(3 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberThat this House takes note of the need to eliminate domestic abuse, and to support victims and survivors.
My Lords, I felt this was a timely moment to bring this debate to our Chamber. We have just had 16 days of action—which started with the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women and ran through until Human Rights Day on 10 December—as part of a campaign that seeks to end violence against women. Last month, a documentary by Her Majesty the Queen, “Behind Closed Doors”, aired on television, telling the harrowing experiences of women subjected to domestic abuse, with victims including an MP and a police chief inspector braving speaking to the camera.
There is to be a review on the law of homicide and last week Jess Phillips launched a pilot for the new domestic abuse protection order. We must not forget that Christmas often brings an increase in calls to the police reporting cases of domestic violence. Financial pressure and increased alcohol can lead to outbursts and this in a period with fewer opportunities to report or to escape to safety.
According to the 2021 Act, domestic abuse is where the victim and perpetrator are
“16 or over and are personally connected to each other”
and
“it does not matter whether the behaviour consists of a single incident or a course of conduct”.
Domestic abuse is defined as an incident or pattern of incidents of any of the following: controlling, coercive, threatening, degrading or violent behaviour, including sexual violence, and economic abuse.
The origins of the present Act can be traced back to the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 which aimed to protect battered wives. To me, that does not seem that long ago and all of us, I am sure, can remember watching Punch and Judy on the beach or reading Andy Capp, where domestic violence was seen as humour. Thank goodness, to most of us, that is not the case today.
In the majority of cases, domestic violence is carried out by a partner, an ex-partner or a family member or parent. This heinous, devastating crime can be experienced by anyone, regardless of race, ethnic or religious group, sexuality, class or disability. If you know three women or seven men, statistics suggest that you know one who has experienced some kind of partner abuse or violence.
Last year, there were 2.4 million victims—1.7 million women and 699,000 men—picked up by the data, but we know that it is on the increase, with almost certainly more victims than I have mentioned. Women are more likely to be victims and 95% of those contacting services are women. In a survey, it was found that police received domestic-related calls every 30 seconds.
Women should never feel that it is safer to stay with a man than to leave him but, according to the Femicide Census, 38% of women killed by an ex-partner were killed within the first month of separation and 89% within the first year. A 2023 NHS survey stated how domestic violence escalates in pregnancy, with one in three pregnant women experiencing some kind of domestic abuse. Domestic violence is more common than any other health problem among women during pregnancy.
According to an NSPCC survey, one in three children have lived with an adult perpetrator of domestic abuse. These children are deeply affected, living with bated breath for the next verbal or physical assault, with psychological problems such as anxiety, regressive behaviour, anger and other symptoms of depression, leading well into adulthood.
Age is no barrier. Abuse of older people is underreported according to many people. Older victims are often invisible victims. Older women and men may be affected by what are perceived as low-level individual instances that are part of a long-standing pattern of cumulative abusive behaviour. Many older victims develop coping mechanisms and accept domestic abuse as part of everyday life. They can also experience a feeling of shame because they have stayed with their abuser for many years.
It is also reported that one in five teenagers under the age of 16 have been victims of violence due, in particular, to coercive behaviour in their dating relationships. Many are as young as 13. The moving campaign by the parents of Holly Newton—who was stalked and murdered aged 15 by her ex-boyfriend—brings a devastating reminder of what young victims are experiencing. The age limit of 16 and over is now under scrutiny as the law prevents victims under 16 calling it domestic abuse. In the Young People’s RSE Poll 2024, 74% of girls and 54% of boys surveyed believed that the primary school curriculum should address ideas of how children should behave in their relationships.
The statistics mentioned only scratch the surface and, I hope, set the scene for all other noble Lords to suggest how we can move forward. I feel there is at last so much happening in this space—so much more awareness that victims will feel that they are not alone. The bravery of those who are speaking up about their horrific experiences, and the charities, victims’ advocates, refuges and many more organisations which do so much in this space, set the scene for all of us to join them. Every day we read or see on social media the horrors that happen behind closed doors. Let all of us be aware that, when we know someone who begins to behave differently—does not want to meet up, does not want us to visit them at their home, only speaks briefly or not at all on the phone—we should ask ourselves why.
I have had many moving emails from victims relating how much more is required in support when they bravely start this journey away from the abuse they have experienced, and I look forward to hearing from all noble Lords today about how we can move forward to really help these victims who are desperately in need of support.
I thank your Lordships for taking part in this debate. It shows this Chamber at its best when we come together like this. As the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, said, there are marvellous organisations out there helping victims—but, as she also said, there are still victims who feel they have to go back to the abusive household that they have tried to leave. I hope that in some small way us speaking up today can help, but as the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, said, we need a whole-systems approach.
I thank the Minister for his empathy in this debate. Now I am getting emotional; I knew this would happen. I absolutely swore to myself that I would not. I thank him for his empathy and for all that he is hoping to do on this hideous, awful crime. We can probably never eliminate it, but we can certainly all come together to make sure that everybody has the support they need.
(4 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak briefly on Amendment 34. I start from the point of having huge respect for the noble Baroness, Lady Lister; her expertise on this subject far outweighs mine. But I have concerns about what she is trying to do. The amendment puts a duty on the domestic abuse commissioner to investigate and report on universal credit payments. I have concerns about this because surely it is vital that we protect the independence of the domestic abuse commissioner, as we have heard from many noble Lords in discussing earlier amendments. The commissioner must be free to set the priorities she chooses; it must be wrong for her to have to report on universal credit or on any other matter.
On the rest of the amendment, as we know, universal credit is a single-household payment. Where a claimant is part of a couple living in the same household, they need to make a joint claim for universal credit. For many legacy benefits, a payment is already made to one member of the household, so the way universal credit is paid is not a new concept, and evidence shows that the vast majority of couples keep and manage their finances together. So payments into a single bank account fit with how most couples organise their finances. Therefore, I am concerned that departing from that would fundamentally change the structure of universal credit, from a single-household payment made to one individual of the benefit unit to payments split between joint claimants by default.
As we all know, a more proportionate response was the creation of split payments to prevent hardship to the claimant and their family. Anyone in a joint claim, including individuals suffering from domestic abuse, can request a split payment arrangement, and it is my understanding the DWP will support them in putting this arrangement in place.
Surely it is important that we allow the individual experiencing domestic abuse to decide whether they think split payments will help their individual circumstances. No information on why a split payment has been requested or granted will be notified to the claimant’s partner. If someone is experiencing domestic abuse, they can tell their work coach in the way that is easiest for them; it is not a requirement for their partner to be involved. As soon as there is awareness of abuse, individuals are signposted to third-party organisations that can provide expert support and advice.
Of course, access to money for those suffering domestic abuse is vital, but the approach in place ensures victims are supported, while the simplicity of the overall system is maintained for others. Sometimes reinventing the wheel can have unintended consequences. I look forward to what the Minister is going to say on this point to reassure me that all those suffering domestic abuse can manage to get their universal credit when required.
My Lords, first, I would like to add my thanks to the chorus of praise that is being heaped on the tremendously clear and cogent introduction by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister.
Many noble Lords and parties outside this place—charities, other groups, news media and so on—have expressed great concern that, at a time when victims are at their most vulnerable, they are being failed by our support systems, which were designed to come to their rescue. We need to know what effect government benefits and interventions are achieving.
I support all these amendments and would have added my name to all of them if there had been space. Amendment 34 calls for the commissioner to look at universal credit split payments. It is probably a deeper question than that, as some of the discussion we have had on this has already revealed. It is a knotty, complex problem, and it very much bears investigation by the domestic abuse commissioner to see what can be done to make the whole system fairer. I have been campaigning for split payments by default for some time. Perhaps we need more, but that would be a very good start.
Amendment 150 is a neat solution to a problem of the Government’s own making. Long delays in the payment of benefits when a victim could be destitute and in need of more financial support to replace belongings they have left behind, find somewhere to stay, et cetera, can lead to extra expense just to survive, so to claw back payments made in advance when they would not have been necessary in the first place if they had been paid promptly is surely adding insult to injury. In the grand scale of moneys paid out by the Government recently to help people disadvantaged by circumstances, it is a drop in the proverbial ocean.
Amendment 152, which would disapply the benefit cap for 12 months after a new claim following a new universal credit claim for a victim of domestic abuse makes a lot of sense. It would enable a victim, desperate for accommodation and some security, to not have to worry if there is one bedroom too many for 12 months while they find their feet. I was shocked to learn from the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, that a panic room could constitute an additional bedroom, and I very much look forward to the Minster’s response on this because, if that is the case, it really needs sorting out. Is this too much to ask? Perhaps the Minister will tell us what she believes about this cap.
Finally, Amendment 153 would require the Government to assess the impact of any social security reforms on victims or potential victims of abuse. The Government need to know the effect of government policies. If we do not measure the effectiveness of what we are spending, how can we spend taxpayers’ money most effectively to help our offer to these people, the most vulnerable and in need of help in our society? They are not huge measures in terms of cost, but they will give big relief for those who are already suffering.
(4 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I want to speak in support of Amendments 2 and 4 tabled by my noble friend Lady Meyer. I remember being horrified when I first heard her personal story, many years ago. But since then, I have learned and seen that this is not an isolated incident, unfortunately.
As we have heard, while there is no single definition of parental alienation, it is recognised by Cafcass as when
“a child’s resistance or hostility towards one parent is not justified and is”,
tragically,
“the result of psychological manipulation by the other parent.”
It has devastating impacts on the child, but is a form of abuse and control of the other parent and in line with emotional abuse of a controlling and coercive nature.
As I have listened to this debate unfold, I have thought back to the battle that has taken place over a long time to include coercion in our definition of domestic abuse, and to recognise children as victims. I hope that it does not take as long for us to wake up to include parental alienation.
No one wants their relationship to break down but, when it does, both parents are responsible for the healthy development of their child. This includes promoting a proper, loving relationship, which includes frequent, regular contact between the child, both parents and their extended families.
Alienation adversely affects the psychological development of a child, as it prevents a natural, healthy bond and relationship with a parent. A child needs to be nurtured and protected; that is especially true of a baby. At a time of total dependence, a mother’s physical and emotional presence regulates the baby’s fear response and overproduction of adrenaline and cortisol. Brain scans of toddlers who have experienced abuse and been deprived of emotional nurturing were shown to have disproportionately large and active limbic systems. As a result, these “fight or flight” hormones remain in the body and the child is in a constant state of anxiety and distress, not dissimilar to a soldier suffering from PTSD.
But it is equally important that the child has a relationship with their father. This is not a gendered issue. A major study in the Journal of Applied Economics, “The Impact of Income and Family Structure on Delinquency”, found that when interactions between a child and their parent broke down, and the perception and view of the other parent deteriorated, it was the child who suffered and transitioned to emotions of abandonment, alienation and a lack of trust, with both parent and child worse off.
There is no statistically significant difference between men and women as perpetrators and victims of parental alienation. Raising issues of gender discrimination to discredit the experience of many is not the way forward. But the effects on alienated parents, who lose the trust of their children and therefore their willingness to see them due to the actions of the other parent, are devastating.
There can be no doubt that judicial decisions in cases involving children must take account of all aspects of the family dynamic, including all types of abuse. This is crucial, as we have heard this afternoon. There is a need for qualified professionals to assist in court in assessing whether there is abuse, and if so its severity, and how it should affect child-parent residence and contact arrangements. But we also need to be mindful that children’s expressed wishes in court are not always their own. They do not always feel free to express their actual wishes, particularly when young, and they can be used as a weapon by an abusive parent.
Therefore, it is important that parental alienation is recognised in the Bill as a form of abuse, so that it can be identified and addressed.
My Lords, before I had the pleasure of meeting my noble friend Lady Meyer, I had read about the unbelievably distressing time she went through following the alienation of her children by their father. Today she has told us that story in the most moving way. I apologise for the fact that, as she is sitting behind me, she is seeing only my back rather than my front as I make this speech.
I admire my noble friend for all she has done to raise awareness of parental alienation through the setting up of her charity and getting the academic and judicial profession to realise that parental alienation needs to be recognised. Along with her, I want parental alienation recognised, but it must be tackled in law in the right way. Hasty law makes for bad law and will not elevate parental alienation to where we all want it. This important Bill must not become a Christmas tree on which we hang too much, which leads to minimising what it wants to achieve.
I cannot agree with the amendment to this Bill. Clause 1 sets out to define domestic abuse by listing different types of abusive behaviours, and not how they may be manifested. This is important, because to do this could be risky and give more weight to how a particular type of behaviour is displayed, and potentially ignore others. As many noble Lords have mentioned, the introduction of parental alienation into the Bill could have unintended consequences due to the absence of a common definition. Consequently, in a family court, cases of parental alienation could mean whatever the judge wants it to mean.
A child may form their own reasons for resisting contact, and there are cases where a parent, for no justified reason, restricts the other parent’s relationship with the child. These are two very different situations under the parental alienation label, which serves to validate the misuse of parental alienation and to obscure the tactics of perpetrators of domestic abuse.
Parental alienation needs to be looked into in its own right. This is now being done after too many years of misunderstanding, lack of clarity and muddle among the experts. My noble friend Lady Helic mentioned how the Ministry of Justice set up an expert panel and reported in June 2020. The panel made a series of recommendations, which I do not have time to go into here, to reform the child arrangement programme in family law. Leading on from this, the Government published an implementation plan for some of the recommendations. One recommendation said:
“A review of the presumption of parental involvement … is needed urgently in order to address its detrimental effects.”
In November, the Government announced an advisory group to begin this work. I welcome these initiatives and feel strongly that this is the way forward, to make sure that parental alienation gets the recognition it deserves.
I want my noble friend to get all she feels is necessary to have parental alienation recognised in law, but my fear is that adding her amendment to this Bill will have a detrimental effect on the work that is going on, and will minimise the importance of this appalling problem. We must make sure that parental alienation is put into legislation where it can be properly dealt with, and this Bill is not that legislation.
My Lords, this is such a difficult issue. This afternoon we have heard strong and cogent arguments on both sides. I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, for telling her heartrending story.
Parental alienation exists, if by that we mean that the parent with care seeks to alienate the child from the parent without care. One issue is that there is such a wide range of definitions, as mentioned by my noble friend Lady Brinton. I saw it first-hand as an MP when I was involved with an organisation called the Association of Shared Parenting, formed by parents who were struggling to see their children after separation or divorce. It was based on the premise that most children benefit from contact with both parents, surely something with which no noble Lord in this House would disagree. The Association of Shared Parenting still exists, despite changes in family law, which I would have hoped would save it from needing to exist. Clearly, we need qualified professionals to assess what is going on. The bitterness of a break-up and the reluctance of the parent with care to continue the relationship through the child causes some parents to resist allowing contact by weaponising the child or poisoning their mind.
That is why I initially added my name to these amendments, but I have since removed it, because I do not believe that this is what we are talking about today. We are talking about cases in the criminal courts, not of divorce settlements necessarily but of domestic abuse. The problem with this amendment, which it took me some time to get my head around, is that the abused parent could actually be painted as the abuser. As Vera Baird, the Victims’ Commissioner for England and Wales, who has been quoted more than once already today, says:
“It puts victims of domestic abuse into the ridiculous position where, if they raise their abuse in the family courts, however well they have actually behaved, that can trigger unfounded allegations of parental alienation that could result in their children being placed with the abuser.”
She continues:
“This attempt to turn the fact that the perpetrator has terrified their partner into a destructive criticism of that partner is typical coercive controlling behaviour.”
My noble friend Lady Brinton and the noble Baronesses, Lady Helic and Lady Newlove, the former Victims’ Commissioner, are absolutely right. With sympathy to all parents suffering the anguish of break-up, the interests of the child must be paramount. I do not envy the task of the family courts in resolving these cases. We must rely on properly trained experts to decide. On balance, I believe that allowing Amendments 2 and 4 would do more harm than good to victims and dilute the definition of domestic abuse in this Bill.
(4 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this Bill brings us transformative legislation and gives us the opportunity to transform the response to domestic abuse. It has come not a moment too soon, at a crucial time when we know that calls to the NDA Helpline are up by at least 49%. Worryingly, calls seem to have been driven by third-party reporting, showing that there is significant underreporting by actual victims. Among other charities, the NSPCC helpline has received an increased number of calls with concerns about children. It is on children that I want to concentrate today.
Children are often the hidden victims of domestic abuse, which leads to a devastating impact on their lives. We see such children presenting with mental and physical problems. They have difficulty settling into a school environment, which in many cases leads to poor educational outcomes. Once they become adults, they are more likely to enter abusive relationships. Under the Bill, young people aged 16 and over can be considered as perpetrators and can be criminalised for sexual offences. Young people who harm are often victims themselves. They need to be recognised as children and given specialist help leading to a change in their behaviour which could have a positive impact on their lives. Can my noble friend the Minister reassure me on this point?
Statutory support for all children, wherever they are living, is vital. The Bill ensures that children in safe accommodation receive statutory support but leaves the majority who live at home or in the wider community without support. It is vital that the Bill is strengthened to include community-based services, a position supported by the Domestic Abuse Commissioner.
Community-based services provide a crucial lifeline of support to survivors of domestic abuse and their children. Around 70% receive support via community-based services, which provide court support, health services, housing advice and emotional support, helplines and perpetrator programmes, as well as local agencies offering drop-in services for children, among many more vital services of help and support. I fear that excluding community-based services could lead to unintended consequences; local authorities could feel it necessary to divert funding from community-based services to accommodation-based services to ensure that they meet their duty requirements. The Bill should be amended to provide a statutory underpinning to commission community-based services.
It is my understanding that the Government want to wait for the domestic abuse commissioner to complete the mapping research for all domestic abuse services, which is indeed important, but we know that there is already evidence on demand. So I ask the Minister to consider a commitment in the legislation to, if necessary, extend powers at a later stage.
There must be a holistic approach to domestic abuse; support must be provided to all victims and survivors, including children, no matter where they live and regardless of their status. Community and accommodation-based services, along with specialist services, would ensure that there was support for prevention along with early and late intervention.
I look forward to hearing from my noble friend, and I take this opportunity to thank her and the Bill team for dealing with queries ahead of today. I know that the Bill is in formidable hands as I have worked with the Bill team, led by Charles Goldie, and I have worked with my noble friend the Minister. I know that we have ample aid with my noble friend Lord Parkinson as well, and my honourable friend in the other place, Victoria Atkins.
(4 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberYou cannot decouple domestic abuse from mental health trauma. Surely the two go hand in hand, not only for the woman—it is usually a women—who is suffering abuse at the hands of an abusive partner but also, usually, for her children, who feel those effects and the trauma for a very long time, if not the rest of their lives.
I ask my noble friend the Minister when she thinks the Domestic Abuse Bill will come to this House? She said “soon”; does that mean “soon, soon” or “soon, soon, soon, soon”? When it does come, can she make sure that children, from birth to the age of 18, are seen as victims and not witnesses so that they can get the support that they need for the trauma that they have experienced?
My noble friend will know that I would introduce the Domestic Abuse Bill into this House tomorrow if I could, but a number of pieces of legislation need to get through this House. It will probably be early in the new year but I will press—the Leader of the House is sitting there—for that Bill to come to this House as soon as is practicably possible. On the question of children, my noble friend will know that children will benefit from a number of measures in the Domestic Abuse Bill, including—I note what I said in the last answer—the fact that it ensures that they are now recognised as victims in their own right. The Designate Domestic Abuse Commissioner has been appointed to encourage good practice in, among other things, the provision of protection and support for children affected by domestic abuse.
(4 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord is right that there is a way to go on this with regard to some of those self-reliant communities that he talks about. We have more to learn about them and therefore some of the interventions that might be necessary to deal with some of the hidden harms that occur in them.
A multiagency approach to combating violence against women is obviously fundamental. What are government departments doing to come forward with a joined-up strategy so that women can feel safe in coming forward?
My noble friend is right that without a multiagency approach—in other words, government departments coming together—it will be very difficult to tackle this issue. She will know about the troubled families programme, which brings together a lot of different agencies; indeed, through that programme we have unearthed far higher levels of domestic abuse than we first thought. I can also tell her that the Home Office, the MoJ and the MHCLG have all announced funding to support victims. We must work together as a whole Government to tackle this issue.
(7 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 93A in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Stevenson of Balmacara is the first amendment in a small group before the Committee this afternoon. They are probing amendments to allow us to begin to debate the issues around Schedule 3, specifically Part 2 and matters concerning health data and social work data.
Amendment 93A would delete the words “or another individual”. I want to understand clearly what the Government mean when they refer to the “serious harm test” for the data subject and to this very wide catch-all phrase, “or another individual”. Amendment 94A would delete specific wording as detailed in the Bill and replace it with the wording in my amendment.
I can see the point of paragraph 4(1)(c) of Schedule 3, but do not see why the Government would not wish to rely on the definition of lacking mental capacity, as defined by the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Can the Minister explain, if my amendment is not going to be accepted, why the Government appear to be relying on weaker words in this section?
Amendment 94B would delete paragraph 4(2)(a) of Schedule 3. Again, I stress that this is a probing amendment to give the Minister the opportunity to set out clearly how this is going to work so that it does not cause problems for research but respects people’s privacy regarding the data that they have been provided with.
On the other amendments in the group, Amendment 94C looks to broaden the definition of social work data to include education data and data concerning health, by probing what the Government mean by their definition of social work data in the Bill. Amendment 94D probes, regarding paragraph 8, the details on data processed by local authorities, by the regional health and social care boards, by health and social care trusts and by education authorities.
With Amendments 95A and 95B, I am looking for a greater understanding of what the Government mean. The wording in the Bill which these amendments would delete is quite vague. We want to understand much more what the Government are talking about here. I beg to move.
My Lords, the Bill sets new standards for protecting general data, in accordance with the GDPR, which will give people more control over use of their data and provide new rights to move or delete personal data. However, there will be occasions when it is not in the best interests of the data subject for these rights to be exercised, or where exercising them might impinge on the rights and freedoms of others. Schedule 3 considers this issue in the specific context of health, social work, education and child abuse data. It provides organisations operating in these fields with targeted exemptions where it is necessary for the protection of the data subject or the rights and freedoms of others. Importantly, much of Schedule 3 is directly imported from existing legislation.
The amendments which the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson and Lord Kennedy, have tabled focus on exemptions available for healthcare and social services providers. Let me deal first with the amendments relating to the healthcare exemptions. Amendment 93A would amend the serious harm test, in paragraph 2 of Schedule 3, by removing the reference to harm caused to other individuals. This is an important safeguard. For example, if a child informed a healthcare provider that they had been abused by a relative and then that person made a subject access request, it is obvious that disclosure could have serious consequences for the child. I am sure that this is not what the noble Lords envisage through their amendment; we consider there are good reasons for retaining the current wording. As I said earlier, these provisions are not new: they have been imported from paragraph 5 of the Data Protection (Subject Access Modification) (Health) Order 2000.
Amendments 94A and 94B would amend the exemption in paragraph 4 which allows health professionals to withhold personal data from parents or carers where the data in question has been provided by the data subject on the basis that it would not be disclosed to the persons making the request. Again, neither of these provisions is new. They too were provided for in paragraph 5 of the 2000 order and we think they remain appropriate.
If Amendment 108F is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 109 due to pre-emption.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for turning the attention of the Committee to the accreditation process. I recognise the intention behind his detailed amendments; namely, to reduce the administrative burden associated with requests for accreditation decisions to be reviewed and, subsequently, for the review process to be appealed. Under the new regime, both the Information Commissioner and the United Kingdom Accreditation Service will be able to accredit organisations that wish to offer a certification service for compliance with data protection legislation. Many organisations may wish to make use of certification services to support their compliance with the new law, and the accreditation process is intended to support them in choosing a provider of certification.
Schedule 5 establishes a mechanism for organisations that have applied for accreditation to seek redress against a decision made by UKAS or the Information Commissioner. The mechanism process has two elements. In the first instance, organisations can seek a review of the accreditation decision. Then, if they are unhappy with that review process, they can lodge an appeal. I share the noble Lord’s desire to minimise the administrative burden created by that review and appeal mechanism. Amendments 108C and 110A limit the documents that may be submitted when appealing. Amendment 108E reduces the time to lodge an appeal. Amendment 108F removes the ability of the appellant to object to members of the appeal panel.
I assure noble Lords that we want a fair and straightforward review and appeals mechanism. Our choice of process, time limits and other restrictions mirrors the appeals process that UKAS currently operates. That process is as provided for by the Accreditation Regulations 2009. Maintaining a consistent appeals process creates administrative simplicity and efficiency. The Government consider that the process in Schedule 5 strikes the right balance between limiting the administrative burden on the accrediting bodies, while also providing applicants with sufficient means of redress.
To add them up, there are four reasons why we feel that what is in there now works well: our choice of process, time limits and other restrictions limits the appeals process that UKAS currently operates; it maintains a consistent appeals process, which creates administrative simplicity and efficiency; it strikes the right balance between limiting the administrative burden but provides applicants with sufficient means of redress; and the accreditation process will give organisations confidence that they are choosing the right provider of certification. I hope I have addressed the noble Lord’s concerns and urge him to withdraw the amendment.
I am grateful to the Minister for her response. I think I may have slightly misled the Committee: I think I am right in saying that this is a new process, brought in by the Bill. It was not in the Data Protection Act 1998. I should have said that there is an additional reason for wanting to scrutinise it, to make sure we are looking at the right things.
I should have asked one question, to which I do not expect a response now, unless the Minister has it to hand. I notice that the national accreditation body, which has to be set up by member states because of the GDPR, is set up under another EU instrument because it is the designated body under the Accreditation Regulations 2009. I take it that they will be brought forward in the withdrawal Bill as necessary regulations for that to be provided.
As the noble Lord said, the process is new to the GDPR and not in the 1995 directive or the DPA. The GDPR requires member states to ensure that certification bodies are accredited by the ICO and/or the national accreditation body. As such, the UK Government will need to demonstrate their compliance with that requirement, which Clause 16 and Schedule 5 fulfil.
I thank the Minister for that response. I am sure that the narrow point about the regulations can be dealt with by correspondence, so I will not press it today. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I do not know how influential I am, but I certainly agree that the Government are absolutely clear that reducing the harms caused by drugs needs to be part of a balanced approach. That means acting at the earliest opportunity to prevent people starting to use drugs in the first place and escalation to more harmful use, and providing evidence-based treatment options that can be tailored to individual need. The noble Lord talked about the rise in certain drug deaths. It is very concerning. PHE will continue to work with the Government and local authorities in delivering tailored, effective responses according to specific local issues. The reasons behind some of the increases in drug-related deaths are multiple and complex, which is why we established an expert group that has made recommendations to curb the number of people dying from drug misuse.
My Lords, a charity called the Nelson Trust goes into prisons to help prisoners with drug rehabilitation. Does the Minister feel that this is the way forward and that we ought to concentrate more on this? By the time prisoners come out, it is often too late to try to treat their addictions.
I thank my noble friend for that question and respect her great experience in the area of health. It is absolutely right that prisoners should receive treatment for both prevention and their drug use, because when they come out of prison, it is very important that they have recovered from their drug use and the issues associated with it.
(8 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, these amendments were discussed on Report a few days ago. Amendments 1 and 2 add the world “reasonably” to this section of the Bill requiring someone to confirm their nationality. In that discussion, I made the point that in this section of the Bill the wording “without reasonable excuse” is used in respect of suspects in new Section 43B(1) and again in new Section 46C(1), and on that page there is also “for a reasonable cause”. That is different from the provisions for police and immigration officers. I asked the noble Baroness, Lady Chisholm, to write to me, and I think she was going to, but I have not yet had the letter. It is on its way. That is good to know. When she replies, I hope she will shed some light on why the Government do not need the same provision for both groups in this part of the Bill.
My Lords, these amendments again seek to provide in the Bill that a police or immigration officer exercising the powers in Clauses 161 and 162 to require a suspected foreign national to state their nationality and provide their nationality documents on request must act reasonably.
I am grateful for the opportunity to clarify the Government’s position. On Report, the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, suggested that the drafting of these clauses seemed inconsistent, given that, on the one hand, there was no express requirement on an officer to exercise the powers reasonably but, on the other hand, the defence operated only where the accused had a reasonable excuse. There is no inconsistency here. The reasonable excuse defence is a necessary safeguard which allows a suspected foreign national to offer legitimate reasons to an officer and, if necessary, a court, for their non-compliance. This might include, for example, circumstances where a document may have been destroyed with reasonable cause—a scenario which is also catered for elsewhere in immigration legislation. The requirement for officers to act reasonably in the first instance is, in the Government’s view, a quite different point.
I acknowledge that there are some variations in the drafting of the large number of existing Acts which set out UK immigration law. It is also accepted that certain actions in the Immigration Act 2016 explicitly require those exercising coercive powers to act reasonably. However, it is not the case that, in the absence of an explicit reference to that effect, officers are able, through that omission, to act unreasonably. This language is not universally applied, or required, nor is it used elsewhere in legislation which deals with the seizure or retention of nationality documents.
In exercising the powers conferred by Clauses 161 and 162, police and immigration officers must act in accordance with public law principles, which include acting reasonably, or they may be challenged in the courts by means of judicial review. I also note that the wording of these clauses is consistent with that used elsewhere in immigration legislation—for example, Section 17 of the asylum and immigration Act 2004, which uses the same language for similar purposes. Section 17 deals with the retention of documents that come into the possession of the Secretary of State or an immigration officer in the course of exercising an immigration function.
Finally, I should add that operational guidance in respect of these new powers will make it clear to officers the circumstances under which these powers may be exercised. In the light of this further assurance that these powers may be exercised only when an officer has a reasonable suspicion that an arrested person may not be a British citizen, I hope that the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.
However, I will just add a couple of things: of course we are very happy to continue to engage with the noble Baroness as our plans for pilots develop; she is also right that Hampshire was one of the places that was suggested for the pilot.
Before the noble Baroness sits down, did I hear her correctly say that these powers can be exercised only when an officer has a reasonable suspicion? If that is the case, then I do not see why it should not be in the Act and this amendment accepted.
We take the view that the police should always act in a reasonable way.
I think that encompasses our arguments.
With regard to the pilots, I am grateful for the noble Baroness’s assurances, but had there been consultation on the choice of Hampshire, she might have had some useful input.
I do not know whether the noble Baroness is in a position to tell us whether there is a distinction between an immigration officer or constable “suspecting” under these clauses in the Bill and an officer having “reasonable grounds for believing”. Are these different tests? It seems to me that suspecting and having reasonable grounds for believing are not the same, but I think she is telling us that they are. Does she have anything that she is able to add?
I am slightly muddled by what the noble Baroness is saying. Could she explain that a bit more?
I take the point that different formulae are used in different parts of immigration law, but the Immigration Act to which I have referred provides for an officer to have “reasonable grounds for believing” something, while under this Bill, he simply has to “suspect” something. “Reasonable grounds for believing” seems to me to be a much tougher test than simply suspecting. The noble Baroness may have something she can share with the House on that.
Suspecting and believing are slightly different words, obviously. Perhaps I had better write to the noble Baroness with more clarification.
My Lords, I wonder whether this is something that we can add to the discussion or consultation on the pilots. If one is going to pilot two provisions in the same place, carried out by the same officers and prompted no doubt by the same observations, it would be quite interesting to have them either able or not able to require documents from the same people, but not able to do so because in one case the ground applies and in the other it does not. I realise we are getting into very fine detail, but it will be very real detail in the application. It is not the noble Baroness’s fault, but I can see that we are not going to be able to make further progress on this today. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, as these amendments are purely consequential on various non-government amendments added to the Bill on Report, the Government will not oppose them. We are reflecting on the debates on the amendments put forward on Report by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Royall and Lady Brinton, and we will set out our position when those amendments are considered by the House of Commons on 10 January.
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Lords ChamberMy Lords, as we have heard, this group of amendments relates to the provisions in Clauses 144 and 145, which confer powers on police and immigration officers to require a suspected foreign national to state their nationality after arrest and to produce nationality documents where required. Following the debate in Committee, government Amendments 180, 181 and 194A seek to address concerns raised then by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the Joint Committee on Human Rights. The noble Baroness has tabled a number of amendments of her own, designed to push the Government a little further, but before I respond to these I shall explain the government amendments.
Amendment 180 concerns the situation where a UK national does not possess a passport and is otherwise suspected to be a foreign national. As recommended by the JCHR, this amendment clarifies that officers are able to take into account alternative documentary evidence which would establish an arrested person’s entitlement to a British passport. Supplementary guidance will also be provided to make it clear to officers what specific evidence would normally be sufficient to establish nationality and can therefore be taken into account in that assessment. Given this, I do not believe that Amendment 180A, which seeks a similar end, is necessary.
Amendment 181 will enable us to pilot these provisions on a limited basis to ensure that police processes are robust and that there are no adverse consequences for black and ethnic minority British nationals. Following the pilot and in advance of the rollout of these provisions, we will lay a report before Parliament on the outcome and effectiveness of the pilot. Among other things, the report will include a full equality impact assessment. Given this undertaking, I hope that the noble Baroness will agree that Amendments 181A and 181B are also unnecessary. The noble Baroness wanted to know where the pilots will take place. Subject to agreement with the police, one pilot will take place in Hampshire and the other has yet to be agreed.
Amendments 179A and 179B seek to make it clear that an officer may impose the requirements in Clauses 144 and 145 only when it is reasonable to do so. However, it is already the case that officers may only ever act on reasonable grounds when exercising their powers. Accordingly, I put it to the noble Baroness that there is no need to write this into the Bill. Moreover, in respect of the offences in these clauses there is, in each case, a reasonable excuse defence.
Finally, Amendment 181BA seeks to provide for a post-legislative review of not just the provisions in Clauses 144 and 145 but also the powers conferred by the Immigration Act 2016 to search for and seize driving licences held by an illegal migrant. There is an established procedure for post-legislative review of all legislation, which takes place three to five years following Royal Assent. Consequently we do not need to make express statutory provision for this.
While this is not the occasion to reopen the debates on last Session’s Immigration Bill, I shall just make a couple of observations about the new powers in relation to driving licences. During the debates last Session on these powers, my noble friend Lord Bates made a number of commitments addressing the concerns then raised by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, including a commitment to pilot the power to search for a driving licence in one or two police areas. The pilot will test the operational details so that any impacts can be identified by the pilot scheme and addressed. My noble friend also committed to issuing guidance to police and immigration officers on the operation of these powers and to a public consultation on that draft guidance before implementation. The consultation will raise awareness of these powers and provide an important gateway through which communities will be able to consider and comment on, among other things, appropriate safeguards.
It is also unnecessary to set up an ad hoc independent review every time we wish to scrutinise police forces’ use of specific powers; Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary exists for this purpose. The inspectorate independently assesses police forces and policing activity in the public interest. The PEEL inspection programme —an annual, all-force inspection which assess forces’ efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy—considers both the extent to which forces use their powers effectively and the extent to which forces treat the people they serve with fairness and respect. In addition, the Home Secretary has the power to commission HMIC to inspect and report on any particular issue if she feels that it requires greater scrutiny than it has received in the course of rolling inspection programmes.
HMIC has a strong track record in shining a light on police use of intrusive powers and has not pulled any punches in its reports on stop and search. It is largely due to HMIC’s findings that the previous Home Secretary announced increased scrutiny of road traffic stops through their incorporation into the best use of the stop and search scheme. We are therefore confident that the necessary systems to provide effective scrutiny of these powers are already in place. The clear statutory safeguards against the misuse of this power, the commitment to a pilot and a public consultation and the role of HMIC mean that this amendment is unnecessary.
The noble Baroness also asked about the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee’s recommendation. As this is essentially a commencement power, we are not persuaded that the regulation should be subject to a parliamentary procedure. However, I assure the House that we will set out in the regulations the duration of any pilot, and I have already undertaken to lay a report before Parliament on the outcome and effectiveness of the pilot before we commence these provisions more widely.
I trust that this rather lengthy explanation of the government amendments will provide the necessary reassurance to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and that she will therefore be content to withdraw her amendment.
Before the Minister sits down, will she address the point I made earlier about page 163 where “reasonable” is used a number of times in respect of suspects but not of police officers. Why is that distinction there? If the Minister would like to write to me, that is fine, but I think it is odd that there is that distinction.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. When the noble Baroness writes, perhaps she can also explain this about what the Government did in the Immigration Act 2016. For this purpose, I simply refer to Section 43, which introduces a new paragraph in Schedule 2 to the 1971 Act providing for power to be exercised only if the authorised officer has “reasonable grounds” for believing that, in this case, the driving licence is on the premises. The very fact that that terminology is used in legislation which we passed a mere few months ago must raise the question of why it is not included in the comparable clause in this Bill. I know that the noble Baroness cannot answer this at the moment, but I hope that as well as writing, she might be able to discuss this with officials. It is an intrinsically important point, but also a technical one, as to why it should not be included in this Bill. Perhaps we can come back to this at Third Reading. I am not of course expecting her to do anything other than nod sympathetically, as she is doing.
The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee will no doubt consider the Government’s response, but I note that on the question of the affirmative procedure, the Minister said that she did not think that these regulations should be subject to parliamentary procedure. The committee also suggested, or would require, that the Secretary of State should consult interested parties before making the regulations. I am not sure—I might have missed it—whether she referred to the maximum duration of pilots. I accept that there will be post-legislative reviews, and that everything has to be kept under review, but it is the importance of the subject matter which led us to raise the point about requiring an ad hoc review.
I do not know whether the Minister has any information as to whether the pilots and guidance under the Immigration Act are going to be introduced in tandem with, and in the same areas as and so on, the pilots under this Bill. Does she have any information about that?
I think that is still under discussion at the moment with various authorities.
My Lords, we will see, but I am glad to note the Home Office’s acceptance of the importance of the issue, which I never had in doubt. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I realise that the House wants to move to a vote on the very important and significant debate we have just had. I do not know whether there is a mechanism whereby I could come back to Amendment 185 at Third Reading so that we do not lose this debate because this, also, is a very important question with regard to the anonymity or otherwise of people involved in rape cases. I would be grateful for some guidance on this matter.
I am afraid that if the noble Lord wants to press this amendment he has to press it now. We cannot go back to it again because we have to go in order.
I will speak as rapidly as I can and I am sorry that this is going to detain the House. Amendment 185 is in my name and those of the noble Baronesses, Lady Howe of Idlicote, Lady Brinton and Lady Cohen of Pimlico. I thank them for their support.
I do not apologise in the slightest for returning to a matter that I raised in Committee, since most of the countercase put by the Government in Committee triggered dismay and incredulity among those involved in cases such as those I highlighted then. To the extent that there was any validity in the Government’s countercase, I have adjusted the wording of the amendment to respond constructively. The impact of this new clause would be to prohibit the police in England and Wales from disclosing the name of the victim of rape or attempted rape to the alleged perpetrator—
My Lords, my name is also attached to this amendment, but I would not normally have spoken given that the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, were such distinguished proponents of it. At the moment there is a choice of injustices. Perhaps we should have provided—and I should be glad to provide at Third Reading—a clause saying that a judge may decide whether the name should be disclosed. This is, however, also a modern offence. In the old days it might not have mattered very much if you disclosed only the name of the accuser. These days, the perpetrator has no trouble at all, because of the spread of social media, and these cases are more frequent.
One reads of cases all the time and I want to disentangle this from the issue of rape. It is not entirely about rape. It is about being knifed in the street or pushed under a Tube train by a perfect stranger, as I am sure we have all read about, and being terrified thereafter in case he or she comes and does it again. Therefore, I would be very grateful if the Minister would understand the strength of feeling and the injustice being done. If we can put in a clause at Third Reading offering the possibility of review by a judge if necessary, I would be glad to do so.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, has explained, this amendment is designed to strengthen the protection for the victims and witnesses of a sexual or violent assault by a stranger. I sympathise with this objective but, as I indicated in Committee, there are difficulties. I am grateful to the noble Lord for taking on board the points I made in response to his earlier amendment on this issue. He has now come forward with a substantially revised amendment. I fear, however, that this serves only to highlight again the challenges of legislating in this area.
It is vital that the criminal justice system supports and protects victims and witnesses, particularly victims of sexual offences, who are especially vulnerable. As I stated in Committee, there are already a number of means whereby those at risk of further harm, or who are deemed to be intimidated, can be safeguarded. I shall not repeat these measures now, other than to say that there is a wide range of options available for their protection. To intimidate a witness is a very serious criminal offence.
Of course, the right to a fair trial is a cornerstone of our criminal justice system. The noble Lord, Lord Wigley, has rightly acknowledged this in the revised amendment before us today. However, to say that the identity of a victim or a witness may be withheld from the defendant except where to do so would compromise the defendant’s right to a fair trial is almost always a contradiction in terms. As my noble friend Lord Hailsham said, fundamental to a fair trial is the right of the accused to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The accused cannot be expected to prepare a proper defence if he does not know who is accusing him of the alleged crime, and without that there can be no fair trial.
In exceptional circumstances, there is already provision for anonymity of victims or witnesses from the accused, through a witness anonymity order. A number of conditions must be met for this to apply, including that it would protect the safety of the witness or another person, that it is in the interests of justice for the witness to testify and the witness would not testify if the order were not made, and that it would be consistent with the defendant receiving a fair trial. It is an exceptional measure of last resort. This means that in the minority of cases where those accused of violent or sexual assault are strangers, the court can decide to grant victim or witness anonymity, provided these other conditions are met.
On that very point, if the court determines at that stage whether or not to release information, surely there is every case to get consistency prior to that. I quoted five cases, I think it was, of different responses by the police in different parts of London. The absence of any consistent approach to this underlines that there is a serious problem. If the Government were willing to review how the mechanism of referring to the courts, which the Minister mentioned, can be brought in in a way that avoids the variety of ad hoc responses by the police, that might be one way forward. I would be very grateful if the Minister would consider that.
The problem is that, as I said earlier, it is an exceptional measure of last resort. This means that, in the minority of cases where those accused of violent or sexual assault are strangers, the court can decide to grant victims and witnesses anonymity, provided that the conditions are met.
While I cannot for these reasons support the noble Lord’s amendment, he has raised an important point about the consistency of practice both across and within police forces about the disclosure of the address and telephone number of a victim. Crown Prosecution Service policy on prosecuting cases of rape clearly states that addresses of victims and witnesses should not be disclosed to the defendant during court proceedings. The same is true of victims’ or witnesses’ telephone numbers or email addresses. However, we do not know how aware the police are of this policy, so we will explore with the College of Policing whether it would be appropriate for additional guidance to be given to police forces to ensure that this practice is universally followed.
Before the Minister sits down, I say that in the case with which the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, and I are most familiar, the police disclosed the victim’s name quite automatically to the perpetrator about 20 minutes after they had arrested him on the evidence of two policemen. It is all very well to say that you can wait to have a court make a decision, but a policeman made a decision at the earliest possible stage, and that is the issue that the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, and I are attempting to address.
I am sure the noble Baroness will understand that I cannot go into individual cases. CPS policy on prosecuting cases of rape clearly states that witnesses’ addresses should not be disclosed to the defendant unless already known. The CPS does not disclose the addresses, email addresses or phone numbers of victims or witnesses in any case unless already known. That is why we are looking at ways to ensure that this approach is similarly applied by police forces.
While the amendment is well intentioned, for the reasons I have given, I do not consider that it will help advance the noble Lord’s cause. He has alighted upon an important issue regarding the consistency of practice adopted by criminal justice agencies in relation to the disclosure of a vulnerable victim’s address or other contact details, and I am ready to explore further how this might best be addressed. On that basis, I hope the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful. I realise that the House wants to move forward rapidly. I was grateful for the contributions made by the noble Viscount and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, to the contra argument with regard to the rights of the defendant. Of course I recognise that they are important. The question seems to revolve around the inconsistency of the police response, which the Minister has accepted needs to be looked into, and whether, while it was reasonable to withhold addresses and telephone numbers in the past, it might now be necessary to withhold the name because of the ease of getting addresses from information available on computer-based systems these days. If the Government are prepared to review those aspects of the question, we will feel that we have made some progress on this issue. If the Minister can indicate that the Government are willing to look at those aspects, I will be prepared to withdraw the amendment.
We realise that certain aspects need to be addressed, which is why I said that I am ready to explore further how this might best be addressed.
I am grateful to the Minister. On the basis of that assurance that there will be an investigation into those aspects of the question, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness. Lady Hamwee, for speaking to me beforehand; we have had some discussion. I would like to go straight to answering both those questions, from my perspective, as I was the person who tabled the original amendment. I must declare my interest, as I now chair the National Mental Capacity Forum. I took over and started to do that in September of last year.
In terms of consultation, when I was listening to the voice of the person who had been on the receiving end of the Mental Capacity Act it was very evident very quickly that the automatic requirement for an inquest was causing an enormous amount of distress to families. It was also through that process that Ann Coffey MP consulted widely in her constituency and further afield—and coroners have been asked. So this was not brought forward lightly.
There was also consultation with the adviser to the Care Quality Commission, who feels strongly that DoLS are a useful process for safeguarding people who are particularly vulnerable. He was very supportive of the process following the judgment of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, which clearly laid out the acid tests under which DoLS should be applied.
As for cost savings, I see there being absolutely none. Actually, there is a possibility that costs might go up. Although unnecessary inquests will not, I hope, happen, so coroners will not be taken away from inquests that really do need to happen by the bureaucratic process of the unnecessary inquests, of which there were almost 7,000 last year, that find that death was due to natural causes, it is possible—indeed, I hope that this will happen—that more people will be inclined to make a deprivation of liberty safeguards application if there is a doubt about whether somebody is being deprived of liberty, because the deterrent of knowing how much distress would be caused to people, including families, will be removed.
Care home, clinical and hospital staff find it very distressing to say, “We’re going to go through this process of applying for a deprivation of liberty safeguards authorisation—and, secondarily, by the way, that means that there will automatically be a coroner’s inquest”. For those who culturally need a burial very rapidly after somebody has died, that causes profound upset—as it does to other families. As one coroner’s officer said, to me, “Sadly, sometimes the first time the families realise there has to be an inquest is when I have to pick up the phone to tell them, and they are deeply distressed”.
I suggest that by putting this measure in place we are removing a barrier to the deprivation of liberty safeguards, which are a way of protecting the rights of the most vulnerable person, because there is an inspection process. It must be necessary, proportionate and in the person’s best interests, and the person has a power to appeal to the Court of Protection against a deprivation of liberty safeguard. So people have far greater rights than somebody who ought to have a deprivation of liberty safeguard authorisation in place but where no application is being made. So I hope that this will increase the rights of the most vulnerable as well.
The process of scrutiny is that the Care Quality Commission has to be notified when a standard DoLS is in place. It will know whether a place has unusually many or unusually few DoLS applications, and will look in depth at the quality, the atmosphere and the culture around the way that care is given there. With all due respect to coroners, I think that the CQC is far more likely to detect where things are going wrong than a coroner’s inquest on a single case. But I reiterate that if a family have any concerns whatever, irrespective of whether there was a DoLS in place, they can ask for a coroner to look at a case when somebody has died. If they are suspicious, they can ask the question.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for raising this important issue. The Government take seriously their responsibilities to the very vulnerable group of people in society whom this amendment concerns. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for her deep knowledge of this issue, and for the words that she has spoken this evening.
Coroners in England and Wales play a critical role in investigating the deaths of persons where there is a suspicion that death may have resulted from violence or unnatural causes, or indeed where the cause of death is unknown. Coroners will continue to have this duty with regard to persons who have been deprived of their liberty as authorised under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. There is no restriction on when or by whom deaths can be reported to a coroner. Indeed, the registrar of deaths has a duty to report deaths to the coroner where he or she considers that the coroner’s duty to investigate may apply.
The Government recognise that there is a need to improve the scrutiny of deaths that are not investigated by a coroner. The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 contains provisions to introduce medical examiners who will contact the deceased’s family and those involved in the deceased person’s care to identify any concerns as part of a reformed death certification process.
We consulted on our proposals earlier this year and aim to publish our response to the consultation in the new year. This will of course be particularly relevant to vulnerable people in hospitals and care homes, regardless of whether they are being deprived of their liberty. Medical examiners will not just be responsible for scrutinising individual deaths not investigated by the coroner but will have a role in analysing data on deaths across their area. They will identify patterns and contribute to lessons that will reduce avoidable deaths. They will also have a duty to report to coroners deaths for which a coroner’s investigation may be required.
The effect of Clause 155 will be that the death of anyone subject to a deprivation of liberty safeguards authorisation, or an appropriate Court of Protection order, will no longer trigger an automatic coroner’s investigation. We supported this change in the law in the light of views expressed by the then chief coroner, his honour Peter Thornton QC, in his 2015-16 annual report. He called for immediate action to remove deprivation of liberty safeguards cases from the definition of “in state detention”—a point that, just prior to his recent retirement, he reiterated to the Minister for Victims, Youth and Family Justice.
The issue here is not simply one of the resources needed to undertake these inquests. The then chief coroner had addressed this to some extent through his 2014 guidance, revised in 2016, which set out a streamlined process. But, as he has said, these inquests “serve no good purpose”. It cannot be right that more than 20% of inquests undertaken each year are unnecessary, with all that that implies in terms of added anguish for bereaved families.
I thank the noble Baroness for raising the profile of this important issue, but I hope that she will accept that the Government’s recently completed consultation on reforming the death certification process will, when its proposals are implemented, complement and support the work of our coroners who investigate suspicious deaths.
I think that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked who we consulted in the consultation. The Ministry of Justice consulted the former and current chief coroner. Having said that, we consider that this removes any further need for further consultation on the coroner’s statutory duties, and I hope that the noble Baroness will therefore be content to withdraw her amendment.
I thank the Minister, but I cannot restrain myself from observing that her answer has been that there has been a consultation and that the Government will publish their response to it next year. I say that as nicely as I can, because clearly a lot of work has gone on with regard to this—and I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, as well, for filling out the information that she gave pretty comprehensibly to the House on the last occasion. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I hope that my noble friend will understand that, given the further business to which the House has to attend tonight, I will confine myself to saying that we on these Benches enthusiastically support her amendments.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for meeting with me, and for tabling these amendments again so that this House has a further opportunity to debate the important issue of victims’ rights.
Some of the amendments seek to place aspects of the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime on a statutory basis. This is a statutory code, provided for by the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004, and as such all criminal justice agencies are required to provide the services victims are entitled to under it. Many of the entitlements for victims included in the proposed amendments are already in the code. Some are for all victims of crime, while others are enhanced entitlements for the most vulnerable victims of crimes such as stalking and domestic and sexual abuse. Placing them on a statutory footing separately will not ensure compliance, nor guarantee that those entitlements are delivered effectively. The effect would merely be symbolic, and make amendment and updating of entitlements more difficult.
As I said before, we recognise the importance of training for professionals who work with victims. Under the police educational framework and national curriculum, police officers and staff receive training on the code throughout their careers. Officers and staff can receive training on the code at various stages of their careers. This training is supported by a new online package launched by the College of Policing. All Crown Prosecution Service staff who attend court have been given face-to-face training on the new Speaking to Witnesses at Court guidance and on how to interact with victims and witnesses at court without undermining the fairness of the trial. This is supported by a comprehensive package of e-learning, which barristers who appear for the CPS in court are expected to complete.
We also appreciate that more can be done in relation to certain categories of crime. That is why, for example, the College of Policing, as part of reviewing its guidance on stalking and harassment investigations, is looking at whether police officers fully understand the offences and are receiving appropriate training. It is also why Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate are carrying out a joint inspection to assess the effectiveness of police forces and the CPS in dealing with cases involving stalking and harassment, and to examine the service received by victims. The CPS is developing a training package for its prosecutors to improve the quality of charging and review decisions in stalking and harassment cases.
There has also been a concerted effort to improve the response of the police in domestic abuse cases. In its most recent national thematic inspection of the police response to domestic abuse, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary found improvements in police attitudes towards victims and front-line officers’ understanding of the importance of dealing with victims in a supportive way. Since 2014, every police force has published a domestic abuse improvement plan, new guidance has been published by the College of Policing, new training has been successfully piloted and for the first time, police are now collecting data against a national standard on all domestic abuse recorded crimes. A joint police and CPS witness care review is looking to identify clear performance measures which would include timeliness of communication of information to witnesses as set out in the code. In addition, Her Majesty’s Courts & Tribunals Service is undergoing an audit by the Government Internal Audit Agency on the effectiveness of arrangements in place for victims and witnesses, against requirements in the victims’ code and the witness charter. Results are expected in the first quarter of 2017.
In order to determine what is required to strengthen further the rights of victims of crime, we are looking at available information about compliance with the victims’ code, and considering how it might be improved and monitored. We are also looking carefully at the range of proposals that have been made by the Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses and others. We are focused on making sure we get this work right, and ensuring that any future reform proposals are evidence-based, and an effective and proportionate approach.
Finally, in relation to Amendment 188, which seeks to provide a direct route of complaint for victims to the Parliamentary Ombudsman, I should add that on 5 December the Cabinet Office published a draft public service ombudsman Bill. The Bill will improve access to the ombudsman’s services by allowing for all complaints to be made with or without the help of a representative and in a variety of formats to meet the digital age. When the Bill is brought before your Lordships’ House, it will provide a further opportunity for noble Lords to test whether the measures I have set out are delivering the improvements to the experience of victims in their interaction with the criminal justice system that we all want to see.
I hope that, having further debated these issues and received greater detail of the work that is being undertaken both by the Government and by the criminal justice agencies, the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.
I thank the Minister for her response, but sadly, many of the concerns I have raised were not particularly well articulated. There is no doubt that there is an entitlement to victims to have support. The fundamental problem is that there is no duty on the agencies to deliver it. The Minister said that police receive training when they first start their careers, and they can receive training later on. The problem is that, in practice, it does not happen consistently. The experience of victims, as outlined both tonight and at earlier stages of the Bill, demonstrates that it is still woefully inadequate in some parts of the country. The College of Policing clearly has an important role, but there are real concerns that there is a focus on the domestic abuse improvement plan without understanding that stalking and coercive control are key issues as well.
I accept the points the Minister has made about the draft public services ombudsman Bill, but there is more in Amendment 188 than is covered in that draft Bill. I believe that I have noble Lords’ support, and I would like to test the opinion of the House.