Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

Richard Burgon Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd February 2016 Public Bill Committees

Question again proposed.

[Richard Burgon (Leeds East) (Lab)]

I would like to express my hearty support for new clause 3. Select Committees have routinely held pre-appointment hearings for a number of public appointments since 2008, with a number of candidates not approved. The previous coalition Government did develop the scrutiny agenda somewhat when the Chancellor agreed to the Treasury Committee having a power of veto over appointments to the Office for Budget Responsibility in 2010.

The Public Accounts Committee has a veto over the appointment of the Comptroller and Auditor General. Appointments to the Monetary Policy Committee and the Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England are made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and are then subject to a confirmation hearing by the Treasury Committee. The Treasury Committee has power over the chair and board members of the Office for Budget Responsibility, an arrangement that the Chancellor told the Treasury Committee he would put in place

“because I want there to be absolutely no doubt that this is an independent body”.

The Minister will be aware that, when it examined the proposals for the future Financial Conduct Authority in 2013, the Treasury Committee made a number of recommendations on the accountability of the new body to Parliament, including that the legislation provided that the chief executive of the FCA be subject to pre-appointment scrutiny by the Treasury Committee. The Treasury Committee was disappointed by the Government’s response, particularly in view of the deficiencies in the accountability mechanisms for the Financial Services Authority.

I would like to express support not only for the new clause tabled by the Scottish National party, but for the view of the Treasury Committee, as set out by its Chair, the right hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie), in his letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer on 26 January, following the appointment of the current Prudential Regulation Authority chief executive, Andrew Bailey, to be the next leader of the FCA. In that letter the right hon. Gentleman set out his Committee’s view that it should have a veto over the appointment and dismissal of the chief executives of both the FCA and the PRA. Indeed, the letter said that the FCA’s chair, John Griffith-Jones, told the Committee that there was merit in that proposal when he met its members on 20 January.

It would be helpful to know whether the Chancellor has responded to that letter, and whether the Minister can share with us now the Treasury’s thinking on extending pre-appointment hearings and the power of veto to those two positions. I thank the hon. Member for East Lothian for flagging up this issue with his new clause, which we support and will consider returning to on Report, if the Government are not on board with it.

[The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Harriett Baldwin)]

I am going to convince Opposition Members that this new clause is not necessary. I will give them an updated response on the Chancellor’s views and the process of recruitment for the new chief executive of the PRA, the deputy governor for prudential regulation. That newsworthy notification to the world is taking place in front of a large crowd, as we can see.

My understanding of the proposed new clause is that it would give the Treasury Committee a statutory veto over the appointment of the chief executive of the PRA, which is soon to be the Prudential Regulation Committee. I am well aware that the Treasury Committee, of which the hon. Members for East Lothian and for Bassetlaw are members, has proposed this measure. Last month, following the announcement of the appointment of Andrew Bailey as chief executive of the FCA, we received a letter from my right hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie), in which he argued that the Treasury Committee should have a veto over both the appointment and the removal of the chief executives of the FCA and the PRA. The Chancellor has replied to the Treasury Committee in a letter, which normally would be published by the Committee—I imagine that it has been published already. We believe that such an arrangement is neither necessary nor appropriate for the financial regulators, and I will articulate the reasons why.

First, such an arrangement is not necessary to protect the independence of the FCA and the PRA or of their chief executives. The model of independent regulation that we have in the UK gives the regulator a clear statutory framework of objectives and duties and ensures that regulatory decisions are taken in an objective and impartial way. Importantly, this legislative framework protects the independence of the PRA and the FCA chief executives. It includes provisions that require the terms of appointment to be such that the appointee is not subject to the direction of the Treasury or of any person.

We agree that it is important that the Treasury Committee holds a pre-commencement hearing before the new PRA CEO takes up their post. However, we believe that it is important that the Chancellor remains the person who is fully accountable for deciding on the right person for the job. Pre-appointment hearings are not common for chief executive posts. Hon. Members will understand that such a process would potentially introduce scope for delay and public disagreement, which would not help to recruit good candidates. For example, candidates who are otherwise very good might not want to disclose their interest to their current employer in advance of confirmation of the appointment.

The hon. Member for East Lothian has argued that the arrangements for the appointment of the chief executives of the FCA and PRA should mirror those for the senior leadership position at the Office for Budget Responsibility; that appointment requires the consent of the Treasury Committee. However, the financial regulators are materially different from the OBR. The OBR was established to examine and report on the sustainability of public finances and, by doing so, to help Parliament hold the Government to account for their fiscal policy decisions—the same argument applies to the Comptroller and Auditor General—and as such the OBR has a unique model of dual accountability to the Government and to Parliament.

The previous Government proposed the statutory veto of the Treasury Committee over appointments to provide an assurance of independence and to ensure that those individuals at the OBR have the support and approval of the Select Committee. However, we do not believe that that model of dual accountability is appropriate when regulators are independently carrying out executive functions of the state, such as regulating and supervising the financial services industry. As I have said before, I would welcome the Treasury Committee holding a pre-commencement hearing with the chief executives of the PRA and the FCA. That would provide an important opportunity for Parliament to scrutinise new appointees to those offices before they take up their posts.

Let me update the Committee on the process for appointing the next chief executive of the PRA, who will take over from Andrew Bailey. The Government are running an open competition. The post was advertised on Friday 19 February, which was last week, and the closing date for applications is 4 March—the window is still open should any members of the Committee wish to apply. The appointment is made by the Queen, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister and the Chancellor. Interviews will be conducted in mid-March by a panel chaired by Sir Nicholas Macpherson, together with the second permanent secretary, the chair of the court and one of the other deputy governors. It is expected that the new chief executive will take up the position as soon as possible, but by 1 July 2016 at the latest. You see, Mr Brady, we have all the breaking news after 2 pm in this Committee.

There is another argument that is not in my speaking notes, but which I strongly believe is the case. Let us hypothesise that whoever is appointed through that process then goes through the pre-commencement hearing with the Treasury Committee that we have agreed, and that Committee produces a report that is extremely unfavourable to the person nominated by the Government. I think we can all see that, from a practical point of view, that would be as powerful as having a pre-appointment hearing.

Let us look back at the recent examples of Andrew Bailey’s move to the FCA and, for those of us with slightly longer memories, the appointment in the previous Parliament of Mark Carney as the new Governor of the Bank of England. The Chancellor invested a lot of personal time in those appointment processes, persuading individuals to come across. Imagine if he had had to say, “It is not actually in my power to offer you these jobs; it is in the power of the Treasury Committee.” Would we have seen candidates of such quality prepared to put their names forward? I submit that we would not.

I therefore think that the Government have made the right judgment in agreeing to a pre-commencement hearing. I hope that I have explained to the Committee why I do not believe it would be appropriate to accept the new clause, and I hope that the hon. Member for East Lothian will withdraw it, or that the Committee will vote it down.

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[George Kerevan]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. Forgive me, Mr Brady; I do not normally like the sound of my own voice quite so much as to speak so often, but I will get this over as quickly as I can.

New clause 4 suggests a change in the title of the Bank of England to the Bank of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. I know I am at risk of being accused of triviality. In defence, because we are talking about a Bank of England Bill, I thought it was pertinent to bring the matter up. I accept that it is a minor aspect of the legislation.

I am not claiming ownership of the Bank of England for Scotland, even though that institution was first mooted by William Paterson in the 1690s. He suggested the original project to lend His Majesty’s Government the sum of £1.2 million. The geek in me made a quick calculation of what that would be worth today, and it comes out at about £26 billion, so that was quite a serious project for the time. The yield on the original loan was 8%, which was a good deal better than one would get today.

Let me quickly get to the core: why change the name? I appreciate that it is an historic name known around the world and is a great brand. There is a minor irritation in the other parts of the kingdom at the use of the name England. That is no offence to the great people of England—my father is from Liverpool—but it is a minor irritation. But that is the least of it.

I talk of a great global institution, one that has played even more of a global role since the crisis of 2007-08. If it is to play that global role and represent a modern Britain, it needs a name that reflects a modern Britain. That is the issue for me. The intent of the Bill for the Government and the officers of the Bank of England is to modernise. What better opportunity to have a modern name?

I am suggesting a minimum change in legal terms to the Bank of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. I suspect that in day-to-day operations it would be comparable to a company saying, “This is the legal name but trading as.” I am sure that for a generation to come it would still be known as the Bank of England, but honour would be settled by the fact that the legal title would be as I suggest. It is the minimum change, and it is put forward as an attempt to gain some common ground.

I know that a number of my colleagues—and not only in the SNP—are considering tabling other amendments with other names on Report. The issue is not going to go away, but I think this solution is doable and still retains the tradition of the Bank of England, which I am sure the Minister will defend.

[Richard Burgon]

What’s in a name? But we are happy to support the renaming of the Bank of England to the more accurately titled Bank of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, purely on a principled basis, given that they all fall under its area of geographical responsibility.

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[John Mann]

Before my hon. Friend sits down, would he like to contemplate that in the unlikely event that Scotland becomes independent and I am an elected Member of this House, I will certainly not be voting to allow Scotland to remain within sterling? Therefore, the likelihood is that Scotland will be required to have the euro as its currency. So if the name were to change and Scotland was using the euro, would the Government of the day not have to change the name back again in order to give some proper accuracy and balance?

[Richard Burgon]

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. It is very helpful. I have to say that I cannot foresee any circumstances in which my hon. Friend would not be re-elected and re-elected as the hon. Member for Bassetlaw—he truly is a man of the people—but I can foresee circumstances where the SNP’s desire might not reach fruition. My hon. Friend raises complicated and important questions and I look forward to the Minister’s response to them.

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Brought up, and read the First time.

[Richard Burgon]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. This is a simple new clause to change the terminology and move the Bank into the modern world. We have heard the Minister talk in this Committee about the importance of modernising the institution, and we have also heard eloquent discussions of the need to modernise from both the hon. Member for East Lothian and my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw. The clause is a very simple way of showing that we are serious about this.

The Bank and the court of directors were established, as the Minister reminded us, in 1694. A lot of things have changed since then. The Bank is the second-oldest central bank in the world, after the Swedish Riksbank, and it is the eighth oldest bank. The Bank’s own website states that,

“the few public companies formed at the time of the Bank’s foundation, in 1694, tended to be governed by Courts of Directors”.

The phrase “courts of directors” is not used in relation to companies these days. It is worth asking whether the term “court of directors” survived into the modern day in other institutions, and whether this matters at all. Of course, this term did not survive into the modern day in other institutions, unless the Minister can tell me that I am wrong in that regard. If this does matter, should we continue to call what is currently termed the court of the Bank of England by that name? The Treasury Committee report of October 2011, “Accountability of the Bank of England”, stated:

“The Court is the governing body of the Bank of England. In this respect, it is the board of the Bank”.

The report also said:

“Given that the Court has changed recently, its name is outdated and does not give a clear picture of what the Court actually does. In terms of corporate governance the Court is the Board of the Bank and its name should change to reflect that. To reflect the shift of emphasis in its role, we recommend that the governing body of the Bank (Court) change its name to the ‘Supervisory Board of the Bank of England’. References below to the Board of the Bank of England in this report use this term. Whatever name is ultimately chosen, we strongly recommend that the term ‘Court’ is abolished”.

Those are the words of the Treasury Committee report in October 2011. I know that the court of the Bank, in replying to this report, did not express any opposition to this modest proposal to rename it. The court’s response read:

“Whether or not to rename Court is a matter for Government. We simply note that Court itself is divided on the balance of the arguments”.

In considering the cases for and against the renaming of the court of the Bank of England, the court stated:

“On the one hand, renaming would recognise the considerable changes in Court’s actual and prospective responsibilities in the past decade. On the other hand, it could give rise to serious misunderstandings, since amongst central banks ‘Board’ is often used to refer to an executive and/or policy making committee, as exemplified by the Federal Reserve Board and the Executive Board of the European Central Bank”.

We believe that such concerns can be overcome. The board—or the supervisory board, as the Treasury Committee would prefer to call it—would not be changing its responsibilities with this name change. Such a change, however, would be one small statement to help connect it to modern practice in terminology in major financial institutions. It would also cut through some of the mystery of the workings of the Bank and help make it more accessible to everyday people.

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[Harriett Baldwin]

What is in a word? The hon. Gentleman has set out the case for changing the name of the court. I do not know about you, Mr Brady, but I rather like some of our old traditions in this country.

The court has existed since the Bank’s inception in 1694. The composition and structure have obviously changed over its long history. Initially, there were 26 individuals on the court, while today it is much smaller, with the executives and non-executives, and is much more characteristic of a modern, unitary board. The term supervisory board, used by the hon. Gentleman, is more redolent of the German approach to corporate governance than the British one. I am sure he will provide me with examples. It is not the Americans this time, but the Germans.

For me, there is charm in the term “court”, which is rooted in this long history. It has no particular mystery about it; it merely refers to the Bank’s governing body, which does indeed operate like a modern board. I do not feel we should argue over semantics. We should look at how the court functions. As the Committee has already heard, the court is now far smaller and far more effective than it was historically. There is a clear division between the role of the chief executive and the non-executive chair. The court is comprised of a majority of independent non-executive directors, and there are formal, transparent appointment procedures for executive and non-executive directors alike.

The changes in the Bill, which we have discussed at such great length, will further enhance the role of the court, making it a stronger decision-making body. In particular, to remind the Committee, we are making the oversight functions the responsibility of the whole court, ensuring that every member of the court—executive and non-executive—can be held to account for the use of these functions.

This brings the court into line with the recommendations in the Treasury Committee report. My view and that of the Government on the amendment is clear. Changing the name of the court would make absolutely no difference to how it operates in practice. It is the provisions in the Bill that will do that. I oppose the suggestion to change the name from the rather quaint and old-fashioned term of “court”, which has for me some charm.

[Richard Burgon]

That was indeed a charming oration from the Minister about how things were done in the past and continue to be done to this day. As much as I like many aspects of the history of this country, I am not persuaded that we should not press the matter to a vote. In the name of modernity, I seek to divide the Committee on this issue.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

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[Harriett Baldwin]

Mr Brady, as we come to the final question of our proceedings, I put on record the Committee’s gratitude to you and Mr Wilson for having chaired our sittings so effectively. I also thank the Clerks and the Hansard reporters. For their incredibly diligent work behind the scenes—so often it is unsung—I also thank the Treasury officials, the Treasury legal team and, in this case, the Bank of England’s legal team. I put those thanks and that gratitude on the record. I also thank all members of the Committee for the care and attention that they have given to the line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill.

[Richard Burgon]

I echo the sentiments expressed by the Minister. I thank you, Mr Brady, and Mr Wilson, the co-Chair of the Committee, for your chairmanship. I thank the Clerks and the staff. I thank the Minister for her patience and courtesy and for the detailed responses she has given throughout our proceedings. I also thank my hon. Friends and all members of the Committee. We have no objection to the Bill being reported to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill, as amended, accordingly to be reported.

Andrey Lugovoy and Dmitri Kovtun Freezing Order 2016

Richard Burgon Excerpts

Monday 22nd February 2016 General Committees

[Richard Burgon (Leeds East) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard.

As the Minister has outlined, the purpose of the measure is to establish a freezing order that prohibits persons from making funds available to or for the benefit of Andrey Lugovoy and Dmitri Kovtun. The Home Secretary stated her intention to pursue this course of action in her statement on 21 January in response to the publication of Sir Robert Owen’s report into the death of Alexander Litvinenko in 2006. Members will recall that the report clearly set out Sir Robert Owen’s conclusion that he is sure that Andrey Lugovoy and Dmitri Kovtun were responsible for the death of a British citizen, Alexander Litvinenko. It also set out his finding that the death was probably sanctioned by the Russian state at its highest level.

When the Home Secretary set out her response to the report on 21 January, the shadow Home Secretary expressed the Opposition’s support for her statement. He also asked a number of questions, as did my colleague, Lord Tunnicliffe, when the order was discussed in the other place just before the recess. I therefore have fewer questions about the specifics of the measure and how the order relates to what the Home Secretary said last month than might otherwise have been the case.

The Home Secretary made reference to extra resources for security agencies and the Investigatory Powers Bill, and to points relating to the national security strategy and strategic defence and security review, on which I do not wish to comment in this debate. When responding to the statement, a number of Members discussed the kind of pressure that the Government’s response to Sir Robert Owen’s findings would put on the Russian authorities.

In the discussions of the freezing order, the Minister in the other place confirmed that it will lapse two years after it was made, as set out in section 8 of the Crime and Security Act 2001. He said that the Government will continue to monitor the evidence and, if the order is still in force after two years, consider at that point whether it is necessary and proportionate to make a new order. Will the Minister set out what the expected impact of the freezing order will be in assisting the Government in reaching their goals? How will that impact be monitored?

The Minister in the other place also stated that the Home Secretary was considering the names of individuals, on a list supplied by Mrs Litvinenko’s lawyers, who Mrs Litvinenko felt should have further action taken against them and who are not already subject to Government sanction. Will the Minister say whether it is likely that further freezing orders will be proposed in relation to other individuals? Is consideration ongoing on that? If so, how long should it take to reach a decision?

In the other place, my colleague also highlighted, as mentioned in the order’s explanatory notes, the risks relating to asset flight. I do not believe that the Minister on that occasion replied to that point, so, for the purposes of the record, will the Minister say any more about what assets are being frozen and whether there has been any suggestion of asset flight since 21 January, when Sir Robert’s report was published, and noon on 22 January, from which time the order retrospectively applies?

I appreciate that the Minister may not be able to answer all those points and she may have to consult her colleagues in the Home Office on some of them. If that is the case, I would appreciate it if she wrote to me. The far-reaching implications of the report’s findings cannot be overstated. More work, which may include further asset freezing, clearly needs to be done to deliver justice. I reiterate that the Opposition are committed to working with the Government to bring that about. We support the order.

Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting)

Richard Burgon Excerpts

Thursday 11th February 2016 Public Bill Committees

[The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Harriett Baldwin)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Brady, on this sunny February morning. The clauses and schedules together end the subsidiary status of the Prudential Regulation Authority and integrate microprudential regulation more fully into the Bank of England. I hope I can make it clear that the changes increase the PRA’s effectiveness, but do not undermine its independence.

First, I will talk about increasing effectiveness. Placing the Prudential Regulation Committee on the same footing as the Monetary Policy Committee—and, with our changes, the Financial Policy Committee—will elevate the status of the microprudential responsibilities of the Bank to the same level as monetary policy and macroprudential policy. That reinforces not only to Bank staff but to the public to whom the Bank must be transparent and accountable that the Bank is not simply an organisation dedicated to setting interest rates, but one with equally important macro and microprudential responsibilities.

The Bank has told us that closer integration has increased the feeling among PRA staff that they are integral to the Bank’s mission and have broader opportunities for progression across the whole Bank. That can only assist recruitment of the best people to the supervisor. Another benefit is increased clarity of governance. As the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards noted in discussing the existing regime:

“The accountability arrangements of the new structures are more complex than those of the previous regulatory regime. The PRA is a subsidiary of the Bank, and the FPC is a sub-committee of the Court of the Bank.”

Ending the subsidiary status of the PRA and establishing the PRC, MPC and FPC on the same statutory basis simplifies and clarifies Bank governance.

A further benefit of ending the PRA’s subsidiary status is that it enables the members of the new committee to devote more time to microprudential policy and operations. As the Governor explained at the Treasury Committee, the change will

“liberate…a portion of the time of the members of the PRA Board that is spent duly exercising their responsibilities as directors of a company”,

while noting the important responsibility PRC members will continue to have for ensuring the prudential regulation functions are adequately resourced. The Governor concluded

“that time is freed up to do their core job—what they are there for—which is to provide guidance on judgment-led supervision.”

For example, the PRC will not have to spend so much time discussing IT provision since that will be a concern for the Bank at large, and ultimately for its governing body, the court. Equally, whereas the PRA board had to be involved in discussions on staff terms and conditions and recruitment, the new committee will be able to leave those important concerns to the wider organisation and focus more on supervision.

Secondly, in terms of protecting independence, the PRA is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Bank, staffed by Bank employees. The Bank appoints the non-executive directors of the PRA board, subject to the approval of the Treasury. The transfer of the PRA’s functions to the Bank does not therefore transform the PRA from a body that is independent of the Bank to one that is not.

It may be worth explaining what “independence of the PRA” actually means. The Basel core principles on banking supervision state that legal safeguards should ensure that a regulator has

“operational independence, transparent processes, sound governance, budgetary processes that do not undermine autonomy and adequate resources”.

The Bill provides for all of those things. It provides that the Bank’s PRA functions may be exercised only through the new Prudential Regulation Committee. The Bank may not exercise its prudential regulation role in any other way.

The Prudential Regulation Committee will have a clear majority of external members. There will be at least seven external members, including at least six appointed by the Chancellor plus the CEO of the Financial Conduct Authority, and five internal members, comprising four Bank officers and one member appointed by the Governor. It is important to note that that is an increase in the weight of external members from the PRA board, on which a majority of only one is required.

Continuing with the protections for the PRA’s operational independence, the Basel core principles call for transparent processes and sound governance. The Bill sets out clear processes for the new committee’s decision making. The core principles also stress adequate resources. Every year, the committee will report directly to the Chancellor on the adequacy of its resources and the independence of its operations. The requirement for the Bank to separate resolution and supervisory functions will ensure that the UK complies with the European Union directives that insist on separation.

Finally, the Bill grants a strong statutory role to the PRA’s chief executive. He or she will be responsible for the day-to-day management and implementation of the prudential regulation strategy, and for determining how resources are allocated, managing policy development and overseeing supervisory decisions that do not reach the level of the committee. Our changes will increase the PRA’s effectiveness without undermining its independence. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Richard Burgon (Leeds East) (Lab)]

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship on this sunny day, Mr Brady, or indeed on any other day.

The effect of clause 12 will be to demote the PRA from being a separate authority to being a mere sub-committee within the Bank of England. We tabled an amendment to remove the clause and those that are consequential upon it. We think that the Treasury is dismantling another significant part of its regulatory reforms, which came into being through the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013. The clause would make the Bank of England as a corporate entity responsible for microprudential regulation. Our principal concern is with the manner in which microprudential regulation is to be conducted. We are concerned that the new PRC will be less independent than the PRA.

The risk is that the Government are demoting concerns about microprudential regulation by devolving the functions of the rule-making, free-standing regulatory authority, which is supposed to oversee that, to a sub-committee of the Bank. That is not a minor matter. The PRA is a separate corporate body and a distinct authority. It can be held separately liable and accountable for its actions and interactions. If it becomes merely a committee within a much larger corporate body, it will not be possible to hold it to account in the same way.

In the other place, my shadow Treasury colleague, Lord Tunnicliffe, said:

“The thing that keeps it clean is the fact that the PRA is a subsidiary—an independent company, as mentioned, governed by company law—and, therefore, there has to be an arm’s-length relationship between it and the FPC.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 1 November 2015; Vol. 765, c. 2005.]

I do not believe that moving the PRA closer to the Bank and, by definition, closer to the FPC is a good thing. The present separation works and should continue.

The former Treasury Committee Chair, Lord McFall, said that the clause is

“downgrading the PRA to a mere committee”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 26 October 2015; Vol. 765, c. 1059.]

The desubsidiarisation—a bit of a mouthful—of the PRA may simplify the Bank of England’s governance, as its current and outgoing chair, Andrew Bailey, said at the Treasury Committee. But will it make it more competent and more effective in carrying out its work? Our concern is that it will not, and there is no evidence that we are aware of to demonstrate that.

In Mr Bailey’s discussion at the Treasury Committee, the Chair of the Committee, the right hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie), raised concerns that there will not be sufficient independence owing to the make-up of the committee’s membership. He highlighted:

“the Chairman of the FPC, who will also be the Chairman of the PRC, who will also be the Governor of the Bank.”

Mr Bailey said,

“We have to be very clear in our own roles and thinking which hat we are wearing at any given point in time”.

He also said that the body will be more integrated into the Bank, but that it also has certain functions that it needs to carry out independently. The Governor was also pushed on this, again by a Treasury Committee member, the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker), who said:

“In addition to being Governor, you chair the Financial Stability Board, you are a member of Court, and you chair the FPC, the MPC and soon the PRC.”

He warned that,

“the institutions are set up in such a way that they strongly depend on the Governor’s capacity to act independently in different contexts.”

Also at the Treasury Committee, the hon. Member for East Lothian asked the Governor whether the overlap of personnel meant there were grounds for conflict

“if we have the PRC reporting on its independence from the rest of the Bank.”

I am sorry to quote the Treasury Committee at such length, but the discussion there threw up contradictions, and it is not clear to me that those contradictions have been sufficiently resolved. So can the Minister say whether the body can be both more integrated and remain independent? We welcome joined-up thinking and ensuring a broad overview. We also heard about the dangers of groupthink in Committee the other day, and the Governor of the Bank told the Treasury Committee that the Bill did not specifically address that. If we have too many key persons juggling too many tasks, is there not a risk of oversight being impaired or conflict of interest setting in?

An authority employs its own staff who are therefore dedicated to the pursuit of its particular goals, in this instance microprudential regulation. By creating a committee of senior figures, microprudential regulation becomes simply another series of talking points among senior executives, as opposed to an ongoing regulatory activity. There are many very important functions that must be performed by a microprudential regulator in the wake of the last financial crisis: first, the conduct of stress tests to ensure that individual financial institutions are putting to one side sufficient capital. That is a microprudential activity that relates to the solvency of the institutions. We are surely not arguing that it is no longer important.

With the creation of new starter banks, there is a greater need than ever for microprudential regulation as those institutions start up in business. If we continue to start new credit unions and new blockchain banks and so on, microprudential regulations remain fundamentally important. Also, there continue to be high street banks in financial difficulties, such as the Co-operative and Britannia. The danger of the Prudential Regulation Committee being appointed as is currently suggested makes it more likely that groupthink will develop.

The strength of having different agencies in existence simultaneously is that there is a useful tension between them as each of them considers the same question from a different angle in terms of the systemic risks, the risks to the solvency of individual banks, and in terms of activity on individual markets. So the political and economic context should be considered elsewhere beyond those regulatory bodies.

It is remarkable that we are witnessing what some commentators would call a downgrading of micro- prudential regulation UK at a time when financial institutions such as the Co-operative Bank and the Britannia, as I have just mentioned, face such serious solvency problems. The PRA was created for exactly that sort of situation. I therefore want to spend time on the arguments raised in relation to that change.

It has been stated that the PRA is being put on the same footing as other activities and that it is being taken back in-house. Taking the PRA back in-house is an odd idea. The PRA is currently a subsidiary of the Bank of England, so it is already in-house. A subsidiary is something that is owned by a parent company; the PRA was already a part of the Bank of England and in any event was answerable, through a statutory scheme, to the Governor.

Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

Richard Burgon Excerpts

Tuesday 9th February 2016 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Copies of any written evidence that the Committee receives will be sent to Members and made available in the Committee room and online.

We will now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room. It shows how the selected amendments have been grouped together for debate. Amendments grouped together are generally on the same or similar issues. A Member who has put their name to the leading amendment in a group is called first. Other Members are then free to catch my eye to speak on all or any of the amendments within that group. A Member may speak more than once in a single debate.

Please note that decisions on amendments take place not in the order in which they are debated, but the order in which they appear on the amendment paper. In other words, debate occurs according to the selection and grouping list, and decisions are taken when we come to the clause that the amendment affects. I hope that that explanation is helpful. I will use my discretion to decide whether to allow a separate stand part debate on individual clauses and schedules following the debates on the relevant amendments.

Clause 1

Membership of court of directors

[Richard Burgon (Leeds East) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 9, in clause 1, page 1, line 7, at end insert—

“(2A) In section 1(2)(e), at end insert “who shall include four designated representatives including—

(i) Practitioner Representative,

(ii) Smaller Business Practitioner Representative,

(iii) Markets Practitioner Representative and

(iv) Consumer Representative.”

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 2—Composition of the Court of Directors of the Bank of England—

“In making nominations to the Court of Directors of the Bank of England, the Chancellor of the Exchequer must have regard to the importance of ensuring a balanced representation from the nations and regions of the United Kingdom.””

New clause 5—Publication of transcripts of meetings of the Court—

“In paragraph 12A of Schedule 1 to the Bank of England Act 1998, replace the word “record” with the word “transcript” in each place where it occurs.””

Clause stand part.

[Richard Burgon]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Wilson, and to serve opposite the Minister.

On part 1 of the Bill, which is on the Bank of England, it is our intention to make the case for increased transparency and increased accountability at the Bank. At a time when the financial services sector, as the political system does, faces a lack of public support and public trust—or rather, not as much as we would like—it is in the interests of the sector as a whole and the Bank of England itself for it to present itself and its decisions in the most open way possible.

Clause 1 relates to membership of the court of directors. Amendment 9 regards representation on that court. We accept the proposals in the clause regarding membership of the court, but I note that concern was expressed in Committee in the House of Lords about a potential reduction in the number of non-executive directors in the court. Will the Minister clarify the number of non-executive directors that the Government foresee sitting in the court? In the light of amendment 9, which is in my name, and new clause 2, tabled by Scottish National party Members, the Government should make use of the option of nine non-executive directors in the legislation to ensure the widest possible representation and fullest possible input into and scrutiny of the Bank’s work through the court.

Through amendment 9, we seek to amend the Bank of England Act 1998 to insert a requirement that, of the nine non-executive directors, four be designated as representatives of specific practitioner sectors, including a consumer representative. We recognise that the court, as it stands, includes representatives of a variety of backgrounds, including, historically, the trade union movement. We welcome that and believe that that tradition and representation should continue.

To improve that representation, we propose drawing on the practice at the Financial Conduct Authority and the categorisation of its statutory panels to ensure that a practitioner representative for larger firms, a smaller business practitioner representative for smaller firms, a markets practitioner representative and a consumer representative are included. That is all I have to say directly in relation to amendment 9.

We believe that providing transcripts of the court’s proceedings, such as Hansard provides of our own discussions in Parliament, allows for rich scrutiny of lines of argument and is a clear way to increase transparency and public awareness. In the United States of America, it is the practice to broadcast meetings of the chairs of the various Federal Reserve banks. In the new clause, Members have not asked the Bank to go that far, but we believe that that is a positive example. The aim is to enable the public to understand what is going on and to allow greater scrutiny of the Bank of England’s valuable work.

[George Kerevan (East Lothian) (SNP)]

I want to speak to new clause 2, which is a probing amendment. My response will be determined by the Minister’s response. We are asking that, when making nominations to the Bank’s court of directors, the Chancellor should have due regard to the importance of ensuring balanced representation from the UK’s regions.

Overall, the Bill is useful in tightening regulation and in refocusing the organisation and direction of the Bank of England. In particular, there is much merit in tidying up the operation of the Bank’s three main committees overseeing micro and macroprudential activity and the operation of the Monetary Policy Committee and, if that is accepted, in ensuring that the Bank’s court becomes essentially the organiser of the organisation, with responsibility, as the main oversight, for how the Bank’s operation works and for ensuring that there is managerial competence and value for money and that resources are well deployed between the Bank’s various functions.

It has been generally recognised over the years that the court has sometimes had an ambiguous position halfway between being a proper corporate board and a policy-making institution. The Bill, correctly, separates the policy functions that go to the committees, leaving the board with the essential corporate governance. That is a step forward. My point is that, if we do that —if we redefine and concentrate the board’s activity—we must look at the composition of the board and ensure that it is fit for purpose—a new board for a new competence.

The composition of the current board is a little too narrow. I accept that it has moved beyond the days when the court consisted simply of City grandees. In recent years, appointment to the board has widened; the international influence has widened. It includes a South African and an American. There is some industrial representation, but by and large there is still a feeling in the wider financial community outside London and in the wider industrial and commercial communities outside London that it is too City focused. For a board that is about not simply managing the City, but managing the central bank, it would be in the interests of the central bank and of commanding the respect of the central bank if there were a wider remit in relation to appointments to the board.

In the new clause, I am trying not to be too specific. A board should not be federalised; it should not consist of delegates. A board has overall responsibility. I presume that most people around this table have been on the boards of companies, large and small. I have been on at least two dozen boards in my rather geekish lifetime. When boards have discussions about who should be on them, they say, “Well, what experience do we have? Who is not represented? What area of competence do we need that will help the board to function?” That is perfectly proper.

I am just saying that, given the key role that the Bank of England plays in the UK, there should be more representation of the regions and nations of the UK. That is particularly the case because the banking community is no longer concentrated simply in the City of London. There are operations in Manchester, Bristol, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Cardiff and beyond, and the industries and sectors there want to feel some confidence that the Bank of England listens to them.

I know of course that the Bank of England has long had a system of agents. I suppose that many of us around the table will have met the agents in our region over the years. However, the agents have a different function. We are talking about a new board for a single bank.

Let me say—I hope that the Government will respect this—that the principle has already been conceded in one respect, which has been referred to. It has been traditional since the post-war period for the Bank to have a representative of the labour movement, the trade union movement, on the grounds that labour and capital were the two great elements of the economy. Given that that principle has already been conceded, all we are talking about is extending it.

My final point is that the distinguished Governor of the Bank of England, Mr Carney, of course comes from Canada, where the principle is already accepted. There is a rule that, in composing the board of the Bank of Canada, due consideration should be given to the provinces being represented. There is not a rule that every province has to be represented on the board of the Bank of Canada; it is not as specific as that and nor should it be. However, if we look at the board of the Bank of Canada, we see that, strangely enough, all the provinces are represented. Mr Carney is perfectly comfortable with that, so we are not trying to impose a burden that he has not had to face in the past.

[Richard Burgon]

I will comment on new clause 2, in the name of the hon. Member for East Lothian. As I said, we see merit in the proposal for wider geographical representation on the board and we believe that it complements our proposals to ensure that different stakeholders are represented. We would be interested to hear a little more detail if possible. He spoke about different centres of employment—Birmingham is one example—but I would be interested to hear specific comments on whether this proposal relates to personal residency or employment and, crucially, does the SNP believe that devolved bodies should make recommendations to the Chancellor?

To clarify, our new clause 5, on the publication of transcripts of meetings of the court, is a small tidying amendment, but we hope that it would have a significant impact by opening up the discussions of the court to wider scrutiny and that it would ensure increased transparency and accountability. That is why I will seek a Division on new clause 5 and why I invite all hon. Members to consider voting for it.

[John Mann (Bassetlaw) (Lab)]

It is an honour and a privilege to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Wilson. The issue of the court and its lack of transparency— the amendments attempt to bring in some transparency—is one that has bypassed the majority of commentators and the general public. Hidden in the rather grand depths of the Bank of England, the court holds significant potential power, yet it has become embodied by not a concept of nepotism within the financial sector, but something akin to that. Perhaps “revolving door” is a better term. Someone goes in one door, they fail and go out of another door, and then they turn up in the same industry and at the same heights, time and again.

The criteria for who is on the board have always been shrouded in some secrecy. The hon. Member for East Lothian raised the question of the representation of the labour movement. That is a good and interesting point to examine in this context, because it remains the case today that Mr Prentis of Unison is on the court, as was Mr Brendan Barber of the TUC before him. I believe that Mr Bill Morris was on the court before that, and Mr Gavin Laird was too, in the distant past. Indeed, I used to see the papers that Mr Laird received at the time and the contributions he made. If they had been listened to at the time it would have had a significant impact on British competitiveness. Mr Laird used to argue repeatedly, very eloquently and in beautifully scripted speeches, that we were in danger of overemphasising the importance of finance at the expense of manufacturing. That is an issue not only for the Government, but for the Bank of England itself. Industry, as opposed to finance, needs to be in at the Bank. That is a fundamental weakness, because at present it is financiers as opposed to industrialists who are evident at the Bank, not so much in the expertise but in the mindset and the thinking which lead to decision making. The Bank thinks as financiers do, and it does not think more widely.

In the same way, my hon. Friends on the Front Bench propose to broaden the court with consumer champions and others who are missing at the moment. The Chancellor is decisively, deliberately and calculatedly removing consumerism and the consumer interest from regulation. Why? Because that is seen as a barrier to the ever onward growth and recovery of the big banks, not least RBS and Lloyds. Some commentators are speculating that there might be a fuel tax increase. That is quite wrong, in my view. What the Chancellor wishes to do is maximise his returns on the sale of shares in RBS and Lloyds. In itself, that is very sensible, and it is something that the Bank of England would support, does support and will support. However, speed and timing are critical in all of this. We have the Bank of England being unduly influenced by the Chancellor and the Treasury, while at the same time it is losing external influences from the world of industry. That includes both the employer and, potentially, the trade union influence.

There is the intriguing possibility of a more regional Bank. What would the world come to if there were people in the Bank of England who did not live in London or, more likely, in the commuter belt outside London? How would the world survive? It is a shame that my hon. Friends did not go even further and suggest that the court ought to meet not in the hallowed chambers on the third or fourth floor of the Bank, but in Manchester, Birmingham, Cardiff, Edinburgh, Aberdeen or Sheffield, in order that the public can see and hear it and get a feel for it. That would be an easy, significant win, and I am sure that the Bank’s representatives listening in will take note of that. I commend the amendments to the Committee; they are excellent and should be agreed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Harriett Baldwin]

Nothing in my remarks this morning has suggested any change whatsoever in that policy, but it is important that the best people are selected for the roles and we do not accept the Opposition amendments, which would further constrain the selection process. I hope we can all agree that every member of the court, wherever they are from, should consider in their decision making the Bank’s impact on everyone in the UK, across the UK, not just in one region or one individual sector.

The amendments call for a different kind of court, made up of representatives from UK regions and representatives of narrow interests, and that would result in a court riven by conflicts of interest. We have tried that kind of court before and we know how the story ends. I hope that members of the Committee agree that we should not allow the amendment to take us back there.

[Richard Burgon]

We will not seek to divide the Committee on the amendment, but we might, of course, revisit the matter on Report.

On new clause 5, we have heard powerful interventions from the hon. Member for East Lothian, and insightful ones from my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw, who speaks, on this and other matters, not only with great experience because of his role on the Treasury Committee but with great common sense about transparency and representation. I am disappointed, therefore, by the Minister’s lack of support for the new clause. She says that she supports transparency but, with respect, I do not believe that she has offered greater transparency in this regard, not even with the compromise of an above-the-line and below-the-line model for transcripts, which is used by local authorities and school governor boards. On that basis. I will wish to press the new clause to a Division and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[The Chair]

I remind colleagues that votes on new clauses will be taken at the end of the Bill proceedings.

Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2

Term of office of non-executive directors

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Harriett Baldwin]

I am glad that you are finding it as confusing as I am, Mr Wilson, that there is a group 2 and a clause 2 and what have you. Clause 2 enables the Government to extend the appointment of a non-executive director. The standard length of appointment for a non-executive director is currently four years, and this will be maintained following the passage of the Bill. However, if necessary, the Government will have the power to extend the appointment by up to six months. If the individual is subsequently reappointed to the court, the length of their new tenure will be reduced by the length of the extension.

The ability to extend a non-executive director’s appointment provides a number of key benefits. First, the ability to extend the terms of appointments by a few months enables the end dates of non-executives to be staggered, which supports smooth transitions in membership, preventing a significant change in personnel at any one time. Secondly, should a member of the court resign or retire unexpectedly, extending the term of one or more non-executive directors can provide resilience during a potentially turbulent time. Finally, enabling this extension will bring the court in line with the FPC and the MPC, whose members can already have their term extended by up to six months.

[Richard Burgon]

I will be brief, because the Opposition are happy with the proposal to provide for the extension of the term of office of non-executive directors. However, we feel that this is an opportunity to highlight again the important role that non-executive directors can and should play, a point made effectively by my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw in the debate on clause 1. There was a clear suggestion in the other place that the Government believe that a smaller body of non-executive directors on the court would be more efficient, and the Minister has made that clear again. I take this opportunity to reiterate the point that it is necessary to ensure broad representation and the appointment of active and dedicated members. As my hon. Friend has indicated, the world would not come to a stop if there was broader representation, both geographically and in terms of life experience.

[John Mann]

I warmly welcome—warmly—this clause, as I do the Minister’s confirmation to the hon. Member for East Lothian that the Government have no intention of removing the trade union representative from the court. I warmly welcome that. It is an exceedingly sensible approach that will resonate well beyond this place. This clause should be unanimously adopted.

[Harriett Baldwin]

Excuse me if I faint from astonishment, Mr Wilson. I do not think that that has ever happened to me before with the hon. Member for Bassetlaw.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3

Abolition of Oversight Committee

[Richard Burgon]

I beg to move amendment 10, in clause 3, page 4, line 5, after “would” insert “materially”.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 11, in clause 3, page 4, line 7, leave out “may” and insert “shall”.

Amendment 12, in clause 3, page 4, line 11, after “directors” insert—

“and

(c) for the review to be conducted by a person who is not an employee or director of the Bank.”

[Richard Burgon]

The abolition in clause 3 of the oversight committee was clearly a very controversial part of the original Bill, as evidenced at each stage of the debate in the House of Lords. My colleague in the other place, Lord Tunnicliffe, supported Lord Sharkey in seeking to challenge it. Labour Members believe that the abolition of the oversight committee is an attack on accountability within the Bank, and yet another example of the Government rolling back recent legislation. I am sure that we will come to that topic on another day.

Not only is the reverse burden of proof or the presumption of responsibility being removed before it is even implemented, but the oversight committee was established only in the Financial Services Act 2012, as hon. Members will remember. The Government clearly felt unable to sustain their line of argument, and in amending the clause to allow a majority of non-executive directors the power to initiate reviews, they have made a welcome concession. It remains our view that the abolition of the committee is a retrograde step. We are yet to be convinced that affording the non-executive directors this power without the existence of the previous forum for discussion will mean that power can be exercised effectively. Perhaps the Government can say how they believe the non-executive members will discuss their concerns outside of the meetings of the court. Will they have to organise something akin to a stand-alone non-executive directors meeting? Perhaps such a forum exists, and the Minister can inform and enlighten me about it.

Following the negotiations in the other place, we have decided to allow this change in the Bill to be made. We will keep a watching brief on how it works over the coming months and we will seek to take advice from the non-executive directors on how they feel it has affected their ability to carry out their oversight functions.

We have proposed a number of amendments to improve the clause, particularly amendment 12, which seeks to increase the authority of the non-executive directors. On Report in the Lords, the Government stated that the initiators of a review among the non-executive directors would determine that they have the power to decide who should carry it out. It could be someone external or someone internal, from the independent evaluation office.

During a Treasury Committee hearing, the Governor was questioned at length, and told the Chair of the Committee that the IEO’s work is set by the court. Therefore, our amendment seeks to give the non-executive directors a duty to bring in external expertise and analysis to conduct such a review into the work of the Bank. Amendments 10 and 11 would further clarify and strengthen the Bill in that regard.

[George Kerevan]

I, too, had reservations about the abolition of the oversight committee. I warm to it to the extent that we have clarified, or are in the process of clarifying, the role of the court in a narrower sense as a proper functioning board of a wider organisation, although the Minister’s responses in the previous debate have given me some cause for concern.

It is important to grasp that the existing oversight committee is nothing more than the non-executive directors meeting as a body, so the existing oversight body gives some official grounds for the non-executives to meet. I have been on many boards where it was quite the norm for non-executives to meet informally, and one trusts that the non-executives on the court are of sufficient experience to be able to do that. Nevertheless, there must be a worry if the current ability to meet separately and to be resourced as the oversight committee is taken away. Therefore, the amendments being proposed to the clause are a useful way of just stressing on the part of Parliament that what I have described is what we expect the non-executives to do.

It might be important to consider circumstances where the non-executives might want to discuss the overall direction of the Bank. We have had one such experience in the last couple of years. The major activity of the Prudential Regulation Authority, which is soon to be the Prudential Regulation Committee, has been to conduct the stress tests on the banks. It does so under separate legal obligations from Europe. The stress testing is a highly extensive and highly resource-driven activity, and there were issues in the first round of stress testing because resources were clearly being directed from other parts of the Bank to help the PRA to do its job. There were issues about who was making decisions, and about whether enough resources and staff time were being made available from the other parts of the Bank to the PRA. A number of the non-executive directors became slightly alarmed about how the stress tests would be conducted and about the availability of the necessary resources.

There can be quite significant points when the non-executive directors would have to say, “We are worried about the deployment of resources by the executive directors. We want to stand back and look at how this is being done.” The non-execs must have the power as a body to lean against the significant influence of the executive. The Bank of England is one of the major institutions of the UK and of global banking, and the Governor of the Bank, Mr Carney, for whom I have a great deal of respect, is one of the most senior central bankers in the entire world. Leaning against him when he says, “Do this or do that,” is difficult. The amendments would give the non-executives some backbone, so when they are worried about the direction of resources they can say, “Whoa.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Harriett Baldwin]

The line-by-line consideration of this provision in the other place and here this morning has been extremely helpful. Before I speak to the amendments, let me give the Committee an example of the problems in the oversight committee’s current arrangements which I think will inform our debate. The hon. Member for Bassetlaw mentioned the 2013-14 foreign exchange market investigation, which sought to establish whether any Bank officials were involved in or aware of the FX market manipulation. In October 2013, the Bank’s governors initiated an extensive internal review, and they regularly briefed the court at its meetings from November 2013 onwards. In March 2014, it became clear that an independent investigation would be appropriate. The oversight committee took over the investigation and appointed Lord Grabiner QC. That is a very good example of the oversight functions. In practice, the executive needed to join the oversight committee discussions for the oversight functions to work and be effective, both as the investigation progressed and once attention turned to delivering the recommendations. It would be better practice to make the oversight functions the responsibility of the whole court. That is the purpose of the clause.

I welcome the opportunity to speak to the amendments and to explain the improvement in the oversight arrangements at the Bank of England and the power we have ensured for the court’s non-executive majority. The Bill brings the court closer to the model envisaged by the Treasury Committee, which called for a board with powers to conduct ex-post reviews of the performance of the Bank; for board members to be authorised to see all the papers submitted to the Monetary Policy Committee and the Financial Policy Committee; and for the board to be responsible for reviewing the processes of the Bank’s policy committees. Making the oversight functions the responsibility of the whole court makes it clear that every member of the court, executive and non-executive, can be held to account for the use of these functions. No member of court can claim that the oversight functions were not their job, since they will now rightly be the responsibility of all.

That replaces the current arrangement in which there is effectively an oversight committee overseeing the work of an oversight board. That is neither efficient, nor best practice. In fact, on Second Reading my right hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie), Chair of the Treasury Committee, put it well when he said:

“The oversight of the executive will be the responsibility of the court itself, rather than a sub-committee. Even though it was not called a sub-committee, it was, in fact, a sub-committee, and a weaker committee than the court.”—[Official Report, 1 February 2016; Vol. 605, c. 668.]

During the Bill’s passage through the House of Lords, we introduced the power, which has been welcomed by members of that House, that this amendment seeks to alter. This part of the Bill ensures that a majority of non-executives can always initiate performance reviews without needing to secure the agreement of a majority of the whole court. If just four non-executive directors want a review, they will be able to initiate it. Under our proposal to give more powers to the non-executive directors to do their job effectively, the initiators of a review would determine who should carry it out. This could be someone external or someone internal, including the Bank’s relatively new Independent Evaluation Office. The amendment would take away their discretion and make the new Independent Evaluation Office irrelevant.

The Bank’s Independent Evaluation Office reports directly to the non-executive chair of court. A few months ago, it published a review into the Bank’s use of forecasting—a clear example of where an internal review is appropriate. In our opinion, Lord Grabiner’s inquiry into Bank officials’ awareness of market manipulation in the foreign exchange market was an example of where an external review was appropriate.

The Bank’s non-executive directors, as we have heard in a previous debate, are selected for their ability to bring new perspectives and experience and to challenge and scrutinise the Bank’s executive. It is right to give them the powers to ensure they are able to fulfil this role. The amendment would send a message that we do not trust the non-executive directors to do their job. For the discretion of those high-quality non-executives to determine what reviews should be carried out and who should carry them out, it would substitute a conveyor belt of external reviews.

Those commissioning a review, whether the court as a whole or the non-executive directors, are best placed to decide whether an internal or external review is most appropriate. The Bill rightly allows that discretion for the whole court and for the non-executives. The amendment would take away that choice, which we think would be bad news for effective oversight. I hope the hon. Member for Leeds East has listened to the arguments. We all agree that the important power in the Bill for the non-executives to act independently to initiate reviews of the banks should not be constrained in this way, and I hope that after due consideration, and after the extremely valuable debate in both Houses, he will withdraw his amendment.

[Richard Burgon]

We do not intend to divide the Committee on the amendments to clause 3, although I will make one observation. I might get the quote wrong, but I remember a line in Shakespeare’s “Julius Caesar”:

“I come to bury Caesar, not to praise him.”

The oversight committee was praised by the Minister, but now, under clause 3, it is to be buried. It was praised by the Minister in response to an intervention by my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw, and now we see that it is about to be buried, which we regret. We welcome the concessions that have been made. We do not wish to press the amendment, but we reserve the right to return to these issues on Report. I also point out that the Internal Evaluation Office can continue, tasked by the court. The amendment refers to decisions by non-executive directors. Internal evaluation is the Bank marking its own homework, which should worry us all. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Harriett Baldwin]

The clause gives the oversight functions previously delegated to the oversight committee, which has been a sub-committee of the court, to the full court. What do we gain by making the oversight functions the responsibility of the whole court? We want to keep those functions, which we all agree are important, and now every member of the court, executive and non-executive, can be held to account for the use of those functions. Should something go wrong, no member of court could ever claim that the oversight functions were not part of their job. They will now rightly be everyone’s responsibility.

We have heard how that arrangement was endorsed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chichester on Second Reading, but it is worth harking back to what the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards recommended when it set up the oversight committee. In its report, the commission endorsed the Treasury Committee’s recommendation that the Bank’s board should be responsible for conducting the ex-post reviews of the Bank’s performance and we believe that that is precisely what the Bill will achieve. The commission went further—I am sure that hon. Members will have read its report before arriving this morning. On page 482, the commission rejected the oversight committee created in the 2012 Act. The commission denounced the committee and despaired that

“It, rather than the Court as a whole, will be responsible for monitoring the Bank’s response to, and implementation of, the recommendations of any review it commissions.”

It is therefore important to stress that, through the Bill, the court as a whole will be made responsible for ensuring oversight of the Bank.

We have also talked about how the clause will enable full and frank discussion involving both the executive and the non-executive majority on how best to exercise the court’s oversight functions. The non-executives bring challenge, scrutiny and outside experience while the executive minority provides the in-depth knowledge of the Bank’s operations. By abolishing the oversight committee, we bring the court closer to the model envisaged by the Treasury Committee, which called for: a board with powers to conduct ex-post reviews of the Bank’s performance; board members to be authorised to see all the papers submitted to the MPC and the FPC; and the board to be responsible for reviewing the processes of the Bank’s policy committees.

It is important to emphasise that the Bill protects the ability of those non-executive directors to initiate performance reviews. We do not need them to secure the agreement of a majority of the whole court. Should a majority of non-executives wish to initiate a review, the rest of the court will not be able to block it. The initiators of such a review would determine who should carry it out. It should be someone external or internal, including the Bank’s new Independent Evaluation Office.

The clause safeguards the non-executives’ oversight of the Bank and provides additional protection against the emergence of groupthink. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4

Functions of non-executive directors

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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[Harriett Baldwin]

I can canter right through the clause, which requires the court to establish a sub-committee of at least three non-executives to determine the remuneration of the Governor and deputy governors. Clearly, we would not want the executive to set its own pay, so to require that that power be delegated to at least three non-executives brings the legislative requirements for the Bank’s remuneration committee in line with UK corporate governance code. The current remuneration committee has four members.

[Richard Burgon]

I too will be brief. I will not be cantering as I know very little about horses, but as we have already discussed non-executive directors in the debate on our amendment to clause 1, I have nothing further to add.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5

Financial stability strategy

--- Later in debate ---

[Harriett Baldwin]

This will be more of a trot—[Interruption.] There are no Trots opposite me today, obviously.

Clause 5 will provide the court of directors with an express power to delegate the production of the financial stability strategy within the Bank. Subsection (3) makes it clear that the court retains the ultimate responsibility for any delegated duty or power, including its duties in relation to the financial stability strategy. The clause will allow the Bank to utilise its internal expertise to produce the strategy, while maintaining a clear line of accountability to the court. The drafting reflects the discussion in the other place, where it was felt that the Government’s initial proposal lacked sufficient clarity. Those concerns were addressed by the Government amendments that bring us the clause as it stands today. I hope that the Committee agrees that the clause will afford the Bank the necessary flexibility when producing the strategy while ensuring that the court will be held to account for its contents. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Richard Burgon]

In the debates on the clause both on Second Reading and in Committee in the Lords, it was argued that it should not simply confer on the Bank the power to set the financial stability strategy. The original proposal was vague, but although it was subsequently clarified by the Government amendment that conferred the power on the court of directors, the Opposition are not convinced that that is sufficient.

The impact assessment says:

“At present, the Bank’s financial stability strategy is set by the Court after consultation with the FPC…and HMT.”

It goes on to say that making the Bank responsible for setting the strategy and allowing the court to delegate its production within the Bank will ensure that the court is responsible for the running of the Bank and the Bank’s policy committees are responsible for making policy. The clause does not make it clear exactly what the financial stability strategy is supposed to be. All it does is create a power and impose the responsibility to create such a strategy relating to systemic risk in the UK financial system.

I shall repeat a concern raised by my colleague Lord Tunnicliffe regarding the financial stability strategy, because the response in the other place was not sufficient. Lord Tunnicliffe highlighted how a five-page strategy document was produced in 2013; it was then revised and published in the 2014-15 report, wherein it had been reduced to one column. In the Bank’s 2015-16 report, there was no mention of a financial stability strategy in the court’s ownership. Will the Minister confirm the importance of the financial stability strategy? It should be clear who is responsible for such a strategy.

Clause 5 creates a problem. A future financial stability strategy will emerge from somewhere within the Bank of England. It would be preferable if the people who are to be directly responsible for its production were identified in the Bill, rather than responsibility being conferred on the court with powers to delegate elsewhere. It would make most sense if the people made responsible for producing the strategy were the members of the Financial Policy Committee, as we have set out in new clause 6, which we will discuss later.

[John Mann]

The debate on the clause is very important, because the little-discussed danger is that we are creating an all-powerful Governor who determines, in his or her ultimate wisdom, a financial stability strategy for the country—as if everything will then be fine.

The current Governor obviously has a bit more time on his hands because interest rates have not risen since 2009. The MPC, with its monthly meetings having gone down to eight a year, has not had a great deal to do other than maintain the status quo. In some ways, that is precisely the problem that was there previously. Before the 2008 crisis the Governor was responsive—looking at things, making speeches about what had happened in the past month or two and trying to tweak the system—and examination of the underlying problems in the system, in the sector and on occasion in the economy as well simply did not happen. The danger is that we again become complacent about such things. That is precisely why the Treasury Committee was keen to see an enhanced and powerful court of directors taking responsibility. It would be useful to have a clear statement from the Minister, endorsed by Parliament, that the model being created is not that of the all-powerful Governor, and nor is it one that we expect to see in future.

The Treasury Committee is a wonderful body, with great membership over the years and reasonable membership even to this day, but a clear message about what is expected of it by Parliament would be valuable: the Committee, on behalf of Parliament, is expected to hold the court to account properly and effectively. That has not been the case over the past decade. The chair of court has appeared, but the non-execs have been invisible. With the court having a more important role, it is critical that the Treasury Committee be given a clear indication by Parliament that it is expected to give a reasonable amount of its time to holding the court to account publicly for the new powers, whether the Committee likes it or not, or does it joyously or reluctantly.

It will be useful to hear from the Minister about those two points, so that we get her views on the record.

--- Later in debate ---

Proposed new subsection (7B) would require the Financial Policy Committee to publish a record of its discussion within six weeks of each policy meeting. I am sure the hon. Members for Leeds East and for Wolverhampton South West will be reassured to hear that, under the Bank of England Act 1998, there is already a requirement in section 9U for the FPC to publish a record of its policy meetings within six weeks of them taking place. I hope I have convinced the Committee that clause 6 should stand part of the Bill and that new clause 6 is unnecessary. I hope the hon. Member for Leeds East will not press the new clause.

[Richard Burgon]

As the Minister explained, the Financial Policy Committee is to be transformed into a committee of the Bank of England. As she explained, it had existed previously as a sub-committee of the court. Again, we see what one commentator, Professor Alastair Hudson, described as a spaghetti of committees. Perhaps we need to look at simplifying them so that the people we represent can understand better the system that is intended to serve them.

The FPC should be a body that takes a much more visible role when there are systemic challenges to the UK financial system. The problem that is created by the so-called spaghetti of committees issue is that it is unclear when and if it will relate to finance as opposed to economic policy more generally, and when it will relate to systemic risk rather than simply to the solvency risk associated with an individual financial institution. The spaghetti of committees issue means that the individual bodies have to fight for their role within the regulatory structure, instead of having their regulatory role clearly established by statute.

We believe that considerable thought should be given to how the FPC could play a more active role in the creation of policy relating to systemic risk. At one level, the body that is supposed to analyse the highest levels of risk to the UK economy ought to be one that regularly takes the lead in relation to policy formulation in that context. The Minister explained and reiterated quite rightly how many external views are published, but it would be helpful for the economy as a whole if the views of the members of the FPC were given greater publicity.

Our intention in proposing new clause 6 is to propose requirements on the FPC to regularly publish external research into the level of systemic risk to the stability of the financial system in the UK. I note the points that the Minister has made on that. Furthermore, as we seek greater transparency, we have again sought publication of a record of the meetings of the Financial Policy Committee within a reasonable timeframe. I am delighted that the Minister has clarified that that is indeed the case, and that that takes place within six weeks. I am reassured by much of what she has said regarding the provisions of section 9W of the 1998 Act on research and surveys and the provisions of section 9U on the publication of that research. Given that, and given the comments made by the Minister, we will not press new clause 6.

Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)

Richard Burgon Excerpts

Tuesday 9th February 2016 Public Bill Committees

[The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Harriett Baldwin)]

The clause is the last one to do with the governance of the Bank of England; the others we covered this morning.

The clause amends the existing statutory requirement to publish the Monetary Policy Committee minutes within six weeks of the occurrence of the meeting so that they will be published as soon as is reasonably practicable. That, too, was a recommendation of the Warsh review, which set out that it would improve “effective communication” of the MPC’s policy judgment and stated:

“Publishing the details of the vote contemporaneously would bolster individual members’ independence and accountability.”

The MPC accepted the recommendation and since last August has published the minutes of its policy meeting at the same time as its policy decision. The clause simply formalises that arrangement, enhancing the transparency and accountability of MPC practices.

The clause also reduces the number of times that the Monetary Policy Committee is required to meet each year, changing the requirement to meet at least once a month to a requirement to meet at least eight times in each calendar year and at least once in every 10-week period. That, too, is implementing a recommendation of the Warsh review, which concluded that the change would bring the Bank’s practice into line with that of

“other leading advanced-economy central banks”

and support effective policy making.

The clause also amends the quorum rules in line with the changes to the MPC membership that I set out in my remarks on clause 7. Finally, clause 8 formalises processes and strengthens procedures on conflicts of interest for the MPC that are already delivered in practice.

[Richard Burgon (Leeds East) (Lab)]

Clearly, the decisions of the MPC are important for the financial markets. In essence, those markets may react immediately upon seeing the detailed minutes of the MPC meetings. A system in which all discussion between committee members was made public would be the ideal, because financial markets and, importantly, the general public would then understand the discussions being held behind closed doors. Running as a distant second to that is the less desirable policy of simply producing minutes of the meeting. The minutes, however, record only a general sense of the participants’ contributions. However, we have tabled no amendments to the clauses on the Monetary Policy Committee while the former committee member David Blanchflower conducts a review commissioned by the shadow Chancellor. We look forward to returning to debate the MPC in another forum at a future date, when we will be pursuing our amendments on the measure.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9

Audit

[Richard Burgon]

I beg to move amendment 14, in clause 9, page 7, line 15, at end insert—

“(6A) The Comptroller may enquire into the Bank’s success in achieving its stated policy objectives but shall not enquire into the desirability of such objectives having been set.

(6B) Reports by the Comptroller into the functioning of the Bank shall be published promptly unless in the opinion of the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons such publication would be likely materially adversely to affect the stability or functioning of the UK’s financial or banking system.”

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 21, in clause 11, page 11, line 30, at beginning insert—

“Subject to sections 7E(3) and 7ZA(6A) of the Bank of England Act 1998,”

I remind the Committee that if amendment 14 is withdrawn or negatived, amendment 21 falls.

[Richard Burgon]

Here we turn to the role of the National Audit Office and the new proposals to afford the NAO power to investigate the functions of the Bank. This is a positive development, which we welcome, but it is important to get the legislation right and to ensure that no loopholes are left to prevent the NAO from conducting its necessary work.

The Comptroller and Auditor General was clearly concerned about the proposals in the Bill as published that would have allowed the court of directors a veto over the new powers for the NAO. There was significant discussion, however, at the Treasury Committee and at all stages in the other place. At the Treasury Committee Andrew Bailey said that the issue was to do with

“getting the boundary right between what is appropriate, in my view, which is value for money in terms of the way we run the Bank of England, and questioning the basis of monetary policy, which would not be in my view appropriate.”

Our amendment fits in with that, though I expect that the Government will disagree with us.

The draft memorandum of understanding that the Minister provided the other day stated that the comptroller does not expect to second-guess expert discussions by Bank officials. The amendment asserts that the comptroller may inquire into the Bank’s success in achieving its policy objectives. We believe that that does not encroach beyond the boundaries of questioning the merits of policy decisions, but would assist the National Audit Office in ascertaining whether the Bank is delivering value for money. Amendment 21, which is consequential on amendment 14, would require that reports by the comptroller into the functioning of the Bank be published promptly to allow relevant Select Committees, should they wish, as well as other Members of the House, to make an assessment of the National Audit Office’s findings.

[Harriett Baldwin]

We are moving on to the part of the Bill that covers the role of the National Audit Office and the publication of its reports. One of the Bill’s objectives is to enhance the Bank of England’s accountability and clauses 9 to 11, which allow the National Audit Office to conduct value-for-money examinations of the Bank for the first time, are key in that respect.

The independence of the Bank and of the National Audit Office, which are two vital public bodies, was carefully considered in developing the arrangements, and I believe that the clauses in the Bill strike the appropriate balance. It is probably best if I first set out some background on the important role of the National Audit Office’s value-for-money studies in supporting transparency to Parliament and the public.

The National Audit Office scrutinises public spending on behalf of Parliament. It reviews whether public bodies have used public money efficiently, effectively and with economy and makes reports on those issues to Parliament. In carrying out its work, the NAO is precluded by the National Audit Act 1983 from reviewing the merits of policy objectives. That is the case in relation to all the bodies with which it currently engages and the Bill ensures that the same restriction will apply in relation to its oversight of the Bank.

That is an important point in relation to amendment 14, which I believe is unnecessary. The amendment states that

“The Comptroller may enquire into the Bank’s success in achieving its stated policy objectives but shall not enquire into the desirability of such objectives having been set.”

The Bill as drafted will have that exact effect. The comptroller will be free to question the Bank’s success in achieving its policy objectives, but not the merits of the objectives. The Bill reinforces that by setting out specific areas in which the NAO cannot question the merits of the Bank’s policy decisions. That extra protection, which has been agreed to by both the Comptroller and Auditor General and the Governor, reflects the crucial importance of protecting the independence of the Bank’s policy decisions.

In all of those areas, the Bill will allow the NAO to examine the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation of policy decisions and of the resources underpinning them, but not the merits of the decisions themselves. Specifically, the Bill carves out the merits of policy decisions taken by the Monetary Policy Committee, the Financial Policy Committee and the Prudential Regulation Committee, the merits of policy decisions taken by the body within the Bank responsible for the supervision of financial market infrastructures and the merits of policy decisions taken by the body within the Bank responsible for the exercise of its resolution functions, but where the Bank has used its statutory resolution powers in relation to a financial institution in difficulty, the NAO would be able to consider any resolution policy decisions relating to the institution concerned. That is particularly important given that the Bank is now the resolution authority for the UK and has primary operational responsibility for financial crisis management. In future, therefore, the NAO will be able to examine the role of the Bank in interventions like Northern Rock—it is a shame that the hon. Member for Bassetlaw is not in his place to hear that exciting news. That bespoke arrangement recognises the unique and crucial role that the Bank plays in UK economic policy. I believe that it strikes the right balance and will bring about a significant improvement in the Bank’s accountability.

The second part of amendment 14 would require the comptroller to publish reports promptly, unless the Treasury Committee judges that publication was likely to have a material adverse effect on financial stability. Again, I submit that that is unnecessary. Adequate protections are already built into the legislation to prevent the disclosure of certain types of sensitive information. Proposed new section 7H of the Bank of England Act 1998, inserted by clause 11, will ensure that the comptroller is subject to the same limitations on disclosure as the FCA in relation to information received by the Bank. Those limitations are set out in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and will restrict the NAO from disclosing information held by the Bank for the purposes of monetary policy; financial operations intended to support financial institutions for purposes of financial stability; and the provision of private banking services.

Furthermore, the subject of sensitive information is covered by the memorandum of understanding between the NAO and the Bank, which ensures that there is a codified agreement between them on how sensitive information should be treated. It makes it clear that there may be instances in which the Bank is prohibited from disclosing information. Where that is the case, it will explain why that is the case to the comptroller. The memorandum also makes it clear that there may be situations in which the Bank is able to disclose information to the comptroller but legal restrictions apply to onward disclosure or publication.

In terms of the timing of publication, Parliament has rightly delegated to the comptroller discretion over the content of NAO reports and the timing of their publication. He acts independently on Parliament’s behalf, and it is important that he is able to use his judgment on how Parliament and the public are best served.

I hope that I can reassure the Committee by saying that once the comptroller has signed off a report for publication, there is an in-built incentive to lay it in Parliament and publish it within a short timeframe. Prompt publication mitigates the risk of the report’s conclusions being overtaken by events. Moreover, the process from completing the report to publication is very simple. Typically, it takes between two and four days, but it can be speeded up if required.

Amendment 21 seeks to disapply the restrictions on the disclosure of specially protected information that the National Audit Office has received from the Bank for certain reports by the Comptroller and Auditor General. As I have said, information is specially protected from time to time if it is held by the Bank for the purposes of monetary policy or for financial operations supporting financial institutions to maintain financial stability. A good example, which we heard about this morning, is emergency liquidity assistance.

The reason why restrictions are placed on the disclosure of such information is that its publication could harm the financial stability of the UK or adversely affect the Bank’s monetary policy operations. A report by the NAO on the extent to which the Bank has achieved its financial stability objective could, in fact, be destabilising if, for example, it revealed market-sensitive information about financial operations undertaken by the Bank to preserve financial stability in a particular period.

I trust that all Committee members will agree that those restrictions on disclosure are entirely appropriate and, indeed, vital. I urge the hon. Gentleman not to press his amendment.

[Richard Burgon]

My colleagues and I have listened to what the Minister has said. She went, with characteristic detail, into the Government’s position on this matter. My hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw, who is not in his place, scolded or praised me—I do not know which—for moderation earlier. We did not press our amendment to a Division on that occasion, but having listened to what the Minister has said, and because transparency is a key principle when it comes to the work of the Bank of England and we want to expand that transparency, we seek a Division on amendment 14.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Richard Burgon]

I beg to move amendment 15, in clause 10, page 7, line 37, at end insert—

“(6A) The Treasury must lay before Parliament a copy of any report it receives under subsection (5) within one calendar month of receipt.”

As the Bill reads, clause 10 applies where the Treasury gives an indemnity or guarantee to the Bank in respect of an activity or series of activities that it undertakes. Our amendment 15 simply seeks to maximise transparency and accountability with regard to this by requiring the Treasury to publish a copy of such a report within a reasonable timeframe. We hope that the Government will accept this amendment.

[Harriett Baldwin]

If I may, I will speak to clause 10 at the same time as speaking to amendment 15. Clause 10 obviously defines the process which will deliver greater oversight of activities undertaken by the bank or a company of the bank, where that activity has been indemnified by the Treasury. In such circumstances, the Treasury takes on the risk of the activity and will bear any associated losses. It is right that the Bill allows for full NAO oversight of these activities.

The occasions on which the Treasury grants an explicit indemnity to the Bank of England are very rare. Examples include the provision of emergency liquidity during the financial crisis and, more recently, the asset purchase facility, which is the vehicle by which the Bank of England has purchased £375 billion of Government bonds to deliver the Monetary Policy Committee’s quantitative easing policy. Clearly, these are very different examples. The former relates to an operation undertaken on the Bank’s balance sheet to provide assistance to an institution in distress. The latter case is an example of an activity undertaken by a subsidiary company of the Bank. Given the Bank’s varied role, it is difficult to predict every circumstance in which an indemnity of a Bank activity might be considered necessary in the future. Clause 10 allows for discretion to be applied to each case of indemnified activity. In some circumstances a financial audit may not be required. However, the objective of this clause is clear. It will facilitate greater accountability of indemnified activities where this is appropriate.

Amendment 15 would require the Treasury to lay a report on activity indemnified by the Treasury before Parliament one calendar month after receiving it from the Bank. Let me say first that Treasury indemnities of specific Bank activities are very rare. I have cited a couple of examples. In the example of the provision of emergency liquidity during the financial crisis, clearly the information being shared between the Bank and the Treasury would have been extremely sensitive. It would have included commercially confidential material and potentially information that put at risk the stability of the wider financial sector. It is clear from just that one example that publishing a report of this kind could really work against the public interest in the future, especially if the Treasury were bound by a specific statutory deadline. The Treasury must retain that flexibility over whether and when such reports should be published. I urge the hon. Gentleman to think hard about that and withdraw the amendment, while urging the Committee to agree that clause 10 stand part of the Bill.

[Richard Burgon]

I mentioned earlier the possibility of compromise on the part of the Government when it comes to balancing the protection of information they believe needs to be confidential because of financial risk with the requirement for transparency. I mentioned the practice of having some matters under the line and some over the line in local authorities and on boards of school governors. I encourage the Government to think further about that possibility in relation to the areas where transparency has been requested. We reserve the right to return to the matter on Report but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 11

Examinations and reviews

[Harriett Baldwin]

I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 11, page 9, line 11, at end insert—

“(b) the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which a Bank company has used its resources in discharging its functions.”

Amendments 1, 2 and 3 extend inserted section 7D of the Bank of England Act 1998 to enable the Comptroller and Auditor General to examine the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of Bank companies, as well as the Bank itself. “Bank company” is defined by amendment 3.

--- Later in debate ---

[Harriett Baldwin]

Thank you, Mr Wilson. That is what I am trying to do. I am just buying some time while I go through great wodges of paper here, to ensure that I do not rush ahead.

I will speak to Government amendments 1 to 6 on National Audit Office oversight of Bank subsidiaries. As we know, the Bill makes provision for the first time for the NAO to initiate its value-for-money studies of the Bank of England. As we have discussed, that delivers an important increase in the accountability of the Bank and its operations. The intention in the Bill was to grant the NAO these powers to the Bank in the broadest sense, subject to the bespoke policy carve-out, which also features in the Bill, protecting the independence of the Bank’s policy decisions, but as the Bill is drafted, the NAO’s powers to conduct value-for-money examinations in relation to companies owned by the Bank differ from its powers to conduct value-for-money examinations of the Bank itself. That was not the Government’s policy intention. The amendments will ensure that the NAO’s value-for-money powers apply on the same terms to the Bank, its subsidiaries and other Bank companies that are indemnified by the Treasury.

I will briefly outline the inconsistencies that arise through the current drafting. First, the NAO would have powers to conduct value-for-money examinations of Bank companies that have been indemnified by the Treasury only where the Treasury has directed the company concerned to send its accounts to the NAO, as provided for in section 7C of the Bank of England Act 1998, inserted by clause 10 of this Bill, and the NAO’s examination would be made under the powers given to it in section 6 of the National Audit Act 1983. Those NAO examinations would not, therefore, be subject to the bespoke policy carve-out that has been defined in the Bill. Secondly, under the Bill as drafted, subsidiaries or companies of the Bank that do not benefit from a Treasury indemnity would not be within the scope of NAO examination.

I hope that the Committee agrees that we should make the NAO’s power to initiate value-for-money examinations applicable on the same terms across the Bank, its subsidiaries and other companies indemnified by the Treasury in which the Bank has a minority interest. The amendments seek to do just that.

[Richard Burgon]

Having considered this matter and listened to the Minister’s detailed explanation, I can confirm that we will not oppose amendment 1.

Amendment 1 agreed to.

Amendments made: 2, in clause 11, page 9, line 12, leave out

“of the Bank (however described)”

and insert

“(however described) of the Bank or the Bank company”

Amendment 3, in clause 11, page 10, line 3, at end insert—

““Bank company” means—

(a) a company which is a subsidiary undertaking of the Bank, within the meaning of section 1162 of the Companies Act 2006;

(b) a company not within paragraph (a) in respect of which a direction under section 7C(2) has effect;”

Amendment 4, in clause 11, page 10, line 16, at end insert “or a Bank company” —(Harriett Baldwin.)

This amendment extends inserted section 7D(11) of the Bank of England Act 1998 (which provides that section 6 of the National Audit Act 1983 does not apply to the Bank) to Bank companies. Section 6 provides for economy, efficiency and effectiveness examinations by the Comptroller and Auditor General.

[Richard Burgon]

I beg to move amendment 16, in clause 11, page 10, line 19, at end insert

“and the Comptroller must lay a copy of the first memorandum of understanding to be prepared, and of any subsequent revisions, before both Houses of Parliament”.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 17, in clause 11, page 10, line 26, after “procedure” insert

“which may be reviewed by the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons”

Amendment 18, in clause 11, page 10, line 32, at end insert—

‘(3) The Comptroller must lay before Parliament a copy of the Memorandum within one calendar month of its preparation.”

Amendment 19, in clause 11, page 10, line 32, at end insert—

‘(4) The Treasury Committee of the House of Commons may in its absolute discretion enquire into the genesis and contents of the Memorandum.”

[Richard Burgon]

There was significant discussion of the extent to which the Comptroller and Auditor General is to be involved in the audits of the Bank during the Treasury Committee autumn hearings attended by the Chancellor and the Governor of the Bank of England and at various stages of the Bill’s passage through the other place. From statements made by the National Audit Office’s chair, Lord Bichard, and from the Chairs of the Treasury Committee and the Public Accounts Committee, I am aware that positive movement is believed to have been made following significant early criticism.

On Report in the House of Lords, the Government spokesperson said that

“to protect the Bank’s independent status the Bill provides for a policy carve-out from the scope of NAO value-for-money reviews”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 15 December 2015; Vol. 767, c. 1996.]

and that there had been significant discussions between the Bank, the NAO and the Treasury. We welcome the removal of the original proposal to allow the court a veto over NAO investigations. I thank the Minister for forwarding to my office yesterday a copy of the memorandum of understanding being discussed by the Bank and the NAO. I understand that it may be approved or finalised in the days ahead. I stated on Second Reading that I had written to the Minister asking that the memorandum be published during the lifetime of the Bill, and she acknowledged in her response that that would be her preference, so I am pleased that that has been possible.

I believe the draft memorandum has been circulated only to members of this Bill Committee—I hope the Minister will correct me if I am wrong and it has been seen anywhere else. We tabled amendment 16 to require that the memorandum be published and laid before both Houses of Parliament, which it appears will now happen. I also recognise that amendment 18 is somewhat repetitious on this point. We may require further discussion on the draft memorandum on Report. When it appears, it will have been finalised or approved by all parties to it. My initial reading of the draft memorandum is that it does not move us on significantly, in that both sides are able to publish letters that set out whether they agree with each other’s proposals to carry out or refuse an investigation, but there is no clear information in the memorandum on how such a dispute would be resolved. Of course, resolution is key in such matters.

We tabled amendments 17, 19 and 20 to allow for further scrutiny of the dispute procedure. It is our view that a role for the Treasury Committee could be a useful one, where such a dispute was left unresolved and it was clear the procedure was not working.

--- Later in debate ---

[Richard Burgon]

Again, I welcome the Minister’s confirmation that the court will consider the draft memorandum further on Thursday and that it will be approved or amended that day. I also welcome the fact that the final version will be more widely circulated in time for Third Reading and Report. We recognise that events have overtaken our amendments and therefore will not pursue them. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Richard Burgon]

I beg to move amendment 20, in clause 11, page 11, line 6, after “must” insert “promptly”.

We wish to make the point that we need the report to be published promptly. Otherwise, for example, the Treasury Committee, with all its expertise, cannot review using its powers, as the Minister has just referred to.

[Harriett Baldwin]

With regard to amendment 20 and the Treasury value-for-money reports, new section 7F of the Bank of England Act 1998, which is inserted by clause 11, preserves the existing power for the Treasury to commission value-for-money reviews of the way the functions of the Prudential Regulation Authority are exercised by the Bank. There is an equivalent power for the Treasury to commission such reviews of the functions of the Financial Conduct Authority. Taken together, these important powers ensure that the Treasury can carry out cross-cutting reviews of the operation of financial regulation in this country.

Amendment 20 would require the Treasury promptly to lay before Parliament any reports it receives following reviews into the PRA. It is, of course, vital that those reports are made available to Parliament to inform its deliberations into the regulation of financial services. Indeed, the Treasury is already required to lay reports into the operation of the PRA and the FCA before Parliament and to publish them. I assure the hon. Gentleman that the Treasury takes its obligations to this House very seriously and is concerned to fulfil them in good time. I am happy to confirm that any such reports will indeed be promptly laid before the House. There is no need for that requirement to be in the Bill.

[Richard Burgon]

I welcome the Minister putting on the record her desire for the reports to be published promptly. I would welcome it even more if she would, therefore, accept the amendment in order to insert the word “promptly” into statute. That would be one of many pieces of history that I am sure she will make in her role of shadow City Minister.

[Harriett Baldwin]

Actual City Minister.

[Richard Burgon]

I do apologise for the role reversal. I was even called a moderate today so we are getting confused, although I am most moderate. I invite the Minister to reconsider her position on the amendment. Or shall I assume, unless she intervenes, that the matter is closed?

[Harriett Baldwin]

I am afraid the hon. Gentleman has not convinced me at this stage. I am sure we will return to this on Report.

[Richard Burgon]

Like the Minister, we have put on record our thoughts on this matter. Although we reserve the right to return to it at a later stage, we will not be pushing for a vote, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: 5, in clause 11, page 11, line 20, leave out “only”.

Amendments 5 and 6 amend inserted section 7G of the Bank of England Act 1998 to provide that where the Comptroller is examining a Bank company under inserted section 7D, he will have access to documents and information held by that company and its auditors.

Amendment 6, in clause 11, page 11, line 24, at end insert—

‘( ) In the case of an examination under section 7D(1)(b), subsection (1) also applies to documents in the custody or under the control of—

(a) the company to which the examination relates;

(b) the auditor or auditors of that company.”—(Harriett Baldwin.)

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

[Harriett Baldwin]

At this point I will simply commend clause 11 to the Committee. I cannot be certain of the Committee’s enthusiasm, but I cannot imagine that anyone disagrees with a clause that will increase the Bank’s accountability while protecting its independent status and recognising the complex nature of its activities. The clause, as amended, will achieve that.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 11, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Sarah Newton.)

Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [Lords]

Richard Burgon Excerpts

Monday 1st February 2016 Commons Chamber

[Richard Burgon (Leeds East) (Lab)]

I beg to move an amendment, to leave out from “That” to the end of the Question and add

“this House, whilst noting improvements made to the Bill in the House of Lords, declines to give the Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [Lords] a Second Reading because the Bill fails to increase oversight and accountability of the work of the Bank of England, because the Bill reduces regulation of financial services and because the Bill removes the reverse burden of proof with regard to personal responsibility in the Senior Managers and Certification Regime which was introduced following the cross-party Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards and enacted in the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013; and considers that there is no evidence base to justify the removal of the reverse burden of proof which has not yet been implemented.”

The regulation of financial services has been discussed at length and legislated upon in this House since the financial crash, with the Financial Services Act 2012 and the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 being passed, and this Bill now being brought to this House. The Bill is made up of two parts: first, amendments to the structures of the Bank of England; and, secondly, regulation of financial services. We believe that the Bank of England should carry out its work in the most efficient way possible, with transparency and accountability in its decision making, serving the interests of the people who have sent us here to represent them. We also believe that senior bankers and others in the financial sector should be effectively and appropriately regulated, in order to deliver a banking culture that is free from the systematic greed and reckless risk-taking that precipitated a bankers’ crisis of historic proportions in 2008.

[Cat Smith (Lancaster and Fleetwood) (Lab)]

Is it not the case that Labour rescued the banks in 2008 and that now the Conservatives are selling off RBS shares at a loss to the taxpayer?

[Richard Burgon]

I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention, and she is correct. It shows what disregard the Chancellor has for the taxpayers’ coffers and the public purse—he is also showing that in his numerous meetings with Google and their shoddy outcome. Financial stability and the effective regulation of our banking and wider financial services industry are vital in ensuring that the sector serves the interests of the whole economy, does not hurt ordinary people or small and medium-sized businesses, and delivers vital investment that our country needs for long-term growth. Getting the balance of regulation right is an important task for any Government, one that Governments around the world have failed to fulfil in the past decade. It is a task that has been attempted since the bankers’ crisis of 2008, but today the Government are threatening to set back this task.

The context of the Bill is vital to understanding our concerns, and the reasonable concerns and demands of the public. We are eight years on from the economic crisis—the bankers’ crisis, which brought the financial services sector and the country to its knees. Banks that were too big to fail were bailed out by the state.

[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman was not here then, so he can form a dispassionate view. What has he learnt about the mistakes the regulators made under Labour, when we saw all those excesses that he is now talking about?

[Richard Burgon]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention. At the time, Conservative Members were calling for even lighter regulation, but what is clear, and what I will illustrate, is that Labour Members have learnt the lessons of the banking crisis but that this Bill shows they have not been learnt by Conservative Members. Eight years on, bankers’ behaviour and bankers’ bonuses remain in the news. Court cases and institutional fines continue, with hundreds of millions of pounds-worth of fines issued, yet still only one person is in prison, despite all the damage done. Despite a series of commissions and reviews, there remains too little evidence that the lessons of the bankers’ crisis have been learnt. We should all know that the public remain angry at what a number of top bankers did to our economy and our society.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech and I strongly agree with it. Was it not astonishing that before 2008 those in the private banking sector did not appear to spot the crisis that was coming? They were too busy making money hand over fist for themselves.

[Richard Burgon]

I thank my hon. Friend, who has extensive experience in these matters, for that. Troublingly, the people who now say there is no risk of a financial crisis ever again were the very same people in the very same sector who were saying before 2008 that everything was fine and there was no risk of disaster at the time. Sadly, how wrong they were! Despite what the bankers did to our economy and our society, about which there was entirely justified anger among the population, the Chancellor has cunningly turned the bankers’ crisis into a crisis of public spending, and has adopted a policy of spending cuts to vital services to which there seems to be no end in sight. In looking at this Bill, it appears that the Chancellor believes that he can now turn back the clock in the banking and financial sector.

Under this Chancellor, things are going in the wrong direction. For example, he sold off shares in the Royal Bank of Scotland at a very significant loss to the taxpayer; he appointed Angela Knight, who was head of the British Bankers Association during the financial crisis and who defended the top bankers during the crisis, to head up the Office of Tax Simplification in the Treasury; and he decided he could do without the continued services of the respected chief executive of the Financial Conduct Authority, Martin Wheatley. I am sure that he is delighted with the new appointment, as we have been told by the Minister that Mr Wheatley’s successor is fine with the abolition of the reverse burden of proof. I wonder whether Martin Wheatley, who departed prematurely, would have said the same.

The FCA’s planned public review into banking culture has now been cancelled, and its investigation into the promotion of tax evasion by HSBC has been brought to a premature conclusion. I know that we will be hearing more about the FCA in another debate this evening.

The Bank of England and Financial Services Bill was originally drafted, according to the Chancellor at a Treasury Committee meeting, to make changes to the Bank of England’s structure. One important concern is that it includes a major change to the regulation of senior bankers, undoing a key measure taken after the bankers’ crisis to change senior bankers’ conduct and to deliver transparency and accountability to financial decision making. I am talking about the presumption of responsibility—or the so-called reverse burden of proof.

We welcome the extension of the senior managers regime to senior managers across all regulated financial firms, but we do not accept the Government’s case for ending the presumption of responsibility for the top managers in banking.

The presumption of responsibility, as currently set out, applies to senior managers. It means that, to avoid being found guilty of misconduct when there has been a regulatory contravention in an area for which they are responsible, they will have to prove that they took reasonable steps to prevent that contravention. This Bill removes that onus on senior bankers. The onus is entirely reasonable, proportionate and, as bitter experience tells the British people, entirely necessary. Misconduct and misdemeanours in financial services are not merely a tale from history. In 2015, for example, the FCA had to fine firms more than £900 million. There was also a LIBOR scandal, foreign exchange fines and the mis-selling of payment protection insurance to the value of up to £33 billion.

[Sammy Wilson (East Antrim) (DUP)]

At the conclusion of her speech, the Minister indicated that by voting against the Second Reading of this Bill Members would be putting the public at risk from further bank abuses. Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that, by voting against this Bill and getting it changed so that the reverse burden of proof is put back in place, we are safeguarding against the abuses of the past?

[Richard Burgon]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for putting that necessary point so powerfully. People outside this place will be shocked to hear that, as a result of this Bill, senior bankers in the top firms will have less guards on their personal responsibility.

[Harriett Baldwin]

rose—

[Richard Burgon]

I do wish to make some progress. [Hon. Members: “Give way!”] I will give way.

[Harriett Baldwin]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way. Further to that point, the measures that he seems to object to so much are in clause 22. Why is he voting against Second Reading when there are many other excellent measures to which he presumably does not object?

[Richard Burgon]

It may be that others can explain to the Minister the real purpose of a reasoned amendment in these circumstances. I think our action is entirely right.

The presumption of responsibility is so reasonable and necessary that the policy was introduced with cross-party support. That should not be forgotten. It was originally proposed by the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, led by the Conservative right hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie) and Labour’s Lord McFall of Alcluith, and it was the Liberal Democrat Lord Newby, a Minister in the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, who moved its introduction into law. I have to echo a point previously made by the hon. Member for East Lothian (George Kerevan), sitting on the SNP Front Bench, that it was passed as recently as December 2013, and the presumption of responsibility has yet to come into effect. It was meant to come into effect in March this year, and it remains untested. We must remember that this was a safeguard brought in by the very same Chancellor who is now seeking to scrap it.

[Mark Garnier]

The presumption of responsibility has not gone. The senior managers regime absolutely includes the presumption of responsibility for everybody in these institutions. The hon. Gentleman may have had a number of conversations with some of the banks being affected by this, as I have, and I served on the banking commission that brought in the reverse burden of proof. What is interesting is that the banks are now complaining bitterly that the reverse burden of proof has now been reversed, because that managed to be a tick-box operation and they now have a much more onerous responsibility for management than they ever had before. This is a far stronger measure for ensuring probity for the managers of banks than the reverse burden of proof.

[Richard Burgon]

I thank the hon. Gentleman, who is experienced in these matters, for his intervention, but every time we have received correspondence from, and listened to, bankers on this matter, they seem desperate for the reverse burden of proof to be scrapped. They say how dreadful it would be, how it was totally unjustified and that business as usual is fine—that we can just return to things with no risk of a repeat of the financial crisis of 2008. Unfortunately, I believe they were wrong, but we need to remember that this presumption of responsibility, or the reverse burden of proof, was a safeguard brought in by the very same Chancellor who is now seeking to scrap it.

In 2013 the Chancellor said he had

“called for a thorough and intensive investigation into how to improve standards in the banking system and the PCBS has delivered. I am pleased to say that the government will implement its main recommendations.”

Of course one of its main recommendations was this presumption of responsibility.

On that occasion, the Chancellor was not alone. This was his Bill and Conservative Members backed it. Indeed, the right hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells (Greg Clark), then Financial Secretary to the Treasury, clearly explained that his Government were introducing new rules to promote higher standards for all bank staff and were reversing the burden of proof so that bank bosses are held accountable for breaches within their areas of responsibility.

The Conservative Member for Macclesfield (David Rutley) was briefly on the Treasury Committee, and he said:

“It is critical to bringing about the individual accountability that many of us want to see across our financial services sector, with the tough senior persons regime, reversing the burden of proof and criminal sanctions for reckless misconduct. All those steps are vital”.—[Official Report, 9 July 2013; Vol. 566, c. 261.]

His party colleague, the hon. Member for North East Cambridgeshire (Stephen Barclay), said:

“I do not think there can be any doubt about the merits of reversing the burden of proof…The Government’s announcement that they will reverse the burden of proof is extremely welcome.”—[Official Report, 8 July 2013; Vol. 566, c. 119.]

I could go on, but instead I ask this question: what has changed? What, or who, has so dramatically changed the mind of the Chancellor? At the Treasury Committee in October the hon. Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier) put the question many of us are thinking when he asked the Chancellor whether the proposed scrapping of the presumption of responsibility was “largely as a result of lobbying by the banks, which has the flavour of getting stronger.”

[Grahame M. Morris (Easington) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend is making an interesting argument in a powerful speech. Does he agree that the Chancellor had said he had not met the banks in the lead-up to the general election, but apparently he has met bankers on five separate occasions since the general election—presumably to discuss the contents of this Bill? Is he concerned, as I am, that the Chancellor might be the victim of Stockholm syndrome and has become a prisoner of the bankers and their financial interests?

--- Later in debate ---

[Richard Burgon]

Of course it is correct that the Chancellor meets senior bankers, but what concerns me and many people outside this place is that the Chancellor appears to be acting in their interests alone.

[Imran Hussain (Bradford East) (Lab)]

Following comments made to the media by Robert Jenkins, a member of the Bank’s Financial Policy Committee, that the regulators and their political masters were captured by banking leaders in the run-up to the meltdown, is my hon. Friend concerned that the Bill shows that the Government are still being captured by banking leaders?

[Richard Burgon]

My hon. Friend hits upon an important point. The role of a City Minister, a shadow City Minister and of the Government is not to represent the interests of the City to the population, but to fulfil their democratic function. A Government are not there to take orders from the City of London. Yes, we must listen to the City of London and value its contribution, but we are not its political representatives on earth.

On the Chancellor’s change of mind, the Chair of the Treasury Committee put it well when he asked his Chancellor a very reasonable question: “Why did you not wait for the regime to come into force to enable an assessment of it, how it works, before implementing this further change?” That was an extremely serious question. The change is based on no evidence, which is the worst kind of change.

Banks are having to put significant effort into identifying and establishing new procedures to meet the requirements of the 2013 Act, which received cross-party support in Parliament. The issues were already abundantly clear then, but now the Conservative Government have performed a dramatic U-turn and are not willing even to test the procedures that they initially supported. It is rare for an important measure to be abolished before it has even been introduced.

How will the public feel when they learn that the Chancellor is scrapping a duty on senior managers in banks—a duty that was welcomed as necessary on a cross-party basis—before it has even been implemented? The public’s deep concern about the behaviour of some senior bankers should extend to the Chancellor, who, it appears, is doing the bankers’ bidding, not the bidding of the British people. Do not the Chancellor and the Government understand the widespread anger of the public and their mistrust of the banking system? The public are right to remember that, because of the bankers’ behaviour, people whom this House is meant to represent lost their homes and their jobs. We should never forget that it was the bankers’ crisis that caused the deficit that this Government have relied upon as their justification for their political choice to cut our public services, cut funding to our local authorities, cut the incomes of working people and cut support for the most vulnerable people in our communities.

[Mark Garnier]

The hon. Gentleman is being generous with his time. I am sorry to be a pedant, but in 2005 there was a £43 billion budget deficit. There was a deficit long before the banking crisis, and there was a structural deficit that the banking crisis brought out.

[Richard Burgon]

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s pedantry. With respect, he makes a point that does not bear too much political scrutiny. The global financial crash caused the huge increase in the deficit and stalled the economy. It also gave the Government the opportunity to carry out their long-harboured ideological desire, decades old, to cut public services and wither away the state.

The Bill comes to us from the other place, where there was considerable debate at every stage. The Bill has changed, following a number of amendments proposed by the Government. In our reasoned amendment, we recognise those changes as improvements, and they are welcome, but the Bill has not changed significantly enough. As I mentioned, the Bill is in two parts, and on the first part—on the Bank of England’s structures—we recognise that the Government have made some positive movement, although it is insufficient. We recognise that they have moved on aspects of the oversight powers of the Bank’s court of directors, but the directors’ forum for discussion—the oversight committee—remains abolished.

We also recognise that the Government have moved on the proposed power of veto for the Bank’s court of directors over National Audit Office investigations, but the memorandum of understanding referred to in the Bill remains under negotiation and unpublished. On other aspects, in the House of Lords, there was no agreement. I wrote to the Chancellor asking that the memorandum of understanding be presented to this House during the passage of the Bill. I am glad to say that the Economic Secretary responded, explaining that it is not yet complete and is subject to ongoing discussions between the Bank and the National Audit Office. She explained that she will write to the Governor of the Bank of England and the Comptroller and Auditor General at the National Audit Office to see whether they will be in a position to share the draft memorandum of understanding during the passage of the Bill. In such an important matter, it can only be right for the House to have sight of that crucial memorandum of understanding. Any other approach would be a cause for concern.

The Bill replaces the Prudential Regulation Authority with a new Prudential Regulation Committee. Peers on both sides—including Government peers—expressed concern that that represented a downgrading and threatened a loss of independence.

As I have discussed at length, the Bill also replaces the presumption of responsibility with a duty of responsibility. Opposition peers challenged that on Report, and the Government’s measure scraped through by only 200 votes to 198. If I believe what I am told by the Minister, scrapping the presumption of responsibility is entirely uncontroversial and entirely reasonable. Unfortunately, that is not the case, and the issue gives us particular cause for concern in the wider context of the Chancellor’s new settlement with financial services.

We need a healthy and effective banking sector that is appropriately regulated, that serves the interests of the whole economy, that does not hurt ordinary people or small and medium-sized businesses, and that delivers the vital investment our country needs for long-term growth. The Conservative Government climbdown on the presumption of responsibility, which they previously supported, will hinder, not help, the fulfilment of those ambitions. Personal responsibility is vital for the operation of our regulatory systems. The Chancellor’s policy U-turn reduces exactly the personal responsibility that the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards recommended in its 500-page report. Scrapping a key measure before it has even had the chance to be tested makes no sense—unless, of course, the Chancellor is just following bankers’ orders. The startling and precipitous scrapping of a widely welcomed measure shows that there is a very real risk of failing to learn the lessons of the bankers’ crisis.

Our concerns go much wider than the presumption of responsibility, to the role of the Governor, the work of the FCA and the programme of selling off, for example, Royal Bank of Scotland shares at a loss to the taxpayer. The Chancellor’s whole approach says, “Let’s get back to business as usual.” However, it was the bankers’ business as usual that brought Britain to the brink; it was the bankers’ business as usual that caused the deficit. Returning to business as usual will make another financial crisis even more likely, with disastrous consequences for those we are meant to represent in this place, and that—to clear up any confusion on the part of the Minister—is why we are asking the Government in our reasoned amendment to think again today.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

Oral Answers to Questions

Richard Burgon Excerpts

Tuesday 19th January 2016 Commons Chamber

[Harriett Baldwin]

I am sure the right hon. Gentleman will welcome the announcement we are expecting on Wednesday from the Bank of England, the FCA and the Prudential Regulation Authority about their working together to back innovation in the financial sector. A key part of our long-term economic plan is to back competition in the banking sector, which is why I am pleased there were eight new entrants to the banking sector in the last Parliament. In this Parliament, we are aiming for 15.

[Richard Burgon (Leeds East) (Lab)]

Mr Speaker,

“interventions by HM Treasury and other bodies have raised questions…regarding the board’s independence”—

not my words but those of an FCA-commissioned external report on the FCA board published last week. How will the Chancellor demonstrate that the appointment of the new chief executive will not be yet another example of an overreaching Chancellor trying to get his own way?

[Harriett Baldwin]

It was good of the hon. Gentleman to turn up for Treasury questions this time—I guess there was not a Stop the War march or a picket line to join today. I can assure him that the Treasury has the power to appoint both the board and the chief executive and to set its remit, but from then on it has operational independence.

Draft Payment Accounts Regulations 2015

Richard Burgon Excerpts

Wednesday 9th December 2015 General Committees

[Richard Burgon (Leeds East) (Lab)]

It is a real pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe. I thank the Minister for the way in which she outlined the regulations, which implement the EU payment accounts directive. The Opposition will not oppose the regulations, but since we want a banking sector that works in the interests of consumers rather than penalising them, I would appreciate further detail on some matters from the Minister and further explanation of the rationale behind some of the decisions that the Government have made.

Some payment account fees for switching accounts or using overdraft facilities have cost individual account holders billions of pounds. That has been subject to campaigning by consumer advocacy and advisory groups such as MoneySavingExpert.com and Which? for several years. Those campaigns have seen not only millions won back for consumers, but changes in the industry to fees and the information available about fees. That is to be welcomed, but with the most recent research from Which? in August 2014 confirming that several of the biggest banks have relatively poor customer satisfaction levels for their current account offerings, and continued concern regarding overdraft fees and their impact on people on lower incomes, the debate will clearly continue after today’s discussion.

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

The shadow Minister is making a robust case for the consumer, but does he recognise that ensuring that a basic account is available for any legal resident of the EU under the directive may increase the prospect of fraud or financial crime? How would he ensure that the concerns raised by some in the finance industry are dealt with properly, while standing up for those who otherwise would be left behind in the way that he suggests?

[Richard Burgon]

The Minister raised the issue of everyone in the UK being able to have a bank account. With respect, it is for the Government to suggest how fraud will be guarded against in these circumstances. The Minister may be able to address that in her further comments.

Today we are talking about the implementation of the EU payment accounts directive and our regulations. As the Minister indicated, the PAD has three main principles: first, to improve the transparency of fees relating to accounts that are principally personal accounts; secondly, to make it easier for consumers to switch accounts, and thirdly, to make sure that all EU consumers can access banking services by ensuring the availability of a sufficient number of accounts with basic features. When the Minister touches on that, she may wish to outline the Government’s position on the point that the right hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster made about preventing fraud in such circumstances.

I will pick up the point on payment account fees. There is significant crossover between the regulations and the Competition and Markets Authority’s recent report on the banking sector. On overdraft fees, the CMA’s analysis shows that outcomes are particularly poor for heavy overdraft users and indicates that around 9% of customers have paid more than £20 a month in overdraft charges. Furthermore, around 2% have paid more than £60 a month in overdraft charges. So the CMA’s evidence shows how the monthly charges for using an unarranged overdraft can be as much as 15 times higher than for those with an arranged overdraft.

The consumer group, Which?, has said that the CMA should tackle higher overdraft charges. One proposed remedy is to consider stopping banks differentiating their charging structures for arranged and unarranged overdrafts.

With regard to switching accounts, research conducted for the Competition and Markets Authority found that 37% of people had been with their bank for more than 20 years and a further 20% had had an account for between 10 and 20 years. The report also found that only 3% of customers switched in 2014.

Will the Minister explain what analysis of this the Government have undertaken? If so few people change banks, as these figures suggest, is there a failure to extend the regulations to cover existing customers and is that undermining their effectiveness?

The CMA’s report also made the following points:

“Low levels of customer switching mean that banks are not put under enough competitive pressure, and new products and new banks do not attract customers quickly enough… Bank customers fear that switching their current account to a new bank will be complicated, time-consuming and risky.

[Mark Field]

Will the hon. Gentleman give the banks some credibility and accept that the lack of switching may be down to customers’ broad satisfaction? It is often assumed that we do not have large-scale switching. As the hon. Gentleman pointed out, many adults have bank accounts at a particular bank for decades—20 or 30 years at a time. That might reflect their broad satisfaction with the service they receive, rather than any fault of the Government, which have gone a long way in at least trying to ease the process of switching.

[Richard Burgon]

I am not seeking to attack the credibility of the banks, but I think that, given the statistics I have just cited, we need to look into this further and ensure that people are not staying with banks during their busy lives just out of habit, and that they are fully aware of the options. Opposition Members will also agree that competition is very important in the banking sector as it is elsewhere.

However, despite identifying those problems, the remedies that the CMA propose put the onus on consumers to navigate the system, focusing on measures to make it easier to switch bank accounts. With this in mind, will the Government say how they anticipate that the Competition and Markets Authority’s report into the banking sector will be integrated into this framework?

The regulations also state that the Money Advice Service would be required to operate a comparison website. There is some concern that this could be funded by cuts to Money Advice Service spending elsewhere rather than by increasing the levy on industry. Will the Minister clarify how the website will be funded and provide more detail about the timescale? For example, when does she expect the resource to be available to consumers?

Finally, during the consultation, no information was received about the anticipated costs to non-current-account switching members, as a result of the proposed approach on switching, nor did the responses address the costs or benefits to consumers as a result of the proposed measures. Will the Minister also comment on these points?

As I said at the beginning of my remarks, we do not oppose the measures. Public confidence in the banking system needs to be addressed urgently. It is vital to ensure that people in all categories are treated fairly, particularly those living on lower incomes who are hit by unexpected fees or stuck in accounts that do not give them the best deal for fear of being hit by switching fees. The measures go some way to achieving that and, therefore, we are happy to support them.

Capital Markets Union

Richard Burgon Excerpts

Thursday 3rd December 2015 General Committees

[Richard Burgon (Leeds East) (Lab)]

It is a great pleasure to serve on my first European Committee under your chairmanship, Mr Hanson. I am pleased to serve opposite the Minister.

On this occasion, my remarks will be brief, but I note the late arrival of two letters from the Minister to the European Scrutiny Committee and to members of this Committee. I understand that the letters were sent to the European Scrutiny Committee on Monday evening, and I believe that I should have received them yesterday, although I have no record of doing so. I therefore had sight of them only this morning, which means that I have not had time to seek advice. I defer to the member of the European Scrutiny Committee, the hon. Member for Rochester and Strood, and I will raise a few issues that the Minister may be able to respond to. Why were the documents provided so late and what opportunity there is for further consideration of them?

The motion references a number of documents from the European Commission relating to the capital markets union and the action plan to deliver the CMU’s objectives, which the commissioner, Lord Hill, set out on 30 September. There is much technical detail in the paperwork for this debate, but I will make some general points. The CMU is being driven forward at a rapid pace by Commissioner Hill and is part of a process of the economic recovery of the European Union as a whole and a contribution to supporting jobs and growth. The initiative’s intention, as Commissioner Hill and the Minister have said, is to build a single capital market across the European Union.

The central goal of the proposals, as set out by the Minister, is to make it easier for small and medium-sized enterprises to access funding in a period when finance has dried up from banks. Delivering finance where it is needed is, of course, vital for economic activity to deliver the necessary investment for future growth, which Opposition Members set out as our priority at the recent autumn statement. The Opposition naturally wish to support measures that generate finance for investment, and to support jobs and growth, as would be expected. We want accessible finance to be delivered across the economy, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises to ensure that they deliver the dynamic and innovative economic activity that our economy needs.

I note that we are discussing this in the week of the recent Bank of England stress test results, when, despite the fact that two banks have to take action to boost their capital reserves, the Governor of the Bank of England stated that the post-crisis period is over. We should recognise the wariness and the real concerns with regards to the CMU and the return to securitisation in the wake of the financial crisis.

The Minister has said that this needs to be done in a

“simple, transparent and standardised way”,

but I am sure that she will understand those who urge caution. The recent statement by Finance Watch, supported by a number of non-governmental organisations, states that

“the CMU revives pre-crisis trends without adequately integrating the lessons from the crisis.”

It has expressed concern that there is a risk in the CMU agenda of favouring short-term growth and competitiveness over long-term, sustainable development.

To quote two academics, Daniela Gabor from the University of the West of England and Jakob Vestergaard, from the Danish Institute for International Studies,

“if the CMU is to make a substantial and lasting contribution to investment and job creation in Europe, it must be accompanied by reforms that address systemic risk in securities-based financial systems and enhance pan-European supervision of securitization”.

The Minister said in October that we need to turn our attention from financial services reform

“to reform that boosts our economies, and increases competitiveness.”

Our belief is that, although we wish to boost our economies, we should not consider financial reform to be done and dusted. Indeed, there is the potential for further reform to deliver that boost to our economy. There is a real need to discuss the role of securitisation, particularly as banks have increased their capital and cleaned up their balance sheets and can now lend more, not less. There is no overall shortage of credit supply. Opposition Members—I know that all Members would agree with me—do not wish to see a return to the securitisation that facilitated the US sub-prime mortgage crash, from which the global economic crisis originated. It will be necessary to demonstrate what lessons have been learned as the action plan is developed.

To do that, I hope that the Minister can address a number of points. Will she ensure that the key principles of good securitisation are not watered down through pressure from large, international banks? Will she set out how the CMU will deal with a lack of convergence or consistency in existing supervisory regimes? Do the Government support a new single regulatory or supervisory body for capital markets across Europe?

The Opposition believe that we should be open to a wider range of measures to deliver finance for business and investment, as we recently discussed in the debate on the RBS share sale, including: encouraging increased lending by the private banking sector and using our influence where we have direct interest in banks, such as RBS; the establishment of a dedicated national investment bank; and the development of regional banking. Capital markets might be an area for future development in Europe, but UK business remains largely reliant on bank lending. We need to ensure that we do not take our eye off the issues raised in the Lawrence Tomlinson and Andrew Large reports, or overlook the difficulty businesses have had in accessing bank finance following the economic crisis and the bank bail-outs.

The commissioner has said that securitisation under CMU will

“free up bank lending for the wider economy.”

Will the Minister say how CMU will affect the steps being taken by the Government to ensure that SMEs can access the finance they require from UK banks?

[Mark Garnier]

Perhaps I can help the hon. Gentleman. Reducing the requirement for large businesses to borrow money from banks by going to the securities markets would leave more capital in the banks that could then be passed down to smaller businesses. That would shift the big requirement on banks’ assets away from big businesses to concentrate on smaller businesses.

[Richard Burgon]

I welcome that clarification of the Government’s position.

Finance Watch has argued that CMU

“is also likely to undermine important financial reforms processes such as the long-awaited separation of risky capital markets activities from basic banking”.

Will the Minister respond to that concern and set out what impact CMU will have on bank ring-fencing and the separation of retail and investment banking?

CMU is an opportunity for European finance, but we must maintain the goal of having finance act for the UK and European economies and for the general public as a whole. With Europe rising up the agenda, it would certainly help to be able to highlight the positive benefits to the finance sector that EU membership and the CMU will deliver, but many questions about the proposals still need to be addressed. I will seek to increase my discussions of these matters with members of both the European Scrutiny Committee and the Treasury Committee.

We do not wish to raise any controversy about the information the Minister has given. I am grateful for being allowed to address these issues.

Royal Bank of Scotland

Richard Burgon Excerpts

Thursday 5th November 2015 Commons Chamber

[Richard Burgon (Leeds East) (Lab)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton (Kate Osamor) on securing this debate, and thank the Backbench Business Committee for giving Members time to discuss this important and topical issue in the Chamber. I am pleased that so many have taken part. It is a real pleasure to join the Minister and to respond on behalf of the Opposition for the first time in the Chamber.

We have discussed a proposal that asks the Government to consider suspending the further sale of their shares in RBS while a review is conducted of the UK’s financial sector and the case for new banking models. It is a simple motion and all Opposition Members support it.

This discussion of the causes and consequences of RBS’s bail-outs and of the Chancellor’s ongoing plans to sell off RBS, with a resulting cost to the taxpayer, has also been an excellent opportunity to discuss the future of RBS and of British banking as a whole, including the new models and structures that may benefit the British economy. The Government must engage in this debate, as my hon. Friend the Member for Dagenham and Rainham (Jon Cruddas) so effectively set out in his speech.

Labour Members want a thriving and dynamic banking sector that will best deliver for the economy and the electorate as a whole. In government, Labour decided to bail out RBS. That was a big decision—a £45 billion decision—but it was the right one given the calamitous situation in RBS, which my hon. Friend the Member for Norwich South (Clive Lewis) outlined so effectively. According to the National Audit Office, the decision was justified, and the price was backed by Institute for Fiscal Studies, but the scale of the bail-out—the money invested on behalf of the taxpayer—means that we cannot so lightly take a simple decision to return to business as usual.

The Chancellor argued in his Mansion House speech earlier this year that

“the easiest path for the politician is to put off the decision”.

I believe that the Chancellor has taken the easy decision to return, as I have said, to business as usual. The former shadow Chancellor my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) said at the time that

“taxpayers who bailed out the bank will want their money back… The Chancellor needs to justify his haste in selling off a chunk of RBS”.

Both those points still stand: taxpayers still want their money back, and the Chancellor must still justify his haste.

Let us be clear that we cannot afford to get this sale wrong. The evidence of the Move Your Money poll, which was presented to us in the media this morning and by my hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton, shows that the public think the Government are getting it wrong: 82% of those polled agree, given their own interest as the majority shareholder in RBS, that this should operate in the public interest, and 58% believe that the bank should be restructured to serve local economies throughout the UK.

[Jeremy Quin]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Richard Burgon]

No, because I want to give the Minister as much time as possible to respond.

It is incumbent on the Minister and the Chancellor to set out why they are moving ahead with the sale. What evidence does the Minister have that it is the right thing to do? This is the first opportunity for a full parliamentary debate on the decision of the Chancellor to privatise RBS since his announcement to the City at the Mansion House in June. He did make a statement the following day, but informing the House was clearly something of an afterthought, as my hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Grahame M. Morris) clearly spelled out. At the Mansion House, the Chancellor announced a share sale even if it meant a financial loss to the taxpayer. The 5% stake sold on 3 August has already realised a loss of £1 billion, and some calculations suggest that the total losses if the entire stake is sold in this way could be about £13 billion, which is almost a third of the £45.5 billion total cost of the bail-out.

The Government have provided no real evidence of why RBS should be returned to the private sector in its previous form or why it should happen now. A 13-page report by the Rothschild Group and a two-page letter from the Governor of the Bank of England have been mentioned. The authors of the Rothschild report stressed that they had

“not sought to address the question of whether the government should sell its stake in RBS, but rather when it should do so.”

In other words, the review did not consider the full range of policy options. Will the Minister elaborate on how moving RBS shares from public to private ownership will promote financial stability, and on whether the relevant Bank of England Committee has endorsed that view? Will she publish any evidence she has received in support of that view?

It is welcome that the right hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie), the Chair of the Treasury Committee, has asked to see the advice provided by UKFI to ensure that the taxpayer, as shareholder, is getting good value from this Government-owned company. I support that call. Is the timing of this sale in the interests of taxpayers or bank customers, or does the Chancellor just want to sell off another state asset quickly to make his borrowing figures look better? Was this decision taken purely for ideological reasons, or is it based on expert, independent advice? Will the Minister explain how the Chancellor arrived at his decision? In line with the call by my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman), will the Minister share the evidence, if she has any, with Members of the House?

I will turn to alternative models and structures for RBS and the future of British banking. I ask the Government to consider undertaking a full review of UK banking that questions how financial institutions have operated before and since the crash, and what other models might be considered to diversify the sector and deliver for the country by strengthening the economy.

There has been a much needed discussion of banking practices and reform over the past five years. We have had Lawrence Tomlinson’s report, Sir Andrew Large’s report on RBS’s independent lending, Sir John Vickers’ Independent Commission on Banking, and the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards and the work of the Treasury Committee, both under the excellent leadership of the right hon. Member for Chichester, to name but a few.

Given how badly things went wrong and the problems that still exist at the bank, the question we must discuss today is how we can do it better. We need to know not only why RBS failed, but whether it is delivering for the British economy now, and, if it is not, how we can do it better.

Labour was right to bail out RBS, but how has it operated since the Government became the majority shareholder? RBS has been bailed out, but there are still major problems with its operation, as the hon. Member for Aberconwy (Guto Bebb) indicated in his speech. It has cut more than 30,000 staff since 2008, many of whom were backroom staff on about £20,000 per year. It is closing branches faster than any other bank, and 90 of those it has closed this year were the last branch in town.

The Tomlinson report said in 2011:

“Returning RBS and Lloyds to full private sector ownership in their current form would be a return to the banking landscape of 2003, possibly with even less competition… Given the lack of any real change in the banking sector, there is nothing that will stop 2018 being the same as 2008 unless radical action is taken now.”

The Andrew Large report found that RBS was failing SMEs. He said:

“A perception has risen among some SMEs that RBS is unwilling to lend.”

I want to take this opportunity to touch on how RBS has been treating businesses. The House will recall the Backbench Business debate on 4 December last year on the Financial Conduct Authority redress scheme, in which hon. Members raised the serious concerns of businesses. My hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Steve Rotheram) stated:

“The only thing that is consistent and transparent is that the banks that caused the financial crash are profiting from selling products such as interest rate hedging products, which were bought by a company in my constituency, the Flanagan Group, and have caused it great difficulty.”

Similarly, my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Paul Farrelly) talked about one of his local businesses, DK Motorcycles, which had been “badly let down” by RBS, but had

“finally escaped the clutches of RBS”.

He talked about

“people from small businesses who feel bullied by their banks”.—[Official Report, 4 December 2014; Vol. 589, c. 480-84.]

Information that I have seen this week shows that the serious concerns of businesses such as Flanagan’s have not gone away. I therefore want to take this opportunity to ask the Minister whether she will meet me, concerned MPs like my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton and businesses such as the Flanagan Group in his constituency to discuss the behaviour of RBS and what can be done to resolve the situation.

That leads me to the question that was put so well by my hon. Friend the Member for West Bromwich West (Mr Bailey) of whether selling RBS in its current form represents good long-term value for the taxpayer, taking into account all the economic costs and benefits. Is the Minister aware of those who say that the low price of RBS shares represents a belief among market participants that the reforms to guarantee its future financial health have not yet been concluded? Is the Minister satisfied that all necessary steps have been taken to return RBS to a state where it will not be in trouble again? Finally, is the economy best served solely by private shareholder banking, or is there a case for a more diversified sector that includes publicly owned and directed institutions, mutuals, co-operatives, social enterprises and regionalised banking? With so many fundamental questions yet to be answered, it is right that we engage in a wider review of the UK’s financial sector that considers the case for establishing new models of banking that might better serve our economy.

In conclusion, there are many alternatives. It has been proposed from a number of quarters that RBS be broken up to deliver regional banks, including by the Tomlinson report, the New Economics Foundation, Civitas and ResPublica, as Opposition Members have mentioned. We must discuss how regional banks can help to rebalance the economy—perhaps the Chancellor took the opportunity while visiting Germany to look into that.

It is our responsibility to map out the best way forward for UK banking, so that it delivers for the electorate and the economy as a whole. That means suspending sales of shares in RBS, which give away taxpayers’ money to private shareholders. It is incumbent on the Chancellor to explain why he thinks that is the right thing to do, and that means engaging with a real review of the banking sector and alternative models that will deliver a diversified and more resilient economy. How we treat RBS now will demonstrate whether we have learned the lessons of the crisis—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)]

Order. I hope the hon. Gentleman is reaching the conclusion of his conclusion because we are way over time and there is a full debate to follow. If he could finish his speech now, I would be grateful.

--- Later in debate ---

[Richard Burgon]

The scale of the bail-out and the money invested on behalf of the taxpayer mean that we cannot take a simple decision lightly and return to business as usual. The Labour party wants a thriving and dynamic banking sector that will best deliver for the economy and the electorate as a whole. We do not accept that the case has been made to sell the bank off now—at significant loss to the taxpayer—and that is why we support a full, independent review of all the options before further shares are sold, and we encourage MPs to support the motion.