(3 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the principles of the amendments and declare my interest as a registered medical practitioner.
The debate in Committee has been most interesting in this regard, because it raises a delicate and deeply sensitive issue for any practising clinician—any practising healthcare professional—with the suggestion that something that is considered absolutely sacrosanct, the duty of confidentiality, may be in some way undermined.
That is, of course, not to neglect or fail to understand the fact that there are clear circumstances provided in the context of well-recognised and frequently applied professional guidance in which confidentiality may indeed be breached. But there is a suggestion that the way the Bill is drafted, there may be a deeply undermining impact on a very important principle, one that is so well recognised that it is protected in both data protection legislation and, as we have heard, common law. I wonder whether the Minister can explain why it is so important to achieve what are important objectives in the Bill that we need to undermine the common-law effect of such an important principle—confidentiality of medical information—and why they need to be promoted in the way proposed in the Bill. Have Her Majesty’s Government considered other ways to achieve their important objectives without creating this deep anxiety and uncertainty, because the full implications are clearly not well understood by the regulator or by professionals more generally, and which, we must therefore all feel, has the potential to be attended by consequences that could be deeply unhelpful to the nature and solidity of the doctor-patient relationship?
My Lords, I am well aware that we have some of the most senior lawyers in the country in the Committee today, and very senior doctors who have grappled with these issues, so perhaps I should put my point as a question. If the legislation provides for something that a doctor “regards”, is not the concept of reasonableness implied in that proposition, so the doctor must be reasonable in what he regards?
My Lords, I am sorry to intervene again, but it may help the debate if I address some of the issues raised. I should have mentioned in my speech—but I deliberately did not—my personal experiences when I was approached on four occasions by the police to give some information about patients. I refused, because I followed the guidance of the General Medical Council, and at no time did that threaten or harm the health of the patient nor anyone else—relatives or any members of the public. On one occasion, I voluntarily informed the police about a patient who had approached me for completely different reasons, but I had noticed that harm was being done to her and, on subsequent occasions, it became quite clear that it was becoming a serious issue. Therefore, I disclosed information to the police; again, following the GMC guidelines.
The common law may have soft edges, but if a doctor follows the common law and the guidance the GMC issues, it works. On what happens when a doctor refuses to give information, despite the fact that the patient is being harmed or that the patient may cause harm to other people, then the doctor will be wrong in his or her duty, and therefore can be overridden. That is the only point I would make.
(3 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I agree very much with the concerns that have been expressed this evening, and I would because I have an interest which I should declare as a trustee of Safer London whose work is directed to deterring young people from becoming involved in crime. Giving young people the tools they need to resist being pulled into crime is a very wide agenda. As is obvious from the name, the work is confined to London, but it is needed all over.
As well as that, I remember the debates during the passage of the Modern Slavery Bill on what is meant by “exploitation”. I take the point about people—it is not just children—who may be perceived as criminals but who are actually victims, so I understand the calls for much better understanding of child criminal exploitation. I hope that what I am about to say is understood to be support for, not opposition to, the thrust of what is being proposed.
Amendment 52, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, on training is absolutely to the point. If all agencies and authorities were trained to recognise what they are seeing but not recognising, in a way that would answer all the other points that have been made. If the prevention and reduction of crime, which is what these clauses are about, means anything, surely it must include safeguarding. That is prevention. Safeguarding is not defined, which does not surprise me because it is comprised of an awful lot of component parts and is different in different circumstances. I would be interested to know whether the Minister call tell us what is already on the statute book in this area. Are we talking about bringing together provisions that should be brought together that are scattered, as can be the case, or are we talking about something new in statutory terms?
I do not think that we can leave the issue without referring to resources. If there were the resources to extend the excellent work being done by various organisations far more widely, both in the voluntary sector and to statutory authorities, I do not think we would be talking about all this. But I am quite convinced that it comes back to training to recognise what should really be in front of people’s eyes. I know it is easy for us, standing up in the Chamber, to say that, and I would not like to do the job that some police officers, teachers, health workers and so on do. But the training should support the achievement of everything that noble Lords are seeking this evening.
My Lords, there are a number of general points I need to make about the new legal duties to support a multiagency approach to preventing and tackling serious violence. I will try to make them in the appropriate group of amendments, but I hope the Committee will accept that there is a great deal of overlap.
The overwhelming response of the non-governmental organisations I have met with which have concerns about this part of the Bill is that, as drafted, it is actually about forcing agencies to support a police-led enforcement approach to serious violence—not a public health approach, or even a multiagency approach, to preventing and tackling serious violence. The Government’s own consultation on this issue gave three options: a new legal duty on specific organisations to effectively share information with the police; a new legal duty to revise community safety partnerships, the existing and well-established mechanism where local authorities and police forces work together to prevent and tackle crime, and where the local police chief and local authority chief executive are equal partners in doing whatever each partner and others can do to reduce crime and disorder; and a voluntary non-legislative approach. There was more support for a legislative approach than a voluntary one, but more respondents favoured enhancing community safety partnerships—40%—compared with a new legal duty to provide information to the police—37%—and, tellingly, the police supported equally options one and two.
Even the police, the sector most likely to benefit from a police-led enforcement approach, were ambivalent as to whether it should be a truly multiagency approach by enhancing community safety partnerships or a police-led enforcement approach. So why did the Government opt for the latter and not the former? A police-led enforcement approach was the Government’s preferred option from the beginning. These amendments, which we support, are the first manifestation of challenging that police-led enforcement approach, in that the legal duty does not sufficiently recognise that many young people, particularly those involved in county lines, are victims of criminal exploitation rather than free-acting criminals. Henry Blake is a former youth worker who draws on his personal experiences of working with at-risk young people in his powerful film, “County Lines”—a drama about one young man who is drawn into county lines drug dealing. I would highly recommend this film to any noble Lord who is unaware of the realities of county lines.
Many young people lacking family support and living in poverty find themselves groomed by adults who appear to show them the love and concern they desperately seek, and who treat them to meals in burger restaurants and buy them new trainers—something their often lone parent cannot afford. They promise them money, not just so they can afford the latest designer clothing that they need if they are not to be bullied by gangs, who see those who do not wear designer labels—even Nike and Adidas—as targets. It is not just so they can go to McDonald’s whenever they want, but so that they can help their mum put food on the table and make sure their younger sister has decent clothes to wear. I hope noble Lords can see how easily vulnerable young people are drawn into criminality, not just for pecuniary advantage but for the sense of belonging and the sense that someone is at last paying them some attention. For many, it is as much an emotional need as a financial one.
Of course, the reality is very different. The adults exploiting these young people take the vast majority of the profits of the drug dealing in which they are involving these young people whom they have groomed, and the youngsters take all the risks, often ending in violence from rival drug dealers. These young people are victims of criminal exploitation, and each one of us is to blame—not them. It is our fault that their single mothers have to do three minimum wage jobs to pay the rent and put food on the table and so, through no fault of their own, can rarely be there for their kids as most wish they could be. It is our fault that too many people do not have a decent place to live, because they cannot afford private rents for an appropriately sized home in a good state of repair, and that there is a shocking shortage of social housing and much of what exists is in an appalling state of repair. It is our fault that, as the cost of living spirals upwards, we take away £20 a week in universal credit from those most in need. The Government’s response is to force other agencies to divulge information that makes it easier for them to prosecute these victims of criminal exploitation.
That is why the Bill needs to radically change from a police-led enforcement approach to preventing and tackling serious violence to a truly public health and multiagency approach, starting with—although this is only the beginning of the changes needed—putting the safeguarding of children involved in serious violence in the Bill. That must include, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, suggests in his Amendment 50, and as both Barnardo’s and the Children’s Society have suggested, including a statutory definition of child criminal exploitation in the meaning of exploitation in Section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, suggests in her Amendment 52, training for police officers in particular, to ensure that they are aware of child criminal exploitation and actively seeking evidence of such exploitation.
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am not sure whether the knocking sound behind us has been someone trying to get in or someone trying to get out of the Chamber.
The House recently established a new Justice and Home Affairs Committee, which I am lucky enough to chair. We are currently looking at new technologies and their application in the law—wider than the Bill, but very pertinent to it and to crime prevention and reduction, and to policing and sentencing. Artificial insemination—
I hope Hansard does not repeat that.
Artificial intelligence has huge potential benefits and raises huge concerns, and it is not anticipating the work of the committee to refer to them this afternoon. For instance, collaboration between authorities—Part 2 of the Bill—requires the sharing of information. Will this contribute to profiling and predictive policing? Predictive policing algorithms identify likely crime hot spots; officers are deployed there, and so more stop and search takes place and more crime is reported. It is a feedback loop; a self-fulfilling prophecy which can teach the algorithm to alert the user to particular geographical areas, communities and ethnicities. It has been put to the committee that it is important to involve at a very early stage of the process, and in a meaningful way, members of the communities that are likely to be at the sharp end of these algorithms, and not to leave it to people such as the witness or me—a white, middle-class, university-educated person, who is unlikely, one hopes, to be profiled as a future risk—because even with the best will in the world, we might not spot some of these problems and risks. A tick-box exercise is not enough.
Trust in systems translates to trust in authorities and in government itself—or, of course, the converse. The Bill permits the disclosure of data, but who owns it? What consents are required? Who knows about disclosure? We all expect some information—for instance, that between us and our medical professionals—to remain confidential. Transparency is important at an individual level, as well as more broadly. A defendant, or indeed someone questioned, will find it difficult to establish what technology—what combination of facial recognition technology, number plate recognition, predictive techniques—has led to his being identified as a suspect. If he cannot identify it, he cannot challenge it. How are we to ensure governance, regulation, accountability and scrutiny on an ongoing basis in the case of machine learning?
The technology has to be procured, and it will be procured from the private sector, whose interests are not the same as the public sector’s, and it is differently regulated, if at all. How can we be sure that purchasing authorities in the public sector understand what they are procuring? In the US, some police departments accepted a free trial of body-worn cameras, but they came with an obligation to be part of the manufacturer’s data ecosystem, including an obligation to use that company’s software and store data on its servers.
It is said that we need “human override”, but humans can get it wrong too. Human operators need to understand the limitations of particular technology to avoid overreliance on it or misinterpretation; they need to retain their critical factors.
These issues apply to identification, the extraction of information from electronic devices, monitoring and more that is in the Bill. They are the context for the development of policing and sentencing, such as the new cautions; for scrutiny, both general and in particular cases; and for our assessment of ethical considerations. We should be clear that there are clear principles to be applied. The National Audit Office has just reported on the national law enforcement data programme from a value-for-money point of view, of course, but there are other costs. The NAO mentioned, as I have, trust and the cost of damaging it. AI impacts society, communities, democracy and individual rights. We must be clear about what we are doing and why.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will be supporting the noble Baronesses, Lady Meacher and Lady Hamwee, and my noble friend Lady Wilcox should they wish to press this amendment to a vote today. We all know that migrant women with no recourse to public funds face so many additional barriers to safety from violence. Abusers commonly use women’s fear of immigration enforcement and separation from their children to control them and stop them seeking the help that they need. Thanks must go to Elizabeth Jiménez-Yáñez, co-ordinator of Step Up Migrant Women, Janaya Walker of Southall Black Sisters, and all those organisations which work with migrant women and have kindly shared many heart-breaking testimonies with us.
We all, including the Minister, wish to ensure that safe pathways are established for migrant women to report abuse. To be honest, I am disappointed that our arguments for the Bill to play its part in achieving that have so far fallen on deaf ears. The Government are saying that the 2020 National Police Chiefs’ Council guidance simply needs better implementation. We are saying, however, that the super-complaint investigation, which several of us referred to in Committee, found that the guidance on data-sharing has been only inconsistently adopted by police forces in England and Wales; is discretionary, as the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, has said; and is therefore not fit for purpose.
If the guidance is not working adequately and there is no legal duty for the police to tell immigration enforcement if they know someone is in the country illegally, why are the Government not using this Bill to remedy the situation? Why also are the Government waiting until 21 June to respond to the super-complaint investigation by Liberty and Southall Black Sisters? Obviously, this will be too late for this Bill—and too late for so many women who are living in fear not only of abuse but of detection and of reporting that abuse.
Why are the Government also insisting that the police need to share the victim’s data to safeguard the victim? Surely, it is the role of the police to safeguard and investigate, and to refer the victim of abuse to specialist services, as the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, has said—and it is the role of immigration to enforce immigration policy and rules. These roles should not be conflated at the expense of the victim. The Stand Up Migrant Women campaign also insists that there is a distinct lack of data on any positive effects resulting from such information-sharing. I ask the Minister to think again about the importance of this amendment to so many migrant women who are trapped in the sinking sands of irregular identity and regular abuse.
My Lords, this amendment is about victims of domestic abuse who have—or, crucially, believe that they have—insecure status. Believing or being told that you are insecure is part of control, as the noble Baroness, Lady Crawley, just said, and trust or lack of trust—indeed, fear of an authority figure—is a significant barrier to seeking help. In Committee, I quoted Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, who said:
“Victims should have every confidence in approaching the police for protection”,
and should
“never be in a position where they fear the actions of the police could unintentionally but severely intensify their vulnerability”.
That was about organised crime but it applies precisely also to this situation.
The Government have, or will have, their pilot on the needs of migrant women. They are not a homogeneous group: there are different groups and communities, and so on, but the subjects of this amendment are characterised by the common factor of insecure status. The issue is about process. Without a firewall, quite a lot of women—and some men—will not even get to square one of “victims first and foremost”.
At the previous stage, the Minister spoke of the benefits to sharing information. I do not dispute that there are certain benefits in some situations but this is a matter for the individuals’ consent. I am very concerned that in Committee, in referring to victims’ needs being “put first”, she talked about there being a “clear position” on the police exchanging information about victims of immigration enforcement. There should indeed be a clear position, and the amendment provides it. She also said that the Government are
“equally … bound to maintain an effective immigration system”,
that
“individuals … should be subject to our laws”
and that if their status is irregular, they
“should be supported to come forward … and, where possible, to regularise their stay”.—[Official Report, 1/2/21; col. 1912.]
We could have a debate about safeguarding from exploitation, which I acknowledge that she mentioned, too, but that is not the issue here.
This sounds too much like “status first” and is not consistent with “victims first”, which is what we have heard throughout the debate, and rightly so. I support the amendment. We on our Benches will support it not only because of the Istanbul convention, as mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, but because of its intrinsic importance.
My Lords, I have put my name to both these amendments. The points made in the previous debate substantially apply, as well as the powerful speeches we have heard in Committee and today. I noted that the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, ended on a very positive note. Amendment 70 is about the destitution domestic violence concession, and I found myself thinking about the meaning of each of those words. At the previous stage, the Minister said that the system was designed for a different purpose,
“to provide a route to settlement for migrant victims who held spousal visas”—[Official Report, 8/2/21; col. 98.]
and had a legitimate expectation of a permanent stay. However, given the definition of domestic abuse, the term included in the amendment as part of the Bill and defined in it, even if one thought that any extension beyond someone with a spousal visa was inappropriate, there would surely be unlikely to be any substantial numbers.
Even if one thought that an extension of limited leave to remain from three to six months was too generous, it is only limited leave, as has already been said. Do the Government really believe that this would
“lead to more exploitation of our immigration system”,—[Official Report, 8/2/21; col. 99.]
as was said in Committee? If we consider victims as victims first, what is the Government’s proposal for the victims we are discussing here, who are in a very particular situation on top of everything else that they have to contend with?
Amendment 87 is about equality—positive equality without discrimination on the grounds of migrant or refugee status. This prompted me to think about the unconscious, sometimes perhaps conscious, prejudices that there are against equality and, indeed, against migrants—some migrants, sometimes all migrants. My noble friend Lady Hussein-Ece made a very succinct point in Committee that the amendment would enshrine a more consistent and cohesive approach which must be adhered to by all public authorities in providing for victim protection. She had hoped to be able to speak on the second day of Committee, but was unable to, so withdrew her name, and the procedures mean that she cannot speak on it today. I am sorry, because her voice would have been welcome.
This is another amendment that would deprive an abuser of a means of control and abuse. We were told in Committee and on other occasions that the ratification of the Istanbul convention is, of course, under review, pending the evaluation and findings of the support for migrant victims scheme. I am afraid that “under review” and “pending” sound to me rather like “parked”. Both the noble Baronesses, Lady Helic and Lady Lister, mentioned the suggestion that we have heard from the Government—not in the debate, but before today—about ratification with reservations. I share their concerns.
I am baffled that there should be any resistance to ensuring that all victims of domestic abuse receive equally effective treatment and support, irrespective of who they are and how they came to be in the UK. In view of what has been called an inconsistent and even haphazard response by the police, we need to make clear that this is about equality. It is not about some victims qualifying and some not. Surely we accept equality. We accept that legislation is not necessary for ratification of the convention, but this is our opportunity to move ahead. What is the problem? Are the Government concerned about challenges to particular decisions? Is this in fact, as it was beginning to sound at the Bill’s previous stage, about not victims first but Treasury first? If so, could we at least hear that said?
To me, the arguments of the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, are irrefutable, and she put them very clearly and powerfully. Our Benches support her. I hope that she will give the House the opportunity to support her. If she does not, I give notice that when we get to its place in the list, I will move Amendment 87 to put it to the House and, if necessary, take it to a Division, and I would be grateful if my voice could be taken accordingly.
My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I agree with everything she and the previous speakers, particularly the right reverend prelate Bishop of Gloucester, have said. These two amendments follow on from Amendment 67, and it really is time that the Government at last implemented the Istanbul convention without reservations, treated all victims of domestic abuse equally and made provision for those subject to immigration control to have a route to make the appropriate applications. The Government would retain control, but it would at least give these people, who are not married, or not treated as married, a possible route to remain in this country—without having certainty of it, which would remain in the hands of the Government.
Without these amendments, like with Amendment 67, there is a danger of serious discrimination against groups of victims and the creation of a flawed piece of legislation negating much of what would otherwise be, as so many people have said, a landmark Act. I add that the pilot project is just delaying an important and necessary decision.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, like the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, I feel a sense of frustration. There are so many issues that one wants to pursue, but it is not the first Bill where we will experience that. In Committee, we had a series of amendments regarding the role of the domestic abuse commissioner. Almost all of them were concerned with ensuring that the job is not so constructed as to preclude the commissioner making her own decisions on how to go about her work. I put it that way to distinguish it from the content of the work.
The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, put it very succinctly. He said that the whole thrust of certain clauses is a worry because it appears that the Secretary of State wants to pull all the levers. Our debates largely boiled down to the commissioner’s autonomy. I did not entirely follow the assessment of the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson; he said that our amendments focused on independence but then set about how the commissioner should fulfil the role. Independence was a particular focus on this part of the Bill, although naturally noble Lords had been keen to draw attention to a variety of issues. That tension has been a bit of an issue today, of course, but that is perhaps by the by.
Independence is a hugely important component of the role. The Government have been arguing today that that is so in resisting some amendments; they certainly did that in Committee. It is a component, as far as possible, given that the commissioner’s position is that of a statutory officeholder funded by the Secretary of State with no separate legal persona. The framework agreement between the commissioner and the Secretary of State will be very important in this regard.
As well as the commissioner’s freedom to select her own staff—following due process, of course—in Committee we had quite extensive debate about the advisory board. Different noble Lords argued for members of the board with particular backgrounds and experience. The Bill provides for at least six members and spells out whom each of the six is to represent. I have to say that the term “represent” still troubles me. I think there is a danger of muddling representation and advice. The maximum under the Bill is 10 members. Why? Clearly, there is a huge range of problems and situations relevant to domestic abuse and so a range of individuals and organisations with a range of experience and expertise, including experience of the whole sector and its interconnecting parts, is needed.
In our view, the commissioner should have the scope —and this is a matter of her autonomy—to appoint such a board to advise her, or, in the future, him, as she considers appropriate. At this stage, I am not arguing with the interests that the six are to represent under the Bill, although I remain concerned that they will be the Secretary of State’s pick, but if the commissioner wishes to bring in more than four further people in the capacity of advisory board members she should be able to do so. There seems no good reason to impose the restriction on numbers.
In Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, said that this was
“to ensure that the board can operate effectively and efficiently.”—[Official Report, 27/1/21; col. 1711.]
That is what we all want, but efficiency and effectiveness is about more than numbers. It is about what each member contributes and how the board as a whole operates and that should be a matter for the commissioner. The commissioner can and may well seek advice from elsewhere. I dare say she can bring people into board meetings as a one-off. I am not sure whether she can co-opt—I cannot see that there is a restriction on that. However, those individuals should be afforded the respect of a permanent role if that is warranted and not be limited as the board proposes. This issue encapsulates our concerns about the commissioner’s autonomy and independence and that is why we have chosen it as the one to pursue at this stage. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am very glad that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has brought this matter back to the attention of your Lordships on Report. Clearly, the idea of an advisory board is welcome and, like the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I have no objection to the range of interests which the Bill specifies must be represented on the board itself.
Like the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, although it is not the subject of the amendment, I am still very surprised by the term “representative”. I know that this is an advisory board, rather than a governance board, but having the notion of representatives is very bad corporate governance. People should be appointed for what they can contribute, not for whom they represent. I hope that that does not make it more difficult to have an effective advisory board.
I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, on the numbers to be appointed. I accept that 10 is a reasonable figure, but there may be circumstances where the commissioner would want to go above that. I fail to see why we cannot leave it to her good sense to be able to do so, if she wants to. I hope the Government will accept this very sensible and modest amendment.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for setting out why she has tabled this amendment again, which would remove the upper limit of 10 advisory board members to be appointed by the domestic abuse commissioner. It is certainly important that the advisory board should be representative of a broad range of different groups and experts who have responsibilities for responding to domestic abuse. However, the Government submit that we need to limit the numbers of the board, not because we want to fetter the discretion of the commissioner but to ensure that the board is sufficiently large to be representative but not so large that it becomes unwieldy.
We consider that the maximum membership of 10 is the right number to ensure that the board can discharge its functions efficiently and effectively. I appreciate the acknowledgement by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, that 10 is a reasonable number, even if he supports the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. This upper limit does not, of course, stop the commissioner from also seeking advice from other experts, but the advisory board itself needs to be of a manageable size and small enough to provide focused support to her. To answer the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, others could of course attend the advisory board meetings if the commissioner so wished, even if they were not members of it.
As I indicated in Committee, a member of the advisory board could represent the interests of more than one group, ensuring an even wider range of representation. For example, she or he could represent the interests of victims of domestic abuse while also representing the interests of specialist charities.
As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, noted, in addition to the board, the commissioner will be required through her terms and conditions of employment to establish a victims and survivors advisory group to engage directly with victims and survivors in its work. I hope noble Lords will appreciate the importance of putting victims and survivors at the centre of that work. The commissioner may also establish any other groups as she sees fit, so could—as the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, asks—seek additional advice if she wanted to do so.
So the Government remain of the view that Clause 12 strikes the right balance between setting out certain minimum requirements regarding the membership of the advisory board while affording sufficient latitude to the commissioner to appoint one which can support her in the exercise of her functions. However, we would certainly be happy to keep this under review. On that basis, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, will be content to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have supported this amendment. As my noble friend described, circumstances can change. She put the position very clearly.
The noble Lord has just said that the matter will be kept “under review”. I realised as this short debate went on that this was one of the very rare occasions when I wished that the matter was dealt with in regulations rather than in primary legislation, because it would have been so much easier to change the numbers through secondary legislation.
Despite comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and by me, the Minister used the terms “representative” and “represent” throughout his response. This is precisely something that continues to concern me—and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, as he said. The Minister said that the Government do not want to fetter the commissioner’s discretion, but, of course, that is exactly what the clause does.
The dynamics of groups is something which interests me—how a group develops ways of working and works most creatively. Other experts who may be asked to give advice would not be part of a cohesive unit. I think that a cohesive unit where members are able to spark off one another and bring to the table various parts of experience—including of life, as well as of the direct subject matter—makes for the most effectiveness. Sometimes disagreeing makes for effectiveness, too. Of course, a huge group will function in a different way. I am not anticipating a very big group. I have chaired for quite a long time a group of 25; that was too many, but it was too many for the particular task rather than too many, period.
For the benefit of other noble Lords as well, I am happy to provide a quick response. We will certainly take that point away and discuss it further. The noble Baroness is right that as it is in primary legislation then primary legislation would be needed. The Government submit that the number we are putting forward is reasonable. If the experience of this and future commissioners suggests that it is not then we would of course discuss that with them, and it would be a matter for Parliament to change the primary legislation if it so wished. Still, for the reasons that I set out, the Government consider that the number that we are putting forward, 10, will not bring about the problems that noble Lords have anticipated.
I thank the Minister for that. I hope we do not feel an urgent need to review this issue. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(4 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am speaking on this group because I respect the experience and judgment of the signatories to these two amendments. The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, mentioned the resentment that can grow after a long period of caring for a family member. I would add the sheer exhaustion and the discovery that the person who is being cared for does not seem to be the person they once were.
The first amendment on the duty to report reminds me of debates we held not so long ago about a mandatory duty to report and act on the abuse or neglect of children. This amendment does not go that far. It seems to be cast as a contract of employment. I am not sure what the outcome would be in the case of non-compliance. It may be too detailed at this stage when we are discussing principles.
This is another aspect of awareness and the culture change, which have been discussed quite a lot this afternoon. The amendment is worded as if someone is carrying out a financial assessment. Would that person have more access than someone carrying out an occupational health assessment of the needs for adaptations? I accept that a financial assessment is about more than paperwork, but there will be clues, such as, “Oh, my daughter deals with all that”.
The amendment is linked to the amendment introduced on the second day of Committee about mandatory awareness training for professionals. Its focus was on front-line professionals, but all the points made then apply here too. When the House looks again at that amendment, as I am sure it will, can we think about how it is relevant to this situation? In that debate, my noble friend Lady Burt talked about co-ordination between agencies. The Minister, who gave a sympathetic and detailed response, referred to guidance from different agencies. As the mover of that amendment, the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong of Hill Top, said,
“there is plenty of guidance but no means of making sure that it is always translated into action.”–[Official Report, 27/1/21; col. 1741.]
Despite the Scottish and Welsh examples about the power of entry, I am rather leery of going down this path. I do not know the extent to which professionals, other than the police and social workers, can apply for an order, as the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, mentioned. I am too much of a Pollyanna in wanting to start from a position of sympathy with both sides and to take a gentler approach, but I know that gentleness and nuance do not always work. Adult safeguarding is complex, especially if access is blocked. All this raises issues around privacy and the importance of building relationships.
I realise that the life and limb threshold for the police to gain entry under PACE is high. I also appreciate that there has been work on this issue, although, unlike the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, I could not get past “page not found” when I searched for it this morning.
The noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, is a doughty campaigner and advocate. I appreciate I have been a bit picky, so I make it clear that I share the concerns which lie behind these amendments, although I have some reservations about their detail.
My Lords, like others, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, on championing the rights of older people over so many years. I will speak in support of Amendments 165 and 166.
At Second Reading, I highlighted the ONS statistics showing that in 2017, when it comes to older victims, more than 200,000 people aged 60 to 74 experienced domestic abuse in England and Wales. One in four victims of domestic homicide are over the age of 60. Age UK argues that older victims are systematically overlooked, suggesting that an older person being physically or mentally abused by their adult child or grandchild, family member or spouse of 50-plus years is far less likely to be recognised for who they are—a victim. It is a well-known fact that, in the UK, women regularly outlive men. As a result, they are often more vulnerable, living on their own and frail.
The noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, highlighted the work of Hourglass, formerly Action on Elder Abuse. Its recent polling, conducted during the pandemic last year, showed that the number of calls related to the abuse of older people by a neighbour doubled. Meanwhile, 38% of calls in the first six months of 2020 related to sons or daughters as the perpetrators. Hourglass also reports that financial abuse is the most common type of abuse reported to its helpline, making up 40% of calls in 2019. These facts only reinforce the importance of these two amendments.
Amendment 165 is needed because financial assessment is an important marker and access point where potential abuse can be identified. Amendment 166 will ensure powers equal to those tried and tested across the border in Scotland and is an important safeguard for all, including older victims. How we treat our vulnerable is a reflection of our society and the elderly, like the very young, are among the most vulnerable. We need a zero-tolerance attitude to abuse, whatever the age of those involved, and must work hard to protect the vulnerable and support the many hidden victims of such crimes.
My Lords, the Equality and Human Rights Commission is pretty hard pressed and overloaded, so it is interesting that it chose to work on the subject of domestic abuse at work in conjunction with the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development—the human resources professional body—from which we had a helpful briefing.
We spoke earlier about the impact of domestic abuse at work, about the workplace being a haven, about workplace culture and the importance to both employer and employee of dealing sensitively, appropriately and helpfully with domestic abuse. I regard this as part of occupational health and safety. As has been said, neither amendment seeks direct legislative provision.
Proposed new subsection (2) in Amendment 174, with regard to a code of practice, uses the terms
“appropriate care and support from their employer.”
It is not looking for the employer to solve the problem but to enable access to professional support and give flexibility to accommodate the needs of a victim or survivor. As the CIPD says in respect of its guide, Managing and Supporting Employees Experiencing Domestic Abuse, what employer support could look like includes
“recognising the problem, responding appropriately to disclosure, providing support, and referring to the appropriate help.”
One good outcome of the pandemic is the greater alertness to the various situations in which employees find themselves. I include in that senior staff right up to the top. We sometimes talk as if “the employer” is not made up of human beings. We will all be aware of, or work with, organisations that have a huge range of policies applying to employment and the workplace. They are, in effect, codes of practice. Both amendments identify a gap that should be filled.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate and I join those who have already wished the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, a happy birthday. She has had a busy birthday in your Lordships’ House today. I hope that we will finish in time for her to celebrate before the day is over. I am particularly grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Burt of Solihull, and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, for setting out their amendments in the way they did. They bring us on to the role that employers can and should play in supporting employees who are victims of domestic abuse.
The Government agree that employers can play an important role, and that there is more that can be done in this area by working with them to help lift the lid on this often-hidden crime. However, as noble Lords have noted, this is a sensitive area and it is vital to ensure that we have the right approach. That is why, in June last year, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy launched a review into support in the workplace for victims of domestic abuse. This comprised a call for evidence, a literature review and discussions with interested parties and groups to explore the issues in greater depth. As the noble Baroness, Lady Burt of Solihull noted, we published the report from this review last month, on 14 January.
The findings in this report show that, for people experiencing domestic abuse, the workplace can be a place of safety and respite. As my noble friend Lady Newlove said, it is somewhere where they might have a trusted mentor or confidant. They can make the arrangements that they need there and perhaps use a work telephone to contact refuges or other services, which can help them escape their abuser. The review also highlighted the importance of employers responding with empathy and sensitivity to disclosures of domestic abuse, asking the right questions and ensuring that the workplace is a safe place for people to come forward.
The evidence provided to the Government made it clear that victims may also need flexibility to engage with services such as refuges, healthcare, the police and the courts, during their regular working hours. Sometimes that might mean changes to their working location or the type of work that they do in order to ensure their safety. We expect employers to respond with empathy and flexibility to such requests. No victim should need to worry about their employment while they are seeking to leave an abusive situation.
Where victims of domestic abuse need to change their working patterns or locations, they may be able to make use of the existing right to request flexible working, which noble Lords noted. Our review into how employers can support victims of domestic abuse generated some valuable insights, which will be considered when we take forward the commitment that we made in our manifesto to consult on making flexible working the default.
The Government recognise that there is much merit in providing guidance and support to employers on how to support victims of domestic abuse. The review that I mentioned found that, while employers want to support their staff, they may lack the awareness, understanding and capacity to do so. My noble friend Lady Newlove gave an example of an employer who, sadly, got it wrong. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, companies are made up of people; this is first and foremost a human interaction. People want to get it right, but they need to be given the right advice on how to do so. It is also clear that domestic abuse can bring difficult challenges for employers, for example where victims and perpetrators work together in the same place.
The Government want to ensure that employers have the tools and support that they need to support their staff. As set out in our report, therefore, we will work with representatives of victims, employers and workers alike to bring forward proposals in this area. We welcome the positive action that we have already seen across the country. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, mentioned Vodafone, which is one of many employers, including Lloyds and many more, which are showing the way by adopting policies that support victims in the workplace and by raising awareness of domestic abuse as a workplace issue. We will continue to encourage employers to follow suit wherever possible.
In doing that, we recognise and value the good work being done by a variety of organisations, some of which have been mentioned in our debate, to provide support and guidance for employers: for example, the Employers’ Initiative on Domestic Abuse, Hestia, Public Health England, Business in the Community, the Equalities and Human Rights Commission and the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development all provide resources for employers free of charge. As the noble Baroness, Lady Burt of Solihull, said, they are all over this, and trade unions are doing important work in this area, as well.
Through our review, the Government have set out a clear course of action to help employers to support victims of domestic abuse. It creates a firm basis on which to make progress. Given that commitment and the findings of the report from last month which I mentioned, I hope that the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.
(4 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, at this stage in the journey of a Bill, I know your Lordships’ House will be mindful of its role as an unelected revising Chamber, but in the context of this Bill I humbly suggest that noble Lords be equally mindful of the serious constitutional, human rights and rule of law implications of the legislation, which was not a manifesto commitment of any party.
While mature democracies the world over have written constitutions and entrenched Bills of Rights, including ultimate strike-down powers with which their highest courts can protect fundamental rights and freedoms, that is not currently the case in the United Kingdom. Instead, the burden of protecting rights and freedoms must be more evenly shared between the judiciary and legislature. While your Lordships’ House lacks the other place’s elected legitimacy, it can in my view justify its existence at all only by having more of the independence of mind required to stand up for the most fundamental human rights of the vulnerable against state oppression, by accident or design, in the form of authorised criminality with total legal impunity.
Furthermore, the Joint Committee on Human Rights has an important role in our unusual constitutional scheme. It has been unequivocal in its critique of the ways this legislation violates the European Convention on Human Rights. Your Lordships took its clear advice, and that of my noble friend Lady Massey, in the form of the amendment banning the authorisation of certain grave crimes, in particular murder, rape and torture. The Government’s rebuttal is both circular and hollow. They argue that the grave offences in this amendment would provide a deadly checklist against which suspected undercover agents might be tested, but they also argue that the convention rights already provide these express prohibitions. This amendment might be either dangerous or superfluous, but it surely cannot be both. Which is it?
In the past, government lawyers have argued that the convention rights do not bind undercover agents of the state, and only recently, in the very litigation that provoked this Bill, they argued that agents are not precluded from committing murder. I am clear in my belief that the Human Rights Act binds undercover agents of the state, alongside the state itself. I would be grateful if the Minister could place her express agreement with that proposition on the record during today’s proceedings.
However, even that would not render this amendment superfluous, as the criminal law provides a clearer and more detailed set of instructions to all our citizens. This is essential to our nation’s compliance with convention rights. What would your Lordships’ House say if this kind of criminal immunity, without detailed limitation even for grave offences, were being passed in Russia, China or anywhere other than here? What would the Government say?
As a matter of conscience, and if only to record our grave concerns for the benefit of the litigators and senior jurists who will inevitably pick up the stitches that legislators have dropped, I will test the opinion of your Lordships’ House.
My Lords, I will speak to Motions A, C and D and my noble friend Lord Paddick to Motions B and E. I thank the Minister and the Government for their engagement on the Bill, which raised far more issues than its slim size might have suggested.
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, proposed the way forward on the first point, along with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. They and we on these Benches would have far preferred the new Section 29B to require criminal conduct authorisations to require “reasonable belief” on the part of the person granting them that they are necessary and proportionate and that the requisite arrangements are in place—in other words, for that to be placed in the Bill. Necessity and proportionality are dependent on a belief which, as the Bill is drawn, is subjective, which dilutes the safeguards. The House agreed with us.
The Government have been concerned that, because Section 29 of RIPA—the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act—which deals with authorisation for the conduct and use of covert human sources, requires belief only, the different wording in new Section 29B would throw Section 29 into doubt. I understand the significance of consistency in legislation, but I do not entirely follow the argument in this case, since Section 32A, which was inserted into RIPA in 2012 and deals with authorisations, including those under Section 29—I hope noble Lords are following so far—provides for judicial authority if and only if the judicial authority is satisfied that there were reasonable grounds for believing and so on. Even if the argument is restricted to consistency, our view is that the term should be included in the Bill. The Commons disagreed with this on the basis of inconsistency, which would cast the doubt to which I have referred. The Solicitor-General assured them that
“the legal position is already that the belief must be reasonable, as a matter of public law.”—[Official Report, Commons, 27/1/21; col. 425.]
We have therefore come to the pragmatic solution that the statutory code of practice at paragraph 3.10 should not, as it says in the draft of the code, say that it is expected there should be reasonable belief. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, commented pithily that nothing could be less desirable. A mere expectation should not satisfy the Solicitor-General either. It is to be replaced by the words the Minister has quoted; I would be grateful if she could ensure that Hansard knows there are to be quotation marks around them, because they could have sounded descriptive rather than the text—the same changes are to be made at paragraph 6.4 of the code of practice. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has commented, the police will rely on the code of practice—I hope I have not stolen his line.
On civil redress, during the passage of the Bill there have been different approaches to ensure that someone injured during the course of authorised conduct should be entitled to redress. We were repeatedly assured that no amendment was necessary; the Minister said the Bill did not “in practice” interfere with the criminal injuries compensation scheme, a term which I queried.
The cross-party amendment led on by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, was agreed by the House by a very substantial majority. We now have a Commons reason that it would be
“inappropriate to create an exception to the effect of”
CCAs, which rather makes our point that an amendment is necessary, but I understand the sometimes slightly obscure process of coming to the formulation of reasons. We welcome this amendment, and we are pleased that the Government have found a form of words to cover the issue that they can live with and with which we are happy to live.
(4 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we have Amendments 55 and 56 in this group, and my name is also to Amendment 154 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher.
From the moment the Data Protection Bill, as it was, arrived in this House, we opposed paragraph 4 of Schedule 2, which exempts data processed for purposes relating to “effective immigration control” from the protection provisions. Our reasons range from the ethical, for instance, solicitors being unable to obtain what the Home Office knows or thinks it knows about a client; to the humanitarian, for instance, deterring asylum seekers from seeking assistance to which they are entitled; to the practical, for instance, there are obvious implications for public health if people seek to stay under the radar.
The vulnerability of migrants subjected to domestic abuse is recognised by the commissioner-designate, and we have more amendments to come on different issues. It is recognised by Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, who has recently said:
“Victims should have every confidence in approaching the police for protection. They should expect and receive protection at times when they are vulnerable and so desperately need the assistance of the agents of the state. Victims should never be in a position where they fear the actions of the police could unintentionally but severely intensify their vulnerability and thereby strengthen the hands of organised criminals and others whose motives and objectives are to inspire fear and do them harm.”
There is an obvious read-across from that. The vulnerability and fragility I mentioned are also recognised by the Government, but by way of a pilot.
As well as the stand-alone proposed new clause, which is Amendment 154, it seems to us necessary to address the issue in the specific clause regarding disclosure of information both by and to the commissioner. Patient information is dealt with; nothing requires or authorises its disclosure, and that is right. Nothing requires or authorises disclosure that would contravene data protection legislation. That does not preclude processing—the term used—of personal data for
“the investigation or detection of activities that would undermine the maintenance of effective immigration control.”
We very much support Amendment 154, whose authors have thought through many aspects of this. They urge that we do not put the commissioner in a position where information may not, out of fear, be confided in her, or where she is required to disclose immigration information. As so often happens when one returns to an amendment, I can see Amendments 55 and 56 might be more nuanced and detailed, but it is important, at this point, to get the matter on to the table. I beg to move Amendment 55.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 154 in my name. I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Wilcox and Lady Hamwee, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London for supporting it.
The key point is that victims of domestic abuse and their witnesses must be able to divulge personal data in the context of seeking or receiving support or assistance related to domestic abuse without the risk that such data may be used for immigration control purposes. Proposed new subsections (1) and (2) require the Secretary of State to make arrangements to honour this key principle and proposed new subsection (4) requires them to issue guidance to relevant officials and others affected by the new clause.
Migrant women with insecure immigration status are, in my view very understandably, reluctant to report domestic abuse to the statutory services. Would you, one might ask, particularly to the police? This reluctance is due to the current data-sharing agreements between statutory services, including the police and the Home Office, for immigration control purposes. This means that women affected cannot seek support or a safe place to go, with the most appalling consequences, as one can very easily imagine. Perpetrators are not being brought to justice.
In 2019, the Step Up Migrant Women campaign found that half of migrant women with insecure immigration status do not report abuse to the police for fear of detention and deportation. The use of insecure immigration status by perpetrators as a tool of coercive control has been highlighted for many years. CEDAW highlights this problem and calls on states to repeal restrictive immigration laws that leave migrant domestic workers vulnerable in this way. Imkaan’s vital statistics report shows that no less than 92% of migrant women have reported deportation threats from their perpetrator.
The Government’s draft statutory guidance framework for the Bill recognises the situation; indeed, it recognises the need for more support if these women are to seek help, but this support is not available in this Bill. The Government’s response has been to announce a pilot scheme to assess the needs of migrant women and provide those with no recourse to public funds with emergency accommodation. This is really concerning. As I have said, we know very well what the issues are and their consequences for migrant women. We know perfectly well what their needs are—the same as those of other women or men subject to domestic abuse—so I do not believe that we need this pilot. We need legislative protection for the women involved. If the Bill is passed without a solution to this problem, it could be years before the next appropriate piece of legislation. I really hope the Minister will agree that the proposed pilot is redundant and therefore not appropriate at this point.
The briefing sent to us by Step Up Migrant Women and others includes a number of heart-rending cases—I am very happy to pass them on to the Minister, but I have a feeling she already has them. She might want to make that clear.
In view of the serious crimes that go unpunished because of the fears of women with insecure migrant status, it is not surprising that the Equality and Human Rights Commission supports this and related amendments. The EHRC refers to a joint report of several policing bodies, including the HMICFRS, which found that victims of crime with insecure or uncertain immigration status are fearful that, if they report crimes to the police, their information will be shared with the Home Office. It concluded that the current system of information sharing between the police and the Home Office was causing significant harm to the public interest. I hope the Minister will respond to this particular concern in her response.
I put on record that, in 2019, the draft Bill committee made a clear recommendation to the Government to establish
“a firewall at the levels of policy and practice to separate reporting of crime and access to support services from immigration control”.
That is exactly what this amendment seeks to do.
Finally, as the Minister knows, without this amendment, and no doubt others, the measures in this Bill will not be compliant with Article 4(3) of the Istanbul convention, which states that
“provisions of this Convention by the Parties, in particular measures to protect the rights of victims, shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as … national or social origin … migrant or refugee status”.
The Minister will know that, in December 2019, the Government stood on a manifesto pledging to support all victims of domestic abuse. Can we discuss how to deal with this before Report? I am tremendously aware that she is responsible for, I think, three Bills—overwhelming, I must say—and is clearly extremely busy, but I would very much welcome even 10 or 15 minutes to try to clarify where we might go on Report. I realise that these are complex issues but very much hope that the Minister will work with her colleagues to achieve government support for this amendment or something like it.
My Lords, I do not think this is going to be the end of our discussion regarding victims whose immigration status is insecure, or they believe to be insecure. The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, talked about a “tool of coercive control” and someone else—I am afraid I did not make a note who, but it might have been the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox—talked about the power of an abuser. We should not be contributing to the power of the abuser, nor contributing a tool to the abuser.
The Minister has confirmed, and I am glad to hear it, that the Home Office’s approach is to treat an abused person as a victim first, but this needs to be followed through. Providing data to police or other authorities does not answer the issue to which noble Lords have been speaking. What if the victim knows that she or he is unlikely to be able to regularise their status? The Minister referred to the HMI report following the super-complaint. As stated in its press release, the investigation’s recommendations included:
“the Home Office should review the relevant legal framework and policy to establish sound and fair priorities regarding migrant victims of crime and migrant witnesses to crime, with insecure or uncertain immigration status”.
The Home Office is reviewing that. But this is the opportunity to deal with the matter in legislation and surely, given our data protection legislation, it needs primary legislation and not just guidance. I believe we will come back to this amendment on Report, but for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw it.
My Lords, we have Amendment 57 in this group—or clutch—of amendments, pushing what I hope is an open door: the need for protection of abused or allegedly abused people not only at home. The Government have an amendment extending prohibition to other places, and another amendment relating to the workplace or educational establishment, and those are welcome. Other noble Lords will speak to their amendments using terminology about where the abuser or alleged abuser lives or works. Amendment 79 would allow for discretion when both parties worked in the same place.
Our Amendment 57 is similar to the Government’s amendment, but it applies to domestic abuse protection notices, whereas the Government’s amendment is about domestic abuse protection orders. I regard notices as preventative—not leading inevitably to an order. It is far better, to state the obvious, if one can head off abuse by a notice. Perhaps I am naive in hoping so, but I note that the Minister’s letter or the draft guidance recently circulated—I cannot remember which one—makes the same point. In any event, reasons for including the workplace and other premises as prohibited, apart from the home, can surely apply when a notice is given as well as subsequently. As a matter of drafting, I wondered why Clause 21(2) was necessary, since it seems to be covered by Clause 21(1), but that is not the issue and it certainly makes the point as to what is covered. I suspect that others are going to make very similar points, but I beg to move Amendment 57.
My Lords, Amendments 58, 59, 60, 74, 76, 77 and 79 are tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Kings Heath. I am grateful to all noble Lords who have signed up to speak in support of them, in particular the noble Baronesses, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick and Lady Newlove.
These workplace amendments were discussed in the other place and it is right that we make it absolutely clear in the Bill that domestic abuse protection orders and the notices that precede them can cover a victim’s workplace as well as their home. Presently, the Bill says only that a perpetrator can be prevented from coming within a certain distance of where a victim lives. I acknowledge that the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, has tabled Amendment 75, which uses the term “specified premises”, but I would prefer the word “workplace” in the Bill, as that is stronger. The amendments I am proposing would ensure that those making domestic abuse protection notices and orders had the discretion to consider the workplace as well as the home.
The Government have said that they would expect a domestic abuse protection order to include restrictions on a perpetrator’s access to where the victim works if the court considered it necessary. However, expectation is not strong enough; the workplace should be referred to explicitly. Work is an important part of people’s lives; other than their home, it is the one place where they are present during fixed hours, normally in a fixed place. That makes a person vulnerable and victims need the added protection that my group of amendments would bring.
There is also the issue of the perpetrator seeking to drive a victim out of work to wreck their economic circumstances, as well as the other horrors they are seeking to inflict on a victim. Women have been murdered at work and the Government have a responsibility to ensure that victims are protected in all aspects of their lives. In 2005, Clare Bernal was killed by her ex-boyfriend—who worked on the same premises as she did—while she was at work. In 2010, Jane Clough was murdered by her ex-boyfriend as she walked into work. In 2014, Hollie Gazzard was murdered by her partner at her place of work. In 2016, four women were murdered in their workplaces by men. All these women would have benefited from stronger workplace protections.
The TUC undertook a survey and found that 47.3% of respondents said that their abusive partner turned up at their workplace and 43.6% said that they stalked them outside their workplace. Without the scope to extend domestic abuse protection orders to the workplace, victims will continue to be harassed, threatened and assaulted at work by abusive partners. Their job prospects and safety will continue to be threatened, and, tragically, as we have heard, in some cases they will be murdered.
Government Amendment 78 states that domestic abuse protection orders should avoid interfering with the perpetrator’s work, rather than, more specifically, their usual times of work. This should mean that in cases where a perpetrator and victim share a place of work, the perpetrator’s work patterns can be adapted to ensure the victim remains in work safely. It will be helpful if the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, can confirm that that is the intention when he responds at the end of this debate, and that that will be made clear in any guidance issued by the Government.
This is a really important issue; victims need certainty and clarity to provide them with the protection they need. I hope that at the end of this debate we can get a positive statement that we need to look at this further and come back to it on Report.
My Lords, I make it clear, if it was not already, that of course we welcome Amendment 75. I thought that naming victims who have been murdered at work or on their way to work makes the point very vividly. Rightly, it has been said that work can be a place of refuge when one’s home is not, but it is not the only place that should be specified, as noble Lords—particularly my noble friend Lord Paddick—have made very clear.
The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, referred to attendance at college, but a child’s school, when it is known that the other parent will be there at the start or end of a day, is also an issue. We have already talked during the passage of the Bill about a child being a witness and therefore also a victim, being drawn into the abuse. It strikes me, too, that in some circumstances it might well be helpful to a school to know that there is a prohibition on approaching the school premises.
If I may say so, the Minister’s explanation does not seem to answer the point. Clause 21 contains the words “may not contact the person”, but contact is different from coming within a given distance of a premises. Certainly the Government’s drafting for the order is better than the one that we put forward for notices, because it refers to premises of a specified description rather than requiring a particular address. That, as I say, is better, but having that in that part of the Bill must surely throw into doubt whether notices which are not just silent on the point but refer to premises in which the abused person lives can extend as far as my noble friend and I would wish, and, by implication, from what other noble Lords have said, as far as what they, too, regard as not just desirable but essential, given the detail into which the Bill goes. We welcome that but we would welcome more the bit in our amendment being added to it.
However, for the moment, I of course beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, we have Amendments 61, 65, 66, 67 and 70 in this group and support Amendment 63, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, requiring a risk assessment, which I would have thought should be an automatic item on a check list.
Clause 22 deals with matters to be considered before giving a notice. We support a police officer being required, under the clause, to consider any representations about the giving of the notice—to use the words in the Bill—by the person to whom it is to be given. Amendment 61 is to establish that representations must be considered regarding the provisions of the notice. If that is not so, an officer could simply ignore representations about specific provisions, for instance—harking back to the previous debate—“But I work in the same building” as him or her.
Amendments 65, 66 and 67 are amendments to Clause 24, which deals with breach of a notice. Regarding Amendment 65, is it appropriate that, if it is believed that there is a breach of a notice and a person is arrested, he or she is automatically held in custody, albeit for a very short period—possibly overnight, sometimes over a weekend? I have not discussed this with my noble friend Lord Paddick, but is there a risk of the use of custody as a punishment in itself—“Let’s put him in a cell to cool down”, that sort of thing? Should this not, however, be at the discretion of the officer?
Clause 24(7) allows the court to impose requirements when remanding on bail. Amendment 66 probes whether a domestic abuse protection notice continues in any event, with its requirements, or are these transferred to become conditions of bail if the court so decides?
Amendment 67 addresses “interference” with witnesses. I guess that this term has a history in legislation, but the amendment probes whether it means or covers direct or indirect contact with witnesses, for instance via a third party or social media. The same point would apply, in the last of our amendments, to Clause 38. I beg to move.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 63 which, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, would ensure that a risk assessment is carried out. That would consider any risk to the victim which was likely to occur due to the perpetrator being given notice that a DAPO is likely to be given to the perpetrator.
I presume that the amendments in this group are probing amendments—mine certainly is—going into the detail of how the DAPOs and notices are to be administered. It is right that these are only probing amendments because each case is different and, while there should be comprehensive guidelines on the way that the police operate these procedures, they need to be sufficiently flexible for police officers to make reasoned judgments. There is a very real point about risk assessments: it could be that the victim is put at greater risk through the perpetrator receiving a notice. Counter to that, it could also help the victim if an order is put on without her consent—but that is a matter for a separate amendment in a later group.
I support all the probing amendments in this group, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
My Lords, these probing amendments relate to the operation of domestic abuse protection notices. Clause 22 sets out the matters which the police must consider before issuing a notice. Among other things, the police must consider any representations made by the person on whom the notice is to be served. Amendment 61 seeks to probe whether any such representations can extend to the provisions included in the notice.
I agree fully with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that the police should give full consideration to any representations on all parts of the notice, including any of the restrictions, as listed in Clause 21, that they consider imposing.
The draft statutory guidance, published in advance of the Committee stage, covers the considerations that the police must make before a notice is authorised. Although the current draft makes no specific reference to the consideration of representations in respect of individual provisions to be included in a notice, I would be happy to ensure that this point is addressed in the final form of the guidance.
Amendment 63, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, seeks to ensure that a risk assessment is carried out before a notice is given by the police to an alleged perpetrator. I fully support the intention of this amendment, which is to ensure that full consideration is given to the risks to victims when deciding whether to issue a notice. I think that probably brings into relief the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Sadly, police enforcement action against a domestic abuse perpetrator can lead to the perpetrator blaming the victim and seeking to retaliate. That is why it so important that these notices and orders do not require the victim’s consent and that victims can therefore distance themselves from police action against the perpetrator. It is why it is extremely important that the notice can be used to provide immediate protection to the victim. In the aftermath of an incident, police can use a notice to evict the perpetrator from the victim’s home and prohibit the perpetrator from contacting the victim for up to 48 hours. Last Wednesday, I inadvertently referred to 24 hours, for which I apologise. This provides the victim with breathing space to consider their options and for police and specialist services to support the victim with safety planning.
The notice is followed by an application for a DAPO which is designed to provide longer-term protection and can be tailored to respond to the level of risk to the victim. Therefore, if police involvement in the case and the giving of a notice to the perpetrator have led to an escalation of risk to the victim, the DAPO can include provisions to address this risk.
Robust risk assessment is central to the police response to domestic abuse. The College of Policing guidance on domestic abuse stipulates that a risk assessment must be carried out in all domestic abuse cases. The importance of risk assessment when using a DAPN or order is also set out in the draft statutory guidance for police which has been published ahead of Committee. This guidance makes it clear that it is essential that police use appropriate specialist domestic abuse risk assessment or screening tools in consultation with partner agencies to safeguard the victim and reduce the risk of further harm by the perpetrator. The guidance also includes information on safety planning action that police should undertake alongside the notice and order.
Amendments 65, 66 and 67 deal with breach of a notice. Clause 24 provides that, where there are reasonable grounds for believing that a person is in breach of a notice, they can be arrested without warrant, held in custody and brought before a magistrate’s court within 24 hours, or in time to attend the scheduled hearing of the application for a domestic abuse protection order—whichever is sooner.
Amendment 65 would make the process of holding the perpetrator in custody following arrest for breach of a DAPN an optional matter for the police. Although I understand noble Lords’ concerns regarding the blanket nature of this provision, this amendment could put a victim at increased risk of harm, coercion or retribution once an alleged perpetrator is released. The amendment could lead to further breaches occurring while the court hearing is pending and increase the need for protective measures for victims during that period.
Clause 24 also provides that if the court decides to remand the person on bail, it can attach any conditions that are necessary to prevent the person obstructing the course of justice, for example interfering with witnesses. These are standard provisions, which largely replicate the approach taken for remand following breaches of protective orders, such as non-molestation orders, occupation orders and anti-social behaviour injunctions.
Amendment 66 seeks to test whether a notice would continue in force following the court imposing bail conditions under Clause 24. I can advise the noble Lord that if a court were to remand a person on bail under Clause 24, the notice would continue in effect until the application for a domestic abuse protection order had been determined or withdrawn.
Amendments 67 and 70 seek to probe what constitutes interference with a witness. The term “interference”, which is used in other legislation relating to bail requirements, would capture direct or indirect contact with the witness and is intended to protect against someone influencing a witness’s evidence, or dissuading a witness from giving evidence, for example.
I hope that those two explanations satisfy noble Lords and that consequently the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, will be happy to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, these are indeed probing amendments. With our amendment to Clause 24, by using the term “may” rather than “must” about custody, we were proposing discretion, not precluding custody.
I am grateful to the Minister for her confirmation of various points and for her suggestion that the guidance is adjusted to cover the point made at the start of the debate. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 61.
My Lords, we have Amendments 64, 68 and 69. Clause 26 takes us fully into the area of protection orders. Of course, we have been referring to them this afternoon. We are particularly concerned about how the Bill is constructed to mean—as I read it—that there is an inevitability about a protection order following a protection notice. I appreciate that there are stand-alone protection orders: those are not the ones I am referring to here.
Under Clause 26(3), the police must apply for an order if they have given a notice. Our Amendment 68 would change that “must” to “may”. Clause 27(1), to which we have tabled Amendment 69, makes a similar point. The wording in the Bill is “required … to apply”. Amendment 64 anticipates those two amendments. Of course, we are not arguing that there should never be protection orders, but does the Bill have the right balance? It seems to me that the Minister’s descriptions, in response to the last group of amendments, of situations in which a protection order could be used, make that point very well. I find it quite depressing to see that notices would always be regarded as precursors to an order. Do notices not have their own place in prevention? In other words, this group of amendments asks: is the balance in the Bill right? I beg to move.
My Lords, I support Amendment 68. This is really a very short point; it is a question of flexibility. There may be circumstances where a protection order has been issued, but by the time it comes to a senior officer, circumstances have changed and it would be far better not to have it go forward. It would be wise, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said—I realise that this is a probing amendment—to have the flexibility in the Bill so that it is not the case that, if an order is issued by someone of junior rank, it is automatically supported by someone more senior.
My Lords, the amendment has been described as probing, which it was in the sense of my wanting to understand the thinking behind the phraseology in the Bill. A probing amendment can, in the course of a Bill’s various stages, become substantive. The Minister says that the strength of the process is to provide a breathing space. We are not suggesting, in these amendments, that that should not be possible; we are suggesting that it should be a matter of discretion. It occurs to me that not making it discretionary could itself be a deterrent to a notice being issued. The provisions for protection of the victim and for taking the burden away from the victim are not affected by these amendments. I heard what the Minister had to say and we are not going to progress the matter with this toing and froing, so I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 64.
My Lords, we support the approach of the amendments. As has been said, they are to be taken seriously; of course, all amendments are, but these not only incorporate theory but reflect practice. The comments of the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, about positive responses reminded me of how, in this situation as in many others unrelated to domestic abuse, there may be what I understand is called a “teachable moment”, when the person who can or should benefit from some sort of support or assistance is most receptive to it.
As we have made clear, and as I hope is implicit in all our amendments, we believe that the judicial process must be seen to be fair to both parties, otherwise confidence is rapidly lost. Giving a defendant an opportunity to make representations is part of that. I read that as part of the thrust of these amendments to what I think we all regard as very wide provisions. We are pleased that they have been brought forward and supported by such eminent signatories.
My Lords, it is a privilege to take part briefly in a debate led by the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Anderson, and by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. I would sum up this debate by saying that we have heard some very wise words. The noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, said that these amendments were logical, rational and humane. He also entered the Covid caveat, and obviously we need a degree of flexibility over timing, bearing in mind the extraordinary overburdening of the justice system at the moment. I cannot help but refer your Lordships to the Times today, which lists the extremely large number of people being drafted in to be judges without any previous experience. We have to bear that in mind—but I endorse the spirit behind the amendments, and I will say no more.
My Lords, we are happy again to be working alongside the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. We have Amendments 82 and 85 to 88 in this group.
Amendment 82 is about choreography. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has just referred to Clause 42, which provides for the variation of orders as well as their discharge, and Clause 36, as has been discussed, provides for their duration. This amendment would establish—I am seeking to avoid the word “probe”—whether the new order under Clause 36(2) could have different provisions from the original. I assume that it could and that there could be variations. Could there be overlapping orders? Again, I assume that is possible, though it would be confusing. Could there be a lacuna—a gap? Obviously an order could end and new abuse give rise to a new order, so could that be an unintended gap? That is unlikely, I guess, because the Bill seems to have been meticulously drafted, but I do want to be sure.
Amendment 85 is one of our most significant amendments. A protection notice may be given by a police officer who
“has reasonable grounds for believing that P has been abusive”
within the meaning of the Bill, and that the notice is necessary. An officer who
“has reasonable grounds for believing”—
the same terminology—that P is in breach of a notice may arrest him, and that leads on to a hearing before the magistrates. The court may make a civil order if it is satisfied, this time “on the balance of probabilities”—that is, the civil standard—that an order is necessary and appropriate.
It is what follows from that which is the subject of Amendment 85. Under Clause 37, P commits an offence if, without reasonable excuse, P fails to comply with the requirement of an order. The penalties are up to five years imprisonment, an unlimited fine or both. Our amendment would require the court to be satisfied “beyond reasonable doubt”—the criminal standard—that P has, without reasonable excuse, failed to comply with the requirement of an order. I am aware that the Stalking Protection Act 2019 is not dissimilar from this Bill in its approach; indeed, there is a good deal of other legislation in the same sort of area and I have no doubt that my noble friend Lord Paddick will refer to it, but that does not allay our concerns.
I hope it will be understood that we are looking at the issue neutrally. The Minister can advise me whether the term “audi alteram partem” is appropriate here. We do not take the side of the perpetrator, but we want to explore what the appropriate burden of proof is when one gets to an order and its breach—and indeed, I have to say, to explore what the standard of proof is, because the law should be both fair and clear. The legislation is silent; no doubt that means that we should understand it. I am sure there is a Latin tag for that as well.
I have assumed that there is no requirement for the criminal standard since nothing is spelled out. When my noble friend and I discussed this with the Minister, it was on the basis of a civil standard, which I think he was also working to, although it was a very rushed discussion. Whatever I am pointed to, I am very uneasy about the application of significant penalties on the basis of the civil standard—or is it the civil standard? The letter dated 26 January that noble Lords received from the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, said:
“Criminal sanctions will only be imposed following a conviction for the breach offence in the criminal court, which would need to be proved to the criminal standard in the usual way.”
That was in correspondence. I do not think it is referred to in the draft guidance that we have seen but, whether it is in correspondence or in guidance, I believe that the legislation should be completely clear.
Amendment 87 is in the same area. It would import “reasonably believes” into an application for a warrant for arrest for a breach under Clause 38, as for a breach of notice under Clause 24, rather than simply the term “considers”.
I turn to Amendment 86. Under Clause 37, for there to be an offence of breach the person must be aware of the existence of an order. The amendment would add that P must be aware of the requirements of the order if he is liable to be convicted of breaching a requirement—for instance, approaching particular premises—because he may be unaware of the requirements. The Minister may tell us that this is implied and that no court would convict if the defendant, or whatever I should be calling him in this situation, were not aware—in which case, of course, why not say so? Or would he say that this would call into question equivalent provisions elsewhere?
Finally, I turn to Amendment 88. Clause 42, to which we have referred, deals with the variation and discharge of orders. The court must hear from a person for whose protection the order was made. That was referred to earlier today as potentially being a burden on that person. We suggest that this should depend on whether the person wishes to be heard; that is the formula that applies to the police here. Are the Government not confident that the court would be able to decide for itself that it was not necessary? Are they not confident that the person may be able to determine this for herself or himself? We accept that a person may be vulnerable and require support or special measures, but it seems a little patronising to deal with the matter in this way. We would like to think that the person’s agency was respected. In fact, the letter from the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, which I have just mentioned, and the Bill recognise this by referring to contempt of court as “an alternative”. Can the Minister tell the Committee what the impact would be of proceeding on the basis of contempt of court? Is this a model used elsewhere, and what is the experience of it?
I have had a request to speak after the Minister from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.
The Minister’s reply will obviously take some reading, which we will do. As regards the point on contempt, my question was about the experience of the model. I quoted a ministerial letter—not a letter from the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson—about the why, or at least partly why. In any event, I thank him for responding to that.
My question is about the criminal standard for breach of an order. The Minister said that it applied automatically; he then used the phrase, “in the usual way”. When he writes his letter, perhaps he could add a paragraph explaining how it is automatic and where that comes from, so that we can understand its application. He referred to other civil orders and he might want to refer to whether those are silent in legislation as to the standard of proof when breached or whether they deal with the standard explicitly.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for explaining the contempt of court point in more detail and for setting out the question of the standard of proof. I will be happy to include a paragraph on that in my letter as well.
(4 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my noble friend Lady Burt and I have Amendments 24, 25 and 26 in this group. Clause 7(2) sets out the powers that the domestic abuse commissioner can exercise in pursuit of her functions. I read that subsection as not being exhaustive, and I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm that when responding to the debate. I ask because, as I say, subsection (2) is about powers, not functions, and Clause 10 gives the commissioner the usual facilitative—if that is the word—incidental and conducive powers.
In any event, Amendment 24 would include powers relating to perpetrators, including words similar to those in Clause 7(2)(a), which relates to services to people affected by domestic abuse. I appreciate that there are other paragraphs—(c) is one of them—that are not limited to victims, but a specific reference to why people abuse seems appropriate. I think we can agree, since this is a point that has been made by a number of speakers and we will come back to it, that many noble Lords regard this as a crucial issue. I certainly do.
Amendment 26 would extend the power in Clause 7(2)(g). That power as drafted provides for the commissioner being able to co-operate or work jointly with public authorities, voluntary organisations and other persons. We would extend that to making recommendations to voluntary organisations and others. Under Clause 7(2)(b) the commissioner can make recommendations to a public authority. I think that all those to whom recommendations can be made should be included in the clause.
The Bill as drafted regards co-operation and joint working with public authorities as being likely to prompt recommendations—hence the Bill before us— but co-operation and joint working with voluntary organisations are not exactly the same. I would have said it was implicit that recommendations to them could follow, were it not for the distinction in the drafting of the Bill.
Amendment 25 is a consequential bit of drafting. I beg to move.
My Lords, in the interests of making progress, I have nothing further to add to what the noble Baroness has just said.
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Burt called these small amendments. Like the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, I do not think that more words necessarily add to one’s case; I understood him to be supporting the point. Amendment 167 is about another duty. As I hoped I had made clear, I understand that Clause 7(2) is about powers while Clause 7(1) is about duties and functions. Amendment 167 is important but has a discrete function about creating a strategy. This amendment makes the point that work regarding perpetrators is wider than a strategy. We will come to Clause 16 on responses, to which reference has just been made, at a later point.
I still think that this is a slightly odd omission. I am glad to have confirmation that the list is not exhaustive. I cannot emulate the very senior lawyers involved in many of our debates, but any lawyers who are involved in this debate will recognise the term “sui generis”. It means that anything added to an existing list must be of the same type.
So it would not do any harm to mention perpetrators here, and it would make the point. I do not believe in legislation being used for messages, but something can sometimes be read into an omission. Of course, I will not pursue the matter now and I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 24.
My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. I agree very much with the line that he took. I anticipated that I would, and that is why I was glad to add my name to a couple of these amendments.
It is essential—and indeed it was really the underlying substance of my noble friend the Minister’s response to the last debate—that the commissioner is independent. To give the Home Secretary the power to censor a report is, certainly from my point of view, a step too far. Parliament should have a role here, and a central role.
Although there are slight divergences between the amendment to which I am giving my support and the amendment admirably introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, they are very similar, and she indicated that. Effectively, they are probing amendments. I have always believed that, for the most part, it is best if we do not have Divisions in Committee, so that we can hear what noble Lords have to say, the Minister can hear the points that are made and we can achieve, I hope, a degree of consensus by the time we come to Report.
I certainly could not support the supremacy, in the way that it stands at the moment, of the Home Secretary, and the ability, effectively, to call in—and, as I said at the beginning, to censor—a report. The commissioner must be someone in whom we repose a very high degree of trust, and who can report without fear or favour. I believe that the commissioner should report to Parliament, where we can guarantee that there will be proper scrutiny. Although I accept the important role of the Home Affairs Committee in the other place—as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said, that committee has itself recommended a report to Parliament—I have always been a great believer in Joint Committees of both Houses, especially when there is such a degree of expertise, to which I do not claim any, in your Lordships’ House. We have heard during the course of the debates today—I have listened to all of them—and the debates on Monday, that there really is a degree of expertise, and a depth of expertise, that the other Chamber can complement but not really surpass. So a Joint Committee might be a very good idea. Whatever final decision is made by your Lordships’ House and the other place on that, the centrality of Parliament’s role should be emphasised by underlining the autonomy and independence of the commissioner. She must not be seen to be a creature of government; her independence is vital.
I very much hope that, when my noble friend comes to reply to this debate, he will recognise the importance of Parliament’s role, and how crucial it is that the commissioner is someone in whom we can repose trust and someone who feels she can speak without fear or favour. I hope that, as a result of our discussions this afternoon, when we do come to Report, it will be possible for us to take a consensual and collective view that reinforces the importance, independence and integrity of the commissioner and, at the same time, the important role that Parliament should play.
My Lords, I suspect that the Minister may tell us that Parliament will be quite adequately and properly involved, because the Secretary of State who sponsors—I think that is the term—the commissioner is accountable to Parliament.
Noble Lords who have spoken have all made the point about independence being absolutely crucial. We have already debated that in the context of the budget, particularly the other day, and the provision of staff, and of course it was central to the proposal that the commissioner’s title include the word “independent”. The Government have recognised that—not so far as to accept any amendments but they have recognised the point—and, I hope, the point about the commissioner being seen to be independent, which the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has made today and I think I made on Monday, as I certainly intended to.
Our amendments propose reports going to both the Secretary of State and Parliament because, by nature and inclination, my noble friend and I want to find a way through this that might satisfy everybody. As my noble friend said, it is not unknown for Ministers not to respond promptly to draft reports and other material. In fact, I had Kevin Hyland’s experience in mind when we prepared these amendments. I am personally not wedded to 28 days. What is important is that there is a fairly tight maximum time limit.
On Amendment 35, I have thought about the situation a little more since we tabled the amendments. The commissioner is not actually required to give advice or assistance: “may” is the term in both Clause 9(1) and Clause 9(2), although there is a “must” about publishing advice to any person other than the Secretary of State—that is in Clause 9(4). I am a little worried about whether the prospect of advice being required to be published might constrain people other than the Secretary of State from seeking advice. So, as well as wondering why non-Secretaries of State are not on the same footing as the Secretary of State for this purpose, I am actually a bit concerned about the provision.
Is Clause 9(2) itself actually necessary—that is, the subsection which says that the commissioner may advise or assist someone else—especially as we are told that the list of powers at Clause 7(2) is not an exhaustive list? Can someone seek advice or assistance without it being published? There must be many situations in which that would be appropriate. Also, can the commissioner omit matters listed in Clause 9(6) of his or her own volition? Surely, they can. We have all been talking on the basis that the commissioner can and would do so, but it is a matter of the Secretary of State’s direction, which I find a little curious, in addition to the points made by other noble Lords. I hope the Minister can answer these questions, which, perhaps, go behind some of the words in the Bill, as well as the overarching issues raised by these amendments.
My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I support a number of the comments she made and I look forward to the answers. I particularly support the amendments in the group in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, signed by my noble friend Lord Cormack and others. At another time and in another place, I chaired a Select Committee—on a completely different subject from that before us today—and the annual reports from organisations such as, in this case, the domestic abuse commissioner, are extremely important to Back-Bench Members of Parliament, giving them the opportunity to debate and scrutinise the work undertaken by these bodies.
I believe that these amendments are extremely important. To be honest, I do not know what the situation is if a report is simply made to the Secretary of State, rather than being made more freely available. If a report is made to Parliament, then Parliament and Select Committees have the right to debate it, either in Select Committee or on the Floor of the House, depending on the importance of the contents and of that particular body. I also underline that in other Bills that have come before the House in recent times—looking forward to Committee on the Environment Bill, I am sure this will be commented on again in respect of the Office for Environmental Protection—it is essential that a body such as the domestic abuse commissioner should operate independently of the Secretary of State and the department.
I have received a request to speak after the Minister from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.
My Lords, I thought the noble Lord would not be able to respond to my question about whether advice to someone other than the Secretary of State has to be published. Just after I pressed send, he came to that point, but may I pursue it a little?
From what he said, I think that it would be open to the commissioner to redact part of the advice that is published—it certainly should be. However, there is a power of direction for the Secretary of State. As other noble Lords have alluded to, there are bits of the relationship which we are seeking to fill in, if you like, through these debates. Do the Government not take the point that there may be occasions when it would not be appropriate to publish advice at all—not just about an individual but perhaps a piece of work which it would not be appropriate to publish at that moment? We may need to look at what is meant by “advice” and “assistance”—I do not know where the demarcation line is between the two. I do not expect the Minister to get into the semantics now, but I may look at the semantics after today.
My Lords, this group of Amendments 37, 38, 39, 40 and 43 relates to Clause 12 on the advisory board. I will not introduce Amendment 39, to which my noble friends Lord Paddick and Lady Featherstone will speak, but I agree with what I expect them to say.
At Second Reading, we heard various bids for inclusion in the advisory board, and we heard one, or possibly more, in previous groups in Committee. This prompted me to think about the functions of the advisory board and how it might operate, hence our Amendment 38. Should the members act as representatives of different sectors? Is the term “represent” quite appropriately descriptive of what they will do? Why will they be appointed? This will probably be to give advice across the issues, through the particular lens of their own experience, so that the commissioner has three-dimensional views, if you like.
Of course, they will put forward points of view from within their own sectors, but they will not only make the case for them; I am sure advocacy for resources for sectors will be very likely. As such, I thought I would try the phrase “expertise and experience”—I subsequently found that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, had also picked the term “expertise”. I have applied this to the first of the categories in Clause 12(4), on “victims of domestic abuse”. I would not preclude advocacy, but, rather than special pleading, the commissioner will want advice across the board, built on all of the advisers’ various expertise.
We also have an amendment relating to Clause 12(4)(e), which requires there to be a person
“with functions relating to policing or criminal justice”.
I do not know whether I should read into this that the police are not part of the criminal justice system but, to me, the point is that, if they are regarded as separate, then having experience and expertise in both is necessary.
My Lords, I have received no requests to speak after the Minister, so I call the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to conclude the debate on her amendment.
My Lords, I am glad that three of my noble friends spoke about male victims. I do not think we can remind ourselves too often that, whatever the language in the Bill—I am well aware of the lengths to which the Government have gone to express the Bill and supporting documents in gender-neutral language—the Bill is also about awareness. We have a task to make ourselves and others aware that it is not a gendered issue.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, made the point about governance far more clearly than I did. I was indeed thinking about an integrated approach.
The Minister started on a list of those who might be members of the advisory board. I do not know whether she stopped herself because she realised she was making my point for me—that was certainly how I heard it—but she also said we should leave it to the commissioner to find the right individuals to represent these various categories. We should leave it to the commissioner and trust the commissioner to create an effective, efficient advisory board and to achieve the balance to which the Minister referred. I had thought there might be something more about this in the draft framework document, but essentially it repeats what is in the Bill.
I do not think the Minister replied to the point about the term “represent”. Indeed, she used that term herself. I remain really concerned about that, because I do not think that properly describes what the advisory board—as a body made up of a group of individuals, but we should look at it as a body—is really there to achieve.
I rather feel that the Government’s answer to all the amendments in the group is “not invented here, so sorry”. It sounded more like “not invented here” than “not necessary”. However, we will consider whether we pursue some of these points at the next stage, and I hope we do. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, this is a simple, straightforward amendment which prevents the Secretary of State sitting on the strategic plan consultation. It has been known for a busy Secretary of State to treat a consultation as less urgent than many other items in her in tray. I am sure it would never be the case with this Secretary of State, but the provision in the amendment serves to focus the mind of the officeholder—whoever they are—and ensure that this hugely important plan is given the priority it deserves and is not unduly delayed.
My Lords, in the debate on the last group of amendments, I referred to the draft framework document, which, with regard to the advisory board, says more or less what is in the Bill. The draft document does not in fact cover a great deal beyond what is in the Bill, although it uses more informal language. But one thing it does say is this. At paragraph 5.19, it refers to the strategic plan and the commissioner’s duty to consult the Home Secretary, among others, stating that:
“Although not prescribed by the Act, the Home Office will provide a response to the Commissioner’s consultation on the strategic plan within 28 calendar days of receipt.”
It is not prescribed by the Act, but we think that it could be. I wonder why this is one of the very few items in the draft framework document that is not in the Bill. Are the Government concerned that, over time, this might slip? I hope not.
My Lords, we agree in principle with the spirit of this amendment. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has indicated, the draft framework document already requires the Home Secretary to respond within 28 days. We agree that such a response needs to be provided promptly, so that the commissioner can finalise and publish her strategic plan. Where we disagree with the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Burt of Solihull, is on whether this level of detail is appropriate to put on the face of the Bill.
We submit that it is more properly a matter for the framework document, which must be agreed with the commissioner. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, quoted from paragraph 5.19 of that document, which says that the Home Office will provide a response within 28 calendar days of receipt.
I do not intend to be flippant, but sometimes things take longer than expected. In debating this amendment, we have only now reached the target that we set for the first day of Committee. If things are to be done thoroughly, as they always and rightly are in your Lordships’ House, they sometimes take longer than anticipated. I am happy to give an assurance from the Dispatch Box to the same effect as that set out in paragraph 5.19 of the framework document: the Home Office will provide a response within 28 calendar days of receipt. I hope that, with that assurance, the noble Baroness will be willing to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I rise to speak briefly in support of Amendments 51 and 54, to which I was happy to add my name. I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Burt and Lady Bertin, for introducing the amendment so well.
We heard in the group starting with Amendment 23 about the critical role of better information. I know it is a theme the Minister is acutely aware of, not least because she has departmental responsibility for it in the Home Office. To restate the obvious, and it really cannot be restated often enough, more joined-up, accurate, timely and informative data would enable Nicole Jacobs, on our behalf, to understand the past and the present better, a point made very well just now by the right reverend Prelate.
This point was also made very forcefully earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, on Amendment 23: the need not only to recognise but to try to predict future violent and abusive behaviour better, in order to prevent or mitigate injuries to abused partners and their children. What is the point of having a domestic abuse commissioner if we do not equip her with the right powers and authority, moral and statutory, to do her job as well as possible? As others have mentioned, these amendments have the active support of Nicole Jacobs and, if accepted, they will enable her, again on behalf of all of us, to understand the full gravity and texture of domestic abuse more clearly than we do today. We have to be more proactive and joined up. As was mentioned earlier, domestic homicide reviews are an improvement, but they are still not working as they should.
Amendment 54 will provide the commissioner and the Home Office with ready and immediate access to this vital data. Amendment 51 adds to the collation of vital data by drawing into the commissioner’s information hub all the investigations into domestic homicides by the five bodies named.
In summary, the commissioner has asked us not just on her behalf but on behalf of victims and their families to articulate what is behind her request to be given the additional access to key information that she judges she needs. This will enable her to do her job even more effectively and to do so right from the start. I hope I am right in anticipating a positive and supportive response to the commissioner and the Committee from the Minister.
My Lords, Amendment 189 is of a rather different type. We are proposing that to remove an authority added by regulations to the list through Clause 15(4)(a), the regulations achieving that removal should be the subject of an affirmative resolution. The Minister may say that as the Secretary of State has imposed—I am not sure whether that is the best term—an added authority under Clause 15(4)(a), it is hers to dispose of, but unless there has been an aberration, the public authority so added will be of significance. The Minister will of course know that it is not unusual for my noble friend Lord Paddick and me to take a look at every regulation-making power we find in legislation.
With regard to the other two amendments in this group, listening to and reading the names of the victims of domestic homicide is very moving. They are individuals who together make up significant data. We are particularly aware of this in the context of those who have died during the pandemic. My noble friend Lady Burt has already given the support of these Benches to Amendments 51 and 54. As the noble Lord, Lord Russell, has just mentioned, these are matters that the domestic abuse commissioner designate is calling for. Her shadow period in post has led her to call for a limited number of significant amendments to the Bill. It is not an impossibly large number, and it is not an impossible ask, so I think we should have a very good reason to reject what she has identified as necessary.
In a Bill which is going through your Lordships’ House concurrently, and on many previous occasions, the Minister, and other Ministers, have argued for public servants to have all the necessary tools in the toolkit. We have not always agreed on what those necessary tools are but, on this occasion, we certainly support these amendments.
My Lords, I support Amendments 51 and 54 and even the little tweak of Amendment 189, because these powers will clearly enhance the office of the domestic abuse commissioner, making sure that relevant public bodies actually co-operate and support the work. This reflects the sort of broad approach that should be taken by the whole public sector in trying to stamp out domestic abuse. The Independent Office for Police Conduct will be very important in identifying and dealing with police officers who are domestic abusers themselves. Those people have absolutely no place in policing, and I will revisit this with Amendment 53.
Amendment 54 ensures that the domestic abuse commissioner is informed of deaths where domestic abuse is a factor. This is vital information for the commissioner, and it is hard to see how she will be able to function if she does not have it. These amendments are crucial.
(4 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am very conscious of being the first speaker at this stage of a Bill which has been so widely welcomed, and which so many people, outside and inside the House, are ambitious to amend—or maybe I should say expand.
There are some niggles, but I do not think that any noble Lord is planning to oppose any clause standing part of the Bill. That is very unusual. Often, giving notice of an intention to oppose a clause standing part is not to signal opposition but to probe or interrogate the Government on what lies behind the printed words or how the Government intend them to be fulfilled. The Bill has been a long time in the making, so the Government have had a lot of time to refine it.
This is not the moment for a Second Reading speech—Committee is the stage at which we are workmanlike—but I want to make one general point, which is to thank all the organisations and individuals who have contacted us and informed our thinking. Their hard work and determination are impressive. We will be anxious to do justice to them, but I fear that it will not be possible to credit them by name. Nevertheless, I hope they appreciate that we appreciate that this is a collaborative effort, in which they are partners.
My noble friends Lady Burt and Lord Paddick are on the Front Bench for this Bill but, by chance, I have the privilege of moving the first amendment. I should declare what I regard as interests, because they certainly affect how I think about the issues. For many years, although some time ago, I was a board member and then chair of Refuge. I am currently a member of the board of Safer London, whose work with children and young people can mean addressing family and other personal connections, including working with young people to help them understand what good relationships are.
So, to Amendment 1. There has been debate about the abuse of children but this amendment is not about that. The focus of the Bill is the abuse of partners, and we now have Clause 3, which concerns the impact on children who witness that abuse.
I have from time to time heard reports of abuse by children of adult relations. One would hope that ways outside legislation would be used to deal with such behaviours, but I would be grateful if the Minister could explain to the Committee how the Government regard, for instance, violence or threats of violence by a 13 year-old towards his mother or grandmother. A teenager living in the same household as a grandparent could be in a position to extract money or valuable items from the grandparent. Noble Lords can imagine various reasons: how this might be prompted by a need for drugs, or to get money for a gang, as gang members often regard their gang as their family. We want to ensure that the Bill is comprehensive, and the intention behind the amendment is to ask why it applies only when both individuals are 16 or over.
I realise that it is necessary, in proposing a change to the scope of a Bill, in a non-technical sense, that one should ask oneself: what follows? Should it be a protection order or qualifying for statutory support? Nothing is achieved by extending the categories of people to whom the Bill applies simply as an expression of concern without also considering what is achieved in practice, although it may help us all to understand how other, existing, legislation covers their situations. This is a probing amendment. I beg to move.
My Lords, I refer to my interests as listed in the register. I listened with great interest to the noble Baroness’s explanation of this first amendment. I bring to the House a different situation that in my view is covered by the amendment, but which the noble Baroness has not put forward. Like many of the groups I am involved with, I am very opposed to marriage under the age of 18. There is no doubt that a number of teenage marriages involve domestic abuse. It is important to recognise that, in such marriages, those under 18 are as much at risk as anyone else. Later, I will deal through amendments of my own with a situation I am particularly concerned about: young people both under and over 18 who are forced by coercive control or physical abuse into an unwanted marriage that they—she, generally, but sometimes he—do not want to enter. That is why I want to raise this issue as perhaps another probing part of the amendment: to recognise this group of young people aged under 18.
My Lords, of course I will withdraw my amendment at this point. However, before I beg leave to do so I want to say that, as my noble friend Lord Paddick has pointed out, what goes on in society changes from time to time. At the moment it is county lines. We need safeguarding responses—I would not dispute that for a moment—but we need to look at what is available for safeguarding and what helps with prevention. I mentioned orders. I will also mention domestic violence protection notices and particularly—depending on what happens as we consider later amendments to the Bill—statutory community support. I would have thought that that might have a role, but would not be available if we confined the definition to two people over 16. I look on those measures as part of a raft of preventive measures. I will continue to think about this as we proceed through the Bill, as obviously this is not divorced from the rest of the Bill. I am not going to attempt to answer the noble and learned Baroness, who brings a different concern to the same wording. For the moment, I beg leave—
Before the noble Baroness withdraws her amendment, I had a very late request from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to have a word after the Minister. Can we please hear from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick?
I now apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Would you like to complete your speech please? Do you wish to withdraw your amendment?
Before I do, I would like to say that I asked about this problem; I do not think my noble friend knows that. It is nobody’s fault in the Chamber, but we might write some sort of pause into the procedure. I have asked if the Procedure and Privileges Committee can consider that, because I was caught out last week. I now beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I congratulate the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, on the way she introduced her group of amendments. I fully support Amendments 6, 8, 9, 10 and 14, relating to forced marriages and people in domestic service. Her highlighting of the gap in Clause 3 relating to people who are personally connected in this way is a really important contribution to this debate and, potentially, to the Bill.
I have added my name to Amendments 7 and 12, so excellently explained by the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox. I would also like to support the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, in her Amendment 11. Each of these amendments relates to including the providers of care in the Bill, be it for disabled people or for elderly people who need care.
The definition of domestic abuse could be widened to consider abuse perpetrated by those who are in trusted positions providing either paid or unpaid care. We have heard terrible examples of people being abused by those in positions of trust, whether friends or neighbours, though it can also be family members, and it can also relate to financial abuse. I ask the Minister to ensure that the particular position of disabled people and the elderly who rely on carers is fully taken into account in the Bill.
I wonder whether independent domestic violence advocates might be funded to reach out to more patients in hospitals or in other settings who are over a certain age or disabled in some way. I also wonder whether there could be better training for healthcare practitioners to be able to identify domestic abuse when they are involved with, assessing or looking after older or disabled people in hospital or other settings who might be suffering silently from various forms of abuse.
I welcome the expansion of the definition of domestic abuse in the Bill and the specific inclusion of statutory inquiries into suspected financial abuse, as set out in the Care Act 2014. I hope that my noble friend will be able to reassure us about the intention to include these groups and I look forward to her reply. Once again, I congratulate those who have laid these amendments, which are important for us to discuss in Committee.
My Lords, Amendment 13, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Paddick, does not seek to broaden or narrow the amendment to which the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, has spoken, but rather to understand what is meant by “live independently” in the context of carers. The term “independent living” is a familiar one, but I do not know whether that is quite what is intended here. Needing support to live in one’s home, which I regard as hugely important, does not to me feel like independence. The relationship is very much about dependence, or trust, which was the term used by the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson. That is the extent of the reason for Amendment 13, but I am glad to be able to comment on some of the other amendments in this group.
The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Lord, Lord Randall, have identified a number of significant situations. The noble and learned Baroness described situations, in the plural, as she carefully explained, relating to forced marriage, which came over vividly. She has an amendment about guardians, a term that has expanded beyond its original technical meaning. She and I have often been involved in discussions about the needs of children who have been trafficked where guardianship has featured. I would never challenge the noble and learned Baroness and I have not done my homework, so I hope that she will forgive me, but I wonder whether a guardian has parental responsibility and, if so, whether that would cover the situation.
The noble and learned Baroness and I have also been involved in many debates about domestic servitude and I would be interested to know what is sought to be achieved by, and the consequences of, Amendment 9 beyond identifying behaviour already criminalised under the Modern Slavery Act. Is it something about protection or prevention?
In Amendment 14, the noble and learned Baroness points out a lifestyle that may not be covered. Its significance lies in Clause 3, which relates to children as what I wrote down as “collateral damage”, a term that I am slightly embarrassed to use, but noble Lords will understand what I mean. I had at one point wondered about lodgers who are in the same household, but I decided not to pursue that. I was going to ask the noble and learned Baroness what she envisaged as a consequence of that amendment, but I think that she has explained it. It is certainly partly the need for greater awareness on the part of the authorities to the situation of those in domestic servitude to whom she has referred.
My Lords, Amendment 10 is in my name and is supported by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. I support the amendments in her name—Amendments 8, 9 and 14. We should explore the definition of “personally connected”. I am not sure that the Bill as we see it includes all those people who could be included as personally connected.
Amendment 9 is about domestic servitude and I should declare my interest as a deputy chairman of the Human Trafficking Foundation, along with the noble and learned Baroness—domestic servitude has been a long-standing issue for us. I recognise that there are other possible categories of people who are in the same household. My understanding of the word “domestic” is that it means “in a home”, so “domestic abuse” should cover those people who are ordinarily staying in that household, which is why I have put down Amendment 10.
The Minister may well say that some of these instances are already covered by other Acts and I would not think that that was not necessarily the case, particularly in connection with the other amendments dealing with disabled people and carers. However, I remind my noble friend that, when we were working on the early stages of Modern Slavery Bill, one of the reasons for the Bill was to put all the legislation together so that it was less confusing not only for the courts but for the police and other authorities. I ask that we have a serious look, before Report, at how “personally connected” could be better defined.
I would also like to speak to Amendment 8 on forced marriage, which is again in the name of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and which she explained admirably, as always. I watched a compelling drama on television a few months ago, which was based on fact, about honour killing. Watching that shocked me, and we have to take every opportunity to try and address something like that—though that ultimately ended in murder and was dealt with by the appropriate legislation—which in many ways starts with abuse.
I have received one request to speak after the Minister. I call the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.
My Lords, the Minister has given quite a long reply, which will bear reading. However, it sounded somewhat circular: the various groups referred to in the amendments are not within the definition. But that, of course, is why this long list of amendments was tabled. I felt that the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, really nailed my concerns. I am not speaking from the point of view of someone who feels that their concerns have not been picked up, but I was unclear whether the Minister was saying that there were adequate remedies and protections for every one of the people covered by the amendments. I certainly did not feel that the Government accepted that being in the same household is very close to a personal connection—it is, after all, a domestic situation. I wonder whether the Minister can help further.
The noble Baroness is right: it was a lengthy response, which I hope set out why the wide range of examples given by noble Lords are, we believe, already covered either in the drafting of the Bill or in existing statutes. She is also right to say that the debate will repay reading—for me, as well as for others—to make sure that we have indeed covered all the examples.
In brief, the dilemma, as encapsulated by the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, is to make sure that, in seeking to cover the wide variety of relationships, we are not diluting the unique character of domestic abuse. A person coming into somebody’s household as a friend or as a temporary flatmate who may be there only a short time is in a different category from some of those other examples. I am sure that we shall return to this point throughout the scrutiny of the Bill.
My Lords, with this group, which comprises Amendments 16 to 19, we turn to the role of the domestic abuse commissioner. I do not want to delay the commissioner-designate being able to drop that suffix—it is a bit tempting to refer to her as “elect”, but that is just what she cannot be.
At Second Reading I referred to the commissioner-designate’s energy and how much she and her team have managed to do without statutory backing. I was surprised to discover that the appointment is on a four days a week basis. That is the formal appointment, at any rate; it must be a challenge to keep to four days, if she does. I have not discussed this with Nicole Jacobs, and I must make it clear that this comes out of my head and is not something she has suggested. I suspect that she is far too professional to have done so in any event. I also suspect that she does not watch the clock. She would say that she knew what she was applying for; I would say that not making it a full-time appointment is mean-minded and gives a message about whether the Government regard the commissioner’s role and work to be as serious as it is. That is certainly not what they want to project.
The noble Earl, Lord Lytton, who has had to withdraw from the debate, emailed me when he did so to explain that something had come up that would need his attention. He had previously emailed me to say that he very much agreed with this amendment.
Turning to Amendment 17, the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner has the word “independent” in her title and so did her predecessor, because that is in the Modern Slavery Act 2015. Personnel change and so can attitudes to the role on the part of the Home Secretary. The postholder can obviously change; people move on.
There has not been the same concern as during the passage of the Modern Slavery Act to designate —if I can use that term without it being confusing when used as a verb—the commissioner as independent through the means of the title. Whether that is because the various commissioners over the last few years are all spirited and clearly their own persons, I do not know, but titles are significant. Third parties would be justified in questioning the independence of a postholder so dependent on the Secretary of State as Clause 6 makes her.
Amendments 18 and 19, in my name and that of my noble friend, together amount to the right for the commissioner to appoint her or his own staff. Again, I point to the Modern Slavery Act, under which Section 40 provides that the commissioner may appoint staff—no more, no less. The commissioner will be restricted as to the numbers of staff and their salary levels, because their appointments will all have to be within a budget set by the Secretary of State. However thorough and sensitive the consultation may be when the Secretary of State appoints staff, we believe that the commissioner should be in charge and should be seen to be in charge.
My Lords, I am unclear as to the precise status of the commissioner. I have one key question: is the commissioner the accounting officer for the commission? If I knew the answer, I could either shut up or not proceed with any of the other points I want to make. I am not going to get an answer, but I invite the Minister to give an answer if possible, because it indicates certain things.
Amendment 16 would, it seems, prevent the commissioner taking on any other role which might be relevant or helpful to the role of commissioner. I am not clear as to whether full-time means excluding any other roles.
The whole thrust of Clauses 4, 5 and 6 is a worry because it appears that the Secretary of State wants to pull all the levers. This becomes really clear in Clause 8. I am therefore very sympathetic to the thrust of these amendments and the Minister will have to make a convincing case to avoid my supporting them at another stage. I also note that Refuge is very supportive of this group. Can we have a clear answer on whether the commissioner is the accounting officer for the commission?
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for setting out her reasons for tabling these amendments and all noble Lords who took part in the debate on them.
Amendment 16 would mandate that the commissioner role be a full-time appointment. We do not think it is necessary to add that to the Bill. As has been noted in the debate, many statutory officers operate on a part-time basis, in line with similar commissioners, for instance, the anti-slavery commissioner and the lead commissioner for countering extremism—two other subjects which we take very seriously.
On advice from executive search specialists, we advertised for a part-time designate commissioner so we could attract as wide a range of suitably qualified and high-profile candidates as possible. As a result of that exercise, we found one such person, Nicole Jacobs, who was appointed initially on the basis of three days a week. We said at the time of her appointment that that time commitment would be reviewed after six months, and following that review, it was increased to four days a week with her full agreement. To answer the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, we will look again at that time commitment before commencing Part 2 of the Bill and keep that matter under review. But we would be denying ourselves the opportunity to appoint a highly suitable and qualified candidate in future if the legislation insisted this had to be a full-time appointment.
If I may say so, there is a slight tension between the amendments brought forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. She wants to underline the independence of the commissioner by changing her title, but then setting out more clearly in the Bill how she ought to fulfil that role. That seems to be slightly inconsistent. It is also important to note that the commissioner is not a one-woman operation; she will be supported by an office comprising around a dozen full-time equivalent staff. Reflecting modern ways of working, that will be a mixture of full and part-time appointments.
Turning to Amendment 17, I certainly agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that nomenclature can be important, and symbolically so. But I do not think we should get into the habit of labelling every commissioner or other statutory office holder in law as independent. Granted, as she mentioned, we have the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, but we do not have an independent victims commissioner, an independent children’s commissioner or, as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, mentioned, a new independent commissioner created under the Medicines and Medical Devices Bill. I do not think any noble Lord would suggest that holders or previous holders of this office, such as my noble friend Lady Newlove, were any less independent because the word did not appear in statute in their job title.
Nicole Jacobs has amply demonstrated her independence from the Government—not least, as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, pointed out, in the way she is campaigning for changes to the Bill. Her independence will come from the statutory framework provided for in Part 2, boosted by the provisions in the framework document, but also by the way she conducts herself once she is formally appointed in the role after this Bill receives Royal Assent. To add a word to her title in the Bill would in no practical terms augment her independence, so we do not think that amendment is necessary.
Amendments 18 and 19 would mean that the commissioner, rather than the Home Secretary, would be able to appoint staff for her office. Clause 6 provides for the staffing of the commissioner’s office by the Home Secretary, as well as accommodation, equipment and other facilities. It does so for a simple practical reason. We are creating here a statutory officeholder, not a body corporate. The commissioner will have no separate legal persona and therefore cannot, as a matter of law, appoint her own staff or otherwise enter into other contracts. To answer the question posed by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, the accounting officer function therefore rests with the Home Office. We will write to set out that position more fully, not least because several noble Lords were interested in it and picked up on it.
Consequently, as a matter of form, the commissioner’s staff will be Home Office civil servants. Crucially, however, Clause 6(2) provides that the commissioner must approve the appointment of all her staff. To address the point raised by my noble friend Lady Newlove, one of the contracts that she cannot sign is for office space. Obviously, she does not exist in law until the Bill is passed, but the Home Office is looking for suitable office space for her—not located in Marsham Street, where the Home Office is, to illustrate her independence. At the moment, like so many other people, she is working from home because of the pandemic.
In addition, we have made further provision in the framework document provided for under Clause 11. This sets out how the commissioner and the Home Secretary will work together, including on matters such as governance, funding and staffing of the commissioner’s office. The draft framework document makes it clear that, while the commissioner’s staff will be provided by the Home Office, the commissioner will have day-to-day direction and control of staff in support of her work. Moreover, as I said, appointments can be made only after consultation with, and with the approval of, the commissioner. In fact, the commissioner or her chief of staff will conduct recruitment campaigns and the commissioner will be responsible for deciding whom to appoint. I hope that these reassurances are sufficient for the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have weighed in on this subject. Committee stage is the opportunity for us to make our views known, even if we do not really think that something should be in the statute. I am not the first, and I shall not be the last, to have used that opportunity.
I hope I have not given the impression that we are anything other than extremely impressed by the job that Nicole Jacobs has done and is doing. I mentioned her energy and determination, and could go on about her grasp of the subject and so on. I would be pleased if noble Lords took all that as read.
I hope it is not really inconsistent—is that what I heard the Minister say?—to call for independence but suggest that the job should be full-time or, to put it another way, not part-time. I do not think it is at all inconsistent. I cannot believe the Minister is suggesting that, in the other bit of time that might be available, the postholder would take up a position in any way in conflict with acting as domestic abuse commissioner. That would clearly not be appropriate.
Independence is in more than the title, of course, and the question from the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, was very good. The answer has rather confirmed much of what noble Lords have been saying. I looked at the titles of the other commissioners but, as I have said, it very much exercised the House at the time of the 2015 Act. I did not read independence, in the way we have been talking about it, into the draft framework document.
I liked the reference to giving you armour when dealing with the Home Secretary that the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, made. She is right to point to the—“loyalty” may suggest something I do not want to suggest, but the buy-in from the team. This is teamwork led by the commissioner.
I still feel that being seen to be independent is important, but most important of all is having the tools. Noble Lords have talked a good deal about the ability to hire one’s own staff. Coming out of this group of amendments, that may be the issue we will want to return to at the next stage, but at this moment I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 16.