Scotland Bill

Monday 29th June 2015 Commons Chamber

[2nd Allocated Day]

Further considered in Committee

[Sir David Amess in the Chair]

Clause 12

Power of Scottish Parliament to set rates of income tax

18:40

[Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 124, page 14, line 14 , at end insert—

‘( ) The Scottish Parliament may determine the level of each threshold of income at which a Scottish taxpayer becomes liable for income tax at any of the rates set by the Scottish Parliament;”

This amendment allows the Scottish Parliament to decide at what threshold of income Scottish taxpayers should have to pay the basic rate or any of the other income tax rates to be set by the Scottish Parliament.

[The Temporary Chair (Sir David Amess)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clauses 12 to 14 stand part.

New clause 32—Treasury Review of the implementation of Scottish rates of income tax—

‘(1) The Treasury shall, no later than one year after the date on which this Act is passed, publish and lay before the House of Commons a review of the implementation of the Scottish basic rate and any other income tax rates for the purposes of section 11A of the Income Tax Act 2007.

(2) The Treasury review must include—

(a) a review of the revised fiscal framework;

(b) the tax year to which sections 12 and 13 of this Act will apply, and the day on which they are due to come into force;

(c) the number of staff assigned by the Scottish Government, Revenues Scotland and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, to the project implementing the Scottish basic rate, and any other rates;

(d) a report on the identification of Scottish taxpayers who will be liable to pay the Scottish basic rate, and other rates;

(e) the rates and bands at which the Scottish basic rate, and any other rates, have been set by the Scottish Parliament; and

(f) a projection of the impact of the Scottish basic rate, and any other rates, on income tax revenues generated in Scotland and across the UK.’

This New Clause would provide for a review of the progress in implementing the new Scottish rate of income tax. This will include a review of the revised fiscal framework, a task that will hereafter be undertaken by the Scottish Office for Budget Responsibility.

New clause 54—Taxes on income—

‘In Section A1 in Part 2 of Schedule 5 (fiscal, economic and monetary policy) to the 1998 Act, in the Exceptions, after the entry for local taxes insert “Taxes on income.”’

This new clause is intended to devolve income tax completely to Scotland.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

My simple amendment would allow the Scottish Parliament to set tax thresholds, as any good Parliament should be able to do, and is a genuine attempt to elicit from a Minister the reasons why the Scottish Parliament is not currently allowed to set the personal allowance. I am a lawyer, but I do not claim to be a tax expert or an economist. [Interruption.] Well, it’s just the truth. I am not an expert tax lawyer or economist. This is a probing amendment to help us investigate a complex issue, to which we can always return on Report.

The House of Commons Library has illustrated the complexity of the issue:

“The Bill as it stands would allow the Scottish Parliament to set the bands of income at which different Scottish rates of tax would apply. Clause 12(3) states that where there is to be more than one Scottish rate, the resolution which sets these rates ‘must also set limits or make other provision to enable it to be ascertained…which rates apply in relation to a Scottish taxpayer.’”

That is not immediately terribly clear, but it continues:

“So, if the Scottish Parliament wished to, it could set a zero rate of tax over a specific band of income, in effect increasing the personal tax allowance to all Scottish taxpayers.”

Importantly, in its briefing on the Smith commission, the Institute for Fiscal Studies asked why the power to set the allowance was to be reserved. That is the question I am asking. The IFS, a reputable body, has asked it, and I am simply using the amendment to ask it again. I think most people would agree that setting tax and then spending the money raised is a prerequisite of a responsible Parliament.

It is not necessary to go over all the arguments I used on Second Reading or in Committee two weeks ago—they are on record—but suffice it to say that power breeds responsibility. The Scottish Parliament must take responsibility for its own destiny in the firm conviction that it is ready and able to do so. So why are we devolving bands and rates, but not thresholds? Is not setting the threshold at which people start to pay tax—the personal allowance—vital to the decision-making process? Setting a band or rate but not a threshold is like being willing and able to leap the bar in high jump without having any control over where the height is calculated from. It does not make any sense. What we are giving the Scottish Parliament is only half a power. Are not thresholds much the most interesting part of the equation? We spent a lot of time last Parliament debating that point in relation to the UK economy.

[George Kerevan (East Lothian) (SNP)]

Surely if the Westminster Parliament keeps the right to set the initial threshold, it can also vary it, thus taking away from the Scottish Parliament the ability to plan its entire budget, because the threshold could change overnight.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

That is a good point, and I agree entirely. It does not make sense. One Parliament might be trying to manage its own affairs by setting bands responsibly, but another Parliament could cut the ground from beneath its feet by changing the threshold. I do not know why the power has been reserved, but no doubt the Minister will tell us.

[Nigel Mills (Amber Valley) (Con)]

Does it not go even further? Without the Scottish Parliament having control over the rules and the tax base, the UK Parliament could create a load of new reliefs that would cost it a fortune. If we are going to devolve income tax, we ought to devolve the whole thing, not just part of it.

18:45

[Sir Edward Leigh]

As I explained, my personal view is that we should devolve the whole thing. It makes logical sense. As I said, setting the thresholds is often much the most interesting part of tax policy in modern Parliaments. When our friends the Liberals were in power with us—we remember those happy times—was not their proudest boast that they, as members of the Government, had lifted hundreds of thousands of people out of tax altogether?

There is an interesting argument here. For the record, I am dubious about lifting the threshold. It is expensive, and surely more, not fewer, people should have a stake in the income tax system. But that is my personal view, and I accept that there are countervailing arguments. For instance, lifting the threshold reduces the pressure on tax credits. I recognise that it is an interesting political debate.

Setting rates and bands without being able to set thresholds makes no sense. Of course, raising thresholds and personal allowances is dramatic and expensive, which is presumably why the Scottish Parliament is being denied the power, but leaving aside the need for and desirability of full control, does not full fiscal autonomy lead to full fiscal responsibility? The more autonomy a Parliament is given, the more responsible it becomes. Countries such as Belgium and Spain—not without their own separatist problems—provide exceptionally broad autonomy to their constituent parts.

That is certainly the case in the United States, where the states have full fiscal autonomy, including the power to issue bonds and the like—the whole lot, as far as I know. This country is definitely not the United States, despite the best efforts of Mr Blair, but if there is one aspect of America we should like to emulate, it is its vigorous civic culture. Its states, counties and towns have real power and the capability to respond to people’s needs and democratic desires. Surely we all want Scotland to have that capacity, just as we want the whole UK to have it. The fact that fiddling with thresholds is so expensive makes Governments and Parliaments niggardly about raising them—each £100 is inordinately expensive—but why should the Scottish Parliament be less responsible than the UK Parliament? Can anybody tell me why a responsible Scottish Parliament should not also be niggardly about that power and use it in a very conservative—small c—way?

Of course, full fiscal autonomy requires a set of support mechanisms through a formula-based grant. That should be based on need, not obscure variations on English spending, which is why I am opposed to the Barnett formula and want to replace it with one based on need—but that is a debate for another time. If the UK Parliament issued a sensible grant formula based on the specific needs of the Scottish Parliament, and if that were followed by full freedom for the latter to set personal allowances, bands and rates, I believe the Scottish Parliament would use that power responsibly and carefully. I contend that the more power we give the Scottish Parliament, the less it will be a grievance Parliament and the more the forces of canny, prudent Scottish financial conservatism will be unleashed. Indeed, the best way to encourage the growth of the Conservative party in Scotland is to give the Scottish Parliament more power. At the moment, all the pressure on it is to spend more money and blame the UK Government when we indulge in any austerity programme.

In the current situation, it is perfectly logical for the voters to choose whichever party complains the most and makes the biggest fuss. I do not blame the Scottish people for doing that. The current system leads to that sort of mindset, whereas the UK system leads to an alternative mindset—we want politicians in power who are careful about how they vary thresholds and bands. It is because Treasury Ministers have that power that people are careful about whom they elect, and Conservatives do not do too badly in that UK set-up.

With full home rule and full fiscal autonomy, the voter would be in charge and would choose representatives who would raise and spend money wisely rather than just go cap in hand to Westminster. That is surely what we want to achieve, so what is the objection? If it is said that the Barnett formula makes such natural freedom unobtainable, the solution is not the denial of power or freedom but the end of the formula. If the argument is that the Scottish tax system could undermine full UK fiscal responsibility, I find it unconvincing. For instance, the Scottish Parliament spends £37 billion and raises £30 billion—quite responsible, actually. The UK spends £732 billion and raises £648 billion. [Interruption.] I thought Scottish National party Members would respond in that way, but I could not resist helping them along.

The serious point that I am making is that the Scottish budget is very small compared with the UK budget. If we gave the Scottish Parliament full fiscal responsibility, it is extremely unlikely that it would upset our fiscal responsibility. The Secretary of State may, of course, be able to deal with that point. He has many more expert advisers than I do, and I will listen to the arguments that are made today and wait for his response. Perhaps he will indulge me, if not with a yes to my arguments then at least with a willingness to listen and, in time, to move. If he is not interested, we could return to the matter on Report.

I make my comments in the spirit of trying to be creative and helpful. We can return to these matters, but I hope that the Secretary of State will not just provide a throwaway line from the civil service brief but will try to respond to the arguments that are made. We are trying to create a responsible Parliament; let us give it full fiscal autonomy.

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship in this Committee, Sir David, and to speak to our new clause 54. I enjoyed much of what the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) had to say, apart from his description of the “separatist problem”, which we tend to call “national aspiration”—I think I know what he meant. I am conscious of the time, so I shall try to cover the debate as briefly as I can.

Paragraphs 75 to 79 of the Smith agreement covered issues of income tax, and stated that income tax would remain a shared tax and that both the UK and the Scottish Parliaments would share control of it. The agreement said essentially that MPs representing constituencies across the whole of the UK would continue to decide the UK’s budget, including income tax. That certainly makes sense with the very partial devolution suggested by the Bill.

Within that framework, the Scottish Parliament will have the power to set the rates of income tax and the thresholds at which they are paid for non-savings and non-dividend income only. As part of that, there will be no restrictions on the thresholds or rates that the Scottish Parliament can set. All other aspects of income tax will remain reserved, as the hon. Member for Gainsborough said, so that even such things as the definition of income could be changed by a UK Government, making subsequent and consequential serious change to the yield forecast by the Scottish Government. That is one reason why, with the partial devolution, we should all continue to vote on that component of income tax in the Westminster Parliament—and it is an even stronger reason, of course, for the devolution of all income tax.

The Scottish Parliament Information Centre analysis for the Scottish Parliament Devolution (Further Powers) Committee—for the rest of the evening, termed “the devolution committee”—found in its interim report on the draft Scotland Bill that draft clauses 10 to 12, now clauses 12 to 14,

“broadly seek to give effect to the extension of income tax powers recommended by the Smith Commission. These would give the Scottish Parliament the power to set rates and bands in relation to non-savings and non-dividend income…above the UK personal allowance.”

Clause 14 also deals with the interaction between income tax and capital gains tax. Currently, individuals who pay income tax at the higher rate also pay CGT at the higher rate. The clause sets out that the rate of CGT that applies to Scottish income tax payers will continue to be calculated using the UK income tax rate limits. That would create an imbalance should there be a change or proposed change for Scotland and people choose to do something in a different way.

There were, however, no draft clauses in relation to the corresponding adjustment in the block grant or the Scottish Government’s reimbursing the UK Government for costs arising from implementation or administration of the powers. Can the Secretary of State confirm that these recommendations do not require legislation?

The Scottish Parliament’s devolution committee interim report said in its conclusion about income tax powers that

“the essence of the Smith Commission’s recommendations has been translated appropriately by the previous UK Government into the draft legislative clauses”,

and that it had “no particular concerns” with “the drafting”. However, it highlighted the

“significant issues still to be resolved regarding the implementation of the new powers, such as an appropriate definition of residency…the details of the administration of the new regime (who collects the tax and how it will function…the need to avoid double taxation and the timing and phasing of the new powers on income tax relative to those already devolved under the Scotland Act 2012”.

Those are all matters that I am sure the Scottish Secretary will address. At paragraph 166, the devolution committee also recommended that

“details on the implementation of the new powers over income tax be produced before the Scottish Parliament is expected to give its legislative consent”.

That is extremely important. It concluded, too, that

“any final detail of the fiscal framework and the other matters we have considered is provided to the Scottish Parliament before the question of legislative consent to any new bill is considered”.

That is a view endorsed by the Scottish Government, and I understand that discussions on these issues are ongoing with the UK Government, in parallel with the passage of the legislation.

It is normal practice for the Scottish Parliament to consider legislative consent before the final stage of a Bill in the Commons; with the Report stage likely in the autumn, usual practice would suggest September. However, the devolution committee suggested 2016 as a more likely date, so when does the Secretary of State believe the Bill will reach Report?

Because of the lack of information on the various technical aspects of the delivery of the tax powers, beyond the wording of the Bill, the committee said:

“As yet, we are not able to conclude that we are content with the fiscal framework and no detriment arrangements as these details are currently being discussed between the two governments.”

Will the Secretary of State confirm that discussions are under way and update us on progress, particularly in respect of the no detriment and no advantage clauses—principles agreed by Smith before the committee reported?

The devolution committee also said:

“both the process of these negotiations and the outcome requires proper parliamentary scrutiny. We recommend both Governments reach an urgent agreement on just how this will be achieved and for the Scottish Government to report to the Committee on what arrangements it proposes to put in place for parliamentary oversight.”

Will the Secretary of State describe what actions his Government are taking in respect of parliamentary oversight, particularly if we do not—as may well be the case—get through the debate on all the clauses and groups of amendments tabled for debate today?

In their response to the devolution committee’s interim report, the Scottish Government made it clear that they were

“broadly content with the clauses in the Scotland Bill relating to taxation”.

It added, however:

“as the Committee recognised, there will need to be extensive discussions between the Scottish and UK Governments over the plans for implementing these provisions.”

I note at this point that there were changes between the draft clauses and the Scotland Bill. In paragraph 165 of the interim report, the devolution committee highlighted one area that required specific clarification, so I ask the Secretary of State to confirm—I am sure he will—whether clause 12(5) of the published Bill now contains a change to specify that a zero rate of income tax is possible?

It is also worth saying a little about the nature of the taxation powers, which has been touched on. They are very limited. Even if we include the VAT assignation, the Scottish Parliament would raise the equivalent of around 50% of devolved expenditure. However, excluding the VAT assignation, the figure falls to barely a third. That is important because many of the submissions to the devolution committee called for more. In its written evidence, the Scottish Trades Union Congress called in its recommendation 2.1 for the

“devolution and assignment of taxation amounting to…two thirds of Scottish public spending (over 50% of all spending in Scotland)”.

The Bill clearly does not reach that standard.

19:00

The point is important also because it does not match what the UK Government said in their Command Paper “Scotland in the United Kingdom”, which claimed:

“As a result of the Smith Commission Agreement, the Scottish Parliament will control around 60 per cent of spending in Scotland and retain around 40 per cent of Scottish tax.”

Clearly, that claim works only by including the assigned VAT; the taxes that Scotland will actually control amount to less than 30%. The full devolution of all tax on income would help resolve that problem.

It is also worth noting the evidence to the devolution committee of Professor Andrew Hughes-Hallett, who warned of the risks associated with reliance on one single tax. He said a great deal about the possible compositions of the tax base, but in essence his point was that Scotland needs a diverse tax base. We believe that adding responsibility for savings and investment income along with every other aspect of income tax would at least offer a partial solution to that problem.

Furthermore, Professor Anton Muscatelli told the Committee:

“the cleanest solution would have been to have a package that would have involved not only complete income tax devolution, including the personal allowance”

but additional devolution of national insurance contributions, which would have

“allowed some flexibility around employers’ national insurance contributions to try to affect employment, since that issue seems to be of concern to Scotland.”

To try to resolve a number of the problems that we have identified, our new clause 54 seeks the full devolution of responsibility for all tax on income.

One of the other issues that new clause 54 seeks to address is that raised by the National Union of Students Scotland, which told the devolution Committee that it believed

“that by only devolving non-savings taxes, the Scottish Parliament is put in a precarious position for any future tax rises, and particularly the introduction of a higher rate of tax. As was seen in the year before the introduction of the 50p rate in 2010, and then in the year following the reduction to 45p, those who it affected were able to shift extremely large sums of money between years and between income and dividends, in order to either escape or benefit from the changes in rates. Without the ability to tax dividends, there is a great risk that Scotland will never be able to fully utilise or benefit from any future reform of income tax.”

[Sir Edward Leigh]

rose—

[Stewart Hosie]

I shall give way once, yes.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

That is a very important point. We always moan about tax avoidance. I have been talking to people in Scotland, and it appears now that wealthy people will be putting more and more money into dividends precisely to avoid tax. I cannot understand the logic of encouraging people to avoid paying tax by putting their money in dividends.

[Stewart Hosie]

I agree entirely. None of us should be encouraging tax avoidance or evasion—not least a Tory Government, which is why I am sure the Secretary of State will want to support the full devolution of tax on earned and unearned income. It is a jolly good idea.

However, whether the devolution of income tax is extended or not, issues of implementation must be fully resolved. I ask the Secretary of State to confirm that, as part of the fiscal framework discussions, the following issues are now being fully addressed: the timing of the implementation of the Smith provisions; the length of the transition period and how it relates to the transition period for the Scottish rate of income tax; how the costs of implementation will be met; whether there will be an agreement to revisit the memorandum of understanding between the Scottish Government and HMRC for the Scottish rate of income tax, to ensure that it remains fit for purpose; the enforcement and compliance regime under the Smith income tax proposals; how gift aid and pensions relief will be treated under Smith; how the block grant adjustment will work, although that is much broader than simply income tax; the forecasting of revenues, the interaction between the Office for Budget Responsibility and the Scottish Fiscal Commission and the detail of how we calculate the transfer of revenue; and the continued role of the National Audit Office in working in partnership with Audit Scotland.

The key issue is the forecasting that will drive the revenues that the Scottish Government will get and the block grant adjustment. There has to be a fair balance between the role and input of the OBR and the Scottish Fiscal Commission, particularly given that the OBR uses Treasury numbers to drive its calculations.

As I said at the outset, I am conscious of time; we have many groups of amendments to get through and others will want to speak. I hope that the Secretary of State can answer those important detailed questions on the proposed devolution. I commend amendment 54 to the Committee.

[Ian Murray (Edinburgh South) (Lab)]

I was not able to make it to the House earlier, Sir David; I would like to express my sympathies to everyone involved in the tragic events in Tunisia. Our thoughts are with the families all across the United Kingdom, but especially the people in Scotland who have been caught up.

I want to speak to new clause 32. Part 2 of the Bill devolves significant new powers to Scotland over income tax and other taxes, and it is a real opportunity to provide the powerhouse Parliament promised by the Smith agreement. Clauses 12, 13 and 14 make provision for transfer to the Scottish Parliament of the power to set rates and bands of income tax, including, as the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) was pushing for, the ability to set a zero rate. The full impact of that and other tax measures should not be downplayed.

Lord Smith himself outlined that the measures proposed in the agreement would create one of the most powerful devolved Parliaments in the world. When taking taxation and spending clauses together, Scotland would be only slightly behind the Canadian provinces and Swiss cantons. Likewise, according to the OECD, in exercising power over setting both the rates and bases of income tax, Scotland would rank above sub-central legislatures in Sweden, Norway, Finland, the US and even Germany.

The economic evidence suggests that fiscal devolution can work. It is our responsibility, and that of the Scottish Government, to make sure that it does—that is the genesis of our new clause 32. However, these are hugely complicated processes; anyone who has tried to read the fiscal framework analysis in the Smith agreement will know that. I note that the Scottish National party and its new friend, the hon. Member for Gainsborough, have tabled new clauses that would seek to devolve income tax in its entirety.

I should say at the start that those are perfectly legitimate arguments that have been debated at great length at both the Calman and Smith commissions. Labour disagrees, because we believe fundamentally in the pooling and sharing of resources across the United Kingdom; that is not a criticism of the SNP position, but merely a disagreement on a fundamental broad principle. We have rightly and repeatedly criticised the Smith agreement and the Bill on a number of occasions, particularly on Second Reading and in last Monday’s debate, but I agree with the hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie): in this instance at least, the Bill and the Smith agreement have got it right. That is probably why there are so few substantive amendments to the income tax clauses. The Chartered Institute of Taxation has echoed that by saying that the commission has made a

“pragmatic set of proposals which shows a lot of thought has been given to balancing the desire of Scots for greater tax powers against the practical obstacles to devolution”.

It is worth reflecting on the Scottish Parliament’s current position on income tax. Since 1999, Scotland has been able to vary the rate of income tax by 3p in the pound. Despite the current clamour for more powers, that power has never been used—incidentally, I believe that it has now lapsed, which shows the problems with the fiscal framework. Notwithstanding that, under the Scotland Act 2012, and as a result of the Calman commission, the Scottish Parliament has been afforded control over the first 10p of the basic rate of tax. Obviously, the Smith agreement and the Bill go much further.

The Scottish Parliament will have total control over income tax rates and thresholds and complete freedom over the levels at which those rates and thresholds are set. That is significant as the estimated devolved income tax liabilities on income tax in 2013-14 amounted to almost £11 billion. That is a considerable sum, the collection and deployment of which confers a substantial degree of responsibility on the Scottish Parliament. If they wish, the Scottish Government—of any colour—can increase or decrease that liability.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

I entirely accept where the hon. Gentleman is coming from in saying that he wants responsibility to be shared throughout the United Kingdom. However, can he explain why we should share responsibility over thresholds but not, apparently, over bands or rates? I cannot see the logic of that.

[Ian Murray]

The Scottish Parliament will have a significant ability to adjust the zero rate in particular. I hope that the Secretary of State responds to that point, because the House of Commons Library was quite clear on it. However, there has to be some pooling and sharing. Income tax is the biggest tax that everyone pays. Everyone who works pays a proportion of their income in income tax, above the basic allowance. It is important that everyone has a stake in that game. We could get to a situation in which people who did not have a stake in that game asked what the United Kingdom was for. I fundamentally believe in pooling and sharing, and the Smith agreement struck a reasonable balance.

We need a full analysis of how all the proposals will work. That is why we tabled new clause 32. Some adjustment of the powers might be needed in the future. We do not yet know what effect the implementation of the Scotland Act 2012 will have, because it does not come into force until 2016. The question that the hon. Member for Gainsborough raises relates to what we are trying to achieve with new clause 32, because the report would examine the consequences of this transfer of powers.

[Andrew Gwynne (Denton and Reddish) (Lab)]

Is not one of the unintended consequences of the devolution of income tax to the Scottish Parliament that it will affect UK-wide facilities such as gift aid, which reimburses charities on the basis of the basic rate of income tax that is set at a UK level? If there were two different basic rates, might that not cause complexity for donors in tracking what they pay to HMRC and to Revenue Scotland? Does my hon. Friend think that that issue should be considered by the review that would be conducted under new clause 32?

[Ian Murray]

I am delighted by that intervention, because I was going to speak about that issue later. Given the time constraints, I will take that point out of my speech, because my hon. Friend has made it well. The Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations has raised the relationship between income tax and gift aid. Although that matter is not mentioned in new clause 32, I hope that if there is a reporting mechanism, it will look not only at gift aid, but at pension relief. That is another matter that was not mentioned by the Smith agreement, but which has been raised by many of the organisations that have been in touch with us about the Bill. Gift aid is worth £1 billion a year to charities, so we must ensure that it is considered properly.

[Stewart Hosie]

The hon. Gentleman spoke about the principle of pooling and sharing, and I have heard that argument before. However, if it were a real principle, it would apply to the aggregates levy, landfill tax, air passenger duty and other small taxes that have been devolved. There is no principled reason why it is required to be applied to income tax. He rather gave the game away when he spoke about the ability to vary the rate by 3p either way, which was the original plan, and the ability to set the first 10p of income tax. Why does he think that so little is enough for a nation like Scotland? Why is he so afraid of giving our national Parliament all the powers it needs to tax income properly?

[Ian Murray]

What the hon. Gentleman is asking for is full fiscal autonomy. There are many amendments that will allow us to have a full debate about that later this evening, but I fundamentally disagree with that principle because the pooling and sharing of resources is important. The difference between income tax and the aggregates levy, landfill tax and all the other taxes he mentioned is that they are removable taxes, whereas income tax is not. We should be pooling and sharing resources, and we should therefore ensure that the significant sum of £11 billion is part of the overall matrix of the United Kingdom.

As I said at the start of my speech, I do not disagree with everything that the hon. Gentleman said, but we disagree on the fundamental principle of pooling and sharing. His speech was completely reasonable in terms of what he is seeking to achieve, but Labour Members simply disagree with the broad principle of not pooling and sharing. There is no right or wrong on these issues in terms of what should be devolved; the issue is whether one believes in these broad principles or not.

I find it difficult in these debates to have 56 SNP MPs braying at me from behind, when I am actually agreeing with them. I have no idea what they will be like when I disagree with them. I am paying a compliment to the hon. Member for Dundee East, which I do not do often, and he is still unhappy with my contribution. Never mind; given that they have signed most of our amendments to the welfare clauses, perhaps we will be much more collegiate tomorrow.

I was explaining new clause 32. The Scottish Affairs Committee report on the fundamental principles of the Smith agreement, which was published in March, said:

“The Smith Agreement represents the best of both worlds. It presents Scotland with much greater powers over taxation, meaning for the first time the majority of the money the Scottish Government spends will be paid for by its own taxation. This will make it more fiscally accountable to the people of Scotland for how it spends their taxes.”

I am confident that the income tax provisions in the Bill strike the right balance between reserved and devolved taxation, although I agree with the hon. Member for Gainsborough that some movement might be required in the future.

I believe that these clauses are in the spirit and the letter of the Smith agreement and the vow. The vow is quite concise on these issues. It says very little or nothing at all about taxation. One thing that it does say, which goes back to the pooling and sharing of resources, is that the Barnett formula should be maintained. The Bill and the Smith agreement are utterly in accord with that stand.

19:15

[Mrs Anne Main (St Albans) (Con)]

Last week, I supported the SNP on full fiscal autonomy and scrapping the Barnett formula, although I know the hon. Gentleman did not. The SNP Members all trooped through the Lobby to vote for that, so does he share my surprise that they have come back today with amendments that do not include it?

[Ian Murray]

Nothing ever surprises me, although I was a little surprised last week that the 56 SNP MPs went through the Lobby with the Thatcherite arm of the Conservative party. That was because full fiscal autonomy would deliver something that would be fundamentally damaging to Scotland. The hon. Lady is absolutely correct. [Interruption.] I thank her for waking up all the SNP MPs with her intervention.

The Smith agreement said:

“Income Tax will remain a shared tax and both the UK and Scottish Parliaments will share control of Income Tax. MPs representing constituencies across the whole of the UK will continue to decide the UK’s Budget, including Income Tax…Within this framework, the Scottish Parliament will have the power to set the rates of Income Tax and the thresholds at which these are paid for the non-savings and non-dividend income of Scottish taxpayers”.

That is exactly what the Bill does, and it is important to highlight two aspects of that quotation.

First, maintaining income tax as a UK-wide tax is critical to the continued pooling and sharing of resources. That facilitates UK-wide redistribution on the basis of need, which underlines the welfare state and the state pension system. The Church of Scotland expressed the same view when it argued for

“a degree of solidarity across the United Kingdom, where prosperity is shared and those with broadest shoulders can carry the extra weight of supporting those less fortunate.”

Secondly, the Smith agreement explicitly mentions the continuing right of Scottish MPs to vote on the Budget within the framework that it sets out. That is equally important, particularly given the Government’s proposals on English votes for English laws. Devolving income tax in its entirety, which the hon. Members for Dundee East and for Gainsborough are advocating, would place that right in doubt and create two classes of MP in this place. That risk was the subject of considerable debate in the Smith commission. As long as one believes in the pooling and sharing of resources, which we certainly do, Smith’s recommendation to retain income tax as a shared tax is critical. That is why we reject amendment 124 and new clause 54, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Dundee East.

New clause 32 concentrates on the implementation of the powers being transferred and, as I have said a number of times in this Committee, the use of those powers. What we are trying to achieve chimes with much of what the hon. Member for Dundee East said, when he laid out the concerns about how the proposals would be monitored, how the number of income tax payers would be determined, the “no detriment” policies across the United Kingdom and the complicated nature of the fiscal framework.

The report under new clause 32 would include

“a review of the revised fiscal framework”,

given its complicated nature. It would also include

“the tax year to which sections 12 and 13 of this Act will apply, and the day on which they are due to come into force”

so that businesses are able to plan. It would include details of the number of staff that both Governments would assign to the implementation of the new Scottish rate of income tax to ensure that adequate resources were deployed to make it happen. It would be useful if the Secretary of State responded to the particular concern that the staffing level to determine the Scottish rate of income tax might be deficient.

[Tommy Sheppard (Edinburgh East) (SNP)]

I am just trying to understand the point that the hon. Gentleman is making. As I understand it, this is an opportunity to discuss whether the Scottish Parliament should have enhanced powers over income tax. His position seems to be that, rather than take that step, we should have a review of the situation. I can understand the logic of having a review of the powers, but why does he think that the review would be better in the hands of the Tory Chancellor, rather than the representatives of the people of Scotland in the Scottish Parliament? Surely the time has come to allow the Scottish people to determine these matters for themselves, rather than a Tory Government who have only one single representative in Scotland.

[Ian Murray]

I think that the hon. Gentleman is confusing two issues. We fundamentally agree with the clauses relating to the devolution of income tax, but these are hugely complex matters, as is demonstrated by the complicated nature of the devolution of the 10p income tax provision in the Scotland Act 2012. The new clause would not prevent the Bill from proceeding; it would merely allow the Secretary of State to bring to the House a report on the progress of implementation.

There is another difficulty. The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right—the Scottish Parliament could produce a report and submit it—but I cannot, in the House of Commons, command a different Parliament to do something, which is why I am asking the Secretary of State to produce the report.

It is right for these issues to be raised. I hope that the Scottish Parliament will also examine them in great detail, and will present a full report to both Houses. Our aim is to protect Scottish taxpayers rather than to create a political divide. It is disappointing that, although we agree on the broad principles of the devolution of income tax, Members are trying to bring about division between us. We are trying to be a responsible Opposition in calling for a report on the implementation of income tax rates.

New clause 32 calls for

“a report on the identification of Scottish taxpayers”.

The aim is to ensure that individuals are either Scottish or UK taxpayers but not both, to prevent the double taxation that was mentioned by the hon. Member for Dundee East, and to deal with cross-border mid-financial year movements, which is important in the context of where people may live or work.

The review must include the rates and bands at which the Scottish income tax will be set, and a projection of the impact of the tax on revenues generated in Scotland and across the United Kingdom. That is primarily designed to ensure that Scotland does not become worse off over time owing to the relative tax bases and demographic or behavioural changes in the United Kingdom overall. Such a review would allow us to assess the transitional process, and to ensure that the projected rates and bands accorded with the principle of no detriment for both Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom. That would protect Scottish taxpayers, as well as taxpayers in the rest of the UK.

Critically—the Smith agreement restates this—any updated fiscal framework should secure the Barnett formula, with the Scottish budget bearing the full costs of policy decisions that reduce or increase revenues or expenditure. That is crucial to the fiscal framework.

My hon. Friend the Member for Denton and Reddish (Andrew Gwynne) mentioned gift aid, and I hope that the Minister will be able to respond to what he said.

I think it important for the people of Scotland to know what their Government are doing about these substantial income tax powers, whatever the colour of that Government. Those powers are worth £11 billion, and they are fundamental to the working lives of people in Scotland. As I have said all along, this is about transparency: transparency in regard to whether additional powers should be devolved, and transparency in regard to the use and impact of those that are devolved. That is what our new clauses 1, 21 and 32 seek to foster.

All I ask is that the United Kingdom Government, and, indeed, the Scottish Government, approach the Bill in the same spirit of transparency and openness as us, and agree to new clause 32. We shall be pressing it to a vote later this evening.

[Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD)]

As others have said, the genesis of the clause lies in the report of the Smith commission. I have supported the commission since the day, indeed the hour, when it reported, but we cannot ignore the fact that the process was undertaken at great speed. Necessarily, given that five parties were engaged in the process, it involved a degree of compromise all round. It is for that reason that all of us undertook to ensure that there would be consultation following the publication of the report and, subsequently, the draft clauses.

In a debate in which consensus is not always easy to come by, I am pleased to note that there is consensus on the fact that the clause is a faithful replication of the agreement that was reached under the chairmanship of Lord Smith. However, the consultation that has been conducted since the publication of the draft clauses at the end of January has highlighted, and generated, a substantial number of important matters, some of which are technical and some of which go to the heart of the issue of taxation itself.

I suggest to the Secretary of State that further consideration may be necessary. He has the ability, through the good office that he holds, to bring all the parties together again to consider the representations that have been made during the consultation, and to consider whether, given the complexities and possible areas of conflict that could arise, it is actually worth implementing the tax power in the way that is currently envisaged. If the consultation is to be carried out in good faith—and, for my part, it always has been—there are sufficient matters about which we should be talking. That would still allow us—if it were necessary, and if it were possible to construct a consensus—to return to the issues on Report.

[Nigel Mills]

I rise as a reluctant supporter of the devolution of income tax to the different countries of the Union. I agree with the hon. Member for Edinburgh South (Ian Murray) that people throughout the United Kingdom should feel that they are paying the most important tax—the tax that puts the largest amount of money into the UK pot—and seeing it redistributed. We are where we are, however, and we are talking about devolving income tax to Scotland.

I fear that we have one foot in each camp, with part of the tax in this Parliament and part of it in the Scottish Parliament, and that we will end up in a real mess. I am not sure how it is possible to make a tax work when a Parliament can set the rate, the bands and the starting point, but not the actual rules. A particular policy issue in Scotland may mean that the Scottish Parliament rightly wants to incentivise certain employment and income activities. That may not be not a priority for the United Kingdom as a whole, perhaps for reasons of scale or owing to a different approach, but there will be no mechanism enabling income tax in Scotland to promote that certain activity. A new tax relief for people working in the offshore oil and gas industry, for instance, might not be a priority for the UK as a whole, but it might be a priority in Scotland.

The record of our income tax code is cluttered with examples of the use of the tax code to promote certain types of behaviour. I am not sure that we can secure the full and effective use of a tax code if our Parliament is not setting the rate and looking after local activities.

The flipside will be that tax avoidance as a result of a loophole may become material for the Scottish Parliament in the case of a certain piece of exploitation, but will not become material to the budget of the whole UK. It may be extremely important in Scotland to get that loophole closed, but in the UK there may be several others that are ahead of it in the queue, because it does not represent a large loss to the Westminster Parliament. An action that ought to be taken on something that has a material impact in one part of the UK will not be taken because of the strange disparity that exists.

If we are going to start devolving taxes, we should step back and have a look at what a federal UK tax system would be like. We should work out which taxes are federal and which are devolved, and then try to bring about some consistency in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland so that similar taxes can be devolved in the same way, rather than adopting a piecemeal approach in regard to corporation tax in Northern Ireland, income tax in Scotland, and so forth. I do not think that anyone in the country will know to which Parliament they are paying what tax, and who has complete control of it. That means that we will not get all the advantages that we expect, such as the ownership and the accountability that my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) mentioned.

I do not think that we are achieving the sharing and the pooling that the hon. Member for Edinburgh South wanted, the coherent use of income tax that the SNP wants, or the full devolution that would make sense. We appear to have become involved in a strange halfway fudge which we may regret in a few years’ time. I think it would be better to step back and try to get this right from the start, rather than trying to find a way of clearing up the mess.

I accept that there are always good reasons why the line is drawn where it is. We must be very careful about tax avoidance through the use of residency, or pretend residency. If I am working full-time in Scotland, to get the Scottish rate—which may be higher or lower than the rate in the rest of the UK—I shall probably have to go and live in Scotland. I suspect that I cannot achieve that artificially. If I have large dividend flows, I can probably pretend that I am in Edinburgh when I am in London and vice versa in order to obtain the tax advantage. I can see why there is an attraction in having one UK-wide passive income tax, rather than an active tax.

[Ian Murray]

The hon. Gentleman is raising the issue of what are known in my constituency as “willies”—people who work in London, live in Edinburgh. Those are people who take the trip down to London every Monday and go back on a Thursday evening. According to the House of Commons Library, the UK’s reason for not devolving dividend income is to prevent people from pushing money into dividend income and taking advantage of a differential rate.

[Nigel Mills]

Yes, as I was saying, I accept there are always reasons for drawing the line where we do, and trying to stop tax avoidance within a territory is a powerful reason. However, that has left us here with a convoluted tax system where we seem to be devolving part of it, and that is not a sensible approach. It would be better to have a federal income tax which everyone in the UK paid at a lower rate than they pay now and which covered all passive income, and then have a devolved income tax like the one in the United States. It has a state income tax that can be credited against the federal one. That may be a better, more sustainable system than the one we have.

19:30

I cannot therefore vote for the amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh), because it is only half-fixing the problem. It is fixing the issue of the starting point, not the whole tax base. I sense it would be a bit of a rush to devolve the whole thing now in one amendment, so I am not sure I can vote for either of the two amendments, even though I think I agree with them, because we are starting from the wrong position. We need to look at what sort of federal tax system we could have.

[Pete Wishart (Perth and North Perthshire) (SNP)]

The hon. Gentleman is making a thoughtful speech and he has the ears of those on the SNP Benches. He is right that we have got a halfway house and we have got to get this resolved. That is what the Scottish people thought they were voting for when they voted for us in such numbers. Is there anything the hon. Gentleman can do to persuade his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State to listen to what Scotland has said, and to have the proper solution and ensure we do this right and get what the Scottish people voted for just a few weeks ago?

[Nigel Mills]

I have tried to convince the Treasury Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for South West Hertfordshire (Mr Gauke), of various tax reforms over the last five years with, I would have to say, somewhat limited success, so I am not sure my words will help. If we are to achieve a lasting settlement of our constitution, having these tax rules in the right place with everyone understanding them and believing them to be fair will be extremely important. I do not think my constituents will understand how Scotland can set a different rate of income tax from what they pay if Scottish MPs are still able to vote on the English rate of income tax because it applies to passive income and dividend income. I suspect we will get into a constitutional nightmare, and I can foresee a situation in which Scotland chooses a lower rate of income tax than we have in England, and the English taxpayer will, rightly or wrongly, see a subsidy going from England to Scotland through the Barnett formula and then SNP MPs coming here and voting for a higher rate of income tax than their constituents are paying. That is the nightmare we would hate to see.

We need to have a clear devolution of taxes and responsibility, not what I fear we have here: a halfway fudge that we will have to try to fix in a few years’ time.

[The Secretary of State for Scotland (David Mundell)]

May I start by agreeing with the hon. Member for Edinburgh South (Ian Murray) that we should put on record our thoughts for those people who have been caught up in the events in Tunisia, particularly those from Scotland who have perished? Although our debate has been curtailed today, it is right that that matter has been given such due consideration in this House.

I say to the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) that I have considered the various issues raised in the House in the first part of our Committee stage, and I will continue that approach through the further days in Committee.

[Tommy Sheppard]

rose—

[David Mundell]

I would like to make a little progress.

Since the Committee last met, I have had the opportunity to appear before the Devolution (Further Powers) Committee—to give it its full title—and to listen to its views and explain the Government’s stance. I can assure the hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) that that Committee will continue to play a full part in my consideration of the Bill as it progresses through the House, and I have assured the convener of that.

I had a very useful meeting with the Deputy First Minister to look at how we move forward, particularly in relation to the fiscal framework, and I am going to disappoint the hon. Gentleman, but in a good way, because the criticism that was forthcoming from the Committee to both me and the Deputy First Minister was that we both said the same thing to the Committee, which was that we are not going to give a running commentary on the negotiation of the fiscal framework. What I can say is that the list of issues that the hon. Gentleman referred to in his contribution will be part of the discussion of the fiscal framework. We will of course keep this House updated from a UK Government perspective, but it will be for the Scottish Government to keep the Scottish Parliament updated.

I am pleased to start with the clauses on income tax in today’s debate. These are often overlooked, meriting only a few lines in the comments received on the Bill from both Parliaments and from the Scottish Government, but that is because, as has been said, they command widespread support as delivering the central aspect of the Smith agreement in full.

The changes made by clauses 12, 13 and 14 will give unprecedented flexibilities to the Scottish Parliament on income tax and are a significant milestone in Scotland’s devolution journey within the UK. The Scottish Parliament will be able to set income tax rates and thresholds for earned income. This includes the ability to introduce new bands.

[Roger Mullin (Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath) (SNP)]

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of the most recent analysis by the Fraser of Allander Institute, written by Dr Jim Cuthbert? This is not an issue about the individual devolution of income tax; it is about the interaction that will occur between the way in which income tax is proposed and the Barnett formula and the Government’s proposal with the Holtham index, and the conclusion of that analysis is that, when likely shifts in relative population and shifts in relative tax base are taken into account, this will create significant negative dynamic effects. In other words, it will be all over the place and lack consistency, and it will be a source of conflict down the years. Surely, that needs to be avoided by taking a stronger look at making sure the right income tax powers are devolved?

[The Temporary Chair (Mr David Crausby)]

Order. May I remind the Committee that interventions should be brief?

[David Mundell]

Obviously I am familiar with Cuthbert’s views on a range of issues, and many of the points the hon. Gentleman refers to will indeed be dealt with in the fiscal framework, which is why that is important for delivering a stable settlement.

The Scotland Parliament will retain the receipts from the income tax it is responsible for. This represents a significant devolution of powers, with Scotland retaining around £11 billion of income tax receipts. That accounts for over 90% of income tax receipts collected in Scotland. This gives Scotland greater fiscal autonomy, with incentives to increase employment and increase wage growth.

I emphasise to Members that there are no restrictions on this power. If the Scottish Parliament wants an income tax system with a dozen different rate bands, these powers allow it to do that. Similarly, if it wants to set a zero rate of income tax, it can.

As I said on Second Reading, the devolution of the rates and bands of income tax means we will correct a fundamental imbalance in the devolution settlement. Since 1999, the Scottish Parliament has debated how public money should be spent but not how it should be raised. The Scotland Act 2012 started to change that, giving the Scottish Parliament more tax-raising powers. The Bill goes much further.

As things stand, the Scottish Government still receive the vast bulk of their budget in a block grant from this Parliament and choose how to distribute that budget according to their priorities. When the UK Government have taken difficult decisions to bring our public finances back into order, the Scottish Government have often condemned us for inflicting cuts. Although I believe those spending reductions were necessary to secure our economy and are far preferable to increasing taxation on working families in Scotland, it is true that the Scottish Government took a different view. These clauses will allow them to do something about it.

With control of the rates and bands of income tax in Scotland, the Scottish Parliament will raise over half the money that it spends. If the Scottish Government want more money to spend on their priorities, such as higher welfare payments, they will be able to increase taxes to raise that money. However, they will have to justify that spending to the hard-working men and women in Scotland who will be paying for it out of their wages every month.

[George Kerevan]

Following on from what the Secretary of State is saying, how could the Scottish Government ever be sure of their tax yield if another House were setting the threshold?

[David Mundell]

The Scottish Government already have to manage their finances by building in estimates of revenue. That is part of the system in which we operate and part of the decision to have a United Kingdom-wide tax. I will come on to that point in a moment.

The Deputy First Minister has confirmed that the Scottish Government are already considering using the tax powers that they will shortly receive under the Scotland Act 2012 to put up income tax. The powers contained in these clauses will increase the scope for action considerably. With the SNP in government, Scots might pay the highest income tax in the UK. Perhaps the party will dust down its old “penny for Scotland” policy, although now, with inflation, it might need a little more.

[Stewart Hosie]

Will the Secretary of State please tell the House which person in the Scottish Government has suggested that income tax is going up in Scotland?

[David Mundell]

The Deputy First Minister, Mr John Swinney.

Ruth Davidson, however, has set out the Scottish Conservative position by saying that Scotland would never have higher rates of income tax than the rest of the UK. If people elect Scottish Conservative MSPs next May, that is what they will get. Scots voted decisively to remain within a United Kingdom. The UK is more than just a name and a flag; it is a social and fiscal union in which risks and rewards are pooled and shared. The Smith commission looked closely at a range of tax powers and agreed on a package of devolution that enhances Scotland’s place within the United Kingdom. It strikes the right balance, by empowering the Scottish Parliament, while maintaining the UK’s strength and coherence. There is a good reason for transferring every power that we are devolving in the Bill, and a good reason for keeping in reserve everything that we are not devolving.

Turning to amendment 124, devolution of income tax is a significant step, but it is important to remember that in the independence referendum only last September, the Scottish people decisively opted for the security of being part of the UK family of nations, and part of that is a single, cohesive income tax system. That is why HMRC will administer Scottish income tax for the Scottish Parliament as part of its UK-wide management of income tax, thus minimising the burdens on employers and individuals. It is also why the Smith commission—which it is important to remember all parties present in the Scottish Parliament signed up to—specifically decided after careful consideration not to devolve the personal allowance.

[Tommy Sheppard]

Colleagues here are finding it incredibly depressing that on this, the third day of our debates on this important Bill, the Secretary of State still seems to be resisting completely any amendment to his point of view. What parallel universe is he living in if he thinks that the will of his party, which has one representative in Scotland, should prevail over the wishes of the majority of the electorate in Scotland, who voted decisively for our party and for more powers?

[David Mundell]

The world in which I live is one in which I have had a very productive discussion with the Deputy First Minister of Scotland on how we should take forward these financial measures and reach agreement on a package that will provide stability and financing for the Scottish Parliament within the United Kingdom. That is what I am committed to doing. Of course I will listen to the views expressed in amendments tabled in this House, and that is what we are continuing to do today. It is for those who are tabling amendments to make a case for their being accepted.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

We are dealing with my amendment, which relates to threshold points. Surely, if incomes in Scotland are generally lower, the Scottish Parliament would want to address the problem for people on lower incomes by lowering the thresholds. Would that not be the logical thing to do? I understand the Secretary of State’s point about the pooling and sharing of resources, but I have to ask the same question of him that I put to his opposite number: why is it okay to pool and share resources on thresholds but not on bands and rates?

19:45

[David Mundell]

As my hon. Friend knows, we had lengthy discussions in the Smith commission on the balance between the respective responsibilities, and it was agreed that while income tax should remain part of the wider UK tax regime, these specific significant powers would be moved to the Scottish Parliament. I believe that that creates the balance we were seeking.

[Pete Wishart]

Will the Minister give way?

[David Mundell]

No, I will not at this stage—[Interruption.] The hon. Gentleman is one of the most frequent contributors to debates in the House, and he does get to have his say, although not as much as his former leader does. The right hon. Member for Gordon (Alex Salmond) is a very frequent contributor.

The SNP’s new clause 54 goes further than amendment 124, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh). However, to go further than the powers set out in the Bill would break the concept of shared tax and be complicated for individuals and employers with activity on both sides of the border, as they would have to understand and comply with two potentially entirely different tax systems. The Law Society of Scotland agreed with us, saying of the proposed change:

“The administrative burden would increase considerably. The complexities regarding the UK savings and investment market may also be particularly problematic”.

That would not be in keeping with a stronger Scotland within the United Kingdom. It is not what the people of Scotland voted for last September, and I cannot accept the new clause.

On new clause 32, tabled by Opposition Front Benchers, I hope that I can provide some reassurance to the House. The new clause is intended to provide the House with a report on the implementation of the Scottish rate of income tax and the further income tax powers in the Bill. That is a laudable aim, but I can reassure hon. Members that current legislation already provides for annual reports on the implementation of devolved tax powers to Scotland.

Section 33 of the Scotland Act 2012 requires the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers to lay before both Houses of Parliament and the Scottish Parliament annual reports that broadly cover the areas suggested in the new clause. Three reports have already been produced, the most recent in March, and HMRC’s accounting officer for the Scottish rate and the Comptroller and Auditor General have both given evidence to the Scottish Parliament on the progress of tax devolution to Scotland. Of course, Westminster Committees have the opportunity to call for evidence, too. Alongside that existing requirement and to ensure that Parliament can have confidence in the implementation and operation of the Scottish rate, the Comptroller and Auditor General is required to report annually on HMRC’s administration of the Scottish rate.

I can also tell the hon. Member for Edinburgh South that I am satisfied that adequate resources are being brought forward to deal with the issues relating to the transfer of these powers to Scotland and to HMRC’s involvement in that process. I would further reassure Members that reporting requirements are a feature of the negotiations currently under way between the two Governments on the fiscal settlement that accompanies the Bill.

I have set out the rationale behind the Government’s drafting of the Bill, which, as has been widely acknowledged, fully implements the Smith commission’s recommendations on income tax. The fiscal framework will be an important part of the discussions, and we are giving this exercise the focus and priority that it deserves.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clauses 12 to 14 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15

Assignment of VAT

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Temporary Chair (Mr David Crausby)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss:

New clause 20—Review of operation of VAT refund schemes in Scotland—

‘(1) The Treasury shall, within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, publish and lay before the House of Commons a review of the application of VAT refund schemes for businesses in Scotland.

(2) The review must include an analysis of the impact of the qualifying criteria for the VAT refund schemes—

(a) in Section 33 of the VAT Act 1994, and

(b) for Government Departments and the NHS,

on the level of VAT payable by Police Scotland and by the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service.”

Following the amalgamation of the (formerly regional) Scottish fire and rescue services and Scottish police forces into a single fire service (the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service) and a single police force (Police Scotland) respectively, they are no longer eligible for VAT exemptions under the VAT refund schemes mentioned. This amendment requires the Treasury to carry out and publish a review of the schemes in Scotland, and in particular in relation to the level of VAT payable by Police Scotland and the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service.

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr David Gauke)]

Clause 15 makes changes to ensure that a proportion of the VAT that is attributable to Scotland may be assigned to the Scottish Government’s budget. The Smith commission set the objective that more devolved spending in Scotland should come from tax raised in Scotland. Control over setting VAT rates is not being devolved to Scotland, because EU VAT law does not allow for differential VAT rates within a member state. The changes made by clause 15 will, however, ensure that a proportion of the VAT that is attributable to Scotland may be assigned to the Scottish Government’s budget. Clause 15 sets that proportion at the first 10 percentage points of the standard rate of VAT and the first 2.5 percentage points of the reduced rate of VAT. On the basis of current VAT rates, that would be exactly half, representing, very approximately, £4.5 billion.

Clause 15 will link Scotland’s share of VAT to economic activity, providing incentives for the Scottish Government to promote growth. The Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government have considerable levers to do this, for example on skills and education policy, and it is now for them to set out how they will do that. Assigning VAT to Scotland’s budget will strengthen the financial responsibility of the Scottish Parliament, and strengthen its ability to pursue its own visions, goals and objectives.

Let me say just a word or two about new clause 20, although I am sure the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Wayne David) will be saying more about it shortly. It requests a review of VAT refund schemes in Scotland, with a particular focus on how they affect Police Scotland and the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service. In 2012, Police Scotland and the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service restructured in order to streamline and modernise. As a result, eight local police and fire authorities became one. The restructuring stopped the duplication of support services, potentially saving £130 million, according to the Scottish Government. Like other people and organisations, fire and rescue services and the police pay VAT on the taxable goods and services they purchase, but because they are largely not engaged in business activities they cannot recover this VAT through the VAT system in the same way as businesses do. However, there are, in certain clearly defined circumstances, existing schemes that refund some or all VAT.

Section 33 of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 was introduced to ensure that VAT is not a cost borne by local taxation. There are two long-established criteria for inclusion in this scheme. First, that a body must undertake a local government function—we accept that the successor bodies of the former fire and rescue service authorities do this. Secondly, the body must have the power to draw funding directly from local taxation. The Scottish Fire and Rescue Service is funded by the Scottish Government rather than through any legal call on local taxes, and so does not fit under that criteria. In 2011, the Scottish Government were explicitly advised of this consequence of changing from regional police and fire services to a single authority. The expected benefits in the Scottish Government’s business case far outweigh the loss of any VAT refunds, and so the Scottish Government understandably continued restructuring with that in mind. The restructuring was the decision of the Scottish Government, made with the full knowledge of the VAT consequences of their decisions. This is a historical request and is not a matter that the draft clause regarding VAT assignment should address. Having set out the background, in anticipation of the arguments we may hear from the hon. Gentleman, I urge him not to press his new clause to a Division.

[Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Crausby.

The Smith commission’s report was very clear about VAT, particularly in paragraph 84. The Government have spelt out in the Bill how this arrangement will work in practice. The Opposition support the Government in implementing this part of the Smith agreement, but we have a real concern about the position of Police Scotland and the fire and rescue service in Scotland. A number of organisations have expressed concern about VAT relief schemes in Scotland, and I very much hope that the Government will accept our new clause 20 and that the review will be sufficiently broad based to cover a wide range of organisations, including charities.

I wish to focus my remarks on the situation, which has already been referred to in part, regarding Police Scotland and the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service. Surprisingly, none of the 43 police forces in England and Wales, or the Police Service of Northern Ireland, pays VAT—not even the National Crime Agency has to pay VAT—but both Police Scotland and the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service do. There is widespread indignation at this unfairness in Scotland. Sir Stephen House, Scotland’s chief constable, has said, in unambiguous terms:

“It simply isn’t correct. It is not right. It’s unfair and it shouldn’t be allowed to continue”.

The eight police forces and the eight fire and rescue services, before they were amalgamated, were exempt from VAT, but now Police Scotland has a huge annual bill—a bill that is unfair and unique in the whole of the UK. At a time when Police Scotland has no alternative but to make significant cuts, it is a liability that every year it has to put forward a forfeited bill of about £10 million—the figure for the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service is approximately £11 million.

Why has this situation arisen? The Government’s position was spelt out in some detail in a letter to Cathy Jamieson, the then Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun and shadow Economic Secretary to the Treasury, on 9 March. The letter from the Financial Secretary explained that the fire and rescue service, and by implication Police Scotland, pays VAT on the taxable goods and services it purchases, but because these bodies cannot recover VAT through the system in the same way businesses do, there are special schemes in place. He then explained that there are two schemes relevant to fire and rescue services. The first, as set out in section 33 of the 1994 Act, made sure that VAT is not a cost borne by local taxation. There are two criteria for inclusion in this scheme. First, the body must undertake a local government function—and the Treasury did accept that was the case with the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service. Secondly, the Treasury claimed that the body must have the power to draw funding from local taxation. The Scottish Fire and Rescue Service is funded directly by the Scottish Government rather than through any legal call through local taxes. Hence, the Government have argued that a “key condition” of the section 33 VAT refund scheme does not apply.

That was the first refund scheme, but there is a second one, which is for Departments and the NHS. It is doubtful whether the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service would be in a position to claim refunds on outsource services, but the Treasury made it clear that the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service would not be eligible in principle because it is not a “central government” Department. To be honest, those reasons might be technically valid, but they are also morally suspect and unjustifiable. I am a great believer in the saying, “Where there’s a will, there’s a way.” Clearly, the situation in Scotland with regard to the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service and to Police Scotland is an anomaly, which applies to only one part of the United Kingdom.

I very much hope that the Treasury can muster the wherewithal to address that anomaly, and to do it through our proposed new clause 20.

20:00

[Dr Philippa Whitford (Central Ayrshire) (SNP)]

I note that Highways England and London Legacy, which was created after the Olympics, have both been granted VAT exemption. They also fall into the same group. Surely Highways England is in exactly the same boat, yet it is given VAT exemption. We are not talking about something that is chiselled in stone or set in concrete, so surely it can be changed.

[Wayne David]

Well, things can be changed through political will. As I have said, where there is a will to make that change, a change can be made. A way can be found, if there is the desire to do so. I very much hope that the Government listen carefully to what has been said this evening.

I must say that something else worries me, too. I refer again to the letter to Cathy Jamieson from the Financial Secretary. The penultimate paragraph says:

“In 2011 the Scottish Government were explicitly advised of this potential consequence of changing from regional police forces to a single authority as part of the proposed revised funding model for Police Scotland. At the time they took the decision to make these reforms they would have known they would no longer be eligible for the VAT refunds as a result.”

There we have it in black and white: the Scottish National party Government were warned that their plans to reorganise emergency services would, in effect, cost millions in VAT refunds. Yes, cost savings might have been made; but they knew the situation and they were prepared to see that loss occur. They still pressed ahead with their plans. This is in part a mess of the SNP’s own making, compounded by an indifferent and apathetic Tory-led Government here in Westminster. The sensible thing surely would have been for the Scottish Government and the UK Government to have come together and sort out this problem before Police Scotland and the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service were constituted on an all-Scotland basis. That is the common-sense thing that should have happened. But that is in the past.

[Callum McCaig (Aberdeen South) (SNP)]

Will the hon. Gentleman enlighten this Chamber as to whether the situation we have here is what the Labour party has in mind when it talks about the pooling and sharing of resources?

[Wayne David]

The hon. Gentleman is really stretching things to try to make that point. What I am suggesting is that for devolution to be effective, there needs to be a consensus, a coming together or an agreement on the best way forward. I quoted an excellent example. Both services would have materially benefited if both the Government of the day and the SNP Government had had the wherewithal to come together and work things out sensibly.

[Dr Whitford]

The SNP Government had written extensively to the Government to try to deal with that issue. Is the hon. Gentleman suggesting that Police Scotland and the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service should have been left in eight divisions?

[Wayne David]

No, of course not. What I am saying is that it would have been far better if the Government in Scotland and the Government in London had sat down maturely and worked things out for the benefit of services in Scotland rather than pursue a fixation with the idea that things had to be brought together on a centralised basis in Scotland, irrespective of the consequences. The Government were absolutely adamant on this. Presumably they could not find parliamentary time, or did not have the political inclination to bring forward an amendment to have a scheme that would have benefited everyone.

The sensible thing would have been to do precisely what I have said, but that is in the past. The important thing now is to move forward and resolve this situation. Our proposed new clause 20 calls for a review of the situation. It is a modest request, which I very much hope that the Government will accept. If they do accept it, it could provide an opportunity for everyone to get together and, hopefully, resolve the issue.

It has been suggested by the Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations that VAT rebates should be devolved so that they better conform to devolved policy to support society and public services. A suggestion has been made that the UK Government could allocate a Barnett formula-based share of the VAT rebates to the Scottish block grant. That is one possibility, but, like all the other suggestions, it needs to be soberly and carefully discussed. It could be a part of the review that we propose. I hope that the Government will accept our amendment so that we can have that meaningful discussion and reach a decision for the benefit of Scotland.

[Stewart Hosie]

It is a pleasure to take part in this debate on clause 15 stand part and proposed new clause 20 in the name of the Labour party.

Let us turn to the way that the Smith commission has spoken about the assignation of a proportion of VAT. It said:

“The receipts raised in Scotland by the first 10 percentage points of the standard rate…will be assigned…All other aspects of VAT will remain reserved.”

The Scottish Parliament Information Centre analysis for the Scottish Parliament Devolution (Further Powers) Committee referred to it in its interim report on the draft Scotland Bill clauses. It said:

“Draft clause 13 [now 15] would give effect to the Smith Commission recommendation that the Scottish Government be assigned receipts from the first ten percentage points of VAT. With the agreement of both governments it also proposes to go slightly further by notionally assigning 2.5 percentage points of the reduced rate of VAT as well…The amount of VAT receipts attributable to Scotland is to be the subject of an agreement between the UK Government and the Scottish Government.”

It did point out that there are no draft clauses in relation to the corresponding adjustment to the block grant. Hopefully, the Minister will confirm that that does not require legislation. In effect, the Scotland Bill proposes the assignation of half of VAT receipts to the Scottish Parliament. However, that will provide no actual control of VAT.

The Devolution (Further Powers) Committee had no particular concerns with the draft clauses, but it did want details of the assignment of VAT revenues and the share of any benefits to be produced—the mechanics of the assignment—before the Scottish Parliament could be expected to give its legislative consent. The committee said:

“There is still significant uncertainty on how the assignment of a share of VAT revenues will be calculated and whether the Scottish Government will be able to reap the rewards of any economic stimulus that yields higher VAT revenues.”

It is also worth noting that the Devolution (Further Powers) Committee’s analysis paper, which set out the differences between the draft clauses and the published Bill, noted that:

“No further detail is provided on the assignment of VAT revenues, or the corresponding block grant adjustment.”

There are a number of technical issues for consideration notwithstanding the fact that there is no particular issue with the legislation as such.

The committee’s interim report considered the evidence on VAT assignment from a range of sources. It said that the bulk of the evidence received by the committee, while welcoming the principle, called for greater clarity in how the assignment of revenues would work. As the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland told the committee:

“Clause 13 in the ‘Draft Scotland Clauses 2015’ regarding VAT delivers the mechanics of the assignment of VAT, but with the large caveat that it applies ‘where there is an agreement between the Treasury and Scottish Ministers’...The rules for agreeing this have not been provided and it may not be easy to identify ‘Scottish VAT’”.

I take on board what the Scottish Secretary said earlier about not giving a running commentary, but on that specific point—and I shall have more specific questions—at least I hope we can get clarity.

In oral evidence to the Scottish Parliament committee, Charlotte Barbour of ICAS elaborated:

“The assignment of VAT offers more opportunity for discussions on how that might be calculated. It slots in with the difficulties with the fiscal framework”—

we discussed those in the last debate—

“and some of the no-detriment issues”—[Scottish Parliament, Official Report, Devolution (Further Powers) Committee, 5 February 2015; c. 4.]

I mentioned those previously. The Scottish Trades Union Congress was broadly supportive of the assignment of VAT. Its deputy general secretary told the Committee that

“I am quite a fan of assigned revenue”,

but he took the point that

“it is not a power in the sense of being usable to promote particular behaviours”.

However, he said:

“A degree of assigned revenue clearly rewards the Scottish Government for economic growth and, in our view, the closer we get to an amount of revenue that is derived from positive actions undertaken by the Scottish Government, the better.”—[Scottish Parliament, Official Report, Devolution (Further Powers) Committee, 15 January 2015; c. 13.]

I do not think that any of us would disagree with that. We want responsibility, which rather prompts the question that given that there is no control over VAT, why assign only half of it? Why not assign it all? The Scottish Government could then quite rightly benefit, if there was a benefit, from the entire rise in VAT in Scotland rather than just half of it and could take responsibility if there was a shortfall, not just for half the shortfall.

Speaking to the committee, John Swinney, the Cabinet Secretary for Finance, Constitution and Economy, highlighted two issues for discussion with the UK Government, which are both important:

“One is establishing the analytical base for how VAT should be apportioned and the other is the policy question of guaranteeing that if those estimates are exceeded, Scotland retains the benefit of that improved economic performance”.—[Scottish Parliament, Official Report, Devolution (Further Powers) Committee 12 March 2015; c. 26.]

The former Secretary of State for Scotland also commented on the issue of VAT in a letter to the Committee, in which he said that he could

“confirm that VAT assignment will link the Scottish Government’s budget with economic activity in Scotland, providing incentives for growth. The amount of VAT to be assigned…will be based on an estimated share of the total VAT generated in the UK...The UK and Scottish Governments will need to agree a methodology”.

Will the Minister provide further details, not on the specific discussions with the Scottish Government but on the themes? What are the options for how VAT will be assigned? Will it, for example, be a consumption-based approach? How can we improve the robustness of the measure and the timescales, for example by improving the survey data? What will be the costs of implementation and how will they be met? Does there need to be a proxy measure over a transition period until the methodology is robust? Has any thought been given to indexation and comparable measures of growth? What has been said about governance and accountability, for example developing a separate strand to the memorandum of understanding with the HMRC on VAT to expand the role of the project board?

The question of the robustness of the survey data is vital. At present, VAT is estimated by the Scottish Government in the Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland report, based on a household survey of expenditure, therefore missing tourism spend entirely. That is corrected by a percentage share adjustment, meaning that the Scottish Government estimate what percentage of UK tourism happens in Scotland, but if the Scottish Government managed to increase tourism spend through other actions, such as reducing air passenger duty, that would not show up according to the current methodology. We therefore need to agree a new robust methodology and, perhaps, an interim measure until that methodology is in place.

As the Minister has said, VAT cannot be varied within a state and we understand and respect that. So let me repeat the question: why give only half rather than all, unless to camouflage the fact that the tax over which Scotland will have control will be such a small share of our tax base? Could the assignation of VAT revenue be designed simply to make that number seem a little bigger?

Let me turn to new clause 20, on the subject of VAT on Police Scotland and the fire service. We heard the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Wayne David) describe the amendment, which proposes a review of the application of the VAT refund scheme for business in Scotland. It has been tabled with the intention, it would appear, of addressing the anomaly of the inability of the Scottish Police Authority and the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service to reclaim VAT. Although we agree that that is an inequitable position for both services, we do not necessarily believe that a review is the way to address it. Instead, the UK Government—as the hon. Gentleman said, where there is a will, there is a way—should simply amend the VAT status of the single police service and fire and rescue service in Scotland.

20:15

There are some technical issues with the new clause. VAT is UK-wide, so any review could not be confined solely to Scotland. Proposed subsection (1) requires a review of VAT refund schemes for “businesses” but there is no business VAT refund scheme as such. Subsection (2) would make the VAT refund scheme applicable to central Government bodies that sit outwith EU law but are the subject of an EU-wide consultation process. The reference to Police Scotland should instead be to the Scottish Police Authority, which is the legal entity and VAT-registered body; Police Scotland is the part of the SPA relating to police officers. However, notwithstanding all of that and the fact that the new clause simply proposes a review, it never does any harm to find out that what we thought we knew was correct—

[Wayne David]

rose—

[Stewart Hosie]

In a moment. We think that the better approach to fix the problem might be through a forthcoming Finance Bill after the Budget in July, but nevertheless we are happy to back the new clause today if Labour presses it to a vote.

[Wayne David]

I was going to ask the hon. Gentleman if he was going to support us, but he has pre-empted me. It is very good that he will, because, of course, the SNP did not table an amendment on this issue. I thank him.

[Stewart Hosie]

We did not table an amendment because there was not an amendment that we could table to fix the problem. As I have just said, that requires an amendment to a Finance Bill. One might have thought that an experienced old hand like the hon. Gentleman might have known that and advised his younger and less experienced colleague, the shadow Secretary of State, on how things work. Having said that, and that we are happy to support new clause 20, I will sit down and hopefully we can move on.

[Mr Alistair Carmichael]

I rise to say a few words in support of new clause 20, tabled by the hon. Members for Edinburgh South (Ian Murray) and for Caerphilly (Wayne David). When considering schemes such as those that lie at the heart of the new clause, it is worth starting with the principle that underpins them. Is it, as the Financial Secretary to the Treasury suggested, the principle that local government finance should not go straight into Treasury coffers? I can understand that principle and it holds water in so far as it relates to the scheme for police and fire services across the UK, as originally envisaged. The difficulty for the Minister, however, is that there are other schemes of a similar nature that go beyond the ambit of police, fire and other rescue services. The hon. Member for Caerphilly mentioned one related to the national health service.

The principle that underlines such schemes is fairly sensible—that for public services to pay money back into the Treasury is essentially an exercise in robbing Peter to pay Paul. It only creates work for accountants and achieves no public good. There is a more fundamental principle at stake, however, in the proposal before the Committee and in the new clause tabled by the Labour party. That is the principle that there should be equality of treatment across the board and across the United Kingdom. The hon. Member for Aberdeen South (Callum McCaig) hit the nail on the head when he referred to the pooling and sharing of risks. I think I have perhaps a greater commitment to that principle than he has, but I must say in all candour to those on the Treasury Bench that if they are sincere in their belief that risks and rewards should be pooled and shared across the UK, whatever the technicalities this situation should not be allowed to continue. Whether it is done through the review in the new clause or through action in the forthcoming Finance Bill, amendments for the sake of the continued constitutional integrity of the United Kingdom should be produced in early course.

[Mr Gauke]

Let me address the issues that have arisen during the debate, starting with new clause 20 and the refund situation. It is correct to say that there is a refund scheme for Government Departments and the NHS. This scheme refunds the VAT incurred on certain outsourced services. It was introduced to ensure that irrecoverable VAT does not dissuade Government Departments from contracting out services where this results in greater efficiencies of scale. There is also —this is relevant to the discussion—a refund scheme in respect of matters that can draw funding directly from local taxation. The Scottish Fire and Rescue Service is funded by the Scottish Government, rather than through any legal call on local taxes, so it does not meet this criterion.

That was not the case prior to the reforms brought in by the Scottish Government. I stress that this was a choice of the Scottish Government, with their eyes wide open to the fact that the VAT refund scheme would not be available in the event of that reform. They decided, as they were perfectly entitled to do, to proceed with those reforms, notwithstanding that loss.

[Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)]

For 18 years, during which I was a member of both Fife regional council and Fife council, they were unitary authorities but we did not have a joint police board and we did not elect or appoint members from different authorities to a separate organisation in which the police were funded entirely by a budget decision of a single authority. In effect, they were operating financially as though they were the education service or the social work service. At that point they had the same VAT treatment as the police in Strathclyde or Lothian, which were managed by a joint board. Fife police did not have, in the Minister’s words, a legal call on the resources of the authority. They were funded because the authority thought it was the right thing to do, not because the police had the right to demand the funding from us. Will the Minister explain why the same position does not now apply to the Police Service of Scotland or the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service?

[Mr Gauke]

As I understand the situation that the hon. Gentleman set out, if services were funded through local taxation, the refund scheme was available. That is no longer the case, as the changes have been made. It therefore does not fall within section 33 as it currently stands. As the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Wayne David) acknowledged, it is technically valid that the refund scheme does not apply.

Many arguments are made in respect of the VAT refund schemes, and requests are made that they be broadened and applied to additional organisations. It is customary for the case to be made that charities, for example, should benefit from such refunds. That comes with significant fiscal cost. Now is not the time to run through the whole argument, but there may well be a case for reconsidering the position, but we should not look at it in isolation because of a particular decision that was made in one case. If there is a case to do that, the matter should be looked at in the round, not just on the basis of one case.

[Dr Philippa Whitford]

Is this not just a dry technical issue? This is the only police force and the only fire service in the whole of the United Kingdom that pays VAT and does not get it back. Members of the Front-Bench team agreed that it would be sensible to bring Police Scotland together and said that they would do the same. Surely now is the time to use some common sense and get rid of this anomaly—£33 million a year that could be going to front-line services.

[Mr Gauke]

But the reason for that is the decision that the Scottish Government took, with full information. This did not come as a surprise or as an unexpected consequence of a decision. It was a decision that the Scottish Government made, fully informed and understanding the situation. I am not criticising the decision because, according to the business case made by the Scottish Government, the benefits far outweighed the costs. But the costs were there and identified to the Scottish Government in advance.

[Wayne David]

I am sure the Minister would acknowledge that devolution is based on mutual respect. With the benefit of hindsight, does he agree that it would have been far better if the Government here in London and the Scottish Government had sat down and worked out a way forward?

[Mr Gauke]

A request was made of the UK Government and we provided information on what the position was. As I was saying a moment ago, there are many calls for an expansion of section 33 and the refund scheme. The cost of the scheme being widely expanded could be substantial. At a time when there are considerable constraints on the public finances, we have to be careful about responding to every request and claim, however reasonable it might be.

[Ian Murray]

I understand what the Treasury Minister says about the number of requests received for exemptions from section 33, but this is not a new exemption. There is a net gain of many millions of pounds a year to the Treasury from this change. Therefore the net effect of changing it back would be zero. We are not asking for exemption from section 33 to be opened up to charities. That is a separate debate. This is a case where the Treasury is a net beneficiary. How does Scotland get that money back?

[Mr Gauke]

As I said, a decision was made by the Scottish Government, believing that the efficiency savings were more than sufficient to outweigh the costs incurred by losing the section 33 refund. That was the basis for the decision, and the position in respect of section 33 was clear.

[Ian Blackford (Ross, Skye and Lochaber) (SNP)]

We keep hearing about respect. We all know why the Scottish Government introduced the change—it creates efficiency in the delivery of police and fire services in Scotland. A clear case has been made by many of my hon. Friends and by those on the Labour Benches as well. If there is a genuine feeling of mutual respect between the Government in Scotland and the Government in Westminster, all the Treasury has to do is make sure that we get the VAT back and we will invest it in front-line services to benefit the people of Scotland.

[Mr Gauke]

We respected the Scottish Government’s decision, because they were perfectly entitled to decide to reform the police and fire services in the way they did, but they knew what the consequences of the law of the land would be with regard to VAT. That decision was taken and it would be unreasonable for us to maintain the existing legislation, given that there are many demands on section 33.

Let me turn to clause 15. The hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) asked why we are simply assigning half of the VAT revenue, rather than all of it. That reflects the agreement reached by the five main political parties under the auspices of Lord Smith. It represents a balance between providing a sufficient incentive for Scotland to grow its economy, relative to the rest of the United Kingdom, in order to increase its revenue from VAT and exposing the Scottish Government’s budget to potential fluctuations in VAT receipts.

20:30

[Mr Angus Brendan MacNeil (Na h-Eileanan an Iar) (SNP)]

For the benefit of the Committee, will the hon. Gentleman explain the difference between the agreement the UK Government have with the Isle of Man and what they are now proposing for Scotland?

[Mr Gauke]

The Isle of Man has different constitutional arrangements. What we are proposing is consistent with the conclusions reached by the Smith commission.

The hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) made a number of technical points about how that will work. I accept that a number of details will need to be worked out as part of the fiscal framework. There is a need to agree the methodology for estimating how much VAT is generated by Scotland and by the rest of the United Kingdom. The UK and Scottish Governments will also need to agree the operating principles, including mechanisms for verifying that the methodology has been applied correctly, how many adjustments might be carried out and arrangements for audit and transparency, including publication of results. It is worth pointing out that other countries operate similar systems and could provide a reasonable starting point from which to build.

Again, those considerations will be part of the fiscal framework, and I think that it is agreed on all sides that it would not be helpful to provide a running commentary on it. Of course, there have already been meetings with the Deputy First Minister and the Chief Secretary to the Treasury on some of those points. All I will say to the hon. Member for Dundee East is that the UK Government are determined to work constructively, as I am sure the Scottish Government are, to ensure that we reach an agreement that is fair and reflects the appropriate assessment that should be made.

[Stewart Hosie]

I thank the Minister for that answer; it is genuinely helpful, as he always is. However, will he confirm for the Committee that the agreement will be reached in good time for the Scottish Parliament to consider it fully before any legislative consent motion has to be passed?

[Mr Gauke]

It is kind of the hon. Gentleman to say that I am being helpful. In the spirit of continuing to be helpful, let me say that I certainly hope that that will be the case, but of course agreements will require both parties to act in a co-operative way, which I have no reason to doubt will be the case.

With those remarks, I hope that the Committee will support clause 15 and that I have said enough to persuade the Labour party not to press new clause 20.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.



Clause 16

Tax on carriage of passengers by air

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Temporary Chair (Mr David Crausby)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause 17 stand part.

That schedule 1 be the First schedule to the Bill.

Clause 18 stand part.

[Mr Gauke]

Clauses 16, 17 and 18 implement the Smith commission’s recommendations by fully devolving two taxes: air passenger duty and the aggregates levy. Those taxes will be switched off in Scotland and the Scottish Parliament will then have full competence to maintain, redesign or scrap them. The changes made by clauses 16 and 18 will switch off APD in Scotland and give the Scottish Government the power to charge their own tax on passengers departing from Scottish airports. The Scottish Government will be free to make their own arrangements with regard to the design and collection of any replacement tax. Alongside that, funding for the Scottish Government will be reduced by an amount equivalent to the APD that would have been raised in Scotland.

Clauses 17 and 18 and schedule 1 make changes to ensure that the UK aggregates levy can be fully devolved to Scotland. The Smith commission agreement stated that there would be full devolution of the levy to Scotland following resolution of the legal challenges against the levy. The changes made by clause 17 will give the Scottish Parliament the power to charge a tax on the commercial exploitation of aggregate. The clause also introduces schedule 1, and together they enable the existing UK levy to be disapplied to Scotland. These provisions allow the Scottish Government freedom in the design and implementation of any tax on the commercial exploitation of aggregate in Scotland.

[Graham Stringer (Blackley and Broughton) (Lab)]

Amendment 36 would, in essence, have opposed clause 16 standing part of the Bill, because I want the Committee to explore the specific issues related to air passenger duty and the more general principles about tax competition between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom that may well evolve from a discussion on air passenger duty.

Some of us who voted to set up the Scottish Parliament in the first place now think that, although it seemed a very bold decision at the time, it was less bold than it might have been and that if we had the benefit of being able to go back in time—we do have the benefit of hindsight—the proposals that the Government are making might well have been those that should have been put before the House after the 1997 general election, with us now moving towards full fiscal autonomy for the Scottish Parliament. It was a fundamental mistake to set up a Scottish Parliament with mainly spending powers and no tax-raising powers, apart from the plus or minus 3p on income tax.

[Mr MacNeil]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. One of the mistakes is that there is no incentive for the Scottish Government to grow the economy. A great example that we have in the Hebrides is that the Scottish Government have put a road-equivalent tariff on to the ferries. This has grown the economy in the west of Scotland, but the increase in tax revenue is not going to the Government that funds it but to Westminster, which gives no extra cash and further incentives to roll it out further across the west coast. It is similar with childcare and a number of other issues.

[Graham Stringer]

The hon. Gentleman makes a pretty fundamental point about devolution. When the House was making a decision to devolve powers, it would have been sensible to settle on a grant basis that was fair between Scotland, England and Wales, which the Barnett formula was not, and then allow the Scottish Parliament to raise taxes on that basis, so that if it wanted better-quality services, it could have had higher taxes and, if it was more efficient, it could have had better services or lower taxes, and so on. That is a very clear principle.

[Mr MacNeil]

The important point I am driving at is that, if the Scottish Government had proper control of their taxes, they could have grown the economy more and that growth would have delivered far more than the zero-sum game of who has got and has not got what in the UK. It is the ability to grow the economy that tax powers would give that is really fundamental.

[Graham Stringer]

If the hon. Gentleman is saying that Scotland, or any other devolved authority, should benefit from the initiatives it takes and from its own efficiencies, I agree completely. We are moving that way, but the Bill does not move far enough. No Minister or shadow Minister has been able to explain to me, in any of our debates, why we should have the unfair funding in the Barnett formula.

Those are the basic principles. I now want to explore how, if taxation is devolved to the Scottish Parliament, the United Kingdom Government will respond to competition. Air passenger duty is a very good example. As I understand it, the SNP intend to reduce air passenger duty by 50% and then reduce it to zero. That is quite a sensible policy for the SNP to follow. For that matter, it is a sensible policy for the United Kingdom Government to follow, because a number of consultants’ reports have shown that there is almost certainly likely to be a benefit for the whole United Kingdom if air passenger duty is taken away.

Every other country in the European Union has moved either to very low rates of APD or, as in the Netherlands, to zero. It is therefore a sensible policy, but the Government do not seem to have a clear position on what they will do about the very unfair competition between regional airports.

[Mr MacNeil]

Air passenger duty is a perfect illustration of what I said earlier. If the Scottish Government decided to lower APD and that upped the rate of economic activity in Scotland, they should benefit from the fruits of that activity. The benefits should not go to Westminster, because it would not compensate the Scottish Government for that initiative.

[Graham Stringer]

On 20 January, the Chancellor of the Exchequer told the Treasury Committee, in response to a question asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Mike Kane) about that very point:

“I think the best approach to dealing with this concern, which I think is perfectly legitimate, is to cross the political boundaries of our two parties to try to find a solution that helps these regional airports that can be affected by an air passenger duty decision north of the border.

HMRC has done some work on this and I think it anticipated that Manchester airport would lose around 3% of its traffic and Newcastle could lose around 10% of its traffic. That was work carried out a couple of years ago… I think you and I—I made the same offer to Ed Balls—could work to help regional airports in the north of England if the Scottish Government were to go down the road of dramatically cutting its air passenger duty.”

Further to that, the Chancellor told the House of Commons on 27 January:

“We have a couple of years to work this out—it does not have be done tonight or tomorrow—and we can work out a plan that protects the brilliant Newcastle, Manchester and other regional airports.”—[Official Report, 27 January 2015; Vol. 591, c. 726.]

What progress has been made on that? This is about a loss of 3% and 10% of business, which are not trivial amounts.

This will result in not only an economic benefit for Scotland, but in real competition, which will come in two forms: there will be competition for passengers on short-haul flights, for which APD is £13 per passenger, and for those on longer-haul flights, for which it is £71 per passenger. Obviously, the same amount is paid for the return flight. A passenger from Newcastle therefore has an incentive—this applies to large families in particular—to travel to Edinburgh or Glasgow in order to save some money. Someone travelling long distance from north America or China has the same incentive.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that there is a knock-on effect on cargo? If the successful flight from Newcastle to Dubai were to be jeopardised in any way, the revenue earned from the airport through the transfer of cargo in that passenger aircraft would also be at risk.

[Graham Stringer]

I agree with my hon. Friend. There is competition not only for passengers, but to get airlines and aircraft to land. Given that a lot of cargo is carried in an aeroplane’s belly, if Newcastle, Manchester or Leeds Bradford loses a flight to Scotland, it will lose not only the passengers and the benefit they bring but the cargo carried by the plane. The United Kingdom already has experience of that with Belfast airport. The Northern Ireland Assembly managed to get the power to vary APD because it was in competition with Dublin airport, which was taking passengers and aircraft to travel from south of the border. That is well known to people who are interested in transport, but it is less well known that the impact was not only on Belfast, but on English and Welsh airports, as people decided to fly across the Atlantic from Dublin to save the £71.

20:45

I will conclude by talking about the economic impact on England. I have given the figures for the savings that passengers could make, and airlines can of course take advantage of those savings by choosing to split them between passengers and their own profit lines. If, however, for the sake of argument, one Ryanair flight and one easyJet flight were moved from Manchester airport to Glasgow, £2.9 million of revenue would be lost to the United Kingdom Treasury and 450 jobs would be lost in Manchester. That is not insignificant when one is trying to build an economy, and I do not blame Edinburgh or Glasgow for trying to build their economy in the way that Newcastle and Manchester are doing. Those figures represent nearly 250,000 passengers, and the economic impact in relation to long-haul flights is much more significant.

[Drew Hendry (Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey) (SNP)]

The hon. Gentleman is making a point about cross-border competition. Does he agree that there is another point about the longer-term sustainability of airports outwith that area, such as Inverness and Dundee? They need additional support and would benefit from the reinvestment in Scotland of the revenue generated by additional passenger traffic.

[Graham Stringer]

I agree with that perfectly sensible point.

The Government may have a number of possible solutions, and I hope that the Financial Secretary will be able to respond in some way. Manchester airport has made the case strongly to the Government that there should be an air passenger duty holiday on new long-haul routes, and that would be helpful. The Government could devolve decision making to other parts of the United Kingdom as well as to Scotland, although it would be difficult to find a mechanism for doing so. The Government could also agree to compete with Scotland, because if there is no competition, there will be an unfair loss of jobs through lowering the rate of air passenger duty.

Such solutions seem sensible to me, given the experience in the rest of Europe and, indeed, in the rest of the world. The tax was brought in not for environmental reasons, as is sometimes said, but entirely to deal with the hole in the budget after the 1992 general election. It is an inefficient tax: consultants have estimated that it costs the economy more than it brings into the Treasury in cash. Even if the Financial Secretary cannot give an absolutely definitive answer today, I hope he will assure us that he is willing to look at some of the sensible responses to this new competition in tax regimes.

[Mr MacNeil]

The hon. Gentleman has been very kind in giving way. The tax is about more than just a hole in the budget; it is actually a demand-management tool for Heathrow and perhaps for Gatwick as well. If airports are full, APD is a demand-management tool that might work. It is certainly not helping in Edinburgh, Glasgow or Manchester. The solution is not to worry about each other, but for us to be rid of it, and for the Government to keep the demand-management tool in airports that are already saturated.

[Graham Stringer]

I do not agree with the point the hon. Gentleman makes in his fourth intervention. Demand management is not the solution for our regional airports, which have huge extra capacity, but if I went down that line, I expect you would rule me out of order, Mr Crausby. I look forward to the Financial Secretary’s response.

[Stewart Hosie]

I will come on to the comments made by the hon. Member for Blackley and Broughton (Graham Stringer) in a moment.

The provisions relating to the devolution of air passenger duty—I will concentrate on the duty, rather than the aggregates levy or the further provisions in clause 18—were set out clearly in the Smith agreement:

“86. The power to charge tax on air passengers leaving Scottish airports will be devolved…The Scottish Government will be free to make its own arrangements with regard to the design and collection of any replacement tax, including consideration of the environmental impact.

“87. In line with the approach taken in relation to the Scotland Act 2012, if such a tax is introduced by the Scottish Parliament to replace Air Passenger Duty (APD), the Scottish Government will reimburse the UK Government for any costs incurred in ‘switching off’ APD in Scotland.”

Given that they simply would not collect it, I do not imagine those costs would be very high. The provisions also require:

“88. A fair and equitable share of associated administrative costs will be transferred to the Scottish Government. The…block grant will be adjusted”.

A wide range of organisations that gave evidence to the Scottish Parliament Devolution (Further Powers) Committee backed the devolution of APD, including the Institute of Directors Scotland, Glasgow chamber of commerce, the Scottish Chambers of Commerce and the Scottish Council for Development and Industry. As the report says:

“This was coupled with support for either a reduction or scrapping of this duty after devolution had taken place.”

The Scottish Parliament Information Centre analysis for the Committee, referred to in the report, found that:

“Draft clause 14”—

now clause 16—

“would make this a devolved tax, as recommended by the Smith Commission. It would give HMRC the ability to ‘switch off’ these UK taxes in Scotland from a date to be set by secondary legislation.”

As with many of the clauses we have discussed, there is no recommendation as to how the transfer would work or how the block grant would be adjusted, but, as I understand from other clauses, there is no requirement for legislation to achieve that. Essentially, the legislation delivers on the Smith agreement in the way anticipated. We have no concerns with the drafting of the clause, which did not change between the Command Paper version and the Bill.

In terms of the policy approach on air passenger duty, on which much of this clause stand part debate is centred, the Scottish National party supports the devolution of air passenger duty to the Scottish Parliament. We are pleased that the Scotland Bill will deliver this recommendation. We have previously set out our proposals to halve APD when control over the tax is devolved, and we fully intend to abolish it when public finances allow. We believe that taking that action will encourage greater tourism and investment in Scotland, boosting our economy and creating new jobs.

There are a substantial number of benefits for consumers from the reduction of air passenger duty, not least because the UK levies are some of the highest aviation taxes in the world—indeed, APD is relatively rare in other countries. APD is currently £71 for an economy class long-haul flight, which is extraordinary—that is over 2,000 miles. Abolishing APD would mean that a family of four, with children over 12-years-old, would save something under £300 per long-haul flight—a substantial saving by any measure. Reducing APD would therefore save consumers money, and, in certain circumstances, significantly reduce the cost of family holidays.

There are broader economic benefits from a reduction in air passenger duty. A report commissioned by Edinburgh airport in March 2015 found that a reduction in APD would bring considerable economic benefits to Scotland. The report argued that the Scottish Government’s policy of halving APD in the first instance would create new jobs, and that a failure to take action would cost Scotland tourists and tourism revenue. Its key findings included the fact that a 50% reduction would provide benefits to Scotland worth £200 million a year, meaning a £1 billion economic boost over the lifetime of a Parliament; and that a 50% reduction would bring considerable benefits to local communities, creating something in the order of 3,800 new jobs by 2020. On the other hand, it was estimated that we could lose out on about 1 million passenger journeys a year if APD was not reduced. Again, by 2020, that would cost the Scottish economy up to £68 million in lost tourism expenditure every year. It is clear, therefore, that devolving and reducing APD would have a considerable economic impact on Scotland and that failure to act would mean Scotland missing out on significant tourism and hospitality revenues.

We have heard what happened in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Although the 2014 study by Ulster University was a little more ambivalent and suggested only a limited number of scenarios in which Northern Ireland might benefit, supporters of a reduction pointed to the success of this approach in the Republic of Ireland. As the BBC reported:

“Tourism NI chairman Howard Hastings said: ‘If you compare with our nearest neighbour in the Republic of Ireland, in the two years since they abolished air passenger duty, they've seen arrivals grow by 1.1 million passengers.’”

It is self-evidently a success, and if we can replicate that, we can deliver the benefits I have described. If we do not, we will face the cost of failure.

The hon. Member for Blackley and Broughton and others tabled amendments that are not being debated—although the debate has been very similar to the one I would have heard had we been debating them—and expressed concern that the devolution of APD to Scotland would disadvantage airports in the north of England, as travellers journey across the border to Scottish airports in order to travel to holiday destinations abroad. The SNP makes no apologies for championing Scotland, and we believe that the reduction and eventual abolition of APD would benefit Scotland’s economy and tourism sector in particular. Its devolution is also a cross-party commitment agreed through the Smith commission.

Attracting more tourists to Scottish airports by reducing APD could also benefit the north of England by rebalancing the economy away from London’s pull and bringing more visitors to the northern parts of these islands as a whole. If one considers Edinburgh to be a hub airport, I am sure that businesses in the north of England would rather spend an hour on the train from Newcastle to Edinburgh than four, five or six hours on the cross-London journey to Heathrow, let alone travelling to a hub airport such as Schiphol or Charles de Gaulle. Edinburgh is the ideal solution for people from Durham, for example.

A stronger Scottish economy will also bring significant economic benefits to the north of England, as new trade and investment opportunities arise. However, we are concerned about some of the UK Government’s threats in relation to APD—this relates to what the hon. Member for Blackley and Broughton said about competition. During the election, the Prime Minister astonishingly expressed concerns that a reduction in APD would “distort competition”. He said:

“The SNP government in Scotland is committed to using its new powers to cut and eventually abolish air passenger duty for flights from Scottish airports. That could distort competition and see business drawn north of the border with a huge impact on airports in the rest of our country so we’re reviewing the way air passenger duty works to make sure other cities don’t lose out”.

Devolving and amending APD is not a distortion of competition; it is competition.

The Prime Minister’s comments chimed with his so-called Carlisle principle. It was reported that the Prime Minister had

“outlined plans for an annual review of the impact of Scottish Devolution on the rest of the UK. He announced what he’s calling the ‘Carlisle principle’”.

He did that during a speech in Crewe—one would think he would go to Carlisle to do it, but Crewe it was. He said that the aim was to make sure that policies devolving more power to Scotland did not have a negative impact on other parts of the UK—in areas such as air passenger duty, tax rates, university tuition fees or energy policy. If only we had thought of that, we would not have abolished the subsidies for onshore wind.

The Prime Minister said:

“I want to set out a new principle—you could call it the Carlisle Principle—that we will make sure that there are no unforeseen detrimental consequences to the rest of the country from Scottish devolution, for either England, Wales or Northern Ireland.”

Will the Minister explain what the Carlisle principle—whatever it actually is—will mean in practice for the devolution of APD? I hope that when he gets up, he will say precisely nothing.

21:00

There is agreement on all sides that we have a no detriment and a no advantage principle, which was agreed before the Smith proposals were published. They are clearly being adhered to. There is all-party agreement on the devolution of APD. There can be no backsliding. I suspect there will be no votes on this. I look forward to hearing what the Minister says in his summing up.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Crausby.

I do not oppose the devolution of APD to the Scottish Parliament, but as my hon. Friend the Member for Blackley and Broughton (Graham Stringer) said, it will have a dramatic effect on regional airports within the UK. The hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) mentioned the attractions of Edinburgh to north-east businesses that want international flights, but I have to say that they would sooner fly directly from Newcastle. As for the notion that people would fly to Edinburgh and then get on a train to travel south to our region, that would not be an alternative to flying directly to the north-east via Newcastle. Newcastle airport has been a success story for the north-east.

We hear much from this Government about rebalancing the economy. The north-east has taken the brunt when it comes to the loss of public sector jobs and it also has the highest levels of unemployment in the UK. There have also been knock-on effects from the Government’s decisions deliberately to divert funds from poorer regions such as the north-east to the Tory heartlands.

We have heard the Government’s rhetoric about growing the private sector. Newcastle airport has, I think, been a great example. A few years ago, I had the privilege of being a director of the airport, which is a great partnership between the local authorities in the region and the private sector. In 2012, the airport added value of some £640 million to the north-east economy, and under its master plan by 2030 it will generate some £1.3 billion for the north-east economy. It is currently sustaining 7,800 jobs, rising to over 10,000 by 2030.

The team at Newcastle airport now provides direct flights to Dubai and to New York, and those international flights will be put at risk if the Scottish Government go ahead with their plans. I understand that this is a devolved matter, and I understand the reasons why the Scottish Government want to reduce APD. Clearly, as my hon. Friend the Member for Blackley and Broughton said, the tax was brought in for environmental reasons that now make little sense when it comes to growing the country’s economy.

[Alex Salmond (Gordon) (SNP)]

I could be reading the amendment paper wrongly, but am I wrong to interpret the hon. Gentleman’s amendment 36, which has not been called for debate, as designed to delete the clause that would devolve air passenger duty? Several times, the hon. Gentleman said that he was not opposed to the devolution of APD, but I thought his amendment was supposed to delete the provisions that made APD a devolved matter.

[Mr Jones]

The reason for that is that I was advised to do so to get my probing amendment on the amendment paper. There is no intention to delete the provisions, and the amendment has not been selected. I would have thought that the right hon. Gentleman’s experience in the House would make him au fait with the procedures for ensuring that Members can get a subject debated.

The Scottish Government’s proposals on APD do not make economic sense. Reducing and abolishing APD will clearly grow airport traffic into airports in Scotland as well as grow jobs, yet that will be to the detriment of airports such as Newcastle’s.

[Peter Grant]

If the hon. Gentleman is concerned that further devolution to Scotland might make Scotland too successful, surely the answer is to see further devolution to the regions and great cities of England, not to stop further devolution in its tracks so that everything remains centred in London for ever and a day.

[Mr Jones]

I do not disagree with the hon. Gentleman’s thrust, but what the Government have proposed for the north-east is not clear: an elected mayor whose area would stretch from Berwick right down to the Tees. That is the only way we will get any sort of devolution to the north-east at all, and there has been no public debate about it.

Clearly, the measures on air passenger duty will grow jobs in Scottish airports. I accept the point made earlier about the more outlying airports. In this country, we seem to have a policy of looking at regional airports as we do the major city airports. However, it is clear that small airports and communities, whether in Scotland or the rest of the UK, need connectivity to the major hubs.

[Dr Whitford]

Prestwick airport, the oldest passenger airport in Scotland, is in my constituency. We are not even connected to London. There was a time when people could take transatlantic flights from it, but no longer. Rather than thinking that Scotland would steal from the north of England, can the hon. Gentleman not accept that the total number of tourist visitors could grow?

[Mr Jones]

I agree, but if air passenger duty were zero in Scotland and the same as it is now in Newcastle, Scotland would clearly have an advantage. I do not want to get on to how much Scotland is able to devote to its tourism promotion budget, something that we need more of in the north-east.

[Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman seems to be setting out the most attractive form of tax competition. If Scotland gets rid of air passenger duty, there will be real pressure on the Chancellor to abolish it for the rest of the United Kingdom, and the whole economy will grow. It is marvellous to see the whole House moving in such a right-wing direction in its economic debates.

[Mr Jones]

On this very rare occasion, I agree with the hon. Gentleman. I would abolish APD altogether; it is a tax that, as the Scottish Government have recognised, stifles economic development. A PwC report says that the number of overseas visitors would grow by 7% if we abolished it altogether and that more money would come in from other taxes.

Scotland, for her own, sensible reasons, could halve and then abolish APD, leaving Newcastle at a great disadvantage. That would cost jobs; it has been anticipated that up to 1,000 jobs could be lost by 2025 if the situation remained the same, along with £400 million gross value to the economy of the north-east. One of the poorest regions in the UK cannot afford to be at such a disadvantage.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Blackley and Broughton (Graham Stringer) said, there seems to be a bit of confusion over the Government’s approach. He read out the Chancellor’s comment at the Treasury Committee sitting. The Chancellor seemed to be sanguine, giving the impression that if Scotland reduced its APD, airports such as Newcastle could happily soak up a 10% loss in traffic. I am sorry, but I have been a director of the airport and I know the management team well—I know how hard they have to work to attract every single flight and new route to Newcastle. A clear 10% loss would not be acceptable. My hon. Friend mentioned another point. The Chancellor also said that his personal view was that tax competition should be allowable. If that means putting the north-east at a disadvantage, the Government have to address that.

There has been some confusion. During the general election, the Prime Minister was asked by a local newspaper about unfair competition affecting Newcastle airport and—we should not forget the other airport in the north-east —Durham Tees Valley airport. He was questioned about reducing rates of APD for north-east airports to match the reduction in Scotland, as the Labour party in the region had been arguing. He said that that could be a positive suggestion.

What we need now is clear action. We have a new Minister for the northern powerhouse, the Under-Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, the hon. Member for Stockton South (James Wharton). I understand that his constituency includes Durham Tees Valley, so whether he can persuade the Treasury to do something about the effect of the clause on the north-east economy will be an interesting test of his power. We hear a lot about the northern powerhouse. Those of us in the north-east think that it ends in Manchester.

It is important that the effect of the clause is addressed. If it is not, this unfair tax will not only cost jobs in one of the poorest regions of the UK, but stifle one of the few economic drivers in the north-east in Newcastle airport, which can grow not only business, but competition. As I said in an earlier intervention, Newcastle airport is important not only for passengers, but for cargo revenues. It enables companies in the north-east to export around the world. The direct flight to Dubai has meant that a lot of local businesses have been able to export products there directly and to grow.

I am interested to know the Government’s approach to this issue. If the clause is passed, we cannot have a lag that leaves regions such as the north-east being hit by the tax competition which the Chancellor seems to think is acceptable, but which the Prime Minister clearly wants to do something about. The ball is firmly in the Government’s court to ensure that this anomaly is put right.

[Alex Salmond]

I am grateful to the hon. Members for Blackley and Broughton (Graham Stringer) and for North Durham (Mr Jones) for the way that they have spoken about this issue. I am unconvinced by the argument that they had to table an amendment to delete the devolution of air passenger duty in order to make speeches. Speeches could be made on clause stand part. None the less, whatever the flow of logic, I am delighted that they have confirmed that they support the devolution of APD. I will be very supportive, in return, of some of the arguments that they have made.

As I have been through this issue in one guise or another over the past few years, I thought that it might be useful to remind the Committee of a little bit of history. The devolution of APD was proposed by the Calman commission. For Members who were not in the House at that time or who are not fully up on these matters, the Calman commission was the response of the Unionist parties to the SNP’s breakthrough in the 2007 election. We are still debating the devolution of APD because it disappeared from the legislative programme arising from Calman that was enacted in the last Parliament. It was proposed again by the Smith commission, which was the response of the Unionist parties, through the vow, to try to deflect the yes campaign in the final days of last year’s referendum.

Both those events, incidentally, have been overtaken by the fact that 56 Members of Parliament now adorn these Benches for the Scottish National party. No doubt, at some occasion in the not too distant future, we will be back debating the Government’s response to that latest political development. Surely history tells us—the hon. Member for Blackley and Broughton referred to this—that it would have been far better to have been more extensive and generous with devolution in the first place, and that we should not repeat the mistakes that the Government and the Unionist parties made in the past.

I had a meeting with Howard Davies a few years back when he was asked to chair the Airports Commission. I will be generous and say that it was set up to address the under-capacity and congestion at airports in the south-east of England—or perhaps it was to bash Boris’s proposal for an island airport. The point was to reconcile between Heathrow and Gatwick. We can be absolutely certain about two things in respect of the proposals that will come from the Howard Davies commission. First, we can be certain that, whatever the final adjudication, it will be some considerable time before either Heathrow or Gatwick emerges as the winner from the process. Secondly, we can be certain that, whatever emerges from the process, considerable amounts of public money, running into many billions of pounds, will be devoted, by one means or another, to expanding the capacity of those airports, which are severely congested at the moment.

The reason I mention this is that when I had my meeting, as First Minister, with Mr Davies—it might be Sir Howard Davies now, for all I know—[Interruption.] I am told that he is soon to be ennobled—other people have more information on these things than I do. Anyway, when I had my meeting with Sir Howard, I said, “Given that, whatever happens, your proposals will take some time to be enacted, would it not be a grand idea for you to propose, in the meantime, measures to relieve some of the congestion in the south of England airports? Perhaps reducing air passenger duty in Scotland, Northern Ireland and the north of England and, pro tem at least, diverting some of the business from those airports would relieve some of the extraordinary pressure on them.”

21:15

I was very disappointed when, in his interim report, Sir Howard made clear his belief that such a move would constitute a “distortion of competition”. I thought that that was a magnificent argument in its way—magnificent in terms of brass neck. It was clearly not a distortion of competition to propose the expenditure of billions of pounds of public money on investment—financed by all of us—in increasing the capacity of the south of England airports, but it somehow would be a distortion of competition to reduce the taxation and increase the revenues generated by airports in the north of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that Scotland and the north-east, for instance, are losing business not just to London but to parts of mainland Europe? At Schiphol, for instance, air passenger duty has been abolished.

[Alex Salmond]

I do agree with that, but I also think that we must consider the motivation for the introduction of what appears to be a remarkably foolish tax. Any Chancellor looking at Heathrow, for example, would see a fully congested airport and an air passenger duty with an effective collection rate of 100%, whereas any Chancellor looking at the north of England, Northern Ireland or Scotland would see airports with substantial capacity where a reduction in APD could increase business, and, given increased revenues from VAT and other taxation, would see the magic formula for a Laffer curve emerging. I was going to turn to the hon. Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) at that point, but when I mentioned the Laffer curve, he was busy having a conversation, just when he could have reached a peak of excitement.I think that it would be possible to achieve that Laffer curve, reducing the tax and increasing the revenue, and it seems that my view is shared on both sides of the Committee.

[Jim Fitzpatrick (Poplar and Limehouse) (Lab)]

Does the right hon. Gentleman not recognise that, whether the Davies commission decides on Heathrow or on Gatwick, the vast majority of the investment will come from the private sector? It will not be billions of pounds of taxpayers’ money. Does he not also recognise that there has been a campaign in the aviation industry to abolish APD altogether, and that the Treasury is hooked on the tax because it is worth £2.3 billion a year?

[Alex Salmond]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman’s first point only to the extent that there are people who argue that nuclear power does not require the investment of public money. I think he will find that, as the implementation of these proposals proceeds, substantial amounts of public money will be invested in the infrastructure to make it viable and credible. According to a recent study of transport infrastructure spending per head in various parts of England, the figure for the south-east of England was over £2,000 per head, the figure for the north-east was £26 per head, and the figure for the north-west was £200 per head. I do not have the exact figures, but I think that I have the relative parameters just about right—

[Graham Stringer]

rose—

[Alex Salmond]

The hon. Gentleman can please inform me otherwise.

[Graham Stringer]

The figures that the right hon. Gentleman has given are moving in the right direction, but the distortion is actually even greater. The capital expenditure figure is over 90% in London and the south-east, compared with single-figure percentages in Yorkshire and Humberside and the north-east.

[Alex Salmond]

I am never knowingly undersold. I accept what the hon. Gentleman has said. I was trying to moderate the figures slightly, in case the Committee found them incredible. However, they do tell us where we should be turning in the context of “distortion of competition”.

I am delighted that Members from the north of England have accepted that this tax should be devolved, and I am delighted that they have accepted the economic argument behind the direction in which the Scottish Government are moving. I think that the tax should be reduced at airports in the north of England as well, because they have substantial capacity that would increase revenue for us all. I am glad that their amendment did not become the basis of this conversation, because if the Scottish Government had opposed the devolution of part of APD to Northern Ireland, no progress would have been made. We are now on the verge of having APD devolved to Scotland, and I say to Members representing north of England constituencies that they should take the attitude that this should be the example for further devolution of a sensible policy which not only benefits one part of the country but looks at the economic opportunities in all parts of the country.

Unfortunately, I arrived for this debate at the end of the VAT fiddle discussion. I hope when the Minister replies on APD that, instead of his wholly disappointing and negative attitude to the embezzlement of VAT from the Scottish police service, he will return to the style of grace and imagination with which he usually so adorns the Dispatch Box, and this time recognise the opportunity for Scotland, and indeed the north of England, of making sure that this disgraceful tax is reduced and economic activity is increased.

[Rob Marris (Wolverhampton South West) (Lab)]

I do not share this cosy consensus. The hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) made it very clear in his usual honourable way—I have sparred with him many times—that if APD is devolved, the Scottish Government, if controlled by the SNP, will cut it markedly and have the goal of abolishing it. He helped the Committee by quoting the Prime Minister to the effect that there would be—these are my words, not the Prime Minister’s—a “beggar my neighbour” attitude downwards on APD. Call me old-fashioned, but I think environmental laws should be state-wide and international, and I consider APD to be an environmental law, which is why I voted for it years ago.

As ever, the SNP has been totally open with the House: it wants to see the number of airline passengers increase throughout the UK. That is an environmental step backwards. Fortunately, we have environmental laws internationally through the EU, for example on waste disposal and air quality, something on which the UK is, to coin a phrase, falling foul at present.

[Mr MacNeil]

Following the hon. Gentleman’s argument, does he want to increase the rate of APD or is he saying the Tories have got it at just the right rate?

[Rob Marris]

Yes, I would increase the rate of APD.

I was a Member of the House when the Climate Change Act 2008 was debated—there are several other such Members present, although we are a minority. There is in that Act a target which I think is UK-wide—I stand to be corrected on that—for an 80% cut in the UK’s CO₂ emissions by 2050. I did not vote for that because I thought it was, to coin a phrase, hot air and, sadly, in the years since that Act has been passed, I have been proved right, as we see tonight.

[Alex Salmond]

The hon. Gentleman is not correct. Climate change legislation is devolved and the Scottish Parliament has its own Act in which the targets are even more ambitious and well on the way to being met.

[Rob Marris]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for that. Can he inform the Committee how on earth Scotland and the Scotland Parliament are going to meet those figures if they are intent on increasing the number of airline passengers?

[Alex Salmond]

Because, as one of the hon. Gentleman’s hon. Friends alluded to, one direct flight is better than two indirect flights.

[Rob Marris]

The right hon. Gentleman will know that the whole history of airline travel hitherto has been that it increases exponentially. It has done so, and if allowed to do so, will continue.

So I do not share this cosy consensus. I am not part of the airline and airport love-ins. As Members will know, airlines and their passengers already get a huge subsidy because of the low price they pay for airline fuel—kerosene. Members ought to bear this in mind when debating APD: no doubt the figures are lower in Scotland, but across the UK in any given year half the population do not fly. I believe that hon. Members have a completely distorted view of this matter. I suspect that I am one of the very few Members of this House who does not fly; I have not flown for years. I suspect that every other Member has a distorted view, based on self-interest. [Interruption.] It is not me who is causing a huge amount of environmental degradation through flying. The greenhouse gases emitted by aeroplanes at high altitude are far more damaging than the same amount of greenhouse gases emitted at sea level. Air travel is the most polluting form of mass travel.

In that context, I regret that the Government are devolving air passenger duty. Yes, I would increase it. The UK Government will live to regret this measure, because we are clearly heading towards the abolition of air passenger duty in Scotland and, eventually, through a process of “beggar my neighbour” downwards, across the rest of the United Kingdom. That will be another nail in the coffin of the doomed and uneconomic HS2 railway line. People will continue to fly south from Scotland and the north of England, and vice versa, rather than using the HS2 line. It is already uneconomic and, with the abolition of air passenger duty, it will become even more so.

[Ian Murray]

I do not want to detain the Committee for long, but let me just pose a few questions on what has been said about air passenger duty and the aggregates levy. I shall start with air passenger duty. Prior to the election, Opposition Members wrote to the Chancellor of the Exchequer asking what impact a rate of air passenger duty that was higher in Scotland than in England would have on regional English airports and Scottish airports. Will the Minister tell us what the Government’s movements have been on that impact assessment?

Hon. Members were berating my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South West (Rob Marris) a moment ago, but he has raised an incredibly important environmental issue. The issue has been raised directly by the Committee on Climate Change, which reported recently that Scotland had missed its climate change target by 4.5%, the third time in a row that it had missed an annual target. The report also asked the Scottish Government to assess the impact of carbon on the economy in relation to the slashing of air passenger duty. I cannot ask the Scottish Government this question directly from the Dispatch Box, but can the Minister tell me whether an environmental assessment has been carried out on the raising or lowering of the duty?

On the aggregates levy, will the Minister tell us what progress has been made on resolving the legal issues relating to state aid and when we can expect the levy to be devolved to the Scottish Parliament?

[Mr Gauke]

We have had a reasonably lengthy debate in which Members have not, for the most part, tended to differ on the substance of the clause on air passenger duty, although the hon. Member for Wolverhampton South West (Rob Marris) is never afraid of setting out a contrary opinion. In fact, some Opposition Back Benchers argued for the abolition of APD, which would cost about £3.2 billion, while others argued for increasing it. If there is a need for fresh thinking among Labour Members, we are hearing plenty of it this evening, even if there has not been much in the way of coherence.

[Graham Stringer]

The Minister is right to mention the revenue from air passenger duty, but is he aware that a number of studies—the most significant being the PwC study—suggest that the economic benefit to the country of the abolition of APD would be greater than £3.2 billion?

[Mr Gauke]

I am aware of those studies. I will not detain the Committee for long on this subject, but we do not agree with the conclusions of the PwC study. We do not believe that the benefits of abolition would be as significant as the study suggests.

The hon. Members for Blackley and Broughton (Graham Stringer) and for North Durham (Mr Jones) talked about the impact on regional airports of the devolution of APD to Scotland. We recognise the potential impacts and the Government are reviewing options for supporting regional airports to deal with the effects of devolution. We will be publishing a discussion paper on this later in the summer and our document will address many of the concerns raised during today’s debate by the hon. Gentleman. I will ensure that it is available to Members of this House.

21:30

[Mr MacNeil]

Does the Minister see any advantages in other tax revenues from the cutting of APD or does he think the countries that have cut APD have done it as a result of lemming-like behaviour?

[Mr Gauke]

There are arguments and different views as to the economic impact of cutting APD. We are legislating to devolve this to Scotland, and I am sure the hon. Gentleman will be supporting this legislation. That move is also part of the Smith commission arrangements. It has potential knock-on effects for regional airports, particularly those close to the Scottish border. As I say, we are reviewing our options there and will report later in the summer.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

One advantage of the reduction in APD that we have been able to achieve in Northern Ireland is on the main flight between Belfast Aldergrove and New York city. That flight is well used, it has made Aldergrove’s position more powerful and it has connected the United States and Northern Ireland—I could say more. That is just an example from Northern Ireland, and the effect of one flight could be replicated across the whole United Kingdom.

[Mr Gauke]

Again, the hon. Gentleman is making a particular case. There are particular circumstances applying to that flight to the US, especially the competition that existed from the Republic of Ireland, which was why steps were taken on that point. As I say, we will be setting out options—

[Mr Kevan Jones]

Is the Minister telling the House tonight that the Chancellor has changed his views? When he went before the Treasury Committee last year, he talked about the effects on Newcastle, which he said would be about 10%. He said:

“That was work carried out a couple of years ago, but in Newcastle’s case, its traffic was up 12% last year, so I think these are manageable.”

Is the Minister now giving a commitment that this will be looked at or is the Chancellor sticking to his position that a reduction of 10% would be acceptable and “manageable” for Newcastle?

[Mr Gauke]

Let me repeat what I said earlier: there are potential impacts of devolution on regional airports, the Government are reviewing options for supporting regional airports in the light of those effects and we will publish a discussion paper later in the summer. I understand that the hon. Gentleman, who has campaigned consistently on this matter, may be a little impatient, but if he will just bear with us for a little longer—

[Mr Jones]

I understand the constraints and I would not expect the Minister to criticise his boss. He said a discussion paper will be coming out, but what is the timescale going to be? Clearly if the Scottish Government move to reduce APD as quickly as they get the powers, that will have a direct effect on places such as Newcastle. What timescale is he looking at?

[Mr Gauke]

Again, that will be set out in the discussion paper, and I think the hon. Gentleman would expect me to say nothing else on the point.

[Rob Marris]

Is it the Government’s view that the existence of APD has had any effect on the number of airline passengers flying to and from the UK, and within the UK, in each year since it came in? Do the Government think the existence of that tax has lessened the numbers, had no effect on them or, paradoxically, increased them?

[Mr Gauke]

It would be fair to say that given our belief that APD raises revenue, there is an adverse effect, in that it reduces the numbers who fly—

[Rob Marris]

A positive effect then.

[Mr Gauke]

I should put it as neutrally as I possibly can. We do not believe that the behavioural effects are as great as those set out in the PwC report, which is why we believe APD does raise revenue. There is a consensus—not a universal consensus—that it is right that we move on APD. On the point about regional airports, we will come back to that later in the summer.

May I also pick up the point on the aggregates levy? The hon. Member for Edinburgh South (Ian Murray) asked about the likely progress on legal matters. The European Commission was forced to reconsider its 2002 decision that the exemptions from the levy did not provide state aid following legal action by the British Aggregates Association. It announced its decision in March, finding that the levy as a whole was lawful, as were most of the exemptions. The Government are currently informally consulting trade associations on draft legislation to reinstate those exemptions—for example on slate and clay—found lawful by the Commission in March 2015.

With those points of clarification, I hope that the clauses before us can stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1 agreed to.

Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 1

Independent Commission on Full Fiscal Autonomy

‘(1) The Secretary of State shall appoint a commission of between four and eleven members to conduct an analysis of the impact of full fiscal autonomy on the Scottish economy, labour market and public finances and to report by 31 March 2016.

(2) No Member of the House of Commons or of the Scottish Parliament may be a member of the commission.

(3) No employee of the Scottish Government or of any government Department or agency anywhere in the United Kingdom may be a member of the commission.

(4) The Secretary of State shall appoint as members of the commission only persons who appear to the Secretary of State to hold a relevant qualification or to have relevant experience.

(5) The Secretary of State shall not appoint as a member of the commission any person who is a member of a political party.

(6) Before appointing any member of the commission, the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) the Chair of any select committee appointed by the House of Commons to consider Scottish affairs, and

(b) the Chair of any select committee appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of Her Majesty’s Treasury and its associated public bodies.

(7) The Secretary of State may by regulations issue the commission with terms of reference and guidelines for the commission’s working methods, including an outline definition of the policy of full fiscal autonomy for the commission to analyse.

(8) The Secretary of State must lay copies of the report of the commission before both Houses of Parliament, and must transmit a copy of the report of the commission to the presiding officer of the Scottish Parliament.

(9) Regulations under this section must be made by statutory instrument, subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.” —(Ian Murray.)

This New Clause requires the Secretary of State for Scotland to establish an independent commission of external experts, appointed in consultation with the Treasury Select Committee and Scottish Affairs Select Committee, to publish a report by 31 March 2016 setting out an analysis of the impact of the policy of Full Fiscal Autonomy on the Scottish economy, labour market and public finances.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Ian Murray]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Natascha Engel)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 21—The Scottish Office for Budget Responsibility—

‘(1) Part 2 of Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998 (specific reservations) is amended as follows.

(2) In Section A1 (fiscal, economic and monetary policy)—

(a) For the heading “Exception” substitute “Exceptions”—

(b) After that heading, insert—

“The creation of a body corporate, called The Scottish Office for Budget Responsibility, for the independent scrutiny of Scotland‘s public finances, including all tax and spending in areas for which the Scottish Government has legislative competence.””

This New Clause would provide for the creation of a Scottish Office for Budget Responsibility to exercise fiscal and budgetary oversight over Scottish Government competencies. The Smith Commission recommended that the Scottish Parliament should seek to expand and strengthen the independent scrutiny of Scotland’s public finances in recognition of the additional variability and uncertainty that further tax and spending devolution will introduce into the budgeting process.

New clause 23—Local Discretionary Taxation—

Individual local authorities in Scotland shall have the discretion to raise additional income by levying a tax, in addition to Council Tax and Non-Domestic Rates, on either residents, occupiers, property owners or visitors in the local authority or within a discrete area of the local authority.”

The power will enable local authorities to introduce tax(es) without the need to seek approval from Scottish Government, with the rates and reliefs being determined locally and the local authority being both granted powers to ensure that those on which the tax is levied have a legal obligation to pay and the local authority having the discretion to determine how the additional revenue is expended.

New clause 24—Tax and Economy Forum—

‘(1) The Secretary of State shall appoint a Tax and Economy Forum to conduct an analysis of the impact of the changes in legislative and executive competence resulting from this Act on the economy, labour market and public finances in Scotland and in the other parts of the United Kingdom.

(2) The Tax and Economy Forum may make recommendations for fiscal reforms within Scotland, to be considered by the Secretary of State.”

The new Clause would require the appointment of a Tax and Economy Forum to assess the impacts of fiscal devolution proposed within this Bill on Scotland and on the rest of the United Kingdom.

New clause 25—UK Commission on fiscal powers—

‘(1) Within 6 months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State shall appoint a commission to examine the deployment of fiscal powers at local, devolved and United Kingdom levels.

(2) The commission shall comprise between 4 and 6 representatives of any of—

(a) the Scottish Parliament,

(b) the National Assembly for Wales,

(c) the Northern Ireland Assembly,

(d) local government,

(e) the House of Commons, and

(f) the House of Lords.

(3) The bodies mentioned in subsection (2) shall select their representatives in any way they see fit and the chief executive or presiding officer of each of those bodies shall inform the Secretary of State of the names of the representatives of those bodies, which may replace their representatives whenever the body concerned has determined to do so.

(4) Subject to subsection (5), the commission may determine its own quorum and methods of working and must publish a protocol setting out its own terms of reference.

(5) The commission shall keep the operation of fiscal powers under review, making reports and recommendations as it deems appropriate.

The purpose of this New Clause is to ensure that there is proper consultation between the different parts of the United Kingdom to ensure that new Scottish fiscal powers are deployed in a way that does not undermine the cohesion of the UK. The proposed Commission could also make recommendation regarding the future of devolved fiscal powers.

New clause 33—Full fiscal autonomy for Scotland—

‘(1) The Scottish Government and the Government of the United Kingdom must enter into an agreement (the “Economic Agreement”)—

(a) setting out a plan for implementation of full fiscal autonomy for Scotland, and

(b) establishing a framework within which the two Governments are to coordinate their economic and fiscal policies in the context of full fiscal autonomy for Scotland.

(2) Full fiscal autonomy for Scotland means that—

(a) the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government have competence for determining revenues raised in or as regards Scotland through taxation and borrowing,

(b) the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government have competence for determining levels of public expenditure in or as regards Scotland,

in accordance with the amendments made by this Act.

(3) The framework mentioned in subsection (1)(b) must in particular include arrangements for—

(a) facilitating fiscal coordination,

(b) overseeing economic cooperation,

(c) joint responsibilities in areas of mutual interest,

(d) safeguarding fiscal sustainability.

(4) In determining the terms of the Economic Agreement the two governments must seek to ensure—

(a) the maintenance of monetary stability throughout the United Kingdom,

(b) the maintenance and promotion of the single markets in the United Kingdom and the European Union,

(c) that they cooperate in the exercise of their respective functions relating to the administration and collection of taxes,

(d) an equitable and transparent approach to consequences, resources and rewards,

(e) that the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government retain the benefits of increased tax revenues delivered by successful policies pursued by them,

(f) that the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government have the powers necessary to manage the consequences of full fiscal autonomy for Scotland,

(g) that full fiscal autonomy for Scotland is implemented over a period of time, as the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government acquire capacity to carry out their additional competences.

(5) The Economic Agreement is to be entered into as soon as possible and the two governments must cooperate in good faith with a view to achieving that.

(6) As soon as possible after the Economic Agreement is entered into—

(a) the Scottish Ministers must lay a copy of it before the Scottish Parliament, and

(b) the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before both Houses of Parliament.

(7) The two governments must from time to time review the Economic Agreement and make such amendments to its terms as they may agree with a view to ensuring that it continues to meet the requirements of this section.

(8) Subsection (6) applies to the Economic Agreement as amended as it applies to the Agreement as entered into.

(9) The Secretary of State may, with the agreement of the Scottish Ministers, by regulations modify this section.

(10) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (9) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”

This new clause would require the Scottish and UK governments to reach agreement on the delivery of full fiscal autonomy for Scotland.

Amendment 3, in clause 63, page 67, line 30, leave out subsection (3) and insert—

‘(3) Part 2 of the Bill comes into force at the end of 2 months beginning with the publication of the report of the Independent Commission on Full Fiscal Autonomy appointed under section (Independent Commission on Full Fiscal Autonomy).”

This amendment provides that Part 2 (Tax) will not come into force at the end of two months beginning with the day on which the Act is passed, in order to link the commencement of the tax provisions of the Act with the work of the Independent Commission on Full Fiscal Autonomy, appointed under New Clause NC1, which would be required to report by 31 March 2016.

[Ian Murray]

It is great to see you in the Chair, Ms Engel. Congratulations on your elevation to Deputy Speaker. It appears that in tonight’s debate there is a sense of déjà vu, as we debated full fiscal autonomy a few weeks ago. Given that the Committee stage of this Bill has been dominated by the SNP manifesto commitment to deliver full fiscal autonomy and bringing forward its watered down promise to deliver it this year, it is good that we have the opportunity to try to put it into this Bill. In fact, as we witnessed last week, the SNP’s hand had to be forced by its arch Thatcherite colleagues, when its Members went into the Lobby with the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh). I said at the time that the worst possible scenario for Scotland would be the SNP demanding full fiscal autonomy and its being delivered by a majority Conservative Government. Those words were echoed—

[Pete Wishart]

rose—

[Ian Murray]

Let me just finish this point. Those words were echoed by Dave Watson, the head of campaigns at Unison Scotland, who said:

“An incoming Tory government faced with a big number of SNP MPs, saying, ‘OK, if that’s what Scotland voted for, let’s give them Full Fiscal Autonomy.’ The Treasury would be able to dump £7.5bn of the deficit on the Scottish Government and just walk away.”

The fact that the SNP has another fudged amendment this evening shows that it does not believe that full fiscal autonomy would be good for Scotland.

[Pete Wishart]

rose—

[Ian Murray]

Before the hon. Gentleman pops up to say, “Too wee, too stupid and too poor,” as he always does, may I remind the House that that was a phrase coined by the SNP Finance Secretary and no one else? It is worth putting that on the record, given that he always pops up to say that.

Lord Smith of Kelvin said in his report that one of the primary aims of the Smith agreement was to provide the Scottish Parliament with accountability—

[Pete Wishart]

rose—

[Ian Murray]

I said that I would give way, and I will do so when I have made a little progress, given the late hour.

Lord Smith said that the Scottish Parliament was a Parliament that spends resources but does not raise any, so there is no accountability or responsibility. The Scotland Act 2012 resolved that position a little with the devolution of the most immovable taxes and 10p of income tax—

[Pete Wishart]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Ian Murray]

I will give way to the hon. Gentleman before he bursts a blood vessel.

[Pete Wishart]

I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. This rewriting of history is great and it is fantastic to find out the position of the Scottish National party, but perhaps he can explain the position of Scottish Labour. He abstained on full fiscal autonomy. Is that because he is uncertain, or is he perhaps now unsure about full fiscal autonomy?

[Ian Murray]

I am delighted by that intervention. What I did not want to do last week was rain on the parade of the Scottish National party as its Members went through the Lobby with the Thatcherite Conservatives to deliver full fiscal autonomy for Scotland. That is what seems to be wrong. The SNP is in full agreement with the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) again tonight on the subject of the devolution of the entirety of income tax. Perhaps the party has a right-wing agenda after all.

As we know, the Bill provides full control of nearly 50% of revenues and more than 60% of spending. According to the Library, that will be 65% if the devolution of housing benefit is agreed tomorrow, making it one of the most powerful devolved Parliaments in the world. The OECD ranked the Smith proposals and came to the same conclusion.

With that accountability and responsibility must come transparency and honesty. During the general election campaign, the First Minister and SNP candidates repeatedly said that they would vote for full fiscal autonomy this year. That was reaffirmed in the television debates. All the impartial and independent expert analysis of full fiscal autonomy shows clearly that that would devastate Scotland’s financial position. That is the genesis of our new clause 1. If the Scottish Government want to dismiss all the independent experts simply because they do not agree with them, let us set up an independent commission to consider the consequences on Scotland’s finances of full fiscal autonomy.

[Martin John Docherty (West Dunbartonshire) (SNP)]

Subsection (2) states:

“No Member of the House of Commons or of the Scottish Parliament may be a member of the commission.”

Is the hon. Gentleman saying that the Members of the unelected and unaccountable Chamber at the other end of this building could be members, such as the possible future chair, Baroness Goldie of Bishopton?

[Ian Murray]

The new clause is quite clear. I do not think it would be appropriate for Members of the House of Lords to serve on the commission—[Interruption.] Will SNP Members let me finish the sentence before they start braying from the Back Benches again?

The commission would specifically be designed to have no politicians on it from either Parliament, as well as no employees of the Scottish Government or the UK Government or of any agency related to them. It should be a commission of impartial experts in the field and if the Secretary of State wants to agree to the new clause, I am happy to take on board the suggestion that “no Member of the House of Lords” should appear in it, too.

[Alex Salmond]

On a point of order, Ms Engel. I am not sure that I heard the hon. Gentleman correctly, but he seems to be redrafting his clause during his speech. Would it be in order for him to redraft his new clause to include the House of Lords during his speech? Can he be that uncertain of his arguments?

[The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Natascha Engel)]

The right hon. Gentleman knows that that is a matter of debate, so let us continue with that debate.

[Ian Murray]

The problem with the right hon. Member for Gordon (Alex Salmond) is that he does not want to debate full fiscal autonomy, as he knows that it is a bad policy. Let me emphasise that if the Secretary of State wants to accept the new clause, I would be more than happy to ensure that Members of the House of Lords were not on the commission. Let us be transparent and accountable in this place, rather than nitpicking about parts of the clause. The SNP do not want the scrutiny and that is the key to this argument.

Let us consider some of that scrutiny. The much-quoted IFS analysed full fiscal autonomy in Scotland and said that it would cost £7.6 billion next year and up to £10 billion by 2020. It has made it clear that that is over and above the deficit of the UK at the moment and the spending profile of the current Conservative Government. Let me emphasise again, as this has been misquoted by the hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson) on a number of occasions, that that figure is in addition to the current UK deficit.

The impartial analysis has been dismissed by the Scottish Government, so let us turn to another source of information, Her Majesty’s Treasury, which analysed these figures with results broadly in line with the analysis of the IFS. According to Treasury costings that I obtained through a freedom of information request, full fiscal autonomy would leave Scotland with an additional cash terms deficit of £7.7 billion in 2015-16, rising to £8.4 billion in 2019-20.

21:34

Again, this will no doubt be dismissed, so let us look at the Office for Budget Responsibility oil and gas report published just 10 days ago. It shows that revenue from the North sea is projected to fall from £36.7 billion to just £2 billion in the period 2020-40. [Interruption.] That is dismissed not just by the SNP, but at this moment by the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart), so let us try the Scottish Government’s own annual accounts in the form of the Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland report published in March this year. The Scottish Government’s annual accounts show an annual deficit over and above the UK deficit of some £4 billion, and projections are due to worsen with the lower oil price.

[Mr MacNeil]

The hon. Gentleman will be aware that between 2007 and 2009 the UK’s deficit quadrupled. Given the significance that he attaches to deficits and to one year, what significance does he attach to the quadrupling of the debt of a state in a two-year period?

[Ian Murray]

I am not sure I understand the intervention. We are debating a deficit in Scotland being £7.6 billion over and above any UK deficit, rising to £10 billion by 2020. If we are defending Scottish jobs and livelihoods, that seems not just economically incredible, but economic illiteracy. Hon. Members need not take my word for it. The Scottish Trades Union Congress general secretary, Grahame Smith, commented that the Scottish Government’s own accounts were

“a sobering reminder of some of the risks of full fiscal autonomy”.

That is from the trade unions in Scotland.

The Scottish Government sneaked out their own oil and gas bulletin, their first since May 2014, last week on the last day of the Scottish Parliament. It would be good to look at that alongside the independence White Paper. The bulletin was very much in accord with the Office for Budget Responsibility that was rubbished just a few days before. It showed that North sea oil revenues and projections have fallen drastically in recent times, so let us have a look at those figures. The Scottish Government’s own oil and gas bulletin of June 2015 estimated North sea tax receipts for the period 2016-20 to be £5.8 billion. The same scenario from the same bulletin 13 months earlier estimated the receipts to be well in excess of £26 billion. Even if we compare one year—say, 2016-17—revenues had fallen from a projected £6.9 billion to £1.1 billion, and the lower estimates are as low as £500 million.

These are the Scottish Government’s own figures—all in all, an 85% drop. That tells us two things. First, it blows apart the financial basis for full fiscal autonomy. Secondly, like my new clauses 1 and 21, it calls for a more robust and impartial analysis of the Scottish economy and public finances. That is why we tabled new clauses 1 and 21. New clause 21, alongside new clause 1, would provide for the creation of a Scottish office for budget responsibility to exercise independent and impartial fiscal and budget oversight over Scottish Government devolved competencies.

The Smith commission recommended that

“the Scottish Parliament should seek to expand and strengthen the independent scrutiny of Scotland’s public finances in recognition of the additional variability and uncertainty that further tax and spending devolution will introduce into the budgeting process.”

The new clauses would do just that and take away the politicisation of one of the fundamental underpinnings of the Scottish economy, the financing of Scottish public services and, crucially, though it tends to be forgotten in this debate, the livelihoods of everyone living and working in Scotland.

I would go further and ensure that the Scottish office for budget responsibility assesses and reports on individual party manifestos, so that the public can be confident that what they are being sold is both credible and desirable. This is about simple transparency and accountability. That transparency and accountability, as I have said, has not been forthcoming on the current manifesto commitment on full fiscal autonomy. If we had had a Scottish office for budget responsibility at the last election, it would have reported that FFA would be hugely disadvantageous to Scotland. It would have backed up the IFS analysis that showed that FFA did not work and that Scotland would need a real-terms growth rate of 4.5% per year at least between 2013-14 and 2019-20. The assistant general secretary of the STUC, Mr Stephen Boyd, commented exactly on this and said:

“The implication across the board is that taxes would be cut. There are a number of examples where the Scottish Government would be trading a real and immediate cut in revenue for benefits that may not be great in the long run.”

That shows that it would not be achievable in the figures from the IFS. The IFS’s conclusion is that FFA would incur deep, deep cuts in spending or huge tax rises.

It is easy to talk about figures, percentages and statistics, but this has to be about the everyday lives of ordinary, hard-working Scottish families. Inflicting a policy on Scotland that would leave a deficit larger than the entire education budget, or more than three quarters the size of the NHS budget, will not assist Scotland. We all reject the Conservative Government’s misguided austerity, which we know is ideologically driven, rather than an attempt to balance the country’s finances, but we must also reject any policy that would inflict harsher and deeper austerity in Scotland. [Interruption.] This is not, as some would claim—they are claiming it as I speak—about being anti-Scottish, anti-aspiration or anti-hope for the ingenuity, passion and entrepreneurial spirit of Scotland; it is a sobering response to a key manifesto commitment from the Scottish National party.

SNP Members dismiss the views of the IFS, the OBR and even their own GERS reports, but even Jonathan Portes, the director of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, has said on FFA:

“If the SNP plan for full fiscal autonomy were to go ahead, then, as a number of commentators have said, that would lead to very, very severe austerity in Scotland.”

That is why Labour is against full fiscal autonomy; that is why we believe in the pooling and sharing of resources across the United Kingdom; and that is why the public voted to remain part of the United Kingdom.

[George Kerevan]

Does the hon. Gentleman not see that there is a contradiction in standing up and telling us repeatedly that full fiscal freedom would be bad for Scotland and asking for an independent budget review, which he clearly does not want to take account of? He wants an independent budget office, but he is telling us what it is going to say.

[Ian Murray]

That is a rather strange intervention. If Members read new clause 1 and new clause 21, they will see very clearly that what we are asking for is an independent commission to analyse the consequences for Scotland of full fiscal autonomy. If the SNP is so confident about its figures, it should back that proposal and then we will have the transparency, impartiality and independence of those policies. If it is so confident that it was not fiddling the figures, it should help us to set up a Scottish office for budget responsibility and let that body analyse its figures. However, it is clear once again that, when we shine the light of scrutiny on SNP policies, its Members want to talk about the process but not look at the impartial and independent evidence before us. If they are so confident, they will back new clause 1 and new clause 21 and bring much needed transparency, credibility and accountability back to the Scottish Parliament’s finances.

[Stewart Hosie]

We have just listened to one of the worst speeches I have heard in 10 years. The Labour party now has one argument: we have gone from being too small, too poor and too stupid for independence to being too small, too poor and too stupid for any powers at all. The hon. Member for Edinburgh South (Ian Murray) spoke about something that was “credible”. Credible? The Scottish people decided what was credible at the election in May, and they did not say it was his party. He spoke about right-wing, Thatcherite Tories, but it sounds to me like the core vote of the only Labour MP left in Scotland.

New clause 33, which stands in my name and those of my hon. Friends, would require the Scottish and UK Governments to enter into an economic agreement setting out a plan for implementation of full fiscal autonomy for Scotland and establishing a framework within which the two Governments co-ordinate their economic and fiscal policies in the context of full fiscal autonomy for Scotland. The Scottish Parliament and Government would have competence for revenue raised in Scotland through taxation and borrowing and for determining levels of public expenditure in or as regards Scotland.

We see the framework including arrangements for facilitating fiscal co-ordination, overseeing economic co-operation, safeguarding fiscal sustainability, and setting out the joint responsibilities in certain areas. In the agreement, the two Governments must seek to ensure the maintenance of monetary stability throughout the UK and the single market of the UK and the EU. They must also ensure co-operation in the exercise of all the respective functions relating to the administration and collection of taxes and an equitable and transparent approach to the consequences, resources and rewards. The Scottish Parliament and Government would retain the benefits of increased tax revenues as a result of positive policy impacts and would have the powers they need to manage the consequences of full fiscal autonomy.

I turn briefly to new clauses 1 and 21. New clause 1 would require that a Tory Secretary of State appoint a commission of between four and 11 members, none of whom can be a Member of Parliament, a Member of the Scottish Parliament or an employee thereof. It is backed by Labour and United Kingdom Independence party Members, so we have a Labour amendment backed by UKIP asking a Tory Secretary of State—

[Ian Murray]

rose—

[Stewart Hosie]

No, no, no.

The new clause asks for a Tory Secretary of State to appoint a commission of the great and the good from the House of Lords to determine Scotland’s future. What a lot of absolute rubbish!

[Ian Murray]

On that point, Madam Deputy Speaker. For the sake of clarity, the Committee will know that the procedure of this House is that any hon. Member can sign any amendment they so wish.

[Stewart Hosie]

So we have confirmation—Labour and UKIP hand in hand, empowering the Tories to run the rule over Scotland again.

As for new clause 21 on a Scottish OBR, we already have one—it is called the Scottish Fiscal Commission. The consultation on its expanded power closed on Friday. One would have thought that Scotland’s sole Labour MP might actually have known what was going on.

New clause 33 would have the Scottish and UK Governments enter into an economic agreement that set up a plan for the implementation of full fiscal autonomy and establish a framework within which the two Governments would co-ordinate their economic and fiscal policies in the context of full fiscal autonomy. That would mean the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government having competence for determining revenues raised in Scotland through taxation and borrowing, and for all of the spending, paying compensation to the UK for shared services. This is the right approach to take. I am just disappointed that we did not have proper time to debate it rather than being subject to the nonsensical rant and talking Scotland down by the so-called shadow Secretary of State. By taking responsibility for key areas of Scottish life, we can improve the Scottish Parliament’s ability to deliver real progress for the Scottish people. New clause 33 does that. It rejects the miserablist approach of the Labour party, and I commend it to the Committee.

[David Mundell]

I do not need a commission to tell me what a disaster full fiscal autonomy would be for Scotland. The hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) set out the facts, and the facts are clear—a £10 billion black hole for Scottish taxpayers to fill. We do not need a commission to tell us that.

I do not accept the new clause on a Scottish OBR, because one thing that the hon. Gentleman said is correct—it is for the Scottish Government to determine for the people of Scotland how they will ensure independent oversight of fiscal policy. The UK Government would like legislation brought forward by the Scottish Government to be consistent with OECD principles for best practice in independent fiscal institutions. We therefore look to have those discussions during the negotiation of the fiscal framework.

I therefore reject the new clauses and propose that we pass the clauses as stated.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

21:59

Division 26

Ayes: 192

---

Labour: 186
Liberal Democrat: 4
Green Party: 1

Noes: 376

---

Conservative: 312
Scottish National Party: 55
Democratic Unionist Party: 4
Plaid Cymru: 2
Ulster Unionist Party: 1
Independent: 1

22:13

Proceedings interrupted (Programme Order, 8 June).

The Chair put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that time (Standing Order No. 83D).

New Clause 21

The Scottish Office for Budget Responsibility

‘(1) Part 2 of Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998 (specific reservations) is amended as follows.

(2) In Section A1 (fiscal, economic and monetary policy)—

(a) For the heading “Exception” substitute “Exceptions”—

(b) After that heading, insert—

“The creation of a body corporate, called The Scottish Office for Budget Responsibility, for the independent scrutiny of Scotland‘s public finances, including all tax and spending in areas for which the Scottish Government has legislative competence.””—(Ian Murray.)

This New Clause would provide for the creation of a Scottish Office for Budget Responsibility to exercise fiscal and budgetary oversight over Scottish Government competencies. The Smith Commission recommended that the Scottish Parliament should seek to expand and strengthen the independent scrutiny of Scotland’s public finances in recognition of the additional variability and uncertainty that further tax and spending devolution will introduce into the budgeting process.

Brought up.

Question put, That the clause be added to the Bill.

22:14

Division 27

Ayes: 194

---

Labour: 188
Liberal Democrat: 4
Social Democratic & Labour Party: 2
Green Party: 1

Noes: 376

---

Conservative: 311
Scottish National Party: 56
Democratic Unionist Party: 4
Plaid Cymru: 2
Ulster Unionist Party: 1
Independent: 1

New Clause 33

Full fiscal autonomy for Scotland

‘(1) The Scottish Government and the Government of the United Kingdom must enter into an agreement (the “Economic Agreement”)—

(a) setting out a plan for implementation of full fiscal autonomy for Scotland, and

(b) establishing a framework within which the two Governments are to coordinate their economic and fiscal policies in the context of full fiscal autonomy for Scotland.

(2) Full fiscal autonomy for Scotland means that—

(a) the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government have competence for determining revenues raised in or as regards Scotland through taxation and borrowing,

(b) the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government have competence for determining levels of public expenditure in or as regards Scotland,

in accordance with the amendments made by this Act.

(3) The framework mentioned in subsection (1)(b) must in particular include arrangements for—

(a) facilitating fiscal coordination,

(b) overseeing economic cooperation,

(c) joint responsibilities in areas of mutual interest,

(d) safeguarding fiscal sustainability.

(4) In determining the terms of the Economic Agreement the two governments must seek to ensure—

(a) the maintenance of monetary stability throughout the United Kingdom,

(b) the maintenance and promotion of the single markets in the United Kingdom and the European Union,

(c) that they cooperate in the exercise of their respective functions relating to the administration and collection of taxes,

(d) an equitable and transparent approach to consequences, resources and rewards,

(e) that the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government retain the benefits of increased tax revenues delivered by successful policies pursued by them,

(f) that the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government have the powers necessary to manage the consequences of full fiscal autonomy for Scotland,

(g) that full fiscal autonomy for Scotland is implemented over a period of time, as the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government acquire capacity to carry out their additional competences.

(5) The Economic Agreement is to be entered into as soon as possible and the two governments must cooperate in good faith with a view to achieving that.

(6) As soon as possible after the Economic Agreement is entered into—

(a) the Scottish Ministers must lay a copy of it before the Scottish Parliament, and

(b) the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before both Houses of Parliament.

(7) The two governments must from time to time review the Economic Agreement and make such amendments to its terms as they may agree with a view to ensuring that it continues to meet the requirements of this section.

(8) Subsection (6) applies to the Economic Agreement as amended as it applies to the Agreement as entered into.

(9) The Secretary of State may, with the agreement of the Scottish Ministers, by regulations modify this section.

(10) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (9) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”

This new clause would require the Scottish and UK governments to reach agreement on the delivery of full fiscal autonomy for Scotland.

Brought up.

Question put, That the clause be added to the Bill.

The Committee proceeded to a Division.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)]

I ask the Serjeant at Arms to investigate the delay in the No Lobby.

22:28

Division 28

Ayes: 58

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Scottish National Party: 56
Social Democratic & Labour Party: 2

Noes: 504

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Conservative: 309
Labour: 185
Democratic Unionist Party: 4
Liberal Democrat: 1
Ulster Unionist Party: 1
Independent: 1
Green Party: 1

New Clause 54

Taxes on income

“In Section A1 in Part 2 of Schedule 5 (fiscal, economic and monetary policy) to the 1998 Act, in the Exceptions, after the entry for local taxes insert ‘Taxes on income’.”—(Stewart Hosie.)

This new clause is intended to devolve income tax completely to Scotland

Brought up.

Question put, That the clause be added to the Bill.

The Committee divided: Ayes 57, Noes 311.

22:47

Division 29

Ayes: 0

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Scottish National Party: 56
Labour: 1

Noes: 0

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Conservative: 304
Democratic Unionist Party: 4
Ulster Unionist Party: 1
Independent: 1

The occupant of the Chair left the Chair (Programme Order, 8 June).

The Deputy Speaker resumed the Chair.

Progress reported; Committee to sit again tomorrow.