Baroness Stroud
Main Page: Baroness Stroud (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Stroud's debates with the Home Office
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I want to speak in support of Amendments 2 and 4 tabled by my noble friend Lady Meyer. I remember being horrified when I first heard her personal story, many years ago. But since then, I have learned and seen that this is not an isolated incident, unfortunately.
As we have heard, while there is no single definition of parental alienation, it is recognised by Cafcass as when
“a child’s resistance or hostility towards one parent is not justified and is”,
tragically,
“the result of psychological manipulation by the other parent.”
It has devastating impacts on the child, but is a form of abuse and control of the other parent and in line with emotional abuse of a controlling and coercive nature.
As I have listened to this debate unfold, I have thought back to the battle that has taken place over a long time to include coercion in our definition of domestic abuse, and to recognise children as victims. I hope that it does not take as long for us to wake up to include parental alienation.
No one wants their relationship to break down but, when it does, both parents are responsible for the healthy development of their child. This includes promoting a proper, loving relationship, which includes frequent, regular contact between the child, both parents and their extended families.
Alienation adversely affects the psychological development of a child, as it prevents a natural, healthy bond and relationship with a parent. A child needs to be nurtured and protected; that is especially true of a baby. At a time of total dependence, a mother’s physical and emotional presence regulates the baby’s fear response and overproduction of adrenaline and cortisol. Brain scans of toddlers who have experienced abuse and been deprived of emotional nurturing were shown to have disproportionately large and active limbic systems. As a result, these “fight or flight” hormones remain in the body and the child is in a constant state of anxiety and distress, not dissimilar to a soldier suffering from PTSD.
But it is equally important that the child has a relationship with their father. This is not a gendered issue. A major study in the Journal of Applied Economics, “The Impact of Income and Family Structure on Delinquency”, found that when interactions between a child and their parent broke down, and the perception and view of the other parent deteriorated, it was the child who suffered and transitioned to emotions of abandonment, alienation and a lack of trust, with both parent and child worse off.
There is no statistically significant difference between men and women as perpetrators and victims of parental alienation. Raising issues of gender discrimination to discredit the experience of many is not the way forward. But the effects on alienated parents, who lose the trust of their children and therefore their willingness to see them due to the actions of the other parent, are devastating.
There can be no doubt that judicial decisions in cases involving children must take account of all aspects of the family dynamic, including all types of abuse. This is crucial, as we have heard this afternoon. There is a need for qualified professionals to assist in court in assessing whether there is abuse, and if so its severity, and how it should affect child-parent residence and contact arrangements. But we also need to be mindful that children’s expressed wishes in court are not always their own. They do not always feel free to express their actual wishes, particularly when young, and they can be used as a weapon by an abusive parent.
Therefore, it is important that parental alienation is recognised in the Bill as a form of abuse, so that it can be identified and addressed.
My Lords, before I had the pleasure of meeting my noble friend Lady Meyer, I had read about the unbelievably distressing time she went through following the alienation of her children by their father. Today she has told us that story in the most moving way. I apologise for the fact that, as she is sitting behind me, she is seeing only my back rather than my front as I make this speech.
I admire my noble friend for all she has done to raise awareness of parental alienation through the setting up of her charity and getting the academic and judicial profession to realise that parental alienation needs to be recognised. Along with her, I want parental alienation recognised, but it must be tackled in law in the right way. Hasty law makes for bad law and will not elevate parental alienation to where we all want it. This important Bill must not become a Christmas tree on which we hang too much, which leads to minimising what it wants to achieve.
I cannot agree with the amendment to this Bill. Clause 1 sets out to define domestic abuse by listing different types of abusive behaviours, and not how they may be manifested. This is important, because to do this could be risky and give more weight to how a particular type of behaviour is displayed, and potentially ignore others. As many noble Lords have mentioned, the introduction of parental alienation into the Bill could have unintended consequences due to the absence of a common definition. Consequently, in a family court, cases of parental alienation could mean whatever the judge wants it to mean.
A child may form their own reasons for resisting contact, and there are cases where a parent, for no justified reason, restricts the other parent’s relationship with the child. These are two very different situations under the parental alienation label, which serves to validate the misuse of parental alienation and to obscure the tactics of perpetrators of domestic abuse.
Parental alienation needs to be looked into in its own right. This is now being done after too many years of misunderstanding, lack of clarity and muddle among the experts. My noble friend Lady Helic mentioned how the Ministry of Justice set up an expert panel and reported in June 2020. The panel made a series of recommendations, which I do not have time to go into here, to reform the child arrangement programme in family law. Leading on from this, the Government published an implementation plan for some of the recommendations. One recommendation said:
“A review of the presumption of parental involvement … is needed urgently in order to address its detrimental effects.”
In November, the Government announced an advisory group to begin this work. I welcome these initiatives and feel strongly that this is the way forward, to make sure that parental alienation gets the recognition it deserves.
I want my noble friend to get all she feels is necessary to have parental alienation recognised in law, but my fear is that adding her amendment to this Bill will have a detrimental effect on the work that is going on, and will minimise the importance of this appalling problem. We must make sure that parental alienation is put into legislation where it can be properly dealt with, and this Bill is not that legislation.
My Lords, I wish to speak in support of Amendments 10 and 14 tabled by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Lord, Lord Randall of Uxbridge. It seems there is significant agreement on the need for these amendments, so I will keep my remarks relatively brief.
Amendments 10 and 14 are reasonable amendments that seek to clarify the wide variety of domestic situations in which abuse can occur. Numbers of people up and down the country are now accustomed to doing things such as renting out spare rooms and having people not related to them living in their household. Amendment 10 rightly recognises that when a perpetrator and victim live together in a domestic situation, the abuse should be considered domestic whether or not they are biologically related or in a romantic relationship.
Amendment 14 recognises that it should be considered domestic abuse when the perpetrator has regular contact with the home or lives in the home despite not having legal guardianship or a biological relationship with the child, as we have heard. Both amendments are about ensuring that the Bill is thorough in recognising what constitutes domestic abuse and in identifying the victims and perpetrators, to ensure that we can identify and intervene in the wide range of domestic abuse scenarios.
Amendment 10 relates to the legal definition of “personally connected” when assessing the relationship between a perpetrator and victim. The suggested insertion of the line,
“they are ordinarily resident in the same household”,
recognises that “personally connected” should capture those living in domestic situations who may not otherwise be in a romantic relationship or biologically related. As the definition of domestic abuse is set out in Clause 1, abusive behaviours, such as
“physical or sexual abuse … violent or threatening behaviour … controlling or coercive behaviour … economic abuse … psychological, emotional or other abuse”,
are all able to and do occur in domestic situations where the perpetrator and victim live in the same household, but are not in a romantic relationship. As such, I argue that those who live together should be considered personally connected, in the context of the Bill.
Amendment 14 relates to how we define abuse as domestic in relation to a child and recognises that children can be victims of domestic abuse where their perpetrator is not the legal parent, the guardian or biologically related. The suggested insertion of the line,
“the person lives in the same household as the child or regularly visits the household”,
broadens the scope of the different environments in which a child can be personally related to their abuser.
Children can be and are victims of domestic abuse, even where there is no legal guardianship or relation to the perpetrator, as this amendment suggests, when the perpetrator lives in the same domestic situation or is a regular visitor to the home. An obvious example, and why this amendment is necessary, is the case of a new partner to the parent or the child who regularly comes into contact with the child and may spend prolonged or regular contact in the home, or even live in the home, without legal guardianship. Abuse in this situation is self-evidently domestic, despite the abuser not having legal guardianship of the child. Child abuse is 40 times more likely when single parents find new partners. According to a study of children living in homes with unrelated adults, children are nearly 50 times as likely to die of inflicted injuries, compared with children living with two biological parents.
In conclusion, both Amendments 10 and 14 are sensible and reasonable, and strengthen the Bill in its aims to promote awareness, and better protect and support victims of domestic abuse and their children. I hope that we find a way to take these amendments forward.
My Lords, I speak briefly on Amendments 6 and 7, which I support. Unfortunately, I was cut off from making further comments at Second Reading as I would have exceeded the time limit. I seek clarification on Clause 2(1), which I would have mentioned then. On the face of it, it appears to cover most, I hope all, the eventualities of which we can conceive. But I must express concern when the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—who knows more about these matters than anyone else in your Lordships’ House—seeks to amend the Bill, and I endorse the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. They seek to add to the definition of “personally connected” in the Clause, with the words “guardian of the other” and
“lives in the same household as the child”.
An amendment that goes in the same direction adds the definition that one person is a “provider of care” for the other.
In my Second Reading speech, I would have referred to my recollection, as a very young man, a long time ago, of occasionally appearing in undefended divorce cases. To claim a divorce for your client, one had to satisfy the judge of, first, the grounds for the divorce, which did not usually take up much judicial time, and, secondly, the arrangements for the “child of the family”. That was taken seriously. The child of the family did not need a blood relationship. I found no difficulty with this extended relationship from the make-up of my own family.
Of course divorce law has changed considerably since that time, but on the face of it, if you couple the definition in Clause 2 and the words “parental responsibility”, having the same meaning as in Section 3 of the Children Act 1989, which I have reconsidered, it should be sufficiently all-embracing. Obviously the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, is concerned, and the Minister should dwell deeply and give us clarification.
The mischief we are trying to cover adequately is the definition of parent and child and the words “parental responsibility”. My short point is, having regard to the amendments proposed by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is the Minister satisfied that Clause 2 is sufficiently all-embracing? I would be surprised if it is not, but I am not a family lawyer. I have been only a criminal lawyer for most of the past 40 years. I hope the Minister will give the Committee the assurances which the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and all of us would like to have.
My Lords, it is a privilege to move Amendment 15 and to speak to Amendments 20, 172 and 179 in my name today. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, for her cross-party support of these amendments and the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, for her support of Amendment 172.
I am looking forward to noble Lords’ speeches as we debate the importance of recognising the most vulnerable victims of domestic abuse, and I am delighted that the Institute of Health Visiting, NHS England Safeguarding, the First 1,000 Days movement and For Baby’s Sake have all supported these amendments to improve outcomes for the youngest who are at risk of domestic abuse. We must seize the best opportunity to break the cycle of domestic abuse.
By way of context, Amendment 15, to Clause 3, clarifies that the term “children” includes babies from conception onwards, recognising the vital period from conception to the age of two, as highlighted by the first-class work of the First 1,000 Days movement. Amendment 20, to Clause 7, ensures that the domestic abuse commissioner’s responsibility to encourage good practice regarding children affected by domestic abuse includes babies in utero, infants and children under the age of two.
Amendment 172, to be inserted after Clause 72, makes explicit that the Secretary of State is to make provision for publicly funded trauma-informed and attachment-focused support for parents during pregnancy and before their child reaches the age of two.
Finally, Amendment 170, to Clause 73, stipulates that the Secretary of State’s guidance on the effect of domestic abuse on children will cover babies who were in utero during the abuse and babies and young children aged under two.
Why are these specific amendments needed? The Government are to be hugely congratulated on introducing Clause 3, which ensures that children can also fall under the definition of being victims of domestic abuse. I think all noble Lords view this as a major step forward. However, there is currently insufficient clarity in the definition of a child. In her concluding remarks at Second Reading my noble friend the Minister said:
No age group has been out of the debate, including the unborn child and the foetus.”—[Official Report, 5/1/21; col. 124.]
The fact that it was said demonstrates that it needs to be said. This amendment seeks to probe this concern and is looking for an assurance that the Bill covers children from conception to the age of two.
In the Bill, a child is considered a victim if he or she
“sees, hears or experiences the effect”
of the abuse. Without the clarity of this amendment, it is not difficult to see where the legal battles will lie. The unborn child may be just as much a victim of domestic abuse and may experience and hear domestic abuse but not see it. We can say in this House that it is our intention to strengthen support for victims and improve the effectiveness of the justice system. This amendment gives the clarity needed to ensure that the intent of the Bill to protect all children is upheld.
There are other reasons why Amendments 15, 20, 172 and 179 are so important. If we are serious about strengthening support for victims, intervening as early as possible has the best chance of success. Around 30% of domestic abuse begins during pregnancy, while 40% to 60% of women experiencing domestic abuse are abused during pregnancy. These statistics are shocking. The reason it is important that both the mother and the unborn are viewed as victims is because this is one of the most important developmental stages in the life of a child.
The first 1,001 days, from conception to age two, is a period of uniquely rapid development, when babies are particularly susceptible to their environment. Domestic abuse in pregnancy is associated with poor obstetric outcomes, including low birth weight and preterm weight. A mother’s emotional state can have a direct influence on foetal development by altering the environment in the womb, and ongoing stresses such as domestic abuse can disrupt babies’ neurodevelopment, which can affect the cognitive functioning and emotional regulation of children’s shaping and behavioural and emotional outcomes for years to come.
Another reason why these amendments ensure that the first 1,001 days are a policy and funding focus is that this is the optimal and most effective moment for intervention and breaking the domestic abuse cycle, which is a key focus of this Bill. Pregnancy and childbirth are major milestones in the lives of many mothers and fathers and the time when there is most motivation to change. New fatherhood is a motivator for change in men who use violence in their relationships. Therefore, intervening in the perinatal period and including a focus on parenting may improve engagement in programmes to reduce violence. Identifying the specific emotional challenges and unhelpful coping strategies that are relevant to new mothers and fathers can help target interventions at the most relevant issues to lead to behavioural change. Here I must give credit to Amanda McIntyre and the work of For Baby’s Sake; the organisation is nothing short of inspirational.
Finally, these amendments are important because Amendment 172 includes a requirement that the Secretary of State makes
“provision for publicly-funded trauma-informed and attachment-focussed”
support for parents during pregnancy and before their child reaches the age of two. Presently, interventions generally focus on supporting the needs of victims and survivors alone. Few seek also to target the causes and environments of domestic abuse and its associated consequences, in conjunction with perpetrators and children. Even fewer interventions adopt a whole-family approach that seeks to address the mental health problems experienced by parents and protect and support the mental health of the baby and other children in the family. By recognising babies in this Bill, we have an opportunity for early intervention—to break the cycle of domestic abuse not only for this generation but for future generations, and bring about some of that much-needed cultural and societal change that my noble friend the Minister referred to in her opening remarks at Second Reading.
I am also mindful of a number of concerns that have been raised with me about this amendment. I understand that there may be resistance to it, as children are already included in the Bill. However, having been involved in policy-making across government for many years, I and many noble Lords know that, when resources are constrained, policymakers reach for what they have to do, not necessarily what is most effective. The first 1,001 days—conception to age two—is a moment in time when the impact is greatest. Let us make it easier for officials and future Ministers as they battle for resources and ensure that this golden opportunity to break the cycle is not lost.
Secondly, noble Lords have raised whether these amendments could give opportunity to those wanting to reignite the debate around abortion. I have listened carefully to these arguments, as this is not the intention of this amendment. Ideally, the Government would come forward with their own amendment on Report, appropriately worded if we have not got it quite right. I assure noble Lords that this concern does not need to be an obstacle to this amendment.
NHS safeguarding already has good practice in place for managing this concern. At the moment, an unborn baby who is at risk of significant harm—for example, due to a mother’s substance misuse—can be placed on a child protection plan as an unborn baby. The baby is recorded on the CPIS under the mother’s NHS number; once they have been born, this transfers to the baby.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who contributed to debating the amendment, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, who put her name to it. These issues have hugely benefited from noble Lords’ various perspectives. I also thank my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern for signing the amendment. It is a huge privilege to have his support. I thank noble Lords for expressing their commitment to ensuring that babies are recognised as potential victims of domestic abuse in utero and through to the age of two.
I have looked at various government children strategies. Over and over again, unless it was an early intervention strategy or one specifically linked to the early years, each one I looked at did not contain nought to two year-olds. While I completely understand my noble friend the Minister’s comments that babies from conception to the age of two are already included in the Bill, it is my concern that unless they are in the Bill they will be forgotten again in strategy terms when we get to policy-making. However, I am reassured that she is personally committed to ensuring that all children who could be victims of domestic abuse are protected by the Bill. On that basis, and with the hope of future conversation with her and the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.