Identity Documents Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Monday 18th October 2010 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, shortly before the general election I was asked at a meeting what would be the first new Bill that I would introduce if I had the opportunity to do so. I said that we had far too much legislation already and that I would be looking at making repeals before I would look at introducing new laws. I was on a panel with a Member of Parliament who had been a Home Secretary and he agreed with that analysis. The Identity Cards Act 2006 was not in the “unnecessary” column; it was in the column marked “plain wrong”. I am therefore delighted to welcome this Bill and to note the significance of the fact that the upholding of civil liberties and the right to privacy are being given parliamentary time so early in this Parliament.

Even those who were initially attracted by the, “I’ve done nothing wrong, so I have nothing to fear” argument were, in increasing numbers, losing faith in the effectiveness of ID cards. The events of 9/11 and the Madrid train bombings answered the assertion that ID cards would help in dealing with terrorism. As for organised crime, identity fraud—which the noble Lord, Lord Bach, mentioned—is committed mostly online, where identity cards are irrelevant. As for the potential convenience for young people in proving their age, all I can say is, “some nut, some sledgehammer”.

Then, of course, we have heard about the cost. The waste of money is a scandal. The noble Lord, Lord Bach, has mentioned refunds. I agree that there is an issue regarding the payments made by individuals. However, it is completely disproportionate to suggest that the charges that have been paid by individuals are a greater issue than the cost of the scheme so far, and its potential cost were it to be retained.

I could have spent 15 minutes reading into the record the quotes that I found in a very quick internet search. Instead, I will share a couple. These expressions of concern by citizens—I use the term deliberately—very effectively make the point. The first is:

“Why should I have to validate my very existence by signing up for this National Identity Register/ID cards? The potential of this data to be abused/lost/stolen is almost a certainty never mind the fact you have to pay for the privilege. It’s crazy that law-abiding people will be punished for not having one or not keeping their details up to date and it provides no extra benefit whatsoever. Saying it will counteract terrorism is an absolute delusion too”.

The second comment that I will share is as follows:

“ID cards will do nothing effective to reduce terrorism or crime, indeed criminal and terrorist organisations with the resources will probably find ways around them anyway. These cards do however extend the control and interference of the state by another step. This government in particular is investing heavily in building a very good infrastructure for oppression. I will not sign up for these cards, nor carry one. The scheme should be scrapped without compensation to the organisations involved and any money saved moved into worthwhile parts of the budget, perhaps even to help reduce the causes of crime by improving education and youth services”.

Those comments go to the heart of the matter. I do not need to spell out the concerns that we all have about the vulnerability of the personal data to which they refer. I look forward to debating in Committee amendments to explore points from the Joint Committee on Human Rights about the offences that are being re-enacted, and about information sharing in connection with the issue of passports. The JCHR picked up, among other things, on comments made by the Information Commissioner’s Office. I will quote from the Hansard report of the written evidence given to the Public Bill Committee:

“There should be no room for ambiguity over the information which will be destroyed”.

That is a matter that we will come back to.

Mention has already been made of biometric immigration documents, and the need for better language than the divisive “ID cards for foreign nationals”. I appreciate that residence permits are required for a fair system of border control. I hope that the Minister will comment either now or when we come to these points in Committee, as I am sure we will, on who has access to personal information held by the National Biometric Identity Service; how long the information will be retained; whether it will be retained after the individual has left the UK, and if so, why; and whether the UK goes further than is required by European law.

I look forward to passing the Bill after the proper scrutiny to which I have referred, and to the further protection of civil liberties that will no doubt be coming to us—to rebalancing, if I may use a good new Labour term. We can still learn lessons. The noble Lord, Lord Bach, said that it was a shame that we were scrapping the schemes because there were lessons to be learned. I hope that we can learn them in any event.

The ID register is an authoritarian strand of government that I deplore. I see no justification for the scheme other than that “it was invented here, but here is now there”. I do not want to be unnecessarily divisive, because all of us who value our liberties and who rely on a common-sense approach to good government should welcome the Bill—and I believe that they do, because I recognise that those views are held on all sides of the House.

Cyberattacks: EU Committee Report

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Thursday 14th October 2010 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, for introducing this debate. I am glad that there are people who understand all this and can speak the language and handle the acronyms. I use that thought to evade the rule that there should be only one formal thanks to maiden speakers before the winders. I am very glad that we have a “big beast” who was able to get his head around the issues sufficiently to start a new area of work. I am not sure that I should refer to the Minister as a big beast other than intellectually and, to be even-handed, as someone who also has a track record in security.

The noble Lord, Lord Harris, and I briefly discussed the report the other day. Although his speech did not tend in this direction, we agreed at the time that this amounted to something very serious and that something should be done. I tend to see that thought in the report, where we read:

“There was consensus among our witnesses that this was a legitimate area for the EU to be concerned about, and that it had some role to play, but there was no unanimity as to what that role should be”.

I suppose that is formal speak for the same thought.

This is a report about the EU but I entirely take the point made in the speeches we have heard so far that this is a global issue. I was not surprised to read that American witnesses were encouraging about the role of the EU as distinct from national roles. This is a global issue. The phrase “asymmetrical development” is a very polite term for describing the problem of the lowest common denominator.

This is not just about the EU and it is not just about government. As the noble Lord, Lord Harris, said, it concerns every sector from contractors to government departments and the services provided by the private sector. We heard about Northgate but utilities could be affected—the water services, to take one—and traffic lights. The list is very long indeed and it does not take a lot of imagination to get beyond the jargon and think about the real problems that a cyberattack could cause.

I very much agree with the committee that it is for the public sector to take the initiative and offer a real say to experienced internet entrepreneurs in how public/private partnerships are best developed and not leave it to the private sector to come forward with ideas.

While I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, that this is not about cybercrime, like the noble Lord, Lord Harris, I will be interested to hear from the Minister about the role of the new National Crime Agency. Behind technology of any sort are people. That comes through very clearly in the committee’s comments on ENISA. The noble Lord, Lord Harris, referred to juvenile delinquents. I sometimes wonder whether states should thank innocent or naive hackers for showing them where problems and weaknesses arise.

The other day I heard a tale from Bletchley Park about a code—not Enigma—which was cracked because the transmitter of a message in code realised that he had made a mistake and transmitted a second message correcting it. That gave those at Bletchley the material to be able to crack the code. It is individuals who can, in what might appear to be small ways, undermine the security of systems.

I, too, am interested in resilience to cyberattacks, the work that is going on and that which can be undertaken in this area—that must be harder to tackle at an international level than at a national or local level—to anticipate technological aspects and human reactions in dealing with cyberattacks. I know that I am not the only person in the Chamber who has heard about what went on immediately following the 7 July bombings. One of the problems of which we became aware pretty quickly was people’s tendency to use mobile phones and the effect that had on the mobile phone networks. It is a very human reaction to pick up a phone to find out whether one’s family is safe. I wonder whether any thought has been given to involving the media in resilience exercises. I take this lesson also from 7/7: the media have a very important role as people tend to turn on their televisions and radios.

Finally, as result of work that I and other Members of the London Assembly did following those July bombings, I keep in mind the words of the then managing director of London Underground. He said that the big lesson for us was:

“Invest in your staff, rely on them. Invest in technology, but do not rely on it”.

Children: Trafficking

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Tuesday 27th July 2010 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, the functions of CEOP will certainly remain within the new structure for the National Crime Agency. There is no intention to abolish those functions. As to the budget figure, obviously I cannot give an assurance of that kind until we know the outcome of the CSR review. But I note the point that has been made.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, we are aware of work going on to anticipate problems around the Olympics as regards trafficked women. Is this a problem that has been identified as regards trafficked children as well? If so, are steps being taken to address it during the two sets of Games?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My noble friend is right to say that this is potentially a vulnerable point. We have the Olympics particularly in mind and will be looking to see what measures are necessary.

EU: European Investigation Order

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Tuesday 27th July 2010 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

The noble Lord is entirely mistaken. This is mutual legal assistance between national legal regimes.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that this is one of a number of steps that will make it more difficult for people to forum-shop for the legal jurisdictions that best suit them?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

It is certainly the case that mutual legal assistance regularises the likelihood of trials taking place in the proper place.

Policing

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Monday 26th July 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

Order.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, perhaps I may ask the Minister two questions. First, can she say something about the role of local authorities? They have crime and disorder responsibilities and will need to be linked into the new arrangements. Secondly, I ask for an assurance that giving the new National Crime Agency some border responsibilities does not portray a mindset that immigration and crime are necessarily and inevitably linked.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

We intend to consult on the role of local authorities and how they will link into the police and crime commissioners. I take the point about the new agency. The fact that the UKBA will retain its own separate role alongside the border police agency indicates that we recognise that there are border control functions that are unrelated to and do not concern themselves with crime.

Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (Disclosure of Information by SOCA) Order 2010

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Monday 26th July 2010 Grand Committee

[Lord Brett]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for the background and detailed information about how we take forward this important piece of secondary legislation. The Opposition support it and I commend it to the Grand Committee.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I, too, am grateful to the Minister, as she anticipated one or two of my questions, but I have a couple more—a little more than the noble Lord, Lord Brett. First, it was interesting that we are dealing with SOCA providing information to a non-departmental public body. I could have understood the position more easily were it the other way around, as SOCA is the organisation that really needs the information. However, I appreciate the concerns which underlie this measure.

I was interested in the Information Commissioner’s comments. The noble Baroness anticipated these to some extent, but his office emphasises that the question of whether disclosure of information to the anti-doping agency is fair and proportionate necessitates detailed consideration of what information is to be shared and why. I assume that this refers to the need for the assessment to be carried out on a case-by-case basis and that what is being said is that one cannot give global rubber-stamping to this work when dealing with confidentiality and human rights requirements.

The Explanatory Memorandum refers at paragraph 7.4 to,

“obtaining evidence to help pursue drugs cheats”.

I should like to understand whether that is part of this programme, if we are talking only about individuals. It does not immediately strike one as being serious and organised crime, although that may simply be the way that this paragraph is worded and that what we should understand by it is that an individual may be part of a serious and organised crime.

The Minister said that there would be no significant additional cost. Can she therefore confirm that the figures given in the papers attached to the impact statement on a requirement for eight extra staff at SOCA, with a budget of around £100,000, are correct? I appreciate that in government £100,000 is sometimes regarded as small beer, but the public might not always see it that way. I was a little surprised to see that eight more staff were needed. I should have thought that that sort of work might have been swept up in the work that was already being carried out, but I am probably too optimistic on that score.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, the noble Baroness raises a number of points. The reason that we have the arrangement of SOCA being willing to provide information to an NDPB is because the sporting community is extremely unwilling to see an extensive criminalisation of the control of doping in sporting activity and wants to try to pursue a policy where best practice, peer pressure and effective action by the sports’ regulatory bodies are the way by which it is controlled. That accounts for doing it this way. Clearly, if it was concluded that that was not effective, one would have to look again at the arrangements, but the doping that goes on at the moment is not so excessive that it is thought necessary to bring in SOCA in a big way.

On the number of people needed, unless I am mistaken, I think that the eight extra staff will not be employed by SOCA but will be acquired by UKAD, because it has to set up a unit to process the information that it gets from SOCA and to decide the action that needs to be taken. Those individuals need some security clearance, so there is a reason for needing a specialised staff. For SOCA, it is true that the information that it is able to supply is in many respects a by-product of other investigations, but it is extremely useful to the sporting regulatory agencies.

As for the question of drugs cheats, one reason why it will be increasingly necessary to go down that road is that the testing procedures have been shown to be only partially adequate, because practices have developed where either substances are used which are extraordinarily difficult to detect in tests, or they are being dosed in such small amounts that they do not show up in a test, such that one has to go to a more forensic approach to dealing with those cheats. That is why, in the end, one has to bring in an agency which might have information about suppliers. It is, in the end, the suppliers whom we need to try to choke off so that the substances never reach the performers. We are witnessing a change in the nature of the doping culture that, in turn, leads to new investigative techniques having to be employed.

Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Amendment No. 2) Order 2010

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Wednesday 21st July 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brett]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for the detailed explanation of why this order is both important and necessary. In proposing this order, the Government are continuing the policy pursued by the previous Labour Government. I commend the Minister for this and suggest that continuing the policies of the previous Government in a number of policy areas in the Home Office would also be commended as useful. Beyond that, I applaud the Pauline conversion of the minority party in the coalition to the policy set out in the Minister’s explanation. As I recall, it showed far less support when the same policy was put forward previously by the last Government.

My colleague, the Opposition spokesman in the other place, sought and gained the assurances from the Government that I would have placed before the Minister today. On that basis, it remains only for me to indicate support for this order and commend it to the House.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, we discussed the last misuse of drugs order less than four months ago. Speaking on behalf of my Liberal Democrat colleagues, I supported the order, so I am a little confused by what the noble Lord has just said. There were several comments about designer drugs and so-called legal highs, and that the so-called designers would always work on the next drug. Those predictions were clearly right. I am very happy to support this order, but I have a number of questions, to some extent following from the previous order so that the House can understand the success or otherwise—I hope success—of that approach.

The Minister has told us that 115 kilograms of mephedrone/cathinone derivatives have been seized. I know that it is asking her to prove a negative, but does she have any information as to how much might be getting through—the converse of that coin? What steps have been taken to publicise the dangers of legal highs? Welcome was given around the House to the steps that were being taken then, and the noble Lord, Lord Bates, mentioned the use of social media, which struck me as entirely sensible in this context. She has mentioned today steps that might be taken by trading standards officers under consumer protection legislation. Naphyrone and naphthylpyrovalerone analogues apparently have no legitimate purpose in the same way as mephedrone. I do not suppose that they are any more effective as bath salts or fertilisers than mephedrone. Have trading standards officers in fact had any success in using their powers under consumer protection legislation?

Terrorism Act 2006 (Disapplication of Section 25) Order 2010

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Monday 19th July 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bew]

My Lords, I support the Minister with great pleasure because she has over many years now had a fine record of circumspect vigilance, if I could put it like that, in this field. In putting forward this order today, she is exhibiting that same quality of circumspect vigilance. In recent weeks, we have seen the broad outlines of a new government policy on terrorism. On the one hand we have seen a more liberal approach, with an attempt to remove irritations that communities feel with some aspects of policy, and on the other an attempt to draw a firm line with respect to extremist ideologues, symbolised by the action taken by the Home Secretary in the middle of last month over the visit of Zakir Naik. I wish the Government well with this subtle balancing project.

Some of the discussion that is now going on about the strong and realistic possibility that in some months’ time we will move from 28 days to 14 seems to be a little unrealistic and utopian. It is based to some degree—not for the first or last time—on a forced and false analogy with Northern Ireland. It is true that the internment policy, which was introduced in mid-1971, was a failure, but we must remember that, although it was phased out in the mid-1970s, terrorism went on for another 20 years and is not to this day fully extinguished in Northern Ireland. It is important not to have exaggerated expectations for the impact of any move from 28 to 14 days, because it is clear, as all serious practitioners acknowledge, that the issues of the illiberality or incipient authoritarianism, alleged or practical, of our modern state are not the ones that motivate those who involve themselves in terrorism.

There is a more complicated question about the broader communities that may or may not have what is called in Ireland a sneaking regard for terrorism. Here again, it is clearly the case that the Government must take a careful look at what the state does. However, the truth is that what modern states, even the most liberal and sophisticated, do in the face of terrorism is to a degree always clumsy. It is also the case that it is not quite as important in the evolution of communal attitudes as many believe. The tragedy of terrorist acts is that they force members of the community either to identify with them or, in an act of great moral courage, to say no to them. There is something polarising about these acts that forces communities into a position either of denial or—to use the Irish phrase again—of sneaking regard. Therefore, the fundamental thing has to be to stop terrorism, because those actions are the driver of the process, rather than the inevitable, clumsy and inadequate acts of the state. I guarantee that if we go to 14 days, within two or three years something else that the state is doing will be said to be inflaming communal sentiment. For those reasons of caution, I welcome the circumspect vigilance that characterises the approach to these matters of the noble Baroness and I am glad to support the order.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the extension of 14 days to 28 started as a temporary measure and remains temporary; we need to remember that. However, the extension even to 14 days in the parent legislation was an extension from the original four. Fourteen days is exceptional in every sense of the word and 28 days more so. The noble Lord, Lord Newton, referred to drift. I entirely agree with him. It is important that renewal does not become routine and that the reasons for renewal are not merely a parroting of what has gone before. The measures taken over the past few years have too often been knee-jerk.

This occasion is different. Were it not so, I would have encouraged colleagues to vote against the order. Liberal Democrats have consistently opposed 28 days. It may be a disadvantage to be tidy-minded, but I see the logic of not pre-empting the review of counterterrorism powers—not just the headline powers of control orders, detention without charge, deportation with assurances and so on, but how the powers relate to one another and all the underlying measures and mechanisms that are available or that might be made available. These were listed in your Lordships’ House when the Minister announced the review. In all this, I stress the role of the judiciary in allowing an extension of detention without charge and in post-charge interviews. It would be helpful if the Minister could tell us about the bringing into force of, I think, Section 22 of the 2008 legislation.

Reference has been made to the mechanisms available in other jurisdictions. I hope that the review that will come out of the Home Office in due course will explain the differences between the different jurisdictions. I entirely take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord West, that one cannot look at the period of detention without charge in isolation from all the other mechanisms used by the different jurisdictions, as these matters are not easily transferable. However, for those of us who are concerned with this whole area, it would be helpful to have the distinctions spelled out so that we are clear about them.

Biometric Passports

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Tuesday 13th July 2010 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

The existing facial biometric is a chip inside the passport, and that type of passport has been issued since 2006. It is possible, and we intend, to strengthen the security technology that surrounds that chip to decrease the ability of any forger in any way to clone it or counter its security.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the Minister rightly acknowledges the importance of passports to our security. However, does she agree that it is most important to ensure that the existing system is well bedded in and working well before attempting to go on to a second stage? That is one reason why I, for one, support the Government’s intention not to move on to a second stage of biometric passports.

Counterterrorism and Security

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Tuesday 13th July 2010 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

The House would agree that the noble Baroness is quite right; the Government in office must take responsibility for the legislation that they put forward.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I welcome the Statement very much. I think I heard the Minister say that the Home Office will be consulting on the terms of reference, not just once the terms of reference have been set. That would be very welcome, because so many of those who are concerned with these issues may want to have an input at that early stage. With regard to the terms of reference, I ask about item 4, which may remain the fourth of six or become the fourth of more items. The term is,

“extending the use of deportations with assurances”,

which suggests that the Home Secretary already has a view that they should be extended. Everything else is couched in more neutral language, and I wonder whether the Minister would comment on that.

With regard to intercept as evidence, can the noble Baroness assure the House that the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, and those conducting the review will be able to talk to the team dealing with intercept as evidence, because even if it is not included in the review, there must be information that could usefully be shared?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

I hope that I did not mislead the noble Baroness when I talked about the terms of reference. We will publish them, but we do not intend to consult on them per se. I hope also that I made it clear that we will have a very open consultation process that will include not only consulting in an organised way with various interested parties, but offering the opportunity through a website for a wider audience to offer its views. I hope that the terms of reference will not themselves be a constraint on the way in which the six topics are dealt with.

I will say one thing in defence of not consulting on the terms of reference. We want to move on this fairly fast, so there are limits, if I may say, to the number of stages to which we should apply the consultation process. I beg the indulgence of the House in suggesting that we should leave it as an extensive consultation process that will follow, having set the terms of reference.

On the question of the extension of deportation with assurances, I do not have a great deal to add to an earlier answer. We see being able to extend the process of DWA to other countries as useful and in the public interest. The reason is a practical one. We find that there is an increasing number of nationalities where the need to deport is actually an operational requirement. We want to put in place circumstances in which we can do that in a manner compatible with our obligations.

Finally, the noble Baroness asked about the relevance of intercept as evidence. She is quite right to say that various aspects are relevant to the subjects that we have under discussion, and those involved in the review will indeed have the necessary access.