Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(12 years, 6 months ago)
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Lord Newton of Braintree
My Lords, having vigorously indicated to the noble Lord that I wanted him to speak before me, I am left rather regretting it because I now find myself caught in the crossfire between Members on the Liberal Democrat Benches and Members on the Cross Benches. I have the deepest regard for both groups. I ought to say, if no one has said it before, that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, deserves a huge vote of thanks from all of us for the work he has performed over many years in the role to which he has just referred. If I arrive at what is possibly a slightly different conclusion that is closer to that of my former constituent and noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury, it will not be for want of admiration of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile.
My starting point is that 40 or 50 years ago, give or take Regulation 18B, no one in this Chamber would have thought that anything like the successive regimes we have had since the 2001 Act were desirable. They have been imposed on us by a change in the world that we have not been able to control and which we have had to cope with in the interests of our citizens. But it has led us into things that we would not have wished to do in other circumstances. If anyone wonders why I have an interest in this, as well as in too many other things going on in the House at the moment, it is that those with longish memories will know that the choice fell on me to chair the Privy Counsellor Review Committee of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 which contained the provisions under which people were basically locked up in Belmarsh without being found guilty of anything, and the key was being thrown away. The all-party committee found that deeply unsatisfactory. I notice that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, who was a member of that committee, is in her place. We said that something had to be done about it. The then Home Secretary went out of his way to rubbish our report as quickly as he could and nothing happened until the courts threw out the relevant part and said that it just could not stand.
We then got to the control orders under the 2005 Act, which in my view were an improvement. I share the view which has been expressed that these new proposals are an improvement on those orders—perhaps marginal, but somewhat better. So we are moving in the right direction and I would not want it to be thought that I was hostile to the Bill or to its fundamental aim and purpose. However, I do think—here I come to the position of my noble friend Lord Phillips, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—that this kind of thing is much better done as a court order rather than an executive act unless there are very strong reasons to the contrary. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, adumbrated to great debating effect a list of things that are done as executive orders, and I do not want to debate all those with him, but the mere fact that we have done a lot of things by executive orders does not mean that it is desirable. If you do not have to do it, I do not think that you should. As far as I can see, the case has not been made that this should be an executive order rather than a court order. I therefore come down in sympathy with the general purpose of the amendments in this group.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, some of us are even closer to the crossfire.
I start with a question which perhaps picks up where my noble friend Lord Carlile left off. It concerns the time limit on the measures. I had intended to ask it later under some amendments which I have down, but I shall ask it now. I found it quite hard to follow the Bill at the points where it begins to refer to revival, revocation, expiry, and so on. I needed a flow chart to understand just what was available in terms of imposition of measures. Are there any circumstances in which an individual can be subject to a TPIM or a series of TPIMs lasting more than two years, and, if there is one episode of new terrorism-related activity, which is defined, how long in all can a series of TPIMs last?
I should make it clear that I very much support the amendments proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, and supported by others. I also support the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. On his Amendments 42 and 43, he quoted the conclusion today of the Joint Committee on Human Rights on the issue of a full merits review. It is perhaps worth reading into the record as part of this debate the comments that the committee made in leading up to that conclusion. It said that the Government in replying to its previous report had argued that,
“there is no reason to doubt that courts will continue to apply intense scrutiny in TPIMs cases, as they have in control order cases, and that ‘continued reliance on case law’ is the best way to deliver that intense scrutiny”.
That became part of the conclusion. It seems to me that that does not amount to an argument for the principles of judicial review and that intense scrutiny is not excluded by the approach which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has advocated and which I support. I have checked the Government’s response to the previous report by the JCHR. Nothing significant has been left out of the paragraph that I have just quoted.
On the “balance of probabilities”, I added my name to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Can the Minister explain why under Clause 26, which introduces “enhanced” TPIMs, there is a higher standard of proof than for standard TPIMs? The same applies to the Draft Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill which is to have pre-legislative scrutiny. The memorandum from the Home Office to the JCHR regarding the draft Bill with the enhanced TPIMs, which, in particular, would provide for relocation, said that the higher test is because of the more stringent measures allowed by the draft Bill. Clearly it would apply the same argument to Clause 26. So called standard TPIMs are fairly stringent but, even apart from that, I do not follow the logic. The standard of proof as to the facts which permit a step to be taken is a different matter from the steps which are available. I regard those as closely related but logically separate issues. I am lost as to why the higher standard of proof, which, as my noble friend Lord Carlile has encouraged the House to think, would not be a risk to the Government in this context, cannot be applied.
Lord Macdonald of River Glaven
My Lords, I support the amendments. I can do so relatively briefly because I can quite easily and simply adopt many of the arguments that have been made.
Terrorism is the gravest and most dangerous kind of crime and TPIMs are a properly grave response to that threat. A consideration of what the imposition of a TPIM represents gives some clue as to what the correct process should be. The imposition of a TPIM represents a public finding that an individual is involved in acts of terrorism. Of course, the individual’s name is not publicised, but surely his friends and his wider community are aware of it. It is a grave step and a grave potential stigmatising of an individual with an association with the gravest kind of crime. It is in those circumstances that one is driven to the conclusion that, if a TPIM is to be imposed, it should be imposed not by a member of the Executive but rather by a court. It is in those circumstances that I support the amendments to that effect.
I have not yet heard an argument why it is better for these measures to be imposed by a member of the Executive. I have heard arguments from my noble and learned friend, whose advocacy I have heard many times in courts up and down the land and which never ceases to impress me, as to why it is not necessarily constitutionally inappropriate but not as to why it is positively better than the alternative. The argument that has been made by a number of my noble friends and other noble Lords is that, given what a TPIM represents and the gravity of the measure, if it can be done by a court it should be done by a court unless there is a very good reason why it should not. I have heard no such reason.
The same applies to the burden of proof. I agree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick: the balance of probabilities is a test which is tailor made, perfectly made, for the process which the court needs to go through in this situation. It is not the criminal standard of proof because these are, in essence, civil penalties, but a civil standard of proof which, as he said, is flexible, realistic, well understood by the judiciary and does justice in civil cases up and down the land, including in other civil preventive measures.
Again, I do not understand what the argument against this is. If it is that it should be easier to impose a TPIM—that we cannot trust a judge to come to a safe conclusion about whether something is more likely than not—that is a false argument. It is, if you like, a somewhat cowardly argument. We can trust the judges to apply a balance of probabilities test in TPIMs in a way that is both just and entirely capable of protecting the public.
Lord Faulks
What I endeavoured to say was that the balance of probabilities would be appropriate were the courts to be taking that initial decision in place of the Secretary of State, which I understand to be the burden of the amendment put forward by the noble and learned Lord, whereas I understand that the suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is that the initial stage and the decision to be taken by the Secretary of State should be on the balance of probabilities, and there I suggest that the current test is more suitable.
Baroness Hamwee
Does the noble Lord have any comments on the provisions in Clause 26, which provide for the Secretary of State to take a decision based on the balance of probabilities in the position where the more stringent measures might be applied?
Lord Faulks
I have no immediate answer to that, but at this juncture I would suggest that the initial decision-making process is far better on that basis because that is the most important stage: whether or not you decide that it is appropriate to impose, or seek to impose, a TPIM—with the approval of the court, it must be said.
Lord Pannick
We will hear from the Minister in relation to that in a moment. I am satisfied that a sensible and fair way of dealing with what is a very difficult issue, because of the primacy of national security and the particularly intrusive nature of a relocation power, is for the Government to satisfy themselves, as I assume they have done, that relocation powers are not needed. However, given the importance of this power, they recognise that it is sensible to have reserve powers available which, God forbid they are ever needed, can be brought into force. I support the Government on this.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I, too, support the Government and I am very much with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. If my noble friend Lord Carlile succeeds in getting answers to his questions about evidence, I shall consider that there is a huge amount of favouritism going on. That is exactly the sort of thing that we have all asked for on many occasions, but inevitably we are not satisfied because we know that advice to the Government is advice to the Government, and we cannot read their heart as we are being asked to do.
I do not quite understand the distinction between politics and security. For all the reasons we have talked about and will continue to talk about, it is a much more nuanced and complicated—there is probably a geometric term for it that I do not know—picture than a simple polarisation as regards the impact of particular measures. Of course surveillance is going to be costly, but another balance that one must come to is where one puts one’s efforts and spends one’s money.
Lord Macdonald of River Glaven
My Lords, I, too, support the Government on this issue. It does not surprise me at all that if the Government presently have a power, they will seek to use it, and it does not surprise me at all that if the security services presently have a power, they will seek to retain it. But the question is, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said: what is a fair balance? Noble Lords will know that the counterterrorism review considered these issues very anxiously and received a great deal of evidence. It came to the conclusion that public safety could be protected in the absence of the power of relocation but in the presence of additional surveillance, for which funding was indicated, and with the sort of measures that have now been brought forward in the TPIM Bill. That was the considered conclusion of the review and appears to be the conclusion of the Government. I must say, having scrutinised the evidence which was supplied to the counterterrorism review, it was also my conclusion. I therefore support the Government on this question.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I think I heard the Minister refer—I hope I did—to plans for resources for the security services over a period which is longer than to the end of next year. If that is so, I welcome it. At the end of his speech he referred to the next four years. I welcome this because it would not be proper for this Chamber—most noble Lords not being privy to security information—to take a view as to what is required for up to the end of next year and it being something different beyond that. I am not trying to give my noble friend ammunition in favour of his argument but simply to put my concern that we should not be looking at the matter through that lens.
Lord Henley
My Lords, one is always very careful when one speaks on these matters with a Treasury Minister sitting at one’s side. However, I can give an assurance to my noble friend that we have agreed extra resources for the Security Service over the next four-year period.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 10 to 15. These are all amendments to the first schedule to the Bill which deals with measures—in other words, how the measures are administered. I am not seeking, and will not at any stage seek during the debate, to argue against the Government’s responsibility to protect their citizens, which is necessarily complex, nor indeed to disrupt activity—“disrupt” is the term the Minister used. However, I do argue that there may be different ways and means.
I wish to bring the Committee back to the issue of how one deals with the individual at the centre of all this and his or her family; to the possibility of tipping people, including in the wider community because these matters get known about, over into the very activity that we are seeking to prevent; and to the person that we will have at the end of the year or two years. I am well aware that my drafting if often more suited to a contract than a piece of legislation but I cannot help it. I was a solicitor in practice for even longer than I have been in the House. It may be that the answer to a number of my amendments is that the Human Rights Act deals with them but I will take a short time to raise the specific issues in the House.
Amendment 9 deals with the hours that an individual is required to be at his residence, suggesting that an overnight requirement should be for such reasonable hours as are specified. We know that a period of 16 hours is compliant with human rights but a requirement to be at homes for 16 hours—effectively, an early evening curfew—does not sit easily with the desirability of allowing the individual to work or study. An early evening curfew would, for instance, preclude working in the restaurant trade. Indeed, having to be at home for 16 hours would probably make it impossible to carry out any sort of normal work. Some people work from nine to five but we forget that they have to get there by nine and leave after five. That is more than the eight hours which is 24 minus 16. That is my first amendment.
Amendment 10 is on the question of location. The Secretary of State can require the individual to reside at a locality with which they have “a connection”. My amendment suggests changing that to “a substantial connection”. “A connection” could be a very slight one. Maybe “significant connection” would be better. That would be a slightly lower test than a substantial one. To take a deliberately absurd example, I would like to avoid sending an urban person off to the Yorkshire Dales, however beautiful, because Mrs Smith who used to work in his local shop has retired there. That would be a connection but not a very sensible one in this context.
Amendment 11 is on the terms of occupancy of a specified residence. Paragraph 1 in the schedule allows the Secretary of State to,
“require the individual to comply with any specified terms of occupancy of that residence”.
At first, I wondered whether this should be a third party’s terms of residence but the residence may be one provided by the Secretary of State. Pointing to a lease or tenancy agreement would be a more satisfactory way of doing that. That is alluded to but only as one of a number of possibilities. I assume that “specified” means specified by the Secretary of the State. Again, the Secretary of State might be tempted to go beyond the bounds of what one would naturally expect through this paragraph, but be permitted to do so.
Amendment 12 takes us to travel documents. As I have said, the documents—in particular the document referred to in paragraph 2(3)(d)—should be returned to the individual at his reasonable request. I am not proposing that a passport that has been surrendered should be handed back but, reading this, it occurred to me that a Freedom Pass, which allows an individual over a certain age to travel by bus for free throughout England, would fall within this category. Is it right to tell that individual that they cannot have their freedom pass which would allow them to get to, say, their niece’s wedding? Perhaps that is a bad example because attending a family wedding may raise other issues but I am not sure that this deals with that detailed sort of situation. I would like to see something put in place to permit for individual and very detailed requirements.
Lord Henley
I hope I can give my noble friend the appropriate assurances. I will just touch on the individual amendments one by one, before coming to the generality.
My noble friend’s first concern was whether the requirement to remain overnight at a specified residence for specified hours would be exercised in a way that is consistent with the ability to work. We have made it perfectly clear that the new provisions are intended to be compatible with work and study, provided these do not affect public safety. We are certainly clear that an overnight residence measure will allow an individual to work, since the hours involved will not equate to the lengthy curfew that was possible. The specified hours will also be able to take account of work commitments where appropriate, and that could include early morning or early evening shift patterns. The necessity and proportionality of each measure, including each overnight residence requirement, will be determined according to the circumstances of each individual case. The occupancy rules that may be imposed in instances where the Secretary of State provides an individual with accommodation will in essence be those that would normally apply to an individual in private rented accommodation; in other words, a standard letting agreement.
The noble Baroness has a whole list of amendments. She wants to be sure that the connection with the area an individual is sent to is substantial. I can give her that assurance from the Dispatch Box. I do not think the word is necessary but obviously we would not send, as in the example she gave, a person to the Yorkshire Dales merely because they had once visited one individual there. Yes, it has to be substantial. Wherever she uses the word “reasonable”, again, we would want to ensure that “reasonable” was understood to be part of the Secretary of State’s decision.
The noble Baroness touched on the police reporting requirement. It is always the case that, where such a requirement is in place, the Secretary of State will have to act reasonably in terms of the times and manner associated with the requirement to attend a police station. Changes can be made to take account of a new job or other changes in that individual’s lifestyle. Amendment 12 touches on the idea of being able to return travel documents to the individual; for example, something like a Freedom Pass. Obviously asking for the surrender of a passport might be very necessary and obviously we would want to keep that, but I can see occasions where it might be reasonable to allow the return of something of the order of a Freedom Pass. If I am wrong in that matter, I will write to the noble Baroness.
I understand the noble Baroness’s general concerns about the lack of the use of the word “reasonable”, but I can give the assurance that it is fundamental to administrative law that the Secretary of State, or any other public body, behaves reasonably when taking decisions in any capacity. That will certainly apply to the Home Secretary in exercising her powers under this Bill, as much as it does to any other Minister or public authority taking decisions in an entirely different context. Indeed, it is a requirement under Section 6 of the Human Rights Act that public authorities—that obviously includes the Home Secretary—act compatibly with convention rights. So there is the additional requirement that any interferences with individuals’ convention rights are not only reasonable but proportionate. If the Secretary of State fails to act reasonably and proportionately in imposing measures under a TPIM notice, obviously her decisions can be challenged and potentially overturned in the courts.
Noble Lords will be aware that Clause 3 of the Bill provides that each of the measures imposed by the Secretary of State must be reasonably considered by her to be necessary to prevent or restrict the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity. Clause 9, which we will return to in due course, provides that the court must review that decision, among others, by the Secretary of State and that the court may quash or give directions in relation to any measures imposed where it is not satisfied with the Secretary of State’s decision-making, including where she has acted unreasonably or disproportionately. Therefore, my noble friend’s amendments are unnecessary as their effect will be achieved without it being necessary to amend the Bill, and I hope she will feel able to withdraw them.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I will certainly do so. I am very grateful to the Minister. Perhaps he is able to comment on two particular matters. First—and I am sorry, this is almost like trying to prove a negative—can he say how substantial or significant a connection there needs to be in requiring somebody to live at a particular residence? This may be something that you recognise when you see it so I may be asking him a question that cannot be answered in the abstract. I was obviously grateful for his response to my rather extreme example. I do not know whether it is possible to answer what is required.
Secondly, on reporting, I am sure that the Secretary of State would be reasonable; I am much less sure that officers on the ground at particular police stations will be quite as reasonable. Is the Minister able to help the Committee as to the role of the Secretary of State and the comparative role of those officers and whether, though the Secretary of State’s intentions are entirely reasonable—I use the word again—it may be possible on the ground locally for them to be distorted and life made close to impossible for the individual because an officer in a particular police station decides on what is actually an unreasonable time, for their convenience? Of course I take the point about being able to challenge through the courts but there is a limit to how many challenges there can be. This is the sort of thing that we should be able to sort out, if not to everybody’s satisfaction, then by at least answering their points, without having to go down that sort of route.
Lord Henley
The noble Baroness probably answered her own question, at least the first one, on what would be substantial. It is similar to the fact that we have put in “overnight” but have not defined what “overnight” is. We all know what “overnight” means; what we are saying is that we do not want that 16-hour curfew, we want people to be able to have a job, should that be necessary, but we need not be specific. This is where the reasonableness of the Secretary of State’s decision comes in. Similarly with the connection: obviously that connection is not just going to be that you have been on a day trip to Blackpool or went to the party conference there many years ago.
Lord Henley
We had better not comment on Blackpool. I suspect the noble Baroness probably understands what I am getting at and I hope the House will.
Secondly, regarding how the police act, the requirements will be set out in the TPIM notice and in that the Secretary of State obviously will have acted reasonably and set out what are reasonable requirements. It is then a matter for the police to make sure, if there is a reporting requirement, that they interpret that in the proper manner. Obviously if they do not, they will be in breach of whatever appropriate duty of care they have. Therefore, I hope that they will take notice of what that order says. I hope with that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I do not expect a response from the Minister, but I will use this last opportunity to encourage the Secretary of State, in imposing reporting restrictions, to make the sort of considerations that I have referred to entirely clear rather than just leaving them to be implied. If the Secretary of State can make that sort of thing express rather than implied, it could be a very sensible move. However, having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
“(b) conduct which is intended to encourage or assist conduct falling within paragraph (a);(c) conduct which is intended to assist individuals known or believed by the individual concerned to be involved in conduct falling within paragraphs (a) or (b) evade lawful surveillance, investigation, or arrest.”
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Goodhart has put his name to Amendment 23, partly through his connection with Justice, which he will no doubt mention—the organisation Justice; I am not suggesting that other noble Lords do not have a connection with justice—and because of the intrinsic value of the amendment, which is one that Justice has suggested should be raised.
This amendment would delete a large part of the definition of terrorism-related activity, which came from the 2005 Act, and replace it with the words in my amendment. The current definition is broad and includes the facilitation of,
“the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism”.
That could embrace, for instance, innocent activities such as selling an ordinary household chemical that, unknown to the seller, is intended for use in bomb-making, or even perhaps acting as a legal representative for a terror suspect. The suggested amendment would restrict the definition to,
“the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism”,
“conduct … intended to encourage or assist”,
such acts and conduct intended to help,
“individuals … evade … surveillance, investigation, or arrest”.
The extent of the definition of terrorism-related activity has concerned people for some time. Of course, it has to be to defined adequately and appropriately, but I wonder whether we should not now be looking again at a tighter definition, which would not involve risk—that obviously has to be assessed—but that would not be so extensive that it could go well beyond what would be appropriate. I beg to move.
Lord Goodhart
My Lords, my name is put to this amendment and while I do not have a great deal to add to it, there is a certain difficulty here about how the existing text of Clause 4 is drafted. Clause 4(1) (b) states:
“conduct which facilitates the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts, or which is intended to do so”.
In other words, the provision covers somebody who has facilitated the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts but has not intended to do so. That is the possibility. It is perfectly possible, for instance, that someone in a shop may sell something that is, on the face of it and so far as that person knows, entirely harmless. Yet in fact it has a particular use to the person who is buying it. In Clause 4, this is conduct that facilitates the commission of an act of terrorism but that is never intended to do so.
It would be inappropriate to go ahead without some further amendment and the provision in Amendment 23 is perfectly appropriate for this purpose. It deals with,
“conduct which is intended to encourage or assist conduct falling within paragraph (a)”,
or,
“conduct which is intended to assist individuals known or believed by the individual concerned to be involved in conduct falling within paragraphs (a) or (b)”.
That provision seems to cover the effect of Clause 4 a good deal more accurately than its present formation does. It seems to me that it is necessary to change the drafting of Clause 4 and that Amendment 23 is an appropriate way of doing it. It may be that another one can be thought of that is even better.
Lord Henley
My Lords, Clause 4, as my noble friends have stated, provides the definition of the phrase,
“Involvement in terrorism-related activity”,
which comes from the 2005 Act. It obviously ought to be read in conjunction with Clause 30, the interpretation clause, which also refers us back, if noble Lords will bear with me, to the Terrorism Act 2000. The starting point of our response to my noble friend’s amendment is that it is unnecessary. The definition of terrorism-related activity included in the Bill is, as I said, identical to the one in the 2005 Act. We consider that to be the appropriate definition and we see no need to change it. It is settled, it has not proved problematic or objectionable and the courts have not, for once, disagreed with the assessment of successive Secretaries of State that individuals whose activity falls under it are committed terrorists.
Moreover, the Government’s approach to this clause is underpinned by other requirements in the Bill. Not only must the Secretary of State consider that the statutory test for the imposition of a TPIM notice is met, including,
“Condition A … that the Secretary of State reasonably believes that the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity”,
but the court must review the Secretary of State's decision. As I said, that scrutiny will be rigorous and, as a result of relevant case law, it makes a finding of fact on the limb of the test relating to involvement in terrorism-related activity. It also gives “intense scrutiny” to the necessity of the notice and individual obligations.
I have looked very carefully at the amendment as set out by my noble friends. I have even produced a copy that I could share with the House, if it was necessary, showing how the clause would look after their amendment had been produced. However, I really do not think that on this occasion it is necessary. It would probably be safer and better to stick with the well-tried words that we have from the 2005 Act, with which the courts themselves have not had any problems, as I said. From the look on the face of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, when I first mentioned that point, I certainly noticed a degree of agreement with me. If the courts are happy, I suspect we should leave well alone. I hope, therefore, that my noble friends will feel able to withdraw this amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, my concern stems from the possible prospect of a less benign Home Secretary, who may misuse the clause. He—let us say he—might believe that an individual has been involved in terrorism-related activity because he, to use the example that we have given, has sold household chemicals that are to be used for something bad. I suspect that the courts have never had to face the position that I am putting forward and so have not been troubled by it. As ever, one tries to anticipate how legislation might be misused or abused, rather than used in what we would all regard as a proper fashion. However, I hear what my noble friend has said and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, in moving Amendment 24 I shall speak also to Amendments 28, 30 and 31 to 35 in my name. Amendment 24 would amend Clause 5(3), which provides that a TPIM notice,
“may be extended … only if conditions A, C and D are met”.
I am not sure whether my amendment is one of drafting or principle. It certainly does not go to the major principle of the structure of the periods or their limits. However, as Clause 5(3) is drawn, the conditions are to be met and that would allow for an extension of the notice. My amendment concerns when those conditions are met, saying that they should be met,
“at the date from which”—
the notice “is extended”. It is not likely that the Secretary of State would decide in the second week of a notice that it should, in effect, be a two-year notice. However, again, looking to a less sensible or benign Secretary of State, that should not be possible. That is why I have tabled this amendment.
My other amendments all deal with the term “obviously flawed”, although I realise that I have missed at least one instance of it somewhere in the Bill. As my noble friend Lord Goodhart said in speaking to the first group of amendments, what “obviously flawed” means is far from obvious. My amendments, which would take out “obviously”, probe the meaning of the term. The context, in every case, would in effect be an ex parte application. Does “obviously flawed” mean prima facie? When these questions were asked during the Public Bill Committee stage in the Commons, the Minister said:
“An appropriate test at the permission stage acts as a check on the Secretary of State’s exercise of his or her powers. At that stage, it is clearly not appropriate for the court to make the final determination … because it is … an ex parte process”.—[Official Report, Commons, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill Committee, 30/6/11; col. 212.]
I understand that but I am still not entirely clear about the term as distinct from the context; they may be inseparable. The Minister’s answer was that it reduced the hurdle that the Secretary of State must meet. I hope that the Minister will today give us some further sense of where in the hierarchy this comes.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, before the noble Baroness agonises over whether she puts this to the vote, the final point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell of Beeston, about the Secretary of State’s responsibilities is well taken. I congratulate her on what is probably her first appearance at the Dispatch Box, certainly in this Committee stage.
Baroness Hamwee
No, not as ever, sometimes we are shoulder to shoulder. However, I congratulate the noble Baroness and I am grateful for her reply. It will deserve reading. I take her point about the term being used in control order legislation but I have written down,
“much the same as prima facie”.
I, for one, would not like to tangle with her over whether there is any significance in the term “much the same”. If anybody reading Hansard who is better qualified than me thinks that one should take issue with,
“much the same as prima facie”,
I will come back to it on Report. As I say, I will read the noble Baroness’s response. I am grateful to her for the detail. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
“(1A) The application of subsection (1) extends to—
(a) a proposed extension under section 5,(b) a proposed variation under section 12(c), and(c) a proposed revival under section 13,of a TPIM notice.”
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, Amendment 26 is grouped with Amendments 45 and 46, which also stand in my name. We touched on this matter when I asked the Minister a question about the length of TPIMs earlier this afternoon. I thank him for his response. Nevertheless, in case there is anything more to come out on this, I will speak to these amendments.
Amendment 26 to Clause 6 would provide that Clause 6(1), which makes the rest of the clause apply, extends to extensions, variations and revivals of a TPIM notice. As I said earlier, I had difficulty in following the procedures for the different decisions which are open to the Secretary of State. Therefore, I thought it best not to be too proud about my drafting as I do not have a professional reputation to be concerned about to the extent that other noble Lords who are very well established in their fields do. That is why I tabled that amendment.
Amendments 45 and 46, which seek to amend Clause 13, may already have been answered to an extent in the previous debate. Amendment 45 would provide that condition E—that is, the involvement of the court—would apply on revival of a TPIM. I am encouraged to think that a stopping or pausing of a TPIM might be possible—that is implied by the possibility of reviving one—but that this measure would apply after a TPIM had expired or been revoked. I hope to be told that this is provided elsewhere in the Bill. If it is not, it should apply. If a TPIM notice has expired or been revoked—no doubt, for good reason—all the conditions should then be tested again. I beg to move.
Lord Henley
My Lords, we seem to be moving at quite a speed. My noble friend need not worry too much about her drafting. We have all drafted amendments in the past that we knew were defective in many ways but they are often a useful way of getting the Government to the Dispatch Box to explain what is going on. It is worth going into detail on this issue.
I will deal first with the substantive amendment that the noble Baroness has proposed to Clause 6—to which Amendment 45 is consequential. As drafted, the Bill requires the Secretary of State to seek prior court permission to impose a TPIM notice, other than where the urgency procedure set out in Schedule 2 is relied on. This provides an important safeguard in relation to the initial imposition of TPIM notices by the Secretary of State. However, as my noble friend has identified, there is no subsequent requirement for the Secretary of State to seek the court’s prior permission before making any other decision in respect of the TPIM notice. Her amendment would require the Secretary of State to seek prior permission before making three particular decisions. The first is to extend a notice into a second year under Clause 5. The second is to vary the specified measures, on the grounds that this is necessary for preventing or restricting involvement in terrorism-related activity under Clause 12—that is, where the variation is not a reduction in the measures or one made with the consent of the individual. The third is a proposed revival of a TPIM notice under Clause 13. The Bill does not require court permission to take any of these decisions. However, it provides a right of appeal against the exercise of each of these powers.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, again I must read what has been said, but I believe that I am satisfied and will remain so. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
I absolutely support what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said. My amendments to both his amendments were partly in response to an earlier draft, which I think he changed before tabling them. However, the point remains the same: to tease out whether the words “if possible” are objective or subjective to the individual. I am not sure what “if possible” means in the context. I would certainly not want anything that the noble Lord has included to detract from the thrust of his important amendments and argument. I beg to move.
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws
My Lords, I support the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I disclose that I act from time to time in what have been control order cases and may be called on to act in future such cases. I reinforce the importance of having disclosure of the essence of the case. The reason for that is that from time to time I have seen that, when disclosure of the essence of the case takes place, it is possible to show that the inferences drawn from certain behaviour are not appropriate.
I give an example. The case involved a student living in a house with other students. We are always concerned that association can be an unfair way to judge someone. An assumption was made and disclosed in the essence of the case against him that a conspiratorial meeting took place at a particular time. It was possible for us to show that he must have been in his room using his computer because, during the period of the meeting, he was in direct contact with the department with which he was studying at university, drawing down the homework that he was required to do. Not only was the university able to confirm that but his computer, which was seized, showed that the timing coincided with when some others were involved in the meeting, when he was in his room studying. Just that allowed someone to show that an inference being drawn was incorrect.
Given that we are putting together a system which is in many ways a source of concern with regard to liberty, it is really important that opportunities are there for people to show that their actions are not the ones that the state is imagining. We must, in drawing up new proposals—some of which I am not completely happy with—draw on the decisions made by judges under the control order regime.
Lord Henley
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, asked two questions: first, do we accept that the AF principle applies to TPIMs as well as to control orders? I can give him that assurance. It is set out in our Explanatory Notes that we believe that previous court judgments will be binding on TPIMs, as they were on control orders. I do not have the ability to cite cases as authoritatively as my noble friend Lord Carlile or the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, both of whom obviously eat them for breakfast, but my understanding is that they will continue to bind us.
The second question is: do we think that it is necessary to get it on the face of the Bill? I hope that I can explain to the noble Lord why I do not think that that is necessary. We share the desire of all noble Lords to ensure that TPIM proceedings are compatible with Article 6 and we believe that the provisions currently contained in the Bill achieve that. As we explained in our response to the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its 19 July report—I think that today’s was its third report on this issue—the right to a fair trial of individuals subject to a TPIM notice is already fully protected by the provisions contained in the TPIM Bill and the application of existing case law, as appropriate, by the courts.
Paragraph 5 of Schedule 4 to the Bill reflects the read down of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, effected by the 2007 judgment of the Law Lords in MB. As the noble Lord will be aware, the Law Lords read into that legislation, which obliged the courts to ensure the withholding of material from the individual where disclosure would be contrary to public interest, the words,
“except where to do so would be incompatible with the right of the controlled person to a fair trial”.
That has been reflected in the provision in paragraph 5 of Schedule 4 to the TPIM Bill, which provides that nothing in the rule-making power relating to closed proceedings or the rules of court made under it is to be read as requiring the court to act in a manner inconsistent with Article 6. The Law Lords in AF (No.3) confirmed the read down specified in MB and laid down what was required by Article 6 in the context of the stringent control orders before them. There is therefore already provision in the Bill which ensures that TPIM proceedings will be conducted compatibly with the individual’s Article 6 rights and, indeed, the Human Rights Act achieves the same effect.
That is all that I want to say at this stage to the noble Lord’s amendment. I appreciate that technically we are debating the amendment to the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lady Hamwee. It might be more appropriate for the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to comment on that. I hope that he will accept my explanation on why we do not think it is necessary to include his amendment. I hope that the assurances that I have given from the Dispatch Box will be sufficient. I hope that my noble friend and then the noble Lord will withdraw their amendments.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 47, and will speak also to Amendments 48 and 51.
Amendment 47 concerns paragraph 1 of Schedule 3, which deals with appeals against convictions for breaches of measures. My amendment is to enable me to ask the Minister why appeals are limited in this way. A breach of a measure may turn into a criminal offence, but that is a separate matter from the measure itself. If an individual is convicted of that breach, there are consequences for the future, as there are with every criminal offence.
The Minister may say that the measure itself will have consequences. Of course it will. That is executive action without a criminal standard of proof, and so on, as we have discussed. The consequences will be social consequences, in a wider sense. If there is a conviction for a breach, that has other consequences, because of the record of the individual. Therefore, Amendment 47 is to ask the Government to explain the thinking behind that paragraph.
Amendment 48 would take out subsections (1) and (2) to Clause 18. These are about appeals against the measure, and again the amendment is to enable me to ask questions. Clause 18(1) says that there may be an appeal only on a question of law. I would be grateful if the Minister could help the Committee on how one distinguishes between fact and law in this context. How does this apply not just to the decision that there should be a TPIM order but to the detail of the measure? Is proportionality, which we have been talking about quite a lot, a matter of law? I hope to be told that it is.
My final amendment in the group is Amendment 51, which relates to Clause 19. Clause 19 provides for the Secretary of State to make three-monthly reports to Parliament, which is welcome. Clause 19(2)(a) provides that this includes and extends to the powers of a Secretary of State “to impose measures”. I am suggesting that we should add wording that makes it clear that this covers not just the fact that a TPIM order has been imposed but the detail of the measures within that TPIM order. I appreciate that it would not be proper to put every detail into the public domain. However, I do think it would be proper for the Secretary of State to spell out the sort of thing that she is doing, so that we may understand—better than we can if we are simply told that measures are being applied—just what the impact of those measures may be. I beg to move.
Lord Henley
I hope I can answer the noble Baroness’s three points on these three separate amendments, which we are taking together. I shall start with Amendment 47, which deals with Schedule 3. As the noble Baroness is aware, Schedule 3 provides that an individual who has been convicted of the offence contained in Clause 23 of the Bill—contravening, without reasonable excuse, a measure imposed under a terrorism prevention and investigation measures notice—has a right of appeal against that conviction if the notice or relevant measure is subsequently quashed, and if they could not have been convicted had the quashing occurred before they were prosecuted. Schedule 3 provides that the court must allow such appeals. This is obviously not a provision that we expect to be used on a frequent basis. However, its clear purpose is to provide an important safeguard, and to ensure that the person will be able to get a conviction overturned for contravening a measure that the court has subsequently quashed.
It is therefore important that the schedule be agreed to. I know that the noble Baroness is only suggesting removing paragraph 1, but that is the operative provision of the schedule, and without it the remainder of the provisions in the schedule are neutered. I hope she therefore accepts my explanation and can withdraw that particular amendment.
Amendment 48 deals with subsections (1) and (2) of Clause 18 and is really a question about why we are considering having appeals only on a point of law. We believe that the limitation is appropriate, because in cases such as this it is the court of first instance that is the appropriate fact-finding body. It is this court that has developed a particular expertise and body of knowledge in this area of national security, among a small and experienced body of judges who hear these cases. This makes it the right court to review all the material upon which the Secretary of State relies to make her decisions and make findings on that basis.
With regard to the appeal on a point of law, the noble Baroness asked us whether we thought proportionality would be a point of law. Dare I say it—I might have to be corrected—but I think she is probably correct, and it probably would be. If I am wrong, I will correct that in due course. I will certainly write to her and copy that letter to other noble Lords who have taken an interest in these matters.
Finally, I turn to Amendment 51, which deals with Clause 19. Clause 19, as the noble Baroness is well aware, places a duty on the Secretary of State to report to Parliament on a quarterly basis on the exercise of her powers under this Bill. These are specifically the powers to impose measures on a person by TPIM notice, extend a TPIM notice, vary the measures specified in a TPIM notice, and revoke or revive a TPIM notice.
Amendment 51 would amend Clause 19(2)(a) to add “and the measures imposed” at the end of the subsection. The relevant provision would thus state that the requirement was for the Secretary of State to report on her powers to impose measures on an individual via a TPIM notice under Section 2, and the measures imposed. As noble Lords will appreciate, the details of the operation of the system and the particular cases will necessarily be sensitive and could not be disclosed publicly. However, taken together, the list of matters on which the Secretary of State must report ensures that key information about the operation of the system will be in the public domain, and will be debated regularly. Crucially, this will include information about the extent of the Secretary of State’s use of her powers and the number of cases in which measures are imposed.
We understand that there is interest in as much information as possible being made available about the operation of the system and about the cases of those individuals subject to the measures. That has certainly been the case in relation to control orders and it is likely to continue in relation to TPIMs. Having that information available will help to ensure that any debate about the powers is as informed as possible.
Lord Henley
The ingenuity of the noble Lord and others will find ways in which this House, which seems to have a more liberal approach in these matters, can debate these quarterly reports. There are Questions, Questions for Short Debate and all range of things, but it is not necessarily for the Government to offer those. As regards the debate next week, I look forward to it.
I hope that that deals with the points made by my noble friend. If not, perhaps we can discuss it further in due course, but I hope that today she will feel able to withdraw her amendments.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am grateful for the reassurance on my Amendment 49, which takes a stand on a question of law in this context, and I hope that the Minister and I are correct. On Amendment 51, I accept the sensitivity of the detail, which I acknowledged in introducing the amendment. However, I remain concerned that the type and extent of the measures being imposed are reported on. The clause is welcome and I want to make it work well for Parliament and others in the transparency for which we are all aiming. I might therefore like to take the opportunity to discuss with the Minister how one can meet the point without going over the top, which I am not trying to do. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
“Impact of measures
(1) Within 28 days after the imposition or variation of any measures, an assessment shall be made of the likely impact of the measures—
(a) on the individual on whom they are imposed, and(b) on the immediate family of the individual.(2) The assessment shall include an evaluation of the impact on mental health.
(3) Further assessments shall be made not less frequently than every three months and at the expiry, repeal or revocation of the measures, and thereafter during such period and at such intervals (but not more frequently than every six months) as the individual may request.
(4) The assessment shall be made by an independent person appointed by the Secretary of State who shall be appropriately qualified in conjunction with such persons as the individual may nominate and who shall be entitled to make separate reports.
(5) The costs of assessments made under this section shall be met by the Secretary of State.”
Baroness Hamwee
I shall speak also to Amendment 53. This would be a new clause dealing with a matter that I regard as of the utmost seriousness. It is addressed in particular to mental health issues.
The proposed new clause is by no means an opposition to mechanisms for addressing protection of the public and the prevention of terrorism. It is a separate issue about how measures are applied in practice and about the impact of those measures. I have mentioned the matter already today but it is important to repeat it as the context for the provision. It concerns in particular tipping the individual, his family and members of his community into the precise action that we are seeking to avoid; to avoid tipping an individual into breach of the restrictions on him, which is a criminal offence and may turn into a criminal someone who is not a criminal and has no criminal record; and to avoid our failure to recognise that at the centre of all this is a human being.
The moment my new clause was published I saw a drafting error, but I will speak to it as I intended it to be. It would provide for an assessment to be made on the likely impact—my drafting error is that I failed to refer to the actual impact—of the imposition of measures, or the variation of them on the individual and his immediate family every three months, when measures expire or are repealed or revoked, and thereafter at intervals which the individual may request. The assessment I talk of would include an evaluation of the impact on mental health. It should be made by an independent person appointed by the Secretary of State but not only by that person. I suggest that of course the person should be appropriately qualified, but shall work in conjunction with the nominees of the individual who can make separate reports. That is an important point because it is all too easy and obvious that independent experts appointed by the Secretary of State, as has happened with control orders, are perceived as agents of the Secretary of State being there to gather evidence and information.
I have proposed the new clause for the reasons I have already given and because one needs to increase the opportunity for transparency around this whole area. I have said that the costs should be met by the Secretary of State because I thought that someone might ask about that. It seems to me that the numbers of cases we are talking about are small and this would be entirely proper given that the measures applied are potentially so very stringent. Amendment 53 would bring these assessments within the remit of the independent reviewer.
The experience of control orders has been not only that in some cases they are very damaging but that the controlee is essentially broken. I want quickly to share with the Committee the story I heard earlier this week of a controlee who had failed to report to the police on time. I asked how late he had been and was told that it was one hour. His control order of course required him to report at a particular time and having failed to be there on time he was charged with a breach of his order. He found himself in Pentonville. The shocking part of the story is not just that: it is that the individual will not apply for bail. For him, being in Pentonville is preferable to being under a control order. That is what the state has done to some individuals. If that is what we are going to do to them in order to protect the rest of society, we should know what the impact is.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
I do not quite understand the noble Baroness. Presumably this person was in breach of the control order by not attending on time. I do not understand the issue.
Baroness Hamwee
The issue is that to this individual, being in prison is more acceptable than being in his place of residence under a control order, with the restrictions imposed by the system. I am sure that the noble Lord has heard, from people who had been under control orders that were quashed, the impact they had on them and their families. The interference with anything that any of us would recognise as a normal life has been literally intolerable. That is the point I make to the Committee. I beg to move.
Lord Carlile of Berriew
My Lords, I applaud and support the sentiment behind my noble friend's amendment, but I suggest that it is not only unnecessary but would replace a considerable amount of flexibility with something rather less. On the case history that she has just recounted, I say that nobody has been arrested and charged with breach of a control order for failing to turn up at a police station once, an hour late. In every case, there has been an immense degree of tolerance before anyone has been charged. It is only after a very serious breach, or persistent and repeated breaches, that people are charged.
Nor do I recognise the credibility of the account my noble friend was given. When I was the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, on a relatively small number of occasions—but several—I was able to visit controlees in their own homes, alone, one to one. On some occasions I visited them in homes to which they had been relocated. The notion of a state-appointed psychiatrist, however independent, turning up unsolicited at their home would have been no more comforting than One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich. It is a pretty bad idea.
I ask the Minister to confirm that the following occurs and will occur. First, where there is any suspicion or indication of the poor mental health of the controlee or of any member of his or her family, medical facilities will be put in place, including, if necessary, psychiatrists and psychologists, to deal with the problem; and that such facilities will be flexible and will be provided at the cost of the Home Office. Secondly, will the Minister confirm that the Control Order Review Group has met regularly ever since control orders were brought in, that it includes various people involved in scrutinising and observing the person concerned, and that it has always discussed such issues where they have arisen? Will he further confirm that under TPIMs, some kind of review group—I hope it will not be called TPIMsORG —will continue to meet and carry out that function? There is no evidence whatever that controlees have been treated improperly in the way that my noble friend set out.
On one occasion I suggested to the Home Office that there were some difficulties from time to time in giving controlees a single point of contact—perhaps a local police officer—who was aware of the situation and whom they could telephone if they had a problem. I believe that that has been put right, that they do all have someone to contact, and that sympathetic consideration is given to all difficulties of the kind that my noble friend has in mind.
Lord Henley
My Lords, my noble friend has been consistent over the years in her concern about the impact of control order obligations on individuals and on their health, in particular on their mental health. My first point is that TPIM notices are intentionally more limited in nature than those that can be imposed under control orders. We will no longer have lengthy curfews, compulsory relocation to another part of the country and total bans on communication equipment. Therefore, whatever the result, one would hope that the effect on individuals would be less than under control orders.
Despite the limitations that should significantly reduce the impact on individuals subject to TPIMs, I appreciate that my noble friend remains concerned about these issues. I agree with my noble friend Lord Carlile that the amendment does not achieve what it sets out to do. The noble Lord put a series of questions to me about the current position and about what will be the position. He asked whether medical facilities would be provided by the Home Office for those with poor mental health. He then asked about the Control Order Review Group, and about whether something would follow it. He could not quite bring himself to work out the acronym, but no doubt something can be put in place that will have a similar role. I am sure that my noble friend asked those questions in a rhetorical manner and that he knows the answer certainly to the first two questions. Such things will be provided by the Home Office: CORG exists; and we will certainly consider something suitable to replace it in due course.
Although I cannot accept my noble friend’s amendments, I say that the Bill, together with the relevant control order case law and the duty of the Secretary of State to act within convention rights, already ensures that the Secretary of State will give the appropriate consideration to the impact of the measures on the individual and on their family, including the impact on their mental health, both before imposing a TPIM notice and during the year or however long it remains in force. With that, I hope that my noble friend will withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I ought to take two minutes to withdraw the amendment—that might be obscure to anybody reading this—in order to take us to the agreed time of 8 pm. Of course I understand and accept that the measures proposed by the Bill are less severe than control orders. That is the point of the Bill. Not all of them are, because there is the possibility of enhanced TPIMs. I take the point, but it does not quite cover the ground.
I understand the point made by my noble friend Lord Carlile about a series of breaches. I talked earlier—I am not sure whether he was in his place—about the need not just for the Secretary of State to be reasonable about reporting requirements, but for police officers on the ground to be reasonable.
Of course, our experiences and what we hear are not the same, and I could never have the particular experience that he has had, but I hear of the danger of people who are under such orders becoming so despairing that they almost do not care if they breach.
The real thrust of this amendment is the importance of the involvement of professionals who are of the individual’s nomination, not just those who are provided by the Home Secretary. If I say “by the state” it may sound like One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich but I say “the state” quite deliberately because that is how it is perceived in this situation. My amendment suggests the formation of something akin to a case conference with the considerable involvement of an individual or organisation of the person’s choosing because of the interpretation or perception, which I suppose is inevitable in this situation, that anybody who is provided by the state is not going to be neutral, far less on the individual’s side. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Visas: Domestic Workers
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(12 years, 6 months ago)
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Baroness Hamwee
To ask Her Majesty’s Government, in bringing forward proposals to end the Domestic Workers visa, what consideration they have given to the protection of the rights of domestic workers.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)
My Lords, the rights of overseas domestic workers in private households are discussed in the Government’s consultation document, Employment related settlement: Tier 5 and overseas domestic workers. The consultation sets out a number of proposals for reform, which include making protections more appropriate should the route be retained. We are currently considering the responses that have been received.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, the Minister will understand that the portability of the current visa, which means a worker can change employer as long as he or she remains in domestic work, is fundamental to safeguarding the rights of that employee and to safeguard against bonded labour. He will appreciate that I refer to rights such as to be paid at least the national minimum wage, not to be forced to work excessive hours and so on. There are some horrific stories. On Anti-Slavery Day—and every day should be regarded as Anti-Slavery Day—will the Government take into account the need to be very mindful of the rights of all who work in our country?
Lord Henley
My Lords, my noble friend is right to raise this issue on Anti-Slavery Day, but she is also right to say that we should take account of these matters on every day of the week and obviously we will. Settlement has almost become automatic for those who wish to stay in the United Kingdom under these arrangements, and the consultation is about being more selective about those who wish to stay permanently while also, as my noble friend puts it, making sure their rights are safeguarded.
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(12 years, 7 months ago)
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Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for his introduction and welcome him to his position. If I were to say that I wished that my noble friend Lady Browning was here, I would not want him to take that the wrong way, but I use this opportunity to pass on the House’s good wishes to her.
I very much welcome the repeal of the 2005 Act. I hope that by the time this Bill leaves the House I shall be more enthusiastic about the whole of it, but I am already enthusiastic about Clause 1.
No one could envy a Home Secretary faced not just with specific decisions under that Act and this Bill, if enacted, but also with wider policy. I am very conscious of who is sitting immediately in front of me—the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Lympne—in saying this. Control orders always seemed offensive to me because of the impact on the individual and because of the inherent risk that, in using an order, or measure, to restrain a potential terrorist, the effect might be to drive that individual, or perhaps others who knew him and who knew about the restraint because they had been in the same community—however you define that—towards the very actions that one sought to avoid. That is quite the opposite of the intended effect.
I do not challenge the assessment of the risk of the threat of terrorism and am of course in no position to do so. As I have often said, there is no answer to, “If you knew what I know”. But it is necessary to take risks in order to manage risks. It is really not possible for the public, which is almost all of us, to know how executive decision-making operates in this area. We have in this Bill the proposed safeguard of a role for the court to determine whether the Secretary of State’s decisions are “obviously flawed”, to use the term in the Bill. That will be impossible to assess without access to the evidence, which is why the judicial role is so important. These cases are pretty likely to reach the court sooner or later, so why not start them there? However, I take a point made, I think, by Liberty, that the judges’ role must remain separate from that of the Executive, as there is a danger in a judge making a political decision.
In Committee, we will explore where the appropriate fit is within the judicial system. I know that my noble friends Lord Goodhart and Lord Phillips will address that matter. As has been said, the views of my noble friend Lord Macdonald are well known. I do not know whether he will use any of the amendments drafted by the Joint Committee on Human Rights on the basis of those views. I must say that it is pretty jammy to find that a Select Committee has drafted your amendments for you.
We will be debating later today the Terrorism Act 2000 (Remedial) Order. The Joint Committee made a number of points to the Secretary of State, one of which was that prior judicial authorisation of the power to stop and search, the subject of the remedial order, should be applied when stop and search was used without reasonable suspicion. The Secretary of State’s answer was that the Government rejected that view because it would not be appropriate or helpful,
“to blur the lines between the executive and the judiciary in this way”.
I disagree.
TPIMs will continue the use of the special advocate system. The idea of a lawyer representing a client but being unable to take instructions from that client, because there is nothing on which to take instructions, is not something that I have been able to get my head around. Neither the individual nor his lawyers would have more than the gist of the case, if one can call it a case, against him. Believe me, my practice as a solicitor persuaded me after quite a short time that one needs to be able to test the material and test evidence to destruction with your own client in order to be able to represent him.
The whole regime of special advocates will, I believe, be the subject of a Green Paper, and I use this opportunity to ask the Minister whether he could give the House any information as to when we might see it. Under the Bill, the hurdle for the Secretary of State is slightly higher than reasonable suspicion, but reasonable belief is not so very high a hurdle. We have already had mention of the draft enhanced TPIMs Bill, and we have seen the recently added Clauses 26 and 27. On the draft Bill, perhaps the Minister can tell us the arrangements for the pre-legislative scrutiny that we are promised and which will distinguish that Bill from other emergency legislation that we have seen. But under both of those, the Secretary of State would have to be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity. That is, of course, a lower standard than the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt. As I understand it, the enhanced TPIMs will be brought into effect depending on circumstances at the time, not on the risk related to the individual. There seems to me no reason why the balance of probabilities should not apply to standard TPIMs as well as to enhanced ones. That seems to be the logic of the way the enhanced TPIMs would come into effect. So we have executive action on a low evidence threshold and something close to executive legislation, since the Bill includes the power for the Secretary of State to repeal, extend or revive by order the legislation.
The title of the Bill is significant. We need to look at the provisions through the lens of prevention and investigation. I have heard—it may be that I read it as comments during the Public Bill Committee debate in the Commons—that control orders and TPIMs can be compared with ASBOs, but we are not dealing with a sanction or penalty here. It is also difficult to see how there can be an investigation since the objective of the Bill is to prevent offences. It is certainly difficult to see how there can be evidence of new activity for a TPIM after the first one.
The Bill raises issues around many aspects and stages of the process. I was left standing by arguments made by other noble Lords on the distinction between appeal, judicial review and the application of the principles of judicial review when we dealt with terrorist asset-freezing legislation some months ago. That legislation also threw up issues around the last of the major areas that I wish to raise today: how one deals with an individual and those around that individual—close and extended family and friends. This is an individual who has not been charged with, let alone convicted of, an offence; someone who may have terrorism in mind, but who is also a human being. Put at its lowest, and as a simple matter of protecting society, it does not seem to me to be good tactics to treat someone in such a way that we drive or tip them into the very actions that we seek to avoid. There are, of course, reputational issues for our country, too, but there is a basic moral code—common humanity—that must remain in play.
Several noble Lords attended a meeting yesterday when I asked someone who had been under a control order, which had been quashed, about the impact of particular measures. I did so wondering whether something similar to the licences that the Treasury is able to grant in the asset-freezing regime might be applied here, both general—for instance, spending on basic living costs—and case by case. The answer that the gentleman gave me was that it was the prevention from taking part in ordinary, mundane activities that was the most destructive thing. He was banned from meeting—or associating with, in the jargon—his oldest friend. Of course, both the family life of the individual and the life of his family are affected. How can they not be?
I have been thinking about the need for access to a doctor of that individual’s own choice. It is difficult to believe that control orders and these proposed measures could have no effect on mental health. Those in the know say that all the individuals under control orders whom they have encountered have been significantly damaged. It is simply not adequate to say, “Go to the local GP”.
The Minister may say that the measures will be humane and proportionate, and that that is implicit in the revised arrangement. We will want to explore that in Committee. I suspect that much will depend on how the measures are applied by the Home Secretary and others. For instance, the time of day when someone under a control order is required to report to a police station can make the difference between whether or not they are able to work or study. By the end of this process, I would like to be assured that we have made the legislation as good as it can be in what is, I acknowledge, a very difficult situation.
If we forget that there is a human being at the centre of all this, we will overlook the normal reactions to restrictions. There is the risk of driving a person into breach of a measure and thus criminalising someone who was not a criminal before. If we dehumanise someone in our own minds—the human being who is still there at the end of the process—and forget that he will have profound needs, then, whether or not there is more or less of a threat, we will not have done well. These are difficult issues. I find it quite difficult even to find the language to discuss them, but discuss them we must.
Finally, I have some rather more discrete questions to the Minister. In evidence to the Public Bill Committee in the Commons, the Metropolitan Police said that it had put in a business plan regarding the resources that it would require for surveillance. Can the Minister give me any news as to whether the Metropolitan Police has been satisfied with the response to that? Can he give the House any information about the number of prosecutions for terrorism that there have been of those under control orders? Inevitably, I also have to ask him about any news of dealing with intercept evidence.
My noble friends bring different experiences—some high profile, some lower profile but very key—and I hope that they and I, and the House as a whole, can help make this legislation intellectually coherent and satisfactorily based in the rule of law. As our own Constitution Committee has said, it has only an indirect relationship with the criminal justice system. It should be HR-compliant and obviously so—not just assessed as technically compliant, but something with which we, in our hearts as well as our minds, can live.
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, as ever I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Howard, for his helpful intervention. My point is simple. This was a power that previous Home Secretaries and the current Home Secretary found necessary. It is one that the security services and police said was necessary. However, we are now told that the fresh air of the West Midlands conurbation and its bucolic atmosphere have so changed this individual’s personality that he now poses much less of a threat. That is frankly implausible. The reality is that this power was necessary. The present Home Secretary, knowing of the proposal that she would bring before Parliament, chose to exercise the power. The power remains necessary.
Baroness Hamwee
Would the noble Lord like to say anything about the development of technology? He may be overlooking the fact that individuals who are subject to these measures will almost undoubtedly be tagged. I do not know much about it, but I am sure that the technology is developing as we speak, and that it is possible to know where people who are tagged are going, and whether they are going where they should not be going. Surely that needs to be taken into account.
Lord Harris of Haringey
As I understand it, people who are subject to control orders are in many instances already tagged. Tagging is a useful technique. Tags can be removed, though the best tags are supposed to tell you if they have been—and I am sure that only the best tags will be purchased for this purpose. However, the problem is the risk of association. If somebody lives in a particular area and it is deemed that the danger of association is there, a tag will not tell you who comes to see that individual. Nor will it tell you where they go in their immediate vicinity, which could be precisely where those associations take place. The point of relocation is to minimise the risk of those associations, or to enable them to be monitored.
Just eight months ago, the rational and responsible Home Secretary, on the information presented to her, felt that the individual concerned was so dangerous that not only did he need to be subject to a control order but he should be relocated miles away from his previous environment. She made the judgment knowing that the Bill would remove that option and tie her hands in future. The rational and responsible Home Secretary made that judgment knowing that however much of a danger the person was thought to be, such an outcome would be taken away. The Minister needs to tell us why the judgment that the Home Secretary made then will no longer apply to this individual when the Bill becomes law.
Perhaps we should not expect the Minister to go through such contortions to provide an explanation. Perhaps all he needs to do is concede that the Home Secretary made that judgment in the interests of our nation's security but that this shabby, tawdry compromise of a Bill would prevent her making the same judgment in future. This compromise is not just between the two wings of an uneasy and unhappy coalition, but a compromise with the nation's security.
Terrorism Act 2000 (Remedial) Order 2011
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The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)
My Lords, this order is made under the Human Rights Act 1998 and replaces the stop-and-search powers found in Sections 44 to 47 of the Terrorism Act 2000, often referred to as the Section 44 powers. These powers allowed police constables to stop and search individuals at a time and in a place authorised by a chief officer and search for articles which could be used in connection with terrorism, whether or not the police suspected the presence of such articles. The European Court of Human Rights found that the powers were not in accordance with the law. That ruling became final on 28 June 2010 and the Home Secretary made a Statement in another place on 8 July, stating that the use of the powers without reasonable suspicion would be suspended pending a review. The powers were subsequently reviewed as part of the Government’s wider review of counterterrorism powers. As a result, the Home Secretary announced that Section 44 would be repealed and replaced with a significantly circumscribed power. The Government have brought forward these proposed changes in the Protection of Freedoms Bill. However, the review also recommended that consideration should be given to whether the new powers should be made available more quickly than the Bill will allow. The remedial order before us is the result. The order has been made under the urgency procedure in Schedule 2 to the Human Rights Act 1998. The order will lapse on the passage of the similar powers currently under consideration in the Protection of Freedoms Bill in another place.
It is apparent from the European court’s ruling that there is an incompatibility to address. It is also the Government’s view, on the basis of operational advice, that given the very serious circumstances in which the new powers might be used, it was necessary to make them available using the emergency procedure which allowed the change in the law to take effect immediately. It is a fairer and more focused power with significantly stronger safeguards. It provides the police with what they need while ensuring that there are robust safeguards to prevent misuse.
The new powers inserted as new Section 47A into the Terrorism Act 2000 require that an officer reasonably suspects that an act of terrorism will take place and considers that the powers are necessary to prevent such an act. This is a significantly higher threshold than in the old Section 44 power. Furthermore, an authorisation under new Section 47A can cover only a geographical area and a period of time necessary to address the threat. The maximum period of authorisation has been reduced from 28 days to 14 days. The purpose of the stop and search has also been tightened so that the use of the powers is more closely aligned with the particular threat. In addition to these changes, there is a robust statutory code of practice. This sets out the detailed requirements for the authorisation and exercise of the powers, prohibits the continuous renewal of authorisations and requires effective monitoring and community engagement.
This order provides police with the tools they need to address a serious terrorist threat but represents a clean break from the years of misuse of the disproportionate and discredited Section 44 powers. I commend the order to the House.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, it has taken a little time for this order to reach us—although it is within the 120 days—and I wonder why that is so. It would have been good to have considered it rather earlier after the order came into effect. However, it means that we have had two helpful reports from the Joint Committee on Human Rights and I have also found helpful briefing that we received within the past two or three days from the Equality and Human Rights Commission.
As the Minister said, this is a curtain-raiser for the Protection of Freedoms Bill. I declare an interest which, when I mentioned it on a previous occasion, I discovered I shared with a surprisingly large number of Members of this House—I was stopped and searched under Section 44 by, in fact, the MoD rather than the Metropolitan Police. I was driving past the Ministry of Defence at the time. That was a random stop and search, although I have to say that I thought, and still think, it is very likely that they needed a middle-aged white woman to tick that box. Actually, they bagged two Peers because I was giving a lift to another, and they found a report from the Committee on Standards in Public Life in my boot—so there was nothing much to trouble them in all this. I was more interested than offended.
I support the order but share some of the concerns expressed by the JCHR. It used the term “unease”—I thought that that was a good one—about the Government’s assertion of necessity without being prepared to provide concrete evidence in support of alleged need. I am using shorthand, but the numbers in the House have reduced and those who are here will know what I am talking about. I am also concerned about what seems to be some confusion between “reasonable suspicion” and “reasonable belief”. The JCHR could not have known that we would debate this matter on the same day as TPIMs, but it made that connection. The JCHR made the point that “reasonable” does not appear regarding the authorising officer’s consideration of necessity for and proportionality of authorisation. When we come to the Bill, which will be amendable, perhaps we can look at the precise terms of the new Section 47.
I take the point that has also been made that placing elements of the code of practice into the legislation—the elements that restrict the use of the powers—would be desirable. It would mean greater clarity, enable breaches to be challenged and make checks on the use of the powers legally binding. There is also the point that we may need to consider further the relationship between these powers and the right to peaceful protest.
Of course I welcome the code and I note—particularly given my personal history—that the selection of individuals and vehicles at random must be within the parameters set out within the authorisation. Can the Minister give a reaction on behalf of the Government to the recommendation made by the independent reviewer of terrorism in his report of last July, at paragraph 8.39, on the revision of the code of practice to introduce full and proper guidance on the exercise of the officer’s discretion to stop and search? It is a longer paragraph than that but I am sure that the Minister will be familiar with it. The JCHR recommended prior judicial authorisation of the power to stop and search without reasonable suspicion. The Minister will not be surprised, as I said in the previous debate, that I am with the committee on that. However, I support the order.
Lord Carlile of Berriew
My Lords, on this occasion I feel able to support the Government’s proposals unequivocally and without demur. During my time as independent reviewer of terrorism legislation I saw—and I mean saw with my own eyes—Section 44 being overused, misused and occasionally abused. It produced very few, if any, results in terms of counterterrorism intelligence or information, and its passing is not mourned.
The problem was that there was no requirement for reasonable suspicion and it was treated as a random power to stop and search. I had not heard before this evening that my noble friend Lady Hamwee had been stopped and searched. I recall the noble Lord, Lord West, revealing that he had been stopped and searched, and he told me colourfully of the incident.
The passing of Section 44, and the Government’s speedy action in preventing its use, has been welcome, but there was always a gap to be filled as a result. There are going to be events—the Olympic Games are an obvious example but there may be many others—in which there will be reasonably robust intelligence that gives rise to a reasonable suspicion that a terrorism act will take place. It is important to allow the police to protect the public at such events by giving them a power to stop and search. It is not a random power and it is not expressed in this order as a random power. I agree with my noble friend that it is desirable that police officers who find this kind of power quite difficult to exercise, particularly if they have come from a different part of the country to carry out crowd control duty, should have as much guidance and as good briefings as possible before they are placed on duty with this power in their hands.
I have some experience of the reviewing of the authorisations which, as the Minister reminded us, used to be for 28 days under Section 44 in geographical areas. During my time as independent reviewer a new look was taken at these authorisations, and greater demands were rightly placed on chief officers to ensure that the authorisations were not simply pro formas but that reasons were given. I hope that the same sort of discipline will apply to authorisations following approval of this order.
I know that the civil servants in the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism who scrutinise the applications now have a great deal of experience, which they apply very well in that scrutiny. I therefore believe that as a result of this order we have replaced Section 44 with something that is better, necessary and properly limited in scope.
Police Federation
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Baroness Browning
My Lords, the nature of those proposals are such that, in order to give a definitive answer to the noble Lord, I will have to write to him. I will want to take careful advice as to what opportunities were given for discussion or written consultation. The noble Lord is shaking his head. I think that he would prefer a definitive answer in writing than for me to wing something at the Dispatch Box.
Baroness Hamwee
The topic of pensions for the police must obviously be on the mind of the Police Federation as well as on all our minds. Does the Minister have any news on tackling that issue? But thinking about retirement on a more personal basis and satisfaction for people who want to extend their working lives, is there anything that she can say about the retirement age of police officers and about making use of their experience and the investment that has been made in them for the good of the forces and of society, not losing them at a relatively early age?
Baroness Browning
I can tell my noble friend that public service pension schemes are consulting formally on the proposal, for example, to increase employee contribution rates. The consultation for the police pension scheme is happening within the Police Negotiating Board. The Home Secretary wrote to the Police Negotiating Board on 29 July and has asked for views on its proposal by the end of September.
Police: Funding
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Baroness Browning
My Lords, not only do we care, but we have every respect for the work done by police forces every day. However, it is time to look at how the police are deployed in these times of austerity—the very title of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate’s report. We have to challenge, as senior police officers are doing up and down the country, the way forces are deployed. For example, we see in the recent report that, astonishingly, there are more front-line police officers on duty on a Monday morning than on a Friday night. Surely that has to be challenged. Surely there are ways better to deploy forces to protect the public and the front line, and to ensure that we maintain the important reputation that the noble Lord is so familiar with.
Baroness Hamwee
Is the Minister confident that enough funding is available for up-to-date technology? Used well, technology can achieve savings and greater productivity.
Baroness Browning
My noble friend is absolutely right. Indeed, it is very encouraging to see the way in which forces are using technology, and combining across force borders, by mutual agreement, to share in it to improve the way they serve the public.
Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill
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Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, begging the pardon of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, for the term that I am about to use, I do not think that the choice today is “reform or no reform”. I use that term in the current context; I understand the point that the noble Lord makes. Nor even is it a choice between alternative models of reform, to which I shall come back in a moment.
Given both a free hand and the benefit of the expertise on this subject around this House, which has impressed me increasingly day by day, I do not pretend that I would have designed the model that we have in the Bill, but I have always said that the proposal for directly elected police and crime commissioners is in the coalition’s programme for government, subject to strict checks and balances. Although the Whips may not agree, the scrutiny which this House gave to the checks and balances is what the House is here for. The outcomes of those debates were not always as I would have wished—I argued for several tougher checks and balances, although I acknowledge now, which I did not at the time, that some would have undermined the direct accountability of the police and crime commissioners. But now we know what the elected House wishes, and we know what is before us.
My noble and, if I may say so, good friend Lady Harris of Richmond has pursued her amendment with terrier-like energy. I am sadder than I can say that I cannot support her today, and that is not because I disagree with so many of her arguments. It is an inevitable outcome of our procedures and the way in which we undertake our business that her model is insufficiently developed. That is not her fault. After the surprise vote, she and other noble Lords put enormous effort and ingenuity into consequential amendments—if I may use that term in the widest sense. They were not successful and therefore my noble friend’s model is left without the infrastructure within the Bill that would make it work. That is what I mean by not having a choice of models today.
With regard to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Condon, as has been said, at the root of many of the concerns that have been expressed is the possible politicisation of policing. We do not know whether independent candidates will be tempted to stand for the position. It is hardly possible that under my noble friend Lady Harris’s model independents could stand, because almost the whole of the panel from which she is proposing that a commissioner should come would have been elected on a party-political basis as local councillors would make up that panel.
We do know that the more different sets of elections are aligned, the more the focus on each is distorted, often to the basis of the lowest common denominator. There may be mayoral elections in November 2013, but they would be fairly limited geographically, so that date at least reduces that risk, if I can put it that way. I am thinking now not just of the elections for police and crime commissioners but about the local elections that will take place in May—pretty much every May.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, the noble Baroness is making an interesting speech, but if the case is so persuasive for having separate elections—separate from any other elections—why do we not have a proposal to always have these in November?
Baroness Hamwee
I will come to that if the noble Lord can contain his patience.
Local elections should be about local issues and very often they are not. What I wrote down without having to be prompted by the noble Lord is that the first elections for anything tend to set the tone. There could be a debate about having elections every four or six months for different things throughout the year, although that might be going a little far.
This debate has referred quite a lot to the convenience of campaigners. I am sure that many noble Lords have gritted their teeth and hung their canvass sheets on radiators to dry throughout the year. The convenience of campaigners is the least of the factors in this. But decoupling the elections should help avoid the diversion.
Lord Clinton-Davis
The noble Baroness said that the first elections in November will set the tone. Why and how?
Baroness Hamwee
I thought that I had actually explained about decoupling them and I do not want to try the patience of the House by going over the whole thing again. Separate issues have been raised. We would have the same problem with May 2013 because there are county elections then. Other arguments have been made about November and I am not necessarily following them. This is a very particular argument.
I remain intensely concerned that candidates may stand on a simplistic platform of an officer on every street corner. I do not know whether that was in my noble friend's manifesto. It was a very telling manifesto. She left out of her critique of it that probably every crime has a victim: there is no victimless crime.
The issue of additional cost has been raised. To put it at its bluntest, we could probably wipe out the national deficit if we wiped out democracy.
It is a great pity that the opportunity has not been taken to defer the rearrangement in London to beyond the Olympics, because that will be a diversion.
With regard to the proposal for postponement until after a royal commission, there is of course a need for a continuing debate; but however straight the noble Lord’s face is—and he is very good at keeping a straight face—we all know how disingenuous this is. I have been among those who have used an argument for a review when it is really a euphemism for delay, which amounts to opposition. I agree with him of course on pre-legislative scrutiny, but we are rather beyond that on this Bill sadly.
Finally, with regard to amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, he knows that I have agreed with an enormous amount of what he has said about propriety and governance throughout the debates on this Bill. I am not sure whether four non-executive members is the right number or not; I am sure that I agree with him that it is those individuals who need that support who may be the least likely to want it. He talks in this amendment of a code of practice requiring something more than can be contained in his amendment. I trust—and I hope the Minister can respond to this—that the Government will consult on the code, and not just lay it before Parliament in its finished form. I think that the noble Lord has raised important points, but they have not quite worked in this form. We are at a point when we have to take a decision on what is before us, not something as we would like it to be.
I have to say to the House that I really did not expect to find myself in this position today. I have resisted so many blandishments for so long; but, as I said to my own party group about three hours ago, I persuaded myself overnight, given what we have before us to determine today. The basis of the decision, and the underlying proposals, may not be ones that I am hugely enthusiastic about, but we have to take a decision on what is before us today, and I can now see what my decision needs to be.
Lord Goldsmith
Before the noble Baroness sits down, I wonder if she can help me. I am somewhat confused by what she has said. I had understood from many of her remarks that she was very sympathetic to the points made by her noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond and that she found force in them, but ultimately was not happy because, in the end, not enough people supported other amendments proposed by the noble Baroness to make her proposal workable. We all know and respect the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond, very much indeed, and she has huge experience. She has described this Bill as defective and dangerous, and something which will cause lasting damage to our policing. Does the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, agree with that assessment, and if so, what does she propose that we do about it?
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I hoped that I had made clear that it would not be to the benefit of our communities to seek to pass legislation today which does not have what I described as the “supporting infrastructure”. The debate will not finish today. Of course, hugely important points have arisen in minds which might not have addressed them at all until the August disturbances. Those debates have got to continue. I wish I thought that legislation was the answer to everything. I am afraid that I do not. It is the way it is done, and the way that we all conduct ourselves, that matters—the way in which this legislation is implemented, not just the words on paper. I have criticised every Government who I have had anything to do with since I have been in this House for thinking and saying that the latest Bill was going to be the panacea.
Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill
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Baroness Harris of Richmond
My Lords, as the instigator of that infamous amendment right at the beginning of the Committee stage, I welcome what my noble friend Lord Cormack has said. I want only to make the briefest of interventions on Amendment 3, to which I have added my name. My noble friend is absolutely right to say that more work needs to be done on this Bill in the light of what has happened recently. I urge my noble friend the Minister, having given us some comfort in her amendments today, to take a further step.
I will have a little more to say about recent events and their relevance to this Bill when speaking to a later amendment, but I want to support this amendment for the reasons set out by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath. What we seek is to draw out the strength of the panels so that they are able to send a strong message to the public. That is what we want.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, does my noble friend agree that her amendment, which I certainly would not describe as infamous, was the result of concern in the House that the model being proposed did not contain the strict checks and balances that most of us wish to see? Therefore, picking up the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, it would be entirely proper for the Government to come back on ping-pong with proposals reflecting, beyond Clause 1, the strict checks and balances which led to the original amendment.
Baroness Harris of Richmond
I support my noble friend in her comments. The whole point of tabling the amendment was to try to persuade the Government to bring on the strength of the checks and balances. That has not been done, and I cannot imagine what they could come up with at the ping-pong stage. But I hope they do come up with something because it is the strength of those checks and balances that this House, which voted so strongly in favour of my amendment, supported. I therefore urge my noble friend the Minister to see what she can do.
Baroness Browning
My Lords, there is absolutely no guarantee that PCCs will necessarily be party politicians—although they can be, of course. I think that it would be welcome on all sides of the House to get the best person for the job regardless of party. That is what people have usually looked for in jobs such as this across the public sector. Many people in this House will have had very responsible jobs in public office and I hope that no one in this House would suggest that the only reason why they held those jobs was their party political allegiances. I have to say that this also applies to Members of Parliament—yes, there is a lot of party political cut and thrust, but I hope that all colleagues in this House who have formerly been Members of Parliament would agree with me that once you are elected you represent everyone in your constituency. As a Member of Parliament—apart from when you are actually at the other end of the corridor, and I see a few noble Lords nodding—once the election is over, you put party politics to one side in order to take on your responsibilities for a whole constituency. That applies across the public sector when people are elected or appointed to a post. I would hope that, regardless of party politics, people will step up to the plate to take on a public office of this level of importance.
I turn now to the opposition amendments. Amendment 3, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, seeks to alter the government amendment providing for the panel to exercise its functions in support of the commissioner. Instead, it would give the panel a more direct role in the performance of the force. The Government listened to the concerns of noble Lords across the House in Committee and in meetings which I held outside the Chamber about the panel not doing battle with the commissioner and about the panel having a supportive role in addition to the role set out in the Bill. At Report we tabled an amendment to that effect. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Dear, for speaking to this group of amendments and reminding the House of the oath that constables take, which is at the forefront of their minds. That was so well explained—far better than I could have done—and I am grateful to him.
The Government’s amendment sends out a clear message that we expect the relationship between the PCP and the commissioner to be one in which both parties work towards the mutual aim of providing the best service to the public. The amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, and the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham—who also spoke to it—would substitute the Government’s provision with one where the panel is responsible directly for the performance of the police force. As already discussed during our debates, the Government’s model provides for direct accountability from the chief constable to the police and crime commissioner for the performance of the force. The commissioner is then, in turn, directly accountable to the public. To give the panel the role that noble Lords suggest would confuse these clear lines of accountability.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, perhaps I may ask the Minister a question on that before she moves on. It may be another way of putting the point that the noble Lord, Lord Dear, has made. I absolutely take the point about the deletion of the words,
“supporting the … exercise of the functions of the police and crime commissioner”.
That is something that I was concerned about myself. Can the Minister tell the House how we can read into the Bill the points about integrity, impartiality and so on which are clearly exercising the House? If they are not expressed in the Bill they may well be implied, either through the implied reference to the oath or through some other mechanism. Perhaps at the end of her speech she will be able to assist us on how we can understand that.
Baroness Browning
I am grateful to my noble friend because I was about to turn to the amendment that she and my noble friend Lord Shipley tabled.
The intention of Amendment 13 is for panels to include specific provision in their arrangements for substitutes or deputies where a panel member cannot attend proceedings, and provision for the quorum for a meeting of the panel. This was an issue discussed during Report stage. Your Lordships will recall that during that debate I stated that provision for substitutes or deputies for the panel's vote on the precept and the appointment of the chief constable could be included in the regulations dealing with those specific procedures. We will consider using these powers with partners should we feel that they are necessary, but we start from the position—and I hope that noble Lords will agree—that the authorities around the PCP table are responsible bodies that will take their statutory duties seriously and ensure that their rules and procedures more broadly cover this ground.
As to the veto, we have the power to intervene and regulate on this should we feel it necessary. There is also general provision in the Bill for panels to make their own rules of procedure, including rules on the method of making decisions. That is the mechanism for panels to make their own rules on matters such as a quorum. We start from that point but, none the less, I am happy to say to noble Lords that we will look at this in regulations if it is felt that changes are needed.
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, a few minutes ago, the noble Baroness talked about the current system in London not working. By implication, she was suggesting that if the Bill were to pass, the arrangements for the accountability and governance of the police would be stronger in London than they are at the moment. However, in practice, the Government are weakening the arrangements in London. They are providing the Mayor and the MOPC with fewer powers in terms of control and governance over the police service in London, which I assume is not the Government's intention. The purpose of my modest amendment is to require that the MOPC is given the opportunity to interview candidates for appointment as a commander, deputy assistant commissioner or assistant commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. It does not take the final decision away from the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis; it leaves it there.
On Report, I made my view clear that in an ideal world there should be a joint recommendation on the appointment of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis from the mayor and from the Home Secretary. It would continue to be a royal appointment, a fact that the Government and those former Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police to whom I have spoken feel is important. However, this amendment does not change that. What it does do is to give a significant, though not a decisive, role on appointments slightly below that level, down to the level of commander of the Metropolitan Police, to the MOPC. It would give an opportunity to advise on the basis of having seen the candidates concerned and for that advice then to be considered by the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis before a final appointment is made and before the final consultation processes take place.
I am aware that the mayor’s office in London has made very strong representations to the Government. Indeed, as recently as earlier this week—I believe on Monday—the chair of the MPA and London’s deputy mayor for policing wrote to Theresa May, the Home Secretary, with a copy to the Prime Minister in which he reiterated the concerns of the mayor’s office in London:
“The Mayor and I have deep concerns regarding the proposed future lack of MOPC involvement in MPS officer appointments, and conduct matters in addition, according to the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act. The Bill will remove the role of the governing body in appointment of all ACPO officers”.
That is as clear a statement as you can find that the new arrangements being proposed by the Government will reduce the mechanisms by which the mayor’s office in London holds the police service accountable. The statement continues:
“As I have communicated to you previously, the Mayor and I feel strongly”.
The Government are saying that in London there will be fewer levers, fewer controls and fewer powers for the system that governs the Metropolitan Police. This is at a time when the Government tell us that they want to strengthen those accountability mechanisms. This is at a time when the Government tell us that the current arrangements are not working in London and by implication they ought to be strengthened. This is a time, incidentally, when there is a Conservative Mayor of London. You would have thought that the Government would have the utmost confidence in that person’s ability to take on those functions in an appropriate way; but no. What the Government are doing is taking away even those very limited powers that currently exist and giving them to the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis.
I find the approach that is being taken here quite extraordinary. In quieter times, before the events of the last few weeks, the arrangements in London, where there is a directly elected mayor for the whole city, were being held up to us as being the beacon that was guiding this entire piece of legislation; yet now we are being told that those arrangements are inadequate. However, instead of the arrangements and the responsibilities of the mayor’s office being strengthened, they are being weakened by this Bill.
On Report, I challenged the Minister to give me one instance in this Bill where the new structures will have more responsibility than the current structures have over the Metropolitan Police; I received no answer. The reason I received no answer is because there are no such instances. This Bill weakens the governance arrangements in London.
I think we understand, given the national responsibilities currently held by the Metropolitan Police, why the Home Office has to be involved in the appointment of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis. I think we understand the historic reasons why it is important that that appointment be a royal one, but in circumstances where every other elected police and crime commissioner will have at least the power of appointment of the chief officer of police—assuming that the Government restore that measure to the Bill, as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, hinted that they might consider doing. However, in London, even though an assistant commissioner has the equivalent rank to a chief constable outside London, the mayor’s office will have no involvement other than the right to be consulted. I suggest that this is a diminution of the powers which is extremely unfortunate.
I know that one reason the Government have taken this stance is the desire of the outgoing Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis that he should have control over all appointments of his senior team. No one is suggesting that the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis should not be able to decide how he wants deploy his senior team, but I question whether it is sensible that those appointments are made simply by that one individual in these circumstances.
During my time on the Metropolitan Police Authority, for four years I chaired every appointments panel for officers above the rank of chief superintendent. In the subsequent seven years, I sat on virtually all the appointments panels for deputy assistant commissioners and above. There have been one or two instances of disagreements between the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and the appointments panel of the Metropolitan Police Authority. Usually the Metropolitan Police Authority panel has deferred to the preferences expressed, if they have been expressed clearly, by the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis or his representatives. In a number of instances—it is probably inappropriate for me to give any details—that decision has been against the better judgment of the panel of the Metropolitan Police Authority. In those instances, that better judgment has proved to be right and the strongly held view expressed by the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis was in fact wrong. Therefore, I do not think it is sensible to have an arrangement whereby you are preventing or not requiring the MOPC to have a direct involvement and to have at least the opportunity to interview the candidates so that there can be a dialogue or a consultation with the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis on the basis of detailed information about the strengths and weaknesses of various candidates. I do not think it is sensible even in the terms of what the Government are doing in trying to have a transparent system where the elected representative of the people is seen to be having a decisive role in the governance of policing. I think the way in which the Bill is drafted is a mistake. Unless it is rectified at this stage, I suspect that we will rue the consequences in the future. I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, described his amendment as modest. I have often heard him describe his amendments as modest, although I have not necessarily agreed with him. However, this amendment is about no more than making recommendations. If the Minister is minded to resist, can she explain to the House how that squares with the amendment that we have just made to the Bill about supporting the effective exercise of the functions?
Baroness Browning
My Lords, Amendments 5, 6 and 7 change the powers of the Secretary of State to make secondary legislation in relation to elections. The Bill, as currently drafted, allows provision to be made about the registration of political parties, candidates’ spending limits and spending limits for political parties. Amendments 5 and 6 amend those powers to ensure that the Secretary of State can make provision about all these matters, but can also make provision, as in the case of other elections, in relation to other or third parties who may incur expenditure campaigning for or against a specific candidate or more widely.
Your Lordships will recall that my noble friend Lady Hamwee brought forward amendments in this area on Report, which I committed to consider. I am grateful to my noble friend for raising these important points. Secondary legislation to be made under Clause 59 would have already restricted what candidates and political parties could spend in those elections. Noble Lords will appreciate that the spending of organisations that campaign during elections, but that are not themselves fielding candidates, can greatly affect the result of a poll, even if they are not explicitly supporting a specific candidate. It is important that we are clear that the Bill will allow for that. It is usual in elections for such spend to be regulated and PCP elections should not be an exception. The amendments are necessary to ensure that the powers of the Secretary of State are sufficient to achieve that regulation. I hope that my noble friend Lady Hamwee will agree that they achieve the same end as her amendments on Report. I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee
I am grateful to my noble friend, and I think we should all be grateful to the Electoral Commission, for taking such an eagle-eyed interest in and concern for the Bill. I am perfectly happy to accept that parliamentary counsel’s drafting achieves ends that I could only describe in a narrative kind of way.
Baroness Harris of Richmond
My Lords, I want to say a few words in support of this amendment. I find it completely incomprehensible that anyone would think that it was acceptable to put a politically restricted person in charge of making political decisions, which is the effect of the current proposals relating to deputy and acting PCCs in this Bill. Quite apart from the fact that this would give such a person an impossible technical conundrum to resolve—because a politically restricted person must be politically neutral, and therefore cannot by definition make political decisions—it completely undermines the Government’s own arguments about greater public accountability. It is particularly important that an acting PCC must be able to make decisions as if he or she were the PCC. This includes the key decision about what precept to set if the PCC is absent at that particular time of the year. The PCC’s office cannot not make a decision about this, whether or not the PCC is present, because the police service would be missing up to half its funding the following year if this was so. Not for the first time, I have thought that we were creating an Alice in Wonderland world in this Bill—it is all somehow upside-down.
It is clear to me that an acting PCC cannot be politically restricted. That means that an acting PCC cannot be drawn from the members of the PCC’s staff—which bizarrely now include the deputy PCC, although that is another issue. The obvious place to look is therefore among the members of the police and crime panel, and particularly among the elected members of the panel, if we are serious about a commitment to democracy and accountability. This is exactly what the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, stipulates, and I am very happy to support it.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, at the last stage, both the noble Lord, Lord Boswell of Aynho, and I made rather impromptu suggestions about other possibilities which the Government might look at. Mine was that the commissioner should make the choice, because it seemed to me that there would be a logic in that. I hope that the noble Baroness, who sounded very open to the different possibilities, might be able to respond to the menu that was suggested last time. However, I retain my concern about it being proper that the person who acts up is a person who has been elected. I do not think that the fact that the appointment is made by the panel meets the concerns; it is the object of the appointment that I am concerned about. Indeed, there is almost an irony in suggesting that the appointment is made by the panel—the elected people—as the logic of the Government’s model is that the commissioner is an elected person. I hope that the Minister can help find a way through this.
Baroness Browning
My Lords, this amendment, as with similar amendments at Report stage, seeks to secure the appointment of an acting PCC from the police and crime panel rather than the PCC staff. I want to make it clear that the Government accept that this is a important area and one that we must get right. I am aware that the Opposition disagree with the Government’s proposals, but I continue to believe that the alternative put forward is not the answer. Our objective is simple—we agree that the acting PCC must be underpinned by a mandate from the people to act. The point is that, true to democratic principles, this mandate must be what the people have voted for in that force area. The opposition amendment would replace one elected mandate—the legitimate one that brought the PCC into power—with another that may be completely different and at odds with that of the PCC.
I accept that a member of the PCC staff does not have a direct mandate. They are there to help deliver the PCC’s police and crime plan. We have ensured that they cannot amend this while doing their caretaker role—this will ensure that the mandate of the PCC and the public’s will is maintained. Maintaining the PCC mandate intact is important—delivering on an elected mandate is what democracy is all about, and there are also practical implications. As I have pointed out at previous stages in the Bill, we do not want another local politician, with possibly a different agenda, to take the reins and take the police force in a different direction. We believe that this is not a good proposal. There is a fundamental difference in our approach to this—we see the acting PCC role as a caretaker role and nothing else; it seems that the Opposition see the acting PCC as more than this. Given the direct mandate of the PCC and the fact that the acting PCC should be a temporary measure, I cannot agree. We cannot hand the office of PCC to somebody who will likely seek to take the force in a different direction without a mandate.
This was debated on Report, when the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, in particular made the point that there are no other examples of an unelected person setting a precept. It is important to note here that the acting PCC is hardly acting completely unchecked. First, the PCP has a veto in this area; and, ultimately, should the precept remain excessive, it will be subject to a referendum.
I will finish on how this is all likely to work in practice—after all, this is what matters. As noble Lords know, the Government introduced an amendment to allow PCCs to establish deputies. In reality, we envisage that the PCP will appoint the deputy as the acting PCC. Given the debate thus far on the need to ensure the PCC has sufficient powers, noble Lords will see that we have left it to the PCP to decide which members of the PCC staff should be appointed in the circumstances and at that time. I believe that this satisfies the democratic need in this area and I ask that the amendment is withdrawn.
Metropolitan Police Service
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(12 years, 9 months ago)
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Baroness Hamwee
The House will understand that the Minister cannot say anything other than what she just has about the Third Reading of the police Bill. However, in reflecting on it, as I am sure they will, will the Government reconsider the proposed timing of the introduction of their changes, particularly in London where we have these new unexpected factors in the run-up to the Olympics?
On a more detailed point, does the Minister agree that a mechanism for registering interests and hospitality that is available for inspection by everyone in public life, without investigation by the media, is of great importance? The House will understand the irony of relying on the media in this. What really matters is not what you register but what you do.
Baroness Browning
I quite agree with the principle that my noble friend Lady Hamwee has just espoused. Certainly, the investigations, and the recommendations that will come from them, will, I hope, show us the best way forward for things such as hospitality. Very often, these things come down to personal judgment. All of us in public life have to make a personal judgment about some of these issues, and sometimes we are bound by the spirit of the law as well as what is said in the law. I therefore hope that when we see the final results of the investigations, they will include codes and practices that encapsulate the spirit of the law as well as the law itself.
Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(12 years, 10 months ago)
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Baroness Hamwee
I hope that I can reassure the House. In discussions with my noble friend, neither of us realised that we would reach this group quite so soon. My noble friend should be able to be here until well after we have got through this group—unless she is going to take an hour and a half, in which case there will be other problems.
Baroness Doocey
I apologise to the House if I have got it wrong yet again and I thank my noble friend Lady Hamwee. My amendment relates to the handling of complaints against senior police officers in London. The Bill proposes that responsibility for complaints against senior ACPO officers—that is, officers below the rank of deputy commissioner—should be moved from the Metropolitan Police Authority to the Metropolitan Police Commissioner. My concern is not that this would make the commissioner responsible for employing, promoting and disciplining officers—I do not have a major problem with that—but that it would also make him responsible for sackings and, crucially, for hearing appeals against his own rulings. It would remove all the elements of independence and transparency that the Metropolitan Police Authority currently provides and would in effect make the commissioner judge, jury and executioner.
The proposals are deeply flawed because they concentrate too much power in the hands of the commissioner without any proper checks and balances. There is also no effective framework to safeguard impartiality. I am aware of the Government's response to the argument. They argue that it is commonplace for complaints to be decided within an organisation rather than by an external arbiter. However, this fails to appreciate that police officers are in a unique position. They are officers of the Crown who have the power to detain members of the public and to take away their freedom through arrest. Consequently, there is no valid analogy with how other organisations—even the Armed Forces—deal with complaints, conduct, dismissals and appeals. It is in the interest of the police that they should be able to demonstrate an independent element in the assessment of the seriousness and reputational risks of allegations made against their most senior ranks. The Bill envisages allowing appeals to the IPCC, but only at the end of the process. That is no substitute for an independent review of whether standards of conduct may have fallen below those that the outside world would recognise as proper.
Lack of independence also creates another problem. A very likely consequence of the new system is an increase in the number of complaints against the commissioner for failing properly to investigate complaints against ACPO officers under his command. If those making complaints against a senior officer feel that the issue has not been properly or sufficiently well dealt with in the first instance, they will almost certainly lodge a complaint against the chief officer. The whole rigmarole in turn creates an increased possibility of legal challenge.
I believe there is a more fundamental problem. In any closed institution, such as the police, it is common for custom and practice to become entrenched. An independent element is vital to provide a counterbalance and to ensure due process. It is worth considering the virtues of the current system for handling complaints. At present the Metropolitan Police Authority hears complaints through its professional standards cases sub-committee and there is a right of appeal to the Police Appeals Tribunal. This current system is not an accident of history. It evolved to address concerns about the perceived lack of independence and accountability in how complaints and conduct matters had been handled previously. Are we really confident that policing has matured sufficiently to deal with these concerns? The Government seem to be ignoring the lessons of the past and are therefore likely to repeat the errors of the past.
Since the Bill abolishes the Metropolitan Police Authority, the purpose of my amendment is to restore equivalent safeguards to the new arrangements. The amendment would, within London, make the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime the relevant appeals body. It is also essential that the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime has statutory access to all information and systems where complaints are recorded. Without this, the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime will be totally reliant on the commissioner advising it of complaint or conduct matters. It would also be unable to discharge the functions proposed in the Bill to ensure that chief constables have fulfilled their duty in the handling of such complaints. The Government’s proposals do no favours to the PCC. They expose him or her to accusations—unjustified, one would hope—of conflict of interest, bias and favouritism. This amendment would avoid these pitfalls without in any way affecting the proper authority of the PCC and the correct limits to his or her discretion. I therefore commend this amendment as a means of preserving the necessary elements of independence, transparency and impartiality. I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I joined in the debate on these two terms at the previous stage, and on rereading Hansard I wonder now even more than I did at the time how assessing whether something is appropriate could be evidence-based. If I were still a councillor having to decide whether a condition is appropriate, I do not think I could avoid it being a subjective judgment. My noble friend has referred to this. I also asked at the last stage whether the assessment had to be reasonable. If it is “appropriate” rather than “necessary”, I assume that it would have to be, but the Minister very elegantly sidestepped that question. I do not blame her because I had not given her notice of it.
My final point refers to the statutory guidance, again just mentioned by my noble friend. We are not talking about a particular application, but licensing in general is a quasi-judicial activity. Perhaps this is not strictly quasi-judicial, but it comes quite close to it. I am concerned about the need to rely on guidance as distinct from primary legislation in the way this is approached.
Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones and the Minister will recall that I spoke on this matter in Committee. I have no intention of running the risk of prolonging the debate by repeating what I said on that occasion, but nothing that has happened since the previous stage alters in any way the views I then expressed. The only thing I would say in a wholly friendly manner to my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones is that I used the human rights argument on a series of occasions during our debates on the Licensing Bill in 2003. I have to say, in a manner which I hope he will not find too discouraging, that on every single occasion the Front Bench of the then Government shut me up and told me that I did not actually have a case to argue.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara
My Lords, we discussed this matter in Committee and we want to probe further whether the Government have moved in their thinking. We welcome the Government’s move through Clause 123 to allow licensing authorities the ability to set fees locally on the basis of full cost recovery. Operating the licence system since 2005 has cost council tax payers over £100 million more than they anticipated due to the current, centrally set fee structure, which does not allow licensing authorities to set cost-neutral local charges. Given the economic climate, there is a real imperative to allow cost-neutral fees to be set as soon as possible. However, as we discussed last time, there is a drafting error within Clause 123, which would mean two-tier authorities not being able fully to recover all the costs associated with licensing. This was debated in Committee. When the Minister replied, he acknowledged that, as drafted, the Bill would exclude the relevant costs of trading standards and social services departments and that, even though they were discharging duties under the Licensing Act, they would not be able to recover them. He concluded by saying:
“I see sense in the intention of [the amendment] and, if I may, I shall reflect on it further”.—[Official Report, 16/6/11; col. 911.]
The purpose of the amendment is to press the Government for their response on this issue. I hope that they have some good news for us.
Baroness Hamwee
I support the amendment. I reacted rather to the suggestion that what is a marginal cost is therefore almost irrelevant in the case of the authorities affected. I, too, look forward to hearing the outcome of the reflection.
Lord De Mauley
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, has explained, Amendment 305ZB seeks to ensure that the costs of social services and trading standards, in their role as “responsible authorities” only, can be covered by fees when they are located outside the licensing authority as well as within it. I certainly acknowledge that I said in Committee that I would reflect further on the proposal. I have done so very carefully and taken legal advice. Having examined it, I have found that the practical difficulties unfortunately outweigh the benefits.
The role of responsible authority involves, for example, considering applications and, in rare cases, applying for review. The costs arising will be very marginal—I am sorry that my noble friend Lady Hamwee objects to the use of that wording—in the context of overall fee income and the wider functions of these bodies. To set fees locally, each licensing authority will be required to calculate its own costs. We would not wish to require it to calculate the costs of another body without very good reason. The amendment would also imply a duty on county councils to report fractional costs and on the licensing authority to pass the funds to the county. The cost of this would then be passed on to fee payers even if the net gain to local government was very little or even nothing. The current fees regime makes no provision for district councils to pass funding to county councils in respect of these functions and we understand that no money has been transferred.
As I said, I have considered this matter carefully. In a nutshell, I am asking noble Lords to accept that the amendment would result in substantial extra bureaucracy and costs which would be passed on to licence holders for very little benefit. I ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, can the Minister tell the House whether these practical difficulties have been discussed with the Local Government Association, which would undoubtedly have an input into this? If not, that is a pity.
Lord De Mauley
My Lords, flicking rapidly through my papers, I cannot find the answer to my noble friend’s question. I shall write to her about it.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I think that the noble Lord opposite and I would have heard if there had been a discussion. I put that rather gently but firmly.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara
There was, I think, a hint of menace in what the noble Baroness was saying. She was leaning forward slightly, and it was well judged to deliver that blow.
The LGA has indeed been concerned about this issue and has circulated documents widely which address the issue and make the main points that I repeated in the discussions earlier. It has also made it clear that it is very concerned about this matter. Although the Minister said that it was a marginal cost, every pound is important to local government. It is unfortunate that the Government have said that the cost of the bureaucracy of this might outweigh its benefits when those who are responsible for delivering it say that they want it to happen.
The Government are hiding under the question of bureaucracy. They promised a very important principle—that there would be a full cost recovery basis for licensing. They have gone so far down the line but they are not prepared to go the further stage. This is a disappointing result and we would like to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville
My Lords, I intervene extremely briefly. On the strength of my own experience in the two cities, where there is of course an enormous amount of late-night activity and in other parts of the constituency there is absolutely nothing happening at all, I would like my noble friend, to whom I was not very helpful on the last occasion, to know that on this occasion I am sympathetic to what he is saying.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I have Amendment 306ZZA in this group. On the issue of the division of the levy between the police and the local authority, at the previous stage I attempted to reverse the proportions, as provided by the Bill. This time I am suggesting a 50-50 split. I am sure that my noble friend will understand how completely reasonable that must be.
At that stage, my noble friend told me as reassurance that the levy had,
“been designed to raise money for the police, who bear the brunt of late night enforcement costs”.—[Official Report, 16/6/11; col. 943.]
I do not doubt the costs borne by the police, but to some extent they are already taken into account in the way that their funding operates. I am concerned that the costs to local authorities, particularly as regards environmental health and some of the organisation involved in dealing with late-night activity, are not acknowledged.
I have brought this back not only to change the proportion but because of a thought that occurred to me after the previous stage. If an authority is to receive little financial benefit from the levy, it may take a decision not to impose it at all. I wonder whether the Government have considered that risk, if I may put it that way.
Lord Rosser
I will be brief. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, referred to what my noble friend Lord Stevenson of Balmacara said in Committee in respect of the amendments that the noble Lord has moved, in particular the support that we on these Benches gave for a more targeted application of the late-night levy. That continues to be our position.