Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Philip Davies Excerpts

Monday 18th October 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Cash]

I greatly admire my hon. Friend’s perspicacity. He puts his finger on an important point—the context in which these events take place. This is about whether or not, in relation to a matter of such importance as the issue of alternative vote, we end up with a decision which could be on a knife-edge and which is decided merely on the basis of what an officer thinks.

I do not know about hon. Gentlemen in the Committee at large, but sometimes I do not have that much faith in bureaucratic thinking; in fact, I have a strong aversion to it. But if the measure were to say, “In the opinion of the officer,” we would at least know that we were on what I would describe as generally understood judicial ground. The measure does not provide for that, however; it provides for the question of what is in his mind, not his opinion, and there is a very big and important distinction to be drawn between those two things. My hon. Friend is entirely right in believing that there ought to be a context and some criteria.

Furthermore, the measure includes the wording,

“if the officer thinks”—

whatever that means—

“that there is reason to doubt the accuracy of the counting of the votes in the counting officer’s voting area”.

What is or is not reasonable is, again, a question that the courts are well used to determining. There is a whole stream of case law, which I am quite capable of spending some time describing, on the question of what is or is not reasonable, and for that matter what is or is not practicable. I am afraid to say, however, that when the Bill simply states,

“only if the officer thinks that there is reason to doubt”,

it applies yet another spurious objective test, which is actually highly subjective, and that is not the way to legislate.

We want clarity and impartiality, and to be sure that, if there is a knife-edge vote, there will not be some unfortunate mistake in the mind of the officer—and I shall make no mistake whatever about what I say this evening.

[Philip Davies (Shipley) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making a very compelling case, as usual. Does he not agree that this is an open and shut case? Owing to the way in which the measure is worded, if the chief counting officer, or the regional counting officer, thinks that there is a reason to doubt the accuracy of the count, he “may” give a direction for a recount. Surely, if a returning officer has reason to believe that the count is not accurate, it is an open and shut case. Surely, it is the duty of the returning officer that they must order a recount in those circumstances.

[Mr Cash]

Absolutely. My hon. Friend, with again the greatest perspicacity and accuracy, has put his finger on the complete absurdity of the Government’s chosen language. Let us be quite serious for a moment—I am trying to be serious the whole time—because the fact is that in legislation of this importance, and in the circumstances of a knife-edge vote, we are allowing a situation in which, if the counting officer “thinks” that there is a reason, he only sort of has to think about whether or not he might or he might not decide to order a recount. However, as my hon. Friend says, it is absolutely crystal clear in the circumstances to which he refers that it is not possible for the officer to give a direction other than on a mandatory basis, which is what “must” actually means.

[Philip Davies]

I obviously agree, but does my hon. Friend agree that his proposal would actually benefit counting officers and returning officers? In a situation where people have been up late at night, they are tired and it is not clear whether people want to have a recount, making the position abundantly clear in the legislation would be of great help to a returning officer, who would then not be under any pressure not to undertake a recount.

[Mr Cash]

Given the seriousness of the situation that we face this evening, for example, it would be intolerable to keep people up late for no useful purpose. That is precisely why I am making these very useful comments—to ensure that what happens is in line with the proper principles of administrative law.

On the next provision, which is amendment 154, there are a number of other extremely important matters that are of grave concern. That is so important that hon. Members have devised a special provision—not merely an amendment of the kind that I have described but the very well-thought-out separate paragraph (4A), which says:

“If the difference between the total number of votes cast in the referendum in the country in favour of the answer “Yes” and the total number of votes cast in the referendum in the country in favour of the answer “No”—

this is crucially important—

“is fewer than 10,000”—