ZB: Clause 74, page 79, line 7, leave out subsection (3)

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the short point that my noble friend Lord Paddick wanted to make, as he generally does, in leaving out Clause 74(3) is that, again, this seems to conflate immigration and terrorism. It extends powers to question people about involvement in terrorism at the border and applies the powers to people being detained under a provision of the immigration Acts, and so on. The objection runs like a thread through the Bill, to so many points. Immigration and terrorism are not the same. Not all terrorists are immigrants. Terrorists who have succeeded in the UK have been British, and if the Government allow, in legislation, the bias implied by the conflation of these two, no wonder others display the same bias. I beg to move.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

This clause would extend the use of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act to people who have been detained under the immigration Acts and transported outside of a port or border area. Schedule 7 can be an important tool in the prevention of terrorism, but it has had a chequered past at times. It has been improved in recent years by the work of independent reviewers of terrorism legislation, two of whom we are now fortunate to have as Members of this House.

I have three or four questions for the Government on the provisions of Clause 74. Have the Government consulted on the extension of the power? Has the change been requested and, if so, by whom or by what body? Can the Minister give more detail on the scale of the problem this is designed to address? How many individuals are officers unable to stop and question under the current arrangements? How was the period of five days arrived at? For those who travel through conventional routes, does not the power have to be used pretty much immediately, in which case five days is a considerable extension? Finally, the powers apply provided an officer “believes” that the person arrived at sea, was apprehended within 24 hours of arrival, and it has been no more than five days since they were apprehended. What will that “belief” that the officer is required to have be based on? It would be helpful if the Government could give some responses to those questions.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank both Members of the Committee for their remarks. Schedule 7 examinations have been instrumental in securing evidence to convict terrorists, yielding intelligence to detect terrorist threats and supporting the disruption or deterrence of terrorist activity. Currently, officers may exercise Schedule 7 powers only when an individual is located within a port or border area as defined in the Act. Clause 74 will provide an added layer of protection to the existing processes in place for dealing with those who arrive irregularly by sea in the UK. I think that goes some way to answering the question of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser—they are arriving irregularly outside of ports. The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC, has stated:

“In principle, people arriving irregularly in the United Kingdom should be liable to counter-terrorism examination as much as those arriving at sea ports and airports.”


This clause ensures that, for those arriving irregularly by sea, such as via illegal channel crossings, this will continue be the case.

There are several reasons why those who engage in illegal channel crossings can be moved to a different location from their place of arrival very quickly after arriving. They can range from weight of numbers to the need to move the vulnerable or those in need of medical attention to more appropriate facilities. It is impractical and inhumane to keep large groups of people port side in order to give counterterrorism police an appropriate opportunity to exercise their current powers under Schedule 7.

I reassure noble Lords who tabled the amendment that this is by no means an attempt to treat all migrants arriving in this manner as terrorists, or to stop and examine large numbers of people away from ports and borders. Schedule 7 is not designed and cannot be used as a universal screening mechanism, and Clause 74 has been deliberately drawn to provide an appropriate time window for counterterrorism police to exercise their powers under Schedule 7.

To remove the effect of Clause 74 would impact our ability to determine whether those who are entering the UK in this way are involved in terrorism, impacting our national security. It would continue a scenario where those who arrive in the UK by conventional means are subject to powers to determine involvement in terrorist activity, whereas those who have arrived irregularly by sea, and about whom we have very little documented information, may not be.

I cannot answer precisely who has been consulted on this, other than the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, and obviously the counterterrorism police will have a keen interest in how this debate develops. To answer on the numbers, this concerns those arriving irregularly by sea, outside established ports, under the existing rules. I could not tell you how many there are. The other questions impinge on operational matters, on which I am not qualified to comment. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister said there is a deliberate time limit to these powers. I may be reading this wrong, but they apply to

“the period of 5 days beginning with the day after the day on which the person was apprehended”.

It is not five days from entry or arrival. I am not sure whether that would alter those points that the Minister suggested we take into account. But, since we are not even half way through the groups of amendments, I had better just beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 175ZB withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Debate on whether Clause 76 should stand part of the Bill.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, has her name to the opposition to Clause 76 standing part of the Bill. I am happy to pick this up briefly, as she has had to leave.

Clause 76 gives the tribunals a charging power in respect of wasted resources. I do not know whether it is aimed at lefty, liberal lawyers, a group to which I would be proud to belong, although I do not think I quite qualify—lefty maybe, liberal certainly, but I am an ex-lawyer.

I am trying to read my notes, but I cannot understand what I wrote last night.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Perhaps while the noble Baroness looks at her handwriting, as a lefty, liberal lawyer, I say briefly to the Minister that the immigration and asylum system is the most unlevel playing field in our legal system. Tribunals were set up, as the Minister will remember, with the aim of people being able to represent themselves, not as places for expensive lawyers.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Thursday 3rd February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I understand the noble Baroness’s point. I cannot go beyond saying there are no current plans, but I can think further about the point she is making and perhaps give her more detail on it, if she will allow me to do so, but that is as far as I can go. She might be further comforted by some of the things I am going to say about vulnerability, et cetera.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, if the Minister is coming on to that, perhaps I should sit down, because I was going to stress welfare as distinct from safety.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

That is what I am going to come on to, if noble Lords will accommodate me—no pun intended—for a short period of time.

Whether an accommodation centre is suitable for individuals who share the characteristics listed in the amendment will depend on a number of factors, including their personal circumstances and vulnerabilities and the facilities available at the particular site or area. This goes to the points made by both noble Baronesses.

I now turn to Amendments 58 and 59, which seek to limit stays in accommodation centres to 90 days. The amendments attempt to disapply a key part of Clause 12. One of the aims of Clause 12 is to enable wider flexibility to ensure that individuals are supported in accommodation centres for as long as that form of housing, and the other support and arrangements on-site, is appropriate for their individual circumstances. We intend to provide vital services and support co-located within accommodation centres. Reducing individuals’ access to these vital services by restricting them to a 90-day stay would not be acting in their best interests.

We do not think Amendment 60 is necessary because we are not proposing to use the power in Section 36 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, so there is no need to amend it.

Moving to Amendment 61, I would like to thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, for his contribution to this debate. The Home Office is already required to provide accommodation to destitute asylum seekers and failed asylum seekers in a way that is consistent with the European Convention on Human Rights and the requirements in the Equality Act 2010. Our policies also recognise that we need to take account of the individual’s safety and welfare—to take the point from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—in considering the type of accommodation that is suitable for them.

There are no plans to use accommodation centres to house all asylum seekers. I slightly wondered whether there might have been some conflation with that in today’s debate. Some will be identified at the outset as unsuitable for that type of accommodation, and some will need to be moved out of the centres as new issues emerge. All individuals in the asylum support system have access to an advice service from Migrant Help, a voluntary sector organisation that we fund for this purpose, and are able to put forward reasons and evidence why they need a particular sort of accommodation.

Moving to Amendment 62, I need to be clear on this. As my noble friend Lord Horam said and my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts asked, accommodation centres are being set up to provide housing and other support for those who require it because they would otherwise be destitute. The judges mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, may not in certain circumstances need this type of accommodation; I am not making a presumption, but they may not. These are not detention centres, of course. Individuals are free to move out of the centres if they can obtain their own accommodation, for example through friends or family.

--- Later in debate ---

It is also possible that other conditions may be imposed that require the individuals to be present at the site at certain times. That might be because they need to attend an interview to help determine their asylum claim or facilitate their departure from the UK if their claim has been rejected. This is important because one of the key objectives of using the centres is to speed up asylum decisions by placing casework facilities on site; that really goes to the point made by the noble Lords, Lord Alton and Lord Green. In other circumstances, the individuals will be able to leave the centres during the day if they wish, for example to access medical services or for personal reasons.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

The point was made very clearly that these centres should not be places of detention. I was waiting for some assurance that the ability to come and go would be recognised. The Minister has just said that people will be free to leave if, for instance, they need to go and do something specific. To me, that sounds very different—it may just be a trick of the language—from an assurance that these will not be places of detention subject to specific allowances to leave for specific purposes.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I repeat that these are not detention centres. There may be specific conditions—for example, if an asylum seeker needs to attend an interview about their claim, they will be required to be there—but they are not detention centres.

--- Later in debate ---

This is a very modest amendment and I find it depressing that the Home Office continues to resist it, but hope springs eternal, so I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I am glad to have my name to this amendment. I am aware—to use the rather odd language of this House—that lunch-hour business is to come, although neither “lunch” nor “hour” is accurate. I could just use the first line of my notes, which reads “Lister—double tick.” I will say only a very little more. Joining up 28 days, 35 days and 56 days does not take a genius—and even if it did, it has been proven by experience that it does not actually work.

I am looking to see whether there is anything the noble Baroness has not said. In terms of integration for the individual, the family and the community, underlying this amendment is not just support for the individual but the importance of self-sufficiency—this is quite similar to the previous debate—as a component of integration, and not being dependent on the state. Integration and contribution to community and society go hand in hand.

I have one further point. The Minister mentioned the charity Migrant Help in a previous group. As I understand it, it can give advice; that is not the same as providing dosh—the funds that are needed. That seemed to be the implication in that debate. However, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, on her persistence. I am glad to continue to be one of her terriers.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

Am I a terrier as well? I think of myself as a larger animal, but a terrier will do. There is almost nothing left to be said. I am delighted to have my name on this amendment. The noble Baronesses, Lady Lister and Lady Hamwee, have said virtually everything, but I would like to say a couple of things.

In spite of our rather uncertain economic situation—if anyone from the opposing side wants to say that it is all terribly healthy, a Radio 4 programme more or less corrected that conceit yesterday; we have a slightly unhealthy economic situation, and it is not as good as people in the Government claim—we are still a rich country. We ought to show a little more generosity to people who have lost virtually everything, not to mention the fact that we have often caused the instability that forced them to leave their homes. Whether it is Afghanistan, Syria or other countries, when we have sold weapons, invaded or, as I have said before, used fossil fuels to the extent that we continue to do, we have destabilised many countries throughout the world. We have a moral obligation to behave better and take in refugees. This amendment is worthy of acceptance.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Tuesday 1st February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hylton (CB)]

My Lords, in very few words I would like to welcome and support Amendment 40, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. I do so from the experience of asylum and immigration Bills over the last 20 or 30 years, and for the reason that what used to be known as the Medical Foundation, and is now called simply Freedom from Torture, has repeatedly pointed out the necessary delay before people who pass through traumatic experiences are willing to reveal what has happened to them. To do so, they need relationships of trust and confidence with those with whom they are dealing. So if, perchance, Clause 11 survives in some form or other, I hope that the principles of the noble Baroness’s amendment will be somehow incorporated.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, this will not be the last time we talk about the need for a trauma-informed approach. I think the expression “necessary delay”, used by the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, is very useful and applies much better to this situation than “without delay”, which is what we are faced with.

Even without the background and experiences referred to in this amendment, I cannot imagine undertaking the sort of journey that most people fleeing from the situations they are in will have undertaken. Any asylum seeker will be in a pretty awful state. Many will be anxious about authority figures. It is incumbent on us to ensure that they are not retraumatised. We should not require them to present a coherent explanation and make a claim so quickly.

The noble Lord, Lord Hylton, talked about the possible survival of Clause 11. I would add Clause 36 to that. I do not think this provision can be read without looking at Clause 36, which deals with Article 31 of the convention. Clause 36(2) says:

“A refugee is not to be taken to have presented themselves without delay”—


“presented themselves” is the phrase used in Clause 11—

“unless … they made a claim for asylum as soon as reasonably practicable after their arrival in the United Kingdom.”

I do not think it is necessary to read the whole clause.

I hope the Minister can explain how, in practical terms, given the life experiences that we are suggesting, “present” and “make a claim” relate to one another. Does making a claim

“as soon as reasonably practicable”

mean presenting the substance of a claim? If I read these two clauses correctly, we now have “presenting oneself” and “making a claim”. Failure, under Clause 11, to present not just oneself but one’s claim takes one straight into the territory of late evidence and all the horrors of criminality and second-class status.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly. The remarks by the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, made me reflect. She was talking about how it takes a year, 18 months or two years for the people whom she has met in the course of her admirable-sounding charity, to be able to fully open up and explain themselves. This makes me think how similar this is to grief. For asylum seekers who have been forced to flee everything that is familiar to them—their home, country, family and links—and arrive in a strange place, this is a form of grief and bereavement.

I am not the only person in this Chamber who has suffered a relatively recent bereavement. I would not say that I have fully recovered after a year, 18 months, two years—even two and a half years. Indeed, I never will be. Given the disorientation and the inability to fully function, a year, 18 months or two years is not wide of the mark for how long you need to get your act together to handle an asylum claim.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

I thank noble Lords very much for their support for this amendment—their willingness to apply some lipstick to the pig that I think we would all like to be rid of. Some very powerful speeches made the case very strongly for why the groups which are listed may well have good reasons for delay. I take the point that any asylum seeker is, by definition, likely to be vulnerable, but we are talking here about those who have particular vulnerabilities.

I thank the Minister for giving more of a sense of what will happen. It is late and I need to read what she said, but I think that the powerful speeches from noble Lords and the Minister’s response justified our taking this as a separate amendment. As I have said, it was not interrogated in the Commons; this has given us a chance to do that.

I thank the Minister for saying that she will look into the statistics—it was I, in fact, who raised it; I think Women for Refugee Women would value having whatever statistics are available. However, just last week, the British Red Cross produced research suggesting that, for all the better training and guidance, women asylum seekers are still treated very badly, with a lack of gender sensitivity and trauma sensitivity. I would encourage the Minister to read this research, think about it and see what more needs to be done.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

I apologise—I was not quick enough to my feet. I wanted to get in before the noble Baroness withdrew her amendment to ask the Minister if she might be able, after today if not tonight, to answer my question about how Clauses 11 and 36 work together. That could inform our debate when we get to that later clause. Again, I apologise to the noble Baroness.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

There is no need—I am glad that the noble Baroness said that. I had made a note to mention it and then, of course, completely forgot or could not read my handwriting, or both. Anyway, it is late, and I realise that people want to get on. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Tuesday 1st February 2022 Lords Chamber

[A noble Lord]

Hear, hear.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I do not want to sound churlish at all by asking this question. The “Hear, hears” were probably not as loud as they might have been for Hansard to pick them up; I hope that it does. My question will display my lack of grip of the EU settled status scheme. The Minister said that the Immigration Rules will be changed at the next appropriate opportunity. Am I right in thinking that 29 March is a significant date for those with pre-settled status? As I said, I have a lack of grip of this and an even greater lack of grip in pulling the bits together in my head but, if it is a significant date, then it is a significant question to ask whether the change will be made before 29 March.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I do not have the exact detail on the date. I understand her point about 29 March being a significant date; noble Lords will all be informed in due course of when the changes will come about and I will let the noble Baroness know.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, just to follow that up, the Minister will understand that I am concerned that some people may fail to qualify because the rules are not changed by that date, so I wonder whether she could come back to us well before then.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I will of course do that.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

35: After Clause 10, insert the following new Clause—
“European Convention on Nationality
Her Majesty’s Government must within six months of this Act coming into force ratify the European Convention on Nationality 1997.”

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, this might scramble our brains a little less than the last amendment. Amendment 35 would require the Government to ratify the 1997 European Convention on Nationality. This is a Council of Europe treaty, signed, obviously, in 1997, originally by 15 countries. It now has 29 signatories and 21 ratifications. The UK has not followed through on it. In 2002, the then Labour Government said that they planned to ratify it “in due course”, but “due course” has apparently not yet arrived.

The convention sets out the principles to which each country’s nationality laws should conform. The key principles are that everyone has the right to a nationality; statelessness should be avoided; no one should be arbitrarily deprived of his or her nationality; and neither marriage nor the end of a marriage, nor a spouse changing their nationality, should change someone’s nationality. The key part relates to the deprivation of citizenship, preventing states making people stateless unless their citizenship was obtained through fraud, false information or concealment.

The convention sets the bar for deprivation at acts that are seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the state. This was deliberately mirrored in our legislation in 2002, but with the test being lowered in 2006 to cases where the Home Secretary is satisfied that it is conducive to the public good to order a deprivation. Does the UK believe that, as part of a global community, it would be good to be part of a worldwide group of countries in its approach to nationality? Do we want to be an outlier? I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for their brief and succinct points in speaking to the amendment.

British citizenship affords benefits and privileges; the vast majority of us enjoy the freedom that they bring, while of course respecting the rights of others and the rule of law, but there are high-harm individuals who do not share our values. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, is right that no Government since 1997, including the coalition Government of 2010-15, have ratified the convention, and he is right that we are not going to. The convention does not address the modern threat from global terrorism, among other things, and I would add that Spain, Belgium and Switzerland have not signed it either, perhaps for the same reasons.

The convention on nationality is at odds with domestic law. The Government do not consider it right that our sovereign powers to deprive a person of citizenship should be constrained by signing the convention, as the amendment would oblige us to do. That would severely limit the ability of the Home Secretary to make a deprivation decision in relation to high-harm individuals and those who pose a threat to public safety. Sadly, we have seen too often the effect of terrorist attacks on our way of life and the impact of serious organised crime on the vulnerable. It cannot be right that the Government are not able to use all the powers at their disposal to deal with today’s threats to our way of life.

It is the Government’s duty to keep the public safe and we do not make any apology for seeking to do so. I hope that, with that, the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I shall be brief because I regard this amendment as an amuse-bouche, if you like, before the very substantial groups to come. I am sure the Minister recognised that this was a probing amendment, as I was asked to find out what the Government’s view was. I think that together we have fulfilled that task. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 35 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will take that as an invitation. Thank you very much indeed. I will try not to be a nightmare.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

I am sorry to disappoint the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. I thank those who have been complimentary about this amendment and make it clear that it is a team effort on our part. I really did not expect it to provoke such debate, but the thoughts that are teeming round people’s minds are bound to burst out at some point.

I want to ask about Amendment 129, and I will return the compliment to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. It makes an immensely important point but reading it, I wondered whether there was not already an offence—an inchoate offence, possibly, under the existing immigration legislation, or possibly even conspiracy. I do not want to anticipate Clause 40, but are there any problems in using Sections 25 and 25A of the Immigration Act 1971?

[Lord Dubs (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall comment briefly on the discussion we have been having. Why is it young men? I talked to some of the Afghans who got to Calais—this was before the Taliban took over Afghanistan completely—and they said to me that the Taliban were trying to recruit young men into their fighting forces, so the family clubbed together to help them escape, because they were the ones who, at that time, were most vulnerable. Today, it may be that the women in Afghanistan who are more vulnerable, except that they cannot find their way out. But that is one of the reasons why more young men than young women have fled. Indeed, if one looks at the people who got to northern France, quite a few of them have connections with this country, and quite a few are seeking to establish family reunion. That is an argument why we should be able to provide safe and legal routes for people from northern France to come here: so they can achieve family reunion. We should recognise what they have fled.

My noble friend Lord Coaker described the terrible conditions. My comments are going to go a bit wide of the amendment, but I hope that your Lordships will allow me to continue. I think that if we actually explained to people in this country what it is that people are fleeing from—the awful circumstances, the terrifying persecution, war, people being killed in front of them, and so on—they would be much more sympathetic to refugees coming.

The majority of the refugees who reach France claim asylum in France. A small proportion of those claim asylum here—if they can manage to get to this country. In relation to the number of refugees in the world, we are talking about rather small numbers, but there are some very important points of principle, because we are talking about people who are very vulnerable. That is why I am keen on Amendment 36 and I do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Green.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

I would like to say a word in support of the spirit of these amendments. Specifically, I would like to speak in support of Amendments 37, 38 and 42, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, introduced brilliantly by the conscience of the House, the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths. Yet, my heart is not in this game. This is what Americans call “putting lipstick on a pig”—it is still a pig.

The only element of this group which I can whole- heartedly support is that Clause 11 should not stand part of the Bill. Our Constitution Committee gave us a choice: it said that we should either remove or redraft Clause 11. I understand what all these redrafting amendments are trying to do, but it is not a good idea. This is not a case for “death by a thousand cuts”; it is a case for a “short sharp shock”. We need to take Clause 11 out of the Bill.

Why? Because the refugee convention matters; it is an important plank in the international legal order. Clause 11 flies directly in the face of the refugee convention, because it creates two classes of refugees: one with convention rights, and one without convention rights. The charge that it is a breach of the convention is put authoritatively not only by our Law Society and the Law Society of Scotland, but by UNHCR in its 72-page memorandum. That is a pretty authoritative source; indeed, it is the authoritative source. When we set up the refugee convention, we asked UNHCR to be its guardian, to supervise its application, and to report to the Secretary-General on laws on refugees in the signatory states. Therefore, it was not interfering, but doing the job which we, when we wrote the convention, asked it to do. I find it a shaming thought that its report on this Bill will have been seen by all 147 signatory states.

Why is UNHCR so sure that the Bill undermines the convention? Clause 11 is the heart of the matter. UNHCR believes that creating a two-tier system for handling asylum seekers—one class legitimate, one illegitimate—conflicts with the simple definition of a refugee in Article 1 of the convention. A refugee, says the convention, is someone who,

“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country”.

That is all: he is outside his country of origin. The definition says nothing about any requirement to seek asylum in a particular place, and nothing about regular or irregular routes; it contains no suggestion that he is out of order if he does not seek asylum in the first safe country—there is no such requirement anywhere in international law.

A refugee is a refugee is a refugee, and must be treated as such, according to the provisions of the convention, however he got there. That is what the convention says and that is what we have believed down the years. Stretching the meaning of Article 31, as the Government seek to do, cannot change or qualify what Article 1 says, or add something that it does not contain. I have set out the definition of a refugee. There are no two categories; the definition is very simple.

I am no lawyer, and here I am surrounded by eminent, terrifying legal expertise—even including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Clarke of Nottingham; as his former private secretary, I am horrified to see him there—but the definition of a refugee, and of our sin in this Bill, from the UNHCR and the law societies, must be right, because I cannot see how 147 countries would have signed up to the convention if they had thought it meant what the Government now say it means. Four in every five refugees are in developing countries adjacent to their country of citizenship. Would host countries have agreed that guests should never move on, and that they should be required to apply for asylum only in their first host country? Would the developing world have agreed that the developed world could wash its hands of the problem of looking after refugees because they were going to have to stay in the first safe country they reached on fleeing over a frontier? I do not think so. It plainly was not what those who signed up to the convention thought it meant, and the attempt to have an expansive reading of Article 31 and so change the meaning of the convention as a whole, in particular Article 1, looks quite a legal stretch. I agree with our Constitution Committee, the law societies and, importantly, the UNHCR.

I feel for the Minister, because the case she is asked to make on the legal position and the convention seems as eccentric and unconvincing as the claim of the noble Lord, Lord Frost, that you can extinguish the role of the CJEU in Northern Ireland by using Article 16 of the Northern Ireland protocol. I will stay away from the law—this is a rash foray—but I will stick with the UNHCR, the law societies and the conventional reading of the convention, which is how 146 countries still read it, and say that we really need to get rid of Clause 11.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, Clause 11 is the most objectionable clause in this whole objectionable Bill. It has to go, and not just because of what the convention says, our having signed and supported it and so on. It is not just because there is a convention but because the convention is right. However, we have to pick at the Bill. We will have the debate that the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, has started us off on so well on Report, but this is our opportunity to see whether there is any give in the Government’s position and whether there is anything we can, quite bluntly, take apart on Report in a way we have not yet thought of.

My noble friend Lord Paddick, the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Blunkett, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham have indicated their objection to the clause standing part. Had we been able, under the procedures of this House, to add more than four names, I think there would have been a very long list.

Data Protection: Immigration Exemption

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Monday 31st January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, it is disappointing that the procedures of your Lordships’ House effectively precluded us from voting on this SI. When we debated the draft in Grand Committee, we said that we would table a regret Motion but the Government were, of course, aware of the 31 January deadline for producing a measure in response to the Court of Appeal and apparently there was no time for a regret Motion and the usual channels arranged for this take-note Motion.

The Government are obviously proper in complying with the court order in the timing, if not the content, but Parliament should have seen the draft SI earlier, had an opportunity not only to scrutinise it but to debate what it took from that scrutiny and to vote on it. I have drawn this to the attention of the chair of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, given that committee’s and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee’s focus at the moment on procedures.

We are all aware of the deficiencies when we deal with secondary legislation. We knew that we would not win a vote in the Chamber because the Labour spokesman in Grand Committee supported the regulations, although we were grateful that he agreed with much of what we said during that debate. We wanted again to put our opposition on record. I thank the Minister for her explanation of the SI during that debate and I will try not to repeat too much of what was said then but will focus on the Minister’s remarks.

The Court of Appeal required the Government to amend the Data Protection Act to remedy its incompatibility with retained EU law so that it satisfies requirements of Article 23(2) of the UK GDPR. The declaration was suspended until today to provide a reasonable time to do so. That judgment was, I think, in October so they have had plenty of time. Although this is an SI amending the Act, it does not achieve that objective. The Secretary of State must have regard under the SI to the “immigration exemption policy document” and a draft IEPD was published at the same time as the draft SI.

That policy document can be amended. It can be replaced. It is not primary legislation. It is not secondary legislation. It is not legislation at all. It is not even unamendable legislation—secondary legislation cannot be amended. It is not a “legislative measure” within the terms of Article 23(2) which the Court of Appeal described as “remarkably specific”. It is not “part and parcel” of the legislation. It is not even a code of practice or a codification of safeguards; it is simply a policy document. Parliament cannot carry out a scrutiny function in which the outcome may, in theory, be changed even if we know the realities of dealing with secondary legislation. Parliament can play no meaningful part.

In Grand Committee, I asked the Minister how the policy document builds on previous arrangements, as it appears simply to repeat existing safeguards, and also for details of the Government’s consultation with interested parties and how the issues raised in consultation have been dealt with. I am grateful to her for the letter I received this afternoon, by email, in response to this—she said she would let me have the detail if it was not data protected. I am glad to note that some points were taken on board—but not all, quite clearly, because those with whom she consulted were those who brought the case to court. She said that

“the Department published the IEPD in draft form alongside the draft Regulations on the 10th December … enabling stakeholders the opportunity to consider its contents and to comment accordingly.”

Given that this policy document is central to the arrangements, I am surprised that not publishing it could ever have been thought to be an option.

In response to my question in Grand Committee, as to how one should challenge the Home Office if one does not know what it knows, or thinks it knows, to rectify errors—how would you rectify errors if you do not know that there are errors?—the Minister said that the exemption did not restrict the right to seek rectification of inaccurate data. That does not answer the question; it merely makes that question even more important. She also said that the exemption could not be used to prevent a person establishing a legal claim—which also begs the question.

It is not in contention that this data is very significant. Lord Justice Warby said the exemption

“plays a significant role in practice as a brake on access to personal data”—

one’s own data. He referred to Home Office evidence that the exemption was relied on in 59% of responses during the period in question, and that the exemption was available in a wide range of cases. The Minister in Grand Committee made much of how limited its use is and that only the minimum is redacted—only small parts of documents that contain sensitive data that could affect operations. So, I have a request and suggestion that the Home Office, in the current version of the policy document, in paragraph nine, which is a checklist for users—that is, caseworkers—should add to the list that there should be the minimum redaction. That may be implied by other parts of the document, but what caseworkers consider is crucial, and paragraph nine is what they will go to. Can the point that she made, and on which she relied, about the minimum redaction not be spelled out clearly in the checklist? I support my noble friend.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I want—briefly—to supplement the remarks of my noble friends. As I said in Grand Committee, I commend my noble friend Lady Hamwee for her consistent and determined opposition to this immigration exemption. During the passage of the Bill, we were not able to delete the original provisions, but we are quite clear on these benches that this new SI does not at all reflect the safeguards required by the GDPR and by the Court of Appeal’s decision. As I said in Committee, I can only wonder what kind of advice the Minister has had. How has she been able to convince herself that this SI will not meet the same fate as the previous provisions? My noble friends referred to what Lord Justice Warby had to say, and what needs to be done is extremely clear. I do not think there is any need to repeat what my noble friends have said.

It is utterly clear that the provisions being put in place do not comply with GDPR—particularly with Recital 41, and certainly not in the way Lord Justice Warby interpreted that recital. The Home Office, regardless of the law, is going forward with this new proposal with an IEPD which is simply not good enough in terms of its legislative status. As both my noble friends said, it adds nothing in the way of safeguards which were already there.

The Minister seemed to be saying in Grand Committee the Home Office had taken on board the points made by the Open Rights Group and the3million, but that she would ascertain what those points were. Sadly, I have not received a copy of the Minster’s letter, so I do not know what those points are. I hope the Minister will adumbrate those in her response this evening. It is clear that the Home Office is in great danger of having another successful judicial review against it on these regulations.

Despite our best efforts in Grand Committee, the Minister did not deal with the fundamental issue of the mechanism being used to introduce this form of exemption. We were reminded today in the Commons about what Margaret Thatcher said:

“The first duty of Government is to uphold the law. If it tries to bob and weave and duck around that duty when it’s inconvenient, if Government does that, then so will the governed and then nothing is safe—not home, not liberty, not life itself.”


Wise words. Bobbing and weaving and ducking—is that not precisely what the Government are doing on this issue?

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 27th January 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

14: Clause 7, page 9, line 36, at end insert—
“(1A) In section 1 (acquisition by birth or adoption), in subsection (5)—(a) in paragraph (a), for “minor” substitute “person”, and(b) after paragraph (b), for “that minor shall” substitute “that person or minor (as the case may be) shall”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to bring British nationality law in line with adoption law in England and Wales. In those nations, an adoption order made by a court may be made where a child has reached the age of 18 but is not yet 19. Yet such an adoption order currently only confers British citizenship automatically where the person adopted is under 18 on the day the order is made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 14, in my name and that of the name of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and will speak to Amendments 15, 16, 19, 20, 23 and 24 in this group. The noble Lord apologises to the Committee—he is unwell and had really wished to be here—but I hope that the discussion this afternoon will not be an end of the matter. He and I are keen to rectify an anomaly of which he became aware through his association with Coram, and it is also a concern of the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association. There are not a large number of people affected by the point we raise but, as the noble Lord says, that is no reason to ignore a matter of principle. He suggested that we flag this up and that we might discuss it with the Minister before Report. We are lucky enough to have a Minister whose diary secretary must go mad when she hears the commitments being made during Committee days.

The issue is another anomaly. British nationality law in England, Wales and Scotland—Northern Ireland is in a different situation—is not in alignment with adoption law. In England and Wales, an adoption order may be made where a child has made an application before reaching the age of 18, as long as they are not yet 19. In Scotland, an adoption order may be made in respect of someone over the age of 18, as long as the application was made when the person was under 18. An adoption order confers British citizenship automatically only when the person adopted is under 18 on the day it was made. As the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, said very forcefully earlier, citizenship is significant: it is about belonging as well as being a technical matter.

Coram gave the example of a young woman who completed her degree at Oxford after her mother had died of cancer, and her maternal aunt, a British citizen resident here, applied to adopt the young woman before she turned 18. The High Court ordered the adoption when she was 18 but not yet 19. I understand—and this must be quite unusual—that the Secretary of State for the Home Department was represented and did not oppose the adoption order, but the relevant section of the British Nationality Act did not operate to confer British citizenship on her, so she was left with student status due to end shortly after her degree was obtained, no basis on which she could continue to enjoy family life in the UK with her adoptive mother, and Immigration Rules making no provision for someone in her position because she did not have 10 years continuous lawful residence in the UK. I have been given other examples but I am sure noble Lords get the point—and I can see from the Minister’s face that she does.

--- Later in debate ---

British overseas citizenship was intended to be a transitional status, and it is expected that many who held that status will have acquired the nationality of the place where they were born or have been living in the 38 years since that legislation was passed. The existing routes to British overseas citizenship are therefore very limited, and we do not intend to create a new route. However, people who hold only BOC and do not have, and have not voluntarily lost, another citizenship or nationality can apply for British citizenship under existing legislation. If a person believes that they missed out on becoming a BOC because of historical unfairness, and as a result they also missed out on being able to become a British citizen because they have no other nationality, and have not done anything that meant they lost a nationality, there is nothing to prevent them applying for that status under this clause. With that, I hope the noble Baroness will not press the amendments.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I agree with the Minister that Clause 7 is positive and I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, that it must not be just a token. I am obviously disappointed with a good deal of what the Minister had to say. With regard to guidance, which I am glad to hear is proposed, the reference to consultation in our amendment was not accidental. It is important, particularly when we are told that the point of this is to allow flexibility for the Secretary of State, to have the input of stakeholders.

On the point of capacity, if the current discretion is sufficient, I should have said that working on the basis of experience one should put something discretionary into statute, so that everyone is quite clear where they are. As to the transitional nature of British overseas citizenship, there are still people who are affected. The fact that there are very few does not change the position.

With regard to adoption and the need to go through a registration process and for it not just to be automatic, the Minister said that this would be considered on its merits. Just repeating those words indicates how different this is from automatic citizenship, which is part and parcel of whole adoption arrangement. She mentioned the need to be consistent with other nationality provisions. I should say that this amendment would be consistent with the arrangements for adoption that we have in the different parts of the UK. I am particularly disappointed about that, but I hear what she says and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 14 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I am also not a lawyer, but we have Amendment 29 in this group and we join the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, in opposing the Question that Clause 9 stand part of the Bill. I accept that Clause 9 is about giving notice, but the amendments in the group go beyond that. The main concerns that this group addresses are the significant increase in the use of the power to deprive British citizens of their citizenship and the new provision of dispensing with the requirement that the Secretary of State requires notice to be given to a person deprived of citizenship.

There have been many detailed and compelling speeches and I do not intend to repeat them, but I will refer to the powerful and personal speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, about how this provision is affecting some British citizens. This is not going to affect some British citizens, like me, at all, but when you hear her personal recollections of the fear that this clause is generating and about the importance of the family attaché case—reinforced by the noble Baroness, Lady Mobarik—you understand that, although it may not be targeting particular communities within the cohort of British citizens, it is certainly causing distress among certain parts of that cohort.

To answer the question of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, on what we do with those people who wish to do us harm, I say that we prosecute them in the courts. We do not dump them on other countries.

Depriving someone of their citizenship is a very serious step to take and it is being taken with increasing regularity. To then do away with the requirement even to notify the subject is totally unacceptable. How can anyone take any steps to correct or challenge a decision that they know nothing about? The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, talked about how we notify the unnotifiable. Even in the case that he and other noble Lords referred to, which has been in the courts, the individuals were not uncontactable; they were not unnotifiable within the law. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, explained, notice could have been served on that individual, but the Home Office chose not to. In the figures he gave about how many times that has stopped the Home Office from serving notice on somebody of deprivation of nationality, the answer was zero. Clause 9 is not only unreasonable but, based on the facts, unnecessary as well.

With the increased use by the Secretary of State of the power to deprive a British citizen of their citizenship, we support Amendment 28 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, which says that reviews of the use of the power should be annual and not every three years. We also agree with Amendment 27 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, to restrict the circumstances in which someone can be deprived of their British citizenship. My noble friend Lady Hamwee will address our Amendment 29, which removes the power of the Secretary of State to directly deprive a British citizen of their citizenship, requiring an application to be made to a court.

We agree with the principle behind Amendments 32 and 33 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, that the powers the Secretary of State has to deprive British citizens of their citizenship need to be curtailed and the process made more transparent, but we believe that our Amendment 29 achieves those objectives.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I sense very well that the Committee would like to move on, so I will be much quicker than I had intended to be, but my noble friend Lord Paddick has asked me to speak to Amendment 29. Before I do so, I cannot resist rising to the challenge about my party’s involvement in the 2014 legislation. Perhaps after this debate I will explain to the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, the concessions gained in negotiation at that time in response to the agreement.

Amendment 29 would change the requirement from an assessment of conduciveness, if that is a word, to the public good to necessity in the interests of national security. I thank the Minister for her letter following Second Reading. I could not help thinking that the two examples she gave of where Clause 9 could apply probably were matters of national security. She says so for one example, and the other is where it is assessed to be

“in the interests of the relationship between the UK and another country”.

That must be very close to national security, unless the issue is a very long way away from the other country’s security, which would not be a good basis on which to move forward. The amendment would change the requirement of an order to allow for judicial involvement. These two examples actually show why the matter should go to a judge.

I am editing my speech as I go. Reference has been made to particular communities being especially affected by this provision. I say to the passengers on what, in my neck of the woods, is the 337 bus to Clapham that something does not need to be designed to have a particular effect. If it has that effect, it falls into the area we are concerned about.

Our amendment would also add to the exclusions a person holding British citizenship by birth, and where it would

“affect the best interests of a child in the family”.

That is looking at a fairly wide family. Use of the power would require an annual review, which I think is in the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I have listened to this debate with enormous care. I have conflicting feelings about it. I do not know whether I am prouder of the quality, logic and humanity of so many of the speeches, particularly from the Benches opposite, or whether the more compelling emotion I feel is anger that the speeches even had to be made. Unsurprisingly, I will speak against Clause 9 standing part of the Bill and in favour of the various amendments attempting to dilute its pernicious effect—and even more in favour of the proposed new clauses that attempt to go further.

I almost feel as if I and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, have listened to two completely different debates. The absolute tour de force by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, and other speeches on these new clauses were not wide of the mark, because they quite rightly acknowledged that Clause 9 deals just with notice. They conceded that point, but talked about the rot that goes further back in terms of two-tier citizenship and the more precarious version of citizenship that some people are coming to experience because of the increasing use of powers of deprivation, and because these will inevitably have to be used more against some groups within the citizenry than others.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Lords Hansard - part one & Report stage
Monday 10th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[The Lord Bishop of Manchester]

My Lords, I support Amendments 90H, 90J, 95A, 95B and 95C, to which I have added my name. I also signal my support for other amendments in this group which also seek to control more tightly how serious violence reduction orders will operate. I draw your Lordships’ attention to my work on policing ethics, both for Greater Manchester Police and for the National Police Chiefs’ Council, as set out in the register of interests.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, has indicated, Amendment 90H seeks to ensure that an SVRO can be applied only when a bladed article or offensive weapon is used to commit an offence, not simply when such an item happens to be present and in the possession of the defendant. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has indicated, as presently drafted, the Bill requires no substantive link between the weapon and the offence. An individual could, for example, commit a road traffic offence while driving home from a church picnic, with their used cutlery on the passenger seat next to them, and the prosecution could ask for an SVRO.

I can see that subsection (5) of the proposed new chapter is intended to mitigate that by requiring the court to consider that imposition of the order is necessary to protect the public or the defendant from possible future offences involving such weapons. However, I do not believe it adequately achieves that objective. Asking a court to conject what might happen in the future can all too easily invite decisions taken on discriminatory or flimsy grounds, especially as no court would wish to face public criticism for having failed to apply an SVRO should later violence occur. To legislate for future conjecture requires a robust link to what has already happened. Subsection (3)(a) gives that; it requires that the weapon was used by the defendant in committing the offence in question. Deleting subsection (3)(b), as this amendment seeks to do, would ensure that any order is based on genuine and evidenced risk. To put it bluntly, it would pass my church picnic test.

Amendment 90J, if I may turn to that, seeks to more closely tie the order to the offence by limiting it to the actual person who used or had possession of the weapon, not some putative third party who

“knew or ought to have known”

that they had it. The de facto joint enterprise element in the current drafting of this clause widens the net substantially for who can be affected, and includes people not convicted of knife crime. As the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, has just said, this is likely to disproportionately affect women and girls, who may well know or suspect that a partner or family member may be carrying a weapon but are far too vulnerable to be able to extricate themselves from a situation where violence involving such weapons may be committed by others.

I understand that the intention may be to provide such vulnerable adults with an excuse to stay away from both people and situations with which violence may be associated, but when I try to put myself in the position of such a person, I cannot really imagine saying to my partner or brother: “Oh, I must not be near you when you have a knife because I might get an SVRO against me.” I think these people are far too vulnerable. I hope I have persuaded your Lordships that Amendment 90J will address this deficit.

Finally, on Amendment 90J, apart from it being grossly unfair by ignoring the impact on vulnerable people, subsection (4) appears to be unworkable. How will the court determine if someone “ought to have known” that some other person had a knife? The amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, tease out this point specifically. I will leave others to speak to them at greater length, but if our own Amendment 90J does not win your Lordships’ support, I would hope that her amendments are more persuasive.

I now turn to Amendments 95A, 95B and 95C on the pilot scheme. In order to understand how SVROs operate in practice, these are entirely welcome. SVROs present a major innovation. There are significant risks of dangers from unexpected consequences—dangers that may outweigh any good that SVROs achieve. If we are to roll them out across the country, we need to have confidence that they are doing the job intended and making things better and not worse. For all the eloquence of our arguments in this House, there is nothing quite like having real, practical experience on the ground to draw on if we are going to get things right. These three amendments, taken together, simply seek to strengthen the pilot; to make it a genuine gathering of all the most relevant evidence, and one that will feed into a proper decision-making process here in Parliament, ahead of SVROs being rolled out across the nation.

In my early days as Bishop of Manchester, we had an idea of how we might make better and more locally informed decisions on where we deployed our vicars. We set up a two-year pilot across about a fifth of our dioceses. Towards the end of that period, we commissioned an independent evaluation by outside experts. We learned a huge amount from the exercise, and, in consequence, we never rolled out the substantive project. We did something different; we did something better. A pilot has to have the capacity to substantially implement the eventual shape of whatever is the final product, otherwise it is simply window dressing.

It is clear from speeches already made here today that there is considerable uncertainty about SVROs. In particular, noble Lords have drawn attention to the danger that they become associated with disproportionality and hence diminish confidence in policing and the courts. None of us wants that. We noted the risk that, rather than prevent criminalisation, they may draw more vulnerable people—especially young women—into the criminal justice system. We have remarked that extensive use of stop and search powers, especially in the absence of specific evidence of intention to offend, has over and again proved counterproductive. These last three amendments cover both the process and the content of the pilot evaluation. They will make for much better decisions on how and when, and perhaps most crucially if, SVROs are rolled out across the nation. I hope the Minister will be minded to accept them or to meet us to find an agreed way forward.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I wonder whether I could ask the Minister a question about her amendments to Clause 141. This takes forward to one point of detail the comments made by other noble Lords about targeting particular groups of possible offenders. Amendments 92 and 93 would extend the guidance from the exercise of functions by the police to, as in proposed new subsection 1A(b),

“guidance about identifying offenders in respect of whom it may be appropriate for … serious violence reduction orders to be made”.

To me, this reads very much like profiling. Can the Minister tell the House whether “identifying offenders” is about identifying particular individuals or a cohort, class or demographic in respect of whom the Government may see SVROs as appropriate?

[The Lord Bishop of Gloucester]

My Lords, I rise to support in particular Amendments 90H, 90J, 90K and 90L. As has been said, they are critical to ensuring that more vulnerable women are not drawn into the criminal justice system through the de facto joint enterprise element of SVROs. Probably like other noble Lords, I was shocked to read the briefing from Agenda, which states that analysis of

“109 joint enterprise cases involving women and girls”

shows that

“there was not a single case in which women and girls had handled a weapon; in 90% of cases they engaged in no violence at all; and in half of the cases they were not even present at the scene of the crime.”

As we have heard, SVROs will mean that women can be given an order based on a single judgment that, on the balance of probability, they “ought to have known” that someone in their company was in possession of a knife. That key phrase, “ought to have known”, is really troubling. Will the Minister consider how this fits in with wider policy, including the female offenders strategy, to limit the number of women serving short sentences and prevent reoffending?

We have a duty to limit unintended consequences. These amendments would do just that.