The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Bates) (Con)
My Lords, as the noble Baroness explained, these amendments relate to the issuing of a prohibition notice and a premises notice under Clauses 12 and 13.
I begin by saying that the Government fully support the principle of these amendments, so much so that the Bill already contains similar provisions which seek the same thing. A prohibition notice can be issued under Clause 12 where a,
“senior officer or local authority reasonably believes that the person is carrying on, or is likely to carry on, a prohibited activity”,
and,
“that it is necessary and proportionate to give the prohibition notice for the purpose of preventing the person from carrying on any prohibited activity”.
A premises notice in Clause 13 can be issued where a senior police officer or local authority reasonably believes that a prohibited activity, as defined in Clause 11,
“is being, or is likely to be, carried on at particular premises, and … the person owns, leases, occupies, controls or operates the premises”.
Amendments 55 and 58 seek to amend Clauses 12 and 13 respectively to require the relevant senior police officer or local authority to set out the reasons in support of their reasonable belief that the respondent is carrying on, or is likely to carry on, a prohibited activity.
Clause 14 contains supplementary provisions in respect of prohibition notices and premises notices. In particular, subsection (2)(a) of Clause 14 requires that a notice must,
“set out the grounds for giving the notice”,
as well as the consequences of failure to comply. The Government envisage that the grounds specified in the notice will be those supporting the reasonable belief.
Amendments 57 and 60 seek to ensure that the respondent is fully informed of the consequences of a failure to comply with a notice. Again, this is already addressed in Clause 14—the relevant provision being in subsection (2)(b).
In relation to Amendment 60B, the possible consequences of a failure to comply with a notice are unlikely to vary according to the grounds on which a notice was issued. Essentially, the possible consequences are twofold: either a prosecution is pursued for the relevant offence in Clauses 4 to 8 of the Bill, or the relevant law enforcement agency makes an application for a prohibition order or premises order, as appropriate. On the basis that the Bill already delivers the outcome sought by these amendments, I trust that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am grateful for that response. The Minister’s comment that the explanation in the notice would vary according to the circumstances is an interesting one which I welcome because standard-form official explanations which are not designed for particular circumstances are often pretty much unreadable. One cannot necessarily work out quite how they apply. I hope that by highlighting that, I am not causing the hearts of people outside the immediate part of this Chamber to sink with the extra work that might be required in that regard. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Bates
I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving us an opportunity to look at this important area of trading standards. We expect businesses currently openly selling psychoactive substances to comply with the new law. We will be working with the police and local authorities in the lead-up to the provisions coming into force—which we aim to have happen on 1 April 2016 —to ensure that head shops and online traders operating in the UK are in no doubt that they must clear their shelves of these substances and clean up their websites by 31 March. If they do not, they can expect an early visit from the police or a local authority officer. For those who fail to comply with the law, prohibition orders will offer one possible tool with which law enforcement agencies can respond.
I am very much aware of the excellent work that trading standards officers do around the country. I have noticed their work many times, particularly in my former constituency, where they did tremendous work. Local authorities have overall responsibility for public health and spend around 25%—£760 million—of their health budget on dealing with drug and alcohol misuse. The introduction of the ban should reduce this expenditure, allowing councils to use funds to tackle other public health priorities. If it were the Government saying that, I would expect the noble Lord to say, “I’m not too sure about that”. In fact, the LGA is saying just that. It sees this as assisting councils in focusing on the other real problems in their areas which need to be tackled. Far from incurring cost, it sees the blanket ban as easing pressure.
The shop in Canterbury which I keep referring to, which is just across the road from the King’s School, was closed down by trading standards and reopened under a different name. As we have said all the way through, this kind of whack-a-mole game of cat and mouse that is going on between law enforcement agencies and the purveyors of new psychoactive substances goes to the very heart of what the Bill is about.
Lord Bates
I reassure the noble Lord that evidence is coming from those in the front line, such as the police, who spend a great deal of time dealing with the side effects of these establishments, such as anti-social behaviour in the vicinity of these shops. We hear from the Local Government Association that it believes that a disproportionate amount of time is spent trying to tackle and regulate what they are doing. That could be spent elsewhere doing worthwhile things in the area of health. We may not disagree, but I will certainly reflect on the noble Lord’s important point about trading standards. We certainly want to make sure that we are working very closely to ensure that this is effectively implemented.
Lord Bates
Lord Bates
Lord Bates
( ) subject to subsection (8), sending it to the person by electronic means.”
Lord Tunnicliffe
My Lords, just to revert to my original path, I do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, on the burden of proof. We think that for the orders a balance of probabilities is appropriate. The only question I seek assurance on is that if any individual were to be either imprisoned or fined, it would be under the provisions in Clause 23—and my understanding is that under that clause the criminal standard of proof would be necessary. Providing that one has that assurance, we do not object to the burden of proof in the relevant parts of the Bill with respect to the order.
Lord Bates
I shall respond, first, to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe. Clause 23 would require the higher criminal standard of “beyond reasonable doubt”, so that is how the matter would be dealt with.
Turning to the point about appeals, I believe that, as proposed, Amendment 64A would be disproportionate, given the nature of prohibition and premises notices. These notices are the first stage of our graded response to tackling the supply of new psychoactive substances. They are intended as a final warning and can be issued by a senior police officer or local authority requiring that the subject of the notice desist from any prohibited activities.
A prohibition notice can be issued only if the relevant officer reasonably believes that the respondent is carrying out, or is likely to carry out, prohibited activity. Therefore, it cannot be issued without good reason, and the issuing officer must also reasonably believe that it is a necessary and proportionate response, given the circumstances. As I have indicated, a notice acts as a final warning. Breach of a notice is not a criminal offence and there are no other direct sanctions flowing from a failure to comply.
The noble Baroness drew a parallel with community protection notices and pointed to the fact that the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 provides for a right of appeal against such notices. Indeed, this amendment largely mirrors Section 46 of the 2014 Act, but there is an important difference between a community protection notice and the notices provided for in the Bill, in that breach of the former is a criminal offence—hence the right of appeal.
I am not persuaded that, in the absence of a direct sanction for breach, a right of appeal is called for. If the respondent takes issue with a prohibition or premises notice, they can make representations to the issuing agency, which could then, if appropriate, withdraw the notice in accordance with the provisions in Clause 14.
Where the relevant enforcement agency concludes that a prohibition or premises notice had been breached, it could decide to pursue a prosecution for one of the main offences or make an application for a prohibition order or premises order, as the case may be. If the respondent is charged with an offence, they will be able to defend themselves in court in the normal way. If an application is made for a prohibition or premises order, again, the respondent will have his or her day in court and will also be able to appeal against the making of the order. We therefore have judicial oversight where it is appropriate.
I have tried to set out the nature of our graded response to the trade in new psychoactive substances and to state why I believe that an appeal process is unnecessary in the case of a prohibition or premises notice.
The other amendments in this group seek to provide for the criminal standard of proof, rather than the civil standard, to apply when a court is considering making either a prohibition or a premises order—a point on which the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, sought clarification.
Clauses 17 and 19, which Amendments 65, 65A, 68 and 68A seek to modify, make provisions for the application process for prohibition orders and premises orders, outlining a number of conditions that need to be met for an order to be made. Proceedings under Clauses 17 and 19 are civil proceedings. Accordingly, it follows that the civil standard of proof should apply. The noble Lord suggested that, as the proceedings are part of the criminal process, the criminal standard should apply, but this is based on a false premise. The whole point of the civil sanctions in the Bill is to enable law enforcement agencies to adopt a proportionate response to any offending behaviour and, in appropriate cases, to seek to tackle the behaviour by action short of a prosecution.
The application of the civil standard to such proceedings is not without precedent. Under Part 1 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, the civil standard applies to proceedings in respect of anti-social behaviour injunctions. The civil standard also applies to proceedings under Section 34 of the Policing and Crime Act 2009 in respect of gang injunctions. Of course, if a prohibition order or premises order is breached, the criminal standard of proof would apply to any proceedings for an offence under Clause 23, as I stated.
One of the key purposes of these civil orders is to enable the police, local authorities and other law enforcement agencies to act promptly to nip problems in the bud before they escalate. If the criminal standard of proof were to apply, it would necessarily dictate that more time was required for evidence gathering and there might be little to be gained by applying for a prohibition order as opposed to pursuing criminal prosecution for an offence under Clauses 4 to 8. These amendments would circumscribe the current flexibility built into the enforcement powers in the Bill, to the detriment of communities and defendants alike.
Much the same arguments apply to Amendments 85A to 85C to Clause 28. The clause provides that proceedings before the court under Clause 18 or Clause 25 are civil proceedings—those clauses relate to the making or variation of orders on conviction. It is the case that such proceedings take place in a criminal court, but it is important to remember that a prohibition order or premises order, as with similar civil orders, is not a punishment. As such, they do not form part of the sentence of the court. These orders are preventive in nature and in these circumstances it is again appropriate that the civil standard of proof and the civil standard of evidence should apply. Given that these are quite properly civil proceedings, I hope that the noble Baroness and other noble Lords with amendments tabled in this group will, on reflection, consider that the civil standard should operate and, in the light of this explanation, that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, the Minister said that it is not intended as a punishment—I think it was during the debate on a previous group that I wrote down that we heard from the Dispatch Box the term “sanction”. I will need to go back and have a look at that.
As to whether or not we are operating on the basis of a false premise, I do not think that it is quite that, but rather that we have different views as to whether there should be civil or criminal proceedings—it is not so much the premise as the approach.
A premises notice could be given when the activity is being carried on, thought to be carried on or likely to be carried on by somebody other than the premises owner. I am actually quite concerned about how these things interplay.
As regards an appeal, I am glad to hear that representations can be made to the police or the local authority about the notice being withdrawn. However, it does raise the question, certainly to me, of whether there should not be explicit provisions about the right to make representations and how representations should be considered, possibly by providing for a more senior officer to look at the matter. That is not necessarily a very satisfactory way of dealing with it, but there is something in there that we would like to think about—my noble friend is nodding encouragingly; I hope it is encouragingly—as to how to cover the right to make representations and how they can properly be dealt with. Between now and the next stage we will have a think about that—but of course I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Bates
Lord Bates
Lord Bates
Lord Bates
“( ) An item that is handed over in compliance with a requirement imposed by virtue of subsection (4) may not be disposed of—
(a) before the end of the period within which an appeal may be made against the imposition of the requirement (ignoring any power to appeal out of time), or(b) if such an appeal is made, before it is determined or otherwise dealt with.”
Lord Bates
Lord Bates
“Access prohibitions: reimbursement of costs
(1) A person listed in subsection (2) that incurs expenditure for the purpose of clearing, securing or maintaining premises in respect of which an access prohibition is in effect (see section 21(5)) may apply to the court for an order under this section.
(2) Those persons are—
(a) a local policing body;(b) the Scottish Police Authority; (c) the chief constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland;(d) the British Transport Police Authority; (e) the Director General of the National Crime Agency;(f) the Secretary of State by whom general customs functions are exercisable;(g) a local authority.(3) On an application under this section the court may make whatever order it considers appropriate for the reimbursement (in full or in part) by the person against whom the order imposing the access prohibition was made of the expenditure mentioned in subsection (1).
(4) An application for an order under this section may not be heard unless it is made before the end of the period of 3 months starting with the day on which the access prohibition ceases to have effect.
(5) An application under this section must be served on the person against whom the order imposing the access prohibition was made.
(6) In this section “the court” means—
(a) the court that made the prohibition order or the premises order imposing the access prohibition, except where paragraph (b) or (c) applies;(b) where the court that made the order was the Court of Appeal, the Crown Court;(c) where the court that made the order was a youth court but the person against whom the order was made is aged 18 or over at the time of the application, a magistrates’ court or, in Northern Ireland, a court of summary jurisdiction.”
Lord Bates
“Offence of failing to comply with an access prohibition, etc
(1) This section applies where a prohibition order or a premises order imposes an access prohibition (see section 21(5)).
(2) A person, other than the person against whom the order was made, who without reasonable excuse remains on or enters premises in contravention of the access prohibition commits an offence.
(3) A person who without reasonable excuse obstructs a person acting under section 22(1) commits an offence.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (2) or (3) is liable—
(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to either or both of the following— (i) imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks (or 6 months, if the offence was committed before the commencement of section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003);(ii) a fine;(b) on summary conviction in Scotland, to either or both of the following—(i) imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months;(ii) a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale;(c) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to either or both of the following—(i) imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months;(ii) a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.”
Lord Bates
“( ) An order that has been varied under this section remains an order of the court that first made it for the purposes of—
(a) section (Access prohibitions: reimbursement of costs);(b) any further application under this section.”
Lord Bates
Lord Bates
“( ) An appeal under subsection (1) against the making of an order must be made before the end of the period of 28 days starting with the date of the order.”
Lord Bates
“( ) An appeal under subsection (1) against the making of a decision must be made before the end of the period of 28 days starting with the date of the decision.”
Lord Bates
Lord Bates
“( ) an individual against whom a prohibition order imposing an access prohibition has been made reaches the age of 18 whilst proceedings before a youth court under section (Access prohibitions: reimbursement of costs) are ongoing.”
Lord Bates
My Lords, let me deal first with Amendments 87A and 89, which relate to the stop-and-search powers in the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has explained that Amendment 87A would remove the liability to stop and search persons suspected of committing the offence of failing to comply with a prohibition order or premises order. As I understand it, the case for the amendment is that any breach of a prohibition order or premises order would in itself constitute an offence under Clauses 4 to 8, and accordingly it is not necessary to apply the stop-and-search powers to the Clause 23 offence. Such reasoning seems to misunderstand the nature of the prohibition orders and the premises orders. As we have already debated, these orders may contain any prohibitions, restrictions or requirements that the court considers appropriate. Failure to comply with these would be a breach of the order and therefore constitute an offence under Clause 23, so a person could commit the Clause 23 offence without also committing one of the main offences under Clauses 4 to 8. It is therefore entirely appropriate that the stop-and-search powers extend to circumstances where a person is suspected of failing to comply with a prohibition or premises order. To remove the reference to the Clause 23 offence would weaken the enforcement powers in the Bill.
Amendment 89, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, would require an annual report to Parliament on the exercise of the stop-and-search powers. We recognise the sensitivity surrounding the exercise of such powers, which is why my right honourable friend the Home Secretary is determined to reform the way that they are used. Indeed, our party manifesto included a commitment to legislate to mandate changes in police practices if stop and search does not become more targeted and stop-to-arrest ratios do not improve.
As to the specifics of the amendment, I advise the noble Lord that forces must already collect data on stop and search that are published annually for public scrutiny. Those data include the ethnicity of the individuals concerned. Forces are also required under the Best Use of Stop and Search Scheme to record additional data, such as the reason for the stop and search, the outcome and whether there is a connection between the two. This greater transparency enables greater scrutiny and accountability. I expect such data collections to include the stop-and-search powers provided for under the Bill. The noble Lord has raised some serious points. He is right that the stop-and-search powers in the Bill need to be properly monitored, but I hope I have been able to reassure him that there are already mechanisms in place to do just that.
Amendment 94A relates to Clause 46, which provides for a fast-track procedure for the disposal of seized psychoactive substances. The clause was included in the Bill at the direct request of the national policing lead on new psychoactive substances. Clause 46(1) outlines four conditions that, when met, allow a substance to be disposed of under the fast-track process.
Amendment 94A relates to the third condition—namely, that the officer reasonably believes that the seized item is a psychoactive substance but is not evidence of any offence under the Bill. Amendment 94A seeks to amend the condition so that a substance can be seized only where it is proved to be psychoactive. The procedure provided by the clause broadly mirrors the well-established process already in operation for temporary class drugs under Section 23A(4) and (5) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. Section 23A(4) uses the same language as here—namely, a test of “reasonably believes”. For small quantities of seized substances, where there is no evidence of an offence under the Bill, this is an appropriate test. We must be mindful both of the need to protect the public—we do not want to be returning potentially harmful substances once seized—and to avoid tying up the police in unnecessary bureaucracy and the need for expensive forensic testing.
The amendment has the potential to severely restrict the utility of this power and questions the professional judgment of police and customs officers. An officer’s reasonable belief in this context could be based on the substance’s packaging, its markings or even whether the individual from whom it was seized appears intoxicated and the officer can infer that the substance found may be responsible. As demonstrated in the context of temporary class drug orders, requiring officers to make decisions based upon their reasonable belief is not new. The Home Office will continue to work with the national policing lead and the College of Policing to ensure that guidance is developed on this issue to assist officers.
The police rely on statutory stop-and-search powers. I refer noble Lords to annexe A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act codes of practice for the full list. We need to add those statutory powers for the purposes of enforcing the provisions of this Bill. The Government are clear that the powers of stop and search, when used correctly, are vital in the fight against crime. However, when it is misused, stop and search is counterproductive and a waste of police time. That is why the proposal to introduce the best use of stop-and-search schemes and the publication of data, which the noble Lord requested, is such an important part of us monitoring how this legislation is implemented on the ground. That evidence will be collected and, therefore, able to be reviewed as this goes forward. I hope that, with that additional explanation, the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
I am conscious that a letter is on its way to noble Lords, which I promised after the interventions of the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Harris of Haringey, on the whole process of how one begins testing and determining whether what is there is a psychoactive substance. That is in train and will certainly be available to noble Lords ahead of Report stage. I hope that that will give further clarity on this matter.
Lord Paddick
I thank the Minister for his response. By changing horses half way through, I might have thrown the Minister in specifying Clause 23 and not specifying Clauses 4 to 8. Therefore, what the Minister read out was an assumption of what my thinking was, as opposed to what my thinking became when I presented it; namely, that if these are arrestable offences there is a power for the police, once the person is arrested, to detain and search them. Therefore, it would seem unnecessary to have the powers provided by Clause 32. I would not expect the noble Lord to respond now to that because it was my fault for misleading him in the way in which I presented the amendments.
On seizure and destruction of substances that an officer reasonably believes to be a psychoactive substance, my point was not about coming across a small amount in someone’s pocket that the officer could then seize and destroy. We were thinking more of where the substances were found in a head shop, for example, and turned out to be a large quantity which could or could not be a psychoactive substance. Those large quantities could be destroyed simply on the basis of the officer reasonably believing that they are something covered by this Bill, but which then turn out not to be.
Having further explained what I was getting at but did not make clear the first time around, perhaps the Minister will respond to me between now and Report stage. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Bates
(0) a designated NCA officer authorised by the Director General of the National Crime Agency (whether generally or specifically) to exercise the powers of a police or customs officer under this Act;”
Lord Bates
Lord Bates
“( ) In the case of an application made by a procurator fiscal, any requirement imposed on a person applying for a search warrant by this paragraph or paragraph 2 may be met by a relevant enforcement officer.”
Lord Bates
“(3) If the court is satisfied that—
(a) the item is a psychoactive substance, and(b) at the time of its seizure, the item was not being used for the purposes of, or in connection with, an exempted activity (see subsection (12)) carried on by a person entitled to the item,the court must order the forfeiture of the item.(4) If the item is not a psychoactive substance,”
Lord Bates
Lord Bates
“( ) In this section “the court” means—
(a) the court by or before which the person is convicted of the offence, or(b) if the person is committed to the Crown Court to be dealt with for that offence, the Crown Court.”
Lord Bates
(a) a person proposes to give a prohibition notice,(b) a person makes an application for a prohibition order under section 17, or(c) a person mentioned in subsection (1)(a) or (2) of section 24 makes an application under that section for the variation of a prohibition order.”
Lord Bates
Lord Bates
“Police (Northern Ireland) Act 20032A In Schedule 2A to the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2003 (powers and duties of community support officer), after paragraph 9 insert—
“Powers to seize and retain: psychoactive substances9A (1) If a CSO—
(a) finds a psychoactive substance in a person’s possession (whether or not the CSO finds it in the course of searching the person by virtue of any other paragraph of this Schedule), and(b) reasonably believes that it is unlawful for the person to be in possession of it,the CSO may seize it and retain it.(2) If a CSO—
(a) finds a psychoactive substance in a person’s possession (as mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)), or(b) reasonably believes that a person is in possession of a psychoactive substance,and reasonably believes that it is unlawful for the person to be in possession of it, the CSO may require the person to give the CSO his name and address.(3) If in exercise of the power conferred by sub-paragraph (1) the CSO seizes and retains a psychoactive substance, the CSO must—
(a) if the person from whom it was seized maintains that he was lawfully in possession of it—(i) tell the person where inquiries about its recovery may be made, and(ii) explain the effect of sections 45 to 47 and 49 of the Psychoactive Substances Act 2015 (retention and disposal of items), and(b) comply with a constable’s instructions about what to do with it.(4) Any substance seized in exercise of the power conferred by sub-paragraph (1) is to be treated for the purposes of sections 45 to 49 of the Psychoactive Substances Act 2015 as if it had been seized by a police or customs officer under section 32 of that Act. Section 46 of that Act applies in relation to any such substance as if the reference in subsection (1)(b) to the police or customs officer who seized it were a reference to the CSO who seized it.
(5) A person who fails to comply with a requirement under sub-paragraph (2) is guilty of an offence and is liable, on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.
(6) Paragraph 4 applies in the case of a requirement imposed by virtue of sub-paragraph (2) as it applies in the case of a requirement under paragraph 2(1).
(7) In this paragraph “police or customs officer” and “psychoactive substance” have the same meaning as in the Psychoactive Substances Act 2015.”
Lord Bates
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, for moving his amendment, which gives us an opportunity to return to the big picture on the issues we face, namely the global work which is happening on tackling drugs. Let me start by outlining the importance that the Government attach to the special session and our approach to influencing its form and outputs. The 2016 session will be the highest-level UN meeting on international drug policy since 1998. It represents a unique opportunity to engage with all UN member states, international organisations and civil society, to see how they can improve the global response to the harms caused from drugs. We very much appreciate the work undertaken by the All-Party Group on Drug Policy Reform.
The Government are committed to taking a leadership role at that special session. We are working with our international partners to share our national expertise and to advocate a modern, balanced and evidence-based approach to drugs within the UN conventions—an approach which delivers prevention and recovery, alongside proportionate action to restrict the supply of drugs.
Part of our objectives for the special session will be to enhance international action on new psychoactive substances. This is an area where the UK is recognised as a global leader and our long-term plan is delivering significant successes. In April, the Government secured international controls on mephedrone, the first new psychoactive substance to be banned at an international level. We will continue to work with the World Health Organization and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to strengthen the UN’s scheduling system and ensure that the most prevalent, persistent and harmful new psychoactive substances are banned at an international level. We will also use the special session to enhance information-sharing about the latest forensic and public health evidence. I am sure that the Committee will welcome the UK’s ongoing work to fund and support the UN’s global Early Warning Advisory and the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction.
We will also encourage international law enforcement co-operation to tackle the production and supply of new psychoactive substances. This includes supporting China and India to enhance their interception of psychoactive substances for export. We will use the special session to share the lessons we have learned on the need for a balanced and evidence-based approach. We will build on our work through the UN, G7 and EU to share our experience of delivering targeted prevention campaigns.
The Committee will understand the important contribution that civil society and international organisations, such as the World Health Organization, could make to the special session. I reassure noble Lords that the Government are focused on ensuring an open and inclusive preparatory process. We are working closely with our international partners and civil society. We must not, however, allow international discussions to delay for one moment UK action to tackle the pernicious psychoactive substances harming our communities right now. That is why we do not accept this amendment. But in saying that, I would also say to the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and to the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, that I am of course very happy to arrange a meeting. It would perhaps be beneficial to have one with my right honourable friend Mike Penning, who leads in the Home Office on this particular area, to offer some reflections about what the Government’s position should be going into that important set of negotiations.
This might be the last time I am on my feet in Committee, so my final point is to thank noble Lords for their contributions. It has been an excellent process and has given us a lot of food for thought, which we will reflect on between now and Report. This might be the only contentious part of my closing comments, but I do think that we have a rational approach to drugs policy. It may not be the one that some Members would choose, but it certainly has a rationale to it. In addition, it is not without success: we can all take a modicum of encouragement from the fact that overall drug use, particularly among young people, is falling. That is to be welcomed. Given the context of the earlier debates, I would point out that the use of alcohol and tobacco is also falling among young people. That offers some hope that we are on the right track, although of course we have a very long way to go.
Lord Howarth of Newport
My Lords, perhaps on behalf of the Committee, I can say again how much I believe all of us have appreciated the way the Minister and his colleague, the noble Baroness, Lady Chisholm, have dealt with the proceedings in the Committee. There are profound differences of view as to what the right policy should be, but we have managed to debate these difference of view in, I think, an amicable and constructive fashion. I certainly value that very much and am most grateful to him. I am not so enthusiastic about the Minister’s response to this specific amendment and, when he said that the Government do not intend to delay implementation of the Bill for one minute, I thought he showed himself to be uncharacteristically hard-line.
The Minister then went on to be a little modest about the success of the Government’s policies, saying that they had been “not without success”. That did not seem to me to be a very large or confident claim. He then did make a rather large claim, and I am not convinced that it is a justifiable one. He said that drug use, especially among young people, has been falling. I just wonder whether he or any of us really knows—it is peculiarly difficult to find out what is really going on. The drug scene constantly mutates: you can monitor usage of some particular drugs but you can be pretty sure that if you find that there is a dip in the use of cannabis, it is because there is an increase in the use of ecstasy or whatever. It is very hard to keep track of it. I notice that in the report on new psychoactive substances that Mr Penning’s predecessor, the coalition Minister Norman Baker, produced, it was evident that the experts consulted were really finding it very hard to get a handle on what was actually going on in the field of new psychoactive substances.
The Minister, in his response, uttered a great many decent sentiments and used some encouraging words. He spoke of the Government taking a “leadership role” with international partners and of working towards “balanced”, “evidence-based” and “proportionate” policy—who could do anything other than cheer that? He said that there would be a wide-ranging “sharing” of information and talked of partnership with the World Health Organization and with civil society. That I find genuinely encouraging. If the Government really are intent on developing an open and inclusive preparation process, as he told us, that will be helpful, because a lot of people have a contribution to make.
I was a bit more nervous when he spoke of partnership with China. I have myself advocated that the Foreign Office develops its relationship with China in relation to drugs, but none of us should forget that China uses the death penalty and that one of the problems about prohibition is that it leads to constant infringement, of the direst kind, of human rights.
This is complex territory, but I am very grateful to the Minister for agreeing to meet us. He has proposed that we should have a meeting with Mr Penning. If he can persuade the Home Secretary herself to meet the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, myself and some others, that would be even more desirable, but I shall leave that with him. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.