China

Neil Coyle Excerpts

Wednesday 15th May 2024 Westminster Hall

[Bob Seely (Isle of Wight) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered Government policy on China.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Rees. I am here to look at Government policy on China, but also to argue for a more coherent version of that policy, notwithstanding the very considerable progress that, to be fair to them, the Government have been making.

I will start by outlining a few ideas. For me, the 21st century will mark a struggle between two visions for humanity: between open and closed societies; between states that are the servants of their people and states that are the masters of their people; and whether the great scientific discoveries of this century—artificial intelligence, big data—will be used to help humanity or to enslave it.

Opposing the policies of the Chinese Communist party and the direction that it has sadly embarked on for the past 10 to 15 years does not mean being anti-Chinese. Many Chinese oppose the Chinese Communist party, as indeed do many tens of thousands of brave Hong Kong activists in our own country.

I am delighted that the Deputy Foreign Secretary is present to respond to this debate on behalf of Government. I fully accept that the relationship we have with China is significantly more complex than the relationship we had with the USSR; we have a much deeper trading relationship with communist China, and we need to work together on climate and the environment, although that should not be used as an excuse for the status quo. China presents the need for a more complex set of alliances and more complex containment, but there is a greater urgency because, in many ways, China is more powerful than the Soviet Union was. We need to change the dynamic. It is quite clear that shutting off the global economy, which the west still heavily influences, but no longer controls, is not an option.

For me, the direction of travel is clear. Just this week, what have we had? Chinese vessels encroach daily on Taiwanese territorial waters, with conventional military tensions increasing. In the UK, the head of GCHQ warns that China represents a growing and genuine threat, not only to the UK but to the internet as a whole. Three men, including a Border Force officer, are arrested on spying charges. The US announces that it will raise the tariff on Chinese electric vehicles to 100%, citing “unfair practices”.

We are in the middle of what the Government have called an “epoch-defining challenge”; some Members on the Government Benches, and perhaps indeed those on other Benches, see it as a more significantly adversarial relationship. I accept that there are elements of both, and that just focusing on the words to define this issue—be they “adversarial”, “enemy” or “challenge”—is not necessarily the most helpful thing. What is important is that our policies become less piecemeal.

As I say, I do not want to underestimate the journey that the Government have been on. Much has changed since the failed golden era. It is clear that the hope held by the UK, the US and other partners—that normalising trade relations with China would lead to greater security on all sides—has not materialised. Indeed, quite the opposite is true: what China and arguably Russia have done is trash the system from the inside. However, with respect, I think that our policies are still a little too piecemeal. Although we have had sensible decisions on Huawei, spurred by myself, my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) and others, and the passing of the National Security Act 2023 and a significant number of measures, I still think we need to go further.

I am looking at trying to develop a coherent set of ideas, not only in this speech but with the think-tank Civitas, with whom I hope to publish stuff next month. I pay tribute to and thank people such as Charlie Parton, the former diplomat who has done a lot of great work advising Members of Parliament on both sides of the House on China strategy, highlighting what the Chinese Communist party has been saying to itself about the west; Ben Rogers and others at Hong Kong Watch; and Luke de Pulford at the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China for the work that they have all done.

[Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)]

I thank the hon. Member for securing this debate. Given the arrests this week and the issues that he has outlined, does he agree that the issue here is the pace at which we are assessing the situation, and the need for a cross-Government audit of the Chinese Communist party’s attempts to influence UK politicians and Government, and also individuals, which we saw this week with the arrests of individuals attempting to intimidate and harass Hong Kong democracy activists in the UK?

[Bob Seely]

I agree very much with the points that the hon. Gentleman makes. We need to increase our pace, which is one of things that I would like to argue today. What the Chinese Communist party wants is no secret. It does not want to live in harmony with the west; it wants to dominate it. Western nations are viewed in CCP literature as hostile foreign forces intent on damaging Beijing. In Document No. 9, for example, the CCP describes democracy as one of nine false ideological trends. The full list includes: promoting western constitutional democracy; promoting universal values, which would be an attempt to weaken the theoretical foundations of the party’s leadership; promoting civil society, to dismantle the ruling party’s social foundations; promoting neoliberalism, which would challenge China’s basic economic system; promoting the western ideal of free journalism, which would challenge the communist party’s grip on power; promoting historical nihilism, or rather a different interpretation of the communist party’s history; and questioning the socialist nature of socialism with Chinese characteristics. All those things are seen as false historical trends, and there are many other documents, which I will not go into.

The challenges—I use the Government word, “challenges”—from this potentially adversarial state are arising on many fronts. On cyber, just this week GCHQ has said that there is an increased threat; indeed, I was one of the unfortunate servicemen and women whose details were found potentially not to be as secure as we would have liked. I think it was last week when we were told that our details had been stolen or were potentially vulnerable to theft. Trade dumping is an absolutely critical element of this. China’s developing country status at the World Trade Organisation means that the rules on dumping do not apply to it. As we are slow off the mark here, and because the Americans have put a 100% tariff on electric vehicles, on which the European Union may follow suit, I worry that we will become a dumping ground for Chinese goods. That is not an accident. The destruction of our own industries is not happening because the Chinese are necessarily good at them—although some are and, in a free state, arguably more would be. It is a deliberate state policy of intellectual property theft that is happening now, but which was also happening 10 to 20 years ago.

Then there is the long-term planning to buy up resources, the super-cheap communist state loans, the over-production as a matter of policy, and the dumping of goods on international markets to bankrupt western firms. Huawei was an instructional lesson on that. It originally partnered with Nortel, a Canadian company that suddenly found its intellectual property in Beijing. Nortel then collapsed and its place was taken by Huawei, whose state agenda was to undercut western firms and dominate the 5G market. That creation of dependence is one of the things that is most dangerous—I will explain why in a couple of minutes.

There is also the transitional repression—the spying on and intimidation of not only China’s own people abroad, but Hong Kong activists, which is a growing problem that we seem reluctant to tackle robustly. Then there is the question of covid and its origins. If covid had come out of a laboratory in France or the United Kingdom, or the United States especially, we would never have heard the end of it from political parties in this country or the media; and yet I am staggered by the lack of interest shown in the likelihood that covid came out of the Wuhan virus laboratory. I am also staggered at the lack of interest in whether it had been genetically altered before it was, presumably, accidentally leaked. As Lord Ridley said:

“The UK security and scientific establishment refused to look at the evidence for a lab leak.”

That is an extraordinary claim from somebody who is a considerable expert on that. If nothing else, it is astonishing that we seem to be so uninterested in biosecurity standards in other countries, given the potential hazard not only to ourselves but to humanity.

The united front, the malign influence of which we have potentially seen in Parliament, is a long-term, whole-of-state strategy used by the Chinese Communist Party to further its interests within and outside China through multiple organs of the Chinese state and a range of activities—overt and covert; legal and illegal. It encompasses not only espionage but forms of malign influence that are sometimes overt, but sometimes covert. We know from our Intelligence and Security Committee that the united front has “achieved low-level penetration” across “most sectors of UK business and civil society”. What does the Deputy Foreign Secretary have to say about that? Is he concerned about that penetration across most sectors of UK business and civil society by the united front?

I will spend a couple of minutes on the domination of DNA research and on cellular modules, which are so little known, but potentially so important. China believes that its own biomedical data is a

“foundational strategic state resource.”

Yet, at the same time, it is hoovering up DNA data and genomic data from around the world. Western security officials, including those identified in the ISC report, see DNA biotech as another major concern. The Pentagon in the United States listed the BGI group, otherwise known as the Beijing Genomics Institute, as a Chinese military company, and the US Government have twice blacklisted the group’s subsidiaries for their role in the collection and analysis of DNA that has enabled China’s repression of its own ethnic minorities.

That is a really creepy and unpleasant policy that the CCP and the BGI group have been accused of: collecting DNA research for the repression of their own minorities. Needless to say, not only have we not done the same thing as the US, but BGI Tech Solutions was awarded a £10.8 million contract in this country for genomic testing of covid samples. Not only that, but in 2021, Reuters revealed that the company was selling prenatal tests to millions of women globally in order to collect their DNA data, using biotech methods developed with the Chinese military.

A top counter-intelligence official from the US Government has said that BGI is

“no different than Huawei…It’s this legitimate business that’s also masking intelligence gathering for nefarious purposes.”

I wonder if we are again sleepwalking dangerously and somewhat naively into another ethical crisis—the kind that we had with Huawei, and which we could now be seeing with BGI.

I have not had time to show the Minister my speech, because I only finished it about half an hour before the debate, so I will happily write to him on these questions, and perhaps he could give me a written answer. What are the Government planning to do on genomic research and protecting the United Kingdom, which does not only mean our DNA data—unless he thinks we can share it with the rest of the world; maybe we should or could be—and what do we think BGI and China are trying to do with our DNA?

I will talk a little bit about cellular modules because, again, it is an obscure, but important, topic. The internet of things refers to internet devices that talk to each other, from alarm systems, video recorders and fridges, to aeroplanes, boats and, maybe one day, nuclear weapon system launching programmes—and even the lights in our living room. Those gadgets rely on modules—groups of chips—that connect the equipment to the internet and talk to each other. China supplies the west with more than 60% of those modules. But because they are updated remotely by the manufacturer, it is practically impossible to ensure that they are not spying on us and sending back data flows to their source. If that sounds a bit paranoid, let us remember that TikTok is currently under investigation by the FBI after its parent company used the app to monitor journalists in the United States. Let us also remember that a Government car was allegedly compounded—I cannot remember if that was last year or a few months ago—because a cellular module in it might have been pinging back eavesdropped conversations. China aims to dominate the market, as it has with Huawei and BGI, for cellular modules. Do the Government have an opinion on whether that is a threat to our economy, to our people and to our national security?

I am not even going to bother touching on the military threat, because it is complex and detailed, though my fear is not only the slow domination. Sun Tzu, a great man and a philosopher of conflict, said:

“The greatest victory is that which requires no battle.”

That seems to be President Xi’s aim. Arguably, it should also be our aim. That idea should inspire us that we need to defend ourselves now, and that we need to take the short-to-medium and the long-term decisions to defend ourselves, not to aggressively wave fingers at people, but to be able to defend ourselves. The reason I say that is that the most dangerous outcome is that we become so dependent on China in the next five years, for everything from vehicles to fridges to cellular modules to our DNA, that when Taiwan is attacked, if we took out sanctions on China we would effectively collapse the global economy. It would cause chaos and collapse in Europe and our own country that would make the energy crisis for the Ukraine war look like a picnic, with rioting on the streets and destabilised western societies—or we can stand by and say, “Fair enough.”

The other, potentially even greater, threat is that we break the alliance between the United States and ourselves and the United States and Europe, which is undoubtedly China’s strategic aim. That will be a catastrophe for western civilisation. We need to deepen our alliances with the US and Oz and many other states in that part of the world, including South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and Indonesia.

Finally, I have two more points. On TikTok, for young people in China the algorithm is different from that in the UK. In China, it is used to promote science, education and history, including the history of China. In our countries, it makes citizens watch

“stupid dance videos with the main goal of making us imbeciles”.

That quotation is from the former chief software officer of the US Air Force and Space Force. In China, TikTok is about entertaining education; here it is just about entertainment. It is not only cyber-addiction, but real addiction, that is an issue. Do the Government have a position on the large-scale illicit supply of fentanyl by China to the United States, which I understand is now also becoming a problem in this country? I will wind up in two to three minutes; I said I would stick to 20 minutes, which I am trying to do.

What are we going to do about this issue? The real aim of the immediate policy is to insulate ourselves. In no particular order, here are some ideas. Let us add science to human rights. We can DNA test where cotton comes from. Should we not be mandating that, in supply chains that go anywhere near China, we DNA test cotton so that we can see whether it comes from Xinjiang and is made by slave labour, so that we can outlaw it? That is an important thing to do for fair trade, and to help jobs not only in this country, but in Bangladesh, India and places where they do not use slave labour. It is also important for human rights: taking a consistent approach to the human rights agenda and giving it the respect it needs.

We need to diversify as a matter of urgency. As a national priority, we need to diversify our supply chains, so that if there is war in the Pacific or around Taiwan, we are not going to destroy our standard of living, economy or people’s jobs in order to put sanctions on China, or to support the United States or Taiwan.

We need longer-term planning over rare earth minerals—something I have not even brought up due to time considerations. We are beginning to act but we are two or three decades behind China.

We should tell Confucius Institute centres to stop spying on their citizens, or shut them down and kick out the people in them. The same should apply to Hong Kong economic offices, which are now also being used to intimidate Chinese people in this country.

As for the military, we need a permanent western presence in disputed waters and more money spent.

On WTO and dumping, we need to work together; we need to treat China as a developed economy, even if in WTO terms it is not.

I also suggest that we need to have faith in ourselves. There is no inevitability about China’s future victory. It is a very powerful country, but like Russia, it lacks few actual friends. Its one formal alliance is with the basket case of North Korea, although the basket case of Russia is also a pretty close ally. We have many friends and allies, as do the United States and France, and we need to be working with those allies and with our partners in the Pacific for a new, subtle but thoughtful, determined and robust containment programme. That means spending on hard power, but it also means a much more assertive defence of our interests, as well as understanding how decades of subversive conflict across culture, business, sport and science can damage our national interest and threaten our people. Whether it is the use of artificial intelligence, big data, DNA sequencing, advanced propaganda techniques or cellular modules, we need to do more to understand the modern world that we inhabit.

We are in a battle for the future of humanity, between democracies and authoritarian states. At the moment, that conflict is being lost by us. It is also being conducted in myriad subtle ways. We need to grasp the extent of it and do more to react robustly to defend ourselves.

--- Later in debate ---

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair this afternoon, Ms Rees. I congratulate the hon. Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely) on securing the debate and on his excellent, wide-ranging opening remarks. He set out the challenges we face as a country, and presented a pretty dystopian vision of the future, if we allow it to happen. I hope that we are able to collectively rise to the challenges he laid out.

The hon. Member raised a number of matters that I will touch on. I start with the refreshed integrated review, published by the Government last year, which stated:

“China…poses an epoch-defining and systemic challenge with implications for almost every area of government policy and the everyday lives of British people.”

I consider that a welcome revision to our approach. It is a pretty serious, broad statement of where we are and what we need to do. We need to recognise China’s size and influence, alongside the risks that it brings. The hon. Member for Isle of Wight made the point very eloquently that our reliance is one of those risks, alongside China’s greater aggression, its human rights record and the strengthening of its partnership with Russia; they are all potential existential threats.

In many respects, the news emerging this week on both sides of the Atlantic is a stark reminder that these challenges are here and now, and that care needs to be taken. I will take one very clear example from my own constituency, which feeds into the wider picture that has been painted today. There is a Stellantis plant in my constituency. It announced yesterday that it will be selling Chinese-made electric vehicles in Europe from the autumn, and in the UK from next year. We have a very proud history of manufacturing in this country, and indeed in Ellesmere Port, at what is commonly known as the Vauxhall motor plant, which is now owned by Stellantis. A lot of work was put in to secure the investment needed to move to electric vehicle production, which is very important for the plant, for the constituency and for the whole UK automotive sector.

I had hoped that we could lead the way in the sale of new electric vehicles, as the plan was always to expand from where we are now—from the production of vans into the domestic car market—so it is a concern that the owners are already turning to cheaper Chinese electric vehicles. It is too soon to understand the impact of that on domestic production, but surely it is not going to help. That is not to say that I want to insulate the UK from competition, but there has to be fair competition, and there has to be one eye on the future.

There is no doubt that the move to an all-electric vehicle country is going to be expensive and we should be looking at how we keep costs down, but if major manufacturers are already concluding that the best way for them to meet that challenge is to turn to Chinese imports, we are never going to have the domestic manufacturing capacity to meet domestic demand, never mind being able to continue to be the proud exporter to the rest of the world that we have always been.

As we have heard, yesterday President Biden announced he was introducing a 100% tariff on electric vehicles made in China, as well as tariffs on lithium batteries, critical minerals and semiconductors. That is a move designed to prevent cheap, subsidised Chinese goods from entering the US market. The decision was taken after a four-year review, and there are similar moves across the EU to assess the impact of Chinese imports. Since October, the EU has been investigating whether local subsidies have been helping Chinese car manufacturers undercut European-made vehicles. The investigation is due to report shortly.

I am not aware of a similar review being undertaken here. It was reported in February that the Government were contemplating commissioning the Trade Remedies Authority to undertake an investigation into subsidies, but three months on we have silence. Is the Minister able to confirm whether the Government are still looking into that and whether they will look at what the EU says if conclusive evidence of subsidies is found? We risk putting ourselves in a very exposed position. Our manufacturing capacity would be reduced, probably permanently, and we would be kidding ourselves about the race to net zero if we were reliant on Chinese imports.

Cars are just one example of our potential exposure; steel, energy, fibre optics, semiconductors, rare elements or any number of parts of our infrastructure are part of this discussion. We cannot allow ourselves to be at the mercy of one country, especially not one like China, which has what I would consider to be a ruthless focus on economic dominance. As we have heard from the hon. Member for Isle of Wight, that could lead us into a very dark place indeed.

Clearly, we benefit from Chinese investment in this country. Life sciences is a sector that it is investing in heavily. After what the hon. Member has said, that needs to be looked at very carefully as well. The fact is that I could go down any street in this country and see things that have Chinese ownership: pubs, shops, restaurants, cinemas. That is probably fair enough in a global economy, but what about water companies, energy companies and nuclear power plants? I wonder how we have managed to get to the point at which our critical infrastructure is so open to influence by Chinese investors. How have we got to the point where China is a part owner in Thames Water and has significant debts to at least two Chinese state-owned banks? I think we can all see where that might lead us if international tensions rise.

Away from manufacturing, as the hon. Member mentioned, issues in cyber-security have been well documented. Indeed, there was a debate here yesterday on the dangers of social media. I absolutely agree with what the hon. Member said about the differences between TikTok and its Chinese equivalent, Douyin. From a child’s perspective, in China it certainly has a lot more educational content. In 2021 the Chinese Government enacted a law that called for the

“creation and broadcast of online content conducive to the healthy growth of minors”.

That can of course be seen as part of the wider attitude to free speech in China, but it is of interest that they obviously see that some of the content on these channels might have a detrimental effect on a child’s development, but they are more than happy for that stuff to be pumped on to our own children’s screens.

[Neil Coyle]

When my hon. Friend says “they”, he is talking about the Chinese Government. Does he welcome the distinction that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely) made at the start of the debate between the Government of China and the people? As someone who lived in China for two years, may I make a personal statement?

(The Member continued in Mandarin.)

For those who do not know any Mandarin—I appreciate that mine is rusty—that translates as: “I like the country and I like the people. It is the Government who have caused the concerns that are the focus of the debate today. It is the politicians and the political leadership of China that is the challenge.”

[Justin Madders]

I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention. He makes a very important point—the bits of it that I actually understood. He must have seen my speech because I am about to make the very important distinction—

--- Later in debate ---

[Neil Coyle]

In Mandarin?

[Justin Madders]

Not in Mandarin, no—in English. There is a very important distinction that we would all make between the Chinese people and the CCP. There is no doubt that the CCP is the malign influence in all this.

On the question of social media, there is a concern that there may be an imbalance between what we see in this country and what is seen in China, and there may be deliberate reasons for that. We should certainly look at that and at the dangerous anti-western, conspiracy theory, democracy-undermining stuff that comes out from all around the world, and in particular from China.

I echo the comments made by the director general of MI5 in 2022. He said that it would be wrong for us to cut ourselves off from one fifth of the world’s population, and that we should continue to engage and work with China in a way that is consistent with our national security. But I do not think we have the balance right. As the hon. Member for Isle of Wight said, that balance will be consistently and constantly reviewed. We need greater international resilience to international incidents. The analogy with what happened in Russia is very important, because that is a real threat that we could face in the next few years, and we do not want to leave ourselves overexposed.

As has been said, many western countries have begun to understand the risks that we face, have taken action against firms such as Huawei, and have limited the use of such technologies in sensitive and critical infrastructure. In that context, questions must now be raised about our reliance on supply chains that are controlled by China and have such a huge impact on our infrastructure.

It is clear that China holds a dominant position over global supply chains that are critical to the net zero transition. It controls a significant proportion of the rare metals necessary for lithium-ion batteries, wind turbines and solar photovoltaic modules. On the lithium-ion battery chains, China is responsible for 80% of the supply of spherical graphite, refined manganese, anodes and electrolytes, so we clearly need a co-ordinated response to that.

It feels as though we are at a very important point in global politics. We must work across the globe to deal with the many challenges that the planet faces, while at the same time protecting our national security and long-term economic interests. Taking a cautious and proactive approach to risks is central to protecting our country and its citizens. I believe that the way we approach China will be a central feature of our lives for many years to come. On every occasion that we deal with it, the question of security, economic or otherwise, must be the very first thing we ask.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Logan]

I am not here to defend TikTok. I do use TikTok, as do many of our colleagues, including some high-profile Ministers in the Cabinet. That is not what this is about. Some of this has to do with education as well, and I look to my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight. Again, I was based in China. I have a daughter in the education system and, going into primary school level in China, there is a lot in the education system that is focused on the harder aspects of education: learning the sciences, mathematics and physics. I think that that can be reflected in the social media that is used there, by the case of Douyin.

[Neil Coyle]

I intervene not to discuss mutual family that we have still living in the People’s Republic of China, but on the hon. Gentleman’s point about polling, can he focus a little on what the punishment might be for someone suggesting that they are dissatisfied with where the Chinese Government are at? I also mention the corruption and local-level issues. But fundamentally, a much more important issue for us here, where we still have responsibility, is polling within Hong Kong specifically and the Government’s responsibility to Hong Kong nationals and those seeking British national overseas status. Might we see further measures to support those people in the face of article 23 extensions of the diminution of rights in Hong Kong?

[Mark Logan]

The hon. Member raises a fantastic point explicitly on Hong Kong. What has happened in Hong Kong in recent years is unfortunate. I think it is a strategic mistake in terms of the governance of Hong Kong, so I hope the Deputy Foreign Secretary comes to that.

I will finish by saying that for us, it is about the whole idea of soul searching and asking what the UK’s role in the world is and how we can slightly push back against the tone. We do not want to push China into the arms of the axis of authoritarian regimes, as we talked about, because there are many things the Chinese people care about that show their values are very similar to ours. It is not just the paranoia of 200,000 Chinese students in the UK who are all doing these bad things; actually, it shows a society that is striving to do better, and those are values that we share and hold dearly in this country as well.

Israel and Gaza

Neil Coyle Excerpts

Tuesday 27th February 2024 Commons Chamber

[Mr Mitchell]

I do not agree with that analysis. We have to look at the small print of how our arms exports restrictions and operations work in order to see that that is not the case. I have set out clearly the way in which the arms exports regime works, and I am afraid I have nothing to add.

[Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)]

Palestinians desperately need aid, so which organisations are the Government working with to replace the humanitarian efforts of the UN Relief and Works Agency while it is unfunded, especially if there is a ceasefire or pause? Can he assure the House that not a penny of UK funding is still reaching the hands of the terrorists who committed the October atrocities, and who still hold 134 hostages?

[Mr Mitchell]

UNRWA is not unfunded. As I set out, Britain has funded it until the next financial year. I set out how other countries were also producing the necessary funding. The hon. Gentleman asked who else we work with apart from UNRWA: we work very closely with UNICEF, the World Food Programme and the Egyptian Red Crescent, as I saw on my relatively recent visit to Cairo. We continue to explore every possible way, not just through UNRWA, of getting aid and support into Gaza.

Trial of Jimmy Lai

Neil Coyle Excerpts

Monday 18th December 2023 Commons Chamber

[Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)]

I congratulate the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) on securing the urgent question. Jimmy Lai has many supporters in the UK, including Brits and those from Hong Kong, but many of them have experienced intimidation and harassment here in the UK from the Chinese Communist party. Those from Hong Kong face certain persecution, arrest and detention if they are forced to return. Twelve activists have recently been told by the UK Government that they are not at risk and have had their asylum claims rejected. Can the Minister explain UK Government policy on whether Hong Kong campaigners should qualify for asylum in the UK?

[Anne-Marie Trevelyan]

As I set out earlier, we brought forward the British nationals overseas route for Hong Kong residents to come to the UK. So far, approximately 191,000 applications have been processed, and 184,700 have been granted. The point the hon. Gentleman mentions is one that I am aware the Home Office is looking into. There has been a change in relation to age in the processing, and there is an issue there that I know it is looking at now. I will ask the Home Office to update him once it has finished its review.

War in Ukraine: Illicit Finance

Neil Coyle Excerpts

Thursday 17th November 2022 Westminster Hall

[Bob Seely (Isle of Wight) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the Second Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, The cost of complacency: illicit finance and the war in Ukraine, HC 168, and the Government response, HC 688.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. In speaking to the report today, I will outline a series of points made by the Committee in this report and in its 2018 “Moscow’s Gold” report. I will also talk about SLAPPs—strategic lawsuits against public participation —and the case for more action on lawfare.

Our report finds that the UK sanctions response to the war, while ambitious, was initially limited by a lack of resourcing, and the new beneficial owners register still contains loopholes that put some individuals under the threshold for having to declare beneficial ownership. That is against the public interest. The report, which I strongly endorse—I encourage folks to read it should they have time—proposes a number of reforms, including new transatlantic sanctions partnerships, so that London and New York can work more closely together, and the appropriate resourcing of enforcement agencies. Both reports, and the Intelligence and Security Committee, note the lack of funding for the National Crime Agency and other serious crime organisations in the country and that some of them are threatened by the lawyers of oligarchs—potential bad actors. We believe that to be very strongly against our national interest.

In my opinion, and I think also in the opinion of the Committee and many people engaged with this issue, including the right hon. Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge) and other hon. Members, the UK and its offshore territories have for too long turned a blind eye to the transfer and concealment of illicit or semi-licit—if that is a word—wealth, and have granted a number of high-risk individuals political and judicial protections that they do not deserve.

We have built a significant industry catering to the needs of some really quite unsavoury characters. To date, vast sums of both illicit and licit finance have been recycled through the UK’s bespoke package of the financial services industry, legal services, public relations services, private eyes, estate agents, luxury assets, concierge services, visa and citizenship routes and the private education system.

Transparency International and various other bodies have estimated that the amount of wealth, criminal or otherwise, that has flowed from the former Soviet Union via corrupt German and Scandinavian banks, via UK shell companies, to tax havens—sadly, very often the UK—is probably between £500 billion and £1 trillion. That is one of the greatest flows, probably the greatest flow, of illicit wealth in the history of humanity. The fact that we in London are a core part of that flow is frankly pretty shameful.

I was discussing the issue with the great Bill Browder the other day. One of the problems is that this is not just Colombian drug cartel money; this is money that has come from deeply corrupt, but potentially legal deals. For example, an executive at one of the big state gas or oil firms at some points in the 1990s could, if they had the connections, buy an oilfield or a gasfield equivalent to the North sea, for $100,000.

By borrowing that money off organised crime or other areas, that person would effectively become a billionaire overnight, by the sometimes legal, sometimes not, but deeply unethical transfer of state assets—the privatisation of state assets using organised crime as muscle and bureaucratic connections to facilitate it. That is what has happened in the former Soviet Union—in not only Russia, but also Ukraine back in the day, especially under Yanukovych and others, and Kazakhstan. Clearly, that has enriched a small number of people in the United Kingdom, but I do not believe it has been good for the United Kingdom as a whole. It is not good for our reputation and for London as a service industry—although it is undoubtedly true that it has very considerably enriched a small number of people.

In 2018, the Foreign Affairs Committee published an excellent report under the previous Chairman, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), called “Moscow’s Gold: Russian Corruption in the UK”. That report detailed that, despite the Government’s crackdown on Russian activity in the wake of the Skripal poisoning, back before the Ukraine war, business simply continued as usual for most of Putin’s allies in the United Kingdom.

One of the depressing things for me is that I was saying this before I was an MP, so nobody was listening, and have said it as an MP—and still nobody really listened. In 2007, back in the Munich conference speech, Putin declared a new cold war against the west. We have studiously done our best to turn a blind eye because it was too difficult for western states to get their heads around the fact that, in President Putin, we had an aggressive rival who did not accept the international system, would openly challenge it and would fight wars on his borders to secure what he thought were his vital interests—we can debate that or not. After his speech the invasion of Georgia happened, and then in 2014 there was the invasion of Ukraine through proxy groups that confused some people, but should not have done.

Before, during and after those events we have had a wave of assassinations, imprisonments and arrests. I met with Alexei Navalny’s chief of staff. Navalny now may be the most high profile political prisoner in the world; he is in a detention camp in permanent solitary confinement. That is the price for challenging President Putin. Last night, I was chatting to Marina Litvinenko, the wonderful wife of Alexander Litvinenko, who was murdered in Piccadilly back in 2006—he died of radiation poisoning. The problem is that we repeatedly turned a blind eye. Our love of Russian money flowing through the financial and legal systems clouded our moral judgment. That has enabled Putin’s regime. We need to learn from those errors and mistakes.

What is the scale of the problem today? From 2008 to 2015, there were no state checks on tier 1 golden visas. At least eight individuals now sanctioned, or under investigation, are thought to have obtained citizenship through those means. They are citizens like you or me, Mr Efford. How can that be right or in the national interest? The National Crime Agency estimates that money laundering costs the UK £100 billion annually. Serious or organised crime is estimated to have a price tag of £37 billion.

Russians accused of corruption or having close links to the Putin regime have bought at least £1.5 billion worth of property in Great Britain according to Transparency International—that is a vast amount of property. One of the reasons why so many people are struggling with their mortgages is that there are vastly inflated prices for property in London and the south-east. That is in part because it is seen as an easy way to launder money: to pay over the odds for property and then to sell. Even if it is then sold at a loss of 10% or 20%, these people have laundered—legalised—a vast amount of corrupt and criminal, or semi-corrupt and semi-criminal, money.

That £1.5 billion is part of nearly £5.5 billion worth of property in the UK that has been purchased through offshore shell companies. That problem happened under new Labour and the coalition with the Liberal Democrats. What on earth is this country doing allowing offshore shell companies to be vehicles to buy property? It is just wrong. It is wrong that so many people close to Putin own so much property in this country. It is wrong that so many offshore vehicles have been used. What on earth are we doing allowing that to happen, and what on earth are we going to do to stop it? I would love the Minister to reassure us, rather than just saying that we are concerned about it.

[Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Ind)]

The hon. Gentleman is making an excellent speech and I congratulate him. I want to be clear that this is not just an issue about Russia. In my constituency and elsewhere, the red princes and princesses of communist China are buying up property and inflating prices. We should not just focus on Russia when we talk about illicit finance.

[Bob Seely]

I thank the hon. Member for his very sensible point. There is absolutely a wider issue. As well as shell companies, there are vast developments on the south side of the river, around the US embassy, where entire blocks are being bought up as investment options rather than being used to provide housing for Londoners. That is shocking, especially because we have a housing shortage. There is a wider argument on reform of our housing in the UK for giving options first to allow ordinary folks to be buying it, rather than—as much as we love them—Hong Kong, Chinese or Indonesian investors to block buy endless numbers of flat and rent them out or never have them occupied.

I was going to talk a bit about the Azerbaijani laundromat. Between 2012 and 2014, about £3 billion went through UK shell companies as part of the so-called Azerbaijani laundromat; funding was dispersed from Azerbaijani officials to various outlets in this country. As well as that, London’s open economic environment has been a key centre for raising finance for companies or individuals over whom there are now very considerable question marks.

In 2017, En+ was floated on the London stock exchange, raising £1.5 billion from international investors in an initial public offering. We now know—well, we knew at the time—that En+ was very closely associated with Oleg Deripaska, despite his ownership of companies linked to supplying Russian military materials and sanctioned Russian shareholders. He himself is now sanctioned, I believe. En+ and Oleg Deripaska were part of a considerable lobbying effort by a former Member of the House of Lords—a former Conservative Minister, as much as it shames me to say it—to separate Deripaska from En+ in frankly pretty questionable circumstances.

Shortly after the Skripal poisoning, Russia continued to sell Russian sovereign debt in London, facilitated by the sanctioned Russian bank VTB. While our financial services provide anonymity to those who wish to invest, many UK legal firms have sought to further silence those who question the origin of investments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Ind)]

It is a pleasure to rise with you in the Chair, Mr Efford. I thank the Liaison Committee for providing time for the debate, and congratulate the hon. Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely) on his excellent opening speech. I also thank the Foreign Affairs Committee Clerks for notes in advance of the debate, and the UK Anti-Corruption Coalition for its excellent briefing. I speak as a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and also as someone who is just glad to be reunited with the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon)—I knew he would be here today.

The FAC report, “The cost of complacency: illicit finance and the war in Ukraine”, in October made many recommendations, some of which have been touched on. Those that have not been mentioned include the need to implement beneficial ownership rules and to reform Companies House, including by giving the registrar powers to verify information and to remove corporate entities for wrongdoing and provide robust identity verification mechanisms. It also recommends making enforcement more effective by reforming unexplained wealth orders, or by at least assessing why they have not been as effective as the Government originally intended. The report also suggests making better use of the exchange of notes process in relation to companies incorporated overseas, reforming corporate criminal liability laws and whistleblower legislation, professionalising the sanctions unit of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, and making more concerted efforts to seize assets that have been frozen by sanctions.

The Government’s response is, at best, tepid. They say that they are aware of the security threat of illicit finance and suggest that the war in Ukraine is the driving political force for action, but that leaves many people who are focused on this issue concerned that no effort was made previously and wondering why it has taken a war in Europe to drive reform and action in this area, when it has been clear to so many that illicit finance has been entering the UK at colossal levels for some time.

The Government’s response is largely being taken forward in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill, but there is broad concern that it does not go far enough. For example, the Government have committed to reform of Companies House, but the UK Anti-Corruption Coalition says that they need to go much further to prevent UK-registered companies from providing a veneer of legitimacy for secretive offshore networks, by ensuring transparency over shareholders, partners and members. The Government have acknowledged the risk associated with opaque corporate ownership, but the Bill in its current form does not make the changes that would prohibit private limited companies, limited liability partnerships, limited partnerships or Scottish limited partnerships from having opaque corporate partners, and it must go further.

The UK Anti-Corruption Coalition also asked the Government to improve the register’s accuracy by verifying and publishing shareholder information. The information it holds on shareholders needs to be transparent and accurate, including names, company numbers and addresses—all the criteria that we assume is held but is not. The Bill also needs to give Companies House the power to review verification documents provided by third-party agents—usually trust and company service providers—because without that level of work, Companies House’s data will simply not be robust enough.

The Government have said that they will undertake a review of whistleblower protections and are assessing time and scope. It would be really good to have an update on that, because there is a lot of concern that, while journalists may be covered, they are not the only people who warrant protection. Journalists rely on whistleblowers inside companies and organisations, and they should be the focus of further and greater protection. I hope, therefore, that the Minister will tell us whether the Government are considering introducing a whistle- blowing Bill to protect those who seek to speak out against or uncover economic crimes and wrongdoing. That is not covered by current Government plans, so I hope the Government will follow through on their commitment to review the UK’s whistleblowing framework and present the timeline and scope of that review.

The Government say that they accept the Committee’s recommendation to establish a professional and permanent sanctions group within the FCDO. However, the global anti-corruption sanctions regime, which the UK introduced its in April 2021, has been used significantly fewer times than the 30 designations a year that the Government originally envisaged. Why has the performance been so much worse than expected? What steps are being taken to improve it, when will they be implemented, and when will they be put to use?

In response to the Committee’s recommendation to grant additional funding for law enforcement, all the Government have offered is money to fund the reform of Companies House, and they have said that the Home Office will set out an annual report to Parliament on unexplained wealth orders. Frankly, that is pathetic, and today’s statement means that the uplift in the Serious Fraud Office’s core resources budget is simply not good enough to match the level of crime in this country. The UK spends £850 million a year on funding core national level economic crime enforcement bodies, but economic crime costs the UK £290 billion a year. The National Crime Agency has suffered a 4.2% decrease in its core budget over the past five years, yet fraud has risen dramatically. It accounts for 40% of all recorded crime, yet fraud prosecutions have fallen from 42,000 in 2011 to 13,500 in 2021—a 67% decrease in a decade. The Government are simply lagging far behind the scale of the problem. The NCA needs resourcing to the scale required, and the Minister needs to raise the Government’s game.

The Committee has put forward additional asks. Given the speed with which the two economic crime Bills were put before the House, does the Minister anticipate additional legislation to rectify any gaps? Will the Government be reviewing the implementation of the two Acts? When does the Minister expect to see measurable outcomes from changes to resourcing the fight against economic crime? What outcomes is he prioritising? How does the new sustainable funding model support long-term planning to support those goals? How does public-private information sharing feed into those enforcement aims?

It would be good to hear from the Minister what progress is being made on suspicious activity reports reform. The Government have mentioned that they are interested in that, but we have not seen action on it yet. It would also be good to hear from the Minister whether the Government’s understanding of the threat of economic crime has changed. Do they see illicit finance as primarily a criminal issue or a security threat?

Golden visas—the tier 1 visa scheme—allowed a recipient to stay in the UK for three years in exchange for a minimum £1 million investment, but they became a vehicle for much laundering of corrupt money in the UK because of a lack of checks. That scheme was shut in February in response to the full-scale invasion—the second invasion—of Ukraine, but a review of the scheme, commissioned by the Home Office in March 2018, has still not been published. The Committee called for the review to be published without delay. The Government have said that they will publish it “in the near future”. I really hope that the Minister can tell us what is happening. If the Government are at all serious on this issue, they will be able to tell us today when that report will be published.

The Government did not even bother to respond to the Committee’s recommendation that they review visas issued since 2015. Have the Government concluded that none of the outstanding visa holders pose a security threat? Especially given that the Government tell us that they have changed their policy towards both Russia and China in recent weeks, will the Government be reviewing that decision? The Government have not responded to whether they plan to review those granted visas who had gone on to gain residency or citizenship. The Home Office should set out how it will deal with people with corrupt or criminal sources of wealth who have already received indefinite leave to remain or subsequent citizenship through the golden visa route. Those visas may still need to be withdrawn and other measures taken.

It would be good to hear what the Government plan to do, especially in the face of those of us who deal with the Home Office week in, week out, on behalf of constituents desperate to get family members into this country to work here, to contribute here and to care for other family members who are sick here. I have constituents who have had family members pass away while waiting for visa application decisions. I recently saw a constituent who has waited more than a decade for an asylum application to be decided—while corrupt millionaires have been able to gain access under a Government-sponsored programme, which is, frankly, simply despicable.

The UK Anti-Corruption Coalition says that 6,312 tier 1 visas—more than half of all golden visas—are being reviewed for possible national security risks. That is the scale of the problem. The Government opened the door to this. By April 2022, 10 Russian nationals subject to sanctions had previously been granted golden visas. That is what this Government have permitted in this country. In the light of today’s news from the director general of MI5 about potential attacks in this country from Iranian agents, could the Minister tell us whether any of these golden visas were issued to Iranian nationals?

How many people got this red-carpet treatment when they should have had the rug pulled from under their feet? And how are the Government now quantifying the level of damage that these visas, and their approach, have caused? The message sent across the globe has been that London and the UK have been open to blood- soaked money from wherever it comes. Frankly, secret meetings with agents of other countries—this goes right to the top of Government under the right hon. Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip (Boris Johnson)— have simply not been documented. This is a Government who have undermined national security on so many levels and damaged the UK.

The Government have made some reforms to tier 1 visas since 2015, but there remain glaring loopholes, including one that allowed 100 golden visa applicants to borrow money from a firm owned by Russian nationals in order to make investments that ultimately went back to Russia. How are the Government penalising those involved, and how are they seeking to capture the money that should have been here? Can the Minister give any further clarity on timing for the review of the whistleblower legislation?

I have three final points, which are much wider. The first is on corporate criminal liability. The Committee said that the Foreign Office should work across Government to encourage reform of outdated and ineffective corporate criminal liability laws that mean that it is difficult to hold large companies to account for economic crime. In response, all the Government said was that they had commissioned a report from the Law Commission and were considering further action. The initial call for evidence by the Government concluded in March 2017—five and a half years ago. The Government then reported on this in November two years ago. And the Law Commission’s options paper was published in June 2022. I hope the Minister can give us today an update on progress, because frankly it looks like the Government are not even dragging their feet; they have not even got out of bed.

I have already touched on unexplained wealth orders. Since the passage of the emergency legislation this year, only one unexplained wealth order has been applied for by law enforcement. In total, only nine UWOs relating to four cases have been obtained by the NCA since the tool was introduced in January 2018, and just one unsuccessful application for a UWO left the NCA facing £1.5 million in legal costs. The hon. Member for Isle of Wight touched on the cost imbalance and the resourcing issue. The problem is much wider, because aid cuts have led to a £3.6 million budget cut for law enforcement bodies tackling illicit finance and doing international corruption work, and have resulted in the target for the use of UWOs based on aid-funded investigations being reduced to zero. I ask the Government to increase their ambition. Through the Government, law enforcement should be able to obtain UWOs, and they should have a boost in resources to fund the expert staff and technical capabilities that they require.

The UK Anti-Corruption Coalition suggests hypothecation to boost resources and capability. It suggests that funds generated through law enforcement activities be reinvested in law enforcement budgets to fund things such as the state-of-the-art IT infrastructure and data analysis capabilities required to do the job. Law enforcement bodies are hamstrung at the moment and are desperate for resources and capability.

Between 2016 and 2021, law enforcement bodies responsible for fighting economic crime in the UK brought in £3.9 billion in confiscation and forfeiture orders and fines. If that money had been reinvested in the agencies on top of their core budgets, an additional £748 million a year would have been provided to help tackle the problem. That is nearly double the resources that the Government currently provide, so I hope the Minister will respond to the UK Anti-Corruption Coalition’s recommendation.

SLAPPs allow oligarchs to supress evidence of their corruption and protect their reputation through vexatious litigation, unfortunately and very sadly through British law firms, against those seeking to tell truth to power, including journalists and publishers. The pressure of excessive costs coupled with the personal strain of legal threats hampers the ability of investigative journalists, academics and campaigners to shine a light on evidence of illicit wealth. Between March and May, the Government called for evidence on SLAPPs, and concluded in their report that they intend to pursue legislative reform at the earliest opportunity. That requires significant change, so will the Minister outline how the Government will take forward that well overdue legislation? Will they introduce early dismissal so that courts can dismiss any case that is in the public interest, and cost protection for defendants? I hope the Minister will tell us when the Government will legislate and, more importantly, when those powers will be in place to protect those who seek to shine a light on illicit finance in the UK, which is a growing problem.

--- Later in debate ---

[Leo Docherty]

Although I am grateful for the invitation to speak for the Home Secretary, I am going to pass on that opportunity. The hon. Member might seek clarification from the Home Secretary herself.

We are proud that we have sanctioned more than 1,200 individuals and 120 entities since the start of Putin’s outrageous invasion of Ukraine. That includes sanctioning Russia’s major banks, as well as more than 120 oligarchs with a combined net worth of more than £140 billion. This was made possible due to cross-Government planning months before the Russian invasion. Our planning proved pivotal to the swift designation of individuals and the introduction of new measures within days of the invasion. The legislation enabled the Foreign Secretary to sanction more individuals and entities at a greater pace.

We are taking robust action across Government, and with our international partners, to ensure that sanctions are effectively enforced. That is done through the Russian elites, proxies and oligarchs taskforce, which brings together international partners to ensure the effective enforcement of financial sanctions implemented against Kremlin-linked elites and entities.

[Neil Coyle]

Ten of the people sanctioned by the Government are Russian nationals who were recipients of tier 1 visas. Does the Minister have any sense of shame at the level of misuse of that system? When will the review of the 6,000 people who took tier 1 visas but were under investigation for being a national security risk conclude? He has not given us any information on that.

[Leo Docherty]

I repeat that the review will be published in due course. We recognise that there has been a problem, which is why it is under review. It will come forward in good time, I hope.

Let me turn to the resources committed to sanctions. As noted in the Government’s response to the report, we agree that the skillset of staff focused on sanctions has been central to our success in bringing those sanctions to bear. In recognition of the central role that sanctions continue to play as a key part of UK foreign policy, our Department has established a permanent sanctions directorate, in line with one of the report’s recommendations. As part of this new directorate, our Department has established a cadre of sanctions experts to build the enduring expertise that we need in the long term.

Additionally, I can confirm that the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation will have more than 100 staff by the end of this financial year, with current staffing having already more than double compared to last year. That will enable the OFSI to continue to lead the implementation of UK sanctions and ensure that assets in the UK are frozen.

On our approach to asset freezes as opposed to seizures, and getting that balance right—many colleagues have mentioned this and it has come up on the Floor of the House—we are exploring further options to finance the reconstruction of Ukraine using Russian-linked assets. That presents complex legal and policy challenges that officials are considering in detail with other Departments. We are looking at it seriously because we recognise that the scale of assets currently frozen is very significant. I am sure we would all be pleased if there was a route through good legal policy to ensure that that money could be used to make a positive difference.

On overall funding, combatting illicit finance requires the necessary resources to enforce our anti-money laundering laws and bring kleptocrats to justice, which is why the Government have developed a sustainable funding model that demonstrates our commitment to tackling economic crime. We are investing in the National Crime Agency and have increased its budget year on year since 2019. Since February, we have also created a new unit in the NCA, the combating kleptocracy cell, which is focused on targeting corrupt elites and their wealth in the UK. The combination of last year’s spending review settlement and private sector contributions through the new economic crime levy will provide funding of £400 million over the spending review period. That includes £63 million for Companies House to implement its transformation programme, which I already mentioned.

On the speed and scale of our response, we have taken robust action over the past decade. We published a landmark economic crime plan in 2019; we increased the number of investigations into corrupt elites; we established the National Economic Crime Centre; we passed the Criminal Finances Act 2017; and we became the first major economy in the world to implement a public register of beneficial ownership of domestic companies.

Earlier this year, the Government took swift action by passing the expedited Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022. The Act is already helping us to crack down on dirty Russian money in the UK. The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill, which builds on that Act, is currently in Committee. The Bill will help us to bear down on kleptocrats, criminals and terrorists who abuse our open economy, thus strengthening the UK’s reputation as a place where legitimate business can thrive while driving dirty money out of the UK.

A number of colleagues, particularly the hon. Member for Stirling, mentioned the role of Crown dependencies and overseas territories. Of course, all Crown dependencies and overseas territories with financial centres are committed to meeting international standards on illicit finance, tax transparency and anti-money laundering, including those set by the OECD and the Financial Action Task Force. All Crown dependencies and inhabited overseas territories have committed to introducing publicly accessible registers of company beneficial ownership. That is a major shift that puts them ahead of most jurisdictions.

I am pleased that significant progress has been made by several of the jurisdictions, including Gibraltar, which I visited recently. Gibraltar’s register is already operational. The Cayman Islands is working at pace and is completing a consultation on the details of its register. The British Virgin Islands also recently passed legislation that will enable the framework for regulations to be made for a register, in preparation for 2023. Smaller overseas territories, such as Montserrat and Anguilla, are working with the FCDO to update their systems to enable public access. We have funded Open Ownership, a specialist NGO, to provide technical assistance to each overseas territory.

I reiterate our gratitude to the Foreign Affairs Committee for its detailed and useful report. We hope that the Government’s response will assure colleagues that we are gripping the issue at the policy and technical levels. We also hope that it sends the message that London and the UK are no place for dirty Russian money and that our legal framework and institutional strength will deter anyone who thinks that is not true. I also hope it will provide reassurance to our friends and allies, especially Ukraine. We are determined to ensure that we are able to help Ukraine to rebuild its country and defend its sovereignty against outrageous Russian aggression, which all too often has been connected to Kremlin-linked international assets. I hope the Government’s response reassures people that we are getting after it.

Oral Answers to Questions

Neil Coyle Excerpts

Tuesday 17th March 2020 Commons Chamber

[Dominic Raab]

I have to say to the right hon. Lady that I think we have done quite a good job in this House of trying to adopt a bipartisan approach. Whether domestically or internationally, finger-pointing just does not help in any shape or form. We are going to work with all our partners—the US, the Europeans, those in South America and those in Asia, as I have already mentioned—to try to forge the most effective response. That is what all our constituents expect and deserve.

[Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)]

Aman Nasir and Laura Bartley, two of my constituents, are among 100 Brits trapped in Lima, Peru. They say that they cannot get through to our embassy in that country, so how are the Government ensuring that all Brits trapped elsewhere can access embassies and missions that are resourced to answer their queries and to get them home as soon as possible?

[Dominic Raab]

We understand the concern of any constituent who finds themselves in a vulnerable position and also, of course, that of MPs who are trying to do their best. We have beefed up the support we are providing. There is a parliamentary hotline for MPs, and I will make sure that Ministers give the hon. Gentleman all the details so that he can provide the most support and up-to-date advice to his constituents.

Covid-19

Neil Coyle Excerpts

Tuesday 17th March 2020 Commons Chamber

[Dominic Raab]

I think that that is probably one for the Department for Transport. I was not clear whether my hon. Friend was asking about the use of private planes for repatriation, or about whether the restrictions are being extended to them. In any event, I probably ought to pass that on to the experts—the Department for Transport.

[Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)]

The Foreign Secretary is stating quite openly that the Government will not bring everyone home, so how is he working with operators such as TUI to ensure that they act responsibly and do not leave people stranded abroad without communications, like my constituent Michelle Choi in Morocco?

[Dominic Raab]

It is not so much that we will not; it is just a pure question of capacity, given the potential range of hundreds of thousands of UK nationals travelling temporarily abroad. We will liaise very closely with the country—I think the hon. Gentleman was raising the issue of Morocco—and look carefully at what more can be done. The Africa Minister is nodding earnestly, and I know we will take that up. We are also, of course—the hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to nail this point—trying to work with airlines to make sure, as these travel restrictions come into place, that there is a window in which the commercial airlines can come in and get as many as possible of the people who want to come out and back to the UK.

Intelligence and Security Committee Report on Russia

Neil Coyle Excerpts

Tuesday 5th November 2019 Commons Chamber

[Christopher Pincher]

The hon. Lady is right to draw attention to the actions of the Kremlin in states abroad. I have said that we have evidence from around the world of activity that is malign and malicious. I believe that we here in the UK have a robust set of systems in place to defend ourselves. We will look closely at the report that the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield and his Committee have submitted to the Government. It is going through the No. 10 process and at the end of that rigorous review process we will see the report.

[Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)]

Congratulations on your election, Mr Speaker.

We have heard from several Members of the ISC this afternoon, including three sitting behind the Minister, and all have highlighted that every security agency required to do so has signed off this report, as has the Cabinet Office. The unprecedented delay is due to the Prime Minister. Is that because the Prime Minister is acting in the unprecedented fashion of subjugating national security to personal and political interests and his loyalty to Dominic Cummings, a man already found to be in contempt of Parliament?

[Christopher Pincher]

The short answer is no. The report has to go through a proper and rigorous process of scrutiny. It was submitted to the Government on 17 October. The time being taken to scrutinise it is not unusual; to say it is unprecedented is not accurate. Other reports—other sensitive reports, and complicated reports—have taken between four and six weeks to turn around; this important and sensitive report is no different.

Oral Answers to Questions

Neil Coyle Excerpts

Tuesday 25th June 2019 Commons Chamber

[Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)]

2. What support his Department is providing to Trinidad and Tobago to improve that country’s (a) handling of murder cases involving UK citizens and (b) criminal justice system.

[The Minister for Africa (Harriett Baldwin)]

Since 2017, under a bilateral security memorandum of understanding with Trinidad and Tobago, the UK has delivered targeted programmes to improve local judicial and policing capacity.

[Neil Coyle]

I ask this question with specific reference to my constituent Sharon St John, whose son Adrian was murdered three years ago. She is still waiting for justice. I thank the Foreign Office for belatedly getting more involved in the case, but what further pressure can Ministers and the Government put on the Trinidad and Tobago authorities to set the date for a full trial as soon as possible?

[Harriett Baldwin]

I commend the hon. Gentleman’s assiduousness in raising this truly terrible constituency case. He can be reassured that we have taken every opportunity to raise the case with Trinidad and Tobago. We obviously cannot interfere specifically in Trinidad and Tobago’s judicial process, but we are extending every possible support where we can. The hon. Gentleman will be aware that in May last year the magistrate committed the accused to stand trial for murder, but we acknowledge that the trial date has not yet been set.

--- Later in debate ---

[Harriett Baldwin]

I pay tribute to my hon. Friend’s excellence as a trade envoy between the UK and Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s trade has increased by some 80%, which must surely be one of the records among trade envoys.

We are truly appalled by those killings, and our thoughts are indeed with the people who have been affected by them. We support Ethiopia’s progress in political and economic reforms, and we do not want such events to influence that agenda.

[Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)]

T9. What assessment have the Government made of the impact that the Windrush scandal has had and the impact that wider “hostile environment” policies are still having, on our relationships with key allies in the Commonwealth and beyond?

[Mr Hunt]

I think the action that the Government have taken to address the Windrush scandal has been noted by the countries affected, and I think they understand that we see that an injustice was done and we are putting it right.

Oral Answers to Questions

Neil Coyle Excerpts

Tuesday 26th February 2019 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Asia and the Pacific (Mark Field)]

The UK is disappointed that Japan has announced that it will withdraw from the International Whaling Commission in order to resume commercial whaling, and we urge it to rethink its decision. The Prime Minister raised this with Prime Minister Abe on 10 January, confirming that the UK is and remains strongly opposed to commercial whaling.

[Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)]

T3. More than 1 million Venezuelan refugees who have been forced to flee Maduro’s humanitarian catastrophe are now in Colombia. I have a large, vibrant Colombian community in Southwark who are very worried about the knock-on impact of that crisis on their country, and on family and friends. What support and resource are the Government giving to the Colombian Government to manage this situation?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

We are working closely with the Colombian Government in defending the continuation of the peace process. They have borne a massive burden of people who have left Venezuela, and we are at the forefront of European efforts to make sure that we can find a solution in Venezuela, in response to the absolutely unacceptable conduct of Mr Maduro.

Oral Answers to Questions

Neil Coyle Excerpts

Tuesday 4th September 2018 Commons Chamber

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I have to say to the right hon. Gentleman that DFID has limited experience in Latin America. We would like to be doing more, and there has been the provision of humanitarian advice, but I would be the first to admit that that is not nearly enough to address the seriousness of the plight that Venezuelans face. As he rightly says, millions of people have left Venezuela and these problems are now affecting neighbouring countries in a serious way. We are working closely with the Lima group, led by the Peruvian Foreign Minister, to do what we can to try to change the disastrous situation in Venezuela.

[Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)]

10. What recent assessment his Department has made of the level of political (a) violence and (b) arrests in Sierra Leone.

[The Minister for Africa (Harriett Baldwin)]

Sierra Leone held presidential and parliamentary elections in March, and power was transferred peacefully. We are aware of recent allegations of politically motivated violence and we continue to monitor the situation. The new Government have made a commitment to govern for all Sierra Leoneans, and I call on them to honour that pledge and to ensure due process in all cases.

[Neil Coyle]

I am proud of the large and vibrant Sierra Leonean community in my constituency, but many community leaders have come to see me to discuss their worries about escalating tensions, arrests, violence and restrictions on political activity since the elections earlier this year. Will the Minister meet Southwark’s Sierra Leonean community representatives to outline what the Government are doing in response to their concerns?

[Harriett Baldwin]

On my visit to the country earlier this year, I was struck by the journey that it has gone through from civil war to the presence of United Nations peacekeepers to the terrible Ebola outbreak, so it was welcome that elections were held this year and that there was a peaceful transition of power. I would, of course, always be happy to meet the hon. Gentleman’s constituents and the community. To reiterate the point I just made, we welcome the inclusive approach that the Sierra Leonean Government are talking about and hope to see it implemented.