Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

David Nuttall Excerpts

Monday 18th October 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Cash]

I am intrigued by the proposals. The first of the two amendments—amendment 153—deals emphatically with an important question of administrative law. Under paragraph 42(3)(a), the regional counting officer or chief counting officer has a permissive power to give a direction. Importantly, sub-paragraph (3) says:

“The Regional Counting Officer or Chief Counting Officer must then either—

(a) direct the counting officer to have the votes re-counted, or”—

this is the crucial proposal—

“(b) direct the counting officer to make the certification under section 128(5) of the 2000 Act.”

From paragraph 42(4), it is clear that the Government’s intention is that the provision should be permissive only. I pay tribute to my hon. Friends the Members for Milton Keynes South (Iain Stewart), and for Epping Forest (Mrs Laing), for insisting that the provision be not permissive but mandatory. That would put the whole question of the administrative arrangements for such a proposal on a compulsory footing, and that, when applied to the Bill, makes a significant difference. If the provision were merely permissive, almost anything could happen, but if it were compulsory, the regional counting officer or chief counting officer would be under a legal obligation to give a direction under paragraph (3)(a)

“if the officer thinks that there is reason to doubt the accuracy of the counting of the votes in the counting officer’s voting area.”

There will be enormous difficulty and ambiguity if that is done purely on a permissive footing, so I strongly recommend that the Government accept the proposal of my hon. Friends, who insist that the provision be made compulsory.

Under paragraph 42(5), there is a compulsory requirement, in that

“A counting officer who is given a direction under paragraph (3)(a) must—

(a) begin the re-count as soon as practicable, and

(b) if the officer does not begin the re-count immediately, notify the counting agents of the time and place at which it will take place.”

The most extraordinary situation would arise if, under sub-paragraph (5), action was compulsory, while under sub-paragraph (4) it was only permissive. I make the point strongly that a compulsory requirement, enforceable by law, seems the right way to proceed. However, all that would arise

“only if the officer thinks that there is reason to doubt the accuracy of the counting of the votes”.

As is well known, the question is not simply whether the provisions should be permissive or compulsory. We then move on to the question of what is in the mind of the officer.

How are we to establish what the officer thinks there is a reason to doubt? After all, if we are asking in legislation for a potential judicial interpretation—a compulsory requirement to depend upon what somebody thinks—how, short of bringing in the shrink, can we determine whether the person thought that or not? We are faced with an extraordinary situation, which is not uncommon in certain kinds of legislation, where the issue ultimately turns on what is going on in the mind of an official.

[Mr David Nuttall (Bury North) (Con)]

Is not the problem the fact that the Bill gives no guidance as to what matters should be in the mind of the returning officer when he comes to his decision? He is given no guidance as to what matters should be taken into account.

[Mr Cash]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that extremely intelligent and useful intervention, which demonstrates the very point that I am making. If we do not establish criteria, there is nothing by which the court, in a judicial action in administrative law, would be able to judge what was going on in the official’s mind. Is it to be merely a matter of opinion or is it to be a matter of judgment by certain criteria?

I notice that those on the Front Bench are watching me with some interest. I have been watching them with much interest throughout the proceedings as we were moving towards clause 6, but we were not getting there, so we will have to see.

I am sure my hon. Friend and others want more elucidation on the point. We get used to the fact that some legislation states “where, in the opinion of a Minister” and subsequently says that the proceedings shall not be challenged in any legal proceedings whatsoever. That occurs in another interesting and somewhat controversial Bill, the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, which I do not need to go into today because we will have plenty of opportunity to examine it on another occasion.

If the provision merely states that if the officer thinks there is a reason to doubt the accuracy of the counting of the votes in the counting officer’s voting area, and does not say “in the opinion of”, we are using different language from the language that the courts are used to in administrative legal challenges, which is the precise wording, well established in the courts and in administrative law, “if, in the opinion of the officer, there is a reason to doubt the accuracy of the counting of the votes”.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Milton Keynes South made clear at the beginning, this is a matter of great importance when there is a knife-edge vote. He mentioned the experience of the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) in relation to elections. We must bear it in mind that the Bill is not just about an election. It is about a referendum with a range of percentages that may be applied as a result of the threshold provisions. Those will become highly controversial in the context of clause 6, which we will reach later on—much later on.

[Mr Nuttall]

When one is considering whether a recount should be requested, one must take account not just of the number of votes, but of the manner in which the election process has taken place.

[Mr Cash]

I greatly admire my hon. Friend’s perspicacity. He puts his finger on an important point—the context in which these events take place. This is about whether or not, in relation to a matter of such importance as the issue of alternative vote, we end up with a decision which could be on a knife-edge and which is decided merely on the basis of what an officer thinks.

I do not know about hon. Gentlemen in the Committee at large, but sometimes I do not have that much faith in bureaucratic thinking; in fact, I have a strong aversion to it. But if the measure were to say, “In the opinion of the officer,” we would at least know that we were on what I would describe as generally understood judicial ground. The measure does not provide for that, however; it provides for the question of what is in his mind, not his opinion, and there is a very big and important distinction to be drawn between those two things. My hon. Friend is entirely right in believing that there ought to be a context and some criteria.

Furthermore, the measure includes the wording,

“if the officer thinks”—

whatever that means—

“that there is reason to doubt the accuracy of the counting of the votes in the counting officer’s voting area”.

What is or is not reasonable is, again, a question that the courts are well used to determining. There is a whole stream of case law, which I am quite capable of spending some time describing, on the question of what is or is not reasonable, and for that matter what is or is not practicable. I am afraid to say, however, that when the Bill simply states,

“only if the officer thinks that there is reason to doubt”,

it applies yet another spurious objective test, which is actually highly subjective, and that is not the way to legislate.

We want clarity and impartiality, and to be sure that, if there is a knife-edge vote, there will not be some unfortunate mistake in the mind of the officer—and I shall make no mistake whatever about what I say this evening.