Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Lord King of Bridgwater Excerpts

Monday 9th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, I have reservations which I will deal with when I speak to my amendment arguing the case for a Select Committee to take on these responsibilities. Parliament is being required to approve wording which suggests that this committee is controlled by Parliament, but without recognising what the Justice and Security Green Paper of October 2011 says at paragraph 3.19. It states:

“However, under such arrangements”—

that is, the arrangements of a Select Committee—

“the Government would clearly have no veto on publication of sensitive material”.

I repeat:

“no veto on publication of sensitive material”.

In other words, the provision is being introduced as a way for the Government to secure control outside of Parliament, through this half-measure of a committee, over the publication of sensitive material. My view is very simple. If they want to do that, let it be done through a full Select Committee structure. That is the substance of my amendment which will come later.

[Lord King of Bridgwater]

My Lords, if I may intervene in this discussion, I seek to bring to it the “veneer of experience”—to quote the Deputy Prime Minister, as the noble Baroness on the Front Bench did on Second Reading—that this House can contribute on these matters. I am delighted to follow the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, who is an excellent member of the committee that I had the privilege to chair for a number of years. In listening to this debate I am absolutely sure that we have reached the time to move forwards. However, I am torn between Amendment 1, the significance of which I have to admit I do not fully understand, and Amendment 3, which proposes moving to Select Committee status. Early in our committee’s discussions we considered the role of a Select Committee, and—if I can stop the noble Lord mucking up my papers—I shall find a quote from a report that our committee produced in 1998 or 1999. We said:

“There are arguments for and against such a status, and we have not as yet formed a view on the issue … Even if thought desirable, however, such changes would take time to introduce, and could alter significantly the structure of relationships between the Committee and the intelligence community”.

I think that, as time has moved on, we have established that sort of relationship.

It is important to remember where we have come from. Although the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, rightly points out that the agencies were not resistant to the establishment of a committee—that certainly matches my own impression, and she knows the situation much better than I do—many serving in the agencies wanted not only an Intelligence and Security Committee but, in their own interest, for that committee to be as thorough and active as possible so that it could carry credibility. As one of the big problems facing the agencies was false allegation and rumour, an independent and credible body would be seen to address and deal effectively with those issues—in secrecy if necessary, and without disclosure of operational information or other evidence, some of which might come from other countries.

My feeling at that time was that it was critical that we should establish credibility, because although many of the agencies were in favour of the committee, others were nervous about whether parliamentarians could be trusted, whether information would be secure or whether it would be leaked—all the problems that one might advance. There was a lot of hostility. I recall that, way back in the early 1980s, Jonathan Aitken was an original proposer of an intelligence and security committee, and he was interrupted by an old colleague, Ray Whitney—a distinguished former member of the foreign service, and a Member of Parliament at the time—who said that whatever one says about the Senate intelligence committee, there is general agreement that it has destroyed the American intelligence capability. That was an exaggeration of the sort of strong feeling common at the time. Having had the privilege of serving under the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher, who was not the first outspoken advocate of this particular approach, I can attest that there was a lot of resistance to it.

When our committee started out it was very important to establish its credibility. I felt at that time—and members of the committee shared this view; I think that the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, was a keen advocate of it—that it was more important to establish the trust of the agencies, to make sure that they were forthcoming with information, because they could switch us off at any time. After all, we were into the “don’t-know don’t knows”, so establishing that trust was important. I believe that that trust, confidence and relationship have been established now—more than established, I hope, given the passage of time. I am therefore very torn between these amendments, Amendment 1 or 2, which propose setting up a Committee of Parliament, or whether there is not an argument for going straight to a Select Committee. I have learnt something today from the noble Lord, Lord Butler. After spending a brief period of 30 years in the House of Commons, I had not understood that the PAC was set up under a different arrangement. One learns something every day. It sounds attractive for the IC to be on the same wavelength.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

It is confusing but what is set up under statute is the Public Accounts Commission, not the Public Accounts Committee.

[Lord King of Bridgwater]

I have now unlearnt something which I thought I had learnt, and I am grateful to the noble Lord for his intervention. I certainly think that when we come to Amendment 3 there are strong arguments for moving in that direction, provided that the arrangements can be established to ensure security of intelligence. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, was with us when we went to Washington. One is struck by the number of Senate committees there. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is held in a totally secure room, and there are badges for all 19 government agencies that the committee oversees as part of its various responsibilities. It is a completely different facility. If, as I understand it, the proposal is that the facilities will now be provided by Parliament, as opposed to the separate facilities that existed in the Cabinet Office, it will be necessary to think about what sort of facilities will match up to the requirement for total security and the proper safeguarding of intelligence.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

My Lords, one thing that the debate has shown so far—and this will also apply to the debate on the next amendment—is that the Government have not yet done enough to satisfy your Lordships that the arrangements for independence for the committee are adequate. This debate has been interesting. I think I understood the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, correctly when he said that he was quoting me quoting the Deputy Prime Minister on the “veneer of expertise”. I in no way associate myself with that comment, nor with the one that I am told the Liberal Democrat spokesperson from the House of Lords made on TV today—that we are a House full of dead-beats and has-beens. I think that this debate will prove how wrong both those comments are.

The arrest just last week of alleged Olympic terror plot suspects was a clear reminder of the vital and largely hidden work that the intelligence and security services undertake. Part of the discussion that we are having now is based on the fact that the strength and health of our democracy in the UK depends on a very fine balance between the Government, who are empowered to protect our national security, and the strength, credibility and authority of the institutions that have oversight of that power.

I suspect that during the course of Committee the majority of debate will understandably be reserved for the changes proposed to the judicial element of that oversight. However—and I make this point very strongly—our system of democracy is, unlike that of the USA, based on the concept of parliamentary sovereignty. That means that Parliament, as representative of the public, is the ultimate check over other government institutions—not the Prime Minister or the Government. A powerful security service demands equally powerful and independent parliamentary oversight, and the Intelligence and Security Committee is a very important plank in this oversight mechanism. However, it is widely recognised that, while the committee has in some ways developed its remit in response to the changing nature of government intelligence and counterterrorism activities, the law has not kept pace with that change.

The committee was set up in 1994. We saw in its 2009-10 annual report that the committee itself recognised that reform was necessary to maintain public confidence in its oversight function. It asserted that corporate knowledge of the committee’s procedure within government had been lost over time and that in some cases this had led—this is a serious point—to misunderstandings about the statutory independence of the committee and its work and about the nature of the relationship between the committee and the Prime Minister. The committee has suggested a number of reforms which I think we will hear more about and discuss today.

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[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, I welcome the opportunity to say a few words on this amendment, mainly because I always listen with great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. His knowledge of parliamentary procedure is second to none and he is probably the most skilful of anyone I have observed in what one might call the parliamentary maze. However, I disagree with his proposal that there should be a Select Committee for the following and other reasons.

First, intelligence is not created in a vacuum but for a reason. Sometimes it is found to be created for a reason that proves to be suspect but not necessarily to be followed. It is not completely free of scrutiny; far from it. A little later in the Bill there are references to the Intelligence Services Commissioner. I am bound to say—I said this before when I was independent reviewer of terrorism legislation—that the Government and the security services could give a more coherent and fuller narrative of what they do. I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller. She started the process in a convincing way of giving at least some narrative that enabled not only the public but, perhaps more importantly, parliamentarians in the first instance to understand why certain things were being done and certain actions taken. It is subject to oversight and it is necessarily subject to confidentiality. Accountability is very important but we have to face up to the fact that full transparency can never be achieved, and indeed should never be achieved for it runs the risk of exposing those who do very difficult tasks for our intelligence service to risks to which we would not wish them to be exposed.

Furthermore, a Select Committee of either the other place or both Houses involves the normal Select Committee procedures. It is very difficult to limit those procedures because Parliament makes its own rules. Those of us such as the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, a number of others present and me—derided as we are by some for having been in the House of Commons before coming here—know something that possibly not everyone else knows, which is that Erskine May is not like a legal textbook. The rules of parliamentary procedure are often made up as you go along and one cannot anticipate clearly what they will be. Sometimes the mood of the nation changes those rules. Think back to what happened in London on 7 July 2005 to see the emotion that followed those events and how easy it would have been for parliamentary procedure to have been changed, either to make a Select Committee much more secretive in its approach— inappropriately so perhaps—or to go the other way and open up everything to public scrutiny.

If Members of this House or another place are appointed to Select Committees by the normal route, it exposes much of what is given to them to their staff. The Government should be entitled to look at the ability of the proposed members of a committee to retain and hold to confidential material and the reliability of their staff. The one thing one cannot afford in this area is inadvertent leaks or the innocently meant, but foolish, acts of the unwise.

What the Government propose in this Bill is, in my judgment, appropriate. We have a committee that is accountable but not wholly transparent for perfectly good reasons. It has the capacity to look at secrets in detail but within an appropriate context—as limited, for example, by Clause 2(3), which means that the Prime Minister and the ISC must be satisfied as to the part that anything that might be inquired into plays in any ongoing national security operation.

My judgment, for what it is worth, is that what the Government propose in this Bill creates a prudent and carefully thought-out structure for the proper and rigorous scrutiny of how secret material is dealt with by Her Majesty’s Government. There is a danger that we play into the hands of those who believe that because something is secret there is some kind of ghastly Executive conspiracy going on. That is completely untrue. Of course, mistakes are made; there are people in the secret services who have to delve into the most difficult things that face our society, and they are bound to make mistakes. I hope that occasionally they do make the odd mistake in the protection of the public, because overcaution is not a bad thing if it saves lives—sometimes large numbers of lives. But the menu provided in this Bill allows the proper balance, and I shall, if necessary, not support the noble Lord’s amendment.

[Lord King of Bridgwater]

The noble Lord has great experience in these areas, and I take it from the tenor of his argument that he is not advocating a Select Committee approach. He said that he was in favour of what the Government have in the Bill, but since then the noble Lord, Lord Butler, and the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, have produced amendments. What is his view on those?

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

At the moment I am dealing with the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. I listened with great care to my noble friend Lord Henley from the Front Bench, and I am very content with the approach that he has taken. We should wait and see what the Government come up with in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Butler, who has great wisdom and experience in these things—I am completely open-minded about that. But I am not happy with the idea that we should have a conventional Select Committee or, even worse, a Select Committee whose rules have been fiddled with for this purpose.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, like many Members I have been greatly impressed by the contribution made by the noble Lords, Lord Campbell-Savours and Lord Carlile. Both have the gift of being able to articulate their views with awesome clarity and very great force. If one had to, I should find it somewhat difficult to decide which one is correct in this matter. However, in respect of this debate and the earlier Amendments 1 and 2, it seems that everybody’s objectives point very much in the same direction.

In the first instance is the desire for sovereignty and independence for this particular body. By sovereignty one means that it is an organ, extension and delegation of Parliament, to such a degree that, as far as the Bill of Rights is concerned, it would be unchallengeable in the courts. I think that we are all agreed on that matter. At the same time, it has to be independent of the Executive and Prime Minister, which means that it should be, to use a canine expression, the watchdog of Parliament rather than the poodle of the Prime Minister. It is much easier to enunciate that principle than to work it out exactly because, by definition, the Prime Minister and to a large extent the Home Secretary has a constant flow of intelligence information, which will simply not be disseminated generally.

My other point relates to Select Committees. I listened carefully to the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, and believe that the concept of a Select Committee is sufficiently broad and flexible to allow a great deal to be done of the nature suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. I would have thought that a Select Committee could always decide whether to sit in public or not and, if so, on exactly what terms. A Select Committee can decide whether a single word of its report is to be published or whether there is to be general publication, subject to sidelining. Sidelining, of course, can be a severe sanction. I will never forget the day, in about 1967, when I was a Member of the House of Commons and that flamboyant and splendid Member of Parliament Tam Dalyell was hauled before the House to answer a serious charge of contempt. It related to a Select Committee that was looking into the affairs of Porton Down, a most delicate situation as we all appreciate. There was an awesome hush; it was almost like a public flogging. There was the miscreant standing ashen-faced at the Bar of the House. It taught me a lesson about the tremendous and terrible jurisdiction that the House of Commons has, if it wishes to use it in a situation like that.

Where do we arrive? First, at a body that is not appointed by the Prime Minister; secondly, a body that is unchallengeable in the courts; and thirdly, a body—possibly a Select Committee—that is able to do its work with the confidence of the public, and yet able to maintain an absolute confidentiality which is so important to its very function.

[Lord King of Bridgwater]

My Lords, I agree very much with the noble Lord that—as the noble Lord, Lord Butler, said—there is no argument about the ends. We need to establish public confidence in a very important committee which has a very important role in overseeing the intelligence agencies and which clearly has to be regarded as being in a different world from the other areas of responsibility that Select Committees deal with. This is a difficult issue and a number of interesting points have come up during this debate which I had not anticipated. One point, made by my noble friend Lord Lothian, was the implication that this must involve, as I understood it, a majority of public hearings. My understanding is that the Defence Select Committee, particularly when discussing our nuclear deterrent, goes into secret session and there has never been any problem with that. I am not aware of any leaks from any of those proceedings. However, it is a challenge. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, might remember that when we tried to meet totally in secret, as we did, I tried to see whether there was some way that we might at least have a public hearing. I certainly saw the risk, exactly as posed by my noble friend Lord Lothian, that if you were not careful you would end up with prepared questions and prepared answers—all planted—and it would be just a stage show, which would not carry much credibility.

As for the challenge about how we achieve this balance, I reflected on a bit of history. When Sir Anthony Blunt had to be outed at the beginning of the 1979 Administration of the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, there were considerable debates about whether it was time to have some sort of committee. Jonathan Aitken got quite a bit of publicity for being in this particular session when he stood up and said that,

“one debate and one Written Answer do not add up to adequate and continuing scrutiny of the Security Service”.—[Official Report, Commons, 21/11/79; col. 446.]

I think we would all agree with that. He said the Government should take the initiative and if they did not move to establish a “senior and more cautious” committee of privy counsellors, then in a different Parliament—perhaps one dominated by left-wing Back-Benchers—a more intrusive, less sympathetic Commons Select Committee might be set up.

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[Lord King of Bridgwater]

The view about a Select Committee is rather easier to hold if you are in opposition than if you are in government. The history of this was that the entire shadow Cabinet in 1989 voted in favour of it. When the prospect of office loomed, Jack Straw, who was then I think shadow Home Secretary, was asked the same question and was much more cautious about the whole matter. Of course, when they came into government there were no moves to introduce a Select Committee. However, times have moved on and I hope that there will be moves in that direction.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, obviously my noble friend is right to say that times have moved on. All of us can remember as far back as 1989. Things have obviously changed since then. I was merely trying to tease out the official view of the Opposition at this stage, but it does not matter because as we all know, and as a very distinguished Cross-Bencher, the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, made clear, we are all heading in the same direction and at least trying to make sure that we achieve the right thing—a committee that has the appropriate degree of public confidence.

I do not want to re-emphasise what I said earlier about the ISC being appointed by Parliament rather than the Prime Minister, and about its members being free to choose their own chair. That will be debated later, in the context of another amendment tabled by the noble Lord. In parallel with these statutory changes, it is the Government’s intention that the ISC will be funded and accommodated by Parliament. The amendment sets up the ISC as a Select Committee of Parliament. The noble Lord could have achieved that by the simpler means of leaving out the whole of Part 1 and making sure that the appropriate authorities in another place created the Select Committee—but he went down a different route and we are having this debate for the very good reasons that all speakers in the debate made clear.

I will explain why we believe that the ISC should be created by statute. It is to ensure that safeguards are in place to protect against the disclosure of sensitive information. Therefore, the Government do not consider it appropriate for that body to be a full Joint Committee established merely under the Standing Orders of each House, as other Select Committees are.

I hope that the Committee will bear with me if I expand on those reasons. First, in that scenario, the Government would not have a statutory ability to prevent the publication of sensitive material. There are two main problems with this. The risk of disclosure of information that might damage national security could be increased. This might lead to a situation where agency heads find it hard to reconcile their duty to protect information with their duty to facilitate oversight. This could lead to a sharing of less sensitive information and therefore a corresponding reduction in the effectiveness and credibility of oversight.

Secondly, it would not be possible for the most sensitive information to be withheld from the Committee. It is important that safeguards exist so there is adequate provision for those exceptional circumstances where the disclosure of information, even to the Chairman of the Committee, would be damaging to national security and/or would jeopardise vital agency operations or sources of information. The equivalent grounds on which information can be withheld from the Committee under the Intelligence Services Act 1994, have been used very rarely, as those former or current members of the Committee will know. We would expect the similar powers in the Bill also to be used sparingly—only in exceptional circumstances.

Thirdly, there is the appointments process. Again we will deal with that in greater detail later on. Here the Prime Minister has a role, and the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, in a later amendment proposes a much stronger role for him. That role is important. The ISC is unique in that members of the Committee have access to very important and extremely sensitive information, and it is important that the appointments process has sufficient safeguards to ensure there is as little risk as possible of unauthorised disclosure of sensitive information and the consequences that could do significant damage to national security.

The effect of the noble Lord’s amendment to create a Select Committee is not clear to me. He says it could take evidence under oath. In the Bill, even if we were to accept all the noble Lord’s amendments, the ISC would still be created by statute and safeguards would still exist to protect national security in those three areas I have listed, although admittedly altered to some degree. Unless the noble Lord pursues this suggested alternative policy of deleting the whole of Part 1, his amendment would not create a full Joint Committee because that can be done only by the Standing Orders of each House. It would create an entirely novel body, a Select Committee established by statute.

To what extent would such a body share the characteristics of the other Select Committees? The Bill makes it clear that, even were it amended in other respects according to noble Lords’ wishes, the ISC is different from other Select Committees in fundamental respects—for instance, in relation to appointments and reporting. That being so, I believe it is unclear whether or to what extent changing the ISC in this way would give it the other characteristic of a Select Committee. Indeed, I believe the risk is that describing the ISC as a Select Committee when it has characteristics not shared by other such committees could positively mislead as to the ISC’s true character.

I hope that that explanation is sufficient for the noble Lord. I wait to see what he says. This has been a useful debate and there will no doubt be further discussions on this matter, but I believe that it is appropriate for the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, I wholeheartedly support the amendment. My parting speech in the House of Commons in 2001 was on the very issue of the payment of chairmen of Select Committees. I wanted to see the development of what you might call a separate career structure in the legislature as opposed to the Executive. When I was a member, the chairman, the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, did excellent work. When I think of the amount of work that he took on, it is inconceivable that we should now push through legislation without taking full account of that work and the need to ensure that it is remunerated.

[Lord King of Bridgwater]

I intervene very briefly. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, for his comments and for those that he made at Second Reading, for which I am grateful. I am not sure whether this amendment can be made retrospective, but it seems an excellent idea. I do support it—it seems logical if a Select Committee chairman in the House of Commons now has it. I understand my noble friend Lord Lamont made the point. The point the noble Lord, Lord Butler, raised is pretty fundamental because it applies to every Select Committee of this House. If the House is not sitting, people do not get any allowance even if those committees are working. The issue goes a bit broader than just changing it for the ISC.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

If I may correct the noble Lord, it is worse than that. Under the arrangements for other Select Committees of this House, the members qualify even if the House is not sitting. The noble Lord shakes his head but if he looks up the rules he will find—I see the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, agrees with me—that for Select Committees the allowance is available on days when the House is not sitting, but for the ISC it is not.

[Lord King of Bridgwater]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. He has cheered up the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, quite considerably if that is right because he was telling me of the committee session he must attend in the Recess. I simply say that I support this. I do not know quite what the first part of the amendment means or whether the Minister will explain it. I am not clear what the financial benefits are for Members of the House of Commons when they are on Select Committees. We asked for equivalent arrangements for the ISC. Perhaps somebody will clarify that point.

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, the names of my noble friends Lady Smith of Basildon and Lord Beecham are associated with Amendment 9 and we support the proposal that the chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee should be remunerated in line with chairs of departmental Select Committees of the House of Commons. As has already been said clearly, the commitment required by future occupants of this post is likely to be extensive, bearing in mind that the whole purpose of the Bill is to strengthen oversight of the intelligence and security activities of the Government by extending the statutory remit of the Intelligence and Security Committee. The committee, as we know, will be drawn from Members of the House of Commons and your Lordships’ House. It would seem appropriate to determine remuneration as part of the Bill, and to relate it to a not dissimilar position in one of the Houses of Parliament from which the membership of the committee is to be drawn.

A departmental Select Committee in the House of Commons has a different but not widely dissimilar role to that of the Intelligence and Security Committee under the Bill. The chair of a departmental Select Committee in the House of Commons also takes on a considerable additional level of commitment and responsibility. There are a number of such posts and they are not held by Ministers of the Crown. The officeholders, like the Select Committees themselves, are drawn from Back-Benchers, as would be the case with the Intelligence and Security Committee and the chair of that committee. It would therefore seem that the chair of a departmental Select Committee in the House of Commons is the appropriate benchmark, as provided for in Amendment 9, which we support.

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[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 6 in this group. My amendment deals with the wording in Clause 1(5) of the Bill, which states:

“Before deciding whether to nominate a person for membership, the Prime Minister must consult the Leader of the Opposition”.

I have great reservations about this, and I will explain why. I think that this is the product of muddled thinking. This is an appointment of trust. The appointment requires the Prime Minister’s knowledge of opposition politicians. I think that Ministers very often do not understand what motivates opposition politicians.

As an example I take my own appointment. It is utterly inconceivable that the then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, now the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher, would have appointed me to that committee. She would have referred to my record in the 1980s when I was running with the hounds on the issue of Peter Wright and we caused some considerable difficulty, I was informed, in the House of Commons. I had endless arguments with the Table Office over the tabling of Questions. On a number of occasions my Questions, which, it was thought, would have breached national security had they been tabled, were submitted to the Speaker of the House of Commons under the appeal procedure. If, in the 1980s, I had applied to be a member of this committee, I feel quite sure that if it had been left to the Prime Minister of the day—I am arguing the converse—the Prime Minister of the day might well have objected to a person like me being a member of that committee.

The problem was that, at the time, people did not know what we were campaigning about. It was about reform of Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act and about the need to introduce freedom of information legislation. In both areas we were successful. All I am saying is that, before we go down this route and require the Prime Minister to consult with whomever, we should have in mind that it is possible that people might be blocking appointments in an unfair manner.

Amendment 8 deals with the issue that the chair of the ISC is to be chosen by its members. This is the product of muddled thinking among those who fail to understand the internal dynamics of the committee. It is as if someone has sat down to devise systems of greater accountability that enable them to avoid taking the big question on going for full Select Committee status. In my view, the chairman needs the respect of the agencies, and new members appointed in a new Parliament will have no knowledge of the relationship between the chairman or any member of that committee and the agencies. There is a real danger that the Whips will seek to influence members’ decision about whom to appoint as chairman. It might be that there is an exercise in handing out the jobs going on. I feel that it is wrong that the committee should be placed in a position where it has to choose its chairman at the beginning of a Parliament. New members might be unduly influenced by previous members against their better judgment. As I said at Second Reading, if when I was selected to sit on the committee, I had been asked to vote for the chairman, I would never have voted for the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, because he was not top of my list of popular Secretaries of State, but within a matter of months I realised that he was ideal for the job. You need the experience of being on the committee before you start picking the chairman. What we are doing here is establishing a procedure whereby a chairman will be selected by new members going on to a committee without any knowledge of who they might be appointing.

If a chairman does not fully enjoy the trust of the agencies, there is a danger that that lack of trust may impede the work of the committee by denying access to material that is on the margins of the memorandum of understanding. There will be material on the margins of the memorandum of understanding to which the committee wants access, and it is vital that the chairman is someone who has been picked not by members of the committee but by the Prime Minister.

[Lord King of Bridgwater]

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Butler, that the Bill is inadequate without Amendment 5 because it is simply a diktat. The fact that the Houses of Parliament vote on the members is not a really democratic position. We hope to see a more acceptable position.

The question I would put to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, on Amendment 6 is: when he was active on some of these issues, would he have been appointed or recommended by the leader of the Opposition? He says that there was no way in which Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, now the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher, would have appointed him. Would the leader of the Opposition have appointed him?

I do not see how else you can do this. It is really down to the calibre, resolution and determination of the leader of the Opposition. In the end, he is in a very powerful position if he says, “These are the people I want. These are the people I think should be from the Opposition”. I do not know—and I do not know whether the noble Lord has any background on this—whether a Prime Minister has refused to accept the recommendation of the leader of the Opposition.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

If my noble friend Lord Kinnock had been Prime Minister, he would not have been put off putting me on that committee because he was well aware of the campaign that we were running and its objectives.

[Lord King of Bridgwater]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for that comment.

I would like to support opposition Amendment 7. It has not been spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, but I imagine that he will speak to it. It says that the chairman of the ISC should be “from the Opposition party”. In principle, I support that. One of the ways for the committee to gain credibility is for the chairman to be a member of the opposition party. However, I would not wish to see it written into the statute in this way. I will, if I may, cite my own experience. We started this committee with considerable uncertainty and considerable reservations in a number of quarters—in some of the agencies and other places—as to whether it would be reputable. A great effort was made by both the Prime Minister and the then leader of the Opposition to get a pretty experienced bunch. They were mainly ex-Ministers, and I think almost all were privy counsellors. The desire was to have a really credible, reputable and senior committee. It was certainly the most senior of all the committees, and in calibre and experience outranked the PAC, which would otherwise be seen as a pretty senior committee. That was the right way to start.

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[Lord King of Bridgwater]

I am trying to remember how many new Members came on to the committee. There was a big upheaval. I remember that the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, for example, was a member of the previous committee; he was whisked off to be a Minister. It was a pretty major change of cast. With great respect to my noble friend, who says that new members of the committee might be expected to know about these things, a number of them might have had no previous experience whatever of the committee.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I will look very carefully at the point that my noble friend has made and at the statistics relating to 1997 in particular, which was one of those years in which there would have been a big upheaval, with that particular new Parliament. Off the cuff, I do not know who was on the committee and who came on, although perhaps my noble friend can remember. But in the main, with the relatively experienced parliamentarians who will be on this committee, I think that it is well suited to making the decision itself.

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[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I start by being faintly flippant. I remind my noble friend that the quorum for this House and this Committee is only three—one to speak, one to listen and one to sit either in the Chair or on the Woolsack. Even with the crowded House that we have at the moment, we represent probably well below a third or even a tenth of the membership of the House. I should also remind my noble friend that my understanding is that it is the practice of most Select Committees to have a quorum of three or a quarter of the committee’s membership. Three is therefore the number that we have picked. Bearing in mind that the ISC is a relatively small committee with a membership of only nine, three represents a third of the membership.

Having said that, one should take my noble friend’s amendment seriously but we have not, as far as I am aware, had any problems with the quorum. A quorum of five might be overly restrictive, particularly if you take the view that the function of a quorum should be to provide protection against the possibility of a small number of persons on a body taking actions or decisions that could be unrepresentative of that body as a whole.

[Lord King of Bridgwater]

I think it fair to say that this is a Committee that, quite exceptionally, has a remarkably high attendance level, and this is something we are quite proud of and which, I am sure, has continued. I do not ever recall any problem about a quorum. In fact, I recall very few occasions when the whole Committee was not on parade and, as anyone familiar with House of Commons Select Committees will know, that is often far from being the case.

[Lord Henley]

I am very grateful to my noble friend for giving me that assurance. I remember when, many years ago, I was first put on a Committee—the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, possibly the outer Siberia of committees. I think there were seven Members from each House and a quorum of two from each House. On a committee of that sort it was often quite difficult to reach the quorum of both Houses, but some of us manfully attended week in, week out, to preserve it. I am very grateful to my noble friend for making the more serious point that the Committee does, in the main, have not just a quorum but is normally fully attended by virtually all Members; that really answers the points of the noble Baroness, Lady Williams.

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[Lord King of Bridgwater]

My Lords, I shall take together all the amendments that deal with how the ISC can interface more clearly with the public. I listened with interest to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and I wondered whether her view on the meetings in public and the hearings that might subsequently be held in public, which is raised in the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, is that those would be televised as well. This is an option in Select Committees, and hearings that are held in public will presumably be open to television coverage.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

My Lords, I did not hear what the noble Lord said as he turned away from the microphone. Will the noble Lord repeat what his concern was because we missed it on these Benches? I did not hear what his objection was.

[Lord King of Bridgwater]

The point was that it may be decided to hold some proceedings in public which presumably would be televised as well. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, referred to a point that I was also going to refer to. The annual appearance of what was previously the ISC was the publication of the annual report. We used to have a press conference after that and it was televised and open to all the journalists. Of course there could be an inquiry of one sort or another that came outside the annual cycle. The classic illustration of that was Mr Mitrokhin and the Mitrokhin report. I have a copy of the press release that we put out on 13 June 2000 on the Mitrokhin report.

It is interesting about pushing back the boundaries. This is pervasive and accepted by the Government in the whole concept of the initial clauses of this Bill on the wider remit that has grown for the ISC. The committee agreed to conduct this inquiry on the understanding that it would have access to all the relevant documents, including advice given to Ministers as well as evidence from key witnesses. We were given this access. This was never included in the original Bill and was an illustration of the way in which the committee gradually covered a wider area and had greater access. The idea that the committee hides away in private and is not prepared to appear in public is not right.

Amendment 17, in the name of the noble Baroness and her colleagues on the opposition Front Bench, states that the committee,

“may decide to hold some of its proceedings in public, subject to sub-paragraph (2)”.

Sub-paragraph (2) states:

“The ISC may not hold public hearings … if it might lead to the disclosure of—

(a) sensitive information”.

That is the whole problem. As the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, who has now joined us as a former member of the committee, said, if you have an effective committee with effective questioning, where may it lead? If you are discussing serious issues, you cannot be sure at the start of it. You may have started out with a wonderful public agenda but things may emerge in the evidence that make it thoroughly undesirable at that stage that it is held in public. I was trying to think what the issues are because I was myself in favour of trying to see whether the committee could have the occasional public meeting, not as an obligation and having to explain each time why it was not having it in public, but just to show that there are issues, that it is an effective committee and that it could hold the heads of the agencies to account.

One of the problems when we started was that the heads of the agencies did not always want to appear in public and have their faces too easily recognisable. That situation changed and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, was an exception. She was extremely good at bringing a more public face to the essential activities of MI5. I wondered about the sort of subjects on which we could see the committee in action. One of them might be recruitment for the Security Service: the issue of whether it is recruited from too narrow a sector of society, the efforts that the agency is making to recruit across a wider section of community, the importance of diversity, and the importance of access to a wider range of languages and of being involved with and recruiting from all sections of our multicultural society, which is so important at the present time. That is the sort of issue—I got a small nod as I said this—that I thought could be handled in a public hearing.

I would like to have had a public hearing on the accommodation arrangements of GCHQ and our criticisms of the control of that project. This was one of the biggest scandals that we uncovered during our time in Government, where the estimate for the expenditure on the new facility in Cheltenham, the donut, which is now well photographed, rocketed beyond an initial brave estimate of £20 million and ended up closer to £220 million. Issues of accommodation are perhaps relevant, although you can get bogged down in all sorts of tabloid sensations. One of the accommodation issues was the cost of the trees on the balcony of SIS and who was paying for those. The committee has to be careful not to get bogged down—we always took this view—in chasing the individual tabloid shock-horror story of the week and to concentrate instead on the issues that are of fundamental importance.

There is a real difficulty in trying to say that in principle the hearings should be in public. My noble friend Lord Lothian illustrated to those who were not at the earlier session what happened with the Senate Intelligence Committee and how it was a put-up job with planted questions and planted answers because that was all it felt safe to handle in public. I do not think that helps credibility and it looks as though the committee is just part of the conspiracy.

I do not support the idea that in principle there should be public hearings and that the committee should explain why if they are not, which is the theme of these amendments. Public confidence is best achieved by taking the opportunity where possible for a public hearing and showing the sort of way that the committee operates but not having it as a presumption in every case.

[Baroness Manningham-Buller]

I am pleased to hear from the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, that the committee is currently thinking of whether there are ways that some things could be held in public because I think it is the case that there are issues—the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, suggested some—that could conceivably be considered in public without any danger to national security. Having said that, I would also say that, whenever I gave evidence to the committee, on practically all occasions I was discussing secret information and very often top secret information. Therefore, the time that you could have an open hearing would be very restricted indeed. On whether this would improve public confidence, it would be narrow so it might or might not. However, if the committee is thinking that way, that is welcome.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, if I have not caused apoplexy so far, I will with this amendment. I have absolutely no expectation that the Government will be minded to accept the notion of confirmatory hearings. However, I tabled the amendment because we do not have to go the way of the United States. There are more and more examples in the UK of confirmatory hearings. They do not necessarily come with a veto—in fact, there are probably no hearings where a veto is granted to the examining committee. However, holding sessions where a nominee for a position can be questioned so that the public know what they are getting in the prospective appointee is part of opening up services to public understanding as well as addressing issues of accountability.

I mentioned the Greater London Authority earlier. I will not draw too many comparisons between the organisations, but confirmatory hearings of mayoral appointments were introduced just after I stood down from the GLA. I watched one of them on what I believe is called a narrowcast on the web and it was absolutely fascinating—not just the questions but the whole experience. One could tell so much from the body language of the person who was being questioned. I thought that it was a very useful session. This is not even in hope, let alone expectation, but I do not want to think that we have to do things exactly as the United States does or discard them because of that experience.

[Lord King of Bridgwater]

I have a point of clarification. Is the noble Baroness proposing that these hearings should be in public or not?

[Baroness Hamwee]

I suppose it had been in my mind for the reason that I gave about public understanding. The noble Lord raises a very interesting point as to whether one should look at this as not a public exercise. That would raise different and very interesting issues, and perhaps fruitful ones. I am sorry I did not go there in my comments. I beg to move.

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[Lord Henley]

I stand corrected by the noble Baroness, but it makes little odds; Crown servants are in fact at Permanent Secretary-level, although I accept that rebuke.

The recruitment process is therefore expected to follow the process for the appointment of Crown servants of such seniority. I could go through the details of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act, but I can give an assurance that they are exempt from that. They will necessarily follow the spirit of the civil servant recruitment principles, which we consider to be the best process. We do not consider it to be the appropriate mechanism for recruitment to public bodies, whether the process is conducted in public or in private. It might be appropriate for the other posts that I mentioned but not for the public bodies that we are talking about.

[Lord King of Bridgwater]

I apologise to the Minister for intervening, as he has been extremely co-operative with the Committee in every respect. It seems to me that, on the whole principle of this pre-appointment hearing—we left open the question about public or private hearings—it is an important asset for the person about to be appointed if he has a successful hearing before the committee. It reinforces his position at the start of his work if the principle is accepted elsewhere.

We then have the argument about Crown servants and their exact role, and we go through a range of bodies, including Ofcom. I do not even know what Ofcom’s position is—whether it is in government or outside it—and exactly what its relationship is. However, I think that the principle of holding hearings has merit, and—to use a phrase I have used before—I have a feeling that they will come.

[Lord Henley]

I am afraid that on this occasion I have to disagree with my noble friend. There it is quite a distinction between Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary or the chair of the Social Security Advisory Service on the one hand and, for that matter, the Permanent Secretary of the Home Office or the Permanent Secretary of any other department on the other. We suggest that the heads of the intelligence and security agencies fit in more appropriately with that later group rather than with the former group.

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[Lord King of Bridgwater]

I am getting very flattered by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. I think that there is a real problem in this area and I do not quite understand the amendments tabled here. I certainly do not understand this business in the Bill about what would be before a departmental Select Committee,

“on grounds that were not limited to national security”.

That is the point that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, made and I hope that the Minister will clarify that point to an extent.

I think that there is a point, though it may seem a bit extreme, in what the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, said. It may strike fear through all proper government structures that the suggestion should be left to the chairman of the committee. I think it is true that it is not just the chairman of the committee: initially, it is the heads of the agencies: they are the people who decide whether they wish to withhold information, then they have to make their case to the chairman.

This takes us into quite interesting country, because one of the arguments used in the past is, to whom are the heads of the agencies responsible? The answer is that they are responsible to the Prime Minister. That raises the question: how does a busy Prime Minister with a thousand problems on his plate really take direct ministerial involvement? One interesting study we did looked at the proposal—one or two members of the committee got quite interested in it—that there should be an intermediate Minister appointed who would have overall responsibility for the agencies at Minister of State level, answering to the Prime Minister. We thought that this was quite a good idea until we discovered that that was exactly what had happened in Germany. I do not remember the name of the Minister, but he became an intermediate and became carried away with his role in intelligence matters—he became a sort of super-M. At one stage he was flying to Iran and other places by private jet trying to negotiate the release of certain German hostages and other people. It had gone completely to his head and people suddenly realised that nobody had much control. One or two senior members of Her Majesty’s Civil Service pointed out the dangers of this role to the Prime Minister—one or two of them may be sitting here—saying that there were occasions when a previous Prime Minister thought that the intelligence agencies were out of control and trying to undermine him. Was it a good idea to pass this off to a junior Minister? The Prime Minister had better keep overall responsibility for it.

Having said all that, I think that there is an argument, for Ministers who are not—if it is the Prime Minister—entirely dependent on official advice on this, that a properly constituted, effective chairman will bear a heavy responsibility if he overrides the head of an agency and says that this information should be made public and then finds that it subsequently proves to be extremely damaging to national security. That would be enormously damaging not just to him or her personally, but, obviously, to the whole role of the ISC. On those grounds, it would not be an irresponsible chairman in this role; it would be somebody who, because of the involvement he has had already, over a period, with the heads of the agencies, could probably be expected to take a more informed and responsible response to representations made by the heads of the agencies.

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I shall be brief, as much of the subject matter has been covered already. I wish to speak to Amendments 21 and 23. The purpose of those two amendments is to ensure that the power to veto disclosure of departmental information can be exercised only by the Secretary of State and not by a Minister of the Crown. Paragraph 3(1)(b) of Schedule 1 requires that only the Secretary of State can decide that information required by the Intelligence and Security Committee can be withheld by the agencies. Moving down to paragraph 3(2)(b), in relation to other government departments, it appears that the Minister of the Crown can make that decision, which would appear to indicate, subject to the Minister’s response, that such a key decision can or would be made at a more junior level than Secretary of State in relation to disclosure of information in respect of a government department. If that is the case, no indication is given about a reason for that decision. Bearing in mind that withholding required information could thwart the Intelligence and Security Committee in its work to meet its statutory remit of strength and oversight of the intelligence and security activities of the Government, such a decision should be taken only at the highest ministerial and accountable level within the department concerned, namely, the Secretary of State. These amendments provide for that.