(3 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for raising this issue. Effective enforcement is essential to the administration of justice, but it must be done safely during the pandemic. This Government have banned bailiffs from enforcing evictions in England, except in the most serious circumstances, until at least 21 February, to help control the spread of infection. We have published covid-safe guidance for bailiffs who are enforcing debts and fines, and have requested that they do not enter homes at present to take control of goods.
I am glad that the Minister has touched on this, but I am sure he will agree that, in the middle of a deadly pandemic, there could be no worse time for hard-up families to receive a knock at the door, yet the Government are still permitting bailiffs to undertake unsafe and unfair doorstep enforcement action. The shadow Minister for legal aid, my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner), has written to the Lord Chancellor twice in the last six months, urging him to pause home visits, as have 11 debt advice charities, which have also outlined widespread abuse of bailiff action during covid-19. Can we have a very clear answer from the Minister: will he reimpose the ban on home visits from the first national lockdown, and will he deliver on the Government’s 18-month-old promise of better industry regulations?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question. It is very important to distinguish between evictions and enforcement. In respect of evictions, the Government have been very clear: people cannot be evicted before 21 February unless arrears are of over six months. In normal circumstances, if someone simply had two months of arrears, they could then be subject to enforcement action. Now there needs to be six months’ notice before possession proceedings even start. This Government are clear that we want to ensure that enforcement agents do not contribute to the spread of this virus, and that is why we have strict regulations in place.
We have, on average, over 20,000 new covid infections each day and, tragically, more than 1,000 deaths, so how can the Minister possibly justify allowing bailiffs to crack on with business as usual in the midst of this deadly pandemic?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question, but he knows and I know that it is not business as usual. In making that remark, he has completely disregarded the guidance that is in place. Of course we want to make sure that these proceedings happen safely. That is why Public Health England has considered these matters, and it is satisfied with the situation as it exists. We have to make sure in this Government that we respect all rights, including convention rights—article 1 of protocol 1—and he should be in favour of that too.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising that point so powerfully. We fully recognise the devastating impact that domestic abuse has on children and their futures. The Domestic Abuse Bill will ensure that all children who experience the effects of domestic abuse are considered victims of domestic abuse in their own right, whether or not they are related to the victim or the perpetrator. I am pleased to report that the Bill was given a Second Reading in the other place last month, and we expect it to complete its passage by the spring.
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for raising that point so perfectly on behalf of his constituent. Good progress is being made following the expert panel’s report. First, we have launched a review into the presumption of parental involvement. Secondly, the design of the pilot integrated domestic abuse courts is under way. Thirdly, measures in the Domestic Abuse Bill to provide further protection to victims and survivors who use the family courts are passing through the other place. Guidance is a matter for the judiciary, but I have raised this with the president of the family division and he is very much seized of it and will consider making recommendations on judicial training to the judicial college in light of the recommendations of the harms panel and other developments.
We have been very clear that there should be no enforcement of evictions during this pandemic—the law is in place—save for the most exceptional and egregious circumstances. I am very concerned to hear the hon. Lady’s point about bailiffs behaving inappropriately. I would of course be delighted to meet her to discuss it further.
This Government consider the opening of Nightingale courts to be absolutely essential. I have visited a number myself. They play an important role in taking the strain, allowing other courts to carry out custody cases. We have already opened 40 Nightingale courts—an additional 20. That will play an important role in our ongoing courts recovery.
I will now suspend the House for three minutes to enable the necessary arrangements for the next business.
(3 years, 10 months ago)
General CommitteesBefore we begin I would like to remind hon. Members of the social distancing rules and the other requirements with which hon. Members are, I am sure, now very familiar and are, of course, observing already. However, I also remind hon. Members that the Speaker has asked that masks be worn in Committee except when a Member is speaking. Our Hansard colleagues would like any notes that Members have to be emailed to them at hansardnotes@parliament.uk.
I beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the Public Health (Coronavirus) (Protection from Eviction) (England) Regulations 2021 (SI 2021, No. 15).
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Paisley. The instrument before us today prevents enforcement agents—that is to say, bailiffs—from attending residential premises in England to execute a writ or warrant of possession, except in the most serious circumstances. The instrument applies to enforcement action in England and will be in force until the end of 21 February 2021.
Since the start of the pandemic, the Government have put in place unprecedented support to protect renters directly, through measures such as these regulations and by making £180 million available to local authorities in discretionary housing payments to help renters with housing costs, but also indirectly through furlough, bounce back loans and many other forms of support.
The instrument renews the restrictions on enforcement agents carrying out evictions that were in place between 17 November 2020 and 11 January 2021. It will prevent enforcement agents from giving tenants notices of eviction or from attending residential premises to enforce a writ or warrant of possession, except in the most serious circumstances. That will ensure we continue to protect public health during the national lockdown at a time when the risk of virus transmission is high, and to avoid placing additional burdens on the NHS and local authorities. The instrument continues to provide for exemptions from the ban in cases where the competing interests of preventing harm to third parties, or taking action against egregious behaviour, make an alternative course appropriate.
The exemptions are as follows: when a claim is against trespassers who are persons unknown; where the order for possession was made wholly or partly on the grounds of antisocial behaviour or nuisance, or false statements, or domestic abuse in social tenancies; for substantial rent arrears equivalent to six months’ rent; or where the order for possession was made wholly or partly on the grounds of death of the tenant, and the enforcement agent attending the property is satisfied that the property is unoccupied.
The instrument contains a requirement for the court to be satisfied that an exemption applies on a case-by-case basis. That will ensure that there is a clear, uniform and transparent process for establishing whether an exemption to the ban applies. This legislation is an extension of the previous ban on the enforcement of evictions in all but two respects. The first difference is that we have redefined “substantial rent arrears” to cover cases with rent arrears of greater than six months. The requirement in the last statutory instrument was for nine months of arrears, not including any arrears that had accrued since March 2020. We have revised the definition to balance the need to continue to protect tenants with the impact of the ongoing restrictions on landlords.
As a result of action that the Government and the courts have taken during the pandemic, we expect that most of the cases that fall within the exemption will relate to possession claims that began before the six-month stay on possession proceedings from March 2020. In those cases, landlords may have been waiting for over a year without rent being paid, and it is appropriate that they are able to seek possession in those unusual cases.
The second difference between this instrument and the one it replaces is that this instrument permits writs and warrants of restitution to be enforced. Those orders are issued in cases where a person who has been evicted from premises re-enters those premises illegally. Therefore, it is appropriate that they are excluded from the ban.
The regulations will be in place until 22 February 2021. We are keeping the provisions under review in order to ensure our approach reflects the latest available data. It is important to ensure that our approach remains proportionate, and strikes the right balance between continuing to protect tenants and ensuring that landlords are able to access justice.
It is important to note that most cases do not reach the enforcement stage, and our support for renters to remain in their homes will continue throughout the winter. As I have mentioned briefly, the Government have taken unprecedented action to protect renters. We have taken action to prevent people from getting into financial hardship by helping businesses to pay salaries—which is the most important measure to ensure that people can pay their rent—using the furlough scheme, which has been extended to April, and we have boosted the welfare safety net by billions of pounds. The Government have also made £180 million available to local authorities in discretionary housing payments to help renters with their housing costs.
We are continuing to require landlords to provide tenants with six months’ notice before eviction in all but the most serious cases until the end of March, which means most renters now served with notice could stay in their homes until June 2021, with time to find alternative support or accommodation.
New court arrangements and rules are in place to ensure appropriate protections for all parties until at least the end of March, and, from early February, we will be piloting a new mediation service to support landlords and tenants to resolve disputes before a formal hearing takes place. This service will be free to use for all tenants and landlords if the duty solicitor at a review hearing thinks that the case would benefit from mediation.
During the debate on 7 December about the previous statutory instrument concern was raised that the Government had not gone further to protect renters by preventing possession claims from being made and heard in the courts. The six-month stay on possession proceedings introduced at the start of the pandemic could only ever be temporary. It is important, of course, to distinguish between claims and enforcement.
The new court rules and processes, introduced in September to respond to the pandemic, remain in place and will be regularly reviewed. Those include the requirement for cases from before 3 August 2020 to be reactivated by the landlord and then be subject to a new review hearing at least four weeks before the substantive hearing. The deadline to reactivate will be extended to the end of April 2021. The new court rules and processes also include the need for landlords to provide the courts and judges with information on how tenants have been affected by the pandemic; where this information is not provided, judges will be able to adjourn proceedings until it has been provided.
A further requirement is for all enforcement agents to provide a minimum of 14 days’ notice before enforcing an eviction in most cases. We have also introduced a new review stage at least 28 days before the substantive hearing, so that tenants can access legal advice. New Government guidance has also been published to help landlords and tenants in England and Wales understand the possession action process and new rules within the court system.
Our approach strikes the right balance between prioritising public health and supporting the most vulnerable renters, while ensuring that landlords can access and exercise their right to justice; landlords can action possession claims through the courts, but evictions will not be enforced, apart from in the most serious cases.
The instrument provides tenants with protection from eviction, ensuring that vulnerable tenants are not forced from their homes during the current national lockdown restrictions. This is intended to protect public health at a time when the risk of virus transmission is high, and to avoid placing additional burdens on the NHS and local authorities. I commend the regulations to the Committee.
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his representations. It is important to be clear: to pick up one of his points, if there are individuals who have been unlawfully evicted, let the message go out that that is a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment. We expect action to be taken in those appalling cases. The legislation is there; it has been there since 1977. Local authorities are well placed to take action and I hope they do precisely that.
The right hon. Gentleman made a number of criticisms. I hope he will take into account that, for those who are potentially at risk of eviction, under these measures, there will be a six-month notice before that takes place. That is far in excess of anything that existed prior to the pandemic under this Government or indeed under the Government he served in.
Ultimately, we have to strike an important balance. Prior to this measure, some landlords might have been in a situation where their tenant was in arrears to the tune of eight months or so, but they had no ability to take possession of their property. Such cases are vanishingly rare, but in those rare cases, it is appropriate that scope for action exists.
These regulations are intended to strike the balance. We are there to support tenants with measures such as furlough, bounce back loans and self-employed income support, to pay their rent. Happily, recent surveys show that more than 93% of tenants are doing precisely that. For those who are not doing so or are unable to negotiate rent reductions or even rent pauses, in those very rare cases—I stress that it is a small minority of cases—it is important and proportionate that there is a remedy.
I also want to stress the enormous sums of money that have gone into supporting local authorities—£4 billion—and into supporting discretionary housing allowance. The regulations strike the right balance. They are on the side of renters. I commend them to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Davies. I begin where my hon. Friend the Member for Bracknell (James Sunderland) began, with a sincere thank you to my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent North (Jonathan Gullis) for securing a debate on this really important subject and for his strong campaigning on it. He made an excellent speech, if I may say so. This is the second time I have had the pleasure of listening to him. I was in the main Chamber for his private Member’s Bill in June, and then, as now, he spoke with force and authenticity on behalf of his constituents.
I also pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Bracknell, who gave an excellent speech as well. In particular, he gave a powerful reminder of the abiding commitment to service that underpins the ethos of our armed forces—it underpins it now, and it underpinned it in the past, not least during the D-day landings, which he referred to.
Let me turn first to the context. As hon. Members are aware, during a variety of demonstrations last summer, protestors targeted statues, including war memorials and other commemorations of cultural significance. The Government were appalled to see the violence and vandalism at those protests because, however noble a cause a person believes they are supporting, there can be no justification for defacing statues or unlawfully damaging symbols of British history, still less desecrating memorials to those who died serving our country.
Quite apart from the hurt and pain caused, those are lawless and mob tactics. Such behaviour subverts our democracy because it corrodes the basic norms of due process that make this a free society under the law and, indeed, the kind of country that many hundreds of thousands of Britons have fought to defend.
I listened to the hon. Members for Stoke-on-Trent North (Jonathan Gullis) and for Bracknell (James Sunderland) and was inspired and moved by their comments. Wherever attacks on war memorials may be—in Northern Ireland, for instance, where I know the hon. Member for Bracknell served—those attacks will be raw for those back home, because the names of people they have loved will be on those memorials, and the names of family members or friends will be on them. The effect is not just what is done to the war memorial; there is also an effect on the family.
I absolutely agree. One of the great pleasures in this place is to have the opportunity to hear from hon. Members who have either served on the frontline themselves or have personal experience of what loss means for relatives. Our debates are enhanced by those contributions.
As I was saying, this kind of behaviour corrodes our democracy, far beyond the mere monetary value of the damage caused. Memorials matter. I will make a brief personal point. As I cycle home from Parliament, I pass by the Rifle Brigade war memorial, which is parked on a busy junction in Victoria. Every time I pass, I am struck by how modest is that physical tribute to those who gave so much. Although dignified, it is unobtrusive, austere even. One could easily miss it. Yet, it honours a full 11,575 men who died in the first world war and more than 1,000 who died in the second world war—more than have died in the British armed forces in all the conflicts since 1945. The least the living can do is defend and honour such memorials. We have a duty to do so, not least for the sake of the dead, who can no longer speak up for themselves.
In his excellent speech, my hon. Friend the Member for Bracknell referred to those who served who had loved and were loved. That is an echo of the poem by John McCrae, “In Flanders Fields”. That came to mind because he summoned the voices of the fallen in that poem. He expressed what the dead might say, if only they could speak. The last three lines are:
“If ye break faith with us who die
We shall not sleep, though poppies grow
In Flanders fields.”
We must not break faith with those who died.
Memorials are not just limited to our war dead. The public is also rightly concerned about upholding respect for other memorials, including statues, gravestones and other matters. Such memorials can have historical significance as part of our national heritage, or other symbolic, cultural or emotional importance. When damage or desecration occurs, the law must be equipped to recognise the range and level of anguish that is caused.
As I have indicated, that anguish goes beyond mere pain to individuals or damage to property. In so many cases it can represent an attack on society. I regret to say that too many people feel able to lash out, to take the law into their own hands and to do so with relative impunity. That is why it has become clear to the Government, not least because of the excellent campaigning of my hon. Friends the Members for Stoke-on-Trent North and for Bracknell, that the law as it stands is inadequate, and we intend to act.
As I mentioned, on 23 June, my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent North introduced a private Member’s Bill, supported in this House by others, including my hon. Friend the Member for Bracknell and the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon). The Desecration of War Memorials Bill seeks to create a specific offence of damage or desecration of a war memorial.
The Lord Chancellor has indicated, as indeed has the Prime Minister, that we wish to take action in this field. The Prime Minister himself made it explicit at Prime Minister’s questions on 17 June, when he said that the Government are
“looking at new ways in which we may legislate against vandalism of war memorials”.—[Official Report, 17 June 2020; Vol. 677, c. 796.]
As my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent North indicated, the Home Secretary has made similar statements. The Lord Chancellor wrote an article in The Sunday Telegraph on 21 June, committing to ensuring that
“laws around criminal damage are fit for purpose and that the punishment for vandalising memorials fits the crime.”
He went on to state that the Government would need to legislate, and that
“now is an opportune moment to think about memorials more broadly and make sure that all acts of vandalism that cause widespread disgust can be appropriately punished by the courts.”
There are various approaches that the Government could adopt to tackle this issue. We have been considering all options to stop those who seek to attack emblems of our national sacrifice and pride, including the proposed Desecration of War Memorials Bill. We want to make sure that any vandalism or attack on property can be met with the full force of the law, so that the courts are equipped with the tools they need to do justice on the facts of the case before them, which was an excellent point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent North. No one is suggesting that all cases and all examples need to be dealt with by a maximum sentence; that would be absurd. The courts will do justice, but they need to have the powers so that they can do that justice on the facts as they find them to be.
As such, although the Government fully support the intention behind my hon. Friend’s private Member’s Bill and firmly agree with the action that needs to be taken, we want to go further and protect a wider range of property. As announced in the sentencing White Paper, “A Smarter Approach to Sentencing”, which we published on 16 September 2020, we will be reviewing the law, not merely the guidance, on criminal damage to ensure that where memorials are damaged or desecrated, the courts are able to sentence appropriately at every level for this particular type of offending. As we indicated in that White Paper, we will be legislating on this matter this year—in the early part of this year, I think it is possible to say—setting out the approach that we will be taking to deal with this issue. When the private Member’s Bill on the desecration of war memorials returns to Parliament on Second Reading next month, the Government will confirm their position on the Bill in accordance with the required parliamentary process, and I am confident it will address the points my hon. Friends have so ably made.
To conclude, the Government intend to deal decisively with this issue, and I thank my hon. Friends for their shared commitment to tackling this crime. I will close by saying that those who take the law into their own hands—who vandalise our heritage, lash out at symbols they disagree with, or demean and dishonour our war dead—should be on notice. We will give the courts the power to do justice on behalf of all: the dead, the living, and those who have yet to be born.
Question put and agreed to.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberAll hate crimes, including where motivated by homophobia, are unacceptable. The courts already have powers to treat hostility based on sexual orientation as a factor that aggravates the seriousness of an offence. However, hate crime laws in England and Wales are complex and are spread across different statutes. That is why the Government gave a commitment to carry out a comprehensive review of hate crime legislation. That review is currently under way.
I am grateful to the Minister for his answer and in particular for the review being done by the Law Commission at the moment, which is looking specifically at the incidence of homophobic abuse in sports grounds. As the Minister will know, the Football (Offences) Act 1991 defines “racialist” abuse—that is the word it uses, which shows how old the Act is—but not homophobic abuse. Clearly, there is no space for abuse of any kind in a sports environment. In particular, match day stewards and officials seem unclear of their powers in these situations.
I thank my hon. Friend for the work that he has done on this issue. It has been noted and appreciated. He is absolutely right; from memory, it is question 57 of the Law Commission’s review of this precise issue. I hope that that work progresses. The extraordinary thing about football is that so much of an advance has been seen in respect of racism, yet homophobia still seems to exist, although I have to say that there is much better work going on in the women’s game than the men’s. The men need to catch up.
As a young person turns 18, the contents of their child trust fund belong to them and them alone, whether or not they have a learning disability, which is an important point of principle, but for those loving parents who, for good reason, want legal authority to access those funds, we want to make the process more cost-effective and more straightforward. As a result, fees can now be waived in appropriate cases and we have set up a working group to work quickly alongside the judiciary to review the process, with a view to streamlining it while maintaining vital safeguards.
I thank the Minister for that answer, the work that he is doing on this issue and the letter he wrote to me this week about my constituents who are affected. As he knows, around 200,000 disabled children could be affected by this in the coming eight years, unable to access their Government-backed child trust fund, so I urge him to continue the good work that he is doing and to really make sure that applications to the Court of Protection are the least onerous possible for the parents of these disabled children.
I thank my right hon. Friend for raising that issue on behalf of his constituents. He makes an incredibly important point. We have a duty to make sure that the rights of those individuals are maintained, but it is also important that, when there are loving parents and all they want to achieve is the best for their children, they are able to access that money in the interests of their children with the minimum of fuss, the minimum of bother and, frankly, the minimum of expense.
The bodies of those who have died should be treated with dignity and respect. Where that does not happen, the criminal law can intervene and there are a number of offences that may apply: preventing the lawful burial of a body, outraging public decency, perverting the course of justice, removing human tissue without consent and so on. We will of course keep the law under review.
I thank the Minister for that reply. I am supporting the campaign of the mother of Helen McCourt, whom we know in this place for successfully campaigning on Helen’s law, but who is equally determined, while understanding the points the Minister has made, to see further reform so that the criminal justice system adequately reflects how we would feel if one of our loved ones was desecrated after death. Will he agree to meet me and discuss with Helen McCourt’s mother further steps we might be able to take?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising that excellent point and for paying tribute to Mrs McCourt, whose brave campaign has led to Helen’s law, as he rightly indicates, getting on to the statute book, having recently received Royal Assent, in large part because of her campaigning activity. We keep the matter under review, and I would be delighted to meet him, as he suggests.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
General CommitteesI beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the Public Health (Coronavirus) (Protection from Eviction and Taking Control of Goods) (England) Regulations 2020 (S.I., 2020, No. 1290).
It is, as always, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir David. The statutory instrument prevents enforcement agents—bailiffs, in plain English—from entering residential premises in England to execute a writ or warrant of possession until 11 January, except in the most serious circumstances.
The purpose of the measure is to protect public health by preventing people from being evicted from their homes by enforcement agents at a time when the risk of virus transmission is high and when local authorities and NHS services are typically under additional strain over the Christmas period. The instrument builds on the Government’s previous guidance on enforcement activity during the national lockdown in England, which was introduced by the Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (All Tiers) (England) Regulations 2020, and on the intention to have a winter pause on evictions, which the Government announced on 10 September. The instrument before the Committee also prevented enforcement agents from entering residential properties to take control of goods during the national lockdown that ended on 2 December. It applies to enforcement action in England only.
The Government took unprecedented action to ensure that renters were protected from eviction at the height of the coronavirus pandemic, including by providing significant financial support and agreeing with the courts to use powers relating to court procedure to stay possession proceedings for a total of six months, until 20 September. That stay could only ever be temporary, however; the civil justice system and the rules that underpin it must be accessible, fair and efficient for tenants and landlords alike.
Ahead of the end of the stay on possession cases in the courts, the Government put in place a number of measures to manage the resumption of cases carefully, so that the courts were not overwhelmed and could make decisions; so that the most vulnerable could get the help and support they needed; and, in particular, so that tenants could have access to legal advice and support. The Government also worked with the judiciary and others to put in place new court arrangements to ensure appropriate support to all parties. Those court arrangements are in place and are working well, and I pay tribute to the working group convened by the Master of the Rolls and chaired by Mr Justice Knowles for the key role that it has played.
In addition, the Government took legislative action. The Minister for Housing laid a statutory instrument on 28 August to amend schedule 29 to the Coronavirus Act 2020 to require landlords to provide tenants with six months’ notice in all but the most serious cases. That approach ensures that tenants will remain safe and have additional time to find new accommodation, while empowering landlords to take action where necessary—if a tenant’s antisocial behaviour is severely affecting their neighbours’ quality of life, for example.
We have also taken some targeted action on the enforcement of evictions to protect public health during the extraordinary circumstances of the coronavirus pandemic. In September, guidance was issued to bailiffs to request that the enforcement of possession orders did not proceed in areas where local lockdown regulations restricted gatherings in residential properties, to prevent tenants being forced out of their homes at an unsettling time in areas where public health risks could be greater.
The Government also announced in September that we would take steps to prevent eviction action taking place over the Christmas period, ensuring that vulnerable tenants are not forced from their homes at a time when public and local authorities may be dealing with the usual level of increased demand on services. Bailiffs were issued guidance that they should not enforce writs or warrants of possession, other than in the most serious circumstances, between 11 December and 11 January, during the winter pause I mentioned. That is the necessary context—forgive me for setting it out in some detail, Sir David, but it is important.
At the beginning of November, following the introduction of the Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) (No. 4) Regulations 2020, enforcement agents were asked not to enforce evictions nationally at a time when the risk of transmitting the virus was high and a number of significant restrictions were in force. As the national restrictions were set to end just before the end of the national winter pause, the Government decided that it was appropriate to build on the guidance not to enforce evictions in England during that time with the legislative measure before the Committee. We therefore laid this instrument in Parliament on 16 November, to come into force on 17 November. We were able to do so because it was an urgent matter taken under the public health legislation. Today’s proceedings are now required to ensure that this made affirmative legislation continues to have effect.
The instrument is consistent with the policy that the Government have adopted since the start of the pandemic. It aims to strike a balance between prioritising public health and supporting the most vulnerable, while ensuring that landlords can access and exercise their right to justice in the most serious cases. For that reason, the instrument contains some limited exemptions from the ban on the enforcement of evictions. These exceptions relate to circumstances where the Government feel that the health risk is lower, or the competing interests of preventing harm to third parties or taking action against egregious behaviour are sufficient to outweigh the public health risks in enforcing eviction.
The instrument provides the following exemptions to the restrictions on enforcing evictions: first, where the claim is against trespassers who are persons unknown, and secondly, where the order for possession was made wholly or partly on the grounds of antisocial behaviour or nuisance, false statements, domestic abuse in social tenancies, substantial rent arrears equivalent to nine months’ rent that predate 23 March 2020, or the death of a tenant where the enforcing agent attending the property is satisfied that the property is unoccupied. The Government believe it is important that there is a clear, uniform and transparent process for establishing whether an exemption to the ban on evictions applies. For that reason, the instrument contains a requirement for the court to be satisfied on a case-by-case basis that an exemption applies.
The measure will be in force until 11 January. New rules require that all bailiffs must give 14 days’ notice of an eviction, which means that in most cases evictions will not resume anywhere in England until 25 January at the earliest. We continue to keep the position regarding the enforcement of evictions in local tiers under review, following the expiry of the national restrictions over the midwinter period. I know there has been significant interest in the House in the effect of removing tenants’ protection from eviction, which was provided by the stay on possession proceedings between 27 March and 20 September this year. Concern has also been expressed by hon. Members about the impact of these restrictions on the rights of landlords, who are dealing with difficult situations in which there is no reasonable alternative to possession proceedings.
The statutory instrument also set out a nationwide prohibition on enforcement agents taking control of goods inside residential properties while the national restrictions are in place. The measure did not prevent enforcement agents from taking other steps to enforce debts and fines under the taking control of goods procedure, including making contact via remote means such as telephone; visiting, but not entering, properties; taking control of goods located outside homes or on the highway; and enforcement at business premises. The Government believe that such steps may be safely undertaken in line with the Government’s published covid-secure guidance for enforcement agents using the taking control of goods procedure. The Government’s view, therefore, is that this policy strikes a proportionate balance between protecting against the risk of transmission and allowing the continuation of the administration of justice.
Forgive me for one moment as I find the next part of my speech.
Thank you for that kind offer.
I will close by saying that the courts remained open throughout the national restrictions in November. The court rules and procedures introduced in September will ensure protections for both tenants and landlords. For example, landlords are required to send the court information about the impact that the pandemic has had on their tenant; a new review stage has been introduced so that tenants can access legal advice; and landlords are required to reactivate any existing claims that were in the system before 3 August. The Government have published comprehensive new guidance for landlords and tenants to explain all these new arrangements and their impact on the court possessions process.
Our approach strikes the right balance between prioritising public health and supporting the most vulnerable renters, while ensuring that landlords can access and exercise their right to justice. Landlords can action possession claims through the courts, but evictions will not be enforced apart from in the most serious cases. This instrument provides tenants with protection from eviction, ensuring that vulnerable tenants are not forced from their home at a time when public and local authorities may be dealing with the unusual level of increased demand on services. I therefore commend the regulations to the Committee.
I thank the hon. Member for Hove for his helpful observations.
The hon. Gentleman asked about illegal evictions. If an eviction is illegal, it is absolutely right that proper action to be taken. It is a cruel and frankly wicked thing to evict someone illegally, without due process. I am proud that this Government have been increasing resources for policing. If there is a breach of the law, there will be more police officers available to take action where that is appropriate.
The hon. Gentleman asked about local authorities and their funding to assist people with local housing allowance. I am glad that he raised that, because he is right: local authorities across the country, including the one in my constituency, face additional pressures. That is why the Government have allocated £4 billion to assist local authorities. On the specific point about local housing allowance, there will be an additional £180 million to allow councils to make discretionary housing payments to individuals who are finding it difficult to make rent payments. In fact, a total of £700 million will be allocated this year, with more next year, also to tackle homelessness and rough sleeping.
As the Committee will be aware, councils have also been provided with funding to support hardship funds, so if individuals have difficulty meeting council tax payments, they can apply to their local authority for assistance. A huge amount of money and will is being put behind trying to assist people in difficult circumstances to meet their financial obligations. All that stands above and apart from the other measures in place, such as furlough and the self-employment income support scheme, to ensure that people have money going into their pockets to meet their obligations.
The hon. Gentleman asked about the distinction between eviction and taking possession of goods. Respectfully, I would say there is a clear distinction. When individuals knock on a door seeking to evict someone from the home they live in, that is manifestly different from taking possession of goods inside the home. It is right that we ensure that each issue is taken on its merits and in the round. In this House we are of course mindful of the impact on the people behind the door, but equally we have to remember that there are those who have the right to access the justice procedure to ensure that debts are honoured and obligations met. It is right that we consider not a one-size-fits-all approach, but an approach that takes account of the implications of the enforcement action. There is no similarity between removing a possession and removing a home.
Finally, the hon. Gentleman asked about the proper question that the Justice Committee raised with respect to independent scrutiny of enforcement agents. The Government will return to that matter in due course.
Question put and agreed to.
(3 years, 12 months ago)
General CommitteesI beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft Jurisdiction, Judgments and Applicable Law (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020.
May I begin by saying what a pleasure it is to serve under your chairmanship, Sir David? This statutory instrument forms part of the Government’s ongoing work to ensure that there are functioning domestic laws that deal with cross-border civil and commercial and family law matters in place at the end of the transition period, and that they are consistent with the UK’s obligations under the withdrawal agreement.
The instrument is made under sections 8 and 8B of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. It amends a number of statutory instruments made to remedy deficiencies in domestic legislation arising from the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. The amendments address minor defects in those instruments, clarify the interaction of international conventions and domestic law after the end of the transition period, and ensure that two of those instruments are consistent with the provisions of the withdrawal agreement.
First, the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 revoke the Brussels Ia regulation—the key EU instrument dealing with jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in cross-border civil and commercial matters. The Government’s exit policy intention is to replicate, as closely as possible, the Brussels Ia employment jurisdiction rules, modified only as necessary to make them work in the UK.
However, in relation to one ground of the special jurisdiction rules, the rule has been inadvertently broadened to cover employees without a habitual place of work in any one part of the UK, rather than employees without a habitual place of work in any one country, as is the case in Brussels Ia. The effect is that a larger group of employees would be able to sue employers in UK courts under this rule. That does not reflect the Government’s policy intention, and neither is it a desirable public policy outcome. This instrument addresses that issue by amending the civil regulations to ensure that the Brussels Ia employment jurisdiction rules are correctly transposed into domestic law, modified only as necessary to make them work in the UK context. It does not represent any reduction in the protection available to employees; it merely properly replicates the existing EU rules.
Secondly, the Jurisdiction and Judgments (Family) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 revokes: the Brussels IIa regulation, which is the main EU regulation dealing with jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in parental responsibility cases; and the maintenance regulation, which is the main EU regulation dealing with jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in maintenance cases. In their place, the UK will move principally to the 1996 Hague convention, for cross-border parental responsibility matters involving parties from EU member states; and to the 2007 Hague convention, for the cross-border recognition and enforcement of maintenance involving parties from EU member states. Where there are no applicable Hague convention rules, the family regulations make provision for the rules that will apply. In the case of maintenance jurisdiction, these are largely the rules as they existed prior to the relevant EU rules taking effect.
Two minor errors have been identified in the amendments made to domestic legislation by the family regulations to reinstate the pre-EU jurisdiction rules for maintenance cases in Scotland. The first error is the carrying through of a reference to
“actions for adherence and aliment”.
These concepts have been abolished in Scots law, making this reference obsolete. This instrument addresses that by simply deleting the reference.
The second error has the unintended effect that, from the end of the transition period, certain applicants seeking maintenance—referred to as “aliment” in Scotland—would be disadvantaged. This would be where that claim is not connected to divorce or other proceedings, and the applicant in such a case would be unable to bring the proceedings in Scotland and would have to pursue the paying party in the courts of the country where the paying party is domiciled.
That problem is addressed in this instrument through an amendment to the family regulations to restore the jurisdiction of the Scottish court to hear claims for aliment where the applicant is domiciled or habitually resident in Scotland. We have worked closely with the Scottish Government to identify these errors and agree suitable remedies via the instrument that we are debating today.
This instrument addresses these areas of uncertainty through amendments to the family regulations to make it clear, and put beyond doubt, that the saving and transitional provisions apply to intra-UK maintenance matters and that the relevant Hague convention rules take precedence over the domestic jurisdiction rules in cases that properly fall under the relevant Hague conventions.
Thirdly, the Cross-Border Mediation (EU Directive) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 revoke or amend, as appropriate, domestic legislation that gave effect to the EU mediation directive—other than court rules and matters within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament. One of the domestic instruments amended by the mediation regulations—namely, the Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998—has, subsequent to the making of the mediation regulations, been amended further by the Employment Act (Northern Ireland) 2016. This amendment came into effect on 27 January 2020. As such, the mediation regulations do not take account of it. This instrument therefore amends the mediation regulations to take account of that later amendment, ensuring that the meaning of the relevant provision in the Northern Ireland order is clear once it is amended by the mediation regulations.
Fourthly, the Family Procedure Rules 2010 and the Court of Protection Rules 2017 (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 make amendments to the family procedure rules and the court of protection rules that are consequential upon the main civil judicial co-operation exit instruments. The instrument that we are debating today addresses some minor technical errors in the rules regulations, re-establishing a link between the family procedure rules and the transitional provisions in the civil regulations in respect of maintenance cases arising under the 2007 Lugano convention, and fixing a cross-referencing error in, and omitting an erroneous reference to “EU member state” from, the amendments to the court of protection rules.
Fifthly, in addition to these corrective and clarifying amendments, this instrument amends two of the civil judicial co-operation exit instruments to ensure that their provisions are consistent with the UK’s obligations under the withdrawal agreement. The first of these instruments is the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations and Non-Contractual Obligations (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, which amend the Rome I and Rome II regulations. The other instrument is the aforementioned family regulations, which I have already described. This instrument amends the Rome regulations and the family regulations to align these instruments with the UK’s obligations under the relevant provision of the withdrawal agreement—article 66 in the case of the Rome regulations, and article 67 in the case of the family regulations.
I should add that this is the first of two instruments that will amend the CJC exit SIs to ensure that their provisions align with the requirements of the withdrawal agreement. The second of these instruments is still being finalised and will be laid before Parliament shortly.
Finally, I will turn briefly to the impacts. As I have indicated, the amendments in this instrument correct minor technical errors and clarify ambiguities in the civil, family, mediation, and family and court of protection rules regulations, and will ensure that the family regulations and Rome regulations are consistent with directly applicable provisions of the withdrawal agreement. As such, they are not expected to have any significant impact on business, charities or the voluntary or public sectors. Indeed, as a result of the errors and ambiguities being corrected, the amendments will ensure that the civil, family, mediation, and family and court of protection rules exit SIs have the impact intended by the Government when they were laid before Parliament, and as is reflected in the explanatory memoranda for those instruments and, in the case of the civil, family and mediation exit SIs, in the impact assessments published in respect of those instruments.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for supporting these regulations. They correct minor technical defects, and we are of course grateful to those who have pointed them out. I do not recall the Labour Opposition pointing out these defects with alacrity at the time, but we welcome the sinner that repenteth. I would like to express the Government’s appreciation for the assistance that we have had from the family law stakeholders who raised the issues. We welcome their input and advice, as we also welcome the input and advice of our colleagues in the Scottish and Northern Ireland Governments. I commend this instrument to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
(4 years ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move, That this House agrees with Lords amendments 1A and 1B.
With this it will be convenient to consider the Government motion to agree to Lords amendments 4A to 4E.
Private international law, sometimes known as conflict of laws, comprises rules applied by courts and parties involved in legal disputes for dealing with cases raising cross-border issues. The rules generally apply in the context of civil law, including specialist areas such as commercial, insolvency and family law. PIL typically includes rules to establish whether a court has jurisdiction to hear a claim that has cross-border elements, which country’s law applies to such a claim, and whether a judgment of a foreign court should be recognised and enforced. However, it can also encompass rules on co-operation between courts and other public authorities in different countries involved in dealing with cross-border issues, such as service of documents, taking of evidence abroad or even establishing efficient procedures to assist with the resolution of cross-border disputes.
These agreements are important. They are the sort of thing that a member of the public, or a business trading across borders may not know they need until a difficulty or a disagreement arises. Without these agreements, cross-border legal disputes can become expensive and difficult to resolve. With them, the path to resolution is clearer and smoother.
I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way so early on in his speech. As he will know, I have to chair the Justice Committee in a few moments, but may I thank him for stressing the importance of this not just for the big financial institutions and businesses of this country, but for individuals? Will he confirm that, in accepting the amendments, we have managed to achieve an improvement to the Bill through the very constructive approach for which he in particular has been responsible? Will he also confirm that, as well as the Bill, it is the Government’s firm intention to seek to join the Lugano convention on the enforcement of judgments and other international co-operation at the earliest possible date, so that we do not have any gap post the end of the implementation period, and to move on to the other international conventions—Hague and others?
I thank the Chairman of the Justice Committee for his remarks and for the contribution he has made throughout the passage of the Bill. I am quite confident that we are in a better place because we have looked at it constructively. That is, in large part, because of the contributions he has made, together with others. Yes, this is about individuals as well as businesses, and yes, we want to use this as the vehicle to get into Lugano, which will be good for the rule of law, good for individuals, good for certainty and good for businesses.
I was making the point that these agreements mean the path to resolution is clearer and smoother. Just by way of a couple of examples, these agreements can help a family where relationships break down and one spouse moves abroad, and they can help to sort out arrangements for custody, access and maintenance in the best interests of the children. These agreements can provide a framework for a small business to seek redress when left out of pocket by a supplier based in another country.
The Minister is explaining the scope of the Bill and I am trying to understand it. We all represent constituents and I have a couple of constituents’ cases, for example one where there is a dispute over a property in Cyprus and another where a constituent was involved in an assault in Italy. They both relate to issues that are not cross-border, but relate specifically to incidents or disputes in those countries. Are those kinds of cases covered by the Bill, or does the Bill look at issues only where there are cross-border affairs that need to be resolved?
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for asking that question. The Bill is more likely to affect the former example, rather than the latter. On the specific issue of a criminal offence, that is likely to fall outwith the Bill. There is, of course, a regime for cross-border co-operation in that regard, but that normally sits outside private international law agreements, which tend to be about family issues—whether you have maintenance and enforcement, and which agreements are going to be upheld by which courts—and commercial agreements, for example, between a widget manufacturer in the hon. Gentleman’s constituency and a supplier in another part of the world. This relates to agreements that are already in existence which we want to roll over, but also creates the framework for us to agree and implement future agreements.
The Bill contains two substantive clauses. The first ensures the continued implementation of three Hague conventions on various aspects of private international law that are currently implemented—at least until the end of the transition period—under the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020. The second concerns the implementation of further PIL agreements—the point that I was just making—by secondary legislation. This clause was removed from the Bill in the Lords on Report, but was returned by this House in Committee back in October. Although clause 1 is not subject to the amendments in front of us today, the need to have these provisions in force by 31 December creates an imperative to resolve the outstanding issues without delay.
As things stand, is it the Minister’s intention that there will be only one five-year period—that in five years’ time the Government will drop it? Or is his current intention that it will be extended if other things come up?
The legislation is clear that it can be extended more than once, but the real point is that parliamentarians will want to be satisfied that that process is not entirely a rubber-stamping exercise and that, first, Governments of any stripe will be actively required to turn their attention to whether it is the proper thing to do—and they will be, because of the consultation requirements in the statute—and secondly, that Parliament will be sufficiently notified of the Government’s intention to do so that it is well placed to marshal whatever opposition it thinks is appropriate.
All of that feeds into the next points that I wish to make, but before I do so I should say that the Government have been clear about how they want to use the power over the next few years, and that includes in respect of implementing the Lugano convention—or, indeed, alternatives with Norway, Iceland and Switzerland, should our application be declined—as well as, subject to consultation, the Singapore convention on mediation and the 2019 Hague judgments project. I pause to mention that the Singapore convention has no more doughty champion in this place than my hon. Friend the Member for Henley (John Howell).
If the Government ask Parliament to extend the power in five years’ time, they will need to make their case again and have the relevant regulations approved in both Houses. In any view, the sunset amendment represents a significant concession by the Government. It takes account of the concerns that have been powerfully expressed, while still retaining a proper measure of the flexibility and agility that we seek—manifestly in the national interest, we contend—to support the UK’s long-term private international law strategy which, I pause to note, strengthens the international rules-based order.
Finally, on the third of the three points to which I referred, Lords amendment 4B adds a requirement for the Government to consult prior to making any regulations under the Bill, whether those regulations concern the implementation of a private international law agreement or propose to extend the sunset period—the point I just addressed with my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly). The amendment puts on the face of the Bill the commitments that we have already made from the Dispatch Box on engagement with Parliament and other stakeholders. Although there will be times when a wide-ranging and broad consultation is appropriate—for instance, when the UK is seeking to join a new private international law agreement—there will be other times when the power is used to make minor technical and procedural updates to agreements, such as to update the name of a foreign court referred to in an existing agreement.
The requirement to consult applies across the piece but allows for a proportionate approach to different issues. Different instruments will require different approaches and, no doubt, different consultees, and the consultees who might be most appropriate to offer a view on an instrument about family law will not necessarily be the same as those who might add most value in respect of an instrument that deals with commercial disputes. As with any statutory obligation to consult, there is a requirement to take proper account of the representations received, and I can give an undertaking that the Government will meet that requirement. In the explanatory memorandum that must accompany any statutory instrument laid before this House, we will provide—I hope this will provide some comfort to my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon—a thorough and detailed explanation of the consultation that has taken place, setting out not only those whom we have consulted but a fair and balanced summary of the views expressed.
In conclusion, I restate the point about the importance of resolving this issue today. Clause 1 needs to be in force before the end of the transition period. It is plainly in the interests of this country to avoid an extended back and forth, and the Bill represents a pragmatic approach that respects the misgivings that have been expressed while ensuring that Governments retain the agility and flexibility that they need to enter into vital international agreements. I urge right hon. and hon. Members to accept this compromise as an appropriate and balanced approach.
I call the shadow Minister, Alex Cunningham.
Let me first declare an interest as an associate of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators.
I thought for a moment that I was going to welcome the agreement that there clearly is between my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly) and me, but, given his last comments, I am not sure any more—I need to think about them. However, I think we are on the same sort of page at the moment.
I, too, welcome these Lords amendments and point out that they are a very good compromise between this House and the other place. I also welcome what the Minister has said in bringing them forward. In taking away the criminality, having a sunset clause and bringing in a consultation, they have done a tremendous amount to bridge the gap that there previously was during our discussions on this Bill. But in fundamental essence, the Bill remains the same in what it can do, and I am glad that it does.
I made the point on Report as to why that was important. I am not going to repeat the entire speech that I made then—I probably could not get away with that—but I stressed the need for agility and flexibility, and I put that in the context of the Singapore mediation convention. There is a great necessity to get the Singapore mediation convention into working order and on the statute book. The reason for that is twofold.
First, it fundamentally does no harm whatsoever—in fact, it does a tremendous amount of good for the small businesses that are choosing mediation as a means of settling their disputes. Secondly, it ends the farce we have at the moment with the system that is in place whereby if one has a mediation, one then has to agree an arbitration, however short that may be, in order to take advantage of the New York convention. That is a nonsense that we do not want to continue with. We must implement the Singapore mediation convention, which allows the results of a mediation to be recognised in the countries that have signed up to this.
The Minister was kind enough to say that I am a great champion of the Singapore mediation convention, and he is quite right, because I have seen that it does a tremendous amount of good for this country. It is also because, as the hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham) said, a tremendous amount of alternative dispute resolution takes place in this country. We are world leaders in this, but we will not remain so for very long unless we sign up to the Singapore mediation convention and get stuck into what the rest of the world is getting involved in. All I can do is recommend to the Minister that he gets on with introducing the statutory instrument to get the Singapore mediation convention up and running in this country. To repeat what I said on Third Reading, I am very happy to serve on the SI Committee that introduces the Singapore mediation convention and to see a great dream come true.
Let me begin, a little sooner than I had planned, by saying that I am absolutely delighted that this Bill is now going to be supported across the House. It is worth reflecting on the journey that we have made, because, as the hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham) rightly said, concerns were raised, first on Second Reading but also in the other place, but we have now got to the point where the Labour and Lib Dem amendments were withdrawn in the other place and this Bill will now receive cross-party support. In getting to this point, their lordships recognised, in the words of Lord Pannick, that “substantial and constructive” amendments had been made by the Government. We did so because we recognise that the issues we are addressing here, when it comes to the constitutional balance in our country, are ones that merit proper and careful consideration. But the imperative for this was in fact laid bare in the points made by the hon. Member for City of Chester (Christian Matheson), who is no longer in his place—[Interruption.] He is back, as if by magic. He asked whether there would be different treatment for British citizens in different parts of the world. That is precisely what the Bill is all about. It is to try to reduce those differences. If we had no private international law agreements, that is exactly the situation we would increasingly find ourselves in. Because we are now better able to implement them, we are better able to provide that certainty and clarity which are in the interests of our constituents and their businesses, whether they manufacture widgets or any other products.
(4 years ago)
Written StatementsThis Government are committed to strengthening victims’ rights and ensuring that comprehensive support is available at the right time. One of my key priorities is that victims clearly understand and receive the rights provided by the code of practice for victims of crime (victims code). This has never been more important than it is now, when we are facing the huge challenges that coronavirus has brought. The criminal justice system and the sector have been tested, but we have continued to respond robustly to the needs of victims.
In fulfilling a commitment made in the cross-government victims strategy, I am today laying a revised victims code, as well as publishing the Government response to the consultation on improving the victims code, which closed on 28 May 2020. To ensure that there is enough time for criminal justice agencies to implement the new code, I will tomorrow be laying a statutory instrument that will bring it into force on 1 April 2021.
We received over 500 responses to our two consultations on the code, which we have carefully considered. I would therefore like to place on record my sincere gratitude to those who took the time to respond and for providing their personal experience, knowledge and candour about what works well and what does not. These views have informed the key changes we have made to the code.
For the first time, the code has been structured so that victims are its primary audience. With its focus on 12 clearly defined overarching rights, we aim to ensure that victims will both understand and be aware of the level of service they can expect to receive from criminal justice agencies. Simplifying the code is a vital step in our efforts to rebuild victims’ confidence and trust in the criminal justice system and their engagement with it, knowing that they will receive the right support at the right time.
We know that victims find having to engage with different contacts frustrating, potentially exacerbating the trauma they may be experiencing. We have made the frequency and method of communication a more victim-led process and have amended the code to make it clear to service providers that they must try to minimise the number of different people victims have contact with. Where possible, they should offer a single point of contact for information.
We have also included information about the ability to access support; without the need to report incidents to the police; at any time during the investigation and prosecution; if the case is stopped or at the end of the case. While the code retains existing eligibility categories for access to enhanced support and information, we have made clearer that service providers have the discretion to offer these enhanced rights to victims who fall outside the scope of the existing categories.
We have introduced an opt-out framework for the victim contact scheme, for victims of a sexual or violent offence, where the offender is sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 12 months or more. All eligible victims will now be automatically referred to scheme which gives vital updates on offenders as they serve their sentence, including their potential release from prison. We have also listened closely to victims of unrestricted mentally disordered offenders, who told us of their difficulties in trying to get information about an offender’s management and potential release from hospital. To help alleviate their trauma, they will receive a new right to be assigned a victim liaison officer, rather than having to contact hospitals directly. This means these victims will be treated in the same way that victims of restricted offenders are, ensuring consistency in the level of information and the way it is provided to them.
For the first time, we have also specifically referenced the support available to victims of foreign national offenders and included information on the role of coroners, as well as for families bereaved by murder or manslaughter abroad.
Recognising that for many victims the impact of the crime may not be immediately apparent, we have redrafted the code to provide agencies with more discretion on when a victim personal statement (VPS) is offered, and revised information so that victims better understand the process and are fully aware of the wider implications of making a VPS. Victims will also be able to request a copy of their VPS for them to refer to in future.
By the time the new code comes into force next spring, we will have embedded the necessary operational adjustments with criminal justice agencies, supported with victim-focused practitioner guidance, to provide clarity on roles and accountabilities. We will continue to work closely with police and crime commissioners and local criminal justice partnerships to improve compliance with the code and also produce a child friendly version of the code to help children better understand their rights and the support available to them.
As Victims Minister, I believe that the revised victims code both demonstrates our continued commitment to supporting victims of crime at a time when they may need it most as well as give them a louder, clearer voice in the criminal justice system process. The code will also form the basis of our forthcoming consultation on a victims law.
[HCWS585]
(4 years ago)
General CommitteesI beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (Relevant Court) (Retained EU Case Law) Regulations 2020.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Christopher.
The instrument before the Committee relates to the question of which courts should be able to depart from retained EU case law. From January, our courts, rather than the Court of Justice of the European Union, will be the final arbiter of laws that govern lives in the United Kingdom. In order to promote legal clarity and certainty in our law following our departure from the EU, Parliament has provided that the EU law we have chosen to retain is to be interpreted in line with EU case law that we have also chosen to retain.
The way in which our law is interpreted by our courts and tribunals does not remain static over time. Our departure from the EU has naturally brought with it a change in the context in which the law is considered, and we would want our courts to be able to reflect that in their decisions where appropriate. Without the ability to depart from EU case law, there is a risk that EU law that has been retained in UK law remains tied to an old interpretation—an interpretation that is arguably no longer appropriate. In that way, the law can become fossilised or ossified. For that reason, the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 vested in the United Kingdom Supreme Court, and Scotland’s High Court of Justiciary in specified cases, the power to depart from retained EU case law, applying their own test for deciding whether to depart from their own case law when doing so.
The instrument will extend the number of UK courts that have the power to depart from retained EU case law to include courts at the Court of Appeal level across the UK. It sets out that in making such decisions the test to be applied by those courts is to be the same as that applied by the United Kingdom Supreme Court in deciding whether to depart from its own case law, namely whether it is right to do so.
The instrument will achieve our aim of enabling retained EU case law to evolve in a more timely way than otherwise might have been achieved through the status quo. It will also help to mitigate the operational impacts on the UK Supreme Court and the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland that would have arisen had the power to depart from retained EU case law been reserved solely to those courts. It will further assist those courts by providing prior judicial dialogue on those complex cases from the Court of Appeal level.
In short, the provisions will balance achieving sufficient certainty with allowing appropriate flexibility. It may be worth my spending a moment just to explain what is meant by retained EU case law. That case law is defined in the 2018 Act as, broadly, any principles and decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union, as they have effect in EU law prior to the end of the transition period. That includes those cases that were referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union by the UK, as well as those referred by other member states. That is a vast and complex body of case law, which spans across many different areas of law—environmental law, employment law, commercial law and many others.
As I have set out, the principle that British courts should be able to depart from retained EU case law has already been decided in Parliament, vesting the power to do so in the Supreme Court and the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland, where it is the final court of appeal. In amending the 2018 Act through the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, however, Parliament also provided the power to make regulations to extend the list of courts that may depart from retained EU case law, to set the test to be applied by those courts and to specify any consideration that courts with the power to depart from retained EU case law should take into account in coming to such decisions.
This instrument extends the list of courts that can depart from retained EU case law to courts at the Court of Appeal level across the UK. The full list of courts is: first, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales; secondly, the Court Martial Appeal Court; thirdly, the Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland; fourthly, the High Court of Justiciary when sitting as a court of appeal in relation to a compatibility issue or a devolution issue; fifthly, the Inner House of the Court of Session of Scotland; sixthly, the Lands Valuation Appeal Court in Scotland; and seventhly, the Registration Appeal Court in Scotland.
The instrument also sets out that the test to be applied by those additional courts when deciding whether to depart from retained EU case law will be the same test used by the UK Supreme Court in deciding whether to depart from its own case law, namely, as I have already said, where it is right to do so. That test is well established and as a result is capable of being easily understood and applied without any further guidance. It is anticipated that applying the same test as that used by the Supreme Court will enable a consistent approach across the jurisdictions and in turn on appeal to the Supreme Court. There is a wealth of case law underpinning the Supreme Court’s test that has evolved over time to ensure that courts take into account changing circumstances and modern public policy.
Although the powers under which the instrument is made enable a list of factors to be specified for consideration by any court with the power to depart from retained EU case law, the Government have decided against that approach. In applying the Supreme Court’s own test in deciding whether to depart from retained EU case law, the courts will consider the principles set out in the House of Lords Practice Statement, which has been in operation since 1966, as well as the wealth of factors set out in judgments of the Supreme Court on the interpretation of its own test.
The instrument does not change the operation of the doctrine of precedent, which practically speaking, as hon. Members will know, means that when a court reaches a decision on whether to depart from retained EU case law, that judgment has the same precedent status as other judgments from that court. In other words, what matters is the rank of the court rather than the underlying material. As required in statute, the Government have consulted the President of the UK Supreme Court, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, the Senior President of Tribunals, the Lord President of the Court of Session, the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, and others. That consultation, which was also extended to the devolved Administrations, as well as to representatives across the legal services sector, businesses and other organisations, and was open to the public, ran from 2 July to 13 August. The Government’s response to the consultation was published on 15 October.
That consultation sought views on whether to extend the power to depart from retained EU case law to the Court of Appeal and its equivalents across the UK, or to the High Court and its UK equivalents. Having considered the responses fully, the consultation response set out the Government’s decision to extend the power to depart from retained EU case law to seven additional Court of Appeal level courts listed in this instrument, as this option, as I have already said, strikes the appropriate balance between enabling retained EU case law to evolve more quickly where appropriate, and providing legal clarity and certainty.
It also assists in managing the operational impact by ensuring that cases are considered in a timely way. Giving additional courts the power to depart from retained EU case law avoids the two highest courts across the UK receiving high numbers of cases that would be likely to take considerably longer to resolve, which is not in the interests of the parties to those proceedings or indeed those with an interest in their outcome. Furthermore, by extending the power to this list of additional courts, we can mitigate the impact of potentially large volumes of divergent decisions both within and across the UK jurisdictions, as decisions of these courts are binding on themselves and courts below, as well as being persuasive across the UK’s three legal systems.
An impact assessment has been published alongside the consultation response. Any impact is heavily dependent on litigant behaviour in bringing proceedings seeking a departure from retained EU case law and of course the outcome of that litigation. However, based on the qualitative assessment, we assess that any impact from an increase of case volumes as a result of this instrument is manageable at the Court of Appeal level, and helps mitigate pressure on the Supreme Court.
The instrument enables our courts to be better able to consider whether to depart from retained EU case law than the status quo provided in the 2018 Act. Providing the seven specified courts with the ability to depart from retained EU case law will allow timely evolution of our case law, relieve pressure on the UK Supreme Court and avoid our case law becoming ossified. We are taking an approach that balances the importance of legal clarity and certainty with a need for the law to evolve with changing circumstances.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Stockton North for his remarks; let me try to address some of his concerns.
The hon. Gentleman referred to the responses to the consultation but did not advert to the fact that a number of those who responded said that they did not want to have any opportunity at all to depart from EU retained case law. We think that would not only strike the wrong balance but would hide-bound British justice in a way that would not serve the interests of anyone in society. Plainly, there must be the opportunity for the courts to depart, the only question is which seniority of court should be able to do so. We quite accept that there is a balance to strike—a balance between ensuring that there is legal certainty and clarity which is important for litigants and those who want to advise them and ensuring that there is the necessary flexibility so that we can evolve, adjust and adapt.
The hon. Gentleman also failed to mention that of those who responded and engaged with the central question, namely, and I paraphrase, ‘Do you want this to extend to the Court of Appeal or beyond to the High Court?’, the overwhelming majority said the Court of Appeal, and that is precisely what we are doing.
The hon. Gentleman’s central point, and again I paraphase, is ‘Look, we should simply stick with the Supreme Court.’ But if he pauses to reflect on the implications of that, the very point he made about access to justice—I concede that that is a proper concern—is inhibited by retaining the power within the Supreme Court. How many individuals can credibly make their way to get a judgment from the Supreme Court? Not many. For the poor old Supreme Court to be left with the entirety of the work would be no service to it either. It would be much better for it to have had some of the legal points considered by the Court of Appeal, which brings to bear some of the finest legal expertise one will find anywhere in the world, and thereafter in appropriate cases for the Supreme Court to engage. If we leave it all to the Supreme Court, I respectfully suggest that is not necessarily particularly good for the overall quality of justice, and it makes justice inaccessible.
The third and final point is this: the hon. Gentleman’s proposal risks absurdity. If the European Court of Justice itself revisits its own case law, as it is able to do, perhaps in respect of employment law or environmental safeguards, and decides to have a different interpretation of regulations, directives and such, under his proposal of our in effect not making any changes ever, British courts would not be able to turn round and say, ‘Well, that looks like a jolly sensible new interpretation; we will apply it here in the UK.’ Our courts would be hamstrung in a way that, I respectfully suggest, would not be good for justice or access to justice.
The hon. Gentleman said that the trade unions have concerns and he referred to a ‘mass departure’ from retained EU law. Again, that misrepresents the position. If we had given the power to Cheltenham magistrates court to depart from retained EU case law, I would quite accept his point. But we are not giving that power to the magistrates court, the county court, the Crown court or even the High Court, but instead to the Court of Appeal. I hope that he recognises that that is a very senior court, and I should also make it clear that the equivalent courts to which I referred bind themselves with the doctrine of precedent.
The hon. Gentleman argued that the SI undermines the doctrine of precedent. On the contrary, it cements and reinforces that doctrine. That is the principle which underpins the provisions. It strikes the right balance between certainty and agility. I commend the draft instrument to the Committee.
Question put,
(4 years ago)
Written StatementsOn the 25 June 2020, the Government published the final report on Assessing Risk of Harm to Children and Parents in Private Law Children Cases, alongside an implementation plan. The report contained a number of recommendations from a panel that included external experts, and the implementation plan set out how the Government proposed to address the recommendations.
One of the recommendations made by the panel was
“that the presumption of parental involvement be reviewed urgently in order to address its detrimental effects.”
I am pleased to announce the commencement of a review of the presumption of parental involvement in child arrangements, and certain other private law children proceedings. This review will focus on the application of the presumption and the statutory exception in cases where there are allegations or other evidence to suggest that involvement of the parent would put the child at risk of harm.
The review will focus both on the courts’ application of the presumption, as well as on the impact on children’s welfare of the courts’ application of these provisions. In particular, the review will examine:
(i) how courts are applying sections 1(2A), (2B) and (6) of the Children Act 1989, which together require courts to presume, in child arrangements and certain other private law children proceedings, that involvement of a parent in the child’s life will further the child’s welfare, unless there is evidence to suggest that involvement of that parent would put the child at risk of suffering harm, and to define involvement as ‘involvement of some kind, either direct or indirect, but not any particular division of a child’s time’;
(ii) and the impacts on children’s welfare of the courts’ application of these provisions.
This is an important, and complex, issue and this approach is intended to identify whether any reforms are needed in this area, and if so, what kind (legislative or otherwise), and to ensure that any conclusions and recommendations are rooted in a solid understanding of the effect of the presumption and its exception, and the evidence base surrounding its application.
I am establishing an Advisory Group to guide the evidence gathering for this important review. The Advisory Group members will be:
Rachel Thomas, Welsh Children’s Commissioner’s Office
Nicole Jacobs, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner
Peter Jackson LJ
HHJ Michelle Corbett
Jacky Tiotto, CEO Cafcass
Matthew Pinnell, Cafcass Cymru
Tammy Knox, Resolution
Michael Lewkowicz, Families Need Fathers
The evidence that this review will gather will include a case file review, input from those working in the family courts, and an academic literature review of how the presumption is currently applied and the impact of parental involvement on the wellbeing of the child.
The Ministry of Justice will follow a competitive tender process to identify the most appropriate individuals to conduct the evidence review.
I anticipate being able to update the House before summer recess with the outcomes of the review.
[HCWS562]