Parliament Square: Occupy Protests
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(9 years, 6 months ago)
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Lord Bates
The noble Baroness is a Member of your Lordships’ House; she is free as a parliamentarian to propose any laws that she wishes; but the reality is that in 2011 your Lordships decided by an overwhelming majority that they wanted this law and they wanted this space for public peaceful protest.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I am sure that the Minister will tell us that the number of police is an operational matter for the police, but I am also sure that Home Office Ministers are not entirely uninvolved in the policy. Does he agree that the lightest practicable touch is as much as we would want to see applied?
Lord Bates
I understand the point my noble friend is making, but what is a light touch when you are faced with a protest that begins at 50, grows to 100, and then grows overnight to 150? The potential for that to get out of hand, and the risk to the public, is something which the police clearly take seriously, and they are right to do so.
Serious Crime Bill [HL]
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(9 years, 6 months ago)
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The Lord Bishop of Rochester
My Lords, I hesitate slightly, as a male religious leader, to speak in your Lordships’ debate on this matter, but it may be important that I do so. I also hesitate to plunge into the legal niceties that have been raised so clearly by those with more knowledge of such matters. I added my name to Amendment 44A largely because of a phrase in subsection (5) of proposed new Section 63T of the Family Law Act. It states that,
“it is immaterial whether she”,
that is, the girl or woman concerned,
“or any other person believes that the operation is required as a matter of custom or ritual”.
The context for that subsection is the possibility that an operation might be justified on the grounds of the physical or mental health of the person concerned and that wording makes it clear that custom and ritual cannot be used as support for such an argument.
We are rightly proud of our national values, whereby we respect and indeed treasure the richness of many and varied cultural and religious traditions, beliefs and practices within the life of our national society. But that proper respect for a wide range of such beliefs and practices does not mean that they are all either good or commendable. It is my view that in female genital mutilation we have a practice that we simply cannot condone, even when it is done out of respect for a particular cultural or religious tradition. FGM is at heart, as has already been graphically described, an act of violence and abuse. It is one that is often associated with control—sadly, male control over women. For somebody from my tradition, it is actually an interference with our human createdness in a way that carries no benefits for health or anything else. It is, indeed, the physical removal of the potential for sensual pleasure which is part of our human and sexual createdness. The Church of England’s marriage service, or at least its current version, speaks of the “joy” of bodily union. FGM removes that possibility. For that reason and others, I support this amendment and its intent. Whatever emerges from this debate, I hope that the reference to custom or ritual will remain within whatever emerges as an Act.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I do not need to reiterate the feelings of abhorrence at the practice of FGM and the enormous number of girls and women who are affected by it. The right reverend Prelate has a very important role in this debate. He should not have hesitated to intervene.
I wish to address a couple of points before I speak to my amendments, which are minnows and just seek clarification. I agree very much with what the noble and learned Baroness said. As one who has been in the lower orders of the legal profession, I am impressed by the way in which members of the judiciary have specialised and gained expertise in a number of areas over the years. I hesitate to make my next remark, and should tug my forelock in doing so, but it is hugely important to ensure that certain members of the judiciary have considerable knowledge and experience of the areas in which they pass judgment. Practice and practical arrangements are also enormously important.
I do not want to argue that this amendment is better than that amendment. However, if there is to be further discussion, which I would never discourage—we talked about consultation on the previous amendment—let us not forget that it need not happen by Third Reading. If there is to be further consideration, it needs to be done well and carefully. The Bill has further stages to go through in the Commons. We are all accustomed to Members of the Commons saying on the record in Hansard, “Let’s send it to the Lords and let them sort it out”. On this occasion, there is time for sorting out to be done, if that needs to happen, before the Bill completes its passage through Parliament. As I say, it need not be done by Third Reading, which is not very far away. However, it is important to have something in the Bill on which any further consideration can build. Therefore, I suggest to the House that we should support the government amendments so that we have them as a basis.
As I said, my amendments are minnows. Nevertheless, I will speak to them. The first is Amendment 46C, which seeks to amend government Amendment 46B on anonymity. I seek to understand the import of “substantially” at line 23 of government Amendment 46B. My amendment suggests replacing “substantially” with “significantly”. It is obviously for the court to decide whether a defence would be prejudiced and to what extent it would be prejudiced. Are there any comparable provisions containing this sort of balance elsewhere in the criminal justice system, given the presumption of someone’s innocence until they are proved guilty? I also ask for confirmation that the restriction here applies on an appeal to a higher court.
My second amendment, Amendment 46D, is to the same amendment, dealing with the second condition in the court’s consideration, where it is provided that the effect would be to,
“impose a substantial and unreasonable restriction on the reporting of the proceedings”.
What might a substantial restriction be that is not an unreasonable restriction and why is the extent of the restriction relevant?
My third amendment is an amendment to Amendment 46E, which is the offence of failing to protect. Again, in order to probe, I am seeking to leave out from proposed new Section 3A(1) the words “under the age of 16” as describing a girl. Indeed, should it be “a girl” or “a girl or woman”? Does girl include a woman? I have not got the words quite right, but that is the import of the provision in the 2003 Act. Why 16? It may in practice be very rarely necessary to seek an order in respect of girls aged 16 and over, but it seems it is not completely irrelevant. The 2003 Act does not have that age limit on a girl and indeed provides for women to be covered as well.
In proposed new Section 3A(4) we are told that a person is responsible in one case where that person has parental responsibility and has frequent contact with the girl. Is frequent contact necessary and, indeed, is it appropriate? How frequent is frequent? I would guess that we expect case law to grow up around this, but I would be grateful for any comments that my noble friend might have. Does parental responsibility extend to care as under Section 3(5) of the Children Act? How does that definition of parental responsibility fit with proposed new Section 3A(5) where there has to be an assumption of responsibility for caring for a girl in the manner of a parent.
I hope that none of this is thought to be too pedantic and too picky. Like others, I am very keen to see these provisions work. If I have by chance lit on anything which needs more explanation than I have been able to apply to it in my own head, then it would be useful to have it on the record.
Baroness Butler-Sloss
My Lords, I intended to put my name to this amendment, which I support. It seems to me that it is more important as a deterrent than probably for prosecutions. Among the various groups that exist—one hopes that they are a really small minority—as the noble Baroness just said, it is very important that the English law is made absolutely clear, as well as the law of Islam. Of course, as the noble Baroness, Lady Tonge, just said, this occurs across other religions. That deterrent has, in other areas, quite a useful effect on culture, and that seems to me the most important part of this. I suspect that there will be very few prosecutions, but what is said in English law may permeate through a number of groups where those who disapprove of this already would then be able to point to the fact that it was also contrary to English law, and those who might want to get involved in this would be deterred from actually supporting it. I, too, support this amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, towards the end of her speech, the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, referred to what was troubling me, which is whether we are talking about general encouragement—if I can put it that way—or encouragement to commit a specific offence. Like, I suspect, those in the conversations she had just before coming into the Chamber, I am puzzled by the presentation of the amendment as meaning general encouragement, because I do not read it that way either. With the wording, “to commit an offence”—a specific offence—I thought that the noble Baroness was getting to grips with what is meant by “promotion”, which was the bit that I found difficult to get my head around in terms of its application in the predecessor amendment. However, the noble Baroness told us that it is the reference to “the other or others”—in the plural—which changes that. Bluntly, I do not follow that. I hope that, when she winds up, the noble Baroness will be able to convince me. The offence of FGM might surely and not unusually be committed by more than one person in the case of a single girl. That was certainly how I read this. It is not about committing offences; I read the provision as being about a particular, specific victim.
Of course, I do not take issue with the noble Baroness about the cultural problems and so on. However, I hope that my noble friend will convince the House that this is covered by the Serious Crime Act 2007, with its Part 2 on encouraging or assisting crime. There are extensive provisions in that part. If that applies, then I would not be particularly keen on having a specific offence when it should be covered by the general provisions. It is better that the general should apply to all criminal offences and not have something separate which actually does not amount to anything different. It is the difference that I am looking for.
Lord Dobbs (Con)
My Lords, I am filled with some trepidation and hope the House will indulge me. I have not involved myself in talking on this Bill before. I will do so now very briefly, with the leave of the House, because I think the issue is so important.
I congratulate the noble Baroness on the objective behind this amendment, but we already have a great deal of law in this area and we are to get a whole lot more once this legislation is passed. However, the law itself is not the answer to what I think the noble Baroness seeks to achieve, particularly with an amendment that, I fear, is all too vague. It refers to,
“encouraging or assisting with the promotion of the practice”.
Does that, for instance, include a tribal elder discussing cultural traditions or a parent discussing the family’s heritage and ethnic customs with a daughter? The noble Baroness talked about authentic and unauthentic version of religious tracts. These are very tricky, difficult areas. What precisely do those words mean? I fear that they do not precisely mean anything.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I do not mean for a moment to embarrass the noble Lord, but I wonder whether he is speaking to the original Amendment 45 rather than Amendment 45A.
Lord Dobbs
The new clause in Amendment 45A is headed:
“Offence of encouraging or assisting with the promotion of the practice of female genital mutilation”.
That wording is still there.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I had gone straight to the text of it. Those words were in the text of the previous amendment and they have been changed. I am sorry if I have perhaps diverted the House in the wrong direction.
Lord Dobbs
I think the original wording is still there and therefore has some relevance.
On the previous group of amendments, the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, called very sensibly for clarity. The challenge in this matter is not just the law but the practice itself. The figures that the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, quoted are appalling: 100,000 victims in the UK; and 25,000 under the age of 15 at risk every year, perhaps even more. These figures are horrendous, but they are meaningless without prosecutions —that is, police and prosecuting authorities taking action. That is what is lacking. We have listened to them and they hope for prosecutions, but there has not been a single prosecution for female genital mutilation.
I looked at the figures for West Midlands Police. This is one of the areas where you would expect them to take a great deal of interest, but in 2011 they investigated eight cases. In 2012, that went up to 25, and in 2013 it was 41. They are getting better but very slowly. That speaks to the fact that this is a very difficult area for prosecution authorities. The noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, spoke to that.
Given the current law and without a single perpetrator having been brought to justice, my fear is that this amendment with its vagueness would be counterproductive and make life more difficult for the prosecution authorities. My fear is that more law, no matter how well intentioned, that is too loose to be effective in practice—the practice is important—will create only more problems in enforcement rather than bring justice to those many innocent children. I applaud the intention of this amendment, but I caution about its outcome.
Baroness Howe of Idlicote (CB)
My Lords, I support Amendment 46, which relates to the protection of children from sexual communication. As the noble Lord, Lord Harris, said, his amendment is supported by the NSPCC. It proposes a new offence so that it is always illegal for an adult intentionally to send a sexual message to a child.
In recent years children’s internet usage has grown exponentially. As your Lordships know, children between the ages of eight and 15 now spend far more time online than they do watching television. They are also keen users of social networks, with many engaging in risky online behaviour, including being in contact with people via social networks who are not directly known to them, sharing personal information, which makes them vulnerable to abuse, and sharing indecent pictures. We have heard about that from the noble Lord, Lord Harris.
Indeed some people behave in very different ways online to offline, apparently. Police interviews with sex offenders show that the majority differentiate the real world from cyberspace believing that their behaviour is acceptable because what is happening is not real or tangible. One offender said that masturbating on a webcam in front of a teenager seemed like “Fun at the time”. He stated that he would not behave that way offline. Consequently, young people are experiencing all sorts of abuse on a scale that we have never seen before. Last year, Childline, as the noble Lord, Lord Harris, said, had an amazing 168% increase in contacts from children relating to online sexual abuse.
The law needs to be changed better to protect children from adults who send these sorts of sexual messages to them. The noble Lord, Lord Harris, suggested that existing laws cover online grooming but the NSPCC and others who support this campaign do not believe that is true. The Sexual Offences Act 2003 was referred to. But, increasingly, abusers online have no intention to meet and abuse the individual child physically. Therefore, the Act apparently does not cover online grooming. There is a similar situation with the Malicious Communications Act 1988. Finally, if the Crown attempted to prosecute an offence under the Communications Act 2003, the defence could argue that the threshold of,
“a message … that is grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character”
had not been met. The Act also does not cover the use of private networks to communicate.
Current laws mean that police can be powerless to act until a child has been coerced into sharing an indecent image, lured to a meeting offline or, in the worst cases, sexually abused. The confusing nature of the law in this area means far more needs to be done to enable the police to take early action to prevent abuse escalating, reducing the risk to children and young people and helping them to keep safe online.
The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Harris, seeks to close this gap in the law better to protect children online and would enable action to be taken against offenders at an earlier stage of the grooming process before an arrangement to meet had been made. It would help protect children from unwanted sexualised content online, potentially have a deterrent effect on offenders and put more responsibility on adults to ensure that who they are talking to online is indeed another adult. More than 75% of people believe it is already illegal for some aged over 18 to send a sexual message to a child under 16, while more than 80% of people have expressed support for such a change in the law. I very much hope that the Government will support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Harris.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, it always seems churlish to take up points in the text of an amendment when one supports the thrust of it but I am afraid I am going to. The action of grooming is hugely serious. On the noble Lord’s example, I wonder whether at least a part of that will be covered by the revenge porn amendment to the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill about the use of images, moved on Report. My noble friend Lady Grender, who put her name to it, arrived just after I had managed to find the text of that amendment. However, that is not my only point on this amendment.
The grooming which the noble Lord described often includes a lack of knowledge in either direction of the people taking part in e-mail exchanges. Therefore, I wonder whether it is appropriate to use the words, which I think have come from the 2003 Act, of A not reasonably believing that B is 16 or over, particularly as I suspect—I do not have detailed knowledge of this—that B, the child, may often claim to be older than she or he is. That is probably my major concern. There is also a reference to subsection (3) which sets out the circumstances in which no offence has been committed—but that only applies to paragraph (1)(d) where it must also apply to (1)(c), and it does not actually need stating in either case.
Perhaps I had better not go down the road of whether communications are written or oral—perhaps verbal is the word one should use there. More serious is the question of whether the list in proposed new subsection (4) is intended to be exhaustive. I would have thought not, but it reads that way. In proposed new subsection (4)(d) I query the reference to promotion of,
“emotional well-being by the giving of advice, and not for a sexual purpose”.
I am not sure whether those words correctly describe the difference between the sexual purpose of the perpetrator and the connection between emotional well-being, sexual advice and sexual well-being, which are inseparable.
Finally, might it not be better to go at this by trying to amend the Sexual Offences Act itself? That would lead to consequences, including the sex offenders register, to which the noble Lord quite rightly referred. Again, while I support the thrust of this, I am afraid that I could not support this particular amendment, which would take us in a direction that might be more difficult to untangle.
Baroness Howe of Idlicote
My Lords, I rise briefly to speak in support of Amendment 47 of the noble Lord, Lord Harris. Some may take the view that internet service providers cannot be held responsible for information that people use them to hold. Although, in my view, ISPs certainly do not have responsibility for generating content, they do, however, play a very important role in facilitating it: first, in the sense that storage protects the material in question and thereby helps to guarantee its continued existence; and, secondly, in the sense of providing a basis from which the said material may be transmitted. In so doing, they have a responsibility actively to take all reasonable steps to ensure, on an ongoing basis, that they are not facilitating the storage and/or transmission of material of the kind set out in subsection (1) of the clause proposed in the amendment.
For myself, I would also like ISPs to have to demonstrate that these active steps have indeed been taken, and are being taken, on an ongoing basis. We must foster a legislative framework that exhibits zero tolerance of all aspects of child sex abuse images, including ISPs facilitating the storage and/or transmission of such images. I very much look forward to listening to what the Minister has to say in his response to this important amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I hate to disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Harris, but I fear that I am going to, as I simply have a question for him. I speak from a basis of almost no technological knowledge, but I would have thought that, presumably, all the services are open to abuse. Can I just ask what consultation there has been on this? The noble Lord talked about the responsible, innovative and exciting—if you are that way inclined—work being done by some of the ISPs. Like him, I have found the big players to be very responsible and wanting to be seen to be responsible. However, the proposed provision would obviously put an obligation on them. I would be interested to know how they have responded to it, if the noble Lord has had the opportunity to ascertain that.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, I rise to speak briefly on this issue. During the Recess we had a meeting with Microsoft to discuss how it approached this matter. I was grateful for that because I probably share only one thing with the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and that is that I have no technical knowledge or expertise and felt quite at a loss when looking at these issues. Microsoft officials gave us an understanding of the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Harris, about the codes used to identify photographs and the hash code it used and they discussed whether it was an offence to store the coded photograph itself. Microsoft has developed its PhotoDNA technology that enables it to identify minor changes that abusers make in trying to slide past any checks and balances in the system, so it is carrying out impressive work to try to address this issue.
In listening to the presentation, I was particularly shocked by the sheer number of photographs and images, and the numbers of people involved, worldwide. At the beginning of his comments, the right relevant Prelate the Bishop of Derby, I think, referred to a recent case in Southend. That is close to where I live, so noble Lords can imagine that my local papers had a tremendous amount of coverage of that and I had commented on it. The case involved the head teacher of a local private school, who was interviewed by the police following the fact that his name came to light in an investigation carried out originally in Toronto. His name was passed to the UK, but it took far too long—well over a year—for him to be interviewed, following delays at CEOP and the police. When he was finally interviewed, he was found dead the following day. The amount of information that was found on his computer was staggering. Time will tell us the outcome of this as the investigations progress, but presumably that head teacher must have had links with people in other parts of the country and elsewhere in the world, and photographs may have been exchanged; certainly, he obtained photographs from others.
The scale of that activity is phenomenal and it is a tall order to expect the police to visit every single person involved in it. Having said that, I am critical of the fact that so few people, who we know have committed these abuse offences and have inappropriate images of children, have been visited by the police. I think that we could do far better in that regard and the delays are a cause for concern. However, we are talking about a massive number of people, so if technology is available that can block these photographs or allow the police to identify people more quickly, we should take every available opportunity to use it.
As I say, I was very impressed by the efforts being taken both by Microsoft, which briefed us, and by others to ensure that they can identify photographs, code them and pass on information. As I think the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Harris, does not place an obligation on internet service providers but allows them to take action. It basically says that they should consider the issue and, if there is a material risk, they should look at what they can do and take reasonable steps that might,
“mitigate, reduce, eliminate or other disrupt said behaviour”.
There are no sanctions or penalties for failing to do so, but it allows the internet service providers to take some action—action that we would want them to take and, I think, they would want to take.
The noble Lord, Lord Harris, has already said that he does not feel that he has a monopoly on being the world’s greatest drafter and is prepared to accept that there occasionally may be things that could be improved. He has, however, hit on something here. It is an issue to be addressed. I hope that the Government are having urgent meetings with the ISPs to see how they can work together on this. This amendment provides an opportunity to do so, and I would be interested to know what discussions the Government are having with internet service providers. It is an issue that we need to address. If we can deal with it at source and identify those who are responsible early on, it seems to me that would be a huge step forward in protecting children from this kind of abuse.
Lord Rosser
My Lords, the purpose of our amendment, apart from giving an opportunity to debate the law relating to domestic abuse, is to provide for the Secretary of State to consult on ways of strengthening the law in relation to domestic abuse, which is perpetrated overwhelmingly against women, with that consultation taking place within six months of this Act coming into force. Our amendment also sets out some of the issues that the consultation would consider, without it being an exhaustive list.
Those issues are: should a specific offence or offences criminalising coercive and controlling behaviour, or a pattern or acts of behaviour within an intimate relationship, be created? Should the violent and sexual offenders register include serial stalkers and domestic violence perpetrators and be managed through the multiagency public protection arrangements? Should a new civil order be created to place positive obligations on serial stalkers and domestic violence perpetrators? Should the breach of domestic violence protection notices and orders be a criminal offence? Should domestic violence protection notices and orders extend across European boundaries?
One of the problems, as the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, said, is that the Government’s definition of domestic abuse, adopted from the general definition of the Association of Chief Police Officers, is not reflected in the law. The Government’s definition is:
“Any incident or pattern of incidents of controlling, coercive, threatening behaviour, violence or abuse between those aged 16 or over who are, or have been, intimate partners or family members, regardless of gender or sexuality”.
The abuse,
“can encompass, but is not limited to … psychological, physical, sexual, financial … emotional”.
However, the current law does not capture the Government’s non-statutory definition of domestic abuse as there is no statutory framework around it. Currently, offenders can be prosecuted only for acts of physical violence, when such violence is often the culmination of psychological and minor physical abuse which constitutes domestic abuse, which is outside the reach of the existing criminal law and does not get reported until it has actually escalated into physical violence—which, to put it mildly, is a bit late in the day.
The figures have already been quoted, but I shall repeat them. According to the Home Office, last year 7% of all women reported having experienced domestic abuse, which is equivalent to 1.2 million women a year. Two out of three incidents involved repeat offenders. The reality is that on average women do not report abuse until there have been at least 30 incidents. Since the age of 16, according to statistics published by Women’s Aid and the Home Office, almost one-third of women have experienced domestic abuse. Interestingly —although perhaps that is not the appropriate word—one in three women who attend an A&E department does so because she has been domestically abused.
As the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, said, according to Women’s Aid, only 6.5% of domestic violence incidents reported to the police lead to conviction and 25% of domestic violence cases that are passed on to the Crown Prosecution Service result in no action being taken. There is an issue around the successful prosecution of cases. In some cases, of course, the victim withdraws their statement to the police of domestic abuse or violence, does not come to court, or comes to court and gives evidence that is contrary to their original statement. However, bearing in mind that on average women do not report abuse until there have been at least 30 incidents, the strong likelihood is that any reluctance to go through the legal and court process is not because the domestic violence and abuse did not actually occur, but for other reasons.
An important reason for consultation, including on the specific points referred to in our amendment, is that following the introduction of specific domestic abuse laws in the United States, there was apparently a 50% rise in women reporting the behaviour, and with it a large increase in the number of perpetrators being brought to justice, along with a decrease of over one-third in incidents of abuse. One key area is the need to consult, as the Government have done, on criminalising abuse that involves coercive control in a domestic setting as well as making domestic abuse itself a separate criminal offence.
A further issue for consideration is whether the prosecution of domestic abuse and domestic violence cases should be subject to statutory time limits. Domestic abuse and violence has often gone on for some time before an incident is reported by the victim. Under the current arrangements, many earlier incidents that have occurred and which make up the totality of the abusive behaviour, cannot also be the subject of a prosecution along with the incident that finally led the victim to decide to report what had been happening.
Our amendment also calls for consultation to consider a new civil order which would be intended to prevent further contact that amounts to domestic violence, would prohibit the perpetrator from engaging in certain activities, perhaps including contact with the victim and the children of the victim, and would exclude the perpetrator from the victim’s home. Such a consultation could also consider whether a breach of this civil order should be a criminal offence and whether such notices and orders should extend across European boundaries, with offending histories and restrictions being shared.
The issues to which I have referred and those set out in the amendment providing for consultation are ones that outside organisations and experts in this field have advocated. The government consultation on coercive control has recently concluded. It would be helpful to know, first, what steps the Government intend to take following that consultation and, secondly, whether the issues referred to in my Amendment 49C and others to which I and other noble Lords have referred, are also either being considered by the Government or were part of the consultation that has just concluded. I hope that the Minister will be able to indicate in his response what issues or courses of action the Government are now considering following their consultation on strengthening the law on domestic abuse.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am in no doubt that there needs to be more effort, more prosecutions, more resources, better practice and better training in the area of domestic abuse. I find it difficult to comment on the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, because it is essentially a trailer for provisions that we do not have before us, but the first steps must be about implementing the existing legislation in a consistent and robust fashion: prosecuting for physical and non-physical forms of abuse, both of which are possible. However, successful prosecutions are rare. I have mentioned training; there is a need for specialist training throughout the criminal justice system. The issue is hugely important to ensure, among other things, that the basics of violence in a domestic situation are properly understood.
The series of actions that constitute abuse are crimes now. Interestingly, the domestic violence charity with which I have the closest links, Refuge—I do not know whether I need to declare an interest in that I chaired it a while ago—commented in its response to the Government consultation that it is concerned that creating a separate domestic violence offence could in fact lead to it being treated less seriously and being downgraded. We know that the phrase, “It’s just a domestic”, is still hanging around. The charity points out that there is a risk that even physical offences may be downgraded, so I think that there is a debate to be had on that. It does not necessarily follow that badging what is a domestic crime would lead to it being regarded in a different way.
Lord Wigley
I have listened carefully to the noble Baroness. Does she accept that the potential crime of coercive control is not an offence at present? It was listed in the Government’s consultation, and that is one area in which progress could be made.
Baroness Hamwee
Indeed, and no doubt that is why the Government have consulted on it. I, too, am looking forward to hearing the results of the consultation, and I hope that if the responses indicate the need for legislation, there will be legislation. I am not saying that there should not be legislation to fill in any gaps, but that I am not convinced that a completely new approach is what is needed here.
Finally, because I am conscious of the time, I am aware that there is opposition in some quarters to relying on sentencing; in other words, regarding an offence as being domestic as an aggravating factor. If what is being considered in this debate is more serious sentences, we have to look at what sentences are available for the offences as they stand, so I would like to see a general debate about whether there is a sentencing element in this or whether it is about the offences in themselves.
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
My Lords, I, like my noble friend Lord Dobbs, have not been involved in the conversations during this Bill, but I speak because of the importance of the issue and our debating it in full. I am very glad to be discussing whether domestic abuse, including psychological abuse, coercive control and a pattern of abuse should be seen in the eyes of the law as a serious crime. The impact of domestic violence on women and their children can be devastating and long lasting, yet its essence of power and control is not criminalised.
My noble friend will be aware of surveys which show the strength of support for change. The Victims’ Voice survey found that 98% of victims feel that reform of the law is needed. A survey of front-line domestic violence professionals found that 97% agree that coercive control should be recognised in law, with 96% agreeing that patterns of behaviour and psychological abuse should be recognised in law.
I welcome the Government’s consultation and appreciate that it will take time for my noble friend and colleagues to consider the 700 or so responses before deciding whether legislation would provide better protection to victims, but, like other noble Lords, I look forward to hearing the outcome of the consultation. Changing the definition of domestic abuse in March last year was obviously a very important step, but there is a clear need to create a culture where victims report much earlier, are believed when they do and the dynamics and patterns of abuse are recognised and understood. Will my noble friend also look at other countries which have successfully criminalised psychological abuse, coercive control and clear patterns of behaviour, because this could be the catalyst which will not just save money but save lives?
Serious Crime Bill [HL]
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(9 years, 6 months ago)
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Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I, too, welcome my noble friend to his position. It must have come as quite a facer in the middle of his holiday to be told what a workload he was going to be coming back to.
Before I come to Amendment 4, I would like to say a word about part of the wording of Amendment 1 and indeed Amendment 14—and this point crops up elsewhere. I suspect that we are looking at a bit of modernised style, because we are told to have in mind the concept of the court “thinking”. There are a number of places now where the court “thinks”. We are quite used to words like “considers”. The Minister himself, in introducing the amendment, used the term “believes”, but one might “suppose”, “imagine” or “suspect”—one could go on for quite a long time.
I am a little concerned that we should be cautious about using modernised language without being very clear about what it means, particularly when similar concepts have been introduced in other legislation using different, and perhaps more “old-fashioned”, words. English is a rich language, and its richness covers a lot of subtleties. I just wanted to get that off my chest because I might come back to it on other legislation.
However, most of the debate so far—and we will hear more—is about the effectiveness of the restraint and confiscation regime. I share the outrage of other noble Lords about criminals salting away the proceeds of their crime. We used to discuss it quite a lot in the context of legal aid: that there were recipients of legal aid who were suspected of having a good deal of cash if only one could find it. Now, in the context of the Modern Slavery Bill, as the noble Baroness said, we could do better.
I hesitate to support the amendment going into legislation. The changes which it appears that we are all agreed should be made to the regime will barely have been in force before April 2015, which is the proposed end of the consultation period. Of course we should be assessing and evaluating the impact of the changes made by the Bill—in themselves, in the wider context and continually—to the confiscation regime. We should be prepared to make changes. Is it sensible to have a consultation running in parallel with the introduction of some alterations? Indeed, are we always talking about legislation that needs changing or about practice? I suspect that quite a lot of the problems are in the area of practice.
The noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Holbeach, explained in Committee that a couple of the proposals were, in the Government’s view, unnecessary; I do not want to anticipate what my noble friend will say. Indeed, as the noble Baroness reminded the House, on the recovery of costs, the noble Lord said that the Government would consider capping legal aid rates. However, without for a moment wishing to suggest that the concerns regarding the application of the Modern Slavery Bill are not important—they are immensely important—it seems that without the amendment there is nothing to preclude both consultation about the application of the provisions of that Bill and the bringing forward of more legislation. Conversely, consultation does not solve the issues which have been raised during the passage of the Modern Slavery Bill—which, like other noble Lords, I am very keen to see being effective.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, the Proceeds of Crime Act has been inadequately applied. There is no doubt that it could be better dealt with. As far as they go, the Minister’s amendments are to be supported—but they by no means go far enough. As a member of the Joint Committee on the Modern Slavery Bill, I strongly support the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Warner. However, it goes further than that. The Modern Slavery Bill is an important part of getting the proceeds of crime, but all of us in this House want to see criminals dispossessed of their assets. The Proceeds of Crime Act and all of the amendments go further than the Modern Slavery Bill. We do need something.
I am not entirely certain, having listened to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that we need it in Amendment 4, but we certainly need either this amendment or a very strong undertaking from the Government that—side by side with implementing the government amendments to the Bill—they will consult. If there was a strong commitment to consultation before the Modern Slavery Bill comes in—bearing in mind that it is much broader than the Modern Slavery Bill—I would be content with that. However, if the Government are not going to give a strong commitment, I would find myself supporting Amendment 4.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, as we noted in Committee, the tentacles of cybercrime can now stretch across the globe. A perpetrator, sitting in their bedroom in London, could be hacking into a computer anywhere in the world, or, located outside the UK, a British national could be causing serious damage to their host country or in our own. The new offence provided for in Clause 40 acknowledges this reality and captures the serious damage that cybercriminals can cause in any country.
Clause 40 goes on to define a reference to country as including a reference to: a territory; any place in, or part or region of, a country or territory; and the territorial sea adjacent to any country or territory. My noble friend Lady Hamwee moved an amendment in Committee to seek further clarity on the last of these three points, which gave rise to an interesting debate on how best to capture damage caused outside territorial waters.
Following that debate, we have given further consideration to the position of installations such as oil rigs, ships and so on that are located outside the territorial waters of any country. Although I acknowledge that this scenario is extremely unlikely, it is not clear that the offence as currently drafted would capture an attack that caused serious damage to the human welfare of those living and working on such an installation, or to the surrounding environment.
To provide greater clarity on this point, therefore, Amendment 17 replaces the reference to damage to human welfare in any country with a reference to damage to human welfare in any place. Amendment 18 similarly replaces the reference to damage to the environment in any country with a reference to damage to the environment of any place.
Once these changes are made, there is no longer any need to extend the meaning of “country” to include its territorial seas. References to damage to the economy or national security of any country will remain, as either the economy or national security of a country has been damaged or it has not. In these cases, it is not necessary to include territorial seas within the definition of a country, so Amendment 19 removes this reference. I am most grateful to my noble friend for raising this issue and I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee
I welcome the Government’s response to this. My amendment seeks further clarity on the provision in Clause 44(8) which makes it,
“a defence … to prove that the person’s participation was necessary for a purpose related to the prevention or detection of crime”.
“Necessary” is narrow, which is right, but a,
“purpose related to the prevention or detection of crime”,
seems to me very wide. The example that came to mind at the previous stage was undercover policing, which is a contentious activity, although we heard from a report in the last day or two some good news on how it is conducted.
I am still puzzled about whether the phrase,
“participation … for a purpose related to”,
and not just,
“necessary for … the prevention or detection of crime”,
takes it beyond something that is acceptable. My amendment invites my noble friend to amplify the provision, if he is able to do so.
Lord Bates
I am grateful for the welcome that the amendment has received. I am mindful of the two questions, which I shall do my best to address. In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, the Bill already provides for a defence when the,
“participation was necessary for a purpose related to the prevention or detection of crime”.
We considered that that, together with raising the threshold for the offence to “reasonably suspects” and a requirement for any prosecution to be in the public interest, provided that additional safeguard. We therefore concluded that the general defence of acting reasonably is unlikely in practice to add any additional protection from overcriminalisation of this offence. However, in the light of particular concerns expressed about the position of the regulated sector specifically, we looked again at the need for a bespoke defence for the regulated sector.
Two aspects of the Proceeds of Crime Act have been raised in this context. The first relates to the obligation that members of the regulated sector have to report money-laundering carried out by another. This aspect is addressed in Amendment 22, which would provide a partial defence that would apply to a member of a regulated sector who took part in activities that he did not know or suspect to be criminal activities as part of an organised crime group. We believe that the additional dimension is there and that it provides a further protection for those who are involved in financial services. I am sure that is why the Law Society, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales and the Local Government Association have welcomed the amendment as far as it goes.
On the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I covered that in the previous answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, but I will come back to her with more detail in writing if necessary. I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, we now turn to the amendments relating to Clause 65—no, we do not. I am sorry but I had what is completely the wrong speaking note and I apologise to your Lordships.
During debate in Committee, I agreed to consider further an amendment put forward by my noble friend Lady Hamwee to what was then Clause 56—it is now Clause 59. Where a substance suspected of being used as a drug-cutting agent has been seized and the court makes an order authorising the continued retention of the substance, Clause 59(7) requires the relevant police or customs officer to notify a person entitled to the substance of that fact, if they were not represented at the court hearing. My noble friend queried why such notice should not also be given to the person from whom the substance was seized, if different from the person entitled to the substance.
I am grateful to my noble friend for raising a pertinent point. On further consideration, we agreed that her suggested amendment would strengthen the provisions in the Bill by helping to minimise any impact on the legitimate trade. Amendment 35 to Clause 59 therefore extends the notice provision in that clause. A similar point also arises in relation to Clauses 56 and 61, which also require notice to be given to a person entitled to the seized substance. Amendments 33, 34 and 36 therefore make equivalent changes to these clauses, while Amendments 37 and 38 to Clause 64 make consequential amendments to the definition of “entitled”. Once again, I am grateful to my noble friend for raising the point and I beg to move.
Communications Data and Interception
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(9 years, 10 months ago)
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Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for contacting me earlier this morning. Obviously, bringing this stop-gap legislation in such a hurry to both Houses has been a difficult process, and the opportunities for consultation have therefore been limited. There are very strong and divided views on these issues, including among human rights and civil liberties groups. I wonder whether the Minister can reassure the House that there will be consultation with those groups on regulations and guidance, if there is to be any, as well as their involvement in the review of RIPA.
I welcome what was described as a package of pro-civil liberties measures mentioned in the Statement. Will the Minister tell the House whether they will be introduced to the same swift timetable? Also—I do not mean the question to be frivolous—we are proposing to talk to the Americans, but have they agreed to talk to us?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
We have good discussions with all our allies and I can assure the noble Baroness that I have no fear in that regard. I understand what she is saying about civil liberties and much of the discussions about this have centred on ways in which we can enhance privacy protection. The noble Baroness is quite right; we have not had time to consult. Letters will be going to a large number of people and I know that the list includes a number of the best-known civil liberties groups. As far as future business is concerned, and the implementation of the powers in the Bill, they will be parties to the discussion in the usual way. I will do my best to ensure that the noble Baroness is also kept informed.
Serious Crime Bill [HL]
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(9 years, 10 months ago)
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Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, this is a tiddler of an amendment, which it is embarrassing to move if there are noble Lords waiting for enlightenment about the philosophy and underlying architecture of the Bill. I have succeeded in imprisoning a number of my noble friends up here, because I was unable to find anywhere closer to the front.
Baroness Anelay of St Johns (Con)
My Lords—while my noble friend takes her seat—we are now in the second day in Committee on this Bill. Admittedly a smallish number of Peers are seeking to take part, but that number take the Bill very seriously. I am sure that, like me, they would like to hear from my noble friend Lady Hamwee as she moves her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend. This amendment relates to an interpretation provision. In Clause 35, new subsection (6B) provides for what:
“References to property or a pecuniary advantage”,
mean in the context of the proceeds of crime. It seems to me that in that legislation and in the legislation that we are amending, some references to property or advantage would be to the whole of it—for instance, if the property is to be subject to confiscation—while some would be to the extent of what has been obtained by a criminal act, for instance the amount confiscated. My amendment really amounts to a question to the Minister as to whether to take it that we should read what is appropriate in the context. In other words, is what I have said implicit and am I worrying about something quite unnecessarily? The second of these examples—in other words, a limited extent—seems not to be provided for in the clause. I beg to move.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)
Perhaps I may help my noble friend and reassure her because Clause 35 deals with a technical amendment to the Proceeds of Crime Act, which will expand the types of cases that UK authorities can deal with on behalf of their international counterparts. The Proceeds of Crime Act currently enables, among other things, requests and orders made by courts in other jurisdictions to be given effect in the United Kingdom. One such order is that allowing for the recovery of specified property or money where that property or money is believed to have been obtained as a result of, or in connection with, criminal conduct. The scope of the order is therefore restricted solely to the recovery of specific property or money.
Domestic law, by contrast, recognises that the proceeds of crime can include not just specific money or property but a so-called pecuniary advantage, such as not paying a tax that is lawfully due. The reason that pecuniary advantage was not originally included within the assistance that could be provided to other jurisdictions was due to the scope of international agreements at the time when the Proceeds of Crime Act was enacted. In recent years, however, the international approach has broadened but the law has not kept pace. As a result, law enforcement agencies are unable to assist those in other jurisdictions in recovering from a defendant convicted of crimes such as tax evasion amounts held in the United Kingdom.
I am sure that my noble friend agrees that it is right that we should be able to co-operate as widely as possible in such matters; this clause will help us achieve that. The clause does not affect the position with regard to domestic cases. However, it extends our ability to assist foreign jurisdictions with the recovery of any pecuniary advantage obtained as a result of criminal conduct. I hope that, with that explanation, I have satisfied my noble friend and she will be able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, this is one of those occasions when one wants to hold back and read the answer, which is not at all to suggest that I doubt my noble friend. Of course, I share the intention and I am grateful to him for that. I will read the answer but, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, both my Amendments 31A and 31B would delete wording, but they enable me to ask a question. The Secretary of State, and in the case of Northern Ireland, the Department of Justice, have the power to make an order to substitute a different amount for the maximum amount of the confiscation order which can be made by a magistrates’ court. Can the Minister give the Committee an assurance that the Secretary of State will consult before such an order is made? I appreciate that it is not in his gift to give any assurance on behalf of the Department of Justice, but he might be able to make a comment, because I know that the Government have been in touch with the Northern Ireland Assembly.
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
My Lords, as the Proceeds of Crime Act currently operates, a confiscation order may only be made by the Crown Court. As a result, if someone is convicted of an offence in the magistrates’ court and the Bench considers the case is appropriate for a confiscation hearing, the matter must be referred to the Crown Court. This is clearly not the most effective use of resources for handling simple cases. As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, notes, there is already legislation on the statute book that would enable the Home Secretary to modify Part 2 of the Proceeds of Crime Act so as to enable confiscation orders to be made in a magistrates’ court in cases where the criminal benefit did not exceed £10,000. The relevant legislation can be found in Section 97 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005.
I can fully understand the frustration of the noble Lord, as a sitting magistrate, in having to refer all confiscation cases to the Crown Court when it would be perfectly possible for straightforward cases to be dealt with in the magistrates’ court, subject to that £10,000 threshold. The noble Lord is all the more frustrated given that the legislation to allow magistrates’ courts to make confiscation orders has been on the statute book for almost 10 years, as he pointed out. The provision in Section 97 of the 2005 Act had, of course, already been on the statute book for five years when this Government came to office. Like the previous Administration, we judged that there were other priorities for improving the asset recovery regime and responding to serious and organised crime, including the setting up of the National Crime Agency. However, we are now working towards enabling magistrates’ courts to make confiscation orders, including putting in place the necessary judicial training from spring 2015.
Given that we are now actively working to implement a scheme empowering magistrates to make confiscation orders, I hope the noble Lord will agree that his amendment, which places a duty rather than a power on the Home Secretary to make such a scheme, is unnecessary. I would be happy to update the noble Lord in the autumn on progress in this area. On that note, I hope that he will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Turning to Amendments 31A and 31B, my noble friend Lady Hamwee indicated that her intention was not to remove the power to vary the £10,000 limit by order but simply to seek an assurance that there would be proper consultation before the order-making power was exercised.
Generally, our approach is that magistrates’ courts should be able to make confiscation orders only in less serious cases. However, there may be situations in which the defendant has been convicted in the magistrates’ court but is potentially liable to an order greater than £10,000. Such a case would still need to be sent to the Crown Court to be dealt with. The order-making power in the clause allows for the £10,000 threshold to be varied if the evidence following implementation shows that the limit is generally too low.
Once we have brought into effect the provisions allowing for confiscation orders to be made in magistrates’ courts, we will keep the arrangements under close review. I assure my noble friend that before any change is made we will consult with the senior judiciary, the Magistrates’ Association and other practitioners as to whether the £10,000 threshold can sensibly be raised.
I also remind my noble friend that this order-making power is subject to the affirmative procedure, so any change would need to be considered and approved by both Houses. I hope that with these comments I have been able to provide my noble friend with the assurance she is seeking.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, Amendment 31C is a small probing amendment. There is a definition in the clause of “a country or territory”, which provides that references to them include,
“the territorial sea adjacent to a country or territory”.
My amendment would change that to “territorial waters”. I simply ask how extensive is territorial sea that is adjacent? It must be less than territorial waters. The natural meaning of adjacent, I would have thought, is “very close to the land”. Why is there a limit and what is the limit? I would guess that this is relevant in the context of the clause about computer misuse to damage to such things as wind turbines and oil rigs, and perhaps, in a transport context, ferries and maybe fishing. I am sure there is a list of matters. I am fairly unclear as to what the clause means. If my noble friend can help, so much the better. I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I hope I can clarify things to my noble friend’s satisfaction. As we know, cybercrime has a global reach; a perpetrator sitting in their bedroom in London could be hacking into a computer system anywhere in the world. The new offence acknowledges this reality and captures serious damage caused in any country. The clause goes on to define a reference to “country” as including a reference to a “territory” and to,
“(i) any place in, or part or region of, a country or territory;
(ii) the territorial sea adjacent to a country or territory”.
It is the last of these three points that my noble friend’s amendment seeks to address, and she raises a very interesting point.
The Territorial Sea Act 1987 specifies that the breadth of the territorial sea adjacent to the UK is 12 nautical miles. I can therefore reassure my noble friend that this form of words does not mean, as one might usually expect, the sea very close to the coastline, but captures the full 12 nautical miles of territorial water surrounding the UK.
However, the position will not be the same for all countries. Although the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea sets 12 nautical miles as a maximum for territorial waters, some states may have chosen a smaller limit. The boundary line for a country’s territorial waters will be governed by its own laws and by international agreements and conventions. The non-specific language in the Bill reflects this variation. Where the damage is caused in the UK the territorial sea adjacent to the country will be the 12 nautical miles around the UK. Where the damage is in another country we would expect the court to take into account the laws of the country in question, together with any relevant international conventions, such as the UN convention, and any other agreements, in determining the territorial sea’s breadth. I hope that my noble friend has found this explanation helpful and that she will agree to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My question was very similar—perhaps I will put it in a slightly different way. The explanation as I heard it is that this is about territorial waters. The language used seems to be that which is used to define territorial waters, whichever country one is talking about. However, it seems that there is no difference between the territorial sea adjacent to somewhere and the territorial waters. To give the Minister slightly more breathing space, perhaps I can also ask her to explain what a “territory” is, as distinct from a “country”?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, to answer my noble friend’s question last, and hopefully throw light on my other noble friend’s question: a “territory” is a geographical concept, the land and sea over which a state has jurisdiction. A country’s land mass may be divided into several territories, so the state of a country may also have jurisdiction over far-flung territories. For example, the state of the country of the United Kingdom has jurisdiction over various overseas territories, such as the British Virgin Islands. However, it is a matter for each state to determine, subject to the 12-mile limit. I hope I have not further confused the House.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, after the tutorial that we have had from the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, I feel that I should just say that I surrender—but, before I do so, I will comment that it would be easier if the Bill were to refer to each country’s territorial waters as that country has determined, rather than using what appears to be general language without making reference to the technicalities. I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister, who no doubt now knows a great deal more about territorial waters than she really ever wanted to. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I will speak also to my Amendment 31H. Perhaps I should speak slowly to give the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, an opportunity to work out how to make her points in the debate on this clause.
In Clause 39, Amendment 31D would omit subsection (4) and Amendment 31H would omit subsection (7), both of which refer to a case in which the accused is in one country and the offence is linked to another jurisdiction, which will very often be the case when there is computer misuse. My amendments are probing; I am asking my noble friend whether there is a risk that a person could be prosecuted for the same act in more than one jurisdiction, and how it should be determined which jurisdiction takes precedence. Obviously, this point arises not only in connection with the Bill and the new offences, so I am not raising a novel point, but it would be very helpful to the House to understand how that conflict might be determined—I use the term “conflict” somewhat hesitantly as, technically, it is not a conflict—when more than one jurisdiction is involved. The first of these two amendments refers to the UK and the second to Scotland. I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I am grateful to my noble friend for the explanation of her amendments. I believe that I can provide the reassurance that she seeks. I know that a number of noble Lords are interested in this issue; indeed, it was raised in the House at Second Reading.
It might help if I briefly explain why we are making the amendments to the Computer Misuse Act in Clause 39 and then set out the safeguards against subjecting a person to double jeopardy. As the Committee is well aware, cybercrime is a serious threat that often crosses international boundaries. The Computer Misuse Act already recognises the transnational nature of cybercrime and provides for the extraterritorial jurisdiction of certain of the offences under the Act where there is a significant link to the United Kingdom.
Clause 37 adds nationality to the categories of significant linkage to the UK. This means that a UK national would be committing a computer misuse offence while outside the UK even where there was no link to the UK other than nationality, provided that the offence was also an offence in the country where it took place. Therefore, in the case of concurrent jurisdiction, a UK national could be prosecuted under the Computer Misuse Act in the UK subject to the usual extradition arrangements or the accused voluntarily returning to the UK.
Decisions about prosecution rest with the Director of Public Prosecutions. It would be for prosecutors in the affected jurisdictions to negotiate where the prosecution should take place. For example, in the EU, Eurojust was established to deal with criminality that extends over borders, and it has guidelines to help prosecutors decide where a case should best be tried. There is a similar protocol agreed by the Attorneys-General of the US and the UK for cases that in theory could be tried by either jurisdiction. The Crown Prosecution Service has domestic guidelines that its prosecutors are expected to follow to help them decide whether to bring a prosecution in the UK or cede jurisdiction to another state with an interest.
My noble friend is rightly concerned to ensure that an individual cannot be prosecuted in both jurisdictions where there is a concurrent jurisdiction. This is a risk that the existing guidance and agreed processes have been designed to manage. Using the UK and Clause 39 as an example, a UK national could commit a number of Computer Misuse Act offences in country B even if the criminality did not impact on the UK. As I described, the way in which we would expect this to work is that the prosecutors in the UK and country B would decide where to pursue the prosecution. In the absence of country B taking forward a prosecution, the UK could take one forward and would need to go through the extradition process to return the subject to the UK. If the case was prosecuted and the sentence served in country B, and the subject returned to the UK, the UK could not then take forward its own proceedings. Double jeopardy would prevent the subject being prosecuted for the same offence in the UK.
It is important to note that the extraterritorial scope of the offences in question does not place any requirements for the offences to be prosecuted here, especially in cases where the offence has taken place outside the UK and the only link to the UK is the nationality of the subject. Similarly, if the subject was outside the UK, the usual extradition procedures would be followed where prosecutors agreed that the prosecution should be pursued in the UK. I trust that that provides the assurance that my noble friend is seeking and that she will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, that was very helpful. I may have missed this, in which case I apologise, but I take it that the arrangements to which the Minister referred at the beginning of her reply deal with where the prosecution actually takes place and the decision between two states as to who takes the lead.
Lord Swinfen
I also support the amendment. In doing so, I declare an interest: I run a medical charity that does all its work online, with doctors and nurses in 74 different countries. However, I am not so much worried about that, because I hope that our confidential information is secure. I am thinking of people using cybercrime to find their rivals’ pricing information and new product designs when tendering for various projects; in other words, hacking into other people’s and firms’ computers and getting confidential information for their own pecuniary and business advantage. This is an important amendment and I hope that my noble friend on the Front Bench will consider it sympathetically.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, to pick up on the point about drugs, it does not seem to me that they are necessarily excluded. The new section of the Computer Misuse Act deals with an act creating,
“a significant risk of, serious damage of a material kind”,
which includes “damage to human welfare”, which is in turn such as to cause, among other things, “loss to human life” or “human illness or injury”. All that links up very closely with what the noble Lord has been talking about. If what he has described is not covered, we will need to go back to Clause 39—but not today.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I have a number of amendments in this group. The clause deals with a new offence of participating in the activities of an organised crime group. The various amendments in this quite long group seek to unpack, as it were, what all that means.
Amendment 31L would provide that a person participates in the activities of an organised crime group only if he takes an active part in those activities. How involved does somebody really have to be in order to participate, as spelt out in Clause 41(2)? Does he have merely to facilitate an activity or actually enable it? Those are very different matters. The provision concerns helping an organised crime group to carry on the activities in question. One can make it possible for a group to carry on activities or one can make it easier for it to carry on activities. I do not know whether there is a distinction between those in the new offence.
The offence is committed if,
“the person knows or has reasonable cause to suspect”,
that there are criminal activities or that he is helping an organised crime group to carry on those activities. That is not actually suspecting—it is having reasonable cause to suspect.
I am aware of the Government’s range of concerns and the need to create the new offence in order to contain what is within the frame here. The threshold for the offence concerns me. I think we need to hear a defence of such a relatively low threshold. I am aware of course that the noble Baroness would make it even lower; certainly her position is closer to the Government than that in my amendment.
My Amendment 31S questions—perhaps this goes in the other direction—why an organised crime group for this purpose consists of three or more persons. Is there not a crime group that consists of only two people and would not fall within this?
The last of my amendments, before I come back to some general points on the clause, is rather different. Clause 41(8) provides a defence if the,
“person’s participation was necessary for a purpose related to the prevention or detection of crime”.
I wondered, when I read that, whether this was about undercover policing. If it is, are there some distinctions between this offence and other offences? Or is there something particular about this offence that requires a defence to be spelt out specifically in this way? The question of undercover policing is of course a very topical and concerning one.
I raised at Second Reading, as did others, the concerns of the accountancy and legal professions about what their members—I do not mean dodgy accountants and dodgy solicitors, but ones who are perfectly respectable—have to do to ensure that they do not fall foul of these provisions. I think that the Minister has now met both the professional organisations. Perhaps this will be an opportunity for him to report to the Committee what progress has been made. I am picking up that it is good progress but I have not picked up much detail about it yet.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, of course I will reflect, but I think that I will add a couple of things to my noble friend’s list between now and Report. I am of course pleased to hear what he says about the work with the Local Government Association. I think the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, was suggesting that I was a vice-president of the LGA, as she is. Some time ago, I was chucked out on the basis that I had been a vice-president for too long. I do not know quite what that says about anything, but I am not a vice-president. I was, however, practising as a solicitor and am still on the roll; perhaps I should have said that, but I think it has been clear.
My noble friend used a phrase like “giving an incentive to report when one is suspicious”. That has to be seen in the context of a client relationship. That is not easy. My noble friend has talked about balance but it is not a two-way balance; there are a lot of factors in it.
Clause 41(8) provides that it is,
“a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that the person’s participation was necessary for a purpose related to the prevention or detection of crime”.
It would be helpful if that had been drafted in a way to refer one—with a “subject to”, for instance—to the provisions which make it necessary for authorisation for the undercover policing to take place. I do not know whether I can put that thought into my noble friend’s mind.
Finally, the Minister suggested that the terms “help” and “enable” are synonymous, but I do not think they are. To help means to assist—to make something easier, while to enable means to make it possible. They are not the same, which is one issue within all this that I would like to reflect on further and maybe come back to at the next stage. However, I have no doubt that my noble friend, in his usual generous way, will want to discuss some of that before we get to that stage. It is clearly a matter of considerable concern around the House that we get the clause right. No one is opposing it, but we want to make it workable, and supported by all those who may be affected. I am grateful for the detail of the response, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Howarth of Newport
My Lords, I was extremely happy to add my name to the amendments in this group, tabled by my noble friend Lady Meacher, and I pay tribute to the work that she does as chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Drug Policy Reform. She is deeply knowledgeable in this field, and I know that the House will always listen with great care to the proposals that she makes. She is right, of course, to make the point that injunctions on their own will achieve nothing, and that people with a drug dependency or who find themselves in the ambit of drug-related gangs are people who need help. She is right to suggest that the help that they need should very likely be help in terms of their health. It is better with these young people to treat their predicament not as a criminal but as a health issue. That is the model that has been established in Portugal since 2001, as my noble friend said, initially amid some considerable controversy—because Portugal faced an appalling crisis of drug trafficking and addiction and a whole generation of young people in very great danger. It was to many people countercultural primarily as a health-related issue rather than as a criminal issue. But the evidence shows that, over the years, the approach has paid off and results have been very good indeed.
I commend to the noble Lord, Lord Elton, and others the report on the Portuguese experience published by the charity, Transform, and available on its website. It looks very carefully at the evidence of what has happened in Portugal. I add to the highlights that my noble friend Lady Meacher mentioned the facts that drug use has,
“declined among those aged 15-24, the population most at risk of initiating drug use … Rates of past-year and past-month drug use among the general population—which are seen as the best indicators of evolving drug use trends—have decreased”,
and that,
“Rates of continuation of drug use (i.e. the proportion of the population that have ever used an illicit drug and continue to do so) have decreased”.
On all these important indicators, the policy has been vindicated. However, it is also important to say that this Portuguese strategy is one of investing very considerably in support services for the young people who are brought before disuassion commissions. The young people come to an agreement with the disuassion commission about a course of action that they will take. Not only will they seek to co-operate willingly with what is recommended in terms of their health, but there are many other courses that the disuassion commission may recommend for them, including job training and all kinds of activities and processes to help them to integrate successfully with society. This strategy came at a time when Portugal was broadening the range and depth of its welfare state and of its support services for vulnerable and fragile young people. Of course, Portugal has been under very serious fiscal pressure in recent years. It may well be that the quality and extent of these services are not what the authors of the strategy would ideally have wished; none the less, the results have been very good.
It will be necessary, if we are to adopt a constructive, positive, humane strategy of the kind that has been pioneered and demonstrated in Portugal, for the Government of the day in this country to be willing to invest in the resources needed to make a full success of that. We all know how very difficult that is going to be for a Government now or in the foreseeable future to do. That is a kind of caveat; but it would not at all invalidate the adoption of a strategy such as the one my noble friend has commended to the Committee. I very much hope that the Committee will favour what she has suggested.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, like my noble friend and other noble Lords, I do not want to comment on the fine detail of the amendment but simply to support the noble Baroness. Her points about avoiding criminalisation and what I might summarise as an active, supportive, constructive response, are immensely important. Under the noble Baroness’s chairmanship, some of us met a number of MPs from Portugal. We were very struck by the agreement across the parties about the benefits of this measure and the lack of contention around it. We actually ran out of questions to ask them on that issue. Clearly, in that country they have succeeded in taking some of the heat out of the drugs issues, which has been a very considerable achievement. I hope that we might learn from that example.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, for giving me a copy of her amendment and a briefing note on it when she tabled it. I was not aware of the Portuguese experience as my noble friend, Lord Howarth described it. It is interesting and bears further consideration. I am not an expert on whether the detail of the amendment is correct. It looks complicated, which might be because it was drafted by a lawyer, but I suspect that it is not so complicated in practice.
These dissuasion panels would sit alongside the injunctions, such as is proposed in the Bill, and a police officer would refer a young person if they were involved in gang-related violence or a drug-related activity. The panel would be tasked with assessing the young person. It would determine whether there was a need to require the young person to undertake some form of action, whether that be treatment or counselling, to prevent them engaging in further activities, to protect them or to address their drug dependency. That seems to be a more holistic approach to tackling the drug culture and drug abuse.
Baroness Hamwee
“Guidance
In section 47 of the Policing and Crime Act 2009 (guidance), for subsection (3) substitute—“(3) Before issuing or revising any guidance under this section, the Secretary of State must consult the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, and representatives of chief police officers, local authorities, health authorities and persons concerned with the care of young people, the Youth Justice Board and such other persons as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate.””
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, Section 47 of the Policing and Crime Act 2009—PACA, as my noble friend referred to it a few minutes ago—provides that the Secretary of State must issue guidance relating to gang-related violence injunctions. Under Section 47, the Secretary of State must, before issuing or revising guidance, consult the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales and such other persons as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate. Given the multidisciplinary nature of gang-related violence, it is interesting that the only specific consultee is the Lord Chief Justice—the courts, essentially. My amendment would add consultation of representatives of chief police officers, local authorities, health authorities and persons concerned with the care of young people, the Youth Justice Board and, again, such other persons as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate.
I do not need to persuade the Committee of the interest, in a technical sense, of all those whom I have listed, in the issue of gang-related violence and the formation and operation of gangs. I appreciate that, under PACA, the Secretary of State is able to consult all these people but it would be appropriate to list a wider number of officeholders and interests than is simply caught up in “such other persons”. I beg to move.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Hamwee for outlining her thinking behind this amendment. I entirely agree that the contents of any statutory guidance should be developed and agreed on by all the relevant parties in advance. I assure her that this is already the case. The statutory guidance on gang injunctions is being revised, as we have already discussed, and will be reissued in the autumn. We are already consulting the Youth Justice Board, the Ministry of Justice, HM Courts and Tribunals Service, the Judicial College, the Crown Prosecution Service and the College of Policing. We also plan to consult police forces and local authorities, through the Local Government Association, as well as the Department of Health and the Department for Education. This will ensure that the welfare of young people is integral to the process. I have emphasised, in my contributions, the importance of this guidance in making gang injunctions effective.
In legal terms, the current requirement to consult the Lord Chief Justice and,
“any other such person as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate”,
allows enough flexibility so that relevant parties are involved in the process as judged most appropriate. It is a commonly used form of words to describe this sort of consultation. Although I understand exactly why my noble friend has tabled this amendment, it is not possible to set out in legislation a comprehensive list of all those who should be consulted and I am not persuaded that anything further would be achieved by laying out a list of consultees. For this reason, and in the knowledge that the new guidance involves considerable consultation—though not I hope so much that it would mean it is not available by Report—I hope my noble friend will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, we know the phrase well. When my noble friend started to list those who are currently being consulted, I thought that this was sticking, again, with the court system. However, he widened that, and I was very pleased to hear confirmation that the importance of the welfare of young people, not just a criminal justice response, is being encapsulated in the consultation going on at the moment. I do not intend to pursue this, but I am glad to have that information and to have the recognition articulated in that way. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
Amendment 40B will end this part of the work on the Bill with, again, something of a whimper, but nevertheless I shall pursue it very briefly in order to get the Minister’s comment.
Clause 56 deals with the retention or return of substances seized under these new provisions. Subsection (7) provides that where the substance is being retained for a second period, reasonable efforts are made,
“to give … notice to the person who the officer thinks may be entitled to the substance”.
The amendment would simply add that notice should also be given to the person from whom it was seized if that person is different. I may be missing something somewhere else in this clause, but I beg to move.
Lord Howarth of Newport
My Lords, I am aware that the Committee is hungry. I am hungry myself, so I shall be extremely brief. This amendment, helpfully tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, provides us with the only opportunity to debate the provisions in the Bill that deal with cutting agents used to bulk out illegal drugs. I simply want to draw to the attention of the Committee the law of unintended consequences. Cracking down on relatively harmless cutting agents such as benzocaine runs the risk that you drive criminals to use much more damaging cutting agents. A case was reported in Scotland recently in which six people died. They had used heroin that had been bulked out with a cutting agent contaminated with anthrax. Criminals are entirely unscrupulous. I hope that, when under the terms of this clause, the police, customs and courts are considering whether to return or retain cutting agents that have been seized, they will think very carefully about the consequences of impounding relatively safe cutting agents, thereby providing an incentive for criminals to use much more dangerous cutting agents.
I will also, although this is a painful thing to do, draw to the attention of the Committee the utterly tragic case of Martha Fernback, a 15 year-old girl who died nearly a year ago after consuming ecstasy—MDMA—which was 91% pure compared to the average street-level purity of 58%. Had that MDMA been cut and the purity been what it would normally be when it came into her hands, she would still be alive today. Her mother, Anne-Marie Cockburn, has campaigned with tremendous courage and great wisdom asking that the Home Secretary and the shadow Home Secretary think deeply about whether it would be right to move from the system of prohibition that trapped that girl towards a system of legalisation and strict regulation as well as vastly better education in this field. I will not enlarge on that theme because the Minister and the House know my views well, but as the House determines whether to approve these clauses we ought to bear in mind that legislation with the best of intentions, which the Government have, can lead to horribly counterproductive effects.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, if a court approves the further retention of a suspected drug-cutting agent beyond the initial 30-day detention period, it is only right that the responsible police or customs officer makes reasonable efforts to inform the person who may be entitled to the substances if the person was not present or represented at the court hearing. A person entitled to the substances is defined in Clause 53 as the person the substances were seized from or the owner of the substances. It is important that all those persons who are entitled to receive notice do so. This provides additional protection for the legitimate trade, ensuring people have sufficient time to consider and act upon the notice, if appropriate.
I commend my noble friend Lady Hamwee for ensuring that we continue to minimise the impact on the legitimate trade by setting out in clear terms who should be informed of the court’s decision. I shall therefore give further consideration to extending the provision to ensure that notice is given to the person from whom the suspected drug-cutting agents were seized, if different from the owner. I will reflect on this point and let her know the outcome in advance of Report.
On the two points made by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, about switching to more dangerous cutting agents, the proposals include a general seizure power which covers any substance suspected of being intended for use as a drug-cutting agent. Therefore, we do not anticipate that they will lead to drug traffickers using cutting agents that are more dangerous than those currently being used. I have heard of dangerous cutting agents being used currently. Any new substances that traffickers begin to use would be equally subject to seizure under these powers.
On the risk that the powers to seize cutting agents would place drug users in danger because of purity issues, by restricting the ability of drug traffickers to cut drugs we anticipate that the new powers will reduce harm by limiting the availability of drugs on the street. Lower availability should increase prices and therefore reduce use. The powers will also attack the profits of drug traffickers, which they use to fund a range of other harmful criminal activities. Moreover, the most common cutting agents are far from harmless. There has been a move away from inactive cutting agents to more dangerous pharmaceutical agents, such as benzocaine, lidocaine and phenacetin. Toxic doses of benzocaine and lidocaine can decrease the oxygen-carrying capacity of the blood and can cause convulsions that mimic the acute toxicity of cocaine. Phenacetin, a painkiller, is no longer used in the UK due to its carcinogenic and kidney-damaging properties.
I hope my response has addressed the issues that my noble friend and the noble Lord have raised and that my noble friend will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, the Minister is extremely generous and I consider my wrist to have been slapped. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Terrorism Act 2000 (Code of Practice for Examining Officers and Review Officers) Order 2014
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(9 years, 10 months ago)
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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)
My Lords, as noble Lords will know, Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 allows an examining officer to stop and question—and, when necessary, detain and search—individuals travelling through ports, airports, international rail stations or the border area to determine whether that person appears to be someone who is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. Examining people at ports and the border area contributes on a daily basis to keeping the British public safe. Those engaged in terrorist-related activity travel to plan, finance, train for and commit their attacks. Most major international terrorist plots have involved individuals travelling through international borders to plan and prepare their attacks. Schedule 7 is an important part of the UK’s counterterrorism strategy and integral to the UK’s border security arrangements.
The Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act, which received Royal Assent on 13 March 2014, made changes to Schedule 7—and to Schedule 8, which provides for the treatment of persons detained under Schedule 7 powers. These changes were made following extensive public consultation in 2012 and are intended to reduce the potential scope for Schedule 7 to be operated in ways that may interfere with individuals’ rights unnecessarily or disproportionately, while retaining operational effectiveness.
The changes made to Schedule 7 include: reducing the maximum period of examination from nine to six hours; extending to individuals detained at a port the statutory rights, already available to individuals detained under Schedule 7 at a police station, to have a person informed of their detention and to consult a solicitor privately; clarifying that the right to consult a solicitor includes consultation in person; ensuring that all individuals examined for more than one hour are formally detained and given their statutory rights; introducing statutory review of the need for continued detention; introducing a statutory requirement for training of examining and reviewing officers; establishing a statutory provision that undertaking strip-searches of persons detained under Schedule 7 powers requires reasonable grounds to suspect that the person is concealing something which may be evidence that they are involved in terrorism, and requires a supervising officer’s authority; repealing the unused power to seek intimate samples— for example, blood or semen; and making express provision that an examining officer may make and retain a copy of information obtained or found in the course of an examination.
Noble Lords will appreciate that our discussions are consequential on the full debates that we had when the Bill was before us. The existing code of practice must be revised to reflect the changes made to the powers by the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act and to make specific provision on training and reviews. I am grateful to noble Lords for attending this debate and beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, this is consequential on previous debates. It is amazing how much and how quickly all that agonising goes out of one’s head, and one has to remind oneself of the subject of it. I am glad that we have had the chance to consider the draft code of practice and the covering SI. What concerns me is the delay in the introduction of the review arrangements, which I assume is because it has simply not been possible to get the training in place quickly enough. I am not suggesting that the better provisions of the legislation, as they are after the work done on the then Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill, should be delayed. However, could my noble friend confirm that training is on track for the more senior officers, who will be detailed to undertake the reviews, and how supervision will be carried out in the mean time? I notice that the code says that it will be delayed until the relevant provisions come into force. However, in distinction, the paragraphs about audio recording say that there is no requirement to follow the code until next April. That is the time when the review provisions are to come into force, or so we are told. I do not know whether I am seeing a problem where there is none. Perhaps my noble friend has information, although he may not, about the proportion of officers who will be trained to undertake the more senior role.
I shall raise a point again that I raised during the passage of the Bill. Will training cover how officers should deal with the family or other accompanying passengers of the individual who is being held or detained? I think that I mentioned during the Bill’s passage that I had come across an example, which I hope was a rare one, of an individual being told that, if he insisted on waiting for a legal representative, it would be a problem for his elderly mother, with whom he was travelling. In other words, inappropriate pressure was put on him to forgo a right. I am also not clear what happens if, because of detention, passengers miss their flights. I hope that my noble friend can also confirm that the facilities for this work are satisfactory and appropriate. We have talked about short-term holding facilities a good deal, of course.
The code refers to legal privilege, where the restriction seems to be on copying, not on looking at it. You cannot erase something from your head although, obviously, there would be a restriction on using it—but what happens if a privileged document is copied when it should not be?
Paragraph 41 suggests that consultation with a solicitor is invariably not allowed. This is in the examination part of the code, not the detention part. I had thought that it was always allowed, but not necessarily with a solicitor of the individual’s choice. Is that only when the individual is actually detained?
Paragraph 42 states that an examining officer may grant a request that a named person is informed of the examination at his discretion and that:
“Where reasonably practicable, the request should be granted”.
Is it discretion or reasonable practicality?
Paragraph 45, which is where we get on to detention, states that the power may be exercised,
“where the examining officer considers it is appropriate to do so”.
The last bullet point of paragraph 46 states that:
“Detention is an option (during the first hour of examination)”.
Is that bullet point just about the first hour of detention? If I am asking too many questions, I have no doubt that my noble friend will ask to write to me.
However, I will raise a couple of matters which I hope he can confirm now. First, paragraph 7.2 of the Explanatory Memorandum reads:
“Examining people at ports and the border area contributes daily to plan, finance, train for, and commit their attacks”.
I shall not reread that, but when the Minister looks at it, he will realise that some words must be missing. I do not think you detain people in order to help them plan their attacks. I have had a word with the Minister’s officials, and I think they think it is a typo, but quite an important one.
My second question is on similar lines, but I think I am on dodgier ground. It is on annexe A to the code, which explains to the detainee that he is detained to determine essentially either whether he is involved in terrorism or whether he is entering or leaving Northern Ireland. I thought, or perhaps I had assumed without applying much thinking, that it should be “and” rather than “or”. Looking at Schedule 7, Northern Ireland is dealt with in a separate paragraph. Will my noble friend confirm that detention can be solely to establish whether somebody is going into Northern Ireland without any terrorism-related aspect? I am sorry to have slung that at my noble friend. I looked at this rather too close to the time of the debate to give him notice of the rather detailed points which I have just raised.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
I will be giving the Minister a somewhat easier time than he has just been given by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.
I thank the Minister for the explanation of the purpose of this order, which brings into operation a code of practice for examining officers and review officers in respect of the exercise of the powers under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and under Schedule 8 to that Act where the powers are exercised in connection with Schedule 7, as amended by Schedule 9 to the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. The code of practice revises the preceding code of practice to take account of amendments made to Schedules 7, 8 and 14 to the Terrorism Act 2000 by the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014.
The Explanatory Memorandum refers to commencing the remaining provisions of Schedule 9 to the 2014 Act this month to coincide with the issue of the code of practice brought into operation by this instrument, with the exception of the provision to which the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, referred requiring review of the detention of persons detained under Schedule 7, which are being delayed until next April to allow sufficient time to develop, accredit and train all examining and review officers. I shall pursue some of the points she raised. Will the Minister say how many examining and review officers still require to be trained, how long the training of each officer takes and why the required training has not been completed by this month and has had to be delayed? The need for such training must have been known for some time. Could the Minister also spell out the impact of this delay, in practical terms, including any impact on the provisions of this instrument, which comes into force at the end of this month?
The Explanatory Memorandum also refers in paragraph 4.5 to consultation on this issue having taken place with “National Business Leads”. Perhaps the Minister could remind me who or what this organisation is or these people are.
As the Minister said, the Explanatory Memorandum states in paragraph 7.2 that:
“Schedule 7 is an important part of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy and key to the UK’s border security”.
The memorandum goes on:
“The changes to Schedule 7 in the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act are intended to reduce the potential scope for Schedule 7 powers to be operated in an unnecessary or disproportionate way, whilst still retaining their operational effectiveness”.
It then lists the changes made under the 2014 Act. They include ensuring access to legal advice for all individuals examined for more than one hour. In that regard, could the Minister clarify what legal entitlements people have when detained under Schedule 7? Will they have access to free legal advice?
The changes also include reducing the maximum period of examination from nine hours to six hours. The Government and others recently expressed concerns about the numbers going from this country to Syria apparently to be trained and engage in violence in the current conflict, and the possible consequences of that. In the light of concerns about what might happen if and when these people return to this country, with or without others, and what their intentions might then be, is it the Government’s view that all the changes made by the 2014 Act, including reducing the maximum period of examination from nine hours to six hours, actually enhance our ability to minimise the risk of those potential threats? Do the Government believe that the new code of practice provided for in this order—reflecting the amendments made to Schedule 7 to the 2000 Act by the 2014 Act—contribute to rather than potentially diminish our security in the present climate?
I simply conclude by commenting that the Explanatory Memorandum states that,
“the majority of consultation respondents agreed that the revised code clearly reflected the changes made to Schedule 7 powers in the”,
2014 Act. What it is not able to say is that the majority of respondents agreed that in today’s climate all those changes are still appropriate. We will not oppose this order, but I hope that the Minister will respond directly to the points and questions I raised, as well as those of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.
Serious Crime Bill [HL]
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(9 years, 10 months ago)
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Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I am opposing the Question that this clause stand part of the Bill simply to probe. I hope that nothing I say will take the Minister by surprise. I would like to use this opportunity to thank him and his officials for the factsheets that we have had and, in particular, for the Keeling schedules. I discovered that in my pile of copies of statutes, I had a copy of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. I then rapidly discovered how out of date that print was, so the material that we have been sent is very useful indeed.
This debate is closely tied to the previous one—still on third parties’ interests. Clause 4 is about receivers, and proposes an addition to the Proceeds of Crime Act involving proposed new Section 10A of that Act, which is inserted by Clause 1 on determining the extent of an interest in property. Essentially, the purpose of this stand part debate is to ask who deals with what, and when. How would all this operate? Who determines whether and when there has been no,
“reasonable opportunity to make representations”,
or whether there would be,
“a serious risk of injustice”?
I am of course quoting from proposed new Section 51(8B) —whereas proposed new Section 10A(1) in Clause 1 provides that the court, not the receiver, determines the extend of a defendant’s interest,
“if it thinks it appropriate to do so”.
My request, therefore, to the Minister is simply for him to explain the procedure.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, it was kind of my noble friend Lady Hamwee to thank those who are supporting me at official level in the Bill; I am supported by a very fine team, and I am grateful. I am also grateful for the fact that a number of noble Lords have taken time to talk to me about the Bill. That has helped us all to get an understanding of a complex measure. Those Keeling measures are needed in order to have the faintest idea about what is going on. Noble Lords will therefore understand the complexity of the matter and why the excellence of my officials is important to me.
Clause 4 deals with the circumstances in which an individual affected by a determination of interest may make representations to the court appointing an enforcement receiver. A court can confer certain powers on an enforcement receiver, including the power to realise property. This power is accompanied by a requirement to allow persons with an interest in the property a reasonable opportunity to make representations to the court.
As we discussed in the previous debate, the basic principle is that an appeal against a Section 10A determination as to the extent of the defendant’s interest in a property will be permitted only where the person was not given an opportunity to make representation to the judge who made the determination, or there is a serious risk of injustice. In cases where there is no receiver, the Court of Appeal will hear the appeal in the normal way. In cases where the court appoints a receiver, however, it is not bound by the determination and can hear representations. It is in effect hearing an appeal.
As interested third parties will generally have had an opportunity to make representations to the court prior to it making a determination of interest in property, the changes made by Clause 4 limit to certain circumstances the right of such parties to make further representations to the court appointing the receiver. As I have explained, it is not a right of appeal at large and does not allow representations to be made that are inconsistent with a determination, except under the two circumstances I described: first, when the affected party was not given a reasonable opportunity to make representations to the Crown Court before it made its determination; and, secondly, where the court considers that the determination would result in a serious risk of injustice to the person. These two circumstances mirror those in Clause 3, which set out the grounds under which the Court of Appeal may hear an appeal against a Section 10A determination.
So that we are in no doubt as to what it means, the “serious risk of injustice” will include an instance where an innocent third party with no links to criminality has an interest in a house that is to be sold to satisfy a confiscation order against a defendant. The innocent third party may have been out of the country when the determination was made and, consequently, had not received notification of the hearing. By contrast, it would not include instances where there has been an inconvenience to a third party—for example, if they had to move out of rented accommodation that was to be sold to satisfy a confiscation order. A serious injustice is not anticipated to be such a rare instance that it would be considered to be an exceptional circumstance. It will be a matter for judicial discretion, based on the facts of the individual case.
The clause enables an interested third party to make representations where their interest in the property came to light only after the Crown Court had made its original determination. Subject to the court’s consideration of any such representations, and to the outcome of any appeal, a determination made by the court is binding on the receiver. As I have said, in cases where there is no receiver appointed, any appeal will be dealt with by the Court of Appeal. This represents an equitable balance between the effective enforcement of confiscation orders and the important rights of third parties. On that basis, I beg to move that Clause 4 stand part of the Bill.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, that is very helpful. I commented to my noble friend when we discussed Part 1 that flow-charts might be quite useful. As he has described the sequence of events, it occurs to me that flow charts or some sort of fairly straightforward step-by-step explanation would be particularly helpful to third parties who get caught up in these proceedings. A defendant will be likely to have legal representation and advisers who can assist with what happens at what stage. A third party may suddenly find that he or she is affected and they ought to be able to find out what steps are available to make representations and how they should be made, without necessarily having to go to the expense of instructing lawyers themselves.
The right thing to do would be to make this user-friendly to people, about whom we should not assume any degree of guilt or their being reprehensible at all. I just use this opportunity to air that thought and of course I am not going to resist Clause 4.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, the first amendment is an amendment to Clause 5, which will introduce a new Section 11 to POCA. The proposed new Section 11(8) provides for the prosecutor to have an opportunity to make representations regarding the time for payment. Clearly, the defendant must have an opportunity as well. I tabled the amendment simply to ask my noble friend whether he can explain when that opportunity would be, and whether he can say whether proposed new Section 11(8) concerns the prosecutor’s response to the defendant’s representations, which are covered elsewhere—in existing legislation if not in the Bill. I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
My Lords, Clause 5 includes provisions designed to minimise delays in the confiscation process. This is achieved by amending Section 11 of POCA to make it crystal clear that the full amount that is ordered to be paid by the court must be paid on the day on which the order is made, unless the court is satisfied that the defendant is unable to do so, for example, because they need time to realise their property.
The maximum additional time allowed for a defendant to pay their confiscation orders has been reduced from 12 months to six. There will also be a further restriction on the length of an extension of the time to pay limiting it to more than is necessary, for example, to realise funds from a specific asset.
My noble friend has indicated that this amendment is designed to tease out whether the defendant has a right to make representations to the court about the time for payment. She has rightly pointed out the fact that the proposed new Section 11(8) expressly confers on the prosecutor the right to make representations, but no such express right is conferred on the defendant.
I can assure my noble friend that the defendant will indeed be able to make representations to the court. However, in view of the way in which the process will operate, it is not necessary to provide for this in the legislation. As I have explained, the default position is that a confiscation order will be payable on the day that it is made. This is the current position. We do not believe that it is impractical. Certainly, for lower value orders, there is no reason why the defendant cannot visit the fines officer and discharge the confiscation order before leaving the court.
The court will not be expected to allow additional time for payment on its own motion. In practice, the court will only be in the position to consider making an order under proposed new Section 11(2) of POCA to extend the time given to the defendant to pay their order if the defendant has made representations to the effect that they need more time to pay their order or part of it. This will be done as part of the confiscation hearing.
Similarly, under proposed new Section 11(4) of POCA, it will be for the defendant to make an application to the court to extend the period allowed for payment. It is implicit in making such an application that the defendant will set out his or her arguments for being afforded more time to pay the confiscation order. New Section 11(8) is intended to ensure that the prosecutor has the right to respond to the case made by the defendant. Having heard the explanation, I trust that my noble friend will agree that the amendment is unnecessary.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, the noble Baroness will know that I was concerned about the very tight provisions of new Section 11. She has explained that the defendant will have an opportunity to make representations at the time. That is reassuring, because it is almost never possible to realise an asset on the day that an order is made and it is often not even possible to transfer money immediately. What she has said about the processes is helpful and I am grateful to her for her explanation of proposed new Section 11(8). I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Deben (Con)
My Lords, I will insert a single sentence here, although it may be rather a long one. I am afraid that my noble friend may have great difficulty in doing what the noble Lord suggests because he will come into conflict with a deep and entirely erroneous Treasury view about hypothecation. For all my political life, I have fought the battle for hypothecation, which is the only way we will get people to accept a whole range of things in future.
It was extremely successfully done on the landfill tax, but the money was then stolen by the incoming Government, who did not understand. The Treasury had hated it in the first place; it had been forced through by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, my right honourable friend Kenneth Clarke. Immediately after he went, the Treasury mandarins got the money back again because they do not like someone else deciding how the money shall be spent. I beg my noble friend to stand firm against that wholly unacceptable attitude.
The Pope was right, in the 1920s, when he talked about subsidiarity being the basis of democracy. He was, of course, attacking fascism and communism. I am afraid that bureaucratism is just as damaging in always trying to concentrate decisions about how money shall be spent in the hands of the Treasury. I think that the more people who make decisions about how it shall be spent, the more we will be able to make democracy work. Obviously, there have to be restrictions and some overall view, but I hope that my noble friend will take this opportunity to fight like a tiger for an essential part of any sensible democracy: hypothecation. Hypothecation should be a tick rather than a cross when something such as this is put forward.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I wonder whether Hansard will be able to resist its usual refusal to let us put lots of “ands” and “buts” in very long sentences.
I have been trying to think of something to say in Latin to the noble Lord, but my A-level Latin is too long ago for me to be able to do it. However, he is probably asking your Lordships the sort of question to which we should answer yes. I remember that from the very early days of my Latin education.
I am certainly on the yes part of the spectrum of answers to this, in principle. I think a large part of the problem is what I unkindly call “turf wars” between the MoJ and the Home Office about who should have the money when the proceeds are recovered. I realise it is more complicated than that.
On the wording of the amendment, I wonder whether it is possible to identify the communities and neighbourhoods affected in an effective and straightforward manner, if at all. For instance, on the proceeds of crime of someone high up in an organised crime organisation dealing with drugs, can you pin down the communities and neighbourhoods affected in the way suggested? I am very attracted to money going towards crime prevention and assisting those who are affected by crime, but I am just not quite sure about this provision. However, the questions the noble Lord asked the Minister about ARIS and the wider questions about how the proceeds of crime when recovered are applied are very important.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, on the face of it, this is a beguiling amendment, not least because of the way the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, moved it by giving an example of helping a primary school understand a bit more about the way our complicated world works. There is no one in this House who defers more than me to the need for this country and this Parliament to help our citizens have a better idea of what it is to be a citizen in our barbarically complicated society.
I concur with my noble friend Lady Hamwee, and I think there is perhaps another problem with the wording of the amendment in that it simply talks about,
“reinvestment in the communities and neighbourhoods affected”,
which seems as wide as the Atlantic Ocean and gives no reinvestment guidance about what, why or wherefore.
I have a deeper problem with the amendment. We heard the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, give the example of $20 billion to $40 billion that should be recovered from frauds in developing countries and is not. We heard other examples from my noble friend Lord Taylor of Holbeach of the abject failure of our current laws to achieve their purpose. I am not in favour of doing anything to diminish the resources available to the prosecutorial authorities for seeking to make more as regards compliance with the manifold laws we already have. It is a sort of scandal that we go on passing law after law with the most perfect of purposes, but then fail utterly to give those charged with implementing those laws the wherewithal to do that.
My noble friend Lord Taylor of Holbeach talked with some satisfaction of six advisers. I have to tell him that when you are up against the big, bad guys, a team of six will look rather small, and he is talking about six to cover the whole landscape. Therefore my reservation about the amendment is simply that if its effect is to reduce at all the current grotesquely inadequate resources that go toward compliance, I am afraid that I am not for it.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, this is a short point because it is just a short question. Amendment 5 is to Clause 8 and Amendment 26 is to Clause 28—the equivalent Northern Ireland provision. Amendment 5 seeks to leave out new Section 25A(2)(a) of POCA, which allows the court to discharge an order in the case of a deceased defendant where,
“it is not possible to recover anything from the estate”.
My question is: is this not covered by new Section 25A(2)(b), which says that a discharge could be made where it is not,
“reasonable to make any attempt … to recover anything”?
It seems to me that if it is not possible to make an attempt, it certainly would not be reasonable. That is my question. I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, Clause 8 deals with the discharge of certain unpaid confiscation orders and applications to vary unpaid orders down in value. Despite the best efforts of law enforcement agencies, some confiscation orders are uncollectable and sit on the books of Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, accruing interest at 8% a year.
Clause 8 provides that the court will be able to write off unpaid confiscation orders where the defendant has died and it is not possible or reasonable to seek payment of the order from the defendant’s estate: where, for example, there are no assets remaining in the estate. Clause 28 makes the same provision for Northern Ireland.
In Clauses 8 and 28 there are two cases where orders may be written off: first, where it is impossible to get any money out of the estate; and, secondly, where it is not reasonable to make any attempt or further attempt to get money out of the estate.
These amendments suggest removing the case for discharging orders where it is impossible to get any money at all out of the estate. My noble friend has indicated these amendments are essentially designed to probe what would be covered by a first set of circumstances for discharging an order that is not covered by a second set of circumstances.
My noble friend is correct to say that there is certainly a significant degree of overlap between the two. If there are no assets of any note in the estate, it would not be reasonable to make an attempt to recover moneys owing to discharge a confiscation order. Equally, it would not be possible to recover anything from the estate.
That said, I believe it is helpful to retain both cases. The first case where it is impossible to get any money at all out of the estate could be said to be a subset of the second case, where it is not reasonable to make any attempt or further attempt. However, there may be circumstances not covered by the second case. It is important that this clause should encompass all possible scenarios to ensure uncollectible orders may be discharged.
I hope that, in light of that explanation, my noble friend will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am not sure that I do understand that it would ever be reasonable to make an attempt to recover something where it is not possible to recover it. I am not going to make a fuss about it. However, when I hear about 8% a year, I think I need to review my investment strategy. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, this amendment is to Clause 11, while Amendment 27 is an equivalent amendment to the equivalent Northern Ireland provision, Clause 13(1). The Minister has already referred to the change from “reasonable cause to believe” to “reasonable grounds to suspect” in the context of the exercise of restraint order powers. The question, obviously, is designed to explore why there is a lower hurdle when we are talking about investigation only, not proceedings.
I appreciate that the later part of Clause 11 requires reporting by the court, although the court can decide not to require it, and that proceedings have to be started within a reasonable time. I am assuming, but perhaps the Minister can confirm this, that a defendant can apply for the restraint to be lifted on the basis that reasonable time has passed and there are no proceedings, and that “reasonable time” is assessed on a case-by-case basis and is not a fixed period. However, it occurs to me that the provision might be giving rise to additional litigation because there are uncertainties around this.
Temporary asset freezing—which is what this is, essentially—could be for quite a long time. We are talking about someone who is not a convicted criminal and may not yet even be a defendant. There could be an impact on that person’s dependants and their business. It is, therefore, a serious matter and I look forward to an explanation of why the Government have chosen to lower the hurdle and the protections that will be in place. I beg to move.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, I am pleased that my noble friend Lady Hamwee has raised these issues. We do not take the impact of restraint orders lightly and we fully understand her points. However, these orders effectively freeze property to prevent it being dissipated before a confiscation order is made. This is important in effective use of the Proceeds of Crime Act. The property is then available to sell, which helps to satisfy a confiscation order which may subsequently be made.
The intention of the Proceeds of Crime Act was to introduce the ability to obtain a restraint order as early as possible in the investigation to remove any possibility that a criminal will become aware, as a result of the investigation, that their assets are at risk and so move or hide them. We have been discussing this for much of the afternoon. Restraint orders are, therefore, available from the earliest stages of a criminal investigation. As I have already said, and as my noble friend is aware, the current test for obtaining a restraint order in all circumstances is that there is a “reasonable cause to believe” that the alleged offender has benefited from his criminal conduct. This is a proportionate test in circumstances where a defendant has been charged and is being prosecuted. In this case there will be available evidence to meet the test of “belief”.
However, the operational experience of our criminal justice colleagues in relation to this issue has shown that, at the early stage of an investigation, it is very hard to prove belief. The reality is that at that stage of an investigation there may be limited evidence, simply because the investigation has not yet had time to gather it. It is notable—as the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, has said—that the number of restraint orders has fallen since 2010-11, despite the Government’s push for more asset recovery action. The number of restraint orders obtained had been increasing and reached a peak of nearly 2,000 in 2010-11 but has dropped every year since then, with fewer than 1,400 restraint orders being made last year.
Delaying the obtaining of a restraint order until there is sufficient evidence to meet the “reasonable cause to believe” test can provide suspected offenders with an opportunity to dissipate or hide their assets to protect them from seizure. The amendment we are making to POCA in the Bill therefore revises the test for restraint in the earliest stages to “reasonable grounds to suspect”—I emphasise “suspect”—that the alleged offender has benefited from his criminal conduct. It is also of note that the amendments include a requirement for the judge making the restraint order to set a date for the matter to be returned to the court so that it can consider whether sufficient progress has been made with the investigation or give reasons for not arranging such a hearing. This reflects current practice of the court when it makes a restraint order in the absence of the person who will be the subject of the order. Making the practice mandatory will ensure appropriate judicial oversight of restraint orders made during a criminal investigation.
It is important that the Committee understands that Clauses 11 and 31 are not breaking new legal ground. “Suspicion”, as opposed to ‘belief’, is a test in other similar matters. Within POCA itself, a judge has to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a defendant has benefited from their criminality in order to issue a production order. Also, under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, a police officer may arrest without a warrant anyone whom he or she has “reasonable grounds for suspecting” has committed an offence. So, at the early stages of a criminal investigation, it is appropriate that the court uses the threshold of suspicion, rather than belief. We think that this is a direct parallel supporting the amendment we are seeking to make in Clause 11.
This was one of the issues considered by the Joint Committee which undertook pre-legislative scrutiny of the Modern Slavery Bill. In its report, the Joint Committee made the following comment:
“It is imperative that law enforcement authorities should be able to freeze relevant assets at the earliest possible stage in an investigation, and rarely, if ever, more than 24 hours after arrest. We therefore strongly recommend that the test for obtaining a restraint order be amended to make it less stringent. We note that the Government has already committed to reducing the test from ‘reasonable cause to believe’ to ‘reasonable suspicion’. We approve of this formulation.”
I hope the Committee will do so too.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee asked what would happen if a defendant were able to make an application to a court to lift a restraint order. A court may discharge a restraint order, on application, where the investigation has not progressed to its satisfaction. That freedom is available to a defendant, who may also apply to the court to vary a restraint order. It must do so if the investigation has not progressed satisfactorily. I hope that noble Lords will be happy with my explanation and that my noble friend will be content to withdraw her amendment, in the light of my comments.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am glad to hear about the judicial discretion which might be applied. I would like to think that the reduction in the number of restraint orders or applications for them is because of a problem with the legislation and not something inherent in the new arrangements with, for instance, those concerned not directing their minds to the lower test. That can always be an issue and changing the test does not change it. I am, of course, happy to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
Amendment 19 would remove paragraph (b) of new subsection (7A) in Section 67 of POCA. Amendment 20 would make an order under this new subsection (7B) an affirmative order. Having had the benefit of a discussion with the Minister, I know what is meant by the phrases,
“money that is represented by”,
and “may be obtained from” as distinct from money actually obtained from. It was an interesting discussion, but it would useful to have the information on the record.
On the order which is required, what is proposed by the Government is quite significant, and it seems to me that an affirmative order would be more appropriate in this case. I beg to move.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, Clause 14 amends Section 67 of the Proceeds of Crime Act with a view to speeding up the confiscation of funds held in bank accounts. In addition, the clause enables, through secondary legislation, the powers in Section 67 to be updated to include other realisable cash-like financial products, such as share accounts and pension accounts that may be held by banks or other financial institutions.
Currently, seizure powers under Section 67 of POCA apply only to money in its traditional form held in an account with a bank or building society. Money can also take the form of, or be represented by, innovative financial products. This includes digital currencies whereby the user obtains goods or services by virtual means rather than a physical or electronic exchange of funds.
Currently, it is not possible to realise such instruments for the purposes of seizure under Section 67 of POCA. The extension of powers to encompass other financial products may require modifications to Section 67 to provide for such financial instruments or products to be converted into cash. The new subsection (7B) of Section 67, inserted by Clause 14(3), provides the power to make such modifications.
Clause 14(3) also applies to money that may be obtained from a financial product that is something other than a standard current or savings account. I shall give examples of this, and I am grateful to my noble friend for giving us the chance to put this on the record. An example of such a product would be a pension plan that has yet to mature but will pay an annuity and a lump sum on retirement. Other examples could include a share account or a virtual currency such as Bitcoin. Essentially, therefore, the clause provides for the capture and realisation of instruments with an economic value. I hope that that explains to my noble friend the use of the term “represented by” a financial instrument or product in Clause 14(3).
By virtue of Clause 14(5) an order made under new Section 67(7A) of POCA will be subject to the affirmative procedure. New Section 67(7B) simply amplifies the scope of the order-making power in new Section 67(7A)—it is not a second free-standing order-making power. I hope that I have made that clear. Accordingly, it is not necessary to refer to new Section 67(7B) in Clause 14(5). That being the case, I hope that my noble friend will agree that her amendment is, strictly speaking, unnecessary. However, it has served a useful purpose in that I have been able to explain the purpose of the provisions in Clause 14. In the light of that explanation, I hope that my noble friend will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am afraid that it occurred to me only while I listened to my noble friend’s explanation that I have not pursued the issue, where it is digital currency or an annuity under a pension plan, of how that will be assessed in cash terms at the point when the cash needs to be calculated. I assume that that must be somewhere else in the legislation—probably in existing legislation. However, that is an issue. We heard recently about how bitcoins are fluctuating in value. Therefore the point at which the calculation is made is very important. Also, we all know that there are issues around the value of an annuity. Therefore I realise, listening to my noble friend, that there is a lot more to this to be thought about than I am afraid I had thought about. Of course, I will beg leave to withdraw the amendment at this point, but—
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I will willingly write to my noble friend. I am not in a position to be able to tell her the process of valuation of those things from the Dispatch Box today, but I am sure that it would be of interest to the House to know how those valuations occur. I do not suppose that that is the only circumstance in which those things have to be valued.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am grateful for that; I did not seek to put my noble friend on the spot today. However, as I said, there is a lot more to that than might appear in the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Student Visas
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(9 years, 10 months ago)
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Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I am sure that the Minister shares my and many people’s anger and shame that so many innocent students have been duped and have had cheating promoted to them as if it were a British value—which clearly it is not. Can the Minister tell the House whether the individual students caught up in this will have a chance to retake the tests before immigration action is taken against them? Can he also say what positive steps the Government are taking to promote the sector, which we all agree is such an important export? We know that a factor in students choosing to come and study here is whether they feel welcome or not.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I will start with the last suggestion made by my noble friend because it is really important. Despite having to deal with this problem— I think the whole House will understand why the Government have had to deal with this problem—we recognise the enormous asset that we have in the higher education and further education facilities in this country. They are global assets and we want them to be available to the world. But they must be conducted under rules which reflect the fact that people come here to study and not as a short cut to involvement in working.
We have had a lot of debates in the House. I think that some of the best have been on this subject, but sometimes I have been the only person saying that students should remain within the net migration figures. I hope that noble Lords who thought differently will be thinking along my lines now and seeing how important it is. I have emphasised that we want the brightest and the best to come here, but they should do so with their sponsorship in order and without the criminality that has been revealed by this particular investigation.
Serious Crime Bill [HL]
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(9 years, 10 months ago)
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Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I confess that I am at a loss. For once, I am not struggling to ask apparently innocent questions as a painful way of masking criticism. My scepticism has also been confounded because so often legislation is added to the statute book when the offences have already been defined and measures have been put in place. I am not a fan of using legislation to promote a message, but the Bill does seem to be about filling lacunae, and I congratulate the Minister and the Home Office on that.
That does, however, make it rather difficult to find a thread running through it on which to base my remarks today. No doubt a theme common to all the issues covered will be—as has already been said—that legislation cannot do everything and that good practice is fundamental. I know that the House will do what it does so well, which is to focus on workability. I am very glad that the Bill has started at this end and I thank the Minister for his introduction.
My noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford talked quite a lot about tracking down and recovering the proceeds of crime in the context of legal aid. He kept saying, “Just find the money”. The Bill cannot assist investigative skills and I am aware from another part of the legal forest—matrimonial work—of the resourcefulness that some people use to conceal their assets. HMRC is pretty good at ferreting out where assets have been hidden.
I am a bit uneasy about using taxation as a sanction—perhaps this is the “Al Capone” clause. I am not entirely sure that I understand the tax provisions. Is there to be a tax assessment when the source of the income cannot be identified but comes under the spotlight as perhaps coming from criminal assets—my civil liberties antennae are twitching slightly—or are we levying a percentage at the marginal rate on income rather than on the whole of the income-producing asset? We will ask questions in Committee. While my antennae are still active, I note from the material I read from the Home Office that the Crown Court must determine whether the defendant has a “criminal lifestyle” and is to apply the balance of probabilities in assessing whether there is “general criminal conduct”. I can see some questions arising from this.
I welcome the priority given to the victim surcharge and compensation, and the use of the assets. I was reminded by a case study in the material provided by the Home Office—for which I and other noble Lords will be grateful—that we are not dealing with the proceeds of crime in a vacuum: it is the crime itself which we seek to reduce or eradicate. That case study could also be a case study from material for the Modern Slavery Bill. It is the underlying crime that makes these provisions so important. But that will not stop us examining, for instance, the Secretary of State’s powers to amend provisions regarding default sentences; and Clause 14, which allows the Secretary of State to amend primary legislation. I was guilty of the perhaps unworthy thought that parliamentary counsel had simply not had enough time to produce the substantive provisions which the Government have in mind. If not, do the Government intend to produce a draft order so that we can understand what they have in mind here?
As for organised crime groups, the current money-laundering rules are a burden on professionals, and Part 1 might add to that. I am aware that another policy aim of the Government, of course, is deregulation. We have had briefings, from the Law Society and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in particular, about Clause 41 and organised crime groups. Prejudice is often expressed against fat cat lawyers. There may be some, although many are very lean, and there may be some lawyers and accountants who are not straight, and I do not defend them. However, there seems to be a lot of justified concern about how this clause will work. We are told that there has been no prior consultation, so the most important question for now is what plans the Home Office has to engage in discussion with the professional bodies. Everyone has an interest in this provision working well.
Before I received the briefings, I was concerned about things such as the burden of proof, serious crime prevention orders as prevention without a conviction, and the definitions. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, I thought that the meaning of the term “helping” in the context of criminal activities could be taken to absurd extremes. Perhaps the question about gangs is how successful the gang injunctions have been so far and their relationship with joint enterprise. A criminal group seems to be three-plus, so more are needed for joint enterprise. Only 25 of the 33 local authorities who are in the Ending Gang and Youth Violence programme responded to the data request. Is this an indication that they are under enormous pressure and are underresourced, because this is described as a “potentially beneficial tool”? Intriguingly, we are told that gangs can disappear from the radar in one area and reappear in another. Do the Government intend to produce guidance on what enables those people to be identified as being the same gang? We will deal with what constitutes harm to children. This made me wonder whether gang-related violence included psychological harm. I am thinking of vulnerable youngsters—particularly how girls may be used by gangs, becoming part of them but being victims of them at the same time.
I am delighted that the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, is taking part in this debate, because she always has such sensible things to say about drugs policy and drugs legislation. I accept the need to deal with cutting agents; their use is pernicious in several different ways. The responses to the Government’s consultation on this mentioned legal clarity, but I can see evidential issues raising their heads as well. I wondered about the equipment used for cutting agents. Do they—I am sorry, I cannot now avoid the pun—warrant attention as well as the agents themselves?
As regards children, the House sometimes has a tendency to divide into sort of a Bill half full/Bill half empty approach. It is very likely that the part of the Bill on the protection of children will attract proposed additions, as it gives an opportunity for colleagues to pursue their often very justified concerns. My noble friend Lady Walmsley, who has been unable to change her arrangements for this afternoon to be here, already has an amendment, agreed by the Public Bill Office to be in scope, that would make it a duty for people who work in regulated activities with children or vulnerable adults and who suspect abuse to report it to the local authority.
The change to the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 to spell out that harm includes psychological harm is the result of sustained work by many NGOs and the Private Member’s Bill from my honourable friend the Member for Ceredigion. It is blindingly obvious to us in the year 2014, but the same issue of what is meant by harm arises in other legislation. It has been addressed recently in the context of domestic violence but outside statute. In that and other contexts, I confess that I am concerned that psychological and emotional damage may be regarded as excluded by implication, since it is to be explicitly included in this case.
Noble Lords will have received briefings from children’s organisations on other possible changes to the 1933 Act. I find quite persuasive the argument that the term “wilful” to describe actions is very narrow. Again, I wonder about guidance and the CPS’s view. It is important that the language that is used carries its natural meaning, so that it is easily used by practitioners.
There is also the issue of the age bracket for victims, possibly taking it up to 18. I doubt that anyone who has had more than fleeting contact with teenagers could argue that they are more resilient than younger children, as has been said. I, too, was horrified by what I read in our briefing about the paedophile manual. I was surprised that it needs specific provision, but for the moment I will just ask whether internet service providers have been consulted on Schedule 3.
All the legislation in the world will not deal with the deeper-rooted cultural issues surrounding female genital mutilation. The Government, I know, are very well aware of that and have been very determined in their approach. I count the Member for Hornsey and Wood Green as a real friend and a long-standing colleague as well as an honourable friend, and I can vouch for the activity that she, among many others, has undertaken.
I end with a positive story. I was at a meeting on Thursday, in the margins of the Global Summit on Ending Sexual Violence in Conflict, with a number of Members of other parliaments. A representative from Portugal recounted a tale of the boyfriend of a potential victim protesting and campaigning against the abuse. In a gloomy subject, I thought that was a cheering report.
There may be a common thread to this: that practice is important and that being alert to what technical changes are indeed necessary to implement existing policy is something on which we can profitably use our time.
Passport Office
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(9 years, 11 months ago)
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Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, the government website still shows the waiting time as being generally three weeks. Are the Government considering putting updated news on that website so that the public are aware of the position? The Post Office is another route to obtaining travel documents. Is it experiencing extra demand? Has there been an impact on Post Office services and on its level of work?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I cannot answer with specific information on the latter point, but I can say that, even at this point, 97% of passports have been issued within three weeks and 99.24% have been issued within a four-week period. None the less, because of the large number of applications, small percentages can mean large numbers of people whose lives have been inconvenienced. That is why the Passport Office is working seven days a week and efforts are being made to ensure that people are not inconvenienced. The Home Secretary’s Statement made that quite clear.