Syria: De-escalation Zones

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Monday 26th February 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call Tom Tugendhat.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

I was going to wait, Mr Speaker.

[Mr Speaker]

That is very decent of the hon. Gentleman, but if he feels a question welling up in his breast, he should share it with the nation.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Many hon. Members wanted to ask questions early, so I was going to wait and allow them to do so.

[Mr Speaker]

We are saving the hon. Gentleman up for the edification of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Speaker]

Tom Tugendhat.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Thank you for your patience, Mr Speaker. I am extremely grateful.

I welcome my right hon. Friend’s response to the urgent question. May I share with him the disappointment that I am sure many Conservative Members feel as a war continues and Stop the War does not protest outside the Russian embassy, but stays silent about the brutality that we are seeing?

My right hon. Friend rightly said that Britain should be at the centre of this process. May I ask him what conversations he has had with Minister Zarif and Minister Lavrov over the last few days, given that Minister Lavrov was instrumental in first blocking and then delaying the UN process? May I also ask him whether it is true that both President Macron of France and Chancellor Merkel of Germany have spoken to President Putin of Russia? What contact have we had with Russia over the last few days?

[Boris Johnson]

I can certainly tell my hon. Friend that we are directing all our conversations and all our energies to getting the Russians to accept their responsibilities. I cannot go into the details of the contacts that we have had with them over the last few days, but suffice it to say that we believe that it is overwhelmingly in their interests to begin a political process. I feel that if they do not do that, they will be bogged down in this conflict for years, perhaps decades, to come. There is no military solution. There are 4 million people in Syria whom Assad does not control, and whom the Russians do not control either. We are therefore exerting all the influence we can to bring the process back to Geneva, where it belongs.

Foreign Affairs Committee

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Thursday 22nd February 2018 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

When you do those introductions, Mr Speaker, I keep waiting for you to say “No hesitation, repetition or deviation”, but I am afraid I cannot make that commitment today.

This is the third report by the Foreign Affairs Committee this Parliament, and I am proud to present it to the House. I think it addresses an important aspect of our foreign policy that, sadly, has often been overlooked by the United Kingdom for many years: the aspiration of the Kurdish people.

Britain has a long and historic connection to the Kurdish people that goes back well over a century. Our relationship with them during our period of governing Iraq, and later with the air policing role that we conducted over Iraq in the ’90s, demonstrates that we have recognised and on many occasions had an appropriate commitment to the Kurdish people. That is made particularly relevant by Turkey’s recent attacks on Kurdish positions near Afrin, which in recent weeks have been deeply concerning. Those attacks are a continuation of a long struggle between Ankara and the various Kurdish groups, but they are also a new departure. On one side is NATO’s second largest army, and on the other, a militia that is backed by the alliance’s largest.

Those recent events have highlighted the relevance of the Committee’s work, and I thank all those who were key to this inquiry, especially all right hon. and hon. Members of the Committee. Those included—they deserve a mention—my hon. Friends the Members for Wealden (Ms Ghani) and for Stratford-on-Avon (Nadhim Zahawi). Their elevation to ministerial greatness has removed them from citation in the report, but they were very important to many elements of its production and it would be wrong to overlook their contributions.

Our inquiry considered the aftermath of the war against Daesh, during which those fighting the extremists shared an enemy but often held competing visions for what should follow its defeat. Kurdish groups were among those fighting ISIS in Iraq and Syria. They played their part in the military victory and were supported by a global coalition, including us here in the United Kingdom. Their success led them to significantly expand their territory in both countries. That expansion has, in turn, raised tensions with regional Governments. In October last year, after Iraqi Kurds held a referendum that voted in favour of independence, the federal forces re-took most of the territory that the Kurds had taken off ISIS. In January, Turkey began the ongoing offensive against predominantly Kurdish forces in the Afrin region of northern Syria. Our report warned that new fighting, or a complication of the conflicts already under way, was indeed probable, and the Kurdish elements empowered by the war against Daesh are likely to be involved. Yesterday’s victories risk causing tomorrow’s wars.

These tensions have pitted some of the UK’s leading allies against each other, not only the Turks and the Americans, who are so intimately involved on both sides, but the forces on the ground. Moreover, they have caused new suffering for the people of the regions, whose severe humanitarian situation the UK has worked with partners to relieve. They have given another cause for fighting in the region, whose instability threatens the United Kingdom through a proliferation of weapons and violent ideologies. The Kurdish groups told us that they shared the democratic and inclusive values of the United Kingdom, but national Governments frequently described those Kurdish groups as a danger to the region. The United Kingdom’s military support for the Kurdish fighters opposing ISIS emphasises the stake we have in these conflicts and the role we play in helping to resolve them.

Our report examined the aspirations of specific Kurdish elements in Iraq and Syria, and suggested what the response of the United Kingdom should be. In Iraq, Kurdish elements held a referendum in September 2017. They voted overwhelmingly in favour of independence. They did so in the face of opposition from Baghdad, regional states and the international community. They unilaterally included territories that the Kurds had taken from Daesh, but whose governance was disputed by Baghdad. That left them open to accusations of a land-grab.

We praised the work of the Foreign Office in trying to avert the referendum and in seeking to find an alternative way of fulfilling Kurdish aspirations. The FCO told us that, while it could potentially accept any outcome—including independence for the Kurds—that was negotiated consensually with the Government of Iraq, its preference would be for the Kurdistan region to remain in a united Iraq. But the overwhelming vote in favour of independence showed deep frustration and dissatisfaction with the region’s place in Iraq. Many Kurds feel imprisoned in a country that they see as not implementing its commitments of equality to them.

The deep differences between the sides have raised the risk of war. We recommended that the FCO should write to the Government of Iraq, formally offering itself in an enhanced role of facilitating dialogue. We asked that it be prepared to criticise both sides when criticism was due, because it had little to say to us about some of the issues underpinning the tensions. We said that the FCO should press the Government of Iraq to lift the restrictions placed on the Kurdistan region of Iraq after the referendum, most notably on air travel. It should also set out its assessment of the role of Shi’a militias in the reacquisition of the disputed territories and whether reports of crimes being committed by them are credible. It should explain whether it sees Iran as supporting or controlling the militias. For the Kurdistan region, the FCO should speak out against signs of corruption, the monopolisation of power or the curtailment of democracy. It should encourage political reform and economic diversification. These are issues that affect the whole of Iraq, undermining its reconstruction and threatening the viability of its future as a diverse but united country.

For Syria, our report focused on the People’s Protection Units—the so-called YPG—the armed group that is the target of Turkey’s current operation in Afrin. Its role as the armed wing of the Democratic Union party—the PYD—means that the two are often referred to as the PYD/YPG, a single, predominantly Kurdish entity. Since 2015, it has operated as part of a coalition called the Syrian Democratic Forces, or—ready for another one?—the SDF. The SDF includes non-Kurdish elements, but the PYD/YPG is the pre-eminent component.

Behind these TLAs—sorry, I mean three-letter acronyms —lie significant policy challenges with deep implications for the United Kingdom. The YPG, PYD and SDF are not just names—or letters—but an armed force and a political project that now encompasses more than a quarter of Syria. Their rise to that position was rapid, occurring in just over four years, as they led to the defeat of ISIS on the ground. That defeat was achieved with military support from the UK, the United States and others. The Americans provided weapons to the SDF and the YPG. The UK Government say they did not, but the RAF did carry out airstrikes to clear ISIS from its way. As such, we concluded that the expansion of the same group that Turkey is now attacking was likely assisted by the UK.

The PYD says that it does not seek independence from Syria, but it has helped to declare and administer a self-governing region in the areas of the country it now controls. The group described this region as being based on values of democracy and inclusivity that the UK should support, but Turkey’s account of the group and its self-declared region could not be more different. This leaves the UK caught between its two leading NATO allies. The US sees the SDF, of which the YPG is the main part, as its leading local ally against Daesh, but Turkey regards the YPG not only as an abuser of human rights but as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ party, or PKK. It therefore sees the PYD and the YPG as a threat to its national security.

We asked the Foreign Office to explain its position and policy regarding the serious differences in approach between two of the UK’s leading allies. Like Turkey, the UK defines the PKK as a terrorist organisation; unlike Turkey, it does not apply that designation to the PYD or YPG. The evidence to our inquiry clearly argued that these organisations were linked, with the nature and extent of those links being debatable—some claimed they were remote, others that they were indeed the same organisation. The FCO’s view, however, was incoherent. Its statements referred to reported links between them, as though it had no clear view of its own, which is simply not credible. The UK is providing military might to one party in this conflict, and the Foreign Office should be clear on the nature of the group receiving military air support. It cannot have a clear policy unless it has a clear view on this fundamental dispute.

The extent to which the UK engages diplomatically with the PYD and supports the group’s inclusion in the Geneva peace talks will have deep implications for relations with the UK’s leading allies in the region. It will also have implications for whether a negotiated end can be brought to Syria’s conflict or whether the war will become yet more complicated and prolonged. Having supported the SDF, and therefore the YPG, militarily during the war against Daesh, the Foreign Office should now clarify whether it will continue to do so and whether it will engage diplomatically with the territory that the UK has helped the group to win.

[Ian Murray (Edinburgh South) (Lab)]

I pay tribute to the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee. The events in Afrin kicked off only very late into our inquiry and so get only a fleeting mention in the report. Will he tell the House, therefore, what he thinks the Foreign Office should be doing to try to resolve that dispute between Turkey and northern Syria, and how can it help to get the Geneva peace talks back on track?

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

I welcome the contribution of my hon. Friend, which he is, to the report—it was a full Committee effort to which everyone contributed enormously—and thank him for reminding me of an area I have not covered. The Foreign Office, of course, has an important role to play. We have supported one of the parties militarily and are an extremely close ally of the Turkish Republic. It is incumbent on us and our excellent Foreign Office staff in the region to seek to help that dialogue progress. Only through dialogue can this conflict be ended and a peace process begun, and Her Majesty’s Government are extremely well placed to make sure that happens.

[The Minister for Africa (Harriett Baldwin)]

I put on record our thanks to the Committee for its hard work in preparing the report. Thanks to you, Mr Deputy Speaker, and the team, the statement has come to the Floor of the House. I thank you for ensuring that that has happened—it is both timely and extremely informative. I reassure the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee that I will pass on the comments made by him and others to the Foreign Secretary and my right hon. Friend the Minister for the Middle East, and that the Foreign Office commits to responding to the report in due course.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I welcome the Minister’s words. Very few of us here do not respect enormously the work of the Minister for the Middle East. His work, influence and knowledge of the region is second to none.

[Dr David Drew (Stroud) (Lab/Co-op)]

Is it not about time that we made stronger representations through the NATO Parliamentary Assembly that one of our allies is spending huge resource in attacking potentially one of our other allies in the battle against Daesh?

[Tom Tugendhat]

I very much welcome the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s work, and the hon. Gentleman is right that that is an excellent forum for discussion. However, I should say that the Turkish Government have not only the right, but the duty to protect their population against terrorist attacks and, if they feel threatened, it is incumbent on them to take action. I would much rather see both parties separating, so that we do not see conflict and the peace process can begin, with different groups not engaged in immediate battles.

[Mr Philip Hollobone (Kettering) (Con)]

I praise my hon. Friend for his statement and commend his Committee for its report. He is setting a very good example to other Chairs of Select Committees, who really ought to come to the House on Thursdays to present their reports. Is not the truth about the Kurds that British foreign policy towards them has been wrong for about 100 years? They were abandoned by us in 1918; we ignored them in the treaty of Versailles; and the problem has persisted ever since. Is it not true that, without the Kurds, ISIS would not have been defeated? We now face the extraordinary scenario where the Assad regime is backing the Kurds against the Turks in northern Syria. Given the fact that Turkey has an enormous border with Syria, will this not be an enormous problem for the international community to solve?

[Tom Tugendhat]

I am extremely grateful for my hon. Friend’s kind words. I have been clear since the time that I was elected to chair the Committee that I answer to the whole House, not just the Committee. I therefore feel that it is my responsibility and not a choice—it is simply a duty—to respond to the House and to be available to respond on anything that we have covered.

My hon. Friend is absolutely right: Britain’s history has not been good. We must not forget the air policing, as it was then called. The then Colonial Secretary, one Winston Churchill, was the first person to use chemical weapons against the Kurds. Indeed, it was the RAF that dropped them. One reason that the RAF still exists is that it cut the cost of colonial policing by reducing the number of battalions required. I am afraid that that is true—we do not always have a glorious history.

The truth is that our role today is as a peacemaker and as an engaged friend of the whole region. In that, we should recognise that the Kurdish people have the right to self-determination, and we do recognise that, but we should encourage them to stay as part of the Republic of Iraq in the areas where they are within Iraq. Many witnesses we spoke to said that, although the referendum had called for independence, they were looking for greater autonomy within the Republic of Iraq, so there is more tension within the Kurdish position than appears immediately obvious. It is, of course, a tragedy that Syria remains governed by such a barbarous dictator and it is a great shame that he is being supported by so many around the world. The fact that he is now supporting Kurds to take on another NATO ally does not make us any happier.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

I congratulate the Chair of the Committee and its members for their comprehensive report. On page 5, paragraph 3, it states:

“The evidence given to us was clear: future conflicts were probable, and Kurdish groups would likely be involved.”

Political events in Kurdistan-controlled areas and Turkey’s interactions have clearly cast a spell over the whole area. Did the Committee consider that Kurdish regional autonomy may be obstructed by Turkey, which is very obvious? However, is it possible that Iraq and Syria may consider it an option? Is it too late to give the Kurdish people the hope, vision and goal that they seek and deserve? Is it possible to move Kurdish regional autonomy from being aspirational to being practical?

[Tom Tugendhat]

Part of the evidence that we received was that Kurdish regional autonomy has been a matter of great debate even within the Kurdistan region itself, and it is not absolutely clear that full independence is sought. There has been an enormous amount of debate about that and indeed some evidence pointed to the fact that greater autonomy in the Republic of Iraq was indeed what most were looking for. We did not look specifically into further details of that, so I will not go much further. I merely repeat that supporting the autonomy of the people of the Kurdish region is important, but so is supporting the Iraqi Government’s right to territorial integrity.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Lindsay Hoyle)]

We now come to the second Select Committee statement. Robert Neill will speak on this subject for up to 10 minutes, during which no interventions may be taken, and I shall then call Members to ask him questions in the usual way. I call the Chair of the Justice Committee, Robert Neill.

Oral Answers to Questions

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Tuesday 20th February 2018 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend is a noted expert on the region, and it is a pleasure to see him representing Her Majesty’s Government in the middle east, but can he bring a little clarity, which the FAC asked for, on the difference between the YPG and the PKK? We received evidence after evidence that there is indeed no real difference, yet Her Majesty’s Government are supporting a group that appears, at least slightly, to be linked to a group that, as my right hon. Friend’s colleague the Minister for Europe and the Americas said just now, is a proscribed organisation.

[Alistair Burt]

I thank my hon. Friend not only for his question but for his leadership of the FAC, and we will study its report carefully. It asked for clarity in some situations in which it is genuinely difficult to provide clarity. There will be a full written response from the Foreign Office in due course, but we do designate the PKK as a proscribed organisation; that is the situation at present.

UK Diplomacy in Europe

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Thursday 1st February 2018 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

Thank you very much, Madam Deputy Speaker, for this, my second opportunity to report back on the work that the House has charged the Foreign Affairs Committee to do. I am pleased that in this report the Committee has begun to tackle one of the most important questions facing us today: our bilateral relations following our departure from the European Union. The House will know that 1,000 years of history and, indeed, simple geography make clear the importance of these connections in our diplomatic outreach.

As part of the Government’s stated policy of pursuing a global agenda, the Committee believes that relations with European states are an important node in the network of our international future. In some areas, that may mean connections to and co-operation with the European Union, as the member states have decided to work together through that structure. On other occasions, it may mean direct bilateral conversations or, indeed, new structures. That poses a question for Her Majesty’s Government: how should we aim to shape this relationship to the benefit of the United Kingdom, our allies and others to achieve the deep and special partnership we hear spoken of so often?

The first answer was reinforced yesterday at a meeting I attended with Baltic partners. I was asked specifically whether the United Kingdom is still intending to invest in defence and play an international role as a nuclear power and a UN Security Council member state. The Committee members present were able to reassure our important allies in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania that, on the 100th anniversary of those countries’ foundation as modern states, our commitment to the defence of Europe and, indeed, to the defence of the Baltic states was undimmed. Nevertheless, their question reflected an uncertainty that the Committee calls on Her Majesty’s Government to do their utmost to dispel. To achieve that, the Committee feels that a vision for our European policy needs to be set out. As one of Europe’s leading foreign policy actors, whatever the precise contours of our future relationship with the European Union it will always be in the interests of the United Kingdom to co-operate with the European Union and its member states on foreign policy, defence and security.

Working together will help us to protect and project our shared values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and will underpin the international rules-based order. Indeed, the Foreign Secretary has told us that he intends to do that, but he has not yet decided what level of access to ask for as regards co-operation with the European Union on foreign, security and defence policy making, and he has not clarified the intent of the United Kingdom to work bilaterally with other member states. The Committee believes that this requires clarification soon, as Lord Bridges warned only the other day in the other place.

The Committee discussed many options and, I am glad to say, unanimously agreed that the ultimate goal should be to secure automatic and institutionalised collaboration that respects the decision-making autonomy of the United Kingdom, the member states and other European nations as they work together. This should include, as Lord Hague suggested, a status on the European Union’s Political and Security Committee that allows the United Kingdom to have a representative in meetings with speaking—if obviously not voting—rights, and a UK-EU strategic partnership to facilitate enhanced dialogue on foreign, defence and security policy. The importance of being, as Lord Hague and Lord Ricketts put it, “in the room” should not be undervalued in order to secure our interests in our nearest neighbourhood.

Now that we are leaving the European Union and surrendering our veto on closer defence integration among the other 27, we must also find a way to support European capability development and ensure that it complements the work of NATO and does not undermine it. To achieve this, the Committee calls on the Government to consider the possibility of participation in some EU defence integration measures, as the United Kingdom already does with the United States and other nations around the world, on the understanding that national sovereignty over force deployment is preserved and that the UK’s ability to co-operate with non-European Union states is unconstrained. The UK would, of course, participate only in programmes as an equal partner with other nations.

The Committee was given mixed messages about the FCO’s role in the Brexit process and beyond and, to clarify the position, the Committee calls on the FCO to publish a paper outlining the overall goals and the specific priorities of UK foreign policy in Europe after Brexit. This would allow the House to debate the priorities set out and to discuss the resources available to meet the objective.

Although we welcome the Minister for Europe’s success in securing additional resources, the Committee is concerned that they are being drawn from the wider network, possibly weakening the Government’s stated policy that we are to become a genuinely global Britain. That would be a grave mistake. Since Lord Hague, the Foreign Office has been opening missions around the world to extend the influence that the UK seeks in foreign affairs. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and now with a vital national interest in extending our diplomatic influence, it would be an error to reduce the resources available to achieve that. If leaving the EU meant that the UK were to reduce its international outreach, that would be a reversal of the aim stated by Ministers in recent months and would cause great concern to the whole Committee, and no doubt to the whole House.

The Committee remains concerned that the Foreign Office is not adequately resourced, and relations with Ireland are one example. The Republic of Ireland is the United Kingdom’s closest foreign partner. It is vital to the United Kingdom’s national interest that the relationship between Westminster and Dublin is as close as possible. Indeed, it is essential to the prosperity of both. That is why our first overseas visit as a Committee was to Dublin and to Cavan, on the border with Northern Ireland. We were hugely grateful for the warm welcome we received, particularly from my honourable friend the Member for Cavan-Monaghan and the Chair of our sister Committee in the Oireachtas, Brendan Smith. We saw first-hand the complications at the border, the importance of the bilateral relationship and the importance of strengthening it throughout this Parliament. We therefore welcome the Government’s commitment to preserving the progress that has been made in UK-Ireland relations in recent years, and regret that recent tensions appear to endanger the hard-won positive momentum.

We welcome the progress made thus far in negotiations, but also recognise that much more needs to be done. That is why the Committee calls on the Foreign Office to increase its diplomatic presence in Ireland and to produce an analysis of the UK-Ireland bilateral relationship, containing recommendations to improve it and options to revitalise existing, or indeed create new, bilateral institutions.

The opportunity for the United Kingdom is in an internationally engaged, networked world. We are uniquely placed to achieve this due to history, alliances and geography, but in order to do so we need both investment and energy, and the Foreign Office, most of all, must set out its vision, its strategy for achieving that, and the resources required to make it possible. The Committee remains concerned by the silence on many areas and the confusion in others.

[Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Lab/Co-op)]

I obviously declare an interest as a member of the Committee that produced this unanimous report. If we leave the European Union, we inevitably lose influence. Does my friend the Chairman of the Committee believe that the Government have confronted the issue sufficiently and made proposals to remedy and ameliorate the loss of influence that will inevitably arise within Europe and European institutions?

[Tom Tugendhat]

The hon. Gentleman is more than aware of the debates we have had behind closed doors on this. I will start by saying that when we leave the European Union the nature of Britain’s influence will change, and does not need to diminish as long as Britain takes the opportunity to invest properly in global power. That is why the Committee was so concerned about the possibility that we are stripping off resources from parts of the world such as Asia and South America to reinforce where we will no longer be in the room in Brussels among the EU27. As my dear and honourable Friend knows very well, that is why we need more resources for the Foreign Office in order to make this possible. We need extra commitment, extra drive and extra energy and, to bind it together, we need the vision that, sadly, have not yet seen.

[Robert Halfon (Harlow) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on this very important report. Does he not agree that, given that we are leaving the European Union, we should redouble our diplomatic, economic and educational links with countries such as Serbia, Poland, Hungary and other countries in eastern Europe that are great friends of the United Kingdom, and that, given the significant number of Polish residents here, we should teach children the positive contribution that Polish people have made to Britain and the world?

[Tom Tugendhat]

I absolutely welcome my hon. Friend’s comments. Britain’s relationship with eastern Europe, particularly the Visegrad Four, was summed up in my conversation with our Baltic partners only yesterday. Britain’s role in assisting at the liberation of those countries from communism and in defending them at other points in history is one that many of them look at with fondness and affection. We should absolutely recognise and invest in that, and I pay huge tribute to our missions and embassies in those countries and the efforts they are making with the resources they have available. All I would add is: imagine what they could do with more resources. Imagine how many more people they could help to persuade of the benefits of thinking along those lines.

[Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)]

I congratulate the Committee on the report. Disrupting modern slavery supply chains across Europe requires high-quality diplomatic skill on our part. What assessment has the Foreign Affairs Committee made of our future diplomatic capacity in this area to disrupt this blight?

[Tom Tugendhat]

The hon. Gentleman asks a fair question, and this is one area where we need to consider not just bilateral relations but relations with the European Union as an organisation. We must recognise that if that is how 27 member states choose to work, our option for working with them is through the organisation that they choose. That is simply a fact. Seeing how we can plug into that organisation is essential, which is why we call on the Foreign Office to consider very hard the bilateral nature of that relationship, and perhaps to look at it in a different way. When we look at the mission in Washington, for example, and the way that the British embassy there plugs across an entire network, that may be a model for how we look into the European Union. Some of us—I speak personally here, not for the Committee—are attracted by the idea of having a Minister resident in Europe, not only to promote Britain’s interests, but to make sure that our European partners and friends see the importance that we place on that relationship.

[Sir Peter Bottomley (Worthing West) (Con)]

My hon. and gallant Friend reminds me that, when I was first elected, half the Whips Office were colonels.

The Committee has done well. There is a reference to the British-Irish Council and to the British-Irish Parliamentary Assembly. I hope that the Government will be asked by this House and by the Committee to make sure that our membership of the Council of Europe, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe get more attention than perhaps they have had in the past, and that there are regular meetings between their members and Government, and debates in this House.

The question for us is how we can all contribute and gain, because that is the best way to maintain Britain’s interests as the status of our relationship with the European Union changes. As a last point, may I say that, as normal, most of these reports have three blank pages? It might be helpful for those who do not want to read the whole report to have a glossary somewhere, so that the alphabet soup can be understood by those to whom some of these things are strange.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Perhaps I can pick up on the last point first. I have just smiled at my excellent Committee Clerk, who was so essential to producing this report, and I am sure that she has noted that.

On the other bodies that my hon. Friend mentioned, I am absolutely in agreement with him that the investment that we must make now in different forms of bilateralism and different forms of multinationalism is absolutely essential to achieving the aims of the United Kingdom. This island is not moving anywhere. We are still going to remain 20 miles or so off the coast of France, and we are still going to have our closest relationships, in many ways, with European nations. How we engage in them is essential, and that will require resourcing and time.

[Paul Masterton (East Renfrewshire) (Con)]

Unquestionably, leaving the European Union means that we must redouble our efforts with our European partners, but surely that cannot come at the expense of manpower or money being siphoned away from other parts of the world. Does the Chair of the Select Committee share my concerns that the Foreign Office does not have enough resources to put the investment that we will need into Europe?

[Tom Tugendhat]

I absolutely share my hon. Friend’s concerns. He will be aware that the recent sale of an embassy in Thailand, which admittedly raised an awful lot of money to address some of the holes in the capital spending of the Foreign Office, will inherently have diminished our presence in some way. These symbolic buildings, these iconic places, are essential to getting people through the door—and, of course, what is the purpose of a diplomatic mission but to get people in to talk to us? Although these palaces may look glorious, and none more so than our embassy in Paris, the work that our ambassador, the right hon. Lord Llewellyn, is putting into that building—not into the bricks and mortar, but into it as a living body, as an embodiment of Britain in Paris—is essential to ensuring that our network is increased, that our reach is augmented, and indeed that our economy is promoted. That is only possible when we resource it correctly, which is why I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend that we do need to increase the resources available for the Foreign Office in order to promote the United Kingdom and to get better return for this country on the investment that we are making.

[Mr Philip Hollobone (Kettering) (Con)]

On page 26, my hon. Friend’s Committee looks at the issue of NATO and the new EU defence pillar. He encourages participation in some EU defence integration measures. On behalf of my constituents in Kettering, may I caution his Committee against that as a slippery slope, because NATO is the main pillar of western defence and will always remain as such? The EU is in great danger of undermining that, and we should not go down that slippery slope, because it would not be in our national interest.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank my hon. Friend, whose points on this area have been important and well made over many years, and I welcome his intervention now. This report was passed unanimously, despite such points, because of the evidence that we heard. The reality is that non-NATO EU states—countries like Sweden—are looking to integrate more closely now that we have gone with other European nations on defence. We have a choice. If we wish to work with northern allies like Sweden in defence of the high north and in projecting Britain’s influence in the Arctic, we need to think, what is the most appropriate organisation, and what is the most appropriate structure through which to operate? I am entirely in agreement with him that the EU would not be the best structure and that NATO is, but the problem is that we have lost our veto in the European Union, the other 27 are pursuing that, and we therefore have a choice either to work with them at some level or not to be part of it at all. Given Scotland’s position and given our position as a nation with interests in the high north, I would urge us to work with others who have interests there and, on occasion and cautiously and carefully, to work with some EU defence structures.

[Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)]

I commend the hon. Gentleman and the members of his Committee for a sobering but very, very useful report. Given the number of quite serious concerns that it raises—for example, the fact that it appears that three different witnesses for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office gave three different understandings as to what their role in the Brexit process was—can he advise the House on what arrangements the Committee intends to make to ensure that Foreign Office Ministers are held to account for the recommendations? In particular, would it be appropriate to ask the Foreign Secretary to make a statement to the House at an early date, so that the House can scrutinise in more detail some of the concerns that the report has raised?

[Tom Tugendhat]

The hon. Gentleman makes a very good point. One thing that we are finding, as the Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire (Alistair Burt), who is in his place today will know, is that at times there is a little resistance in the Foreign Office to answering some questions. Indeed, I had to write to the Foreign Secretary about it yesterday. The Minister is one of the most open and helpful people in his Department, so there is absolutely no criticism either of him or his area of responsibility, but there are other areas in which we are finding it hard to get answers.

For example, we have asked how the Foreign Office envisions the meaning of global Britain. So far, it has declined to answer. I find it somewhat unusual that a Government Department should refuse or decline to answer questions from the assembled people in this Parliament; I find that an unusual position to take. Therefore, we are asking the Foreign Office to think again. The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that we need to hold the various Ministers to account. The Foreign Secretary will be answering Foreign Office questions here in this House, and we have asked all Ministers to appear twice a year before the Committee, because we feel that six months is a reasonable time lag between visits. The hon. Gentleman is well within his rights to call for a more urgent response if there is something that he sees as more urgently requiring it.

[Mr Khalid Mahmood (Birmingham, Perry Barr) (Lab)]

I commend the Chairman and the members of the Committee for producing this excellent report. Will he confirm that, in relation to intelligence and security, a permanent official should be appointed to ensure that the relationship that we have with Europe at the moment continues?

[Tom Tugendhat]

Madam Deputy Speaker, if you will forgive me wearing another hat as the member of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, I will tell the hon. Gentleman that I was privileged to hear from two of our former chiefs of intelligence and two other senior diplomatic officials recently about the sharing of intelligence and the importance placed on it by all nations in the European continent. I am not concerned about it not continuing. The one concern is that we must have influence over data sharing and data holding regulations, because European decisions on that could well affect United Kingdom companies and interests.

[The Minister for the Middle East (Alistair Burt)]

It is my role simply to say thank you to the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee for his presentation and to thank colleagues for their contributions. I have obviously listened very carefully to all the exchanges and will draw them to the attention of both the Foreign Secretary and the Minister for Europe. There will be a formal Foreign Office response in due course, but it is also an opportunity to thank the Committee for its work. I certainly look forward to appearing before it again in the future. Finally, happy birthday, Madam Deputy Speaker.

Select Committee on International Development

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Thursday 18th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Twigg]

I thank my hon. Friend for his question and for his passionate advocacy of the Rohingya cause. I know that his constituency contains a significant Rohingya diaspora community, on whose behalf he speaks. I agree that the Government’s approach needs to place greater emphasis on the protection of the Rohingya, and indeed other minorities in Burma—that was what we alluded to when we said that there was “over-optimism” about the pace of democratic reform in that country. I also agree that conditions simply are not yet there, and—to put it bluntly—are unlikely to be there in the foreseeable future, to allow any significant voluntary return of the Rohingya to Burma.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

I welcome my hon. Friend’s report—he is a good friend—and I thank him for continuing the work that many of us have taken up on the Rohingya cause and for the work of his Committee in broadening out into various different areas. Does he agree that there are a series of problems in Burma, not least the multiple insurgencies involving different ethnic groups? Focusing on the Rohingya is essential not just because it speaks to Burma, but because it speaks to the wider problem of diaspora and refugee populations. Getting this right is essential, not just for solving the problems in Burma, but for addressing many of the other problems that arise in refugee situations around the world.

[Stephen Twigg]

I thank my hon. Friend, the hon. Gentleman who Chairs the Foreign Affairs Committee, and I pay tribute to that Committee for the report it published late last year. We sought to develop and supplement that report, rather than repeat it, and the work of that Committee in describing this crisis as a crime against humanity was an important contribution to the debate. He is right: this crisis is important in its own right, but there are enormous lessons for situations in other parts of the world, including in parts of Africa where there is a massive displacement of people, and the world seems incapable of getting its solutions right.

Hamed bin Haydara

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Thursday 11th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Sir Alan Duncan]

The hon. Gentleman’s perfectly fair questions illustrate the deep complexities of Yemen at the moment. Unfortunately, we cannot just deal with the legitimate Government in the way we might expect to do with other countries. This is a failing state, with the legitimate President, President Hadi, wielding far less power than one would wish and the Houthis wielding far more power than one would wish. Relations on this sort of consular case—if I can describe it as such—are very difficult and our ability to have the influence we would like is far less than we would like.

The Houthis are Zaidis, not classic Iranian Shi’ites, so they have an affinity with Iran, but it is wrong to say that they take all their orders from it and are its straightforward puppets. The history of Yemen suggests that the position of the Houthis is rather more complex than that. There is an undoubted affinity, however, and one that has grown over the past two or three years. Because of that, we will of course use all our diplomatic efforts to put pressure on the Iranians to understand that there is deep concern in this House and more widely across the world about the way in which Mr Haydara and others are being treated.

I absolutely assure the House that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, in his dealings with the Iranians, which have increased over the past couple of months, will not fail to raise this issue and the broader issue of religious freedom on any occasion.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

I thank the Minister for his comments and for speaking very gently and wisely about a matter that is actually very complex. I pay tribute to Her Majesty’s ambassador to Sana’a, Simon Shercliff, who of course is not in Sana’a. He has done an awful lot of work on the Yemen problem, yet through no fault of his own appears to be getting not very much further. I also pay tribute to the Minister for the Middle East, who likewise is doing a lot.

I associate myself with the words of the hon. Member for Birmingham, Perry Barr (Mr Mahmood) on the influence of Iran in the region. Does the Minister agree that the rise of religiosity among the Houthis is an extremely worrying sign and something that has arisen only in the last few years? Although there have been many tribal issues in Yemen, the rise of factionalism on religious grounds is a new thing in Yemeni history.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I totally agree with my hon. Friend. I know that as Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, he will investigate the matter deeply with his Committee. He is right that one of the distressing elements of what has unfolded in Yemen over the past five years is that what was really a tribal conflict has converted into more of a sectarian conflict. That contains the danger of further escalation into a deeper proxy conflict. That is exactly the kind of rising tension and complex structure that, through our diplomatic efforts, we want to reduce and de-escalate so that we get to the point where there can be proper and realistic political discussions in that complex, tribal country to bring stability and, crucially, to overcome the massive famine, disease and rising infant mortality that are probably the worst aspect—although a deeply hidden aspect—of what is going on in Yemen.

Oral Answers to Questions

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Tuesday 9th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Sir Alan Duncan]

As we move on to phase 2 of the discussions and negotiations, all these matters will be in the frame. I am sure that we will be able to negotiate an agreement that is in the long-term interests of the UK.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

The Minister has done enormous amounts in reasserting bilateralism across Europe this past year. Can he assure us that the resources that he requires to make sure that we are ready for post-EU membership will not denude the rest of the world, so that we do not rob Peter to pay Paul or build bilaterals at a cost to global Britain?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

My hon. Friend makes a good point. We have created 50 new diplomatic positions in our embassies, but it is not a question of simply reducing the number of staff outside Europe by the same number. The money to fund these changes will come from changing the way we work and adjusting some our processes, and from some frontline staff savings in Asia, the Americas and Africa. We are also bidding for some extra money from the Treasury to help create over 100 additional new roles to support the process of leaving the EU.

Oman, UAE and Iran

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Monday 11th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Boris Johnson]

I am grateful to the right hon. Lady for the spirit in which she poses her questions. I can tell her that in Tehran I met Vice-President Salehi, the head of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Shamkhani, the Speaker of the Majlis Ali Larijani and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and had long discussions with President Rouhani. In each of those conversations, I repeated the case for release on humanitarian grounds, where that is appropriate, of the difficult consular cases that we have in Iran, and that message was certainly received and understood. However, as I said to the House, it is too early to be confident about the outcome.

The right hon. Lady asked about the plan in Yemen, and she will understand that the plan certainly was until last Saturday that Ali Abdullah Saleh would be divided from the Houthis, which seemed to be the best avenue for progress. Indeed, Ali Abdullah Saleh was divided from the Houthis, but he then paid the ultimate price for his decision to go over to the coalition. We are left with a difficult and tense situation, and what we need to do now, the plan on which everybody is agreed, is to get Hodeidah open, first to humanitarian relief, to which the Saudis have agreed, but also to commercial traffic, too.

I heard the right hon. Lady’s question about the use of the UN Security Council. Resolution 2216 is still operative, but as penholders in the UN we keep the option of a new Security Council resolution under continuous review. It is vital that all parties understand, as I think they genuinely do in Riyadh, in Abu Dhabi and across the region, that there is no military solution to the disaster in Yemen. There is no way that any side can win this war. What we need now is a new constitution and a new political process, and that is the plan that the UK is in the lead in promoting. As I said to the right hon. Lady, we had meetings of the Quad last week, again last night in Abu Dhabi, and we will have a further meeting in early January.

As for the UK’s role in Syria, the right hon. Lady asked about the Astana process and whether it would be acceptable. Our view is that if there is to be a lasting peace in Syria that commands the support of all the people of that country, it is vital that we get the talks back to Geneva. I believe that that is the Labour party’s position. Indeed, I believe it was also the Labour party’s position that there could be no long-term future for Syria with President Assad. If that position has changed, I would be interested to hear about that. However, our view is that it is obviously a matter for the people of Syria, and we will be promoting a plan whereby they, including the 11 million or 12 million who have fled the country, will be given the chance to vote in free, fair, UN-observed elections to give that country a stable future.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

I must pay tribute to my right hon. Friend for the amount of effort that he has put in in the region—not only in the UAE and Oman, which are of course great friends of ours, but in Iran, where the situation is of course very difficult. He listed many of the people he met and kindly told us what he asked of them, so will he perhaps enlighten us as to what they asked of him?

[Boris Johnson]

I can summarise it by saying that what they really want is the kind of diplomatic energy and leadership that, as I was trying to explain to the right hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry), the UK is supplying particularly in Yemen, where an appalling, catastrophic conflict has been going on for three years. The conflict is a scar on the conscience of humanity and, as she rightly said, we are penholders at the UN. We have a duty to Yemen, and we are in the lead on trying to bring the sides together to advance a political solution. As I told the House earlier, one of my reasons for going to both Oman and Iran is that we cannot ignore the role of those countries in advancing the cause of peace in Yemen.

Yemen

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Thursday 30th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend is making an extremely powerful point about the nature of Iran’s arming of the Houthis. Does he not, however, accept the research by Conflict Armament Research that clearly points out that weapons from Iran have come through Yemen and are now being used against Saudi Arabia? He makes the absolutely valid point that Saudi action is only further encouraging such violence, but does he not also accept that Tehran is wilfully undermining and destroying an Arab state to use it as a proxy against Saudi Arabia?

[Mr Mitchell]

I strongly agree with my hon. Friend that blockading weapons—from any country, but certainly from Iran—is the right thing to do, but I am condemning without reservation a blockade that is likely to lead to the famine and death of very large numbers of people.

The price for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of continuing on its current path will be certain failure and utter humiliation, both in the region and more widely. The clock is ticking. Already in Yemen a child dies every 10 minutes. Yemen is a time bomb threatening international peace and security. Our failure to denounce these crimes and use our leverage to stop them condemns millions of Yemenis to death in the future. Shying away from demanding compliance, by all, with the international rules-based order that we in Britain helped to take root also weakens a strained system that keeps British citizens safe.

Britain’s policy is riddled with internal inconsistencies. While one limb of the British Government is desperately trying to secure entry into the port of Hodeidah for vital food, medicine and fuel, another limb is assisting with the blockade and, indeed, the targeting of attacks. One limb supports the erection of seven new cranes that are vital for unloading essential supplies, while another supports the destruction of those same cranes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

If you will forgive me, Mr Deputy Speaker, I will talk about this country for which I hold a deep affection, having studied Arabic there just over 20 years ago. It is a country of great richness and great culture. In many ways, it is absolutely the heart of Arabia. It is there that the camel was domesticated, which allowed the colonisation of the rest of Arabia. So it is, for most Arabs, very much seen as the heart of the culture; indeed, Yemeni Arabic is seen as the purest—the closest to Koranic Arabic that is currently spoken. So to see the country so ruined, so destroyed is a matter of great sadness for all of us who love Arabian culture, the Arabic language and the Arab people.

We have to be clear about what is causing that destruction. It is absolutely right to say that the blockade on Yemen is wrong—there is no doubt in my mind that Saudi Arabia has a particular responsibility to address the humanitarian concerns facing the Yemeni people today—but it would be wrong to point solely at Riyadh. The decisions being made in Tehran today are having an effect that is being felt throughout the region. It would be wrong to be silent in the face of such aggression, and it would be wrong to ignore the roots of it.

When we look at Zaidi Islam, which as we all know descends from the fifth branch of Shi’a Islam—from the son of the son-in-law of the Prophet, Ali Husayn—it is worth remembering that Iranian involvement in Yemen is nothing new. Indeed, it is said that the Prophet himself was born in the year of the elephant, which is so named because it is the year in which the Shahanshah, the King of Persia, landed elephants in Yemen in order to invade what was then called “Arabia Felix”—happy Arabia.

Since then, Iranian involvement in the region has been frequent, and it is so again today, when the Iranians are landing not war elephants but missiles, small arms and rifles. They are equally poisonous to the politics of that region of Arabia today as they have been for nearly two millennia. Just because it is true that Saudi Arabia’s treatment of the Yemeni people today is not acceptable, that does not mean that we should ignore the crimes being committed by Iran.

I urge the Minister, who has done so much for the region—he has done so much not only for the countries and our relationships with them, but for the people themselves—and who understands so well the countries that make up this beautiful and important part of the world, to remember the history that is playing out. I urge him to remember that we have real friends in the region. We have real friends in Yemen whom, of course, we must help. We have real friends in Saudi Arabia, whom we must help to defend themselves. We have real friends in Oman and in the Emirates who are also fighting against Iranian aggression. As we stand up for our friends, we must urge them to remember that they, too, have a responsibility.

[Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Lab/Co-op)]

I am grateful to my friend, the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, for giving way. He referred to the role Iran is playing in Yemen, but are not the Iranians also trying to influence and destabilise other countries on the Arabian peninsula and even trying to increase their influence in Oman?

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

The hon. Gentleman, who certainly is a friend, is of course absolutely right. The actions of the Iranian Government over the past few years of the Khomeini-ite dictatorship have been taken to destabilise many areas of the middle east. If one looks at Oman today, one can see the actions of Iranian-backed insurgencies. If one looks at Bahrain today, one can see violent insurgencies, rather than just the political groups that one sees in Oman. Look at the eastern seaboard of Saudi Arabia. I am not going to praise the Saudis for their treatment of the Shi’as in eastern Saudi Arabia, around Dhahran, because frankly it is not great, but bearing in mind the way the Iranian Government are seeking to radicalise Shi’a groups in eastern Saudi Arabia, it is right of the Government in Riyadh to see threats coming from the east. They are right, because that is what is happening.

All that does not excuse the human rights abuses of the blockade. It does not excuse the famine and punishment that is being made collective against the whole people of Yemen, and I will not excuse it, but we must remember that this is a war being fought against an aggressive regime that has several times now fired missiles at Riyadh and at civilian populations in Saudi Arabia. The hon. Member for Glasgow Central (Alison Thewliss) is absolutely right that the death of the children in Yemen is a crime that cries out for justice, but we must also remember that if Iranian weapons were being landed in Glasgow, we would take action. If Iranian weapons were being fired from France into London, we would take action. I understand that the Saudis are right to take action about it.

Of course, we would not practice collective punishment, we would not blockade and we would not abuse human rights to defend ourselves. We must understand that although there is a legitimacy of Saudi action, as friends of Saudi Arabia and supporters of the welcome changes that are happening in that country today, we have a role and a right to speak out. I welcome the words of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister to Mohammad Bin Salman only a few hours ago. She is absolutely right, and she speaks for the United Kingdom with passion and honour when she calls on him to act, and to act now.

Budget Resolutions

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Monday 27th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

First, I wish to take a brief moment to correct the record: the economy is growing, unemployment is falling, our friends are investing, and the country is doing well. Opposition Members will be astonished to hear that, however, because all we see from them is darkness, while all we on the Government Benches can see is light. Still, ’twas ever thus.

While we are on the subject of light, perhaps I could point to a few things the Budget has done well. First, it has recognised investment in foreign affairs. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary highlighted that clearly when he spoke about the budgets for the intelligence services, defence, DFID and the Foreign Office as being in many ways linked—which, of course, they are. It is not possible to think about the defence of the United Kingdom, its protection, its influence, or its help to others without wrapping them all together, and that is why I am pleased the Government are bringing them together so much more strongly than ever before. The fact that my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire (Alistair Burt) and my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart) sit as Ministers in both the Foreign Office and DFID shows very clearly the link between the two.

I would be grateful to hear a little more from the Foreign Secretary about a few areas. On the European lay-down, it is important to maintain our friendship with the EU. He was clear that although we will be looking for opportunities elsewhere, we on the Government Benches believe in opportunities everywhere; one of those places, of course, is among the 27 members of the EU. I am keen, therefore, to hear a little more from the Government about how we see the lay-down of embassies and partnerships under the common foreign and security policy, the common security and defence policy, the Political and Security Committee, and perhaps even in terms of permanent structured co-operation. Will he talk to us a bit about that?

It is through these established orders that Britain has made herself strong. It is not by accident that we have become a trusted partner and a feared adversary over these past few hundred years; as the Foreign Secretary again said—I find myself in unusual times when I agree with most of the things he says—it is because of the international rules-based system: a system that we helped to write. It is important that we remember our role not just in its formation, but in its maintenance, which is why I urge him to talk a bit more about those areas.

When we talk about maintenance, we mean not only our diplomatic network but areas such as GCHQ. Just as the Navy guarded our sea routes and communications throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, hanged pirates and kept the Malacca straits open, so GCHQ deals with pirates today—okay, it is slightly different: a little less of the hanging; a little more of the hacking.

[Sammy Wilson (East Antrim) (DUP)]

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that while the Government have shown generosity towards the other European nations in assuring them that we will continue in that role, they have not shown the same generosity in the trade negotiations?

[Tom Tugendhat]

My hon. Friend—I do consider him a friend—will know extremely well that I think the UK’s generous position towards the defence of Europe is not only important, but a matter of our own self-interest. Our frontier should start not at Dover, but at the furthest extents of our allies and ships. In ensuring that we have a continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent and that our submarines and ships are under way across the globe, we ensure that we push our borders out from our own shores and that our people are safer.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

My hon. Friend mentions the continuous at-sea deterrent. Given the necessary upfront investment in new submarines, what does he make of the idea put about on the Government Benches that perhaps this major investment should be met from the Treasury reserve?

[Tom Tugendhat]

My right hon. Friend knows extremely well that before 2010 that was exactly where it was met from, because it is an ongoing operation. I urge the Treasury to look very hard at doing so again to ensure that the flux in funding that comes with an expensive programme such as the nuclear deterrent is maintained by the whole of Government. It is, after all, a strategic programme, not a military programme in the standard sense.

There is so much more that we can do. It is not just about the lay-down of defence, although we have spoken about that; it is about the lay-down of our diplomats and aid workers. I am keen that over this coming period we look very hard at this and focus on our strategic priority. Too often we hear about “priorities”—in the plural—and this leads to a deception that one can have more than one; all that tells us, of course, is that we have none. The priority for our country must fundamentally be on the rule of law, on the maintenance of the international rules-based system, and on helping our friends to develop those rules that make us all prosper.

Let me give just two examples that have made a huge difference. The first is the transformation in China of the adherence to intellectual property. Over the last 20 years, that change has enabled Chinese businesses to grow prosperous on the back of their own intellectual strengths, which is brilliant not only for them, but for the whole world, because it prevents piracy and encourages wealth development.

On a more prosaic note, land rights in various African countries have started to be guaranteed. That is a huge advance, because it enables small farmers—smallholders —to own capital, to trade, to develop and to invest. Again, we have an opportunity to promote the international rules-based system, the rule of law, and, indeed, British values.