Baroness Burt of Solihull
Main Page: Baroness Burt of Solihull (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Burt of Solihull's debates with the Home Office
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, before I had the pleasure of meeting my noble friend Lady Meyer, I had read about the unbelievably distressing time she went through following the alienation of her children by their father. Today she has told us that story in the most moving way. I apologise for the fact that, as she is sitting behind me, she is seeing only my back rather than my front as I make this speech.
I admire my noble friend for all she has done to raise awareness of parental alienation through the setting up of her charity and getting the academic and judicial profession to realise that parental alienation needs to be recognised. Along with her, I want parental alienation recognised, but it must be tackled in law in the right way. Hasty law makes for bad law and will not elevate parental alienation to where we all want it. This important Bill must not become a Christmas tree on which we hang too much, which leads to minimising what it wants to achieve.
I cannot agree with the amendment to this Bill. Clause 1 sets out to define domestic abuse by listing different types of abusive behaviours, and not how they may be manifested. This is important, because to do this could be risky and give more weight to how a particular type of behaviour is displayed, and potentially ignore others. As many noble Lords have mentioned, the introduction of parental alienation into the Bill could have unintended consequences due to the absence of a common definition. Consequently, in a family court, cases of parental alienation could mean whatever the judge wants it to mean.
A child may form their own reasons for resisting contact, and there are cases where a parent, for no justified reason, restricts the other parent’s relationship with the child. These are two very different situations under the parental alienation label, which serves to validate the misuse of parental alienation and to obscure the tactics of perpetrators of domestic abuse.
Parental alienation needs to be looked into in its own right. This is now being done after too many years of misunderstanding, lack of clarity and muddle among the experts. My noble friend Lady Helic mentioned how the Ministry of Justice set up an expert panel and reported in June 2020. The panel made a series of recommendations, which I do not have time to go into here, to reform the child arrangement programme in family law. Leading on from this, the Government published an implementation plan for some of the recommendations. One recommendation said:
“A review of the presumption of parental involvement … is needed urgently in order to address its detrimental effects.”
In November, the Government announced an advisory group to begin this work. I welcome these initiatives and feel strongly that this is the way forward, to make sure that parental alienation gets the recognition it deserves.
I want my noble friend to get all she feels is necessary to have parental alienation recognised in law, but my fear is that adding her amendment to this Bill will have a detrimental effect on the work that is going on, and will minimise the importance of this appalling problem. We must make sure that parental alienation is put into legislation where it can be properly dealt with, and this Bill is not that legislation.
My Lords, this is such a difficult issue. This afternoon we have heard strong and cogent arguments on both sides. I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, for telling her heartrending story.
Parental alienation exists, if by that we mean that the parent with care seeks to alienate the child from the parent without care. One issue is that there is such a wide range of definitions, as mentioned by my noble friend Lady Brinton. I saw it first-hand as an MP when I was involved with an organisation called the Association of Shared Parenting, formed by parents who were struggling to see their children after separation or divorce. It was based on the premise that most children benefit from contact with both parents, surely something with which no noble Lord in this House would disagree. The Association of Shared Parenting still exists, despite changes in family law, which I would have hoped would save it from needing to exist. Clearly, we need qualified professionals to assess what is going on. The bitterness of a break-up and the reluctance of the parent with care to continue the relationship through the child causes some parents to resist allowing contact by weaponising the child or poisoning their mind.
That is why I initially added my name to these amendments, but I have since removed it, because I do not believe that this is what we are talking about today. We are talking about cases in the criminal courts, not of divorce settlements necessarily but of domestic abuse. The problem with this amendment, which it took me some time to get my head around, is that the abused parent could actually be painted as the abuser. As Vera Baird, the Victims’ Commissioner for England and Wales, who has been quoted more than once already today, says:
“It puts victims of domestic abuse into the ridiculous position where, if they raise their abuse in the family courts, however well they have actually behaved, that can trigger unfounded allegations of parental alienation that could result in their children being placed with the abuser.”
She continues:
“This attempt to turn the fact that the perpetrator has terrified their partner into a destructive criticism of that partner is typical coercive controlling behaviour.”
My noble friend Lady Brinton and the noble Baronesses, Lady Helic and Lady Newlove, the former Victims’ Commissioner, are absolutely right. With sympathy to all parents suffering the anguish of break-up, the interests of the child must be paramount. I do not envy the task of the family courts in resolving these cases. We must rely on properly trained experts to decide. On balance, I believe that allowing Amendments 2 and 4 would do more harm than good to victims and dilute the definition of domestic abuse in this Bill.
My Lords, I am very glad to support the amendments in the names of my noble friend Lady Stroud, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong of Hill Top, and I have added our names.
It is important to note that the Bill deals with abuse of a particular kind—namely, domestic abuse. So far as I can see, it has no connection whatever with abortion, as somebody mentioned earlier. I am glad to support all that has been said. What the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, said about Amendment 172 is of particular importance, but I intend simply to generalise on all the amendments. All of them deal with children under two years of age and include babies in utero. I have two principal remarks that relate to them all.
First, damage to these children and babies is likely to have effects during the rest of their lives. For me, that is underlined by the magnitude of the awards of damages where negligence is shown to have been the cause of damage that occurred at this stage of their lives. Secondly, during this period of their lives, children develop very quickly and therefore, where abuse is inflicted over a period, the cumulative effect is likely to be magnified by that factor. The lockdown has, sadly, provided many of us with evidence of the rapidity of children’s development if we have experienced the birth of grandchildren or great-grandchildren during this time. Painfully, photographs show us how much of the thrill of contact in the early days we are missing. My final observation is that I believe that in some relationships pregnancy causes a deterioration, which leads to harmful effects on the child in utero.
For those reasons, where applicable, I strongly support these amendments. Knowing my noble friend as I do, I am sure that they will receive sympathetic consideration, particularly in view of her Second Reading speech. It is very important that this area of children’s development is taken into account as a very relevant factor in the context of domestic abuse.
My Lords, I acknowledge all the points that noble Lords have made on this group, and I totally agree with the sentiment that trauma to babies and small children is of the utmost importance in determining a child’s future. Indeed, I was saddened and sickened to discover that around 30% of domestic abuse begins during pregnancy, let alone the number of women for whom it continues throughout pregnancy. I am fully supportive of emphasising the need for help and support for mothers and the little victims whose chances are damaged before they are even born.
However, I want to express a twinge of concern about the wording of Amendment 15. It talks about
“including babies from conception onwards”
in the definition of a child. I have no wish to split hairs, but I am struggling with the idea that “shortly after conception” falls within any technical definition of “baby”. Would it be possible to get some clarity on that? I absolutely accept that it has nothing to do with abortion, but I want it to be technically correct.
The noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, talked very informatively and movingly about pregnancy being an absolutely key time for intervention, as the whole relationship can be turned around, and the importance of resource allocation at that time. I particularly want to support Amendment 172: the requirement for the Secretary of State to make available publicly funded, trauma-informed and attachment-focused therapeutic work.
The noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, is absolutely right when she says it is about resource allocation, but I wonder whether babies are already included in this part of the Bill because children are already covered from conception, as the Minister said.
Whether this is the right place for them or not, I am happy to support these amendments. Even if the Bill already covers it, it is definitely worth the conversation.
Amendment 15 would add an unborn child, from conception onwards, to the definition of a child under Clause 3 of the Bill, which addresses the issue of children as victims of domestic abuse. Clause 7 provides that the domestic abuse commissioner must encourage good practice in identifying victims of abuse, including affected children. Amendment 20 would specifically add
“babies in utero, infants and young children aged under two years”
to the definition of children affected by domestic abuse.
Amendment 172 provides that:
“The Secretary of State must make provision for publicly-funded trauma-informed and attachment-focussed therapeutic work to be made available to all parents of children aged under two years old where those children are victims of or otherwise affected by domestic abuse.”
Amendment 179 states that, where the Secretary of State issues guidance on the effect of domestic abuse on children, it must include,
“in particular babies who were in utero at the time of the abuse, and … babies and young children aged under two years old”.
We fully agree that there is a need to consider the impact of domestic abuse on young babies and the importance of protecting pregnant women and the child they are carrying, and, likewise, with the fact that trauma from domestic abuse at a young age can have long-term consequences.
Clause 3 now recognises children who witness or are impacted by abuse as victims of that abuse—that is children of any age, including babies. I noted with interest the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, based on her experience of how officials react when resources are limited and there is any doubt about what legislation requires them to do. Adequate resourcing will be crucial to delivering the objectives of this Bill.
I appreciate that this has already been said more than once, but I repeat that it has been estimated that 30% of domestic violence begins during pregnancy. It often escalates during this time as well, and represents a real danger to women. We know that domestic abuse during pregnancy increases the risk of miscarriage, infection, premature birth or injury to the child once born, and it is also a major factor leading to complications and death in, or related to, pregnancy.
The impact of domestic abuse during pregnancy does not end at the birth, and is associated with long-term harms to both women and children. Domestic abuse during pregnancy is associated with increased risk of perinatal and neonatal mortality, higher rates of depression among women, low birth weight and a range of long-term emotional, behavioural and traumatic impacts on children.
However, we do have concerns about the possible impact of the inclusion of babies in utero in the Bill. Despite the risk of harm and attack faced by pregnant women, the current long-standing offence of child destruction is rarely used and the need to prove the perpetrator’s intention to kill has made securing convictions difficult. Yet a national inquiry found that some 24%, I think, of 295 maternal deaths over a three-year period were women who had experienced domestic abuse. Of these 70 women, 19 had been murdered. This is an area that the Government should review. In the meantime, it would not be helpful to have references to babies in utero in the Bill without consultation or wider consideration of the impact this could have on legal principles of bodily autonomy.
This issue with the amendment as presently worded is one that the movers—the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, and my noble friend Lady Armstrong of Hill Top—have recognised, and I am sure it can be addressed.
Finally, I reiterate that we recognise the importance of the general issue that is raised by the amendment about early intervention to break the cycle of violence and ensure support for mothers and babies.
My Lords, I wish to speak in support of the spirit of these amendments and the arguments so clearly explained by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Newlove, and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath. They have explained why these amendments are needed, certainly in spirit, even if the wording of some of them is not quite right for the face of the Bill.
If the commissioner position was made full-time and the commissioner was able to appoint staff, they could better determine the scope of work and allocation of resources to respond according to need. It is an important fact that the commissioner needs to have some control.
To take one example—I have already declared that I chaired the Commission on Alcohol Harm—we know that, in general, lower socioeconomic groups experience higher levels of alcohol-related harm, particularly violence. The poorest groups are most affected by alcohol-related domestic abuse. You see this with the number of instances of alcohol-related domestic abuse every year, which are fourteenfold in that group compared with the least deprived. The prevalence rate of alcohol-related domestic violence is five times higher among the most disadvantaged groups compared to the least disadvantaged.
This is a huge job. The commissioner must be free to make decisions on how the budget is used, have their own independent office space and not feel in any way stifled by any influence from government in the work that has to be undertaken.
My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee has outlined, the aim of this group of amendments is to ensure that the commissioner is independent and able to perform her role unhampered by time and resource constraints.
The term “independent” would be in the title, reinforcing, as with the role of the anti-slavery commissioner, that this person can be free to represent victims as they see fit, reporting to the whole of Parliament, not just the Secretary of State, and paid full-time. This has been questioned by several noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Rooker and Lord Hunt, and the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove. The thinking behind this, frankly, is that it is demeaning to the post to imagine that its holder could ever be regarded as a part-timer, given the scale of the challenge she faces. However, we did not intend that there should be no flexibility in the role at all.
The commissioner should of course appoint their own staff, carrying out the challenges of the role as they see fit within the constraints set out in this Bill; the ex-Victims’ Commissioner, the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, emphasised this, showing how important that element is. It is a hugely important role: let us give her the tools to do the job.
Amendment 16 would ensure that the domestic abuse commissioner is appointed full-time. Amendment 17 would include the word “independent” in the title of the domestic abuse commissioner. Clause 6 lays down that the Secretary of State must provide the commissioner with staff and other resources; Amendments 18 and 19 seek to change this, so that the commissioner would appoint staff rather than the Secretary of State.
The Government clearly saw the role of the domestic abuse commissioner as part-time, but already that role has been extended from three to four days a week because, as the Government put it in Committee in the Commons, the designate commissioner
“told us she was doing four days of work a week.”—[Official Report, Commons, Domestic Abuse Bill Committee, 9/6/20; col. 133.]
How was the earlier conclusion reached that three days would be sufficient? Was it because the designate commissioner said that it would be sufficient or because the Government said that it would be sufficient? Are the four days that now apply meant to cover only the role of the designate commissioner or are they meant to apply as well, following this Bill becoming an Act and the commissioner no longer being designate, to the role when it has the full statutory responsibilities set out in the Bill? If four days is meant to apply to the role of domestic abuse commissioner once this Bill becomes an Act, will the four days be increased to five if the commissioner says that she is doing five days of work a week? On the basis of what assessment, and by whom, of workload and responsibilities did the Government reach the conclusion that this should be a part-time rather than a full-time position? I hope the Minister can give some responses to those points.
The Bill gives the Secretary of State the power to appoint staff for the commissioner and provide the resources the commissioner needs to carry out the role. That gives the Secretary of State very real power over a commissioner who surely needs to be independent of the Secretary of State, bearing in mind that the commissioner must not feel inhibited from drawing attention, if necessary, to authorities and organisations that may be falling short in addressing domestic abuse issues, including government.
However, the Secretary of State, through the power to appoint staff and determine the resources needed by the commissioner, has a considerable oversight power over the commissioner and their effectiveness in delivering on their statutory role through the breadth and depth of work they can undertake with the resources provided. Indeed, Clause 6(1) states that the Secretary of State must provide the commissioner with the staff, accommodation, equipment and other facilities
“as the Secretary of State considers necessary for the carrying out of the Commissioner’s functions”—
not what the commissioner considers necessary, or even the view of an independent body or person, if there is a difference in view between the Secretary of State and the commissioner on this issue.
The former Independent Anti-slavery Commissioner, Kevin Hyland, told the Joint Committee that looked at the Bill that he was concerned that the Secretary of State would have too much control of the domestic abuse commissioner’s budget and the appointment of staff. He said that immediately as he took up his post, the Home Office proposed a reduction in the funds Parliament had been told he would be given. Mr Hyland described the process of appointment of staff as “unbelievable”, saying that it could take many months—up to seven, I think he said—for staff to take up their posts. I simply ask what guarantees the Government can give that the issues faced by Mr Hyland will not be repeated for the domestic abuse commissioner. I also look forward to the Government’s response to the other points that I and other noble Lords have raised during the course of this debate.