Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

John Bercow Excerpts

Tuesday 18th January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Mr Speaker]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 5—Expiry and revival of section 2—

‘(1) Section 2 expires when the Parliament summoned to meet in May 2010 dissolves.

(2) In the course of the first month of the day of first meeting of any Parliament after the expiry of section 2 as a result of subsection (1) above, the Minister may by order bring the section back into force for the remainder of that Parliament.

(3) An order made under subsection (2) above is to be made by statutory instrument and shall not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of the House of Commons.

(4) If no order has been made under subsection (2) above, an early parliamentary general election is to take place only if the House has passed a motion that there should be an early parliamentary general election.

(5) The polling day for an early parliamentary general election under subsection (4) above is to be the day appointed by Her Majesty by proclamation on the recommendation of the Prime Minister.

(6) If a polling day is appointed under subsection (5) above, the reference in section 1(4) to the polling day for a parliamentary general election appointed under section 2(6) shall be construed as if referring to a day appointed under subsection (5) above.’.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

May I begin by thanking the Minister for the enormous courtesy, good manners and good temper with which he has responded to the many criticisms of the Bill? I, among others, do not think it the best Bill ever to have come before Parliament, but he has invariably answered questions kindly. I also thank the Clerks for warning me that I was, in their terminology, to “open the batting” in this debate, which I might not otherwise have known. As far as cricketing metaphors go, I am probably more of a night watchman than a Geoffrey Boycott, or Somerset’s own Trescothick, but I shall bat on with regard to the Parliament Act 1911 and my new clause in relation to it.

The 1911 Act, as the hon. Member for Chippenham (Duncan Hames) reminded us earlier today, was introduced, broadly, as a temporary measure. The preamble to the Act says:

“whereas it is intended to substitute for the House of Lords as it at present exists a Second Chamber constituted on a popular instead of hereditary basis, but such substitution cannot be immediately brought into operation”,

but “immediately” has now extended to 100 years of failure to introduce a popular rather than an hereditary form, although not all elements of heredity remain in the upper House. The 1911 Act still allows the House of Commons to get through major constitutional reforms that the House of Lords may oppose.

The reason for introducing my new clause to exempt purely the first section of the Bill—the bit that limits the life of a Parliament specifically to five years, rather than continuing with the flexibility that we have previously had—is that this is a crucial constitutional development that we should be careful about changing, willy-nilly, as coalitions come and go. Our constitution should be safeguarded and preserved; it is not something that should be treated lightly or in an airy-fairy fashion—and one thing that the House of Lords can do, and does extraordinarily well, is prevent that from happening.

By the way, it is notable that their lordships sat throughout last night, fulfilling their proper constitutional role of ensuring that a serious constitutional change is properly debated and reviewed. We in this House find that guillotines come crashing down upon our necks to prevent the detailed deliberation that some of us might like over a rapid raft of changes to the constitution, but their lordships—some of whom are not in their first youth—have stayed up overnight, battling for the great British constitution, which has served us extraordinarily well for hundreds of years. Looking upon their lordships as the guardians of the constitution is a good reason for ensuring that the measure cannot be changed without their consent and approval.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

The simple reason why I am speaking to my amendment is that, as I indicated on Second Reading, I take the gravest exception to the Bill, for a variety of reasons.

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I am loth to interrupt the hon. Gentleman, to whom I look forward to listening, but just for clarification, as I think he knows, we are not debating an amendment; we are debating a group of two new clauses. It is to the new clauses that he is speaking.

[Mr Cash]

Yes, indeed. I am seeking to amend the Bill through a new clause, and I am grateful to you for making that subtle distinction, Mr Speaker.

The point is that the title of the Bill is a give-away. It refers to “Parliaments”; it does not refer to “Parliament”. Therefore, there is an underlying assumption that the process in question—which is inevitably tied up with the concept of the coalition politics, which are increasingly regarded as a perpetual burden that we will be expected to comply with—is inherent in the arrangements for the proposals in the Bill. The use of the word “Parliaments”, in the plural, simply emphasises that.

As one who believes firmly in the idea that our constitutional arrangements have stood us in good stead for a long time, but without being obtuse about the need for reform, I would say that there are changes in our constitutional arrangements that, periodically, can be justified. However, my proposal is, effectively, a “stop and restart” provision. That is, if there is any merit in continuing the arrangements, if they were to survive for as long as the period allocated by the leaders of the parties and the coalition agreement, then there is always the possibility—to put it no higher than that—of referring to some of those outside this place who, as far as I am concerned, are the most important people of all, namely our electors, and not leaders of parties or parties themselves. The real question is: what do the public think about all this? Of course, they have not been asked; indeed, there is not the slightest intention that they should be asked.

What I am suggesting is that the very concept of a fixed-term Parliaments Bill is offensive to the hallowed principle—that simple constitutional proposition—that no Parliament can bind its successors. I have therefore decided—I am glad to be joined by a number of other hon. Members in this notion—that we should have what we describe in the title of new clause 5, namely the “Expiry and revival of section 2”. I happen to hope that such a revival does not take place, and I shall explain why. “Expiry”, certainly; however, as I was very sensibly advised, because of the scope of the Bill and its background, rather than proposing what I would otherwise have put forward, namely a sunset clause—or, as I think it would be better described, a “cast into the darkness of hell” clause—I have proposed that clause 2 be required to expire when the Parliament summoned to meet in May 2010, on that fixed and prescriptive date, dissolves. You might have an interest in this, Mr Speaker, because, if anything were to happen, there might even be the need for the re-election of a Speaker. In such rare circumstances, you might take a particular interest in this provision. I am suggesting that clause 2 should expire in those circumstances.

It is important to bear in mind the provisions in clause 2. We have moved on from the Committee stage to Report, and I remind the House that I tabled amendments to clause 2 in Committee because I took the gravest exception to certain elements in it. I am therefore anxious that it should expire, because I do not believe that it is a constitutionally satisfactory provision. Clause 2(1) states:

“An early parliamentary general election is to take place if the Speaker of the House of Commons issues a certificate—

(a) certifying that the House has passed a motion that there should be an early parliamentary general election,

(b) certifying whether or not the motion was passed on a division”—

I do not think that there would be much difficulty in demonstrating that. The clause continues:

(c) if it is certified that the motion was passed on a division, certifying that the number of members who voted in favour of the motion was a number equal to or greater than two thirds of the number of seats in the House (including vacant seats).”

I have no intention of going back to the discussions that we had on the clause. I tabled amendments to it and argued my case fairly, I thought, but the Whips got in the way—I do not know the reason—and the result was that I lost my Division. If I may say so without presumption, I do not believe that I lost the argument, but hon. Members on both sides of the House, particularly Back Benchers, are prone to believe our own arguments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Simon Hart]

The hon. Gentleman is suggesting that fixing the term at five years automatically favours the Government of the day, whereas it can of course have the opposite effect. Does he agree with me, as did some of the witnesses who appeared before our Committee, that by tying themselves into a five-year fixed term, the Government might find that the election coincides with a rather dismal period in the opinion polls, giving great advantage to the Opposition? I thought that that evidence was given to the Select Committee—

[Mr Speaker]

Order. We are grateful to the hon. Gentleman, but his intervention is getting rather long.

[Tristram Hunt]

I take the hon. Gentleman’s point, but the benefits of a fixed-term schedule outweigh those potential risks. I regard four years as within the rhythm of this country, as it is within the rhythm of other European as well as Westminster-style democracies— Canada, Denmark, the American presidential term, Germany, Sweden. The change to five years is for the good of the coalition, not the nation.

The Deputy Prime Minister referred to and quoted the Chartists again in today’s Question Time, but the Chartists believed in annual Parliaments, not in extending the term to five years. As we have heard, the Liberal Democrats used to believe in four-year terms—before the allure of office moved them to change their minds. May I suggest that the coalition listen to a real coalition leader, the late Herbert Asquith? On introducing his own cut to the parliamentary term, he spoke of securing a House of Commons that is

“always either fresh from the polls which it gave it authority, or—and this is an equally effective check upon acting in defiance of the popular will—it is looking forward to the polls at which it will have to render an account of its stewardship.”—[Official Report, 21 February 1911; Vol. XXI, c. 1749.]

That seems to be the perfect combination. I will move on quickly, as others wish to speak.

I do not feel that the Government have dealt with the problem of exclusive cognisance very effectively, so it still poses the danger of judicial interference. This Bill fits all too neatly into the Government’s overarching constitutional reform strategy: coalition first, country second. Whether it be packing the House of Lords, increasing the number of Ministers by 10%, undermining the Union by slashing 25% of constituencies in Wales, or overriding historic or geographic settlements in new parliamentary boundaries, it is Clegg and Cameron first, country second. That is the abiding weakness of coalition Government. The tragedy is that if this Bill is passed, we will have five years of it.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

[Mr Speaker]

Order. There are fewer than 14 minutes to go and four Members are seeking to catch my eye. Members can do the arithmetic for themselves, so some regard for each other’s interests would be appreciated.