Schedule 5 to the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (Modification) Order 2012
(12 years, 7 months ago)
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Lord Henley
That the Grand Committee do report to the House that it has considered the Schedule 5 to the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (Modification) Order 2012.
Relevant document: 43rd Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)
My Lords, I beg to move that the Committee considers the draft Schedule 5 to the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (Modification) Order 2012. The draft order was laid before the House on 1 March 2012.
Protecting the public from terrorism will always be the principal priority of this Government and we are committed to ensuring that the police and others have the powers that they need to tackle terrorism. But there is also a need to guard against placing disproportionate burdens on business, industry and academia.
The purpose of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 is to ensure that the Government have the necessary powers to counter the terrorist threat to the UK. Part 7 of the Act is intended to improve the security of dangerous biological substances that may be targeted or used by terrorists.
Schedule 5 lists the substances that are subject to the provisions of Part 7 of the Act. Any laboratory that intends to hold one of the controlled pathogens and toxins must notify the Home Office and comply with physical, personnel and electronic security advice as directed by the police. A pathogen is a biological agent that can cause disease or illness.
The purpose of the draft Schedule 5 to the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (Modification) Order 2012 is to add one pathogen to the list of controlled pathogens and toxins in Schedule 5 to the 2001 Act and to remove four pathogens. The draft order sets out the specific details of the modification, which I will not repeat now.
The list of controlled pathogens was reviewed by a group of Government, academic and industry experts with the aim of ensuring that it was up to date with scientific advances and emerging terrorist threats and diseases.
Pathogens and toxins should be added to or remain on the list only if we are satisfied that the pathogen or toxin could be used in an act of terrorism to endanger life or cause serious harm to human health. Conversely, where we are satisfied that a pathogen or toxin could not be used effectively in an act of terrorism, we should seek to remove it from the list to remove unnecessary burdens.
The approach used to review the list of controlled pathogens and toxins is a robust one. Experience with lists of pathogens produced for health and safety at work shows that there is always debate about the inclusion of individual pathogens and toxins on such lists and that they need to be reviewed from time to time as more information becomes available. The key is to make pragmatic decisions based on the available knowledge of the experts involved.
The threat posed by the possible terrorist use of pathogens and toxins remains real. It is imperative to ensure that terrorists do not have access to dangerous substances but it is also important to ensure that the measures are proportionate and important scientific research and medical use are not restricted.
If the draft order is approved by both Houses, it will come into force on 1 October 2012. I believe that the modification strikes the right balance and therefore commend it to the Committee. I beg to move.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, once again, we are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Henley, for his full explanation of the order before the Grand Committee this afternoon. I support the general thrust of what he said and will support the order. I just want to ask a couple of points. Could he say a little more about the consultation process? I note from paragraph 8.1 of the Explanatory Memorandum that,
“Laboratories and law enforcement staff were consulted”.
Were other agencies also consulted that might have an interest in this area? I also want to ask him about paragraph 12.2. Very helpfully, the Explanatory Memorandum points out,
“The outcome will be subject to expert review in 2013”.
Obviously these are sensitive issues, but I wondered whether the outcome of that review in general would be made available in the public domain and whether there might be an opportunity at that point for further debate in Parliament.
Clearly the UK remains in a state of alert against the threat of the use of biological weapons, and that is absolutely right. The Minister will know that his own department and the police have suffered reductions in their budgets. Will he confirm that that has not had an impact on our capacity to deal with the particular threat posed by these biological substances?
The impact assessment, which I found helpful, makes it clear that, in relation to biological agents, inspections are carried out by the Counter Terrorism Security Advisors, who are located within police forces and are responsible for providing specialist protective security advice to local organisations, with their work co-ordinated by the National Counter Terrorism Security Office. My understanding is that the CTSAs have the responsibility to undertake security assessments of laboratories holding Schedule 5 substances and, as stated above, have the power to require improvements to their security arrangements operation. These are located within police forces.
I want to ask the Minister about police and crime commissioners. Will he assure me that the Home Office is satisfied that police and crime commissioners would not be in a position to inhibit the work of these people to carry out their security assessments of laboratories? What would happen if a police and crime commissioner sought to intervene with a chief constable to say that they did not think that this was a particular priority? If the noble Lord thinks that I am on a flight of fantasy, I would remind him of the actions of the Deputy Mayor of London, Mr Kit Malthouse, who has sought to interfere with the Metropolitan Police in the exercise of its operational responsibilities when it comes to phone hacking. The noble Lord was not, alas, able to be present for our debates on the police and crime commissioners except, I think, at the very end, but we raised those issues. So I think that it is entirely relevant for me to ask that question in relation to ensuring the integrity of our national security and ensuring that any perversity that might come from certain elected police commissioners would not in any way interfere with overall government responsibility for national security.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, rather like the debate that we had on the drugs order yesterday, I think it is quite hard for lay people—certainly such as I am—to judge proposals such as this. We have to rely on the experts and are grateful that they are there to advise. My noble friend the Minister has referred to the balance that has been struck. I take the point about the need for there to be a balance, although I was interested to read in the notes attached to the impact assessment the list of criteria used by the Lightfoot review as to which biological agents should be included or excluded from the list. In particular, it was quite interesting that ease of production was one of them, since a substance, a pathogen or toxin was of a level of danger or not. I do not see that as affected by the ease of production, but I suppose that the whole area of risk is quite tricky.
Like the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, I looked at the paragraph on consultation and cannot believe that the health services were not consulted. The impact of any of these getting loose, as it were, is clearly relevant to them. Could the Minister say a word about their involvement in the process?
Apart from those questions, I support the order.
Lord Henley
On consultation and who was brought on to the expert panel, there was a government, academic and industry expert panel comprising representatives of the Health and Safety Executive, the Health Protection Agency, the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, the National Counter Terrorism Security Office, the Security Service and the Department of Health. I can give that assurance to both noble Lords. I imagine that it would also have included representatives from the devolved Departments of Health, as well as the National Institute for Biological Standards and Control, the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry, Imperial College, the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure and, last but not least, the Home Office. That expert panel considered which pathogens handled in UK facilities could have potential to cause very serious harm if used by terrorists. We then had two 12-week consultation exercises, and the consultation document was made publicly available. Communications were targeted at law enforcement and bio-laboratory communities by e-mailing invitations to respond to each force and laboratory through their professional association. We had relatively few responses to that consultation—only about 20—but that is to be expected in such a specialist area.
The noble Lord’s second point related to cuts in the budget. I repeat that it is very difficult in the Home Office and all other departments having to cope with reductions in expenditure. However, we all accept that we can still do the job and do it properly, and I can assure the noble Lord that I still believe that that is possible.
Lastly, the noble Lord raised the point about PCCs. It was a nice try, but they will not be able to inhibit or damage any of the work under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act. The obligations are set out clearly in Part 7, and the police have a duty to explore those obligations. I do not believe that that is a matter on which we will see interference from PCCs.
I hope that that deals with the questions from my noble friend and the noble Lord. I beg to move.