Ian Murray
Main Page: Ian Murray (Labour - Edinburgh South)Department Debates - View all Ian Murray's debates with the HM Treasury
(8 years, 10 months ago)
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Stewart Hosie
I agree entirely. None of us should be encouraging tax avoidance or evasion—not least a Tory Government, which is why I am sure the Secretary of State will want to support the full devolution of tax on earned and unearned income. It is a jolly good idea.
However, whether the devolution of income tax is extended or not, issues of implementation must be fully resolved. I ask the Secretary of State to confirm that, as part of the fiscal framework discussions, the following issues are now being fully addressed: the timing of the implementation of the Smith provisions; the length of the transition period and how it relates to the transition period for the Scottish rate of income tax; how the costs of implementation will be met; whether there will be an agreement to revisit the memorandum of understanding between the Scottish Government and HMRC for the Scottish rate of income tax, to ensure that it remains fit for purpose; the enforcement and compliance regime under the Smith income tax proposals; how gift aid and pensions relief will be treated under Smith; how the block grant adjustment will work, although that is much broader than simply income tax; the forecasting of revenues, the interaction between the Office for Budget Responsibility and the Scottish Fiscal Commission and the detail of how we calculate the transfer of revenue; and the continued role of the National Audit Office in working in partnership with Audit Scotland.
The key issue is the forecasting that will drive the revenues that the Scottish Government will get and the block grant adjustment. There has to be a fair balance between the role and input of the OBR and the Scottish Fiscal Commission, particularly given that the OBR uses Treasury numbers to drive its calculations.
As I said at the outset, I am conscious of time; we have many groups of amendments to get through and others will want to speak. I hope that the Secretary of State can answer those important detailed questions on the proposed devolution. I commend amendment 54 to the Committee.
Ian Murray (Edinburgh South) (Lab)
I was not able to make it to the House earlier, Sir David; I would like to express my sympathies to everyone involved in the tragic events in Tunisia. Our thoughts are with the families all across the United Kingdom, but especially the people in Scotland who have been caught up.
I want to speak to new clause 32. Part 2 of the Bill devolves significant new powers to Scotland over income tax and other taxes, and it is a real opportunity to provide the powerhouse Parliament promised by the Smith agreement. Clauses 12, 13 and 14 make provision for transfer to the Scottish Parliament of the power to set rates and bands of income tax, including, as the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) was pushing for, the ability to set a zero rate. The full impact of that and other tax measures should not be downplayed.
Lord Smith himself outlined that the measures proposed in the agreement would create one of the most powerful devolved Parliaments in the world. When taking taxation and spending clauses together, Scotland would be only slightly behind the Canadian provinces and Swiss cantons. Likewise, according to the OECD, in exercising power over setting both the rates and bases of income tax, Scotland would rank above sub-central legislatures in Sweden, Norway, Finland, the US and even Germany.
The economic evidence suggests that fiscal devolution can work. It is our responsibility, and that of the Scottish Government, to make sure that it does—that is the genesis of our new clause 32. However, these are hugely complicated processes; anyone who has tried to read the fiscal framework analysis in the Smith agreement will know that. I note that the Scottish National party and its new friend, the hon. Member for Gainsborough, have tabled new clauses that would seek to devolve income tax in its entirety.
I should say at the start that those are perfectly legitimate arguments that have been debated at great length at both the Calman and Smith commissions. Labour disagrees, because we believe fundamentally in the pooling and sharing of resources across the United Kingdom; that is not a criticism of the SNP position, but merely a disagreement on a fundamental broad principle. We have rightly and repeatedly criticised the Smith agreement and the Bill on a number of occasions, particularly on Second Reading and in last Monday’s debate, but I agree with the hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie): in this instance at least, the Bill and the Smith agreement have got it right. That is probably why there are so few substantive amendments to the income tax clauses. The Chartered Institute of Taxation has echoed that by saying that the commission has made a
“pragmatic set of proposals which shows a lot of thought has been given to balancing the desire of Scots for greater tax powers against the practical obstacles to devolution”.
It is worth reflecting on the Scottish Parliament’s current position on income tax. Since 1999, Scotland has been able to vary the rate of income tax by 3p in the pound. Despite the current clamour for more powers, that power has never been used—incidentally, I believe that it has now lapsed, which shows the problems with the fiscal framework. Notwithstanding that, under the Scotland Act 2012, and as a result of the Calman commission, the Scottish Parliament has been afforded control over the first 10p of the basic rate of tax. Obviously, the Smith agreement and the Bill go much further.
The Scottish Parliament will have total control over income tax rates and thresholds and complete freedom over the levels at which those rates and thresholds are set. That is significant as the estimated devolved income tax liabilities on income tax in 2013-14 amounted to almost £11 billion. That is a considerable sum, the collection and deployment of which confers a substantial degree of responsibility on the Scottish Parliament. If they wish, the Scottish Government—of any colour—can increase or decrease that liability.
Sir Edward Leigh
I entirely accept where the hon. Gentleman is coming from in saying that he wants responsibility to be shared throughout the United Kingdom. However, can he explain why we should share responsibility over thresholds but not, apparently, over bands or rates? I cannot see the logic of that.
Ian Murray
The Scottish Parliament will have a significant ability to adjust the zero rate in particular. I hope that the Secretary of State responds to that point, because the House of Commons Library was quite clear on it. However, there has to be some pooling and sharing. Income tax is the biggest tax that everyone pays. Everyone who works pays a proportion of their income in income tax, above the basic allowance. It is important that everyone has a stake in that game. We could get to a situation in which people who did not have a stake in that game asked what the United Kingdom was for. I fundamentally believe in pooling and sharing, and the Smith agreement struck a reasonable balance.
We need a full analysis of how all the proposals will work. That is why we tabled new clause 32. Some adjustment of the powers might be needed in the future. We do not yet know what effect the implementation of the Scotland Act 2012 will have, because it does not come into force until 2016. The question that the hon. Member for Gainsborough raises relates to what we are trying to achieve with new clause 32, because the report would examine the consequences of this transfer of powers.
Andrew Gwynne (Denton and Reddish) (Lab)
Is not one of the unintended consequences of the devolution of income tax to the Scottish Parliament that it will affect UK-wide facilities such as gift aid, which reimburses charities on the basis of the basic rate of income tax that is set at a UK level? If there were two different basic rates, might that not cause complexity for donors in tracking what they pay to HMRC and to Revenue Scotland? Does my hon. Friend think that that issue should be considered by the review that would be conducted under new clause 32?
Ian Murray
I am delighted by that intervention, because I was going to speak about that issue later. Given the time constraints, I will take that point out of my speech, because my hon. Friend has made it well. The Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations has raised the relationship between income tax and gift aid. Although that matter is not mentioned in new clause 32, I hope that if there is a reporting mechanism, it will look not only at gift aid, but at pension relief. That is another matter that was not mentioned by the Smith agreement, but which has been raised by many of the organisations that have been in touch with us about the Bill. Gift aid is worth £1 billion a year to charities, so we must ensure that it is considered properly.
Stewart Hosie
The hon. Gentleman spoke about the principle of pooling and sharing, and I have heard that argument before. However, if it were a real principle, it would apply to the aggregates levy, landfill tax, air passenger duty and other small taxes that have been devolved. There is no principled reason why it is required to be applied to income tax. He rather gave the game away when he spoke about the ability to vary the rate by 3p either way, which was the original plan, and the ability to set the first 10p of income tax. Why does he think that so little is enough for a nation like Scotland? Why is he so afraid of giving our national Parliament all the powers it needs to tax income properly?
Ian Murray
What the hon. Gentleman is asking for is full fiscal autonomy. There are many amendments that will allow us to have a full debate about that later this evening, but I fundamentally disagree with that principle because the pooling and sharing of resources is important. The difference between income tax and the aggregates levy, landfill tax and all the other taxes he mentioned is that they are removable taxes, whereas income tax is not. We should be pooling and sharing resources, and we should therefore ensure that the significant sum of £11 billion is part of the overall matrix of the United Kingdom.
As I said at the start of my speech, I do not disagree with everything that the hon. Gentleman said, but we disagree on the fundamental principle of pooling and sharing. His speech was completely reasonable in terms of what he is seeking to achieve, but Labour Members simply disagree with the broad principle of not pooling and sharing. There is no right or wrong on these issues in terms of what should be devolved; the issue is whether one believes in these broad principles or not.
I find it difficult in these debates to have 56 SNP MPs braying at me from behind, when I am actually agreeing with them. I have no idea what they will be like when I disagree with them. I am paying a compliment to the hon. Member for Dundee East, which I do not do often, and he is still unhappy with my contribution. Never mind; given that they have signed most of our amendments to the welfare clauses, perhaps we will be much more collegiate tomorrow.
I was explaining new clause 32. The Scottish Affairs Committee report on the fundamental principles of the Smith agreement, which was published in March, said:
“The Smith Agreement represents the best of both worlds. It presents Scotland with much greater powers over taxation, meaning for the first time the majority of the money the Scottish Government spends will be paid for by its own taxation. This will make it more fiscally accountable to the people of Scotland for how it spends their taxes.”
I am confident that the income tax provisions in the Bill strike the right balance between reserved and devolved taxation, although I agree with the hon. Member for Gainsborough that some movement might be required in the future.
I believe that these clauses are in the spirit and the letter of the Smith agreement and the vow. The vow is quite concise on these issues. It says very little or nothing at all about taxation. One thing that it does say, which goes back to the pooling and sharing of resources, is that the Barnett formula should be maintained. The Bill and the Smith agreement are utterly in accord with that stand.
Mrs Anne Main (St Albans) (Con)
Last week, I supported the SNP on full fiscal autonomy and scrapping the Barnett formula, although I know the hon. Gentleman did not. The SNP Members all trooped through the Lobby to vote for that, so does he share my surprise that they have come back today with amendments that do not include it?
Ian Murray
Nothing ever surprises me, although I was a little surprised last week that the 56 SNP MPs went through the Lobby with the Thatcherite arm of the Conservative party. That was because full fiscal autonomy would deliver something that would be fundamentally damaging to Scotland. The hon. Lady is absolutely correct. [Interruption.] I thank her for waking up all the SNP MPs with her intervention.
The Smith agreement said:
“Income Tax will remain a shared tax and both the UK and Scottish Parliaments will share control of Income Tax. MPs representing constituencies across the whole of the UK will continue to decide the UK’s Budget, including Income Tax…Within this framework, the Scottish Parliament will have the power to set the rates of Income Tax and the thresholds at which these are paid for the non-savings and non-dividend income of Scottish taxpayers”.
That is exactly what the Bill does, and it is important to highlight two aspects of that quotation.
First, maintaining income tax as a UK-wide tax is critical to the continued pooling and sharing of resources. That facilitates UK-wide redistribution on the basis of need, which underlines the welfare state and the state pension system. The Church of Scotland expressed the same view when it argued for
“a degree of solidarity across the United Kingdom, where prosperity is shared and those with broadest shoulders can carry the extra weight of supporting those less fortunate.”
Secondly, the Smith agreement explicitly mentions the continuing right of Scottish MPs to vote on the Budget within the framework that it sets out. That is equally important, particularly given the Government’s proposals on English votes for English laws. Devolving income tax in its entirety, which the hon. Members for Dundee East and for Gainsborough are advocating, would place that right in doubt and create two classes of MP in this place. That risk was the subject of considerable debate in the Smith commission. As long as one believes in the pooling and sharing of resources, which we certainly do, Smith’s recommendation to retain income tax as a shared tax is critical. That is why we reject amendment 124 and new clause 54, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Dundee East.
New clause 32 concentrates on the implementation of the powers being transferred and, as I have said a number of times in this Committee, the use of those powers. What we are trying to achieve chimes with much of what the hon. Member for Dundee East said, when he laid out the concerns about how the proposals would be monitored, how the number of income tax payers would be determined, the “no detriment” policies across the United Kingdom and the complicated nature of the fiscal framework.
The report under new clause 32 would include
“a review of the revised fiscal framework”,
given its complicated nature. It would also include
“the tax year to which sections 12 and 13 of this Act will apply, and the day on which they are due to come into force”
so that businesses are able to plan. It would include details of the number of staff that both Governments would assign to the implementation of the new Scottish rate of income tax to ensure that adequate resources were deployed to make it happen. It would be useful if the Secretary of State responded to the particular concern that the staffing level to determine the Scottish rate of income tax might be deficient.
Tommy Sheppard (Edinburgh East) (SNP)
I am just trying to understand the point that the hon. Gentleman is making. As I understand it, this is an opportunity to discuss whether the Scottish Parliament should have enhanced powers over income tax. His position seems to be that, rather than take that step, we should have a review of the situation. I can understand the logic of having a review of the powers, but why does he think that the review would be better in the hands of the Tory Chancellor, rather than the representatives of the people of Scotland in the Scottish Parliament? Surely the time has come to allow the Scottish people to determine these matters for themselves, rather than a Tory Government who have only one single representative in Scotland.
Ian Murray
I think that the hon. Gentleman is confusing two issues. We fundamentally agree with the clauses relating to the devolution of income tax, but these are hugely complex matters, as is demonstrated by the complicated nature of the devolution of the 10p income tax provision in the Scotland Act 2012. The new clause would not prevent the Bill from proceeding; it would merely allow the Secretary of State to bring to the House a report on the progress of implementation.
There is another difficulty. The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right—the Scottish Parliament could produce a report and submit it—but I cannot, in the House of Commons, command a different Parliament to do something, which is why I am asking the Secretary of State to produce the report.
It is right for these issues to be raised. I hope that the Scottish Parliament will also examine them in great detail, and will present a full report to both Houses. Our aim is to protect Scottish taxpayers rather than to create a political divide. It is disappointing that, although we agree on the broad principles of the devolution of income tax, Members are trying to bring about division between us. We are trying to be a responsible Opposition in calling for a report on the implementation of income tax rates.
New clause 32 calls for
“a report on the identification of Scottish taxpayers”.
The aim is to ensure that individuals are either Scottish or UK taxpayers but not both, to prevent the double taxation that was mentioned by the hon. Member for Dundee East, and to deal with cross-border mid-financial year movements, which is important in the context of where people may live or work.
The review must include the rates and bands at which the Scottish income tax will be set, and a projection of the impact of the tax on revenues generated in Scotland and across the United Kingdom. That is primarily designed to ensure that Scotland does not become worse off over time owing to the relative tax bases and demographic or behavioural changes in the United Kingdom overall. Such a review would allow us to assess the transitional process, and to ensure that the projected rates and bands accorded with the principle of no detriment for both Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom. That would protect Scottish taxpayers, as well as taxpayers in the rest of the UK.
Critically—the Smith agreement restates this—any updated fiscal framework should secure the Barnett formula, with the Scottish budget bearing the full costs of policy decisions that reduce or increase revenues or expenditure. That is crucial to the fiscal framework.
My hon. Friend the Member for Denton and Reddish (Andrew Gwynne) mentioned gift aid, and I hope that the Minister will be able to respond to what he said.
I think it important for the people of Scotland to know what their Government are doing about these substantial income tax powers, whatever the colour of that Government. Those powers are worth £11 billion, and they are fundamental to the working lives of people in Scotland. As I have said all along, this is about transparency: transparency in regard to whether additional powers should be devolved, and transparency in regard to the use and impact of those that are devolved. That is what our new clauses 1, 21 and 32 seek to foster.
All I ask is that the United Kingdom Government, and, indeed, the Scottish Government, approach the Bill in the same spirit of transparency and openness as us, and agree to new clause 32. We shall be pressing it to a vote later this evening.
Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD)
As others have said, the genesis of the clause lies in the report of the Smith commission. I have supported the commission since the day, indeed the hour, when it reported, but we cannot ignore the fact that the process was undertaken at great speed. Necessarily, given that five parties were engaged in the process, it involved a degree of compromise all round. It is for that reason that all of us undertook to ensure that there would be consultation following the publication of the report and, subsequently, the draft clauses.
In a debate in which consensus is not always easy to come by, I am pleased to note that there is consensus on the fact that the clause is a faithful replication of the agreement that was reached under the chairmanship of Lord Smith. However, the consultation that has been conducted since the publication of the draft clauses at the end of January has highlighted, and generated, a substantial number of important matters, some of which are technical and some of which go to the heart of the issue of taxation itself.
I suggest to the Secretary of State that further consideration may be necessary. He has the ability, through the good office that he holds, to bring all the parties together again to consider the representations that have been made during the consultation, and to consider whether, given the complexities and possible areas of conflict that could arise, it is actually worth implementing the tax power in the way that is currently envisaged. If the consultation is to be carried out in good faith—and, for my part, it always has been—there are sufficient matters about which we should be talking. That would still allow us—if it were necessary, and if it were possible to construct a consensus—to return to the issues on Report.
Nigel Mills
I rise as a reluctant supporter of the devolution of income tax to the different countries of the Union. I agree with the hon. Member for Edinburgh South (Ian Murray) that people throughout the United Kingdom should feel that they are paying the most important tax—the tax that puts the largest amount of money into the UK pot—and seeing it redistributed. We are where we are, however, and we are talking about devolving income tax to Scotland.
I fear that we have one foot in each camp, with part of the tax in this Parliament and part of it in the Scottish Parliament, and that we will end up in a real mess. I am not sure how it is possible to make a tax work when a Parliament can set the rate, the bands and the starting point, but not the actual rules. A particular policy issue in Scotland may mean that the Scottish Parliament rightly wants to incentivise certain employment and income activities. That may not be not a priority for the United Kingdom as a whole, perhaps for reasons of scale or owing to a different approach, but there will be no mechanism enabling income tax in Scotland to promote that certain activity. A new tax relief for people working in the offshore oil and gas industry, for instance, might not be a priority for the UK as a whole, but it might be a priority in Scotland.
The record of our income tax code is cluttered with examples of the use of the tax code to promote certain types of behaviour. I am not sure that we can secure the full and effective use of a tax code if our Parliament is not setting the rate and looking after local activities.
The flipside will be that tax avoidance as a result of a loophole may become material for the Scottish Parliament in the case of a certain piece of exploitation, but will not become material to the budget of the whole UK. It may be extremely important in Scotland to get that loophole closed, but in the UK there may be several others that are ahead of it in the queue, because it does not represent a large loss to the Westminster Parliament. An action that ought to be taken on something that has a material impact in one part of the UK will not be taken because of the strange disparity that exists.
If we are going to start devolving taxes, we should step back and have a look at what a federal UK tax system would be like. We should work out which taxes are federal and which are devolved, and then try to bring about some consistency in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland so that similar taxes can be devolved in the same way, rather than adopting a piecemeal approach in regard to corporation tax in Northern Ireland, income tax in Scotland, and so forth. I do not think that anyone in the country will know to which Parliament they are paying what tax, and who has complete control of it. That means that we will not get all the advantages that we expect, such as the ownership and the accountability that my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) mentioned.
I do not think that we are achieving the sharing and the pooling that the hon. Member for Edinburgh South wanted, the coherent use of income tax that the SNP wants, or the full devolution that would make sense. We appear to have become involved in a strange halfway fudge which we may regret in a few years’ time. I think it would be better to step back and try to get this right from the start, rather than trying to find a way of clearing up the mess.
I accept that there are always good reasons why the line is drawn where it is. We must be very careful about tax avoidance through the use of residency, or pretend residency. If I am working full-time in Scotland, to get the Scottish rate—which may be higher or lower than the rate in the rest of the UK—I shall probably have to go and live in Scotland. I suspect that I cannot achieve that artificially. If I have large dividend flows, I can probably pretend that I am in Edinburgh when I am in London and vice versa in order to obtain the tax advantage. I can see why there is an attraction in having one UK-wide passive income tax, rather than an active tax.
Ian Murray
The hon. Gentleman is raising the issue of what are known in my constituency as “willies”—people who work in London, live in Edinburgh. Those are people who take the trip down to London every Monday and go back on a Thursday evening. According to the House of Commons Library, the UK’s reason for not devolving dividend income is to prevent people from pushing money into dividend income and taking advantage of a differential rate.
Nigel Mills
Yes, as I was saying, I accept there are always reasons for drawing the line where we do, and trying to stop tax avoidance within a territory is a powerful reason. However, that has left us here with a convoluted tax system where we seem to be devolving part of it, and that is not a sensible approach. It would be better to have a federal income tax which everyone in the UK paid at a lower rate than they pay now and which covered all passive income, and then have a devolved income tax like the one in the United States. It has a state income tax that can be credited against the federal one. That may be a better, more sustainable system than the one we have.
Mr Gauke
A request was made of the UK Government and we provided information on what the position was. As I was saying a moment ago, there are many calls for an expansion of section 33 and the refund scheme. The cost of the scheme being widely expanded could be substantial. At a time when there are considerable constraints on the public finances, we have to be careful about responding to every request and claim, however reasonable it might be.
Ian Murray
I understand what the Treasury Minister says about the number of requests received for exemptions from section 33, but this is not a new exemption. There is a net gain of many millions of pounds a year to the Treasury from this change. Therefore the net effect of changing it back would be zero. We are not asking for exemption from section 33 to be opened up to charities. That is a separate debate. This is a case where the Treasury is a net beneficiary. How does Scotland get that money back?
Rob Marris
The right hon. Gentleman will know that the whole history of airline travel hitherto has been that it increases exponentially. It has done so, and if allowed to do so, will continue.
So I do not share this cosy consensus. I am not part of the airline and airport love-ins. As Members will know, airlines and their passengers already get a huge subsidy because of the low price they pay for airline fuel—kerosene. Members ought to bear this in mind when debating APD: no doubt the figures are lower in Scotland, but across the UK in any given year half the population do not fly. I believe that hon. Members have a completely distorted view of this matter. I suspect that I am one of the very few Members of this House who does not fly; I have not flown for years. I suspect that every other Member has a distorted view, based on self-interest. [Interruption.] It is not me who is causing a huge amount of environmental degradation through flying. The greenhouse gases emitted by aeroplanes at high altitude are far more damaging than the same amount of greenhouse gases emitted at sea level. Air travel is the most polluting form of mass travel.
In that context, I regret that the Government are devolving air passenger duty. Yes, I would increase it. The UK Government will live to regret this measure, because we are clearly heading towards the abolition of air passenger duty in Scotland and, eventually, through a process of “beggar my neighbour” downwards, across the rest of the United Kingdom. That will be another nail in the coffin of the doomed and uneconomic HS2 railway line. People will continue to fly south from Scotland and the north of England, and vice versa, rather than using the HS2 line. It is already uneconomic and, with the abolition of air passenger duty, it will become even more so.
Ian Murray
I do not want to detain the Committee for long, but let me just pose a few questions on what has been said about air passenger duty and the aggregates levy. I shall start with air passenger duty. Prior to the election, Opposition Members wrote to the Chancellor of the Exchequer asking what impact a rate of air passenger duty that was higher in Scotland than in England would have on regional English airports and Scottish airports. Will the Minister tell us what the Government’s movements have been on that impact assessment?
Hon. Members were berating my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South West (Rob Marris) a moment ago, but he has raised an incredibly important environmental issue. The issue has been raised directly by the Committee on Climate Change, which reported recently that Scotland had missed its climate change target by 4.5%, the third time in a row that it had missed an annual target. The report also asked the Scottish Government to assess the impact of carbon on the economy in relation to the slashing of air passenger duty. I cannot ask the Scottish Government this question directly from the Dispatch Box, but can the Minister tell me whether an environmental assessment has been carried out on the raising or lowering of the duty?
On the aggregates levy, will the Minister tell us what progress has been made on resolving the legal issues relating to state aid and when we can expect the levy to be devolved to the Scottish Parliament?
Mr Gauke
We have had a reasonably lengthy debate in which Members have not, for the most part, tended to differ on the substance of the clause on air passenger duty, although the hon. Member for Wolverhampton South West (Rob Marris) is never afraid of setting out a contrary opinion. In fact, some Opposition Back Benchers argued for the abolition of APD, which would cost about £3.2 billion, while others argued for increasing it. If there is a need for fresh thinking among Labour Members, we are hearing plenty of it this evening, even if there has not been much in the way of coherence.
Mr Gauke
I should put it as neutrally as I possibly can. We do not believe that the behavioural effects are as great as those set out in the PwC report, which is why we believe APD does raise revenue. There is a consensus—not a universal consensus—that it is right that we move on APD. On the point about regional airports, we will come back to that later in the summer.
May I also pick up the point on the aggregates levy? The hon. Member for Edinburgh South (Ian Murray) asked about the likely progress on legal matters. The European Commission was forced to reconsider its 2002 decision that the exemptions from the levy did not provide state aid following legal action by the British Aggregates Association. It announced its decision in March, finding that the levy as a whole was lawful, as were most of the exemptions. The Government are currently informally consulting trade associations on draft legislation to reinstate those exemptions—for example on slate and clay—found lawful by the Commission in March 2015.
With those points of clarification, I hope that the clauses before us can stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1 agreed to.
Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
New Clause 1
Independent Commission on Full Fiscal Autonomy
‘(1) The Secretary of State shall appoint a commission of between four and eleven members to conduct an analysis of the impact of full fiscal autonomy on the Scottish economy, labour market and public finances and to report by 31 March 2016.
(2) No Member of the House of Commons or of the Scottish Parliament may be a member of the commission.
(3) No employee of the Scottish Government or of any government Department or agency anywhere in the United Kingdom may be a member of the commission.
(4) The Secretary of State shall appoint as members of the commission only persons who appear to the Secretary of State to hold a relevant qualification or to have relevant experience.
(5) The Secretary of State shall not appoint as a member of the commission any person who is a member of a political party.
(6) Before appointing any member of the commission, the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) the Chair of any select committee appointed by the House of Commons to consider Scottish affairs, and
(b) the Chair of any select committee appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of Her Majesty’s Treasury and its associated public bodies.
(7) The Secretary of State may by regulations issue the commission with terms of reference and guidelines for the commission’s working methods, including an outline definition of the policy of full fiscal autonomy for the commission to analyse.
(8) The Secretary of State must lay copies of the report of the commission before both Houses of Parliament, and must transmit a copy of the report of the commission to the presiding officer of the Scottish Parliament.
(9) Regulations under this section must be made by statutory instrument, subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.” —(Ian Murray.)
This New Clause requires the Secretary of State for Scotland to establish an independent commission of external experts, appointed in consultation with the Treasury Select Committee and Scottish Affairs Select Committee, to publish a report by 31 March 2016 setting out an analysis of the impact of the policy of Full Fiscal Autonomy on the Scottish economy, labour market and public finances.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Natascha Engel)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 21—The Scottish Office for Budget Responsibility—
‘(1) Part 2 of Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998 (specific reservations) is amended as follows.
(2) In Section A1 (fiscal, economic and monetary policy)—
(a) For the heading “Exception” substitute “Exceptions”—
(b) After that heading, insert—
“The creation of a body corporate, called The Scottish Office for Budget Responsibility, for the independent scrutiny of Scotland‘s public finances, including all tax and spending in areas for which the Scottish Government has legislative competence.””
This New Clause would provide for the creation of a Scottish Office for Budget Responsibility to exercise fiscal and budgetary oversight over Scottish Government competencies. The Smith Commission recommended that the Scottish Parliament should seek to expand and strengthen the independent scrutiny of Scotland’s public finances in recognition of the additional variability and uncertainty that further tax and spending devolution will introduce into the budgeting process.
New clause 23—Local Discretionary Taxation—
Individual local authorities in Scotland shall have the discretion to raise additional income by levying a tax, in addition to Council Tax and Non-Domestic Rates, on either residents, occupiers, property owners or visitors in the local authority or within a discrete area of the local authority.”
The power will enable local authorities to introduce tax(es) without the need to seek approval from Scottish Government, with the rates and reliefs being determined locally and the local authority being both granted powers to ensure that those on which the tax is levied have a legal obligation to pay and the local authority having the discretion to determine how the additional revenue is expended.
New clause 24—Tax and Economy Forum—
‘(1) The Secretary of State shall appoint a Tax and Economy Forum to conduct an analysis of the impact of the changes in legislative and executive competence resulting from this Act on the economy, labour market and public finances in Scotland and in the other parts of the United Kingdom.
(2) The Tax and Economy Forum may make recommendations for fiscal reforms within Scotland, to be considered by the Secretary of State.”
The new Clause would require the appointment of a Tax and Economy Forum to assess the impacts of fiscal devolution proposed within this Bill on Scotland and on the rest of the United Kingdom.
New clause 25—UK Commission on fiscal powers—
‘(1) Within 6 months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State shall appoint a commission to examine the deployment of fiscal powers at local, devolved and United Kingdom levels.
(2) The commission shall comprise between 4 and 6 representatives of any of—
(a) the Scottish Parliament,
(b) the National Assembly for Wales,
(c) the Northern Ireland Assembly,
(d) local government,
(e) the House of Commons, and
(f) the House of Lords.
(3) The bodies mentioned in subsection (2) shall select their representatives in any way they see fit and the chief executive or presiding officer of each of those bodies shall inform the Secretary of State of the names of the representatives of those bodies, which may replace their representatives whenever the body concerned has determined to do so.
(4) Subject to subsection (5), the commission may determine its own quorum and methods of working and must publish a protocol setting out its own terms of reference.
(5) The commission shall keep the operation of fiscal powers under review, making reports and recommendations as it deems appropriate.
The purpose of this New Clause is to ensure that there is proper consultation between the different parts of the United Kingdom to ensure that new Scottish fiscal powers are deployed in a way that does not undermine the cohesion of the UK. The proposed Commission could also make recommendation regarding the future of devolved fiscal powers.
New clause 33—Full fiscal autonomy for Scotland—
‘(1) The Scottish Government and the Government of the United Kingdom must enter into an agreement (the “Economic Agreement”)—
(a) setting out a plan for implementation of full fiscal autonomy for Scotland, and
(b) establishing a framework within which the two Governments are to coordinate their economic and fiscal policies in the context of full fiscal autonomy for Scotland.
(2) Full fiscal autonomy for Scotland means that—
(a) the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government have competence for determining revenues raised in or as regards Scotland through taxation and borrowing,
(b) the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government have competence for determining levels of public expenditure in or as regards Scotland,
in accordance with the amendments made by this Act.
(3) The framework mentioned in subsection (1)(b) must in particular include arrangements for—
(a) facilitating fiscal coordination,
(b) overseeing economic cooperation,
(c) joint responsibilities in areas of mutual interest,
(d) safeguarding fiscal sustainability.
(4) In determining the terms of the Economic Agreement the two governments must seek to ensure—
(a) the maintenance of monetary stability throughout the United Kingdom,
(b) the maintenance and promotion of the single markets in the United Kingdom and the European Union,
(c) that they cooperate in the exercise of their respective functions relating to the administration and collection of taxes,
(d) an equitable and transparent approach to consequences, resources and rewards,
(e) that the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government retain the benefits of increased tax revenues delivered by successful policies pursued by them,
(f) that the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government have the powers necessary to manage the consequences of full fiscal autonomy for Scotland,
(g) that full fiscal autonomy for Scotland is implemented over a period of time, as the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government acquire capacity to carry out their additional competences.
(5) The Economic Agreement is to be entered into as soon as possible and the two governments must cooperate in good faith with a view to achieving that.
(6) As soon as possible after the Economic Agreement is entered into—
(a) the Scottish Ministers must lay a copy of it before the Scottish Parliament, and
(b) the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before both Houses of Parliament.
(7) The two governments must from time to time review the Economic Agreement and make such amendments to its terms as they may agree with a view to ensuring that it continues to meet the requirements of this section.
(8) Subsection (6) applies to the Economic Agreement as amended as it applies to the Agreement as entered into.
(9) The Secretary of State may, with the agreement of the Scottish Ministers, by regulations modify this section.
(10) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (9) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This new clause would require the Scottish and UK governments to reach agreement on the delivery of full fiscal autonomy for Scotland.
Amendment 3, in clause 63, page 67, line 30, leave out subsection (3) and insert—
‘(3) Part 2 of the Bill comes into force at the end of 2 months beginning with the publication of the report of the Independent Commission on Full Fiscal Autonomy appointed under section (Independent Commission on Full Fiscal Autonomy).”
This amendment provides that Part 2 (Tax) will not come into force at the end of two months beginning with the day on which the Act is passed, in order to link the commencement of the tax provisions of the Act with the work of the Independent Commission on Full Fiscal Autonomy, appointed under New Clause NC1, which would be required to report by 31 March 2016.
Ian Murray
It is great to see you in the Chair, Ms Engel. Congratulations on your elevation to Deputy Speaker. It appears that in tonight’s debate there is a sense of déjà vu, as we debated full fiscal autonomy a few weeks ago. Given that the Committee stage of this Bill has been dominated by the SNP manifesto commitment to deliver full fiscal autonomy and bringing forward its watered down promise to deliver it this year, it is good that we have the opportunity to try to put it into this Bill. In fact, as we witnessed last week, the SNP’s hand had to be forced by its arch Thatcherite colleagues, when its Members went into the Lobby with the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh). I said at the time that the worst possible scenario for Scotland would be the SNP demanding full fiscal autonomy and its being delivered by a majority Conservative Government. Those words were echoed—
Ian Murray
Let me just finish this point. Those words were echoed by Dave Watson, the head of campaigns at Unison Scotland, who said:
“An incoming Tory government faced with a big number of SNP MPs, saying, ‘OK, if that’s what Scotland voted for, let’s give them Full Fiscal Autonomy.’ The Treasury would be able to dump £7.5bn of the deficit on the Scottish Government and just walk away.”
The fact that the SNP has another fudged amendment this evening shows that it does not believe that full fiscal autonomy would be good for Scotland.
Ian Murray
Before the hon. Gentleman pops up to say, “Too wee, too stupid and too poor,” as he always does, may I remind the House that that was a phrase coined by the SNP Finance Secretary and no one else? It is worth putting that on the record, given that he always pops up to say that.
Lord Smith of Kelvin said in his report that one of the primary aims of the Smith agreement was to provide the Scottish Parliament with accountability—
Ian Murray
I said that I would give way, and I will do so when I have made a little progress, given the late hour.
Lord Smith said that the Scottish Parliament was a Parliament that spends resources but does not raise any, so there is no accountability or responsibility. The Scotland Act 2012 resolved that position a little with the devolution of the most immovable taxes and 10p of income tax—
Pete Wishart
I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. This rewriting of history is great and it is fantastic to find out the position of the Scottish National party, but perhaps he can explain the position of Scottish Labour. He abstained on full fiscal autonomy. Is that because he is uncertain, or is he perhaps now unsure about full fiscal autonomy?
Ian Murray
I am delighted by that intervention. What I did not want to do last week was rain on the parade of the Scottish National party as its Members went through the Lobby with the Thatcherite Conservatives to deliver full fiscal autonomy for Scotland. That is what seems to be wrong. The SNP is in full agreement with the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) again tonight on the subject of the devolution of the entirety of income tax. Perhaps the party has a right-wing agenda after all.
As we know, the Bill provides full control of nearly 50% of revenues and more than 60% of spending. According to the Library, that will be 65% if the devolution of housing benefit is agreed tomorrow, making it one of the most powerful devolved Parliaments in the world. The OECD ranked the Smith proposals and came to the same conclusion.
With that accountability and responsibility must come transparency and honesty. During the general election campaign, the First Minister and SNP candidates repeatedly said that they would vote for full fiscal autonomy this year. That was reaffirmed in the television debates. All the impartial and independent expert analysis of full fiscal autonomy shows clearly that that would devastate Scotland’s financial position. That is the genesis of our new clause 1. If the Scottish Government want to dismiss all the independent experts simply because they do not agree with them, let us set up an independent commission to consider the consequences on Scotland’s finances of full fiscal autonomy.
Martin John Docherty (West Dunbartonshire) (SNP)
Subsection (2) states:
“No Member of the House of Commons or of the Scottish Parliament may be a member of the commission.”
Is the hon. Gentleman saying that the Members of the unelected and unaccountable Chamber at the other end of this building could be members, such as the possible future chair, Baroness Goldie of Bishopton?
Ian Murray
The new clause is quite clear. I do not think it would be appropriate for Members of the House of Lords to serve on the commission—[Interruption.] Will SNP Members let me finish the sentence before they start braying from the Back Benches again?
The commission would specifically be designed to have no politicians on it from either Parliament, as well as no employees of the Scottish Government or the UK Government or of any agency related to them. It should be a commission of impartial experts in the field and if the Secretary of State wants to agree to the new clause, I am happy to take on board the suggestion that “no Member of the House of Lords” should appear in it, too.
Alex Salmond
On a point of order, Ms Engel. I am not sure that I heard the hon. Gentleman correctly, but he seems to be redrafting his clause during his speech. Would it be in order for him to redraft his new clause to include the House of Lords during his speech? Can he be that uncertain of his arguments?
The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Natascha Engel)
The right hon. Gentleman knows that that is a matter of debate, so let us continue with that debate.
Ian Murray
The problem with the right hon. Member for Gordon (Alex Salmond) is that he does not want to debate full fiscal autonomy, as he knows that it is a bad policy. Let me emphasise that if the Secretary of State wants to accept the new clause, I would be more than happy to ensure that Members of the House of Lords were not on the commission. Let us be transparent and accountable in this place, rather than nitpicking about parts of the clause. The SNP do not want the scrutiny and that is the key to this argument.
Let us consider some of that scrutiny. The much-quoted IFS analysed full fiscal autonomy in Scotland and said that it would cost £7.6 billion next year and up to £10 billion by 2020. It has made it clear that that is over and above the deficit of the UK at the moment and the spending profile of the current Conservative Government. Let me emphasise again, as this has been misquoted by the hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson) on a number of occasions, that that figure is in addition to the current UK deficit.
The impartial analysis has been dismissed by the Scottish Government, so let us turn to another source of information, Her Majesty’s Treasury, which analysed these figures with results broadly in line with the analysis of the IFS. According to Treasury costings that I obtained through a freedom of information request, full fiscal autonomy would leave Scotland with an additional cash terms deficit of £7.7 billion in 2015-16, rising to £8.4 billion in 2019-20.
Mr MacNeil
The hon. Gentleman will be aware that between 2007 and 2009 the UK’s deficit quadrupled. Given the significance that he attaches to deficits and to one year, what significance does he attach to the quadrupling of the debt of a state in a two-year period?
Ian Murray
I am not sure I understand the intervention. We are debating a deficit in Scotland being £7.6 billion over and above any UK deficit, rising to £10 billion by 2020. If we are defending Scottish jobs and livelihoods, that seems not just economically incredible, but economic illiteracy. Hon. Members need not take my word for it. The Scottish Trades Union Congress general secretary, Grahame Smith, commented that the Scottish Government’s own accounts were
“a sobering reminder of some of the risks of full fiscal autonomy”.
That is from the trade unions in Scotland.
The Scottish Government sneaked out their own oil and gas bulletin, their first since May 2014, last week on the last day of the Scottish Parliament. It would be good to look at that alongside the independence White Paper. The bulletin was very much in accord with the Office for Budget Responsibility that was rubbished just a few days before. It showed that North sea oil revenues and projections have fallen drastically in recent times, so let us have a look at those figures. The Scottish Government’s own oil and gas bulletin of June 2015 estimated North sea tax receipts for the period 2016-20 to be £5.8 billion. The same scenario from the same bulletin 13 months earlier estimated the receipts to be well in excess of £26 billion. Even if we compare one year—say, 2016-17—revenues had fallen from a projected £6.9 billion to £1.1 billion, and the lower estimates are as low as £500 million.
These are the Scottish Government’s own figures—all in all, an 85% drop. That tells us two things. First, it blows apart the financial basis for full fiscal autonomy. Secondly, like my new clauses 1 and 21, it calls for a more robust and impartial analysis of the Scottish economy and public finances. That is why we tabled new clauses 1 and 21. New clause 21, alongside new clause 1, would provide for the creation of a Scottish office for budget responsibility to exercise independent and impartial fiscal and budget oversight over Scottish Government devolved competencies.
The Smith commission recommended that
“the Scottish Parliament should seek to expand and strengthen the independent scrutiny of Scotland’s public finances in recognition of the additional variability and uncertainty that further tax and spending devolution will introduce into the budgeting process.”
The new clauses would do just that and take away the politicisation of one of the fundamental underpinnings of the Scottish economy, the financing of Scottish public services and, crucially, though it tends to be forgotten in this debate, the livelihoods of everyone living and working in Scotland.
I would go further and ensure that the Scottish office for budget responsibility assesses and reports on individual party manifestos, so that the public can be confident that what they are being sold is both credible and desirable. This is about simple transparency and accountability. That transparency and accountability, as I have said, has not been forthcoming on the current manifesto commitment on full fiscal autonomy. If we had had a Scottish office for budget responsibility at the last election, it would have reported that FFA would be hugely disadvantageous to Scotland. It would have backed up the IFS analysis that showed that FFA did not work and that Scotland would need a real-terms growth rate of 4.5% per year at least between 2013-14 and 2019-20. The assistant general secretary of the STUC, Mr Stephen Boyd, commented exactly on this and said:
“The implication across the board is that taxes would be cut. There are a number of examples where the Scottish Government would be trading a real and immediate cut in revenue for benefits that may not be great in the long run.”
That shows that it would not be achievable in the figures from the IFS. The IFS’s conclusion is that FFA would incur deep, deep cuts in spending or huge tax rises.
It is easy to talk about figures, percentages and statistics, but this has to be about the everyday lives of ordinary, hard-working Scottish families. Inflicting a policy on Scotland that would leave a deficit larger than the entire education budget, or more than three quarters the size of the NHS budget, will not assist Scotland. We all reject the Conservative Government’s misguided austerity, which we know is ideologically driven, rather than an attempt to balance the country’s finances, but we must also reject any policy that would inflict harsher and deeper austerity in Scotland. [Interruption.] This is not, as some would claim—they are claiming it as I speak—about being anti-Scottish, anti-aspiration or anti-hope for the ingenuity, passion and entrepreneurial spirit of Scotland; it is a sobering response to a key manifesto commitment from the Scottish National party.
SNP Members dismiss the views of the IFS, the OBR and even their own GERS reports, but even Jonathan Portes, the director of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, has said on FFA:
“If the SNP plan for full fiscal autonomy were to go ahead, then, as a number of commentators have said, that would lead to very, very severe austerity in Scotland.”
That is why Labour is against full fiscal autonomy; that is why we believe in the pooling and sharing of resources across the United Kingdom; and that is why the public voted to remain part of the United Kingdom.
George Kerevan
Does the hon. Gentleman not see that there is a contradiction in standing up and telling us repeatedly that full fiscal freedom would be bad for Scotland and asking for an independent budget review, which he clearly does not want to take account of? He wants an independent budget office, but he is telling us what it is going to say.
Ian Murray
That is a rather strange intervention. If Members read new clause 1 and new clause 21, they will see very clearly that what we are asking for is an independent commission to analyse the consequences for Scotland of full fiscal autonomy. If the SNP is so confident about its figures, it should back that proposal and then we will have the transparency, impartiality and independence of those policies. If it is so confident that it was not fiddling the figures, it should help us to set up a Scottish office for budget responsibility and let that body analyse its figures. However, it is clear once again that, when we shine the light of scrutiny on SNP policies, its Members want to talk about the process but not look at the impartial and independent evidence before us. If they are so confident, they will back new clause 1 and new clause 21 and bring much needed transparency, credibility and accountability back to the Scottish Parliament’s finances.
Stewart Hosie
We have just listened to one of the worst speeches I have heard in 10 years. The Labour party now has one argument: we have gone from being too small, too poor and too stupid for independence to being too small, too poor and too stupid for any powers at all. The hon. Member for Edinburgh South (Ian Murray) spoke about something that was “credible”. Credible? The Scottish people decided what was credible at the election in May, and they did not say it was his party. He spoke about right-wing, Thatcherite Tories, but it sounds to me like the core vote of the only Labour MP left in Scotland.
New clause 33, which stands in my name and those of my hon. Friends, would require the Scottish and UK Governments to enter into an economic agreement setting out a plan for implementation of full fiscal autonomy for Scotland and establishing a framework within which the two Governments co-ordinate their economic and fiscal policies in the context of full fiscal autonomy for Scotland. The Scottish Parliament and Government would have competence for revenue raised in Scotland through taxation and borrowing and for determining levels of public expenditure in or as regards Scotland.
We see the framework including arrangements for facilitating fiscal co-ordination, overseeing economic co-operation, safeguarding fiscal sustainability, and setting out the joint responsibilities in certain areas. In the agreement, the two Governments must seek to ensure the maintenance of monetary stability throughout the UK and the single market of the UK and the EU. They must also ensure co-operation in the exercise of all the respective functions relating to the administration and collection of taxes and an equitable and transparent approach to the consequences, resources and rewards. The Scottish Parliament and Government would retain the benefits of increased tax revenues as a result of positive policy impacts and would have the powers they need to manage the consequences of full fiscal autonomy.
I turn briefly to new clauses 1 and 21. New clause 1 would require that a Tory Secretary of State appoint a commission of between four and 11 members, none of whom can be a Member of Parliament, a Member of the Scottish Parliament or an employee thereof. It is backed by Labour and United Kingdom Independence party Members, so we have a Labour amendment backed by UKIP asking a Tory Secretary of State—
Stewart Hosie
No, no, no.
The new clause asks for a Tory Secretary of State to appoint a commission of the great and the good from the House of Lords to determine Scotland’s future. What a lot of absolute rubbish!
Ian Murray
On that point, Madam Deputy Speaker. For the sake of clarity, the Committee will know that the procedure of this House is that any hon. Member can sign any amendment they so wish.
Stewart Hosie
So we have confirmation—Labour and UKIP hand in hand, empowering the Tories to run the rule over Scotland again.
As for new clause 21 on a Scottish OBR, we already have one—it is called the Scottish Fiscal Commission. The consultation on its expanded power closed on Friday. One would have thought that Scotland’s sole Labour MP might actually have known what was going on.
New clause 33 would have the Scottish and UK Governments enter into an economic agreement that set up a plan for the implementation of full fiscal autonomy and establish a framework within which the two Governments would co-ordinate their economic and fiscal policies in the context of full fiscal autonomy. That would mean the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government having competence for determining revenues raised in Scotland through taxation and borrowing, and for all of the spending, paying compensation to the UK for shared services. This is the right approach to take. I am just disappointed that we did not have proper time to debate it rather than being subject to the nonsensical rant and talking Scotland down by the so-called shadow Secretary of State. By taking responsibility for key areas of Scottish life, we can improve the Scottish Parliament’s ability to deliver real progress for the Scottish people. New clause 33 does that. It rejects the miserablist approach of the Labour party, and I commend it to the Committee.