Fixed-term Parliaments Bill
William Cash Excerpts(13 years, 3 months ago)
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Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
The simple reason why I am speaking to my amendment is that, as I indicated on Second Reading, I take the gravest exception to the Bill, for a variety of reasons.
Mr Speaker
Order. I am loth to interrupt the hon. Gentleman, to whom I look forward to listening, but just for clarification, as I think he knows, we are not debating an amendment; we are debating a group of two new clauses. It is to the new clauses that he is speaking.
Mr Cash
Yes, indeed. I am seeking to amend the Bill through a new clause, and I am grateful to you for making that subtle distinction, Mr Speaker.
The point is that the title of the Bill is a give-away. It refers to “Parliaments”; it does not refer to “Parliament”. Therefore, there is an underlying assumption that the process in question—which is inevitably tied up with the concept of the coalition politics, which are increasingly regarded as a perpetual burden that we will be expected to comply with—is inherent in the arrangements for the proposals in the Bill. The use of the word “Parliaments”, in the plural, simply emphasises that.
As one who believes firmly in the idea that our constitutional arrangements have stood us in good stead for a long time, but without being obtuse about the need for reform, I would say that there are changes in our constitutional arrangements that, periodically, can be justified. However, my proposal is, effectively, a “stop and restart” provision. That is, if there is any merit in continuing the arrangements, if they were to survive for as long as the period allocated by the leaders of the parties and the coalition agreement, then there is always the possibility—to put it no higher than that—of referring to some of those outside this place who, as far as I am concerned, are the most important people of all, namely our electors, and not leaders of parties or parties themselves. The real question is: what do the public think about all this? Of course, they have not been asked; indeed, there is not the slightest intention that they should be asked.
What I am suggesting is that the very concept of a fixed-term Parliaments Bill is offensive to the hallowed principle—that simple constitutional proposition—that no Parliament can bind its successors. I have therefore decided—I am glad to be joined by a number of other hon. Members in this notion—that we should have what we describe in the title of new clause 5, namely the “Expiry and revival of section 2”. I happen to hope that such a revival does not take place, and I shall explain why. “Expiry”, certainly; however, as I was very sensibly advised, because of the scope of the Bill and its background, rather than proposing what I would otherwise have put forward, namely a sunset clause—or, as I think it would be better described, a “cast into the darkness of hell” clause—I have proposed that clause 2 be required to expire when the Parliament summoned to meet in May 2010, on that fixed and prescriptive date, dissolves. You might have an interest in this, Mr Speaker, because, if anything were to happen, there might even be the need for the re-election of a Speaker. In such rare circumstances, you might take a particular interest in this provision. I am suggesting that clause 2 should expire in those circumstances.
It is important to bear in mind the provisions in clause 2. We have moved on from the Committee stage to Report, and I remind the House that I tabled amendments to clause 2 in Committee because I took the gravest exception to certain elements in it. I am therefore anxious that it should expire, because I do not believe that it is a constitutionally satisfactory provision. Clause 2(1) states:
“An early parliamentary general election is to take place if the Speaker of the House of Commons issues a certificate—
(a) certifying that the House has passed a motion that there should be an early parliamentary general election,
(b) certifying whether or not the motion was passed on a division”—
I do not think that there would be much difficulty in demonstrating that. The clause continues:
(c) if it is certified that the motion was passed on a division, certifying that the number of members who voted in favour of the motion was a number equal to or greater than two thirds of the number of seats in the House (including vacant seats).”
I have no intention of going back to the discussions that we had on the clause. I tabled amendments to it and argued my case fairly, I thought, but the Whips got in the way—I do not know the reason—and the result was that I lost my Division. If I may say so without presumption, I do not believe that I lost the argument, but hon. Members on both sides of the House, particularly Back Benchers, are prone to believe our own arguments.
Thomas Docherty
On a point of clarification, I think it is fair to say that Opposition Members do not believe that the Deputy Prime Minister has won a single argument in the House during our deliberations on the Bill.
Mr Cash
That does not surprise me very much.
One thing that I objected to in clause 2 was the reference to “the number of seats”. We are elected as Members of Parliament, and I am not sure that “seats” are recognised in our constitutional arrangements. Seats do not speak, and vacant seats speak even less. I find the whole proposal utterly incomprehensible. As we well know, the present arrangement—not only in this legislature but in that of the United States and, I would say, all respectable legislatures—is that decisions are taken by a majority of one. So what is this new-fangled idea about a two-thirds majority? It is being introduced for one purpose only: to keep the provisions in the Bill going in perpetuity. That is why I take such exception to the use of the plural in the title “Fixed-term Parliaments Bill”.
This provision also involves an invasion of the principle that one Parliament cannot bind its successor. That is what I really object to, as that principle is central to our democratic process. The people who come in to any given Parliament are not the same as the previous people, and they are certainly not seats or vacant seats. I hope that other Members will agree that this is a very important constitutional question, on which I place a great deal of emphasis, in relation to the new clause that we are discussing.
Mr Jenkin
I want to ask my hon. Friend a genuine question. Supposing there were a new Parliament and section 2 of the Act were not renewed, would we not be left with a Fixed-term Parliaments Act that made no provision for an early general election? Is that what my hon. Friend wants?
Mr Cash
I do not deny for a minute that that is one of the consequences, but if we were to carry this new clause, it would effectively be the end of the Bill. As I look around the House and see the huge number of people attending this debate, I do not believe that there is the slightest chance of my winning the Division—
Mr Cash
Oh, I see. I am extremely grateful to hear what the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), that fierce defender of British liberty—when it suits him—has to say. In the light of what my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) has said, it would not cause me any concern if my new clause were passed simply because it would require a rethink, when there would be a completely new situation. Does my hon. Friend want to intervene again on that? No.
Austin Mitchell
The hon. Gentleman should not lack confidence about his ability to rally this House behind an important measure. Let me ask, since no Parliament can bind its successor, are not both the Bill and his new clause otiose because a new Parliament will simply wipe the plate, and if it wants to dissolve early, it will do so?
Mr Cash
That is a noble aspiration, but I am not at all convinced that that is how it is intended to operate in practice, mainly because there are other people involved who are called Whips. Unless provision has been made for expiry, there will be a natural locomotion towards a future coalition, which I strongly resent, and towards fixed-term Parliaments, in the plural, and we will be in “a new kind of politics”. I see in their places at least one or two of my hon. Friends who, from what we read, would strongly advocate such a proposal. They have some constitutional ideas so perhaps they will elaborate on them during the debate. I rather doubt it, but we shall see.
New clause 5 is designed so that section 2 of the eventual Act will expire. It also provides for the circumstances that might obtain in the first month after Parliament has returned after a general election, when it might have a totally different complexion and composition. We have no idea who will be sitting on the Government Benches at that time. In that first month with Members reconvened for the first time—leaving aside the constitutional doctrine about successive Parliaments—would it be right for those Members to be saddled with something with which they did not agree? It is a simple as that. That provides another reason, quite apart from the constitutionality of the issue, for the new clause.
Jacob Rees-Mogg
Will my hon. Friend’s new clause ensure that after the next election, the Prime Minister, instead of going through the fiction of having a vote of no confidence in himself, could simply ask for a Dissolution by a vote of the House? If the new clause were accepted, would it not provide a much more straightforward way of getting an early Dissolution?
Mr Cash
That is a perceptive way of putting it; I congratulate my hon. Friend on his perspicacity.
I have great reservations about our movement towards what is seen as a new kind of political understanding. One of the great objections relates to the ease with which it is possible to break manifesto promises, enter into coalitions and then break them as well. Subsequently, a Parliament might emerge that embodied all the thinking of those broken promises in the form of a new politics. That next Parliament is then intended to carry on as if nothing had happened. I think that that is a very unsatisfactory way of governing, and a very undemocratic way of conducting our affairs.
Mr Cash
The hon. Gentleman corrects me by saying that it is proper scrutiny.
The Committee stated:
“Whilst acknowledging the case made by the Deputy Prime Minister for a five year term”—
it is so nice when the authors of such reports use expressions like “whilst acknowledging the case” and “with respect to”—[Interruption.] My hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr Shepherd) knows what is in my mind. The Committee continued:
“nonetheless the majority of the Committee consider that a four year term should be adopted for any fixed-term Parliamentary arrangement at Westminster. In the view of the majority, the shift from a five year maximum to a five year norm would be inconsistent with the Government’s stated aim of making the legislature more accountable, inconsistent with existing constitutional practice and inconsistent with the practice of the devolved institutions and the clear majority of international legislatures.”
That is quite a condemnation.
Mr MacNeil
Just for clarification, is the hon. Gentleman referring to the recommended length of a parliamentary term as proposed by an upper Chamber where the length of a parliamentary term is life?
Mr Cash
I can only repeat what that Committee has said: it states that the appropriate length of a fixed parliamentary term should be no more than four years. The position is, therefore, that that powerful Committee has given that advice to the House of Lords, which has yet to be given the opportunity to vote on these proposals. I think we are moving into territory where there will be proper scrutiny, as it has been described—although the word “filibuster” nearly slipped out—as has proved to be the case in respect of provisions in the alternative vote Bill currently before the House of Lords. There may yet be the possibility of similar activity with regard to how long the fixed parliamentary term should be.
For all those reasons, I believe that the provisions I have felt concerned to raise through tabling new clause 5 are merited. They are consistent with proper constitutional practice and good sense. The attempt to, let us say, fix the next fixed-term Parliament ought to be prevented at all costs.
Chris Bryant
I warmly congratulate the hon. Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) on his amendment and the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash) on his amendment, which I shall address in a few moments. I should, of course, have called them “new clauses”; Mr Speaker corrected the hon. Member for Stone on that earlier. However, I think that the hon. Member for North East Somerset rather misled the House. He did not do so in any dishonourable way, but he suggested that he was not here in 1911. I do not believe that any Member of this House believes that he was not here then or, for that matter, in 1832 and 1641. If it was not exactly him, on each of those occasions it was certainly his predecessor who made almost identical speeches. So I congratulate him on his consistency, which has lasted not only for the length of a Lib Dem manifesto, but through the centuries, and I am sure he will be here for many generations to come.
Mr Cash
I have been increasingly impressed over the months by the manner in which the hon. Gentleman has tackled these constitutional questions. He is putting the House in a far better position by the manner in which he explains many of his points. Having got over that bit of flattery, I point out that it might have been a good idea if, at this point in his speech—perhaps he is coming on to it—he had referred to the comments of the Clerk of the Parliaments. The Bill will go to the House of Lords, as I have pointed out, and we do not quite know what their lordships will make of it. Not only did the Constitution Committee come to a certain conclusion on the issue that my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) has raised, but so did the Clerk of the Parliaments. He said:
“It is...clear that the [Fixed-term Parliaments] Bill does contain provision to extend the maximum duration of a Parliament beyond five years, and that it cannot, therefore, be passed under the Parliament Acts procedure unless, before it leaves the Commons, the [relevant] provisions...are amended.”
Professors Bradley and Oliver agreed. That is an important point. Forgive me, Mr Deputy Speaker, for making rather a long intervention, but I wanted to get it on the record that this is not just a minor matter but something on which the House of Lords appears largely to have made up its mind.
Chris Bryant
I am always a bit reluctant to presume what the House of Lords’ final view might be, not least because three new Members of the House of Lords are being introduced every day at the moment—it is something of a moving feast down the far end of the corridor. The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right about the Clerk of the Parliaments, and incidentally I want to pass on congratulations to Mr Beamish, who has just been appointed the new Clerk of the Parliaments. It is also true that the Clerk of this House has made it clear that there are significant concerns about clause 2, which I shall come on to when I discuss the new clause tabled by the hon. Member for Stone. I am also always very grateful for any oleaginous support I can get.
The point I hope to make about new clause 3, tabled by the hon. Member for North East Somerset, is that I think that there is already adequate provision in the Parliament Act to ensure that Parliament cannot be extended. His new clause would apply to the whole of clause 1, so we would not be able to amend any of the elements of it, even if they had been adumbrated in a manifesto commitment and a single party won the next general election with a majority and legislated in that way. We would not be able to use the Parliament Act even to shorten the length of a Parliament.
If we win the next general election, notwithstanding the fact that we will have won, in a sense, the right for a five-year fixed-term Parliament—I hope we will— want to reduce the number of years from five years to four. As the hon. Member for North East Somerset has shown, historical consistency across the years is a good political attribute rather than a failing.
Chris Bryant
Indeed, Mr Deputy Speaker, although I am not sure that we really have got to the edge of your knowledge; I think your knowledge is boundless, and consequently I agree with you. [Interruption.] The Parliamentary Secretary, Office of the Leader of the House of Commons, is talking about the pillars of Hercules, which is a rather fine pub I have sometimes frequented in—well, north London somewhere.
The new clause tabled by the hon. Member for Stone seems quite sensible, because we believe that section 2 has a series of elements that, as the Clerk of the House has pointed out, are problematic. We think that because the provision has been put into statute rather than included in the Standing Orders of the House, there is a real danger that elements could be questioned in the courts, and one would then have a dramatic constitutional crisis. Consequently, we understand that, as the hon. Gentleman said, those elements are there entirely to bind together the coalition. We understand why the coalition would want to maintain that element, but we certainly do not believe that a future Government should be bound by it.
The hon. Gentleman is right to say that no Parliament is bound by its predecessor and no Parliament can bind its successor. However, there is one sense in which it can delay its successor, because it makes it have to re-legislate if it wants to take away a part of statute law. It seems to me that since it is clear that this piece of constitutional—
Chris Bryant
I was thinking of jiggery-pokery. Section 2 is being proceeded with not on the basis of consensus across the House, but on the basis solely of an agreement between the two coalition partners, so it would seem to us to make sense to make an allowance in the Bill that the section would die at the next general election. I note that the hon. Gentleman has crafted his new clause carefully so that it does not say 2015; it simply says that section 2 expires when the Parliament that was elected in 2010 comes to its end. At that point, whatever new Government had been elected could choose whether to continue with the provisions or to let them lapse. If it were a Labour Government, I am pretty confident that we would want to ensure that the provisions lapsed. However, what other parties may want to do is for others to determine.
The key point is that we would not want to have to introduce primary legislation to repeal this element of the Bill. For those reasons I am keen to support the hon. Member for Stone. I do not think his new clause quite throws the whole of the ship into the whirlpool, but I think that the throwing of a few sailors into the mouths of the demon in North East Somerset would be inappropriate, and consequently we shall support new clause 5 but not new clause 3. I very much hope that we shall be able to divide the House on this matter.
Mr Cash
We are, in fact, moving into very difficult and choppy waters. With respect to my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg), I do not believe in the so-called constitutional statutes at all. They are an invention in the first instance by Lord Justice Laws. They have a certain spurious credibility, but it does not stack up. My concern is that we will need to use a range of “notwithstanding” arrangements in relation not only to the European Union but to the so-called constitutional enactments or Bills when we want to legislate in the House. We will also need to require the judiciary to give effect to the latest Westminster enactment in that field of endeavour and to state expressly what is intended to bypass this attempt to establish a completely new regime of codified legislation. That will simply become very difficult.
Mr Jenkin
That was the purpose of my referring to Lord Phillips’s recent obiter dicta, in which he implied that later Acts of Parliament can effectively repeal the parts of the 1689 Act that protect Parliament’s privileges. I do not think that that is satisfactory, and Parliament needs to think clearly about how we remain in democratic control of this country’s constitutional settlement.
Using legislative techniques, such as those suggested by my hon. Friend, is the direction in which we ought to move. Some people will say that means moving towards a written constitution, but that is to misunderstand our constitution. It is partly written and partly not written. The point is to determine who is in charge. Parliament should be in charge, with the necessary checks and balances between the two Houses. So I very much welcome the debate that my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset has initiated on this topic. This debate will run and run, even though we might not be able to agree or divide on his new clause.
I put my name to new clause 5, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone, partly because it provides an opportunity to remind ourselves of how bad the Bill is. I am afraid that I am appalled that it was introduced in this way. I cannot recall any Government ever introducing a Bill to manipulate the constitution for their own purposes in such a nakedly self-interested way. Clause 2 is simply a fig leaf to ameliorate the problems that arise from fixed-term Parliaments.
Let us remind ourselves of the provisions of clause 2. The two-thirds provision is obviously open to manipulation—assuming that the mechanism does not drag us into disputes with the courts—because if the Government of the day tabled a motion of no confidence in themselves, it would hardly be likely that the Opposition would oppose it, so a general election would still be available at the initiative of the Executive. In a coalition arrangement, the smaller partner might decide not to take part in such a process, meaning that the motion would be opposed and, by arrangement with the Opposition, perhaps passed by only a simple majority. Under the Bill, we are therefore creating arrangements by which a junior coalition partner may switch horses halfway through a Parliament.
I believe that the Liberal Democrats wanted a fixed-term Parliament so that they could swap coalition partners halfway through the Parliament. Lo and behold, we now read in the papers that the Leader of the Opposition and the Deputy Prime Minister seem to be striking up a new friendship—perhaps that heralds the switch. Of course, I am talking hypothetically—the subject is theoretical—but, constitutionally, the possibility exists. It is extraordinary that we are contemplating putting in place arrangements that could bring about a change of Government, Prime Minister and Administration without a general election, but that is what the Bill provides for. The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) seems to be looking at me quizzically.
Mr Jenkin
Inevitably, these debates always depend on speculation about what might happen, which is the one rather unsatisfactory thing about debating the future of the constitution. I have always been regarded as a bit of a pessimist about the European Union, but I did point out to a colleague that, so far, I have been proved right, and if these arrangements remain the same indefinitely, sooner or later I will be proved right again.
The point is that the Bill—except for this new measure in clause 2—is intended to remove the safety valve that allows for an early general election. However, that clause is the worst part of the Bill. As we were told by the Clerk of the House in his memorandum, before the Bill was considered in Committee:
“The Bill brings the internal proceedings of the House into the ambit of the Courts, albeit indirectly by the route of Speaker’s certificates.”
The procedures of the House, votes of confidence, Speaker’s certificates and two-thirds majorities all become potentially justiciable, notwithstanding the Bill of Rights. For that reason, I fully support the new clause tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone.
A vain attempt to remove the courts from considering those matters is made in clause 2(3), which states:
“A certificate under this section is conclusive for all purposes.”
Unfortunately, clause 2(3) is itself justiciable by the courts, because we are putting this into statute. That part of the Bill, which attempts to ameliorate the problems that arise from having fixed-term Parliaments, creates the biggest constitutional headaches for Parliament itself by inviting the courts to intervene in those matters.
Mr Cash
On that very question, does my hon. Friend recall that the 1911 Act goes further? It does not end by saying that the certificate
“shall be conclusive for all purposes”,
but adds
“and shall not be questioned in any court of law.”
I would simply add to that the word “whatsoever” because of the very problem that he has mentioned. The Supreme Court, or indeed any other court, may seek to take control over this.
Mr Jenkin
I put it to my hon. Friend that that wording in 1911 may well have been sufficient because it would not have entered the heads of the judges in those days to breach the Bill of Rights, but we know that members of the now Supreme Court—note the word “Supreme”—sincerely believe that Parliament is within their purview. We have had the debate about whether the sovereignty of Parliament is a common-law principle—that is, part of judge-made law, rather than an historical fact that exists in its own right as a result of the disputes between the Crown and Parliament in the 17th century.
I believe that it would be helpful if I spoke briefly on this matter, and I take this opportunity to commend my hon. Friend on his new clause. Future Parliaments should have the opportunity to throw out the proposals in clause 2. That would not wreck the Bill, but it would invite questions about what it means and how practical it is. It would certainly impel a future Parliament to consider at the earliest opportunity whether the Fixed-term Parliaments Act should remain on the statute book—I very much hope that it will not—or to put in place much better arrangements to provide for early general elections under a fixed-term Parliament system. The Bill as drafted is nonsense and a potential disaster. If we do not fix it in this place, I hope that those in another place will do so.
Jacob Rees-Mogg
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)
Order. If you wish to press your new clause, Mr Cash, you will have an opportunity to do so later, after we debate the next group, which starts with new clause 4.
New Clause 4
Prorogation of Parliament
‘(1) Parliament can only be prorogued in accordance with this section.
(2) If the House of Commons resolves that Parliament should be prorogued, Parliament shall be prorogued at that time, or by declaration of the Speaker.
(3) The Speaker of the House of Commons shall not make such a declaration unless the House of Commons has passed a resolution directing him to do so on or before a specified date and time.
(4) Where Parliament is prorogued under subsection (2) above, the Speaker may by declaration prorogue it to an earlier or later day.
(5) The Prorogation Act 1867 is repealed.’.—(Chris Bryant.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
European Council
William Cash Excerpts(13 years, 4 months ago)
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Mr Speaker
Order. Although it is not my normal practice to call a Member who was not present at the very start of the statement, I note that the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash) chairs the European Scrutiny Committee and therefore, exceptionally, I shall call the hon. Gentleman on this occasion.
Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
I am extremely grateful, Mr Speaker. I really only came here to wish the Prime Minister a happy Christmas. Does the Prime Minister share the concern of many of us that the present financial mechanism is unlawful, and that Britain is exposed until 2013 while the black hole of Portugal and Spain opens up before us? Does he therefore think there are serious grounds for challenging the unlawfulness of it and not exposing the British electorate to the prospect of having to contribute to that while suffering such severe austerity cuts?
The Prime Minister
I thank you, Mr Speaker, for your leniency. No European statement would be complete without a question from my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash). He may have a good point. Article 122 of the treaty refers to help in the case of natural disasters and other emergencies. There are some people who question whether it should have been used in this way to support eurozone countries.
That argument was had and was conceded under the previous Government in two ways. First, they agreed the establishment of the mechanism. Secondly, if we go back to the Nice treaty, it was the then Europe Minister, the right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz), who is in his place, who argued from the Dispatch Box that it was perfectly okay for article 122 to go to qualified majority voting, which is where we are today. So in two ways the previous Government made a bad mistake. As I say, we are clearing up the mess and we will certainly do that from 2013, but the mechanism remains in place till then.
Oral Answers to Questions
William Cash Excerpts(13 years, 5 months ago)
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The Prime Minister
We have looked very carefully at all the quangos and tried to work out which ones need to stay and which ones need to go. That was long overdue. We have a minimum wage and a tax credit system, and there are so many quangos that are not adding value that it makes sense to give taxpayers value and scrap the ones that are not doing anything.
Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
Will my right hon. Friend explain why at every turn—the City of London, the investigation order, economic governance of Europe and the stabilisation mechanism—the coalition Government under his premiership are acquiescing in more European integration, not less? And there is no repatriation of powers.
The Prime Minister
It will not surprise my hon. Friend to hear that I think he is wrong. Under the approach of a previous Government, we would have caved in when the European Parliament asked for a 6% budget increase. We have not, and we have fought that increase—[Interruption.]
Fixed-term Parliaments Bill
William Cash Excerpts(13 years, 5 months ago)
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Mr Straw
No, it would not. There is nothing in paragraph (c) that would, in law, prevent a Prime Minister from being party to an arrangement to secure his own demise and go for a general election. If these provisions go through, there will be nothing, in law, that can be done about that theoretical possibility.
Professor Robert Hazell, in evidence to the Lords Constitution Committee, made a very pertinent comment on this point when he said that political incentives should prove a force for stability. Whatever may have been appropriate in Germany in one very unusual case where the Chancellor did indeed arrange to move a motion of no confidence in his own Government, the prospect of a Prime Minister of this country coming to the House to move a motion of no confidence in his own Administration without suffering immediate popular and parliamentary derision, and a significant loss of votes at the poll that would then follow, is fanciful.
Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
I might have expected that the right hon. Gentleman would hit the nail on the head. He is really talking about the great damage that lies within these provisions—namely, that they are in defiance of the democratic mandate. This is about Whips and patronage; it has nothing to do with the people outside. My only suggestion—it is not a criticism—would be that he may want to qualify his reference to the impact on this House by talking about the impact on our electoral and democratic system and thereby the damage done to the people of this country.
Mr Straw
I accept what the hon. Gentleman says and thank him for the compliment.
I have a number of rules that I try to follow in politics, one of which is that fancy tactics never work. This is a fancy tactic. I am sorry to say—it is not that I have anything personal against them—that one can see the Liberal Democrats, who were, as described by one of their members, a perpetual Opposition think-tank until they suddenly and unexpectedly found themselves in government, thinking up this wheeze on the basis that because it had happened in Scotland and, no doubt, in Latvia or Leichtenstein, it would work here. However, we have a more direct system of democracy; we may criticise, and I hope that we do. [Interruption.] I hear someone referring to Scotland. I happen to think, on reflection, that the relevant section in the Scotland Act is redundant, but different considerations applied at the time. One consideration—I mean this in no disobliging way to Scottish colleagues of all parties—is that the Scottish Parliament is a creature of this House, legally, whereas we have to be responsible for our own rules.
Mr Cash
Following the Minister’s intervention, may I take the liberty of correcting a point that was made regarding the German situation? Under the German constitution—a written constitution, of course—a two-thirds majority must be in each house, whereas the Bill’s provision applies only to the House of Commons. In addition, and more importantly, it must be two thirds of all those who vote in the Division in question, not two thirds of all seats. That is a very important difference.
Mr Straw
I accept that, and the history of the German constitution is very different from the history of ours, even though to a large extent we wrote it.
I will finish where I began, by referring to the explanation by the hon. Lady of the amendment that she moved, with which she does not agree. She pointed out that that was a consequence of her Committee having to rush through pre-legislative scrutiny. I sat on the Front Bench for part of the debates on the Bill, and I have yet to hear any convincing explanation from the Minister as to why they had to rush the Bill through.
Mr Straw
If a Prime Minister really wanted to call an election of choice, they would not worry about the two-thirds majority requirement, because they would be very unlikely to get it. They would instead go for a motion of no confidence.
By legislating for a fixed-term Parliament, we will establish a clear political norm that Parliaments last for five years. Leaving aside the argument about whether the term should be four or five years, I happen to support that principle, and I believe that is where the British people are. However, if the confidence of the House is lost, or the Government of the day simply give up and vote for a motion of no confidence, there must be an election. In the absence of that, there should not.
I have arranged to go and sit in Westminster Hall at 4.30 pm to listen to a debate on a matter of interest to all Members from east Lancashire. If this debate is not concluded by then, I hope I may be excused.
Mr Cash
The Chamber is very empty, considering the significance of what is being done by clause 2. In a way, that reflects the decline of this Parliament, which some of us believe strongly needs to be rejuvenated, not on the basis of protestations of power being returned to the House, as we read in our manifesto, but in the reality of how legislation is introduced.
The clause is the turn of the screw by the coalition into our democratic system of government, which, at its essence, is about the individuality and votes of conscience of MPs, irrespective of the Whips and the patronage system. It creates a permanent constitutional change through a passive, silent revolution—the most silent revolution since our Parliament began. It is being done without a mandate of any kind for any party, in any manifesto, in any part of the political system.
Tristram Hunt
Is the hon. Gentleman as shocked as I am by the new constitutional principle that we are hearing from the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills—that the manifestos upon which individual Members of Parliament were elected no longer mean anything, because the coalition agreement somehow supersedes everything that they were elected to stand for?
The First Deputy Chairman
Order. That is not part of the amendments before us, so Mr Cash, could you restrict yourself to the amendments, please?
Mr Cash
What I am saying, Mr Evans, is that the clause is being introduced without a mandate, using Parliament and patronage to undermine Parliament itself, not only now but in future. The voters, who have reposed their trust in us as MPs, are being severely damaged by what is being done today. As for the future, to quote T. S. Eliot’s “Burnt Norton”:
“Time present and time past
Are both perhaps present in time future
And time future contained in time past.
If all time is eternally present
All time is unredeemable.”
So is this act of constitutional vandalism.
My amendment 4 is based on a simple point of principle, namely that a motion can be passed by a simple majority of one, as has been the case from time immemorial—from the very inception of our parliamentary process in what is sometimes described as the “mother of Parliaments”. That is now being changed in a manner that will seriously alter the method whereby a Government may fall.
The merits of the various amendments, such as amendment 33 and my amendment 4, may differ. However, mine, which has been supported—without my encouragement, I have to say—by the Leader of the Opposition and therefore by the Opposition themselves, has the merit of simplicity and maintaining the status quo. Why have I tabled this amendment? It is because I object to the new-fangled idea that an early election would result from a motion, perhaps proposed by the Opposition, any MP or even the Government themselves, that requires—this is contrary to all constitutional precedent and history since our Parliament first sat representing the electors of this country—the support of two thirds or more of those eligible to vote as Members of Parliament. In other words, we are talking about seats and not the persons present in the House of Commons. That is a profound and dangerous doctrine.
Graham Stringer
I profoundly agree with the hon. Gentleman. Are there not two very offensive things about this proposal? It means that hon. Members of this House are equal apart from when there are votes for a Dissolution; if a Member is voting in a minority, their vote is worth more. Even more strange and offensive is that if a vote were to take place now, the electorate of Oldham East and Saddleworth would be enfranchised, when they are not enfranchised for any other vote in the House. Such a situation is absurd and offensive.
Mr Cash
The hon. Gentleman’s point is extremely sensible and full of common sense, which is what this Bill lacks. This is about something else; it is not about the manner in which our democratic system functions. It is about something completely different and I will come to that in a moment.
Mark Durkan
Does the hon. Gentleman not think that his case against the idea of a special weighted majority for Dissolution in this House would be more credible if he had not previously proposed amendments to the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill that required a threshold of support for any referendum on the alternative vote? He supported other amendments as well, which required not just a threshold that related to those who voted, but to the total number on the electorate. Is there not some hypocrisy in the argument he makes today?
Mr Cash
I am more than delighted to reply to the hon. Gentleman. Sparring with him always causes me great amusement. As for what he says, there is a substantial difference. The threshold amendment that I moved on the other Bill was to do with the threshold of a number of people who would participate in the election, and not what was going on in this House. It was not even related to the question of the threshold of those who voted yes, as in the Scotland Act 1998 and the amendment of George Cunningham, the then Member for Finsbury and Islington, so there is a significant difference. I am talking about the trust that is given to us in this House and the manner in which we discharge it.
The coalition originally proposed 55%, but that was so manifestly absurd that the coalition agreement was then torn up and the figure was replaced with two thirds. If not 55%, why two thirds? The Scottish Parliament—I am using this analogy because it has already been raised, but I think that it is completely irrelevant—does not form Her Majesty’s Government. Decisions in time of war, a Finance Bill or any of the other great levers of power are determined, and will continue to be determined, by the United Kingdom Parliament. One such great exercise of power at a most important time was the confidence motion of 10 May 1940, which was passed, as it happened, by the Government, and it led to the demise of Neville Chamberlain’s Government, because everyone knew he had to go. I do not regard the Scottish parliamentary experience as relevant. If not two thirds, why not 75%, 60% or any other number that Harry Potter’s wand might conjure out of thin air?
Mr Cash
Absolutely. I entirely agree with the right hon. Gentleman. Furthermore, there was the motion of no confidence in the Callaghan Government in 1979, in which the numbers of votes were 310 against 311. The result of that vote may have been a matter of satisfaction for the Conservative party, but I am sure that it would not have been to others. However, if the two-thirds rule had been in operation, there would not have been a change in Government and that would have been a disaster for the country.
Mr Harper
I am listening very carefully to my hon. Friend. I think that he is confusing the two different processes in the Bill. There is provision for having an early election if the Government lose a vote of no confidence. That is by a simple majority, as now, and it is not changed. The other provision is an extra power for the House of Commons, which it does not have today, for two thirds of MPs to vote for an early election. We are not in any way, changing the ability of a Government to be held to account by having to have a simple majority.
Mr Cash
It is only because I have not completed my remarks that my hon. Friend’s intervention seems understandable. I do not dispute the fact that a vote of confidence by a majority of one would apply in the circumstances described in the clause, but—this is the other side of that equation—we then get into the question of the 14 days and the shenanigans that would follow with all the Whips and other people manoeuvring around to guarantee that the vote of confidence would be secured. We go back to my main point: it is the power of patronage of the Whips and the determined and ruthless exercise of that power that lies behind this proposal. That is my main objection to the whole thing irrespective of the fact that there is no mandate for these provisions from any political party.
Mr Christopher Chope (Christchurch) (Con)
When we talk about the law of unintended consequences, which applies big time to the provisions of the Bill, will my hon. Friend not apply that in his mind to what is happening in Ireland at the moment? There is a constitutional crisis that requires the Prime Minister, in honour, to put an issue to the electorate for a general election. This Bill would preclude the Prime Minister from doing a similarly honourable thing in this country.
Mr Cash
My hon. Friend with his customary originality brings into play a contemporary example. Imagine a two-thirds rule being applied in respect of Mr Cowen at this moment. Be in no doubt, there would be riots in the streets of Dublin. This is an essential question about the irresponsible manner in which this power could be used to induce results that are fundamentally undemocratic.
Mr Straw
I understand the Minister’s point that these provisions relate not to a motion of no confidence but to other motions for an early Dissolution. Given, too, the poor definitions of a motion of no confidence, we could anticipate a situation in which a Government who wish to cling to power, even though they lack a simple majority, could dodge and weave—because they determine the business of the House—for quite a period and ensure that the motion that went before the House was tabled under clause 2(1)(c) requiring a two-thirds majority in the hope of buying themselves a little time. If this provision were not in the Bill, the choice between going to the end of the period and having an early election would be much more stark.
Mr Cash
The right hon. Gentleman demonstrates why many people thought that he was one of the foremost leaders of the House of Commons. He understands the mechanics that lie behind such questions. Precisely what he has just said could easily happen. Indeed, many other things are likely to be conjured out of thin air by the wave of a magic wand of the kind that only Harry Potter seems able to use.
Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)
I cannot understand how Ministers can argue that the Bill takes power away from the Prime Minister and gives it to the House of Commons. In 1979, the intention of the provision would have been to prevent the House causing a general election. The Prime Minister would have been in the driving seat, with 14 days to cook up some kind of new deal to stay in power. How is that taking power away from the Prime Minister?
Mr Cash
I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. It is such a shame that more people are not here to hear some of the criticisms that are being made of the Bill. We are not criticising it because we want to be difficult or because we are the awkward squad; we are criticising it because it is a profound constitutional issue. The provision is intended to be permanent, not a will-o’-the-wisp measure that will last a few months, and it will induce permanent constitutional change—it is a constitutional revolution, but a silent one, as I said.
A majority of one is at least understandable and can be calculated. I referred to the German example. Their measure operates on the basis of those in the House itself when the vote is taken, which raises a series of questions about the manner in which the Government’s proposals would operate. If we have a provision that is based on a fixed number of seats, it will not matter at all whether people turn up. Why bother with a Parliament in those circumstances? What would be the point if it were simply a question of the number of seats? Who occupies them, what they think about things or whether they have a view to express would not matter. That is an outrageous proposition, and I cannot believe that my hon. Friend the Minister is prepared to subscribe to such arrant rubbish. The reference in the Bill to the number of seats carries an analogy to the Rump Parliament to extremes.
The proposal is based not on any constitutional principle but the expediency of propping up, if necessary, the “temporary alliance”, which is how the “Oxford English Dictionary” describes a coalition. The measure, for all I know, may run foul of the internal contradictions of putting two parties together that, in certain but not all respects, have entirely contrary views on matters of fundamental constitutional and political importance, such as the alternative vote, which a number of my hon. Friends and I voted against. We are Conservative, and we believe that the alternative vote is the wrong way to go. We believe in first past the post and in a simple majority, because they account for the individual conscience of hon. Members, and not merely the number of seats. Dare I even mention the European question, because that is also part and parcel of the shift in the fundamental balance of power away from this House?
The coalition agreement illustrates that point. At the heart of that arrangement, there are some destructive and some constructive proposals, and some are unworkable. For example, under the agreement, Liberal Democrats have a right or duty to abstain on important matters. The 55% rule proposal was abandoned not only because of its absurdity, but because of opposition to it. The reason for the two-thirds rule is that it will be easier for the Whips to fulfil their masters’ wishes. Their power would be imperilled if a motion were conditional merely on a majority of one. That is the crunch.
The principle of the majority of one proves my point, as the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) indicated in an intervention. I responded to him by referring to the 1979 Division, when there was a majority of one. I find no merit whatever in moving away from the virtues of a simple majority, although I doubt that the Leader of the Opposition, who signed amendment 4, would be so firmly enthusiastic for Margaret Thatcher’s victory in 1979. However, I repeat that I have not tabled that amendment for the sake of the wishes of the Opposition. I simply believe that we adhere to the simple majority.
Mr Harper
My hon. Friend has mentioned the 1979 example twice now. As I said, the Bill would not change the situation when there is a motion of no confidence in any way. If that position happened now—[Interruption.] If the Government lost a Division on such a motion by one vote, the situation would be the same, but the 14 days for the formation of a Government makes things different. Amendment 4, by removing the two thirds majority rule, would effectively mean that anyone who controls a majority in the House can have an election at will—it would effectively give back to the Prime Minister the power to dissolve the House whenever he chooses to do so in a perfectly open way. If my hon. Friend is happy with that, that is fine, but that is not our proposal.
Mr Cash
I understand to a degree where my hon. Friend is coming from, but I am afraid that I am not attacking that constitutional position. I do not believe it necessary to take the power to dissolve from the Prime Minister—that power is based, as it were, on his democratic mandate—and give it to the Whips to engage in their shenanigans in the 14 days following a no confidence motion, as the right hon. Member for Blackburn said.
Mr Harper
Will my hon. Friend make that clear? Is he saying that the intention of amendment 4 is to ensure that the Prime Minister retains the power to seek a Dissolution? I ask that because Opposition Members say that they are in favour of fixed-term Parliaments, albeit there is a debate over whether the term should be four or five years. My contention is that the Opposition’s support for amendment 4 effectively drives a coach and horses through their support for fixed-term Parliaments, because it would give the power to dissolve directly back to the Prime Minister.
Mr Cash
The Opposition’s thinking is not a matter for me. I happen to believe that our present constitutional arrangement should be sustained. It gives me no pleasure to know that the Opposition will vote with me on amendment 4. Their reasoning does not matter; what matters is the constitutional principle that I am advancing.
Mr Straw
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his generosity in giving way. May I illustrate the point that he and I have made in answer to the Minister’s perfectly reasonable point? At first blush, it appears that the provisions of clause 2(1)(c) strengthen the role of the House against the Prime Minister. However, I remember what happened in 1979. I was a candidate at the 1979 election, so I was no longer working for the Government, but I was in very close touch with people for whom I had worked for three and a half years and knew a lot about what was happening. There was a crisis over the outcome of the Scottish Assembly referendum, and the Commons needed an occasion on which it could give vent to that feeling, because the various smaller parties had to have their positions put on the record. Had there been a provision in legislation for an early Dissolution by two-thirds majority, the Government of the day—
Mr Straw
In that situation, the Government of the day would have worked with the smaller parties and said, “You can have your shout on the two-thirds majority, and in return, we’ll give a bit of extra cash to Northern Ireland,” and so on. That would have happened. Therefore, the motion of no confidence would probably never have been tabled, and even if it had been, it probably would have been lost.
Mr Harper
I am simply participating in the debate. I cannot agree with the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) on his characterisation of the 1979 situation. The motion in March 1979 was not about giving vent to anything; it was very clearly about whether the House had confidence in Her Majesty’s Government. I assume that everyone who voted for it had a clear idea what would happen if it were carried. It was, and there were consequences. It states:
“That this House has no confidence in Her Majesty’s Government”,
so I cannot believe that anyone was confused about what they were doing.
Mr Cash
I will now move on to the very question that is being discussed, which is motions of no confidence and what they really mean. There are various permutations, which are well described in the Library note, but the issue for me is basically this. In my belief—and according to the House’s tradition and its conventions, which are now to be overtaken by statute—a majority of one should remain. However, in that 14-day period, with shenanigans worthy of Lord Voldemort and the servants of the Dark Lord, an attempt would be made to keep in power a Government who had lost the confidence of the House of Commons—that is, the representatives of the electorate. That attempt would keep the Government on their feet, while the public would be left watching the spectacle of streams of members of the Cabinet and prospective members of the Cabinet from the Opposition parties striding up and down Whitehall, in and out of offices, all under the baleful influence of the Cabinet Secretary, as they tried to hatch yet another coalition agreement, no doubt based on very different principles from those for which the electorate had voted, in accordance with the parties’ respective manifestos or—dare I use the words?—their promises.
As to the question of what confidence motions actually are, they are various. In 1945 it was Churchill versus Attlee, and the Government won. Then there was Attlee against Churchill in 1952, and Gaitskell against Eden in 1956, when the Government won again. There was also Wilson against Heath in 1972, on the European Communities Act, when there was thought to be quite a lot of manoeuvring on the question of whether there had been a free vote or not. I will not go down that route now, but examples of where the Government have lost confidence motions include the Liberal Government of 1895, the Baldwin minority Conservative Government —note: minority Conservative Government—in 1924, the MacDonald Government in 1924, when there was again a Dissolution, and, of course, the famous Callaghan defeat by Thatcher, by 311 votes to 310.
Mr Shepherd
I am getting increasingly impatient in one sense, but on the distinction between what is a confidence motion and what is not, I put this proposition to the Committee. If the Government lose the Budget, that is it. My understanding of our constitution is that that would be the end of the Government.
Mr Shepherd
Well, Governments have resigned on the loss of such votes. Therefore, what constitutes a motion that arrives at that result? What my hon. Friend has been quoting were dates, not motions.
Mr Cash
Indeed, but that was about the sense of outrage over what had been done. That could apply to a Budget, as my hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr Shepherd) said, or to any other situation. It could have applied to Suez or, for example, the Iraq war. For all those reasons, the confidence motion, in whatever terms it is expressed, is just that: do those voting in the House of Commons at the time, by a majority of one, have a sufficient degree of confidence in the behaviour and policies of the Government?
Mr Shepherd
I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s tolerance in giving way again, but the outcome of the vote in 1940 was the resignation of the Prime Minister, not the Government as a whole. Although the Government went with him, they reformed themselves, so what happened was not an electoral matter; it was the outcome of a confidence motion in the individual who headed the Government.
Mr Cash
I agree with my hon. Friend on that, but there was also the sense of outrage that was being expressed. As that occasion has been raised three times already, let me mention in passing that, as it happens, it took place on the day that I was born, but there we are.
What does such innovation say about the coalition? It certainly demonstrates its determination to stack the cards firmly in favour of the coalition and the Whips. There may well be one third whom the coalition cannot take for granted or persuade, but I fear that that attitude is taking power away from Parliament—which, after all, is made up of the representatives of the people—and not giving it back. If the same principle were followed for any other motion, Parliament would simply not be able to carry out its business. I fear that what is proposed is not modernising, but is a reactionary measure. It is not progress, but a step backwards, along the primrose path, undermining the constitutional principles that have governed our conventions and been tested over many centuries. The proposal has been conjured out of thin air, for the ruthless purpose of maintaining power irrespective of the consequences. In my opinion, it is a great shame that it has been put forward on the proposition that—as was said in the general election and at the conference that took place recently—we are supposed to be “Working together in the national interest”. I fear that on this Bill, on this matter, we are working together against the national interest.
Mr George Howarth
Long before anybody else on the Opposition Benches supported amendment 4, standing in the name of the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash), I added my name to it. I listened carefully to what he said. He used the terms “Whips” and “patronage” to describe what he believes lies behind the provisions in clause 2, which I think is just a shorthand way of saying that we are talking about monolithic party structures that, generally speaking, follow whoever happens to be leading at any given time, and the instruments of that are the Whips and patronage.
I am a party political creature. I would not be in this House under any title other than that of “Labour Member of Parliament”. However, at the same time, I believe that we are sent here to exercise our judgment, particularly on issues such as that we are discussing, which, as the hon. Gentleman said, have not really been tested before the electorate. Fixed-term Parliaments and the alternative vote system were in our manifesto. However, the provisions in clause 2 that he has discussed were in nobody’s manifesto, so I feel in no way obliged to support them.
My hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Tristram Hunt) may correct me on this, but those who follow history, such as the hon. Gentleman, will know that it was quite common in the early to mid-19th century for Governments to change and for votes of no confidence to be taken. In fact, quite often the country would go for several weeks without an effective Government in place. However, the difference then was that party political labels were almost meaningless: the Liberal party did not exist in the form that we later came to know, while the Conservative party was a collection of factions.
In those days, it was possible for Governments to change their leadership and even the coalition that supported that leadership without there necessarily being a general election. We do not live in such circumstances now, and it is important to be mindful of the arrangements that we put in place for the Dissolution of Parliament or any other means by which to change a Government in mid-term.
Chris Bryant
In case there were any doubt about it, I shall join the hon. Gentleman in the Division Lobby unless the Whips manage to get to him, which is very unlikely. They rarely manage to get to him—he is an undiscovered country beyond whose bourn no Whip has ever returned, since we are doing “Hamlet” this afternoon.
Mark Durkan
Many valid arguments have been made about this group of amendments by a number of right hon. and hon. Members. I have total sympathy with the cynicism that has been expressed about some of the devices in the Bill and the motives for them.
However, I believe totally in the idea of a fixed-term Parliament and have supported amendments that clearly stated “fixed term”, although I believe that the term should be four years, rather than five. I have to ask myself, as all of us as legislators and members of the Committee must ask ourselves, if we do not like the present provisions, what is our alternative that would mean that we have credibly passed a Bill for fixed-term Parliaments? That is where I part company and cease to be persuaded by some of the arguments that I hear in respect of some of the amendments.
With reference to cynicism about the motives, a number of hon. Members have articulated the basic nature of the Bill. It is the means by which the two coalition parties have created a statutory harness to keep them together for this Parliament. It is, in essence, a fixed this-Parliament Bill, rather than a Fixed-term Parliament Bill. It is designed to solve the conundrum of either party collapsing the coalition. The Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill is for fixing future elections. This Bill is about fixing this Parliament.
If I want the Bill to be a Fixed-term Parliament Bill, I have to be judicious about its content and any amendments that I might support. That is why I have some questions about some of the amendments that have been so articulately presented today.
The hon. Member for Epping Forest (Mrs Laing) presented amendment 33 with a white flag and in a very novel way, which just goes to show that it is entirely possible for people to present themselves in all sorts of ways in the House. People say that a Government would not use or exploit in any way a no confidence motion against themselves, but any available device will be used in any particular circumstances. That is the nature of politics.
The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) spoke to amendment 21 and made a strong case for an “immediate” as opposed to an “early” general election. The only problem is that if “immediate” can mean only six weeks, as he said to the hon. Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar (Mr MacNeil), what happens if, for example, we are close to Christmas—perhaps the middle of November—notwithstanding that allowances will be made for holidays? If we are truly to take account of media coverage and other activities during that time, is it credible to confine ourselves to six weeks and six weeks only? Clause 2 as it stands allows for consensus in the House on the need to bring forward considerably the due date for an election, and people might do so conscious of current and pending events.
Another hon. Member mentioned the situation in Dublin at the minute, and many people would say that, although confirmation of an early election there has helped to clear the political air, going for an immediate election might cause more market turmoil not just for Ireland, but for others. There are times when we need to leave ourselves and this House the room to make a distinction between “early” and “immediate”.
Mr Cash
I am well aware that the hon. Gentleman is pretty close to and talks frequently with those in southern Ireland and in the Dail, but I doubt whether the Dail or the people of Ireland would be particularly enthusiastic at this moment, when the Government are in coalition with the Greens, to have such a provision imposed upon them. I suspect that, if the idea were suggested, it would lead to serious disturbances in Ireland, and I am quite sure that the hon. Gentleman will agree.
Mark Durkan
The hon. Gentleman raises some wider questions, and you, Mr Hoyle, have said that the next group of amendments deals with confidence, but this debate has strayed well on to that ground and conflated the two issues of whether the House, by a weighted majority, calls for an early election or whether it passes a motion of no confidence in the Government.
In 1994, the Government changed in the Dail. The Labour party left its coalition with Fianna Fail, supported a motion of no confidence in the then Taoiseach and reappeared in a new coalition with Fine Gael and the then Democratic Left. In that situation, as in the Bill before us, provision has been made for a Government to change—a new Government to be constituted—in the lifetime of a Parliament, and in 1994 the people of Ireland settled quite happily for that.
Tristram Hunt
Thank you, Mr Hoyle. That proves my point—the areas where we cannot go because they are before judges are increasing.
In his written statement, the Minister simply cites article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689, and leaves it at that. It provides that
“proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court”,
and he said he could see
“no reason why the courts would not continue to defer to them”.
The comity between Parliament and the courts has relied on the fact that the internal proceedings were entirely matters for the House’s jurisdiction. Its procedures arising from Standing Orders or resolutions cannot be legally challenged, but statute law can. That is the extraordinary development in the Bill.
Mr Cash
The hon. Gentleman is dealing with amendments to come and amendment 6. I take his point, but there is a huge body of law, and statements are being made by members of the Supreme Court that are causing great concern and are being considered by my European Scrutiny Committee’s inquiry into parliamentary sovereignty in the context of law making in this House.
Tristram Hunt
I could not agree more with the hon. Gentleman, and I will come to the Supreme Court in a moment. I do not want to interfere with his amendments on the Speaker’s certificate, which are absolutely correct. My hon. Friend the Member for Wrexham (Ian Lucas) referred to the Digital Economy Act 2010, and the Hunting Act 2004 was also reviewed in court. Yes, the court ruled that it could not interfere with the Act, but it had to go to the Law Lords for that supposedly self-evident truth to be confirmed. Even there, the judgment was hardly a ringing endorsement of parliamentary sovereignty, which is what amendment 33 seeks to retain.
Tristram Hunt
The hon. Gentleman makes a very good point, and his knowledge of the Hunting Act is second to none. I am hinting at the adventurism of justices in critiquing and opening up to judicial review not only the Parliament Act but the proceedings of this place. The fear is that putting these measures into statute will open up the calling of elections from this place. That is what amendment 33 seeks to address.
Mr Cash
The hon. Gentleman is relentlessly hunting out the provisions that will be referred to shortly. The problem with the Parliament Act 1911 is that the phrase
“shall not be questioned in any court of law”
follows the words stating that the certificate
“shall be conclusive for all purposes”.
When the courts come to interpret these questions, they will say, “ Well, that’s what it says in the Parliament Act.” So if the words were left out, there may have been an intention to include the courts of law in this instance. That is why my amendment 6 makes it absolutely clear that there shall be no presentation of such a certificate to the courts, let alone any possibility of their adjudicating on such matters.
Mr Harper
In a moment; let me first address the question I have just been asked.
Earlier in the debate, we had a conversation about motions that were not specifically in these terms, and several Members on the Government Benches referred to certain votes. My hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) referred to some votes on Europe and my hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr Shepherd) talked about a vote on VAT on fuel. How the Government behaved after the debates on those motions was determined by Ministers, not the House.
Mr Harper
Excellent; that is an excellent step forward. [Interruption.] I shall take it as one.
Amendment 4 stands in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone and was also signed by Opposition Members. Effectively, it drives a coach and horses through these entire provisions; the hon. Member for Foyle picked that point up very well. It is because we want to provide for fixed-term Parliaments that the Bill specifies that an early general election can be triggered only if there is a majority of at least two thirds. If it were possible to have an early general election by way of a motion that gains a simple majority, we all know that in most circumstances that would mean that we have given the power back to the Prime Minister. If he felt an early general election was in the interests of the governing party and that view was shared by the governing party, the motion would be passed and we would have a general election, and we would therefore not have fixed-term Parliaments.
I am not surprised that my hon. Friend has tabled this amendment as it is clear from his speech that he does not like the concept of fixed-term Parliaments at all, and that instead he is happy with our current arrangements, which he is entitled to be. However, given that the Opposition have said they are broadly in favour of fixed-term Parliaments—albeit for four years, not five—I cannot understand why they have supported the amendment because, as I have said, it drives a coach and horses through the entire proposition.
Mr Harper
Mr Hoyle, you are pointing out that we can discuss this at length when we get on to a later group of amendments. My view on the hon. Gentleman’s example is very clear: if the Prime Minister so wishes, he can cease being Prime Minister whenever he feels like it. The House could then see whether an alternative Government under a different leader could be formed—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Rhondda says not under this provision, but this provision is for an early election. The Prime Minister can cease being Prime Minister whenever the Prime Minister chooses and Her Majesty will then be able to send for an alternative person to form a new Government. That is not what the Bill is about. The Bill is about fixed-term Parliaments, not fixed-term Governments.
The Temporary Chair (Mr David Amess)
Before we come to the next group of amendments, I have the following announcement to make regarding deferred Divisions. On the question relating to local elections in Northern Ireland, the Ayes were 337 and the Noes were 217, so the Question was agreed to. On the question relating to Northern Ireland Assembly elections, the Ayes were 338 and the Noes were 216, so the Question was agreed to. On the question relating to health and safety and the EPR nuclear reactor, the Ayes were 520 and the Noes were 27, so the Question was agreed to. On the question relating to health and safety and the AP1000 nuclear reactor, the Ayes were 517 and the Noes were 26, so the Question was agreed to.
[The Division lists are published at the end of today’s debates.]
The Temporary Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 22, page 2, line 12, leave out ‘14’ and insert ‘ten working’.
Amendment 36, page 2, line 14, at end insert—
‘(2A) In reckoning for the purposes of subsection 2(b), no account shall be taken of any time during which Parliament is prorogued or during which the House of Commons is adjourned for more than four days.’.
Amendment 37, page 2, line 14, at end insert—
‘(2B) Where the House of Commons passes a motion of no confidence in Her Majesty’s Government, the Prime Minister shall tender his resignation to Her Majesty within a period of seven days of the motion being passed.
(2C) On tendering his resignation under subsection (2B), it shall be a duty on the Prime Minister to advise Her Majesty to appoint as his successor the person who appears to him most likely to command the confidence of the House of Commons.’.
Amendment 25, page 2, line 24, at end add—
‘(6A) In this section a “motion of no confidence in Her Majesty’s Government” shall be—
(a) in the terms “This House has no confidence in Her Majesty’s Government” or
(b) in the terms “This House has no confidence in the Prime Minister”.’.
Mr Cash
During the previous debate, we covered an enormous amount of the ground contained in this group of amendments, so purely to clarify the position I should say that, although the previous amendments dealt with early parliamentary elections when the motion might as well be a confidence motion but of course might not, this group relates to a motion of no confidence. I accept the Minister’s point that such a motion would require a simple majority, and I do not need to say any more on that.
I have already explained the variety of confidence motions, but I am afraid I have the gravest disagreement with the Minister about his definition of a confidence motion. I am very concerned indeed, and for reasons that I shall go into when we reach the next amendments on the potential role of the judiciary. It is impossible for the Minister to explain what a vote of no confidence is, and he certainly has not done so today.
It is extremely difficult to define a vote of no confidence, because it covers a vote on an Adjournment, on the reduction of a Minister’s salary, on Suez, on the defeat of the Callaghan Government—and Margaret Thatcher becoming Prime Minister—by a majority of one, and many other situations. There is a raft of different definitions, and what troubles me is that right at the heart of the matter is one simple proposition, summarised by Leo Amery on 7 May 1940, when he got up during a very charged debate on the Norway issue and said to Neville Chamberlain:
“In the name of God, go.”—[Official Report, 7 May 1940; Vol. 360, c. 1150.]
Although the Government won that vote of confidence, because enough craven people were prepared to vote for them, Chamberlain knew the game was up. The confidence motion was therefore—even in that case—defeated, and he went. The definition of a confidence motion is therefore extremely uncertain. It boils down to the fact that there is such concern about, and lack of confidence in, the Government—let alone the Prime Minister—that he has to go and, therefore, the Government as well. The two things run together.
Mr Cash
As the former adviser to Quebec in the Canadian constitutional dispute of 1982, I am not unfamiliar with the problems that arise in the Canadian constitution. Of course, Canada has a Governor-General, and there is a completely different situation there. There was a similar situation in Australia some time ago involving Gough Whitlam.
I would strongly deny, however, that we should be guided by what goes on in other countries: the real issue is what we do in this House. We have an established position that is dependent on the views of the House. My strongest objection to the phrasing of the previous amendment was that it referred to the number of seats in the House rather than those voting in the House. There is a big difference. In Germany, the question of whether a Government might fall would depend on the number of persons present if, under its written constitution, two thirds vote in a particular division, whereas in the case of this coalition Government, it would be dependent on the number of seats. It is necessary to take into account the Deputy Speakers and the people who might be absent. In fact, the clause includes, in brackets, the words “including vacant seats”, so the arithmetic is extraordinarily difficult. The real question is whether the Government have lost confidence.
Mr David Nuttall (Bury North) (Con)
Would not one solution be to stipulate that any motion of no confidence must specifically relate to this clause, so that there could be no doubt that the motion before the House was covered by the Bill as enacted?
Mr Cash
That is an interesting idea, but that is not what the Bill says, although I am not criticising my hon. Friend for that. The Bill simply says that
“on a specified day the House passed a motion of no confidence in Her Majesty’s Government (as then constituted)”.
I described in an earlier debate the shenanigans of the 14-day period after a day had ended without the House having passed any motion expressing confidence in any Government of Her Majesty. What happens next is that all these people get together in a huddle and then rush up and down Downing street and Whitehall going to see the Cabinet Secretary and receiving some instructions about what they should do, in his view, if they want a stable Government. The net result is that we have a completely chaotic situation driven by behind-the-scenes, unknown negotiations that are then announced—
Mr Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend remember—happy days—when we were Maastricht rebels? We defeated the Government on the paving motion, and they then brought in another motion that was related to a no confidence motion, and we were all brought to heel in that way. Although I would not want to encourage that sort of behaviour, at least it was clear, was it not? The Government were saying, “This is where we are—we stand here.” At least that made for strong government.
Mr Cash
There is one simple reason why some of us voted for the confidence motion on Maastricht. I remember pointing to the late John Smith, who was then Leader of the Opposition, and saying, “There is only one reason why I am going to vote for the present Government on this occasion, and that is because you are more of a federalist than they are.” That is why that vote went that way—it is as simple as that.
This is not only about the shenanigans with the Whips, the patronage, the promises, the chicanery behind closed doors, and all that, leading to yet another coalition agreement, no doubt based on different principles, in order to stay in power. The other aspect—we can get to it later, which is why I am about to bring my remarks to an end—is that it is dependent on the Speaker of the House of Commons issuing a certificate certifying the motion of no confidence. That is an extremely important matter, which we need to discuss properly after the debate on this group of amendments.
I think I have spoken quite enough for the time being, and I would be very glad to expedite matters by moving on as soon as possible to the next issue. I think we will have a very interesting and, if I may so, seminal debate on the role of the judiciary in relation to parliamentary sovereignty.
Chris Bryant
The last moments of the speech of the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash) sounded a bit like a trailer for the next debate. If he does not mind we will stick with this one for the moment, although he is absolutely right to say that the way in which all the different elements of the Bill tumble together in a concatenation will make for a fairly dangerous precedent if we are not given further clarification.
It is important that we establish some basic first principles on no confidence motions. First, the Government should at all times enjoy the confidence of the House of Commons. It is important to state that that should be a matter solely for the House of Commons, no matter whether we change the composition of the House of Lords in future, as I hope we do. I note that motions of no confidence have been tabled and debated in the House of Lords, but that is inappropriate. The elected House of Commons, the primary Chamber, should determine whether the Government enjoy the confidence of Parliament.
Secondly, it is important to say that just because the Government lose a vote, they do not necessarily have to fall. That is an important principle because I think that there are only two Prime Ministers since the second world war who have not lost votes at some point. Even Churchill lost one vote in his period as Prime Minister after the war. Attlee lost four, even when he had a majority, and Wilson lost 31, six in his first time as Prime Minister and 25 in his second. Callaghan lost 34, none of which did for him—well, obviously one did in the end. It is a sign of a healthy relationship between the Executive and Parliament if the legislature is able to defeat the Government on occasion on bits and pieces of legislation.
Obviously there comes a point at which a Government might not be able to continue, for instance because they have not been able to get their Budget through in any shape or form, or because they cannot take through some major piece of legislation. In practice, as the hon. Member for Stone mentioned, what has normally happened is that the Government have brought forward legislation and then lost a vote on an amendment or some motion. Often, the Opposition have then tabled a motion of no confidence the next day.
The convention of the House—I note that it is only a convention—is that the Government automatically give precedence to a motion of no confidence, so that it can be debated immediately. It is obviously in the Government’s interests to resolve the matter of whether the House has confidence in them. I merely note that now we are putting elements of the matter into statute rather than depending on convention and Standing Orders, there is no provision to ensure that a motion of no confidence is guaranteed precedence and can be debated swiftly, one would hope the next day.
Governments have lost large numbers of votes since the second world war and before, and that is important. Some of them have been finance votes, and it is perfectly satisfactory for some finance votes to be lost, for instance on stamp duty or the rate of income tax. On 16 July 1974, the Government lost a vote on a Liberal amendment to the Finance Bill. On 8 May 1978 the Conservatives moved that income tax be cut from 34% to 33%, which was carried against the Government’s wishes. On 10 May that year another Conservative amendment to the Finance Bill was agreed to, and the Government lost another motion the next day in relation to sending the Finance Bill off to Committee.
I do not believe that such losses should of necessity mean that the Government should fall, or indeed that they have lost the confidence of the House in its totality. I also do not believe that a motion to censure an individual member of the Government should, of necessity, lead to the fall of the Government, a new general election or to inciting the provisions in the Bill. There have been occasions in the past, when, effectively, a motion to censure an individual member of the Government has been so considered. The last occasion when a Government who had a majority of seats in the House of Commons lost a motion of no confidence was in 1895. The motion was on reducing the salary of the Secretary of State for War, Mr Campbell-Bannerman, by £100 because he had not provided enough cordite to the troops. The motion was carried. Even though Campbell-Bannerman was probably the most popular Member of the Government at the time, he resigned and the Prime Minister decided that he would consider it to have been a motion of confidence, and the Government resigned. The incoming Conservative Government decided to seek a Dissolution and hold an election and the Conservatives came to power.
Mr Cash
The hon. Gentleman makes an extremely interesting case. He has demonstrated that motions of confidence come in all shapes and sizes—the essence of such motions is whether the House of Commons has lost confidence in the Government—but the question whether the courts will get their hands on such matters is the big issue, and that troubles me. However interesting it may be to go through the various facets of this group of amendments, if we are to have a vote on the courts, we must get on to the next group of amendments, because we need to debate that.
Chris Bryant
I very much hope that we do. There are two elements to why this debate matters: first, the role of the Speaker, and secondly, the role of the courts, which is what the hon. Gentleman wants to debate.
Contrary to what the Minister said, the Opposition rather than the Prime Minister often determine what is and is not a motion of confidence. As we heard, the Prime Minister could decide that the question whether the House adjourns is a matter of confidence, or he or she could refer to minor legislation as such. However, the Opposition can not only table a motion of no confidence, but declare that another matter is a matter of confidence. Effectively, they can demand that the Prime Minister address such a matter personally.
On 15 January 1972, Second Reading of the European Communities Act 1972, which I suspect the hon. Member for Stone knows well, was declared by the then Prime Minister to be a matter of confidence. He said that if he lost, there would be a general election. Undoubtedly, some decided to support him for that very reason.
Thomas Docherty
I thank my hon. Friend. I will not repeat my previous lecture on US constitutional history, but it is worth reflecting on what happened before the 1997 general election, when Labour, the Liberal Democrats and civic society in Scotland got together for a five-year constitutional convention and teased out over that period exactly the mechanisms that would lead to a no-confidence vote. As I mentioned earlier, using the example of Scotland, if the Budget falls in the Scottish Parliament, that does not automatically trigger an early general election. What happens is that the Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament has to set out that there will be a vote of no confidence later.
Mr Cash
The hon. Gentleman spoke about his enthusiasm for the Speaker. Does he agree that we must make certain that under no circumstances should the Speaker’s certificate be decided through the courts? The provision in the clause raises a serious question. The Clerk of the House was entirely right in his assessment. Furthermore, when the Committee votes on the amendments, it must decide that it will not under any circumstances allow the Speaker’s certificate to be decided by the courts, and that the wording of the 1911 Act—
The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Dawn Primarolo)
Order. Interventions must be brief.
Fixed-term Parliaments Bill
William Cash Excerpts(13 years, 5 months ago)
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Mr Shepherd
The proposal suits the Government for their own purposes, and that is why the nation at large is cautious, as are many Members on both sides of this Chamber.
Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend appreciate that many of us may well be cautious, because although we are concentrating on the question of a fixed-term Parliament, when we move on we will be examining the question of an early general election and questions of confidence—confidence in whom and for what? We will also deal with whether such questions should be decided by a simple majority or one of two thirds. These hugely important questions go straight to the heart of the future of this Parliament.
Mr Shepherd
My hon. Friend is, of course, right. This is a hugely important constitutional Bill and we should not doubt that. Every commentator of any serious worth has noted that this is an enormously important constitutional issue and we will try to tickle out its ramifications, including for parliamentary privilege, within our very tight timetable. What he says is true and just, and we should listen to it.
Chris Bryant
Yes, of course. The hon. Lady is right in the sense that constituents will not have to worry about the date of the election. In fact, newspapers and the BBC will have to employ considerably fewer journalists, because they will know the date of the general election and actually have to obsess about something else. However, the past 50 years have shown that, for the most part, once a Parliament has run for more than four years, either the Parliament itself is so fed up with the Prime Minister that it chooses to change the Prime Minister before holding a subsequent general election, or the country is becoming pretty fed up.
Mr Cash
Does the hon. Gentleman accept that, really, this is not a fixed-term Parliament Bill at all? I mean not to criticise but to ask him a question, because, contrary to what he says, the Government do not make all the rules, the House of Commons does. If the House decided to go for a confidence motion because it happened to be fed up with the Government in question, as it did over Maastricht, we could end up with the situation in which the Government lost control. Then there would be a general election, and there would be no fixed term at all.
Chris Bryant
That is right, but that is a point in relation to clause 2 and at the moment we are dealing with clause 1. [Interruption.] At the moment we are talking about clause 1. In fact, the Bill is not really a fixed-term Parliaments Bill, because it does not determine how many days it should sit within those five years; it is a fixed-term elections Bill: it determines when elections shall be. There are things that we need to change in relation to Prorogation and so on, and we shall come on to that at another point in the debate, but, for the most part in this country, after four years and often before, the mandate on which the Government were elected becomes pretty thin, and they start doing things—sometimes pretty unpopular things—that were not clearly outlined in their manifesto. The party or parties might have made all sorts of commitments before they went into government, but events come along or the Government suddenly discover things that mean they have to break those manifesto promises or commitments, and the longer that a Government go on after four years, if they do so, the more likely they are to undermine respect for Parliament.
Chris Bryant
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for sitting there in his rotund way—[Interruption] I am sorry, orotund way—and providing me with the suggestion that I might refer to France. He is absolutely right, and I will indeed come to France. He might also have mentioned, orotundly, that Italy, Austria, Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg have provisions for five years. It is worth pointing out that in Italy there have been 17 elections for its Camera dei Deputati since 1945, and only twice in that time has the Parliament run for the full five years.
Chris Bryant
Of course. The hon. Gentleman is very peripatetic this evening.
Mr Cash
I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman might take on board the fact that the systems of all the other countries in Europe that he has rightly cited are based on written constitutions. Does he accept that the virtue of the British system is its flexibility? Moreover, there is the example of 10 May 1940—the day I was born, as it turned out—when Chamberlain was effectively dispatched because he had completely failed and Winston Churchill took over. That was on the very day that Hitler invaded the lowlands. In other words, we make our decisions based on whether we in this House, on behalf of the people, decide that the Government have had their day.
Chris Bryant
The hon. Gentleman is, in effect, making an argument against the whole of the Bill, because he is basically saying that we should not have fixed-term Parliaments. [Interruption.] I am sorry—he is chuntering so I cannot quite hear what he is saying. However, I disagree with him. My argument is that if we are going to have fixed-term Parliaments, they should not be of five years but of four years, partly because otherwise we will end up having the longest-running Parliaments in the European Union.
In Italy, very few Parliaments have gone on for five years because the President has the power to suspend the Parliament early. In Austria, there have been even more general elections—20—although that country has had a fixed five-year term since the war. Malta has had 16 elections since the war, and only since 1998 has it stuck to the five-year period. Cyprus has had regular changes to its constitution for a whole series of different reasons, not least in relation to Turkey. Only Luxembourg has a fixed five-year term that it has stuck to since 1974. In all these cases—I thought that this is the point that the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash) was going to make—the elections are held on the basis of a system of proportional representation, where there is an expectation that Parliaments might fall rather more frequently because elections do not tend to bring in one party with an absolute majority of seats in the relevant House.
G20 Summit
William Cash Excerpts(13 years, 5 months ago)
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The Prime Minister
There are two points, the first of which is on what is in the communiqué. Everybody signed up to avoiding competitive devaluations and moving towards market-led exchange rate systems. I accept that those are words, but they are positive. The fact is that China and America are discussing their differences and issues in a multilateral agenda. The second point is that it is in the interests of China itself, and indeed in its five-year plan, to see a growth of domestic demand as the next driver of its economy. That is good news for Britain, America and the deficit countries, but it is also in China’s own national interest. We should try to flag that up whenever we talk to the Chinese about that.
Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
Will my right hon. Friend accept my enthusiastic applause for his principle of free trade, the growth of small businesses and all that goes with that in international affairs? Will he explain how he will achieve that without achieving competitiveness in the European Union—the imperative competitiveness to which he has referred in the past—and deregulation, including the repatriation of social and employment legislation from the EU to the UK?
The Prime Minister
I thank my hon. Friend for his question. My point—this is perhaps the point of difference between us—is that although I think the EU has taken too many powers and become too federal, as it were, I believe that at the moment quite a lot of like-minded EU Governments are on the centre and centre right of politics. They want deregulation, competitive markets and an agenda that means that we can reform the structures of our economies and get growth. That is true of the Germans, the Dutch, the Swedes, the Danes and many others. They are natural allies for us and we should push forward the deregulation agenda in Europe. I intend to do so.
Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill
William Cash Excerpts(13 years, 6 months ago)
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Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 7, page 6, line 10, at end insert ‘, and
(c) the number of electors casting a vote in the referendum is equal to or greater than 40 per cent. of those entitled to cast such a vote.’.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 197, page 6, line 10, at end insert
‘, and
(c) the number of electors casting a vote in favour of the answer “Yes” is equal to or greater than 25 per cent. of those entitled to cast such a vote.’.
Amendment 8, page 6, line 12, after ‘“No”,’, insert
‘or if the number of electors casting a vote in the referendum is less than 40 per cent. of those entitled to cast such a vote,’.
Amendment 198, page 6, line 12, after ‘“No”’, insert
‘or if the number of electors casting a vote in favour of the answer “Yes” is fewer than 25 per cent. of those entitled to cast such a vote’.
Mr Cash
The question of threshold is the second most important issue after the question of whether we agree to this Bill on Second or Third Reading. We have Third Reading to come, and I admit to having voted with some enthusiasm against the Bill on Second Reading, as did a number of my colleagues. We did so because of our inherent objection to the principles that underlie it. I objected to the alternative vote in the wash-up, and I have no reservations about my objections to it. Indeed, I have consistently objected to variants of the proportional representation system ever since I entered the House.
That principled objection has been adopted by Members throughout 150 years of our parliamentary democracy. Many, including Gladstone, Disraeli and even Lloyd George, have objected to the whole idea of undermining the first-past-the-post system. I am reminded of what Disraeli wrote in his novel “Coningsby”. At the time of the Reform Act and the repeal of the corn laws, he wrote in a brief chapter of just one-and-a-half pages:
“There was a great deal of shouting about Conservative principles, but the awkward question naturally arose—what are the principles we are supposed to conserve?”
I believe this Bill is inherently contrary to Conservative principles for the reasons I have given.
Indeed, I would go further and say that I fear that we have not really heard the full reality— the actualité—of what is going on here. Failure in that regard makes it all the more necessary to have a threshold, because if we do not tell the British people the entire truth, which Churchill said we had to do, I fear they will be misled in the referendum campaign. My belief that a threshold is necessary is based in part on the fact that at least that would enable a percentage of the population to be the determining factor as to whether or not the vote is valid.
Mr Cash
Actually, I set it at over 60% until we had the shenanigans on, I think, 18 October. We were effectively deprived—I will not say cheated—of the opportunity to debate this matter in our deliberations on clause 6. The chicanery, as I called it, that we engaged in on that occasion resulted in the threshold being negatived under the procedures of the House. I am not going to go back over that territory however, because I am delighted that we are now having an opportunity to debate this topic.
The threshold question is very important and we were previously deprived of an opportunity to discuss it properly because of the programme motion and other activities that I regarded as rather disreputable. I believe the Bill is being severely vitiated, and I think it is very important that the people of this country know that threshold is a key issue. Indeed, threshold and the 40% figure are regarded by all commentators as having significance across the international scene as well as for the United Kingdom.
Stephen Twigg (Liverpool, West Derby) (Lab/Co-op)
The hon. Gentleman mentions the international evidence. Italy has a provision that is similar to the one he is proposing and the effect is that those who favour a no vote in referendums simply campaign for them to be boycotted. If the hon. Gentleman’s amendment is successful, will he campaign for a no vote or for people to boycott the referendum?
Mr Christopher Chope (Christchurch) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend accept that the problem identified by the hon. Member for Liverpool, West Derby (Stephen Twigg) is not one that applies to amendment 197, because it proposes a support threshold, rather than a turnout threshold.
Mr Chope
I see the hon. Gentleman nodding. If amendment 197 were to be accepted, at least one in four electors would have to support the proposed change, and that is very different from what my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) is talking about, which is a turnout threshold.
Mr Cash
We were all much more in agreement about this in Committee. All I can say to my hon. Friend is that I believe very strongly, for the reasons I have given and because of the principles I have enunciated, that the 40% threshold is desirable. Incidentally, on the majority provisions prevalent in other democracies in the west, Denmark’s requirement on constitutional change is for 40% of registered voters and, as the hon. Member for Liverpool, West Derby (Stephen Twigg) implied, Italy has a turnout requirement of 50% of registered voters. Indeed, this country used something not similar, but parallel in the 1979 vote, when the requirement was for 40% of registered voters saying yes.
Mr Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)
All these amendments on thresholds are eminently sensible, but does my hon. Friend agree that there is no chance of their being accepted because the Government will not accept them and that is because there is such profound apathy about this measure among the British people that if any kind of threshold was in place, there would be no chance of the proposal in the referendum being accepted? That is the reality.
Mr Cash
I understand what my hon. Friend is saying, but the problem arises if he simply takes the view that, for one reason or another, either in this House or outside it, there is apathy. I simply refer him back to all the great constitutional problems that have arisen in the past 150 years, when there has also been a problem of apathy, because the constitutional arguments are difficult to get across. I think of this on the basis of, for example, the preference arrangements where a person votes for only one candidate, which will mean that a large number of people will, in effect, be disfranchised—they might be very concerned about that. Some 1.5 million people voted for the UK Independence party and the British National party, and one might say that they may well not vote for anybody else. The other thing, which goes with that, is that if one is faced with a choice of Liberal and Labour, there may be an increased likelihood of people voting Liberal Democrat.
Mr Cash
Wait a minute. That is so for the very simple reason that many people have a visceral hatred of both parties and therefore think, wrongly, that they are voting for another party that will do them some good—we have a different view about that.
I regard this as a lambs-to-the-slaughter Bill—this is why I insist on the threshold—because of what would happen under these arrangements to a number of Conservative MPs if they were to get less than 50% of the vote, as they did in the last election. I have calculated that 60 Conservative MPs had Liberal Democrats in second place. My sense of friendship for my colleagues suggests to me that putting as many as 60 seats on the line is a very high price to pay for the purposes of something so central to the coalition. The figures I have show that those who would be affected range from my hon. Friend the Member for Watford (Richard Harrington), who got 34.9% of the vote, to my hon. Friend the Member for Romsey and Southampton North (Caroline Nokes), who got 49.7%. All those Members would be largely at risk, although some more so than others, and something will depend on the boundary changes. I cannot understand how my party can make arrangements that take those lambs to the slaughter. This is extraordinary and I would be interested to hear the Minister’s reply.
Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)
I am very interested in the hon. Gentleman’s point. I agree that turkeys do not usually vote for Christmas. Does he perhaps think that his leader has a plan for his party that he is obviously not party to?
Mr Cash
I have voted consistently against this Bill and I will continue to do so, for the reasons that I have given. It behoves some of us to act both with consistency and in principle against things that were not in our manifesto—in fact, it is the opposite because our manifesto declared that we were not in favour of the alternative vote. Furthermore, there was complete silence on the question of threshold until we received the Bill.
Thomas Docherty
The hon. Gentleman is probably one of the longest-serving parliamentarians. Will he clarify whether he believes that the House of Lords should be bound to follow the manifesto commitment convention or, given that this provision was not in his party’s manifesto, that the House of Lords is perfectly entitled to disregard that convention?
Mr Cash
That is a very good question.
My final point is that leaving this ultimately House of Commons issue—it is about voting here in the House of Commons—to the House of Lords is absolutely disgraceful. This issue should not be resolved in the House of Lords. I have heard a number of my hon. Friends, for whom I have the greatest respect on most matters, churning this out and I simply think it is unacceptable. This is a matter for the House of Commons; it is about our electors, our constituencies, our constitution and the freedom of choice at the ballot box. I utterly reject this Bill and I utterly reject the idea of AV. I strongly urge hon. Members to vote with me on the threshold provision that stands in my name.
Chris Bryant
My hon. Friend is absolutely right that there is no fixed determined policy that we are completely and utterly in all cases implacably opposed to thresholds. Nor, for that matter, is there a belief that we ardently should have thresholds. However, I suspect that the hon. Member for Stone has tabled this amendment in some sense as a wrecking amendment, in that he does not really want AV, and that is part of his intention.
Chris Bryant
I shall not give way to him, because there is very little time for debate. I accept that that might not be his intention, but none the less it might be the result of such a thing.
Mr Harper
The amendments moved by my hon. Friends seek to specify certain thresholds. They are very different, as has emerged from the debate. The amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) would impose a simple turnout threshold. At least 40% of those entitled to vote would have to cast a vote, or the result would not be valid.
I should take this opportunity to put my hon. Friend right on the form of the alternative vote system that we propose in the Bill. I do not know if he was present for the debates that we had on it. His concern, I think he said, was that people would be forced to vote for all the candidates on the ballot paper, and if they did not, their vote would not be valid. He referred to some parties for which people would not want to vote. I can reassure him—
Mr Harper
Okay, but under our system of optional preferential, we are not forcing anybody to vote for anyone. Voters can vote for one candidate, all the candidates or any number in between, so the form of the alternative vote that we are putting to the electorate next year does not raise any of the concerns that my hon. Friend touched on. I am sorry if I overstated his argument.
The reason we have not specified a threshold in the Bill is, as a number of hon. Members said, that we want to respect the will of the people who vote in the referendum, without any qualifications. The argument against my hon. Friend’s amendment is that specifying a threshold for voter turnout—on this I agree with the hon. Member for Liverpool, West Derby (Stephen Twigg)—is that it makes every abstention effectively a no vote.
People may choose to abstain, but the amendment would create an incentive for people who favour a no vote to abstain. So people would not campaign, as they rightly should, for only yes or no votes in the referendum. We would have people campaigning actively for voters not to participate. We debated this a little on Second Reading, and as I said in my speech then, I do not think that is right. We need to encourage participation in the referendum. We want people to take part, and putting in a rule that encourages at least one side to campaign actively for voters not to take part would do our democracy a disservice.
I am not concerned as some colleagues are about what the turnout will be. As we have said in previous debates, both in Committee and in the House, there are elections for the devolved Administrations—for the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly—but there are also elections scheduled next year for 81% of England. The percentage turnout in English local elections varies, but it is usually in the mid to high 30s at least. I am confident that with the additional publicity and the awareness of the referendum, and the fact that it is an important decision, we will indeed get a good turnout.
Previous referendums in this country have either had good turnouts or, where the turnouts have not been that high, they have produced decisive clear results from the electorate, so I do not share that concern. We should not go against our tradition and practice in this country by setting turnout thresholds.
Let me now focus on the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest (Mrs Laing). She is right to say that it proposes a completely different, outcome-specific threshold. It is worth saying to colleagues on the Government Benches who support the Government’s proposals and respect the coalition agreement that my hon. Friend’s amendment is not compatible with what we set out in the coalition agreement, which was a simple majority referendum, without an outcome-specific threshold. Colleagues who are reconciled to a referendum being held should bear that in mind if they are tempted to vote for my hon. Friend’s amendment.
The Deputy Prime Minister
I would like to make a little progress.
At the heart of this Bill are some simple principles. It is right that constituencies are more fairly sized, so that the weight of a person’s vote does not depend on where they live. It is right that we reverse the unintended trend that has seen this House grow in size and cap its membership at a more reasonable number. It is right for people to have their say on the extremely important question of which system voters use to elect MPs, and crucially, it is right that, at a time when people’s trust in Parliament has been tested to destruction, we act to renew our institutions.
Mr Cash
I am most grateful to the Deputy Prime Minister for giving way and hope not to detach him too long from his speech. Would he be good enough to explain to me, in the light of the announcement earlier today on votes for prisoners, whether under the Bill prisoners who are currently disqualified from voting in parliamentary elections will be unable to vote in the referendum? Do the Government propose to change that to bring it into line with today’s announcement?
The Deputy Prime Minister
As the Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Forest of Dean (Mr Harper), explained this afternoon, we have made no decision on the matter other than to state the obvious point, which was first stated by the previous Government, that we will need to act in accordance with the law. We are still debating exactly how and when to do that, and we will make announcements as soon as we can.
I am sure I do not need to remind Members of the damage that was done by the expenses scandal, which lifted the lid on a culture of secrecy, arrogance and remoteness right at the heart of the democracy. The coalition Government are determined to turn the page on that political culture and give people a political system that they can trust. That is why we have set out a programme for wholesale political reform. We are starting with this Bill, which, through its commitment to fairness and choice, corrects fundamental injustices in how people elect their MPs.
Sadiq Khan
The hon. Gentleman, who is a friend, has been absent for the past few days, and I am not quite sure what point he makes.
Sensible, neutral suggestions that have commanded support on both sides of the House, such as the proposal to ensure that the Executive do not grow disproportionately powerful as the legislature is reduced in size, have been dismissed. As any independent observer who has followed the passage of the Bill to date will readily admit, that unbending attitude deprives the Bill of the adjustments and improvements it sorely needs.
The scrutiny process has suffered from being rushed. It is a convention that major constitutional matters are debated here, but it is also a convention that they are given sufficient time.
Mr Cash
On constitutional conventions, is it not the case that in many countries, including ours, Bills of this kind are subject to thresholds because they ensure that enough people have voted? On the abstention argument, do the Opposition believe that people have a right not to vote? Otherwise, do they believe that voting ought to be compulsory?
Sadiq Khan
The problem with the hon. Gentleman’s propositions is that the manifestos of neither coalition party contained any of the ingredients of the Bill, let alone thresholds. That is one reason why, like sheep, they have voted against proposals for more accountability, both in Committee and on Report. Any independent observer who has followed the passage of this legislation, including the Deputy Prime Minister, who might have had a chance to read some of the Hansard reports, will readily admit that that unbending attitude deprives the Bill of the adjustments and improvements it sorely needs.
Let me give some examples of Bills that have gone through the House with proper debate and scrutiny. The Government of Wales Act 1998 was taken on the Floor of the House and was the subject of more than 69 hours of debate. The Scotland Act 1998 was also taken on the Floor of the House and was the subject of more than 121 hours of debate before it left for the other place.
Mr Cash
I have opposed this Bill from the beginning because I do not believe that it is based on any sensible constitutional principle whatever. It is in defiance of our own manifesto. It supports the process of a coalition, which, given how this Bill came to be part of the coalition agreement, is itself subject to questioning. We have heard from the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) and others as to the manner in which this Bill, or this proposal for this Bill through the coalition agreement, was devised. I do not need to rehearse all that. This is something that is a matter of grave concern to many of us. The question of principle and conviction, which ought to underlie any major constitutional issue, is wholly lacking in respect of this Bill.
I heard many of the arguments from the Labour party. I have to say that irrespective of what Labour Members do in the vote tonight, I cannot honestly say that I believe that they stand on any principle that is worth considering. They have not had any mandate for their vote as far as this Bill is concerned. The idea that a threshold should not be inserted as being the only protection for the people of this country, who are being taken to a referendum—a poll—largely because this Bill is being so heavily whipped, is in itself a matter of the gravest concern. This Bill violates constitutional principle. It violates the manner in which for 150 years we have conducted our parliamentary processes by first past the post. That is a principle that was upheld by people such as Disraeli and Gladstone, and even Lloyd George until the Liberal party decided, under his leadership or his influence at the time, that it might not be so convenient because the votes would not follow what he had to say.
In a nutshell, this Bill is unacceptable, which is why I, and I hope as many colleagues as possible, will vote against it. It is unprincipled. It is without a mandate and it is wrong.
European Council
William Cash Excerpts(13 years, 6 months ago)
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The Prime Minister
One of the many contributions to public life that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) made after making that remark is that all future Front Benchers, probably on either side of the House, will carefully read every treaty and get to the end.
Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
Given that response, will the Prime Minister confirm that the presidency conclusions, to which he has referred, do in fact endorse the EU taskforce report, which clearly states that there will be “a new legal framework” for further surveillance and powers for economic governance, which cover both the eurozone and the EU, including us, and, moreover, that any EU treaty imposes legal rights and obligations on all the member states? Why, therefore, did my right hon. Friend reckon that, together, these do not affect the UK, that
“it isn’t going to make any difference to us”
and that, on that basis, there would be, as he put it, no referendum?
The Prime Minister
This is a very serious point and we probably require a longer exchange than is possible from the Dispatch Box. I say to my hon. Friend, who follows this very closely, that we have to differentiate between two important things—the first is the Van Rompuy report and the second is the very limited treaty change that is being proposed by the Germans and now, in principle, endorsed by the Council—because the treaty change is really focused simply on the issue of putting a temporary bail-out mechanism on to a permanent basis.
On the Van Rompuy report, the paragraph to which my hon. Friend refers is paragraph 34, which talks about “macro-economic surveillance”—something that has happened for more than 10 years in the European Union. It is defined in paragraph 35, and paragraph 39 is very clear that the sanctions it talks about refer only to euro area members. I would also draw his attention to paragraph 4, which states that all of this is looked at
“within the existing legal framework of the European Union.”
That is important. The other paragraph that I think is vitally important is paragraph 18, which says—I quoted it earlier—that
“strengthened enforcement measures need to be implemented for all EU Member States, except the UK as a consequence of Protocol 15 of the Treaty”.
That is what gives us the protection. We read these things very carefully.
Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill
William Cash Excerpts(13 years, 6 months ago)
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Mr Harper
If I may say so, I think that the hon. Gentleman is trying to make debating points where there simply is none. He knows the proposals that we have set out, and appointing the counting officers has nothing to do, in essence, with the combination amendments, which we can debate next week. They will be tabled today, as I said in my letter. Members will therefore have a week to scrutinise them, and we can deal with that point next week.
Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
Will my hon. Friend be good enough to give me an assurance on an important question relating to thresholds? He mentioned the issue in response to my concerns during earlier proceedings of the Bill, and he knows very well that the threshold is commonly regarded by anyone who knows anything about referendums, including about the Scotland Act 1998, as absolutely crucial—as fundamental to the question of how such legislation should operate. Will he assure me that the splurge of amendments before us has nothing to do with depositing the threshold proposals, which I and my hon. Friends the Members for Epping Forest (Mrs Laing) and for Christchurch (Mr Chope) have put forward, at the bottom of the pile for discussion today? It looks highly likely that we will never reach them. Can my hon. Friend the Minister assure me that he is concerned to ensure that the threshold amendment is properly considered today?
Mr Harper
That is a very helpful intervention, because my hon. Friend will know that in the programme motion that I laid before the House last week we made provision for the House to sit until 11 o’clock this evening, which, notwithstanding Mr Speaker’s decision to allow an urgent question, means that the House will have more time today to debate those matters than it would have had if we had not tabled the motion. I am very keen to ensure that the House makes progress. That is not entirely in my hands—it depends on every Member ensuring that we can debate all these important matters—but I certainly want to reach that debate and will do my best from the Dispatch Box to ensure that we do.
Government amendment 262 mirrors the position for UK parliamentary and European elections and is necessary to ensure that counting officers and regional counting officers are suitably equipped to conduct the referendum poll.
Government amendment 270 provides that across the United Kingdom the polling stations allocated for the referendum will be the same as those allotted to electors for UK parliamentary elections. The amendment also provides that where special circumstances arise, the counting officer can allot different polling stations.
The Government have tabled amendments 168 and 169 at the request of the Electoral Commission. Paragraph 5 of the schedule gives the chief counting officer a power to direct regional counting officers and counting officers in the discharge of their functions at the referendum. The amendments clarify the extent of the power of direction and specify that it includes any planning and preparatory steps essential to the smooth running of the poll. That will enable the chief counting officer to require regional counting officers and counting officers to provide copies of plans, risk registers or other things that demonstrate that they are, or will be, discharging their functions in accordance with the chief counting officer’s directions. We believe that the amendments are necessary to enable the chief counting officer to prepare, plan and manage the poll effectively and to ensure compliance with any directions issued within the scope of her power.
Amendments 265 and 266 allow for the fees that are paid to counting officers and regional counting officers for delivering the referendum on the voting system to be reduced in circumstances where they fail to meet an adequate standard of performance.
Mr Cash
On a point of order, Mr Evans. I do not know how the order of the amendments was decided, and I am sure that it was done in a proper and orderly manner, but I wish to place on record the fact that the threshold provisions are being driven further and further down the selection list, yet they are seminal to the referendum and whether it can be justified in the national interest.
The First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Mr Nigel Evans)
A statement was made by the Minister earlier about thresholds and I am sure that it will all become clear to the hon. Gentleman as he stays for the rest of this evening’s proceedings.
Mr Cash
I am intrigued by the proposals. The first of the two amendments—amendment 153—deals emphatically with an important question of administrative law. Under paragraph 42(3)(a), the regional counting officer or chief counting officer has a permissive power to give a direction. Importantly, sub-paragraph (3) says:
“The Regional Counting Officer or Chief Counting Officer must then either—
(a) direct the counting officer to have the votes re-counted, or”—
this is the crucial proposal—
“(b) direct the counting officer to make the certification under section 128(5) of the 2000 Act.”
From paragraph 42(4), it is clear that the Government’s intention is that the provision should be permissive only. I pay tribute to my hon. Friends the Members for Milton Keynes South (Iain Stewart), and for Epping Forest (Mrs Laing), for insisting that the provision be not permissive but mandatory. That would put the whole question of the administrative arrangements for such a proposal on a compulsory footing, and that, when applied to the Bill, makes a significant difference. If the provision were merely permissive, almost anything could happen, but if it were compulsory, the regional counting officer or chief counting officer would be under a legal obligation to give a direction under paragraph (3)(a)
“if the officer thinks that there is reason to doubt the accuracy of the counting of the votes in the counting officer’s voting area.”
There will be enormous difficulty and ambiguity if that is done purely on a permissive footing, so I strongly recommend that the Government accept the proposal of my hon. Friends, who insist that the provision be made compulsory.
Under paragraph 42(5), there is a compulsory requirement, in that
“A counting officer who is given a direction under paragraph (3)(a) must—
(a) begin the re-count as soon as practicable, and
(b) if the officer does not begin the re-count immediately, notify the counting agents of the time and place at which it will take place.”
The most extraordinary situation would arise if, under sub-paragraph (5), action was compulsory, while under sub-paragraph (4) it was only permissive. I make the point strongly that a compulsory requirement, enforceable by law, seems the right way to proceed. However, all that would arise
“only if the officer thinks that there is reason to doubt the accuracy of the counting of the votes”.
As is well known, the question is not simply whether the provisions should be permissive or compulsory. We then move on to the question of what is in the mind of the officer.
How are we to establish what the officer thinks there is a reason to doubt? After all, if we are asking in legislation for a potential judicial interpretation—a compulsory requirement to depend upon what somebody thinks—how, short of bringing in the shrink, can we determine whether the person thought that or not? We are faced with an extraordinary situation, which is not uncommon in certain kinds of legislation, where the issue ultimately turns on what is going on in the mind of an official.
Mr David Nuttall (Bury North) (Con)
Is not the problem the fact that the Bill gives no guidance as to what matters should be in the mind of the returning officer when he comes to his decision? He is given no guidance as to what matters should be taken into account.
Mr Cash
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that extremely intelligent and useful intervention, which demonstrates the very point that I am making. If we do not establish criteria, there is nothing by which the court, in a judicial action in administrative law, would be able to judge what was going on in the official’s mind. Is it to be merely a matter of opinion or is it to be a matter of judgment by certain criteria?
I notice that those on the Front Bench are watching me with some interest. I have been watching them with much interest throughout the proceedings as we were moving towards clause 6, but we were not getting there, so we will have to see.
I am sure my hon. Friend and others want more elucidation on the point. We get used to the fact that some legislation states “where, in the opinion of a Minister” and subsequently says that the proceedings shall not be challenged in any legal proceedings whatsoever. That occurs in another interesting and somewhat controversial Bill, the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, which I do not need to go into today because we will have plenty of opportunity to examine it on another occasion.
If the provision merely states that if the officer thinks there is a reason to doubt the accuracy of the counting of the votes in the counting officer’s voting area, and does not say “in the opinion of”, we are using different language from the language that the courts are used to in administrative legal challenges, which is the precise wording, well established in the courts and in administrative law, “if, in the opinion of the officer, there is a reason to doubt the accuracy of the counting of the votes”.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Milton Keynes South made clear at the beginning, this is a matter of great importance when there is a knife-edge vote. He mentioned the experience of the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) in relation to elections. We must bear it in mind that the Bill is not just about an election. It is about a referendum with a range of percentages that may be applied as a result of the threshold provisions. Those will become highly controversial in the context of clause 6, which we will reach later on—much later on.
Mr Nuttall
When one is considering whether a recount should be requested, one must take account not just of the number of votes, but of the manner in which the election process has taken place.
Mr Cash
I greatly admire my hon. Friend’s perspicacity. He puts his finger on an important point—the context in which these events take place. This is about whether or not, in relation to a matter of such importance as the issue of alternative vote, we end up with a decision which could be on a knife-edge and which is decided merely on the basis of what an officer thinks.
I do not know about hon. Gentlemen in the Committee at large, but sometimes I do not have that much faith in bureaucratic thinking; in fact, I have a strong aversion to it. But if the measure were to say, “In the opinion of the officer,” we would at least know that we were on what I would describe as generally understood judicial ground. The measure does not provide for that, however; it provides for the question of what is in his mind, not his opinion, and there is a very big and important distinction to be drawn between those two things. My hon. Friend is entirely right in believing that there ought to be a context and some criteria.
Furthermore, the measure includes the wording,
“if the officer thinks”—
whatever that means—
“that there is reason to doubt the accuracy of the counting of the votes in the counting officer’s voting area”.
What is or is not reasonable is, again, a question that the courts are well used to determining. There is a whole stream of case law, which I am quite capable of spending some time describing, on the question of what is or is not reasonable, and for that matter what is or is not practicable. I am afraid to say, however, that when the Bill simply states,
“only if the officer thinks that there is reason to doubt”,
it applies yet another spurious objective test, which is actually highly subjective, and that is not the way to legislate.
We want clarity and impartiality, and to be sure that, if there is a knife-edge vote, there will not be some unfortunate mistake in the mind of the officer—and I shall make no mistake whatever about what I say this evening.
Philip Davies (Shipley) (Con)
My hon. Friend is making a very compelling case, as usual. Does he not agree that this is an open and shut case? Owing to the way in which the measure is worded, if the chief counting officer, or the regional counting officer, thinks that there is a reason to doubt the accuracy of the count, he “may” give a direction for a recount. Surely, if a returning officer has reason to believe that the count is not accurate, it is an open and shut case. Surely, it is the duty of the returning officer that they must order a recount in those circumstances.
Mr Cash
Absolutely. My hon. Friend, with again the greatest perspicacity and accuracy, has put his finger on the complete absurdity of the Government’s chosen language. Let us be quite serious for a moment—I am trying to be serious the whole time—because the fact is that in legislation of this importance, and in the circumstances of a knife-edge vote, we are allowing a situation in which, if the counting officer “thinks” that there is a reason, he only sort of has to think about whether or not he might or he might not decide to order a recount. However, as my hon. Friend says, it is absolutely crystal clear in the circumstances to which he refers that it is not possible for the officer to give a direction other than on a mandatory basis, which is what “must” actually means.
Philip Davies
I obviously agree, but does my hon. Friend agree that his proposal would actually benefit counting officers and returning officers? In a situation where people have been up late at night, they are tired and it is not clear whether people want to have a recount, making the position abundantly clear in the legislation would be of great help to a returning officer, who would then not be under any pressure not to undertake a recount.
Mr Cash
Given the seriousness of the situation that we face this evening, for example, it would be intolerable to keep people up late for no useful purpose. That is precisely why I am making these very useful comments—to ensure that what happens is in line with the proper principles of administrative law.
On the next provision, which is amendment 154, there are a number of other extremely important matters that are of grave concern. That is so important that hon. Members have devised a special provision—not merely an amendment of the kind that I have described but the very well-thought-out separate paragraph (4A), which says:
“If the difference between the total number of votes cast in the referendum in the country in favour of the answer “Yes” and the total number of votes cast in the referendum in the country in favour of the answer “No”—
this is crucially important—
“is fewer than 10,000”—
Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)
Further to that point of order, Mr Evans. Two things arise from that point of order. First, it is normally the convention in this House that the vote follows the voice, so if the Government adopt amendment 3, does that mean that they will support it? Secondly, I hope that what is proposed is not a mechanism to meet the letter but not the spirit of the Government’s undertaking that all important elements of the Bill will be debated seriously. The threshold for the referendum to be carried is the most important component of the Bill, so we need to know from the Government whether they intend to provide us with time to debate it properly at a later stage.
Mr Cash
Further to that point of order, Mr Evans. I completely endorse what my right hon. Friend has just said, because I, too, have an amendment down in my name and that of several other hon. Members—amendment 45—but we have had no opportunity to discuss it. In the light of the proposal for the Government to adopt amendment 3, merely for the sake of a vote, but without discussion, I would strongly presume—indeed, hope—that there would be an opportunity to debate the matter properly on Report. There are other amendments affected, such as amendments 45 and 64, standing in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch (Mr Chope), so what is proposed would be completely inappropriate, in light of the fact that, for example, the threshold for the Scottish devolution arrangements in 1979 led to a substantial constitutional crisis. I would therefore simply ask you, Mr Evans, to ensure that the Government are made well aware of our wish to have a proper debate on the matter on Report.
Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill (Programme) (No. 2)
William Cash Excerpts(13 years, 7 months ago)
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Mr Richard Shepherd (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con)
It is a bit rich that the hon. Gentleman should repeat the same arguments as those that he listened to and swept aside when he was in a position to affect the outcome of such a debate.
I am going to reflect on an irony. Along with every other Member, I participated in the last general election. The Deputy Prime Minister—who at the time was leader of the Liberal Democrats—repeatedly made a point about the “same old politics”. That became a mantra, and I remember that his poll rating went up when he referred to it. Yet here we are having the same old politics announced from the Front Bench under his direction; this is his Bill. This is a constitutional measure, which we all understand is of considerable importance. It affects the constituencies, their nature and the nature of representation, and the way in which a Member is elected to this place. I can think of nothing as constitutionally profound as this—leaving aside European legislation—in all the time that I have been here. In addition, it is intended not to be unwound if it is won—that is the point behind it—so why are we looking at the same old politics?
This motion is a guillotine: that is what it is, straight and simple. We need not waste time debating whether it is half an hour short here or two hours short there, or whether we lose part of the debate because of the importance of various clauses. This should have been allowed to roll in this House for as long as it took. That was the constitutional rule almost—
Mr Shepherd
Yes, it was the convention, but conventions have been swept away. Again, that was largely done by the Labour Front-Bench teams of the past 13 years, and one does not now hear the word “convention” used in the House. We have no cause, urgency or reason to accept a guillotine such as this. I must tell the Deputy Prime Minister, through my hon. Friend the Member for Forest of Dean (Mr Harper), who is a very respected member of the Conservative party, that I shall not hesitate to vote against the Deputy Prime Minister’s guillotine motion.
Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
I endorse all the remarks that have been made by my hon. Friends, and I, too, will vote against the programme motion if there is a Division. I simply add to the arguments already ably put forward that this is a constitutional Bill. One has to ask why there are conventions governing such Bills. The answer, as is well established by those who study these matters and who have learned from experience, is that there is a reason for the rule. The reason is that the Bill is important to the future of the electorate of the United Kingdom. It is seminal.
This is not just one of those occasions when one sees people get up and declaim that there is some great constitutional issue at stake and then on examination it turns out not to be anything of the kind. This is genuinely a constitutional Bill, and we deserve the opportunity to debate it properly. I shall vote against the programme motion on principle because it is in contravention of the conventions of this House. As we see the tsunami of constitutional aberrations inflicted on us in defiance of our manifesto and the wishes of the electorate, I am afraid I will have to continue to vote against the proposals because they are in defiance of the interests of the electorate of the UK.