(12 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, you will be relieved to know that my contribution on the Motion will be very brief. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, for having secured the time for this debate. I will not go over the ground that he so ably and wisely covered. Suffice it to say that every effort must be made to maintain the global reputation of the British police for being the world’s leader in impartial policing, without fear or favour—no matter the colour of a person's skin, their origin, political beliefs or station in life.
So far as the consultation on the protocol for policing is concerned, I repeat the comments that I made when the matter was debated in your Lordships’ House many weeks ago. We had been assured and reassured, right from the time when the police reform Bill was introduced, that the fear that the election of police and crime commissioners could be hijacked by political extremists was without foundation. Yet we now find that the Government have had second thoughts, and we now have a protocol setting out the boundaries within which the chief constable and the police and crime commissioner will work. I congratulate the Government on their political courage and good sense in accepting that, perhaps after all, such a protocol is necessary to ensure that a maverick PCC or, indeed, chief officer does not upset the essential balance required for the continued good governance of policing, and that the chief constable's traditional pursuance of non-political, impartial policing is preserved.
I support the regret Motion moved by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, but if I may, I will finish with one plea. My final comment is to ask that the Home Office finalise the financial management code—as he who pays the piper calls the tune. I trust that this code, after proper consultation, will help to curb any misunderstandings over financial responsibilities and control for all the stakeholders in this new governance structure.
My Lords, I was a little surprised when I saw the terms of the Motion because having lived through the Bill, as other noble Lords did, it seemed that the issue of a protocol was consulted almost into the ground. However, I realise that there may be a distinction between consultation on the content of the protocol and consultation on the statutory instrument. I should fess up; I am a member of the Merits of Statutory Instruments Committee, but I was not there on this occasion. That committee is always particularly sensitive to the need for consultation alongside there being adequate time for Parliament to consider an order before it comes into effect, so I can understand how this arose.
I wondered whether it may have been that the complaint was not about the time spent on consultation but about the fact that the consultees had not come from a sufficiently wide group of people. I am not sure that it could have been different at the time that the work was going on last year, but the landscape will change. There will be more players in place, and I for one am reassured by paragraphs 43 and 44 of the protocol. Paragraph 43 refers to,
“periodic review, in particular during the first term of office of the first PCCs”.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has suggested that that should be a quite early review. That would be useful, because we will then see in office not only the commissioners but the police and crime panels. Police authorities have taken part in the consultation but the police and crime commissioner—I emphasise “crime”—has a wider remit than simply the policing function. I would like to see local authorities, possibly through the panels but in their own right, involved in any further consultation that might take place.
As has been said, this started as a concern about what was meant by “operational”. As I understood it from the fringes, there was endless drafting and discussion involving those who were most concerned about it. I heard one of those individuals say that by the end of it he wondered whether there was any need for a protocol at all. However, we have a statutory protocol and, as the noble Baroness has said, that was because there was such a call for it in the House. We are in an interesting position; we have something of a narrative in the order, which is almost a plain English guide to the statute. Regard has to be had to the protocol, but perhaps the Minister can give the House some assurance this evening as to the status of the protocol as against the statute. I assume that the statute must override it if there is any conflict, but I am not suggesting that I have seen any conflict.
As I read this, the protocol deals not just with “what” but with “how”. That comes not only from the protocol itself but from Section 79(6) of the Act, which says in the definition of policing protocol that it is a document that makes provision for,
“ways in which relevant persons should … exercise, or refrain from exercising, functions”.
So that has a purpose of its own as well.
(12 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Lord is taking the issue way beyond the Question on the Order Paper, which relates to the Council of Europe’s convention. Obviously we will consider those points, but those are matters for domestic law and not matters relating to compliance with this convention, which relates to combating violence against women.
My Lords, I welcome the consultation being across Whitehall, because many agencies are involved in the many issues. How are we to reconcile the localist approach of police and crime commissioners and candidates with an eye to election with the need to ensure that police budgets contain an adequate line for what is essentially not a very populist issue? In other words, how do we make it a populist issue?
My Lords, again my noble friend is going way beyond the Question on the Order Paper in bringing in the subject of police commissioners. We are talking about whether we can comply with this Council of Europe convention—compliance that involves changing the law in a number of areas. That is what we are consulting on at the moment, but we are also looking at other issues, particularly extra-territorial jurisdiction.
(12 years, 7 months ago)
Grand CommitteeSince I will find it so difficult to explain my concerns, I suggest that after those interesting exchanges noble Lords might like to give their minds a bit of a rest for a moment.
I apologise to the Minister for raising this matter at this stage, but I started to question the wording of the provision only a very few minutes before time ran out for tabling amendments at this stage. As I said to him, it is better to be shown to be an idiot than to fail to ask a question that needs to be asked.
This amendment would alter the definition of a relevant public authority for the purposes of the meaning of a publicly owned company. It appears to exclude an authority listed only in a limited fashion entirely from the definition of the component part of a publicly owned company. One rapidly gets into the dangers of double negatives, but I would have thought that the exclusion should extend only to the information, which is not referred to in the schedule to the Freedom of Information Act. In other words, if an authority is listed in a limited fashion, it should nevertheless be included to the extent of that limit.
My Lords, I am sure that my noble friend is right when she says that it is better always to ask the question rather than, as she put it, to take the risk. As I understand it, the amendment proposes to extend the scope of Section 6 of the Freedom of Information Act beyond the extension already proposed in the Bill. However, the amendment seeks to do so in a way that I think is at odds with the approach taken in the Act.
At present, Section 6 of the FOI Act brings within the scope of the Act only companies that are wholly owned by the Crown or any single public authority listed, with limited exceptions, in Schedule 1 to the Act. Companies that are wholly owned by more than one public authority, or by the Crown and one or more of those Schedule 1 public authorities, are not currently subject to the Freedom of Information Act. Clause 101 therefore amends Section 6 of the FOI Act to widen the definition of a “publicly-owned company”, with the effect of extending the Act to companies wholly owned by the wider public sector. This simply means that any combination of public authorities subject to the Act, with limited exceptions, or by one or more of those bodies and the Crown, will be brought within its scope.
I mentioned that there are limited exceptions to this change. In one such instance, where a company is owned in part or wholly by a body that is itself subject to the Freedom of Information Act in respect of only some—and not all—of the information that it holds, the company will not be covered. It is this exception that my noble friend proposes to remove, so that such companies are subject to the Act.
I appreciate the intentions behind my noble friend’s proposal. Although relatively few public authorities are subject to the FOI Act only in respect of some information, and the number of companies excluded through the current proposal is likely to be small, the case for adding such bodies may well often be strong. However, I do not consider blanket coverage for these companies in the way proposed to be the most appropriate solution. As their parent body does not exercise wholly public functions—hence their partial coverage by the Act—it follows that some of these companies will also perform functions that should not automatically be subject to the Act.
That is not to say that it will never be appropriate for such bodies to be subject to the Act. Indeed, that may well be the case where any company of this sort exercises, for example, functions of a public nature. However, in such cases other means exist, and are already being used by the Government, to extend the scope of the Freedom of Information Act. These include secondary legislation under Section 5 of the Act to include bodies performing functions of a public nature. It would be more desirable to consider adding companies of the type relevant to the amendment on an individual basis where strong reasons for including them exist. We think that, as it were, a piecemeal approach, rather than the blanket approach proposed by my noble friend, is the better way for doing that.
I hope that that explanation is of some use, but if it is not I hope that my noble friend can at least read what I have said and consider whether that is satisfactory from her point of view.
I thank the Minister for that response. I follow everything he says, except, perhaps, his conclusion because I was not seeking blanket coverage. My draft would deal with the coverage of particular information only. I will read what he said, and I wonder whether I may be able to discuss this with him or his officials in order to understand whether the Government have in mind examples of the piecemeal extension to which he referred. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The two amendments in this group tackle a problem with policing the Freedom of Information Act that the Information Commissioner has identified as a priority. Under Section 77 of the Act, a person or authority commits an offence by deliberately destroying, amending or concealing a requested record with the intention of preventing the disclosure of its contents. Currently, the offence is triable only in the magistrates' court where the maximum penalty is level 5 on the standard scale, which is currently £5,000. The Information Commissioner, who is responsible for policing the Act, has argued that such offences should be triable either in the magistrates’ court or the Crown Court. The latter option would permit a fine greater than £5,000 to be imposed in more serious cases. The Information Commissioner has identified this as a real problem in ensuring compliance with the Act. Amendment 151K would provide that option.
Allowing offences to be tried on indictment would have a further benefit. At present, proceedings for offences which are triable only in magistrates’ courts have to be brought within six months of the offence occurring, but it can take several months between a request being made, a complaint about it being made and it reaching the Information Commissioner’s Office. The Information Commissioner’s Office’s investigation is likely to take several months and, by the time any offence is discovered and the evidence accumulated, it is likely to be too late to prosecute. However, cases triable on indictment are not subject to the six-month limitation. In providing this option, the amendment would have the advantage of allowing prosecutions to be brought more than six months after the offence had occurred and would make policing the Act considerably more effective.
Amendment 151J provides an alternative approach to dealing with the six-month time limit. Under the amendment the offence would remain triable only in the magistrates’ court but proceedings could be brought within three years of the offence provided that this was no later than six months after the prosecuting authority had obtained the necessary evidence. There is precedent for the wording of the amendment: it is identical to that already found in several statutes which have also been amended or designed to avoid the six- month limit on prosecutions. These include: Section 31 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006; Section 11A of the Employment Agencies Act 1973; Section 64A of the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984; and Section 12(4A) of the Theft Act 1968.
I hope the Government will look favourably on these amendments, which would give the Information Commissioner an additional weapon that he feels he needs. All of us want to see the Act enforced effectively. I beg to move.
My Lords, I support the thrust of the two amendments, or either of them. As the noble Lord, Lord Wills, has said, it is important to give the official who is tasked with applying the legislation the tools to do the job properly. After all, he and his office are in the best position to analyse where the obstacles are. This is a clear problem and he has been clear about the need for a solution. I hope we use this opportunity—I do not like the jargon—to add to the toolbox.
I support the amendments. I certainly do not intend to explain the purpose of them because my noble friend has already done that. The key point is that it is the view of the Information Commissioner, based on his or her experience, that there should be the opportunity, if necessary, to have cases heard at the Crown Court. Obviously, this relates to the severity of the fine that can be imposed because there is a restriction if a case is dealt with in the magistrates’ court. The issue of the timescale within which proceedings have to be initiated has also been raised.
I hope the Government will be able to give a sympathetic response, not least because the amendments are based on views that were expressed, I think in evidence to the Justice Select Committee on 13 September last year, by the Information Commissioner and the changes that that individual felt were necessary in the light of experience.
My Lords, I have little or nothing to add to what my noble friend has said. He is right to raise this complex and extensive issue. It is one that has clearly caused many problems for citizens and it would seem that my noble friend’s proposals might be a means of assisting people in their quest for information. This could lead to the roads on which they live being better maintained and safer. It may also assist in resolving difficult and lengthy disputes. I recognise this is an extraordinarily difficult area and I look forward to the Minister’s reply. I wish her well.
The advice “Don’t go to law” might be extended to “Be very careful about buying a house on an unadopted road”. The former private enterprise, which the noble Lord, Lord Soley, described, of clamping one’s neighbours’ vehicles is quite extreme.
Perhaps I may ask a few questions. I do not suggest that the problems the noble Lord has described are not important but, on the amendment, first, is he suggesting that this extends to any public authority beyond the Land Registry? I suppose that local authorities holding a local land charges register might be relevant, but this is all public authorities. Secondly, did the letter from the Land Registry refer to land having gone to the Crown in the situation of intestacy, and thirdly, is there a concern about more than the adoption of roads? The amendment is more extensive than that, as I understand the thrust of it.
Perhaps I should answer those points briefly. The reason for including other public departments is because there can overlap. For example, some of these roads are part-owned by a local authority, so you cannot rule out an interest by another public authority. The noble Baroness’s second point about the Crown is very important. I had thought of adding to it but I had already said enough, in a sense. It is said—although I have never known this to be tested—that if you can prove there is not an owner you can approach the Crown to buy the road. It is interesting because that is in direct conflict with what the Land Registry is saying, which is that all roads are owned. My understanding, from talking to one of the lawyers involved in a case, I think, was that if you proved it is not owned—presumably you would have to do that by checking back through wills and so on—you can then approach the Official Solicitor to buy the land. The duty is not on you to prove that it is unowned—I am not sure you can do that in this context. I think that is an important point.
I am not quite clear what the noble Baroness meant by the adoption issue. There is a whole range of names for these roads: private roads, unowned roads, adopted roads. Is that what she means—
Further to the issue about roads and the general situation described, the amendment could apply to all sorts of situations, I suggest.
The noble Baroness may be right although I asked for it to be drawn up with a specific focus on this. If it does I am not sure that it is the end of the world but the intention is basically on unadopted roads.
I am grateful to the Minister for introducing the amendments and for the letter that he wrote to noble Lords earlier this week. We welcome the government amendments as far as they go. Like the Minister, I commend the noble Lord, Lord McColl, for his tireless and extraordinary efforts on this important issue and the fact that he introduced his Private Member’s Bill, which I believe paved the way for the amendments before us today. As the noble Lord said, his Bill goes further than the EU directive and I, too, look forward to seeing it in Committee in the near future.
These amendments represent a clear admission by the Government that they were wrong in their initial decision to opt out of the EU directive on human trafficking. The claims made at the time by the Prime Minister about the EU directive were ill informed at best when he said,
“does not go any further than the law that we have already passed”.—[ Official Report, Commons, 15/9/10; col. 873.]
As the Minister explained, the government amendments serve to implement Article 9 of the directive, which requires member states to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction where the offender is one of their own nationals and grants member states discretion over the establishment of jurisdiction over non-nationals, where any part of the offence was committed in a member state’s territory or the victim is a national. We welcome the Government’s amendments to introduce extraterritorial jurisdiction over UK nationals who traffic or facilitate the trafficking of people. We also welcome the introduction of jurisdiction over non-UK nationals who commit or facilitate trafficking from within the UK. However, I ask the Minister to confirm three things about the jurisdiction extensions. First, will the extension of the UK’s jurisdiction also apply to those cases where the offence is committed for the benefit of a legal person established in the UK even if no trafficking activities took place in the UK? Secondly, will it extend to offences where the victim is a national or resident of the UK? Thirdly, will the amendments also extend the same extraterritorial jurisdictions over legal persons of the UK operating overseas or benefiting from trafficking perpetrated overseas as required by Article 5 of the directive?
The Government’s amendments to extend the UK’s jurisdiction to cases of trafficking connected with but not perpetrated in the UK is a welcome move and brings us closer to compliance with the EU directive. However, we are deeply concerned that the Government have sought to act in a way that presents us with an absolute bare minimum compliance and that without further primary legislation the UK could fall short of compliance. In particular, the government amendments do nothing to address the disappearance from the system of child victims of trafficking in this country. With 32 per cent of identified child victims of trafficking having gone missing from care between 2007 and February 2010, it would seem clear that the present system of care for child victims is not working. Charities such as CARE and Ecpat UK, which campaign to end child prostitution and pornography and trafficking of children for sexual purposes cite lack of continuity in care and children being passed from one professional to the next as a key reason for the disappearance of these children and have called for the introduction of a system of guardians to address the highly specific needs and risks that child victims of trafficking are exposed to. Articles 12 and 13 of the directive make it clear that signatories must provide, “assistance, support and protection” for child victims of trafficking and ensure that the,
“necessary assistance and support measures are provided for child victims of trafficking, taking account of their individual needs and concerns”.
I ask the Minister how the Government consider the UK currently complies with Articles 12 and 13 and, in particular, how present arrangements for the care of child victims of trafficking are uniquely tailored to the particular needs and vulnerabilities of these children, as required by Article 13. I also ask the Minister how many child victims of trafficking are known to have gone missing from care in the last year, and whether he thinks that the present and proposed arrangements go far enough to protect against disappearance.
There are other areas, too, where action is required in order to bring the UK into compliance with the directives that are not touched upon by these amendments. Article 16 of the directive requires that the UK establish a national rapporteur to independently monitor implementation of the directive. The Government have stated that they believe that the current Joint Ministerial Committee should be sufficient for this purpose. However, I would ask the Minister how the committee can operate independently of government and how regularly it publicly reports.
Finally, as the noble Lord, Lord McColl pointed out, the directive requires that adequate provision is made for access to legal counselling and representation for victims of trafficking under Article 10. I am specifically concerned about how cuts to the legal aid budget currently being considered in the LASPO Bill will affect such provision to some of the most vulnerable individuals. I should be grateful if the Minister could tell me what measures the Government are taking to ensure that the UK is compliant with this article.
In a debate in this House the Minister stated his view that:
“The remainder of the directive can be implemented in full through secondary legislation and through various operational measures and operational routes”.—[Official Report, 25/11/11; col. 1281.].
I am somewhat sceptical about whether secondary legislation can deliver many of the changes necessary to bring this country into compliance with the directive and, crucially, whether it can provide better protection for the hundreds of vulnerable trafficked children who have gone missing from the system. I note the request from the noble Lord, Lord McColl, for further information about the secondary legislation envisaged and I look forward to receiving that information from the Minister.
I welcome the amendments brought forward today and I look forward to hearing from the Minister what additional measures the Government will be introducing to fully implement this important directive.
The opt-in to the directive is of far more than technical importance: the message that the opt-in sent was of great significance. I do not want to repeat much of what has already been said but, on the issue of a national rapporteur, I echo the noble Baroness and what the noble Lord, Lord McColl, has said previously about the importance of its independence. The Government have recently published a trafficking strategy and—because it is human nature—to expect them not to defend their own strategy and to see the issues in a more objective way is to demand more than is reasonable.
I also echo the request for an analysis of the matters that can be dealt with by secondary legislation—it is quite clear that the previous speakers have a much better grasp of the detail than I do—so that we can be assured that every point has been picked up, rather than an assumption that secondary legislation will do the job.
My Lords, I hope that I can respond relatively briefly but I will have to write a number of letters to noble Lords.
On the issue of what further work we have to do through secondary legislation and other means, I shall write in detail to my noble friend, both noble Baronesses who have spoken and place a copy in the Library setting out exactly what we intend to do. The advice I have is that, although we were very nearly compliant, there were certain things that we had to do through primary legislation—and we have found this vehicle through which to do them—and other things that we can do through secondary legislation. Obviously it would be right for me to spell that out in detail.
My noble friend also had some queries about the drafting of the new clauses. In particular, he was concerned that the new clauses referred to offences committed by “a person”. I can assure him that “a person”—as I am sure the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, would have confirmed if he was still in his place—includes legal persons. That will include companies and other bodies, other than an individual as he and I understand that. That is the nature of the law.
My speech moving Amendment 177 will be a little longer than the previous speech. This amendment takes us back to powers of entry to probe one particular point. I must make it clear that I support the restrictions on powers of entry. I know that the matter is likely to be pursued further on Report, and there are bound to be particular issues around particular powers. This power is one where I fear we may be in danger of throwing out a long-standing baby with the bath water.
My amendment would mean that the commencement of Schedule 2 would not be automatic but dependent on an order by the Secretary of State. It is merely a device to raise an issue which came to my attention only a few days ago, well after we had dealt with Schedule 2. Paragraph 12 of that schedule repeals Section 8(2) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, which gives a landlord power to enter premises to view their state and condition. I had minor experience of this in the first flat I lived in in London. The landlord with, I am sure, entirely benign intentions used to come in and potter around. I could tell from the grains of coffee left around that he had been there, and on one occasion, he repainted the kitchen, but did not move the towel hanging on the back of the kitchen door and painted around it. That is minor against the issue of a property being fit for human habitation, which is the subject of Section 8 of the 1985 Act.
The landlord has an obligation to keep the property fit for human habitation. Most modern tenancies have a power of entry written into them—a contractual power, if you like—so there is no need for a statutory power, but the British Property Federation, which has raised this point with me, estimates that of the 120,000 or so regulated tenancies, many of which are very old and rely on statutory terms and conditions, something between 18,000 and 24,000 rely on statutory powers of entry. In other words, there is a legal and, I would say, moral obligation on a landlord, but he will have no means to inspect the property and fulfil the obligation. Unlike modern assured shorthold tenancies, these tenancies often encompass some of the oldest parts of the housing stock, from before 1919. They tend not to have turned over frequently and there is a pretty high probability that if they are not kept up to a good standard, they may become unfit.
I know that this matter has been discussed between the Home Office, looking at it from the point of view of the powers of entry, and the Department for Communities and Local Government. I also know that an issue has been raised that because these tenancies are subject to very low rent limits, they would not in fact come within the scope. I want to anticipate that argument by saying—again, I understand this from the British Property Federation—that the rent limits are those that were in the original contract and cannot really be cited now because that is the historical event which brought them within the scope.
The British Property Federation is very clear that the provisions in the 1985 Act are not redundant. It seems that there is a real issue here, where we should not let our enthusiasm for the principle over powers of entry obscure the need to address it. I would be the first to say that this amendment does not address it. I am merely trying to bring the issue into play at this stage—a late stage, I know—and I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say on this. I suspect that it may be another matter where I am going to add to his diary commitments by suggesting that detailed discussion might benefit us all, but for the moment I beg to move.
My Lords, as my noble friend has explained, the amendment relates to concerns that have recently come to light over the proposed repeal of Section 8(2) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, as provided for in Schedule 2 to the Bill. This provision in the Landlord and Tenant Act grants landlords a power of entry to ensure that their properties are fit for habitation. The Act sets very low rent thresholds for London and elsewhere, which were agreed some considerable time ago. Because those rent levels were so low, it was originally our belief that there were no longer any existing tenancies to which the Section 8(2) power still applied. That being the case, we thought that the power could sensibly be repealed. It has since come to our attention from the same source that my noble friend mentioned, the British Property Federation, that there is a significant number of legacy properties to which this provision continues to apply. The BPF has indicated that there are in fact some 18,000 to 24,000 tenancies where this power of entry would continue to operate.
Landlords have a duty to ensure that the properties they rent are fit for habitation. In the overwhelming majority of cases, we would expect tenants freely to admit the landlord into their property to inspect it. In such cases, landlords have no need to use their statutory power of entry but in isolated cases the tenant may not be co-operative and there is therefore a continued need for this power. While we still intend to repeal this power of entry we propose to introduce a saving provision, using the order-making power in Clause 110, to ensure that the power remains available in respect of existing tenancies. In the case of any new tenancies, a power of entry can be provided for in the tenancy agreement as would normally be the case, as my noble friend will be fully aware as a solicitor. I thank her therefore for raising the matter. I hope that we do not need to have a meeting on this occasion, that she is satisfied by the explanation that I have given and that she will be happy to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, that is extremely helpful. I wonder if I might chance my arm by asking whether there might be any chance of seeing a draft of the order before we get to the next stage, in case technical concerns continue. I am not sure whether the Minister would want to reply to that. However, in response to his point about tenants allowing a landlord in, there must be many properties where there is more than one unit of accommodation within a house and where one could have one tenant who is entirely reasonable and another who is not and who prejudices the position of other people, potentially quite seriously. I am very grateful for that answer and I hope that it is not necessary to have a meeting. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(12 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe very simple reason is that some—particularly in the private sector, which is why I referred to private sector colleges—were involved in an abuse. If there is an abuse of the system, we have a duty to tackle it, and that is what we have done.
My Lords, the Minister may be aware of a recent report from the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry entitled Migration Reform: Caps Don’t Fit. It concludes:
“Our research shows that one of the main reasons companies recruit from beyond the EU is their desire to explore and invest in new, overseas markets”.
It also says that, if the UK’s economic recovery is to be export led, this is a particularly important consideration. Does the Minister acknowledge that?
My Lords, I think that I have followed what my noble friend has said. Obviously, we recognise the importance of universities—as I said in response to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, they are a major part of our exports. However, I also see what my noble friend is getting at. I have not seen the research that she refers to, which talks about the need to bring in workers from outside the EU. However, the point that I was making in my first supplementary answer was that we have a cap on the number of skilled workers, and we have not got anywhere near that cap in the first six months of this year.
(12 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Baroness is absolutely correct. I was not trying to imply any criticism of the group; I was saying that it has put forward a solution that we have found a number of problems with. We will continue to look at any ideas that it puts forward. If we could use intercept as evidence in a manner that was safe and appropriate, we would, but again I stress that we have to get the right balance between advantage, costs and risks.
My Lords, when I heard the Minister’s original Answer I wondered whether it was a case of changing the membership if you do not like what is being said, and in this case I would welcome that. However, does the Minister accept that the longer this goes on, the less trust and confidence there is among those of us who take an interest in this about whether there is a real determination to reach a good and useful outcome?
My Lords, the only reason why the membership changed was because the noble and learned Lord, Lord Archer of Sandwell, stood down due to reasons of health. He has been replaced by Shaun Woodward, and there is nothing else behind that.
(12 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, to assist the House I suggest we hear from the Liberal Democrat Benches first, maybe then the Convenor of the Cross Benches, followed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and then the Bishops.
My Lords, we complain when primary legislation is not commenced or implemented. The first instinct of the noble Lord, Lord Alli, was absolutely right, though he then extended his arguments. We also complain when legislation is not clear. This is not the case today. The Merits Committee, of which I am a member, did not make a judgment on the merits of the substance of this order. It used its entirely standard language, drawing it to the special attention of the House on the grounds that,
“it gives rise to issues of public policy likely to be of interest to the House”.
That statement is quite uncontentious.
I can see from those already attempting to intervene that we will hear today closely argued analysis of a construction of the words “Act”, “authority” and “services”, and I am always glad to recruit such expertise to the cause. Essentially, however, the issue is, “Does the order do what Section 202 of the Equality Act provides?”. I believe that it does. Or, “Does it require any individual or organisation to do what they do not wish to do?”. I believe that it does not. The order cannot trump primary legislation, nor can it require what the Act itself precludes. As we have been reminded, primary legislation says that nothing places an obligation on religious organisations to host civil partnerships if they do not wish to do so. If there are differing views within an organisation, that is not a matter for government.
The noble Baroness uses in her prayer the word “pledge”. It is not a pledge—or rather, it is more than a pledge—because the words are in Section 202. That section is surely permissive: it is an opt-in, not an opt-out. We know there are objections to it, but that was a matter for 2010. I say that to those who would like to extend that section, as well as to those who would like to see it interpreted restrictively. To attempt now to reverse it, extend it or block it, is inappropriate.
I will be quick because there are so many noble Lords who wish to speak. I find it very difficult to see anxiety engendered among people with a particular view. I do not like to see people fed fear. I realise that something that may seem entirely reasonable to me may seem very prejudicial to you, whoever you and I are—that is, whichever side of the argument one is on. I will end by voicing what others might see as my own prejudices. That 46,000 couples have entered into civil partnerships is wonderful; 92,000 people have been able to give formal, legal expression to their relationship. It is a paradox that some who advocate celebrating marriage within a faith oppose extending it to other stable relationships. I welcome the order and look forward to taking forward Section 202.
My Lords, I speak as a lawyer today. I concede my obligation to the House to set out my genuine view, because this is a legal issue and because I was formerly the Lord Chancellor. The noble Baroness, Lady O’Cathain, and the noble Lord, Lord Alli, agree the basis upon which Parliament—not only this House—passed the amendment to the Civil Partnership Act which abolished the prohibition on civil partnerships being registered in places of religious worship. My noble friend Lord Alli said at the time that there was no disagreement about this.
From the outset I want to make very clear that the amendment does not place any obligation on any religious organisations to host civil partnerships in their buildings. We made that clear by including in the amendment the words:
“For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this Act places an obligation on religious organisations to host Civil Partnerships if they do not wish to do so”.
There is no doubt that that was the basis on which the provision was passed. If we have not given effect to that provision, we should not agree to these regulations. The only issue today is therefore whether as a matter of law we have given effect to it. It is for the House to make a decision about this. It is always possible to find a lawyer who says that something is arguable. It is for us to go through the provisions today and form a view about whether or not, contrary to our intention and to that of the House of Commons, we have somehow failed to achieve it.
I will very quickly go through the basic provisions so that we arrive at a clear answer. Section 2 of the Civil Partnership Act makes the moment at which a civil partnership occurs the moment at which the two partners sign the civil partnership document. Section 6 of the Act—this is, before the amendment—says that that signing can take place either at a registry office or at approved premises. It sets out provisions for premises to be approved by somebody called the registration authority. The registration authority is the local authority. The Civil Partnership Act gives the local authority discretion over whether or not they register premises. Section 6 of the Act as originally passed says that civil partnerships cannot be registered at religious premises. Section 2(5) says—and this provision remains—that there should be no religious element in relation to any registration of a civil partnership.
The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Alli, which was supported by Parliament, did two things. First, it removed the prohibition on religious premises being used for civil partnerships. It retained the approval process, so that local authorities still approve whether premises—including religious premises—can be used for civil partnerships. Secondly, it added to the Civil Partnership Act words to the effect that for the avoidance of doubt, this does not compel any religious organisation to host a civil partnership ceremony if they do not want to.
That is the legal framework that we now have to look at. On the basis of that legal framework, my initial conclusion is that Parliament has made its intention absolutely clear: Parliament does not want to compel anybody to host registration of civil partnerships unless they want to.
I wondered what could conceivably be the argument that we have failed to express our intention clearly. I have read the two opinions that have been provided on this. I will do my best to summarise them fairly and set out why they are plainly wrong, although not lacking in bona fides. The first argument, which was advanced by Professor Mark Hill QC in his opinion dated 8 November, is that because the regulations say that—for the avoidance of doubt—the law does not compel anybody to host a civil partnership if they do not want to, the regulations saying it would not, alone, be enough. I completely agree with that. A regulation saying that hosting is not required would have no effect at all if the position was that the primary Act of Parliament did not get rid of the risk of any discriminatory legislation. However, the primary Act of Parliament does contain the prohibition, so it seems clear that Professor Hill is wrong about that.
I looked through Professor Hill’s opinion to find out what he said about the main provision in the Act, which appeared to be the critical provision. He said that Section 202, in referring to an Act, refers to the Civil Partnership Act and not to the Equality Act. I found that wholly unconvincing because the risk which the noble Baroness, Lady O’Cathain, and the QCs identify is that there are provisions in the Equality Act, except for the purpose of this argument, that might be said to create a risk of some sort of action arising from the fact that you perform civil partnerships but not marriages, or the other way round. It seems to me beyond argument that the intention of Parliament must have been to get rid of that risk by putting in the very same Act the phrase,
“For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this Act”,
gives rise to the risk of any compulsion. For Professor Hill’s opinion to be correct, you have to assume that this House and the Commons were unaware of the risk that the Equality Act could give rise to litigation when they put into the very same Act a statement that said that allowing churches to host civil partnerships does not lead to any church being compelled to host one. I cannot think of a judge who would give effect to such a nonsensical argument.
8 November was the date on which the advice of Professor Mark Hill was obtained. His advice came under some legal attack. Noble Lords will know that the legal advisers of the Roman Catholic Church, the Church of England, the Home Office and the Equality Commission have all said that there is no legal risk. Reinforcement was obtained from Mr Aidan O’Neill QC. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady O’Cathain, for providing a copy of his advice. He gives a lot of ground in relation to it, recognising the difficulty that exists.
(12 years, 8 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I apologise in advance for a singularly technical group of amendments, but they need to be explained, if only so that Hansard can show to those who are not here why they have been put forward. They are inescapably dry, not to say turgid. This group contains Amendments 116 to 119, which amend Clause 37, and Amendment 132 which, via the Bill, makes four amendments to Section 22 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.
Clause 37 incorporates new Section 23A into RIPA 2000, thus extending the cases when judicial approval has to be obtained for surveillance. It is a clause that is to be welcomed, as indeed is the Bill as a whole. Amendments 116 to 119 to new Section 23A are drafting ones, but having suffered from unnecessarily obscure wording during the original passage of RIPA, where I led for these Benches, it still remains one of the most complex statutes there is. I hope that the Committee will think that the amendments are worth while.
Amendments 117 and 118 delete what I think are superfluous phrases from Clause 37, the phrases being, “if any” in subsection (2) and “as the case may be”, which appears later in that subsection. Superfluity of language is to be avoided.
Amendments 116 to 119 to the same new clause rectify what seems to me to be a clear error of drafting. I may say that putting together this Bill must have taxed the drafting skills of parliamentary draftsmen to the limit, and one can hardly be surprised if there is the occasional wrinkle. Amendments 116 and 119 address a confusion repeated in new Section 23A. It distinguishes authorisations under Section 22(3), (3B) and (3F) of RIPA from notices required under Section 22(4) of RIPA. Broadly, authorisations allow surveillance to take place whether or not subject to judicial approval, whereas notices are mandatory and require postal or telecommunications operators to disclose data. Both authorisations and notices, which are distinguished throughout both RIPA and this Bill, can be renewed but they are renewable under different provisions in RIPA 2000 and in this Bill.
However, new Section 23A, set out in Clause 37 of the Bill, states in subsections (1) and (3) that the renewal of authorisations is derived from the same sections as the grant of the same. My Amendments 115 and 119 would rectify that by making it clear that renewals are made under subsections (5) and (6) of Section 23 of RIPA 2000. I am not now entirely sure, on rereading my amendments, that reference to Section 23(6) in Amendment 119 is appropriate, but the Minister will soon tell me. It is rather a lot to ask him to have a view on these arcane matters on the instant.
Amendment 122 contains four amendments to Section 22 of RIPA, which will be incorporated through this Bill. Subsection (1) of Section 22 of RIPA gives the context within which breaches of privacy so as to disclose communications data shall be permissible. At the moment, it says:
“This section applies where a person designated for the purposes of this Chapter believes that it is necessary on grounds falling within subsection (2) to obtain any communications data”.
Perhaps we tried when the Bill was passed to insert “reasonably” before “believes”. However, it is never too late and my first change to Section 22 would achieve just that. It seems obvious and follows the general tenor of this Bill that the belief of the designated person should be reasonably arrived at.
The third change in my Amendment 122 to subsection (5) of Section 22 again seems to me obvious: namely, that a lazy or perverse belief on the part of any official should not be sufficient to trigger the authorisations permissible under this important but necessary invasion of citizen privacy.
The second change of my four is to subsection (3) of Section 22 of RIPA 2000, which, as it stands, appears to allow a designated person in effect to delegate his or her power of authorisation to,
“persons holding offices, ranks or positions with the same relevant public authority as the designated person to engage in any conduct to which this Chapter applies”.
Unless my interpretation of this subsection in RIPA is misconceived, this less-than-clear wording would allow a designated person, whose designation has to be prescribed by the Secretary of State by order under Section 25, to delegate under Section 22(3) to persons in the same public authority of any office, rank or position inferior to that of the person making the delegation. Again, in common sense, that cannot be right; hence my insertion of “comparable” so that the delegation by an official under Section 22(3) must be to a person of comparable rank or position.
Lastly—noble Lords will be glad to know that I am coming to the end of this exciting oration—the fourth amendment in my Amendment 122 harks back to the earlier ones in this group. It would change subsection (4)(b) of Section 23 of RIPA by removing “authorise or”, since those words relate to authorisations whereas subsection (4)(b) is exclusively concerned with notices, which, as I have explained, are not permissive but mandatory, and require—that is the relevant word—this or that from the postal or telecommunications operator to which the requirement is addressed.
I am sorry to have taxed the patience of the Committee with these somewhat obscure points but I believe that these amendments would improve the Bill. I beg to move.
My noble friend may not like this question, but we are all family here, are we not? I absolutely agree that one needs a good supply of hot towels when reading this Act. Almost the last point he made was about his Amendment 122, which draws attention to Section 22(3), granting authorisation “for persons holding”—he would like to say comparable—“offices”. I read that as meaning that if you are designated to grant authorisation, you can allow a colleague, whether or not of the same seniority, to engage in the conduct that is referred to in Section 21. What that seems to be doing is saying that the designated person is in a position to grant authorisation, but it is perfectly okay to grant it within his own authority and that the conduct referred to in Section 21 does not mean delegating or granting authorisation to a third party. I am sorry if I have added to the need for hot towels.
I am not perfectly sure that I understood my noble friend’s point. I think she is talking about comparability.
Yes. The reason I think that Section 22(3) of RIPA is wrong is that it does not make any requirement, as I see it, as to the rank or the position of the person to whom any delegation is made by the person originally designated under very carefully confined powers. As my noble friend pointed out, the definition of a designated person involves the Secretary of State making the designation, but when in Section 22(3) a delegation is in effect made, there is no such requirement. Where it refers to the same relevant public authority, that is fine. The person to whom delegation is made has got to be someone else in the same relevant public authority, but there is no requirement as to what rank that person is.
My Lords, my point was that I do not think this is about delegation of authority. I think it is about authorising the conduct which, were it to be proposed to be undertaken by someone in a different organisation, would require authorisation.
My Lords, my noble friend may be right. We disagree, as things stand, as to the meaning of Section 22(3) which, I think she will readily agree, is obscurely worded.
My Lords, I think I need to take my noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury aside to explain that whisky may dull the pain but caffeine keeps one on the job better.
I do speak for myself. I hope Amendment 124, at any rate in the drafting, is a little more straightforward. I declare an interest as one of a number of vice presidents of the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health, from which this amendment comes. The amendment is concerned with environmental health and, in particular, with noise.
There has been, I understand, a long-running issue as to whether the investigation of noise nuisance requires covert surveillance. It is not the Home Office but in fact Defra which has mainly been concerned with this. Environmental health officers listen to noise in its context and record, one of the technical terms, anything listened to which brings—as I understand it since it is as the institute understands it—what it does within the meaning of Section 26(9) of RIPA. The Home Office takes the view that dealing with noise nuisance does not ordinarily require covert surveillance and so it is not caught by RIPA. Perhaps this amendment covers it if and when it does. Therefore this amendment is a probing one. The institute is generally in support of the need for judicial authorisation but so far as its work is concerned in this area there are some difficulties.
As this has been long running, it is able to anticipate the arguments that may be made against the need for such an amendment so I am going to start with the response and then its response to each of the Home Office’s likely responses. The first is that surveillance follows complaints so quickly that obtaining authorisation would not be reasonably practicable and that this excuses the need for authorisation. The institute says that the exception is when surveillance is undertaken as an “immediate response”, such as when a police officer sights a suspect in the street. There is always going to be a delay between the making of the noise complaint and its investigation. Secondly, if local authorities warn noise perpetrators that they may be monitored surveillance following that will not be covert and so will not be caught by RIPA.
Giving a warning causes delay. It rather undermines the duty on local authorities under the Environmental Protection Act to investigate complaints and quite obviously it would tend to be self-defeating. I dare say many noble Lords will have experienced complaint in different contexts to noise or what they may perceive as noise. I perceive muzak as noise. I have often asked for it to be turned down. It is turned down temporarily in a place of entertainment and up it goes again. Thirdly, if local authorities warn noise perpetrators that they may be monitored, again surveillance will not be covert and so not caught. I beg your pardon. I should have said that giving a warning takes the investigation out of RIPA and the measurement of sound pressure levels does not require authorisation. But there is no numerical standard for noise nuisance because environmental health officers have to judge the noise in context. Depending on what else is going on, the noise may or may not be intrusive, and for evidential purposes it is accepted practice to record it.
Fourthly, private information is unlikely to be obtained because perpetrators have no right of privacy to information that is audible outside the premises it is coming from. However, the institute draws attention to the definition in RIPA of “private information” by reference to its content as distinct from its audibility. Fifthly, surveillance carried out without authorisation is not necessarily unlawful. That is the case where there is an equivalent process of authorisation in another statute, but that does not apply in this case. Lastly, the whole thrust of this part of the Bill is the protection of magistrates’ approval against unjustified snooping by local authorities, and both I and the institute have sympathy with that. The Home Office has confirmed in Answer to a parliamentary Question in another place that there is no evidence to suggest that noise investigations are being carried out inappropriately by local authorities. We have read of instances where local authorities have rather overstepped the mark in their use of the powers, but this is not one of those examples.
In the hope that I have not taken too much of the Minister’s speech in anticipation of the answer, I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for her introduction to the amendment, and indeed she has anticipated quite a lot of what I will say in response. None the less, there are some things that are worth emphasising, and I hope that in doing so I can give her some assurances. I certainly agree that noise nuisance is something that is clearly intolerable to the person experiencing it and that in many instances the noise under investigation may occur at night, so anyone who is subject to that kind of disturbance feels strongly about the situation they find themselves in and wants any action to deal with it to be rapid. However, Amendment 124 is unnecessary because the sort of noise we are talking about, that which causes disturbance and affects people’s lives, is not caught by RIPA.
Before I go on to cover some of the topics raised by my noble friend, let me say that Home Office officials have already met representatives of the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health and of Defra to discuss these points. We have said that we shall work with them on revising the RIPA code of practice on covert surveillance in order to make it clear that authorisation under RIPA is unlikely to be necessary for noise abatement reasons. Surveillance conducted and governed under RIPA relates to private information only. It requires that when public authorities obtain private information covertly, they do so only when it is necessary and proportionate, in line with our right to privacy. However, the privacy implications of someone making a loud noise will usually be such that RIPA is not engaged. Loud machinery, alarms or music, for instance, are not private information, and if the noise emanating from someone’s house because of, say, an argument is so loud that it can be heard in the street outside or the adjoining property, it is highly questionable whether the people concerned have a realistic expectation of privacy. If the noise involves violent or threatening behaviour, then it would always be appropriate to call for the police.
If the council’s policy is to serve an abatement notice warning that monitoring may be carried out, then that monitoring cannot be deemed to be covert in nature, which my noble friend has already anticipated. In these scenarios, a RIPA authorisation would not be required. This is made clear in the RIPA covert surveillance code of practice; that code has statutory force.
The only instance where a RIPA authorisation definitely would be required is where a local authority noise monitoring device was calibrated to boost the signal so as to record conversations which could not be heard outside the property with the naked ear. However, this would constitute intrusive surveillance and RIPA does not permit local authorities to do this. Most people would agree that this would be an unwarranted breach of someone’s privacy. I therefore maintain that local authority noise monitoring would not normally require to be authorised under RIPA; that this is already made clear in RIPA; and that it therefore would not be subject to prior magistrate approval. However, as I say, we are meeting with the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health and Defra to look at the code of practice. Before I ask my noble friend to consider withdrawing her amendment, I wish to reinforce the Government’s view that noise disturbance of the kind she describes is an important matter. However, I do not think that her amendment is necessary.
My Lords, I agree that very often in the sort of situation about which the noble Baroness and I are talking, any conversations which take place are not very edifying or instructive—“indiscreet” might be the term for them. I live fairly near a pub so that is why I make that comment. I have learnt a lot of bad language over the years as I have heard it in the very late hours.
I welcome what the noble Baroness says about the possible revision to the code of practice, but I am concerned that if the legislation requires authorisation the code of practice cannot undo that requirement. However, I will read what she has said and discuss it with the institute. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, this amendment was suggested to me and drafted by the Bar Council. Although it looks long and a bit daunting, I hope the Committee will understand that the point which it addresses concerns a simple point of principle, and the practice of that principle. The principle is the need to protect legal professional privilege. The Bar Council is seriously concerned that RIPA violates legal professional privilege by permitting authorities secretly to obtain information about privileged communications, in particular private meetings and other communications between a lawyer and a client. I was pleased to be asked to table this amendment as I feel very strongly that a lawyer and his client should be able to speak freely, and that the lawyer should be able to take instructions without fear of them being listened to.
The right of someone in custody to a private consultation with a lawyer is expressly protected by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The importance of an accused person being able to confer with his lawyer in private has also been emphasised in numerous cases under the ECHR. Indeed, it has been said that it is a fundamental condition on which the administration of justice rests.
The need for reform of RIPA was revealed by a case in 2009, In Re McE, when the House of Lords held that Part II of RIPA permits the covert surveillance of meetings between defendants and their lawyers. Noble Lords will be aware of recent high-profile cases involving CHIS—covert human intelligence sources— that have emphasised the need for privilege to be protected expressly; for example, the case of the undercover police officers, PC Mark Kennedy and DC Jim Boyling, infiltrating protest groups pursuant to RIPA authorisations. The Government’s partial response to In Re McE was to make two orders and two codes of practice under powers contained in the Act, one relating to directed surveillance and the other to covert human intelligence sources, which altered the authorisation procedures, but these do not address the fundamental problem.
We have already referred to the complexity of RIPA. The new clause has been carefully drafted—I am happy to say not by me—to ensure that covert powers of investigation cannot be used to target legally privileged information, while at the same time ensuring that privilege is not abused for a criminal purpose and that the regime caters for a position where it turns out that the privileged material has been acquired accidentally. The provisions would prevent the targeting of legally privileged material. The draft clause uses the code of conduct as a vehicle for guidance on minimising the risk of accidentally obtaining privileged material.
What I understand is called in the trade the “iniquity exception” has been reduced in scope. The Police Act 1997 takes matters out of privilege if the item or communication is,
“in the possession of a person who is not entitled to possession of them”
or is held or made,
“with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose”.
The Bar Council points out that the first of these exceptions would be counterproductive but it has reduced the scope rather than simply taking out the exception, which would perpetuate the problem that it is seeking to deal with. The wording in subsection (6) of the draft clause defining what cannot be targeted by a CHIS is borrowed directly from one of the 2010 orders made following the case to which I referred.
The provision about surveillance is based on evidence from solicitors that legal consultation involving protests or other multiple-defendant situations often take place in private premises—noble Lords will remember that one of the recent examples was of protesters at a power station whose group had been infiltrated by a police officer—and this amendment covers premises in so far as they are used for legal consultations. The other of the 2010 orders to which I have referred makes specific provision for targeting any place in use for legal consultations—in other words, it limits the premises and therefore limits the scope of the order. The definition of legal consultations that has been used is, however, very similar to that used in the order that is already in force.
It is a long amendment but, as I say, at the heart of it is a simple but very important proposition. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am in general sympathy with the objective behind this amendment but have some anxieties about the effect of subsections (9) and (12), which mirror one another in similar language. They seem to say that the question of whether a communication has been made with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose is to be determined in accordance with regulations or provisions made by the Secretary of State. Whether a particular communication is protected by privilege or that privilege is forfeited because the purpose of the communication was to further a criminal purpose is the sort of issue that could easily come up in legal proceedings before an ordinary court. On this notion that the Secretary of State could pre-empt that, I note the language,
“make provision for the determination (on an application for an”—
interception warrant, which I can understand—
“or otherwise)”.
That “or otherwise” seems to carry the power right through to legal proceedings where the question of privilege is an issue. I would like some elucidation on the intention behind these two subsections.
My Lords, I will endeavour to respond as comprehensively as I can to the issues raised in this short debate. I appreciate the concerns raised by the Bar Council but your Lordships will understand that no one can regard themselves as beyond the law or immune from investigation or prosecution. Nevertheless, RIPA recognises the special relationship between a lawyer and client, and puts in place special protections for any covert obtaining of material subject to legal and professional privilege.
RIPA already limits obtaining legally privileged material to intelligence and law enforcement agencies investigating serious crime or acting in the interests of national security. In each case, whether it is interception or surveillance, internal authorisation is by senior official—for instance, the director-general of the Security Service or a chief constable. In addition, and crucially, this is then subject to external independent approval, either by the Secretary of State or a surveillance commissioner, before any covert action can be taken.
The RIPA codes of practice, which have statutory force, provide further safeguards. The interception code makes it clear that where communications which include legally privileged communications have been intercepted and retained, or where the subject of the interception is to be a lawyer, the matter should be reported to the Interception of Communications Commissioner during his inspections and the material be made available to him, if requested.
In addition to safeguards governing the handling and retention of intercept material as provided for in Section 15 of the Act, caseworkers who examine intercepted communications should be alert to any intercept material which may be subject to legal privilege. Where there is doubt as to whether the communications are subject to legal privilege, advice should be sought from a legal adviser within the intercepting agency. Similar advice should also be sought where there is doubt over whether communications are not subject to legal privilege due to the “in furtherance of a criminal purpose” exception. The covert surveillance and covert human intelligence source codes make it clear that such independent external approvals will be granted only where there are exceptional and compelling circumstances that make the authorisation necessary—for instance, where there is a threat to life or limb or to national security.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, have already made reference to the McE case. In 2009, the former Judicial Committee of your Lordships’ House ruled in that case that RIPA could be used to authorise the covert surveillance of legally privileged consultations but that this needed to be subject to an enhanced approval process. The enhanced RIPA safeguards were tested in the case of RA v Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland where the High Court of Northern Ireland ruled that the RIPA regime was lawful and provided sufficient safeguards against abuse. To be clear, those new safeguards have been tested in a court of law and were found to be robust.
In reference to the comments made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, about the amendment put forward by my noble friend Lady Hamwee, I will of course leave my noble friend to respond to him. Given these existing stringent limitations and safeguards on public authorities obtaining legally privileged material under RIPA, and the fact they have been tested in court, as I have said, and have been found to be robust, I would suggest to my noble friend that this amendment is unnecessary and I invite her to withdraw it.
My Lords, this being Grand Committee, of course I will withdraw the amendment. The noble Baroness’s reference to the role of the commissioner and some other comments seem to be steps taken to deal with the issue after the horse has bolted. But I will read her comments carefully. The point that no one is immune from prosecution is not something with which I seek to argue. It is a parallel but different point.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, make a very interesting point about regulations made by the Secretary of State. I did not mean to disclaim responsibility for drafting the amendment; I meant to give credit to others. But I did not draft it and I do not think that it would be right for me to attempt to respond in any detail at this point. The noble and learned Lord set me an interesting dilemma and I shall think about it after today’s Committee Sitting to consider how one might address it.
I do not believe that the Bar Council would have gone to the effort of dealing with a matter about which the current Lord Chief Justice has himself expressed disquiet had it felt that an amendment was not necessary, so I will be talking to the council between now and the next stage. Other noble Lords have asked if there might be a meeting to discuss a number of issues, and this is one that will be particularly amenable to some further discussion, if that is possible. I do want to imply anything as regards the noble Baroness, but for myself this is pretty much above my pay grade. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(12 years, 8 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I am sure that we are all very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Henley, for his explanation of the two statutory instruments that we are debating together this afternoon. As he rightly said, it is only a few weeks ago since we finished proceedings on the Government’s misguided proposals to establish elected police commissioners, but the Opposition will take a constructive approach to these regulations and the many others that are due to come to your Lordships’ House over the next few weeks and months.
As the noble Lord suggested, the regulations under consideration have been developed to a very tight timetable to enable London to transfer early from the current Metropolitan Police Authority to the new Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime. The problem is that, because of the rush, we are not being allowed sufficient time or opportunity to explore the implications of the regulations for the rest of England and Wales before we deal with the issue in London. Can the noble Lord give me some idea of the timetable for all the other regulations that will be produced? There is some hint that there is a less than cohesive approach to doing this. For instance, while a shadow strategic policing requirement and protocol have been laid, the finance code has not—unless that has been done very recently. That makes it difficult to understand the balance of powers between the chief officer, the PCC and the panel because we do not have a complete picture.
Similarly the regulations on PCC complaints have been laid but the regulations on panels have not. Again, that makes it difficult to understand how the complaints process will work, for instance, in relation to the powers of the panel to suspend PCCs. It would be helpful if the noble Lord, either here or perhaps in correspondence, could set out the programme that the department is working to so that Parliament can consider the many statutory instruments that will have to be laid.
There are three matters missing from the regulations that I wish to put to the noble Lord. The first is the absence of any code of conduct or other means of defining what acceptable behaviour is and is not in non-criminal complaints that are subject to informal resolution. The second is the absence of any sanctions or similar powers for the panel in dealing with PCCs that misbehaved. The third is the absence of any provisions dealing with powers of the panel to suspend PCCs or the process that it should follow. I should be grateful if the noble Lord would comment on that.
I have, of course, discussed this with the Association of Police Authorities, which is worried about the lack of clarity with regard to both acceptable standards of behaviour and the panel’s power in relation to informal resolution. That might result in complainants believing that it is better to frame their complaints in criminal terms in order to ensure that they are dealt with satisfactorily. The example that has been given to me is rude behaviour by the PCC, and we have to reflect that this is a political officeholder. Rude behaviour is not unknown from such political office holders—not, of course, the noble Lord himself, who is always an example of chivalry, gentleness and kindness, but there are politicians who do not have the noble Lord’s high standards.
Taking the example of rude behaviour, the risk for the APA is that this might be framed as harassment, conflict of interest or fraud in order to ensure that it is dealt with by the IPCC, whose role is much clearer under these regulations, and that there is a proper resolution with meaningful sanctions, in contrast to it being dealt with under informal resolution. This is an important point on which the noble Lord might be able to reassure me. Clearly, however dubious I am about the elected police commissioners, one does not want a lot of complaints being made in an unscrupulous way, which would actually inhibit the police and crime commissioners in the course of their duty. I would certainly be worried if there was a temptation by complainants to, in a sense, upgrade their complaint in order for it to be dealt with by the IPCC because there is a lack of clarity about how the informal resolution process might work.
We then come to the issue of what, if anything, a panel can do under the informal resolution proposal to ensure that a PCC makes reparation for bad behaviour. If the panel has no powers in that respect, what happens when a police and crime commissioner rejects a means of reparation that the panel has suggested? What recourse does a complainant then have to ensure that the matter is resolved to his or her satisfaction? Again, I put it to the noble Lord that, if the complainant is dissatisfied, one of their options might be to have recourse to the media. The risk of that, I suppose, is that publicity will have an adverse impact on public trust in policing.
The noble Lord will be aware that one of my concerns about the whole notion of elected police commissioners is that it will reduce public confidence. Clearly we can argue about that, and I am very tempted to invite the noble Lord to have another debate about the principle, but I will not do that. However, Parliament having enacted the legislation, it is important that we work together to make it as effective as possible. I am concerned that, if the public do not have confidence in the informal resolution process, as I have said, either they will upgrade complaints in the future or the process will be discredited, and you may well find that the position of the PCC is also discredited. So I think that this is worth looking at.
Some other, rather more technical issues have been raised. Is there not a need for regulations to state explicitly that a force cannot be asked to undertake the investigation of a PCC if he or she is the PCC for that force or connected to that force through collaboration, agreement or close association? It is probably implicit in paragraph 19(3)(b) but would there be argument over how “impartially” should be interpreted?
I understand the logic of appointing the PCC’s chief executive as monitoring officer to the panel—covered in paragraph 7—to achieve national consistency, particularly in Wales where panels will not be part of local government and so will not have automatic access to monitoring officers in local authorities. Is there a risk of putting that chief executive in a difficult situation? Remember the concept of corporate sole means that the employer of the chief executive is the PCC himself or herself against whom a complaint is being made. Is there not a risk that the monitoring officer will not be able to effectively carry out that duty?
The panels will be asked to judge whether a complaint is serious or not. I assume that means that they will look to the monitoring officer for advice. Again, I point out to the noble Lord that there will be a delicate relationship between the role of the monitoring officer’s chief executive and the PCC who is their direct and only sole employer. It is rather different in corporate set-ups where the company secretary or board secretary would probably carry out that role. It is rather different if it is the chief executive. Might the Government be prepared to look at that, in terms of advice on how it might work in practice?
Paragraph 15(3)(a) raises some concerns. Complaints brought by employees to the PCC cannot be dealt with through these regulations where they concern a PCC’s conduct only towards his or her staff. I well understand that there needs to be provision within employment procedures for handling much of this through established grievance procedures but might there be a possibility that that will not address the situation where an employee is accusing, say, a PCC of a criminal complaint such as harassment? What, for instance, would happen in the case of alleged harassment?
What about joint complaints to the chief constable and deputy or assistant chief constable? With the chief constable becoming the appropriate authority for chief officer complaints, there is concern among chief authorities about the potential situation where a joint complaint has been made against the chief constable and someone in the chief officer team. This could result in a chief constable effectively investigating their own complaint. That might strike at public confidence. The question here is whether that should then give the PCC locus in relation to any less senior officer. I would be grateful for some clarification on that.
Are there enough checks and balances around the PCC’s ability to dismiss the chief officer? Of course, we have discussed this in our debate on the Bill. It is worth making the point that PCCs will have to take account of general law considerations when exercising their powers to dismiss a chief constable. It is not a matter for the regulations but it might be one for the guidance that I hope will be given to PCCs on this matter. Indeed, I would strongly advise the Minister’s department to look seriously at the advice and training or development to be given to PCCs on these matters. On that, I assume that there will be some development programmes for the newly elected PCCs. I would certainly put that proposal forward to be considered.
Turning to the fees regulations, these look straightforward. The opportunity to debate the issue of working dogs’ tails with the noble Lord, with his vast experience of such matters, and with his fellow Defra Ministers from past years would be invigorating, but I shall desist. However, I want to ask him about the financial code. A draft code has clearly been circulated round the usual bodies that comment on police matters. My understanding is that a final agreed version is not yet available, but that the work on the drafting has identified a number of challenges. The real issue here is the introduction of two corporates sole, the chief constable and the police and crime commissioner. The audit and all financial matters are unduly and unnecessarily complicated because of that structure. If there is any information that the noble Lord could give me, I would be grateful.
Like the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, I resist entering into a debate on working dogs’ tails, although it was the very point that I marked when I first read the regulations. I will not repeat questions that he asked that arise from concerns expressed by the Association of Police Authorities, save about a couple of matters, one of which is to ask about updated information on what I would describe as interlocking regulations; they may not formally interlock, but in practical terms they will.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, talked about politics being played with in complaints. It is not always the subject of a complaint who has played politics; quite often the complainant uses procedures to play politics.
It is not directly a subject of the statutory instruments, but closely related is the proposed funding of police and crime panels. I have heard concerns that the funding will be very low indeed, only enough for one member of staff and perhaps four meetings a year. These regulations are, one hopes, only a small part of the remit of the police and crime panels, which need to be funded—not extravagantly, but adequately and appropriately. The legislation gives them a wider remit than just complaints.
Thinking about that made me wonder whether that was why, in the consultation process, it was proposed that the police and crime panel should be able to delegate to the chief executive of the police and crime commissioner; the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has already referred to that. I am a bit uneasy, not because of the point about impartiality or objectivity which the APA has raised, but because it seems to confuse the roles of the two entities.
Nor am I immediately convinced about using the local code of conduct in the case of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime and the deputy if the deputy is an Assembly Member, because of their own role in creating that local code. That raises some quite interesting issues. We do not really know where we are with codes and local government yet. I asked one of my colleagues who is still a councillor, and he says that a lot of consultation is going on, but of course these are to be local decisions, even if local authorities adopt the same or a similar standard.
I also want to ask about Regulation 26(4) of the complaints and misconduct regulations; this is a detail, I know.
I was interested that the IPCC will be able to take a view as to whether what is a possible criminal offence is “appropriate”—that is the word—to be considered by the Director of Public Prosecutions. I am sorry that I gave the Minister so very little notice of this matter. As I have said to him, I only managed to look at these regulations at lunchtime. But it seems rather odd to put that power in the hands of the IPCC.
I am interested that the regulations modify Section 22 of the 2002 Act. They seem to do little more than substitute the dramatis personae. As now, the Secretary of State’s approval will be required for commission guidance but, as far as I can see, the power for the Secretary of State herself to issue guidance is new. It may be that the 2011 Act has allowed for this. I would just pause on regulations adding that right for the Secretary of State—not that you could ever stop a Secretary of State issuing guidance—but it might affect the status of the guidance. I do not know whether the Minister will be able to answer my question, which, in effect, is: is there a substantive change brought about in this by the regulations?
My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Lords for making clear that they do not want me to go any further on working dogs’ tails and we will leave that for another day. Perhaps I may start by making a brief reference to my noble friend Lady Browning who, after all, took the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act through Parliament. She completed that before she stood down, at which point I moved to the Home Office, and we are very grateful to her for all that she did. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, is mistaken in describing that Act, which is now on the statute book, as being misguided. As I have made clear, it is now a done deal and Parliament, as I have said, has spoken.
The noble Lord also complained about the rush that is taking place. I do not believe that there is a rush. Obviously, things are marginally tighter for London where things happen faster than in the rest of the country, but the rest of the country has until 22 November 2012. I am sure that it—and the Met—will cope. Certainly, we have had no expressions of concern from the Met about that.
The noble Lord also asked about training programmes and what we are going to do to get the PCCs into the right position for when they are set up, which is obviously of very great concern to my right honourable friend, Nick Herbert, the Minister with responsibility for policing and crime. He chairs a transition board, which includes all the key parties, including the chief executives of police authorities. I assure the noble Lord that everyone involved will be included. My right honourable friend has got the message and he is making sure that something effective will be set up and that we have an efficient transition.
The noble Lord was also worried about the number of further instruments that will be needed to set up these regulations. I referred to a jigsaw and this is just a part of it. Not all of what is coming through will be statutory instruments that will need to go through this House, although some will be. In order to get the detail right, it would probably be best if I wrote to the noble Lord to give him a timetable to assist him in this matter.
He also spoke about the absence of any code of conduct, which was also raised by my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I must make absolutely clear that these bodies will be subject, as elected bodies, to all the noble principles by which we abide. That was clearly set out in the protocol. It is also obvious that they will possibly wish to establish certain locally designed meaningful codes of conduct which they think are appropriate for them. Again, that deals with one of the concerns of my noble friend.
The noble Lord was worried about the absence of any sanctions for dealing with police and crime commissioners. What he must remember is that they are democratically elected bodies. Ultimately, that is the sanction. That is why we brought them in and why we think they will do a good job. They will conduct their business in public, so transparency will be a key tool in how the public view them. I think that this will be a great improvement on the system we have at the moment.
(12 years, 8 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I am sure that the Grand Committee is grateful to the noble Lord for his extensive introduction to these regulations. I was particularly interested in the advice that he read out from the Migration Advisory Committee. He will be aware that when the extension was agreed beyond January 2009, the committee reported in a similar vein at that time and said the impact of lifting the restrictions would be small but that the risks to the labour market were mainly on the downside. That led it to recommend a cautious approach. I assume that the committee is continuing that advice on the basis of that same philosophy.
I take the point the noble Lord made that it is difficult to attach facts and figures to this measure but does he accept the committee’s assessment of its impact? I would be interested to know whether he can put any figure at all on the likely impact of extending the measure by a further two years. He will know that the Merits Committee rather took the Government to task as regards the laying of the regulations and made the point that they have had rather a long time to consider the extension but, by leaving it to the last moment, it will have to be put in place. In a sense we are legitimising that through the current process. The Merits Committee would have preferred the policy to have been agreed somewhat earlier, which would have allowed the regulations to be laid before Parliament in draft and be subject to approval by resolution of each House. Will the noble Lord comment on that? What is his response to the Merits Committee?
My Lords, on the point about the timing of the measure, is the Minister satisfied that individuals and employers will not experience any practical problems as a result of that? I cannot quite get my head round what practical steps need to be taken. Is it the case that an application has to be made for a new accession work authorisation document and that there may be individuals—this goes to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, about numbers—who might have expected that they could continue to work for the same employer in this country beyond the end of this year but will, in effect, be given a matter of a very few working days to apply for the authorisation? Perhaps it is not as few days as from now until the end of December as the regulations were made—oh no, the regulations come into force on 30 December. I am getting very confused about the dates. I suppose that the warning was there for the employers but the regulations will not be made until the day before they need to be in formal terms, but there may be practical implications for individuals caught up with this. I hope that I have made myself at least moderately clear. The Minister is nodding, so I am glad about that.
In applying the tests, which the Minister has told the Grand Committee are about both the labour market and skills, will there be any changes from those that have been applied? My other question was about other EU member states. The Minister told us what some states are doing, so are we to understand that, in effect, the other member states are all maintaining their own status quo apart from Spain, which is reimposing restrictions, so that there is no other change across the European Union? The point has already been made that this cannot be looked at in isolation.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, for referring to the Migration Advisory Committee and its work, on which we are very dependent. He then asked me to speculate how many individuals might come in if we did not seek this further two-year derogation. I do not think that it would be helpful to try to do so. I offer as a little warning some advice to the noble Lord. He might remember that the Government, of which he was a member when Poland and other countries acceded to the European Union, did not seek any derogation on that occasion. It was suggested that the numbers coming here would be very small indeed. I forget the figure, but as we saw, the numbers coming in were exceeded by a matter of 10 or a hundredfold. That is why the noble Lord’s Government were very keen in 2006, with the further accession of Romania and Bulgaria, to make sure that we did have proper controls on the numbers coming in. We obtained that derogation, which other countries also obtained, for five years that could then be extended for a further two years. I shall not speculate on the numbers because, as the noble Lord will remember, it is very easy to get them wrong and to do so by a factor of—let us say, X, but a big factor.
The noble Lord then went on to complain about the timing and mentioned the Merits Committee. I appreciate that we received some criticism, and my noble friend Lady Hamwee also mentioned those problems. I can say that I think many people will have known that this was likely to happen as we had the ability to extend the five years by two years, as long as we did so by the end of this year. We issued this SI on 23 November, which, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee knows, does not come into effect until the end of the year. The Migration Advisory Committee published its report somewhat earlier in the month so we all knew that it was coming, and most employers knew that it was coming. My noble friend had some concerns about the difficulties that some employers may have but I can assure her that any individual who is working for an existing employer will not require fresh authorisation if he stays with that employer. Obviously, there will be a difference if he moves. There will be no changes to the criteria for granting authorisation at all.
The final point was about other member states. Obviously, it is very important to look at what other member states do because that will affect how many people come in. As the noble Lord will remember, when Poland and others were coming into the EU, other member states sought a derogation for a number of years. We did not and that is probably one of the reasons why a very large number came here. On this occasion things have happened differently, and as I mentioned in my opening remarks, Germany and the Netherlands are both seeking a derogation and Spain seeks to extend its derogation. Different things are happening in different countries of Europe, which is a matter for them to decide. We have made our decision based on the advice from the Migration Advisory Committee, which took into account what was happening in other countries in Europe. I shall write to my noble friend to give further details of what other countries are doing if she would like that. The important thing is that we took their actions into account in our decision.
(12 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord is right to draw attention to the specialist work done by individual police forces. It is obviously a matter for each individual police force and the police authority to decide on the appropriate priorities. Certainly within the Home Office, we would want to encourage them to continue with that work.
My Lords, I apologise to the House for missing the start of the Question. I had forgotten that Prayers were earlier today.
Police officers tend to retire at a relatively early age. For their own satisfaction, as well as thinking of the public purse, can the Minister say anything about continuing to make use of their expertise and experience, which is the product of both years and public investment?
My Lords, obviously the training of an individual policeman is a very expensive process. We want to get maximum use of all policemen for as long as possible. Your Lordships will have noticed that some of the policemen who operate around this House tend to be at the older end of the spectrum. We are grateful for their expertise in providing protection for this House. Perhaps, as my noble friend Lord McNally implies from a sedentary position, they all look rather young to us. However, we do want to get as much use as possible out of all those policemen who have trained at such considerable public expense.