Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
Main Page: Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen's debates with the Home Office
(9 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am sorry that the Chamber is not fuller to witness this unique moment when I agree with my noble friend Lord Howarth of Newport. I am not sure that it will happen again: it has certainly not happened before. We all take the view that well-informed education is key to drugs policy and to addressing these very difficult issues. The spirit of Amendment 54 seems quite interesting. We are very interested in how the Minister responds to it. It would be very bad if, by accident, we inhibited thoughtful education on this issue.
I cannot go all the way on Amendment 53. Certainly, I can see why we would like to make a crime of assisting. Encouraging, once again, gets into worrying territory. I will listen to the Government’s response with great care.
My Lords, I think we all agree that the key element of this Bill is the provision of civil sanctions. These are important because they offer an alternative, flexible mechanism to tackle the trade in new psychoactive substances. The amendments in this group relate to the list of prohibited activities in Clause 11. These activities essentially cover the offences in Clauses 4, 5 and 8— namely, the production, supply, importation and exportation of a psychoactive substance—along with the secondary offences of assisting and encouraging those offences.
Amendment 53 seeks to remove paragraph (f) from Clause 11(1) and so remove from the list of “prohibited activity” activities which assist or encourage the production, supply, offering to supply, importation or exportation of a psychoactive substance. In the normal way, the secondary offences of assisting or encouraging a crime apply to each of the main offences in the Bill, which is why the Government have specifically included such conduct in the list of prohibited activity.
If this amendment were to be made it would not, for example, be possible to serve a prohibition notice on someone providing precursor chemicals to another person knowing that the other person intended to use them to produce psychoactive substances. Were that the case, the relevant law enforcement agency might then have no option but to charge that person with the criminal offence of assisting the commission of an offence under Clause 4. Amendment 53 could therefore have the opposite effect to the outcome that the noble Lord is seeking to achieve, as it would force law enforcement agencies down the prosecution route rather than deploying a civil sanction.
The noble Baroness has asked how assisting or encouraging a crime differs from aiding or abetting a crime. This is a complex subject, which has excited much debate within the legal community ever since the Serious Crime Act 2007 created the offence of encouraging or assisting. Perhaps it is simplest to acknowledge that there is potential crossover between the two concepts—on occasion it will be possible both to aid and abet, and encourage or assist—but there will also be offences where, because of the circumstances, it will be possible to encourage or assist, even though there is no aiding or abetting.
Amendment 54 seeks to make clear in the Bill that the provision of harm reduction advice or information does not constitute a prohibited activity. Let me assure noble Lords that giving such harm reduction advice will not be a criminal offence under the Bill. The Government have no desire to hinder the giving of such advice—the opposite is in fact true—but if someone were to publish a manual on the production of psychoactive substances, we would wish to see that activity prohibited. The Bill allows for this. For instance, guidance published by a charity which identifies and highlights the dangers of these substances will be seeking to reduce the harms of these substances and will not fall foul of the Bill. I hope that having that assurance on the record will allay any concerns that the noble Lords and the noble Baroness may have in this regard.
The Government recognise that this legislation is not the silver bullet to tackle psychoactive substance misuse. The Bill must be seen in the context of our wider strategy to tackle the harms they cause. We are also driving forward another key recommendation of the expert panel, that of enhancing our efforts to reduce demand, including through effective prevention programmes and by providing the right health-related services to support individuals recovering from substance misuse. This is, of course incredibly important. On the basis of that explanation and the assurance that I have given on Amendment 54, I hope that the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I certainly will. I am grateful for that explanation. I can understand the structure of the clause and its thrust rather better than I did, which was pretty stupid of me. When I looked up “aid and abet” on the internet to see what that told me, I was pointed straight to the CPS guidance, which seemed to deal with pretty much everything other than aiding and abetting. It starts with “assisting and encouraging”, so it is hardly surprising that some of us are confused. I did not know that there was such a major debate going on in the legal community; they must speak of little else. I am grateful for the clear explanation; I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I have some limited sympathy with these amendments. Any notice that has indefinite extent, which seems to be where the Bill is, has a certain discomfort about it. Clearly the Government share this discomfort because they are limiting the period of extent to three years for under 18 year-olds. I cannot see, having accepted that indefinite extent is inappropriate for under 18 year-olds, why it should not be inappropriate for those over 18. “Proportionate” is a word we all like to move around in legislation. I found that the Government have used it quite freely throughout the document. I will be interested in their response to Amendment 71A as well.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for these amendments and the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, for his views. We see the civil sanctions as a useful tool to take proportionate action against offenders. The Bill contains two levels of sanctions: prohibition and premises notices, and prohibition and premises orders. Orders are the most severe, being imposed by a court and attracting a criminal offence for non-compliance.
Amendments 55A and 60A relate to prohibition notices as provided for in Clause 12 and premises notices in Clause 13. The Government have deliberately created the notice regime to be light touch, allowing a senior police officer or local authority officer to impose such a notice where they reasonably believe that a person is carrying on, or is likely to carry on, a prohibited activity as defined by Clause 11. In the case of a premises notice, the test is that there is reasonable belief that prohibited activity is being, or is likely to be, carried on at particular premises. There is no criminal sanction. The purpose of these notices is to try to stop further criminal behaviour occurring in the first instance. They are a form of final warning.
Amendment 55A seeks to remove the differentiation, so that the time limit will apply to all notices. Our starting point in relation to adults is that, as the primary aim of a prohibition notice is to stop an individual engaging in criminal conduct—something they should not be doing in any event—there was no need to impose a time limit. I remind the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that other civil orders of this kind made against an adult—for example, anti-social behaviour injunctions—may also have an indefinite duration. I recognise that there are particular sensitivities about imposing civil sanctions on young people. For these reasons, we have restricted the duration of a notice issued to a person under 18 to a maximum of three years.
On Amendment 60A, a premises notice cannot be issued to an individual under the age of 18. Similar considerations apply here to those in Clause 12, so we feel that there is no need to put a time limit on premises notices.
Turning to Amendment 71A, we entirely agree that any prohibitions, restrictions or requirements contained in a prohibition order or premises order must be appropriate and proportionate. Proportionality will routinely be considered by a court as part of this decision. It is also important to remember that the court is bound by Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1968 to act in accordance with the convention rights. Arguably, for the reasons I have given, it was not strictly necessary to include a proportionality test in Clauses 17 to 19 but we included it so that there was symmetry with the test applied by a senior officer or a local authority for the issuing of a prohibition notice or premises notice. I accept the spirit in which the amendment is intended but it is simply not necessary to amend Clause 21 to achieve this end. On the basis of this explanation, I hope the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Did the Minister mean the Human Rights Act 1968 or that of 1998?
My Lords, I cannot say that I am comfortable about notices applying for an indefinite or unlimited period. There may be concerns about the detail of the notice. I obviously need to read the noble Baroness’s explanation. I should also wait to see what response we get to my later amendment, which is on appeals against notices. These issues all go together, and I would like then to consider where we have got to in the round. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, the amendments in this group make a number of changes to the provisions in the Bill relating to notices and orders. The most significant amendments—Amendments 75, 76 and 77—insert three new clauses which make further provision in respect of access prohibitions.
Clause 21 enables a prohibition order or premises order to include an access prohibition, barring or restricting access to specified premises. Such a provision would, for example, enable the closure of a head shop selling psychoactive substances, initially for up to three months. This approach is based upon the provisions in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 relating to anti-social behaviour closure powers. Although a number of elements of that regime are already in the Bill, the Government feel that a number of additional elements of the 2014 Act should also be replicated.
For the civil sanctions in the Bill to be effective, they must be adhered to. Therefore, sanctions must be included to deter those who would otherwise choose to breach the terms of an access prohibition.
The other amendments are largely of a technical or drafting nature, and I would be happy to provide further details if necessary. I trust noble Lords will agree that these are all sensible refinements to the existing provisions in the Bill and on that basis I beg to move.
My Lords, I have one or two questions on the amendments in this group. Amendment 75 deals with reimbursement of costs. Would the person being asked to make the payment have the opportunity to make representations with regard to what is being claimed—both about the principle and the amount that has been calculated and ordered?
Amendment 76 inserts a new clause on exemption from liability and refers to,
“an act or omission shown to have been in bad faith”.
I note that that does not extend to negligence. I looked at the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act, and we do not have negligence in there either, but it does not seem to me that not having it in that Act makes this right.
It is not quite a read-across, but Amendment 77 again applies similar provisions to those in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act. Something struck me about this while reflecting on what happened during the last Government and the focus on the rehabilitation revolution and so on. I thought we were trying to avoid short-term prison sentences, and it felt uncomfortable to be providing for short-term prison sentences when we know that so often what happens is that the offender learns more about how to commit crime than he does about how not to commit crime.
My Lords, I reassure the noble Baroness that Amendment 75 makes provision to enable the relevant law enforcement agency to apply to the appropriate court for reimbursement of costs incurred in relation to the “clearing, securing or maintaining” of premises.
Amendment 76 makes provision to exempt the relevant law enforcement agency from civil liability for anything done or admitted to be done in the exercise of a power in relation to an access prohibition. The exemption does not apply when the act or omission was committed in bad faith or when the conduct was unlawful by virtue of Section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, acting incompatibly with the convention rights.
Amendment 77 creates an offence for a person, without reasonable excuse, to remain on or enter premises in contravention of an access prohibition or to obstruct an authorised person exercising powers under Clause 22(1). I understand the noble Baroness’s worries about the maximum penalty in England and Wales of six months’ imprisonment. I might need a little inspiration from my officials on that one, but perhaps we could write to the noble Baroness and make that a bit clearer.
This is really a broad matter of policy, and I appreciate that the provision on length of sentences replicates part of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, although there are also provisions in there for different periods. I should have given the Government an indication of these questions, but I am afraid that I did not think of them until very shortly before we came into the Chamber. This may not be consoling to the noble Baroness, but I was listening in on a rather high-powered legal discussion the other day, where someone referred to what the Minister thought at four in the morning when questioned—
I am sorry to interrupt the noble Baroness, but I have a bit of clarification about Amendment 77. Six months is the standard maximum in a magistrates’ court.
I shall not continue with the anecdote, because I was only giving the noble Baroness an opportunity for inspiration to fly to her. I might tell her later.
My Lords, given the lateness of the hour, I do not propose to speak at length about this group of technical and drafting amendments. My noble friend Lord Bates has provided details of the amendments in two letters to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, copies of which have been sent to all noble Lords who spoke at Second Reading. Copies of these letters have been placed in the Library. I would be happy to explain particular amendments if any noble Lord would like further details, but for now I beg to move.