Counter-terrorism and Security Bill

Mark Field Excerpts

Tuesday 10th February 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

I thank my hon. Friend for giving me an opportunity to make it absolutely clear that we intend the guidance to be clear. We have produced the guidance for consultation; as I said, we are considering the responses to it; and we are looking at areas where we need to clarify the guidance. It is important for universities, notwithstanding academic freedom and the need to secure freedom of speech, also to recognise the duty of care they have to students. That is why I believe it absolutely right for universities to be within this legislation and within the Prevent duty that is being put into statute. We will, of course, make the guidance clear, so that universities can operate appropriately.

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

I very much agree with my right hon. Friend’s view on the issue of freedom of speech. Vice-chancellors and others who are in control of our universities are worried about their ongoing duties, so can we ensure that the guidance will not fall into place and further duties will not be placed on our universities until such time as the clarity of the guidance is manifest, even if that means waiting for a further academic year?

[Mrs May]

There is a reason why we are putting the Prevent duty on a statutory basis, and there is a reason why the Bill has gone through Parliament slightly more quickly than would normally be the case. We have made it clear that we have issued guidance for consultation, and that we will respond to the consultation and revise the guidance. We have also made it clear, in the amendments, the particular regard that universities must have to freedom of speech and academic freedom. However, as I have said, I think that universities must also recognise their duty of care to students. I hope that, if students are being radicalised on their campuses, universities will get to know about it and take some action.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Mark Field Excerpts

Tuesday 6th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hanson]

Let us look at those issues in due course. The hon. Gentleman will have an opportunity to make a contribution and the Minister will respond. I am trying to focus on our new clauses, which are about putting in place a reasonable level of judicial oversight. I have cited what the independent reviewer said because when the Prime Minister launched this policy those concerns were stated outside this House much more severely and harshly than they were when the independent reviewer appeared before the Joint Committee. The point he makes is that the Government’s defence at the moment is that there is an opportunity for judicial review, which is an expensive, long and time-consuming process and which may not be able to be exercised from outside the jurisdiction of UK shores. Under the TPIM legislation, Ministers have to go to a court, whereas under the TEO proposals, as currently put forward, they will not. Our main proposal in the new clauses is to put in place a regime that mirrors that of the existing TPIM legislation. This is not a new, fanciful procedure; it is one the Government have drawn up, as it mirrors their proposal, and I hope they will consider it seriously.

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

Does the shadow Minister accept that these temporary arrangements have a level of urgency that is often not quite there in the TPIM-type arrangements, which is why the Government perhaps feel that adopting judicial oversight as opposed to a judicial review process would be unwise? Perhaps he would go into some detail on the underlying urgency issues relating to the temporary seizure of passports, which we are going to be discussing in the next two days.

[Mr Hanson]

I accept that there will always be an element of speed required on occasion to examine issues such as the temporary exclusion of an individual, but this will not always be an urgent matter. The Government will know of and will be tracking individuals seeking to return; they will have intelligence on that and will be able to prepare and take action on individuals. I know from my experience of being a Minister in a range of Departments that if speed on legal requirements is needed, it can be done. I have often as a Minister authorised legal action to be taken in the morning that is taken through the courts on the very same day. I have done that in the Ministry of Justice in regard to prison strikes and in the Home Office in relation to a range of other measures—it can be done. The question is: is the Home Secretary’s decision on these matters the fount of all wisdom? It may well be—let us not put too fine a point on it. There will be occasions when the Home Secretary is making a perfectly rational and valid decision based on evidence that someone is a potential threat to the UK and therefore needs to be excluded. The question for the House is simply this: should there be an opportunity for someone other than the Home Secretary—the courts—to make a judgment as to whether the Home Secretary has acted proportionately and within the law, and has justifiable reasons for so acting? That could be done in camera or in public—that is for us to consider—but we are making our proposal because the same provision is in place for TPIM legislation. If TPIM legislation is dealing—and I know from personal experience that it is—with those at the very sharp end of the potential terrorist threat, where evidence is around but necessarily cannot always be shared in public, then that can also be done in the case of temporary exclusion.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Field]

Although I share some of my right hon. and learned Friend’s concerns about riding roughshod over a lot of ancient liberties, does he not accept that what he says about “free-born British subjects” is very much a throwback to a bygone age? Many of our constituents would not recognise the notion that the individuals we are talking about are in any way free-born British subjects, because many of them have come here as immigrants, perhaps rather recently, got passports and then misused them, as our hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) rightly points out, by going abroad and then, having renounced many of the liberties for this country, wishing to return. [Interruption.] I will be off my feet in just a moment, Mr Deputy Speaker—[Interruption.] Does he recognise that point?

[Mr Grieve]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, but I must say that I profoundly disagree. I think that the issue is as relevant today as it has always been. British nationality, and British citizenship, are important rights, and they are shared, and should be shared, irrespective of a person’s background or ancestry. That is a fundamental principle on which this country operates and on which the House works. I consider it a very serious matter if we are to say to any group within society that they may be deprived of what is effectively their birth right, and that birth right is extended to all. I should make it quite clear that that in no way endorses the right of individuals to behave contrary to law. If they do so, they should be punished, and punished severely.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir William Cash]

Provided evidence to those who will be making decisions about terrorism-related activities. It is not just about providing evidence to the court, which I think is implicit in what the hon. Gentleman is suggesting; it is about providing evidence about the facts described in the amendment. It is not necessary for the case to go to court, and the amendment leaves out the word “reasonable” in this context for that reason. If the Home Secretary provides evidence that is based on the person in question having repudiated their allegiance to the United Kingdom, and if that person has provided evidence of their allegiance to the new state by virtue of their actions and statements, that is enough in itself. That individual has done those things, and that is the evidence in question.

The legislative framework of this measure has already been mentioned, and I say to the Minister and my colleagues—some of whom I thoroughly disagree with on these matters—that it will be extremely difficult to exclude the operation of the charter of fundamental rights in applications of the kind likely to arise under the Bill. That is a serious problem because it will mean that under sections 2 and 3 of the European Communities Act 1972, the charter of fundamental rights will apply. That has already been made applicable—the European Scrutiny Committee has established that without a shadow of doubt, over and against the continuing belief, which has now been abandoned, that that charter does not apply to the United Kingdom. The charter of fundamental rights will apply, as will the Human Rights Act 1998. In those circumstances, the question of whether decisions will be taken by the British courts is a matter of extremely grave doubt; in fact, I would go further and say it is an impossibility. On the basis that the charter of fundamental rights does apply, if a decision were to go to the courts as in the Opposition amendments, it would be decided by the European Court of Justice under matters covered by the charter. That is a fatal objection. If the measure were to be carried out notwithstanding the European Communities Act 1972 it would be another story, but that is not what the amendments would do.

In conclusion, these are grave issues with great sensitivities, beliefs, convictions and principles at stake. There is an honest disagreement, to say the least, between myself and other Conservative colleagues, and I think we should put the British subject first, by which I mean those liable to be affected by jihadist atrocities, and not put forward the generalised view that the human rights lobby would prefer. This matter is too serious and too dangerous. It is not just about allegiance in its own right, but about a physical danger to the British public.

[Mark Field]

Unlike many of my colleagues I am more sympathetic to the Government’s position than others, although I respect the deep concerns felt across the House about broad issues of civil liberties. I have less concern about the temporary exclusion order being down to Executive authority, and in many ways the accountability of any Minister to come to the House and justify their actions counts for quite a lot.

The right hon. and learned Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) referred to the protection only of judicial review. If it were still down to old-fashioned Wednesbury principles I could accept that, but judicial review is now a rather broader body of law than was perhaps the case in the 1940s. It is now pretty substantial, which provides enough comfort—at least to my mind—for us to go down that route, rather than requiring the oversight that would come through David Anderson QC.

[Mr David Heath (Somerton and Frome) (LD)]

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that judicial review can look only at the process of reaching a decision, but that judicial oversight would be in a position to take further evidence on the correctness of the decision? Surely that is appropriate to these circumstances.

[Mark Field]

That is the principle of judicial review, as the hon. Gentleman is well aware, and judicial activism has put matters well beyond that particular point.

I have two more brief observations, and I have some sympathy with the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart), who is not currently in his place. My concern from the various whisperings around the Chamber in the last couple of hours is that the Government are trying to find some way of backtracking in the House of Lords on this matter. I think it would be a great discourtesy to this House if that came to pass. If we are to have a proper debate on this issue, it should be through the elected House as far as possible, rather than showing a bit of leg and letting things happen in the House of Lords. We shall see what the Minister has to say and how matters proceed in the other place.

I have one brief observation about all these issues and this sort of legislation, which is close to all our hearts. Governments of both colours are perhaps too utilitarian and practical in their outlook on such issues, and at times they need to take a broader view. The right hon. Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson) referred to our international reputation, and I could not agree more. Our international reputation on these issues counts for a hell of a lot, and on the 800th anniversary of the Magna Carta there is a sense in which the rule of law has been an important part of what we have been able, in terms of values, to turn out to much of the rest of the world.

I was also struck by the Snowden revelations made by Angela Merkel at the Reichstag, which recognised those states in the west that pride themselves on the values that have played an important part in developing human rights across the globe, affecting all 7.5 billion citizens of the world. We must watch and ensure that what we do does not set a precedent and an opportunity for dangerous dictators to utilise the fact that the rights of individuals have apparently been run over roughshod. There is no doubt in my mind that what is proposed in the Bill is necessary, but it is open to some debate whether some elements of it are entirely proportionate. It is a delicate balance. My instincts often are on the side of liberty on these issues. More often than not, it is right that we have some form of broader judicial oversight. As someone who is on the Intelligence and Security Committee, I recognise the importance of parliamentary oversight for some of the very important issues that require a focus on terrorism. I think the Government have broadly got it right in this regard. I hope the Minister will pay due attention to the concerns that have been raised and that, if there is to be backtracking, courtesy will be shown and it will come to this House rather than being left to another place. We have had an important debate, with contributions from Members on both sides of the House. The Minister should pay very close attention to the concerns that have been raised today.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Edward Garnier (Harborough) (Con)]

The experience of the constituent of the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan), which I was interested to learn about, illustrates the difficulty that faces us. I do not suppose that anybody in the House—certainly not the Home Secretary or the Minister—wants to do anything that makes it more difficult to catch terrorists and others who wish to do us, our allies and our citizens harm. None the less, in our enthusiasm to deal with the problem, we need to come up with the best answer, and in my view the best answer includes much greater judicial oversight than is currently in the Bill.

I share the great honour, with my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash), of being a former shadow Attorney-General. In fact, I was shadow Attorney-General twice, although I do not know whether that makes my arguments twice as good or half as good—I do not imagine it is of any relevance whatsoever. However, I think we need to extract from the Government a little movement. I hope that the Minister, in his response, can reassure me on this matter. I do not mind whether that movement comes in this House or the other place. I do not share the objections of my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) to altering the Bill in the House of Lords. We are a bicameral Parliament, and if the Lords can come up with an answer that is politically acceptable, elegant and efficacious, let them do it. If it satisfies me and the Government, I am all for it.

[Mark Field]

My objection is not that there is not a great power of intellect in the House of Lords; it is that if the Government have already made up their mind to do it, they should do it here, rather than waiting for a defeat in the Lords.

[Sir Edward Garnier]

I see. That is a different point from the one I was addressing, so I apologise to my hon. Friend. Either way, I want the Bill adjusted for greater judicial oversight.

My hon. Friend is not as anxious as I am about the temporary exclusion orders in clause 3. I would not be as anxious as I am if the expression “temporary” related to a period far shorter than two years. To me, a temporary exclusion order means a matter of months, at the most, and possibly only days and weeks. Once one moves from days, weeks or a few months, one moves into something other than temporary, which bolsters the arguments behind the need for judicial supervision. I do not like the word “permission” in new clause 2 tabled by the right hon. Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson), but I do not think we should be frightened of judicial supervision. By “judicial supervision”, I mean getting to grips with the substance of the case, not judicial review, irrespective of the fact, as my hon. Friend accepted, that judicial review is a bit meatier and has more teeth than when it started. I share the concerns of many hon. Members, therefore, that although the Home Secretary—particularly this one—will be entirely well motivated, we should not allow her or her Ministers to persuade us that their motives trump our concerns about the absence of judicial oversight.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Mark Field Excerpts

Tuesday 16th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Caroline Lucas]

The right hon. Lady makes a perfectly fair point. Most of the evidence is coming from that direction. I agree that we need more evidence gathering specifically on the Islamist threat, but none the less I think the point I am making remains that we need greater understanding of why people are radicalised.

I was talking about counter-radicalisation and Prevent, and I wanted to flag up the fact that, as Members will know, Prevent has been criticised for failing properly to engage at the community level and instead making some communities feel singled out and stigmatised. I think that is a lost opportunity and we must redouble our efforts and engage in effective community-led counter-radicalisation programmes, learning from other countries that have done just that.

Deradicalisation is more relevant to the debate we are having now. I draw Members’ attention, if they are not already aware of them, to programmes in places such as Denmark, where a programme called Back on Track has been operating. Its targets include prison inmates who have been either convicted of terrorism or involved in hate crimes or other extremism-related crimes. The aim of the project is to support inmates through mentoring to become better at handling everyday situations, problems and conflicts. Another key element is to focus on engaging families and social networks in order to offer inmates long-term support when re-entering society. Other Members have already underlined the importance of family and kinship groups.

Back on Track has been running alongside another programme, De-radicalisation-Targeted Intervention, which uses mentoring to support individuals who are trying to leave an extremist group. It is focused particularly on being proactive by reaching out to potential beneficiaries and motivating them to participate. A key objective is helping them to find constructive social alternatives to extremist groups.

Germany has what is known as the Hayat programme, which has been developed to reflect the premise that the minds of young Europeans intent on practising jihad in Syria or Iraq are perhaps less likely to be changed by politicians’ threats or force of law than by their next of kin. One of Hayat’s family counsellors says:

“Families are the closest social community that most radicalised young Muslims have. It is the perfect living counter-narrative to radical Islam.”

Since 2012 Hayat has operated a national helpline, which families who are concerned about their sons or daughters drifting into radical Islam can contact.

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

While I agree that there is much we can learn from what happens in other nations, does the hon. Lady agree that significant work already goes on in our communities, both with the Prevent programme and without it, which takes the lead and which also co-operates with other nations along the lines she is outlining? On the deradicalisation programme, it strikes me that we have to deal with incredibly difficult issues, but I am confident that a lot of thinking is going into this and there is a lot of co-operation between nations, particularly on the very large number of returning jihadis, which is an even bigger problem, in numbers terms at least, in places such as France and Germany than it is in the UK today.

[Caroline Lucas]

I do not doubt that much work is going on, some of it very good, but I wanted to pinpoint the experience of young people who have got caught up in some of these things. They have gone to places such as Syria and they want to come back, and at the moment it does not feel that there is a path that is particularly encouraging to them to come back. We talked about this yesterday when we discussed the temporary exclusion orders and whether or not that means someone will go straight into criminal proceedings.

What I would like us to do is look at some of the models in places such as Germany and Denmark, so that when we have someone who is trying to come back and who is turning their back on what they have done, we do not automatically put them through the criminal process but instead devote a lot more time to trying to see how they can be reintegrated. Obviously one would not do that at the expense of wider security issues, but neither do I think that this is a soft approach. I think, in fact, that it could be a way of making us safer in the long run if some of these deradicalisation programmes work. There is a bit of a gap there, and it is an area that I would like us in this country and our Government to be looking at in more detail.

[Mark Field]

Does the hon. Lady not recognise that we are some 20 weeks away from a general election and so, unfortunately, the rhetoric about throwing away the keys will inevitably come from party leaders? However, in their heart of hearts they all recognise the importance of looking at this issue in a much more holistic way. I agree with her that it is in the interests of our intelligence services, apart from anything else, that we make common cause to find out about some of these returnees, as they can perhaps co-operate. I suspect that work of that order is going on, as well as the range of programmes to which she refers. In many ways, it is understandable that tabloid rhetoric has its part to play, but our authorities are bringing to bear a much more sophisticated, nuanced approach to this very real problem.

[Caroline Lucas]

Again, I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, but I would not be as relaxed about the tabloid rhetoric as he is. I certainly do not think we should be stoking it in this Chamber because that sends out a message that is heard out there and makes young people believe it is too dangerous to come back. I am aware of people from my constituency and the wider area where I live who are out in places such as Syria and do want to come back, but are terrified of doing so. It is not in the interests of wider security that we just send out the same messages; we have to have different messages and learn from countries that seem to be doing a better job on some of this work than we are.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Mark Field Excerpts

Monday 15th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hanson]

I am grateful to you, Mr Streeter.

It is important that we recognise that terrorist attacks are, sadly, highly likely. According to the Government’s own analysis in the explanatory notes:

“Approximately 500 individuals of interest to the police and security services have travelled from the UK to Syria and the region since the start of the conflict. It is estimated half of these have returned. In the context of this heightened threat to our national security, the provisions of the Bill”

are designed to address those matters.

My hon. Friends the Members for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) and for Sedgefield (Phil Wilson) and I have tabled amendments 29 and 17 because there needs to be a debate about two particular issues. If the Bill’s measures are agreed by both Houses they will become law, but there will be no end date or review date for the powers. Amendment 29 seeks to ensure that clause 1

“shall be repealed on 31 December 2016 unless both Houses of Parliament have passed a resolution that it should continue in force until a future date.”

It goes on:

“The date specified in a resolution of both Houses of Parliament under subsection (2) may be modified by subsequent resolutions of both Houses of Parliament.”

The amendment is therefore designed to create, in effect, a sunset clause to review the legislation, which is not unusual for terrorism legislation. It would not demand that we revisit the whole clause by seeking to enact new legislation; it would simply require a resolution to allow the provisions to continue. The amendment has merit and I will willingly discuss it with the Minister.

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

Although I agree with the shadow Minister that that amendment does, in principle, have some merit and that it focuses the mind on the fact that we need consolidating legislation to deal with a whole range of different terrorism-related issues, does he not recognise that the raw logic of his proposal is that if such a sunset clause is agreed, the provisions could end up entirely unprotected if the Government did not introduce any new legislation at that point? That would not be a desirable state of affairs.

[Mr Hanson]

I am sure that the hon. Gentleman has looked carefully at amendment 29, which states:

“This section shall be repealed on 31 December 2016 unless both Houses of Parliament have passed a resolution that it should continue in force”.

Therefore, it does not require new legislation; it simply requires a resolution of this House, which could be agreed in an hour-and-a-half debate, as has happened in the past. Indeed, clause 17(5) states:

“Subsections (1) to (4) are repealed on 31 December 2016”,

so there is already a remit for a resolution to review the provisions. Amendment 29 has a similar purpose.

Amendment 17 is slightly different. It states that, if an individual has had their travel document removed under the provisions of clause 1 and schedule 1, they

“may appeal against this decision in the courts over the evidence on which conditions…of this schedule were met.”

At the moment there is no appeal procedure for an individual who has lost their passport, and that needs to be considered.

On amendment 29, clause 1 introduces schedule 1, which defines a number of areas and sets out a course of action relating to the seizure of a passport from a person suspected of involvement in terrorism offences. Under the heading “Interpretation”, the schedule states that immigration officers, customs officials, qualified officers and senior police officers can remove a passport from an individual. By “passport”, it means either a United Kingdom passport or one issued by another nation. The schedule defines involvement in terrorism-related activity as the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism; conduct that facilitates the commission of terrorism; conduct that gives encouragement to terrorism; and conduct that gives support or assistance to terrorism. The schedule also includes powers to search for, inspect and retain travel documents. Authorisation for that will not just be sought from a senior police officer; the schedule also includes conditions for how that authorisation will be agreed.

I refer to those points because they are definitive statements. They may or may not be appropriate or work in practice, but whatever the Minister tells us today he will accept that the Prime Minister indicated in his announcement at the end of August that the measures would be introduced. It is now December, which means that the Bill has been drafted speedily. I make no general criticism of that, but even the Bill’s explanatory notes state that there has been limited consultation on a range of aspects, even though the matters covered in schedule 1 involve serious powers.

The schedule allows for the period in which the document can be removed and retained by the judicial authority to be extended from the initial 14-day period to 30 days. Paragraph 14 states:

“This paragraph applies where a person’s travel documents are retained”.

Paragraph 14(2) gives the Secretary of State a great power:

“The Secretary of State may make whatever arrangements he or she thinks appropriate in relation to the person… during the relevant period”

and

“on the relevant period coming to an end.”

The Secretary of State is also bound by schedule 1 to produce a code of practice covering training, the exercise of functions by constables, the information to be given, and how and when that information is to be given. The code of practice will be published in draft and laid before this House. All those matters are covered by schedule 1.

I have gone through the schedule in detail because it covers an awful lot of potential activity that may or may not work as the Government intend it to. The purpose of our proposed sunset clause is not to say that Her Majesty’s Opposition oppose clause 1 or schedule 1, because, although some Members might, we do not. Our amendment addresses the fact that the schedule proposes creating a complex new code of practice relating to the criteria covering individual officers and others who can exercise the powers, including removing the passports of not only British citizens but citizens of foreign countries.

If we enact that in the next few weeks, it will be a serious piece of legislation. In view of the reasons the Minister has given for introducing the provisions, it would do no harm for him to consider—this is the purpose of amendment 29—a date for us formally to allow the legislation to fall, unless the House is satisfied with the original proposal. By December 2016, there will have been a general election and the House of Commons will be composed of whoever has been elected, and whoever is the Minister will be able to review the legislation to see whether it works. They would then be able to table a motion to pass a resolution allowing the legislation to continue unamended.

[Mark Field]

The shadow Minister is making some fair points and I think the whole House would broadly support the idea that we need to consider how the Bill will be applied in practice. We all recognise that the new powers raise some legitimate concerns relating to civil liberties. Rather than having a sunset clause, has the right hon. Gentleman given some thought to the idea of imposing on the Home Office an obligation, within a year of the Bill being enacted, to produce a full report on the workings of this novel change in procedure?

[Mr Hanson]

We did consider those matters and I originally drafted an amendment that sought to do that. I could have tabled it last Thursday but I decided to focus our debate on whether the legislation is fit for purpose. I am not saying that it is not; I am simply saying that there are severe changes in the Bill that restrict individuals, give powers to police officers and others, set out a new code of practice and give a range of powers to the Secretary of State to do what they wish with detained individuals. If the Opposition are to support the clause this evening, as we will, it must be reviewed at some point in the future. The mechanism we suggest means that a Minister, whoever that might be, must review the situation and either table a motion or, if the legislation ultimately falls, table a replacement piece of legislation in time for 31 December 2016.

I am not seeking to cause difficulties for the Minister with amendment 29. I simply want him to consider in detail his proposals in clause 1 and schedule 1 and whether we should have a sunset clause. We want such a clause because one of the gaps in the legislation means that there is no mechanism for appeal in the event of the powers in schedule 1 or clause 1 being exercised against an individual. An individual's travel documents will be removed for 14 days, and potentially for 30 days, but in the meantime there is no mechanism through which they can appeal effectively against that decision. Amendment 17 allows for an appeal in the courts on the subject of

“the evidence on which conditions in paragraph 2(1)(a) and (b) of this schedule were met”.

The Committee will agree that the right of British citizens to travel freely, unrestricted by state interference, is crucial and historical.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hanson]

That suggestion is worthy of consideration.

The official Opposition tabled an amendment to say that there should be a right of appeal for the reasons that the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield set out. That concern is shared by Members across the House. It is a basic right of appeal. We can look at how it could be exercised, as ever. We might be able to improve the amendment technically. However, if we had not tabled amendment 17, we would not be having a debate about the right to appeal against this measure. The purpose of the debate is to say to the Minister that we think there should be a right of appeal. If the Minister is sympathetic to that idea, he can take it away.

[Mark Field]

rose—

[Lady Hermon (North Down) (Ind)]

rose—

[Mr Hanson]

I give way first to the hon. Gentleman.

[Mark Field]

Perhaps I do not share the great faith in the bureaucratic competence of the Home Office that was expressed by the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn)—

[Jeremy Corbyn]

It was the opposite.

[Mark Field]

I guessed that that was the case. I was being slightly ironic. One issue with the notion that we could have appeals is that if there was a great emergency and the passports of many dozens or even many hundreds of people were seized, the appeals process would become unwieldy. One hopes that such a situation will not come about. If there was a small number of individuals at any one time, it would be quite manageable, but if there was a large number, that would make it more difficult.

[Mr Hanson]

We do not yet know on how many occasions the power will be exercised. I suspect that a vast number of passports will not be seized, but we cannot anticipate that. According to the Government’s explanatory notes,

“500 individuals of interest to the police…have travelled from the UK to Syria…since the start of the conflict.”

That has happened over the past 18 months to three years. The number of individuals travelling out of the UK who may be of interest might be small, but that does not mean that they should not have the right of appeal because, as I have said, mistakes can be made.

I give way to my hon. Friend the Member for North Down (Lady Hermon).

--- Later in debate ---

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

I would indeed like to say a few words about new clause 8, which I tabled. As we know, there will be situations in which it is necessary to prevent a person from leaving the country, but I would argue that the police already have a tried and tested way of preventing suspects from doing so—the power of arrest, combined with the ability to require passport surrender if a suspect is arrested and released without charge. However, passport surrender is not currently possible in the case of those arrested on suspicion of being a terrorist under section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000, as conditional police bail cannot be granted following such arrests. That anomaly means that there is a currently a loophole in the ability of law enforcement to require passport surrender of terrorism suspects. It would be much simpler to remove that loophole than to proceed with the convoluted passport retention scheme set out in clause 1 and schedule 1.

The safest and fairest way to prevent suspects from leaving the country to participate in terrorist activity would be for police officers to use their powers of arrest. If an individual was considered to pose an immediate risk to the country, they could be detained rather than left to roam the UK for 30 days, as would happen under the Government’s proposal. If they did not pose an immediate risk, they could be detained and bailed, and their passport could be surrendered as part of the process.

Including that provision in the Bill and removing the bar on police bail would be much simpler and fairer than a convoluted passport surrender scheme. It would deliver the same practical result as the Government seemingly wish to achieve—preventing individuals from leaving the country—but would do so in a way that, crucially, protected against misuse and discrimination.

My new clause is intended to give the police the powers they need, and to enable them to exercise them consistent with upholding suspects’ human rights. That would act as a greater deterrent, by allowing for arrest rather than summary passport seizure, and would help to overcome some of the in-built discrimination that exists in relation to stop-and-search and would inevitably be part of a stop-and-seizure approach to passports.

[Mark Field]

I do not wish to cast judgment on the two proposed processes, but does the hon. Lady not recognise that the arrest and bail process would probably involve a higher threshold than mere passport seizure? Considerably fewer people would therefore be subject to it, so it might not make the rest of us much safer. The Government’s intention in using passport seizure is to stop those who wish to escape these shores—they will not necessarily be guilty of any offence before doing so.

[Caroline Lucas]

I thank the hon. Gentleman, but I do not think his point stands up. Under new clause 8, an individual considered to pose an immediate risk to the country could be detained rather than being left to the roam the UK, as would happen under the Government’s proposal. If they were not considered to pose an immediate risk, they could be bailed and their passport seized. Seizing a passport as part of the bail process would be more effective than what I believe he proposes.

[Mark Field]

The problem is not that there would be a risk of people roaming through the UK and being a direct and immediate risk to other UK citizens. It is that they might leave these shores to carry out terrorist activity abroad.

[Caroline Lucas]

I do not see that as being more of a risk under my new clause, the advantage of which would be that we would not be involved in a so-called stop-and-seizure approach, which we know is often not effective. Summary stop powers do not yield effective results—Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary has found that in most years since 2001, more than 1 million people have been stopped and searched, but only 9% were subsequently arrested. If the summary sanction were the removal of a passport, that failure rate would be too high. In addition to risking injustice for the individuals concerned, such an approach would serve to perpetuate a climate of fear and suspicion rather than encourage good relations between different communities in British society.

The Home Secretary herself recently recognised the prejudicial nature of stop-and-search powers and sought to scale them back. She stated:

“Nobody wins when stop and search is misused. It can be an enormous waste of police time and damage the relationship between the public and police.”

It appears odd to legislate for a new stop-and-search-type power when the problems that such an approach causes have been clearly identified and when it is contrary to the Home Secretary’s policy on stop-and-search away from the borders.

I do not think that my suggestions in new clause 8 would reduce our ability to ensure that we are secure. On the contrary, they would make us better able to know where people are, and crucially, they would mean that we would not use so-called stop-and-seizure powers, which have been discredited and are not very effective.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Mark Field Excerpts

Tuesday 9th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Diana Johnson]

I am grateful for the right hon. Gentleman’s observations on amendment 5. As with the previous grouping, the amendment was tabled to give us the opportunity to look at the specifics of clause 17 and to understand fully the thinking behind the Minister’s approach. I take on board what the right hon. Gentleman has said, which may be correct, but the amendment allows us to debate what would be disclosed and what information would be available.

I have just bombarded the Minister with a whole range of questions and I know that, as usual, he will be very thorough and go through each in turn. However, I want to turn briefly to new clause 2, which seeks to move on from the retention of data to a review of whether the form of storing the data is allowing the key authorities to access it in a timely manner. I will say, so everyone understands where I am coming from, that this proposal aims to probe the Minister’s argument, and to look at the clause to see what more can be done and whether we need to be aware of any issues for companies.

My concern arises from the police’s apparent problems in pursuing the majority of suspected paedophiles identified through Operation Notarise. My understanding is that Operation Notarise identified between 20,000 and 30,000 individuals whom the communications data suggested were taking part in online abuse. From that, only 700 people have been named, investigated and arrested, so well in excess of 20,000 IP addresses have been identified, but that information has not been translated into named users. At this point, I am not even talking about arrests, but about identifying the users to enable effective safeguarding interventions.

Once a user is identified, even if it is just an address, the police can make several key checks: first, against the police national computer to see if there is a known sex offender living at the address; secondly, against the Disclosure and Barring Service database to identify anyone who might be working with or have access to children; and thirdly, against the Department for Work and Pensions database to see if a child is registered at the property for the purpose of claiming child benefit.

At the moment, the police do not know how many of the people they have identified are known sex offenders working with children or living with children. Most people would see that as unacceptable and would believe there should be a response. This could start with a review of the degree to which the difficulty of linking IP addresses to users is behind the police’s problems with moving this forward.

Finally, I turn to the amendments and new clauses tabled by my hon. Friends the Members for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) and for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), and by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas), on the degree to which RIPA is being used to access the records of certain professionals, including journalists. They address a real concern that Members and the general public have about the use of RIPA to access the records particularly of journalists and those in the media.

As the shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), has said, this issue has to be addressed. Indeed, a key concession secured by the Opposition during the passage of the DRIP Bill was that a review of RIPA would be conducted by David Anderson QC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, and that it would include the use of RIPA to look at the records of journalists. It is because we have confidence in that review that we do not feel amendment 11 is necessary.

However, that is also why the Opposition have a great deal of sympathy with the aims of new clause 1, which would require a court order before relevant authorities could access communications data that could be covered by a professional duty of confidentiality. The clause does not state whether the role of the court would be simply to ensure that due process is followed, or to apply some test of proportionality or necessity. However, the clause provides for the right of appeal for the individual. That means that an individual would have prior knowledge that their communications data were to be disclosed to law enforcement agencies. It is also important to note that the clause would apply not just to journalists but to doctors, lawyers and others, including Members of Parliament, when a professional duty of confidentiality could be construed.

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

The hon. Lady referred to journalists, but how broadly would she or her colleagues define “journalists”? We are living in a world of bloggers and of a whole range of individuals who would consider themselves to be part of the media overall, but presumably she would not necessarily want each and every one of those self-professed journalists and bloggers to be caught by these potentially restricting and constricting provisions, essentially watering down elements of RIPA?

[Diana Johnson]

I have the disadvantage of speaking first on this group of amendments, and obviously, this is not my amendment, so I am very much looking forward to hearing what the proposers feel would happen. However, the hon. Gentleman raises an important point, because we are not only talking about a limited group of people who describe themselves as journalists and who, in the past, we would have been able to identify clearly. Perhaps the proposers of the amendment would be able to address that when they speak to it.

I want to make a further point about the broad definition of professional duty that concerns me, especially when combined with the right of appeal. As I have said, a large number of professionals have some form of duty of confidentiality, and in many cases it is not clear, particularly when discussing communications data, how that potential duty of confidentiality would be separated from other investigations about which we would not allow the individual to have prior knowledge. There is a clear case for preventing a journalist from being targeted for their sources unless there is an overwhelming need to do so. However, the case is less clear in respect of other professions, particularly as we may be investigating issues involving criminal misconduct. Let me give an example for the Committee to consider: the case of Myles Bradbury, the doctor recently convicted of a string of horrendous sexual assaults of boys in his care. As a doctor, he would potentially have been covered by the new clause, especially in respect of some of his communications, and the Committee would be concerned about that. If he had been alerted to the fact that the police were investigating him, he would have had some time to delete much of the evidence which was then used to lead to his prosecution. I just give that as an example of the care we have to take in considering these matters.

I hope the Minister will respond in detail—I am sure he will—to the issues I have raised on this group, particularly the need for the drafting of clause 17 to be made much clearer so that the general public can be reassured about exactly what it is attempting to do.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Alan Beith]

The hon. Gentleman has a strange desire, which he has expressed during a previous speech, to extend the debate beyond the bounds of clause 17 and the amendments to it. I do not think we should be drawn into that at the moment, except to make the general point that all processes involving intrusion into people’s private communications should have high levels of justification before they are used at all, and protections should be provided by various safeguards and authorisations. Finding the right balance for different levels of communication is a difficult task, and I expect a great deal of work will need to be done. Most of us in this House, and certainly most in my party, do not want, either by design or accidental discovery, a great deal of personal information about people to get in the hands of the state and its employees without any reasonable justification. On a matter that will be raised when the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) speaks, nor do we want the processes of investigation by journalists to be impaired by a fear that sources will be compromised from the beginning. There are very good reasons for extreme caution in this area, but I believe the Government have exercised that caution and sought to devise a process to deal with a particular and recognisable difficulty.

[Mark Field]

The right hon. Gentleman is making a perfectly valid point. In the midst of the more hyperbolic phrases that get used, such as “snooper’s charter”, does he recognise that legislation such as this—and further legislation, which will inevitably be required whoever is in government in the years to come—should also be designed to protect the individual? It is not just about the state getting more powers; it is about codifying the rules and protections for the individual. It is very important that we have that in mind when looking at any new legislation that comes into play.

[Sir Alan Beith]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman’s observation, which points to part of the purpose of the process, of which this is only a part. The clauses we are talking about in RIPA—or DRIPA, as it has become known—are the subject of a sunset provision, because significant further review is to take place and new legislation will be required on the outcome of that review. So those who think that detailed discussion of matters that often feel technically beyond us is just an occasional thing in this House will have to recognise that we are going to be coming back to this issue. That does not apply to me, because I do not anticipate being a Member in the next Parliament, having announced that I am going to retire, but Members in the next Parliament will certainly be engaging with these issues.

I simply wished to place on the record that my view—and, I hope, that of my right hon. and hon. Friends—is that the Government have striven hard to find a sensible way to identify the instrument or apparatus that has been the point of communication. In many cases, that will enable them to identify the individual, but I stress that it does not guarantee that, any more than knowing a telephone number guarantees that the person who used the telephone—that instrument from that number—is the person who engaged in the criminal activity. It is more complicated than that, but this provision is a necessary aid to investigations ranging from the activities of paedophiles through to the serious threats we now face.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Howarth]

Had the hon. Gentleman waited a while longer, I was about to say what more could be done. It is right that we have a statutory provision, and, subject to the concerns that my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North highlighted being satisfied, the provisions contained in the Bill are appropriate. However, there is a problem that we cannot resolve within the context of our own domestic legislation. Many of the communications service providers are not based in the UK; they are based mostly in the United States. Increasingly, the Republic of Ireland is seen as a location of choice for some companies. Google and perhaps one other CSP have already relocated there. It is increasingly clear that whatever legislation we put in place, it will not, of itself, be enough to resolve the problem.

[Mark Field]

Does the right hon. Gentleman also accept that the increased knowledge of the general public and—dare I say it—of individuals who would do us harm about the techniques adopted by the security services and others have also helped to ensure that there is now much more sophisticated encryption in place, which also plays an important part in further reducing our capacity to know precisely what is happening on the internet?

[Mr Howarth]

The hon. Gentleman is quite right and he, like me, is a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee. We have good reason to believe that there are any number of encryption packages that can be bought quite openly on the internet. It is a matter not just of the communications service providers encrypting communications that take place but of individuals buying packages that enable them to do that themselves, which makes the situation even more difficult.

What more can we do? It is no use pretending that this problem is unique to the UK; it is a very difficult international problem. I know that the Home Secretary, the Foreign Secretary and others are in constant dialogue with their opposite numbers in the United States, but there needs to be a growing understanding between ourselves and the places where CSPs are located that there cannot be this ungoverned space within which criminal activity can take place unchecked on the basis that it is in another jurisdiction from where it is being perpetrated. That issue can only be properly resolved by states, either bilaterally or multilaterally, agreeing protocols and ways of dealing with these issues. Obviously, it is much more easy to do that with friendly states—states with which we share common values—than it is in some other areas where internet providers might decide to locate because there will not be many controls on them. Clearly, that is another matter that needs to be seriously avoided.

We need to have order in this ungoverned space. I am talking about legal compliance and there not being this free space in which crime, terrorism and other activities can illegally take place. It is also important that the CSPs take a more responsible view of what they are being used for. Like the hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field), I have seen some CSPs washing their hands of such responsibilities, saying, “That is a matter of jurisdiction. We are not in that jurisdiction so we will comply with the laws where we are.” That might be good for their reputations with their customers, but it is a fairly cynical way of operating. I hope that, through the intervention of our own Government and Governments elsewhere, CSPs can be brought to the view that they should behave responsibly and in such a way that upholds the law right across the world—except in cases where the rule of law does not operate.

[Mark Field]

Is the right hon. Gentleman happy for me to put it on the record that it is also the case that many CSPs do a very good job of co-operating with the police and law enforcement agencies? Part of the difficulty has been that the revelations of the past 14 or 15 months have exposed what some would call an over-cosy relationship between those service providers and the state. I am talking about not so much here in the UK, but in mainland Europe and the United States of America, and it has been commercially damaging to many of those providers.

[Mr Howarth]

As always, the hon. Gentleman makes a good point. Sometimes the difficulty is that the amount of data and communications that providers store means that they are unable to know what is there. Very often, controls are triggered electronically, and so human eyes might not necessarily see the communication that relates to a terrorist plot, organised crime or even, in a hidden corner of it all, some kind of child abuse. Quite often, no human eyes see it, and it may be that only after an event—as in the case of Fusilier Lee Rigby—do people become aware that there was a communication that indicated that someone was about to or was likely to do something, and that knowing about it could have made a difference, as we concluded in our report the other week. Perhaps I have presented too cynical a picture of communications service providers. I know that, on occasion, they do co-operate constructively, but I believe that increasingly we need the space in which they operate to be better regulated, and that requires international controls agreed between responsible allies and CSPs themselves.

--- Later in debate ---

Since the revelations that a number of Members of Parliament have had our telephone calls with our constituents who are prisoners intercepted—tapped—there is now a greater sense of urgency to ensure confidence in the ability of certain professionals and others to maintain confidentiality. It is important that the Government give some serious attention to making recommendations to protect us all. Journalists can become extremely vulnerable if their sources are revealed, but so can MPs. That breakdown of confidentiality between an MP and their constituent can make us vulnerable to charges of collusion and other nefarious actions, so there is an urgency about this. We need imminent publication of an effective code of practice, and, I hope, once the review is published, imminent legislation to involve the courts in the oversight of the whole process. We have gone from RIPA to DRIPA to this Bill, which seems to be mission creep on the extension of data and communications powers.

[Mark Field]

I very much agree that we should be proud of the traditions of a free press in this country. The hon. Gentleman has not yet answered on the extent of the definition of journalism. I accept that new clause 1(6) is not exhaustive, but he has not mentioned religious counsellors, whom many would consider to have a similar duty of care. Does the hon. Gentleman have any thoughts on that, though I accept that he has not made an exhaustive list at this stage? [Interruption.]

[John McDonnell]

My right hon. Friend the Member for Knowsley says that my local parish priest rather optimistically describes me as a lapsed Catholic. The secrets of the confessional need to be included; otherwise, there might be an excommunication.

The hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) makes a good point about journalism. I would like the definition to be membership of the NUJ, but there you are. These days, I would have the widest interpretation, but if it is to be contested, I would like to see a court make the decision on the basis of the evidence before it.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Brokenshire]

We have had an interesting and informative debate focusing on the broader aspects of the ability of the law enforcement and intelligence agencies to do their job in a fast-moving environment where technology continues to change, and their ability to continue to protect us in those circumstances. I will argue that we have an eroding capability and although the measure will deal with one element, there is still more that we need to do. That is a point on which my hon. Friend the Member for Skipton and Ripon (Julian Smith) has intervened on other speakers in the debate and he is right to make the point. I will come on to the possible next steps in the context of the various reviews that are taking place.

The gap was highlighted by the right hon. Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth). I know that his Committee is looking carefully at the issue of privacy versus security. The need to strike a balance between them and some of the issues arising from that have rightly been played out in the context of interception, data retention and communications data. I look forward to the publication of the Committee’s report, which I expect to be extremely informative in this regard.

[Mark Field]

Without giving a preview of anything in the Committee report, I think it is important, for the benefit of the House and those Members who take the matter very seriously, that we should remember that privacy and security are not a zero sum game. Although my hon. Friend uses the word “balance”, as many of us do from time to time, there is also a sense that these are important safeguards individually and in their own right. One of the broader recommendations that we make from the evidence we took from a wide range of people is that the notion that there is a balance and a zero sum game should be dispelled.

[James Brokenshire]

I appreciate the comments of my hon. Friend. As a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, he will recognise the challenges. He is right to underline the significance and to reiterate what I said on Second Reading—that security and liberty should be mutually reinforcing. His point about it not being a zero sum game is well made.

The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson), who speaks for the Opposition, identified a list of 10 points, and I will do my best to respond to some of them. The hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) underlined the role of sensitive categories of person and additional safeguards that may be provided in respect of them when we consider communications data and the ability of the police to request such data. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) pointed out, we are looking at metadata—who said what to whom, when and where—rather than the content.

It is clear from the contributions that we have heard that gaps in communications data capability have a serious impact on the ability of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to carry out their functions—the point that was made clearly by the right hon. Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth) and the shadow Minister. One such gap is internet protocol address resolution. The Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 maintained our lawful data retention regime. It did not create any additional powers, nor did it address any of the gaps in capability. To respond to the point made by the hon. Lady, we remain confident about the manner in which it did that in seeking to address the points raised by the European Court of Justice.

Clause 17 amends that Act—DRIPA—to ensure that communications service providers can be required to retain the data necessary to link the unique attributes of an internet connection to the person or device using it at any given time. Every internet user is assigned an IP address to ensure that communications service providers know which data should go to which customer and route it accordingly. Addresses are sometimes assigned to a specific device, such as a broadband router located in a home or within the work environment, but they are usually shared between multiple users—hundreds or even thousands—and allocated automatically by the provider’s systems. Many providers currently have no business reason for keeping a log of who has used each address. It is therefore not always possible for law enforcement agencies accessing the data to identify who was using an IP address at any specific point in time.

The provision would ensure that these data are available to law enforcement. It would improve the ability of the police and other agencies to identify terror suspects who may be communicating with each other via the internet and plotting attacks. It would also help to identify and prosecute paedophiles, organised criminals, cyber-bullies and computer hackers, and to protect vulnerable people. For example, it could be used to identify a child who has threatened over social media to commit suicide. The IP address has direct relevance to all these issues and it is evidence that can be brought before the court. In the context of the previous debate, it is often instrumental in bringing prosecutions. Communications data are used in about 95% of all serious crime prosecutions, so they have a direct utility.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Brokenshire]

This issue is not going away, and we need to make further changes. I can see the eroding capability of our law enforcement and security agencies. While this plugs an element, there is still more to be done to ensure that our police and security services are able to protect us, and that there is evidence that can be presented in court. On these issues relating to communications data, we are talking about evidence, not merely intelligence. These are hard pieces of information that can be presented in court to secure prosecutions. This is really essential because of the underpinning that it provides to our prosecutorial system.

The Bill does not incorporate provisions on weblogs, but apps and weblogs can be directly instructive in this respect, and the House will need to confront that in, I hope, an informed way. The reviews that the Intelligence and Security Committee and David Anderson are undertaking will inform that debate rather than its being completely informed by belief or emotion, important as those elements are to ensure that it is properly reflective of the view of our communities and the public. We must ensure that the facts are there as we examine the picture, in order to provide the basis for a rational debate when the House considers the legislation it will need to pass before December 2016.

[Mark Field]

Does my hon. Friend accept that another issue, which was skilfully outlined by the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell), is arbitrage, in the sense of authorities being able to choose one piece of legislation rather than another—for example, as he said, RIPA rather than PACE? Given the complications arising from there being more and more legislation in this area, is it not almost essential to move towards a consolidation to ensure that we entirely understand our rights and responsibilities?

[James Brokenshire]

I am sure that that issue will be presented in representations made to David Anderson as part of his examination. Clearly, none of us will wish in any way to prejudge the way in which that evidence is presented. He intends to report back by May. That is the right timing to ensure that the new Parliament after the next general election has the benefit of seeing his report, which will have examined these issues in close and careful detail.

The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North asked about the role of the interception of communications commissioner. He will oversee the acquisition of data retained under clause 17, just as he oversees the acquisition of all communications data retained under DRIPA. The Home Office will ensure that he has the necessary resources to discharge his function.

The hon. Lady referred to multiple requests for traffic and subscriber data. Public authorities can request communications data only when it is considered necessary and proportionate for one of the purposes set out in DRIPA. A communications service provider could disclose only data that have been requested. It is an operational matter for the public authority as to how it makes such requests for data. Where it holds limited information at the outset of the investigation, it is likely that it will need to make more than one request, which means there may be multiple requests relating to a particular criminal inquiry.

The hon. Lady highlighted the issue of costs. The totals that were put into the impact assessment published alongside the Bill were based on studies of IP resolution conducted by the industry and prior work with service providers and the industry on similar projects. This has been an informed process in which there has been consultation with individual service providers likely to be most affected by the provisions of the Bill.

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for tabling new clause 2 to highlight the oversight of the acquisition of communications data retained under these provisions. The data retention regulations passed earlier this year specifically require communications service providers, subject to a data retention notice, to retain data in such a way as to ensure that they are available without undue delay in response to requests. I assure the Committee that in the vast majority of cases, data retained under this obligation are disclosed in a timely fashion. Of course, things may not always work perfectly, but there are systems in place that seek to resolve such issues should they arise. Indeed, there are industry groups that work on precisely that. The law enforcement community works closely with the communications service providers, and the Home Office seeks to establish the best technical solutions to support that.

The issue that we hear about more often than that highlighted by the hon. Lady is the broader one of key categories of communications data which communication service providers do not currently retain and which are therefore unavailable to the law enforcement and security agencies that require them. The hon. Lady raised the issue of additional regulations. The provision amends the definition of “relevant communications data”. The regulations use that definition, so there is no need to amend further or to put it in other regulations, because the intention is that they will follow the change being made to this Bill.

On deep packet inspection, no solution will provide for the retention of or access to the content of a communication. Obviously, it is for the companies themselves to decide how best to implement the legal requirements that would be put upon them, but I wanted to make that point clear.

On compatibility with the European Court judgment, we are confident that the legislation passed by Parliament this summer, and this Bill, are fully compliant with all relevant legal provisions.

Although I share the Opposition’s wish to see the most efficient and timely provision of data, I do not believe that the special review proposed by new clause 2 is required. Indeed, if there are concerns they can be referred to David Anderson as part of his review. With that assurance, I hope the hon. Lady will be minded to withdraw her amendment.

In new clause 1, the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington raises the specific and important issue of the position of journalists and others in relation to sensitive provision. He and I debated the issue when the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 made its way through Parliament this summer. Let me be clear that a free press is fundamental to a free society, and the Government are determined that nothing be done to put that at risk. Although most of the focus in the debate has been on journalists, the same issues arise equally in respect of other sensitive occupations, as Members have highlighted. Individuals should be able to speak freely and frankly to their lawyers if we are to have justice in this country. Similarly, patients must be able to speak freely to doctors, and constituents to their Members of Parliament.

I do not believe that anyone would question that those are important principles, but equally I hope that no one would take issue with the proposition that our law enforcement and intelligence agencies need the tools to carry out their vital roles. They carry out a difficult job day in, day out, protecting the public from crime and from terrorism. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 provides a clear legal basis for many of their critical investigative powers, including the acquisition and disclosure of communications data. The current process is clear and accountable and includes a strong and rigorous system of oversight. I have already explained what communications data are, but they do not contain the content of the communication.

I should like to point out that the interception of communications commissioner has said that communications data

“do not contain any details of what was said or written by the sender or the recipient of the communication. As such, the communications data retained by CSPs do not contain any material that may be said to be of professional or legal privilege—the fact that a communication took place does not provide what was discussed or considered or advised.”

The point that the data do not attract any form of legal or professional privilege is important. Nevertheless, the Government recognise that they are sensitive data that need to be protected accordingly.

The process of acquiring communications data requires a designated person—a senior officer of a rank stipulated by Parliament—to examine applications for such data, which can be authorised only when the officer is fully satisfied that it is both necessary and proportionate to acquire those data. The applications are facilitated by individuals known as single points of contact, who are trained in this area and can provide expert advice and support to the designated person.

Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill

Mark Field Excerpts

Tuesday 15th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

If my hon. Friend reads the judgment, he will see that the Court upheld the principle of retention of data as contemplated in the Bill. A number of frameworks on the purpose for which data are retained were referred to, but we are clear that the regime the House is contemplating this evening, in the context of the Bill and how it sits alongside the existing regime of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, does provide a legally robust approach to enable our police, law enforcement and security agencies to combat organised criminality and to provide the national security that is needed. The powers we already use are intrinsic to delivering on that. The Bill makes it clear that regulations cannot specify a retention period longer than 12 months. We reflected on the judgment of the Court. As the Home Secretary said in her opening statement on Second Reading, different time periods could be allowed in relation to specific types of data.

We are maintaining that focus on proportionality and necessity not simply in terms of giving a notice, but in keeping it under review. The European Court considered that the period of retention should be based on objective criteria to ensure that it is limited to what is strictly necessary. On the basis of law enforcement surveys in 2005, 2010 and 2012, we consider that a maximum period of 12 months strikes the right balance between the ability of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to investigate crimes and an individual’s rights to privacy. Unlike the current regime, under which all relevant communications data is retained for 12 months, this approach will mean that data could be retained for a shorter period than 12 months if considered appropriate, and that different types of data could be retained for different periods.

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making a perfectly good and sound case and I am pleased that he used the phrase “the necessity of proportionality”, which is crucial. But does he accept that there is no longer a clear-cut distinction between data and content? The worry of many outside this House, therefore, is that there will be an opportunity for ever more power to be retained by CSPs and thus by the state. Can he give us some assurances that the Government will keep this matter constantly under review?

[James Brokenshire]

My hon. Friend has expressed his views on a number of occasions on the need for continued focus on the balance between individual freedoms and collective freedom, because that collective freedom relies on our being able to conduct our affairs and to live our lives free from those who would do us harm. Sometimes people have sought to describe them as if they were in parallel, but I see them as mutually reinforcing; security and liberty must go hand in hand to develop and defend the fundamental principles that we have as a society, so to frame it separately misses the point.

My hon. Friend raises the important issue of how technology is evolving; it is constantly changing. That is why we see the import of the review by David Anderson, the independent reviewer of counter-terrorism legislation, to look at the issues more broadly, and at existing legislation and capabilities. We will come on to that, I am sure, in some of the subsequent debates in this Committee where that might be teased out in further detail, but my hon. Friend makes an important point.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Howarth]

I am interested to hear my hon. Friend’s concern. I went to the Vote Office at half-past 8 this morning just to make sure that the amendment had been tabled. Anybody who was interested enough would have been able to see it from half-past 8, and it was tabled in accordance with the procedures of the House yesterday evening. I do not want to labour the point, but there was enough time, if anybody was interested enough, to check what amendments had been tabled. I am sure that my hon. Friend, as the author of another amendment that we will discuss later, took the trouble of checking this morning that his had been included as well. We do have a responsibility to check what we are debating.

This is my small attempt to bring further enlightenment to the proceedings, particularly as regards clause 3. I hope that the Minister will be able to allay my fears that the provision may be too widely drawn.

[Mark Field]

I fear that it was wishful thinking on the part of the right hon. Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth) to assume that there would be no other speakers on this matter. As he will know, because we discussed it yesterday as members of the Intelligence and Security Committee, I wholeheartedly approve of this amendment.

[Mr Howarth]

The hon. Gentleman’s contribution is very welcome.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Field]

I am grateful. I will keep my contribution as short as possible, because other Members want to get on to some of the more important amendments to clause 6 and it is clear that there is no appetite to divide the Committee on this matter.

As the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) said, it is worrying that, all too often, the “economic well-being” head has been drawn so widely that many aspects of it could be seen as part and parcel of something that could fall within the ambit of RIPA and this Bill. One need only look at the controversy around the alleged bugging of the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, by the National Security Agency, if the Snowden reports are to be believed. On the grounds, presumably, of economic well-being, there was an opportunity to listen to particular conversations. That is not a healthy state of affairs.

Many of the public concerns about the Bill that are close to all our hearts reflect an understanding and an appreciation from many of our constituents that certain intelligence needs to be picked up, but the process needs to be necessary and proportionate. Therefore, trying to draw a narrow view—not an overly restrictive view, but as narrow a view as possible—will command more public confidence.

“Economic well-being” is one of the various heads that come under the auspices of RIPA—the 2000 Act that controls most of the surveillance that is dealt with in the Bill. Rather worryingly, permissible purposes under the Bill, as under RIPA, will include

“any purpose (not falling within paragraphs (a) to (g)) which is specified for the purposes of this subsection by an order made by the Secretary of State.”

That is almost a Henry VIII-type provision that relates to the issue of public confidence that is close to all our hearts.

I agree with the right hon. Member for Knowsley that we should be trying to define the terms more narrowly. Perhaps now is not exactly the right time to do it, but I hope we will be able to do so in the months and years ahead when it comes to having a fully fledged Bill on these very important matters.

I agree that we have to look at economic well-being as focusing on the security of the critical national infrastructure, defence contracts and—something close to my own heart—the stability of the UK currency, banking and financial systems, particularly with the ongoing and likely to become more acute issue of cybercrime, and cyber-security issues that will come as part and parcel of that.

I do not wish to detain the Committee any longer. It is important that we put some of these concerns in place. As I say, they have a more general bearing on the idea that if we are to get a sense of public confidence about this sort of legislation, we need to try to define it as narrowly as possible rather than having broad definitions in place. I think that that is what the right hon. Gentleman had in mind in tabling the amendment and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Dr Huppert]

I have heard several comments that clause 3 does not need to be in fast-track legislation, and it does not relate to an impending emergency, but I would not like to see it removed. It is a good, pro-civil liberties, pro-privacy clause, which just trims down what was always quite a bizarrely broad definition. It restricts the issuing of interception warrants on grounds such as national security—fair enough; serious crime—or the UK’s economic well-being, which is a broad concept, as was being discussed. The wording is taken from article 8(2) of the European convention on human rights, which is why we have that idea, but it could be interpreted broadly. There have been a number of discussions about whether, for example, it would enable lawful intercept to be used to find out what other companies are bidding against British companies. That is something that I think the House would be clear now is simply not acceptable—the Government have a stated policy on that—but it is not excluded by law. I think we would all say that it is simply not appropriate, so I am pleased that we are taking the opportunity of this legislation to trim this down; to try to make sure that it is only economic well-being as it relates to national security.

I appreciate that this is a probing amendment, but I have a number of issues with it. In particular, I am concerned that some of the language around

“the conduct of defence contracts”,

and the

“manufacture and design of UK defence systems”,

sounds worryingly as though it is saying that the House believes that it is okay to have interception to win defence contracts against a foreign bidder, or to make sure that we do well. I hope that that is not what is intended.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Brokenshire]

Absolutely. My right hon. Friend makes a very good comment for me to conclude on. Clause 3, which will provide such strengthening, has given us the opportunity to have a constructive and helpful debate.

[Mark Field]

rose—

[James Brokenshire]

I will give way one last time before I sit down.

[Mark Field]

The debate has been worth while. I have some sympathy for the hon. Member for North Ayrshire and Arran (Katy Clark), who made a legitimate point. Equally, however, it is quite right that the Minister cannot give a categorical assurance along the lines that she ideally wants. Clause 3 tries to ensure that economic well-being must be underlined by national security. I hope that it goes some way to giving confidence not just to the Members in Committee, but to our many constituents who feel very strongly about this matter—trying to narrow the scope of the Bill and therefore of the power of the state.

[James Brokenshire]

My hon. Friend makes his customary point about ensuring that there is such clarity. I am sure that we will return to this issue, but for the reasons I have outlined, I hope that the right hon. Member for Knowsley is minded to withdraw his amendment and that the clause will stand part of the Bill.

Communications Data and Interception

Mark Field Excerpts

Thursday 10th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point. To ensure that we get this legislation through in the necessary time and that we have a space of time—I recognise that it is a short space of time—I am publishing the draft Bill today. I am not waiting until Monday to publish the formal introduction of the Bill, because I want Members to have some extra time to look at it. It is important for this House to proceed through this matter in a timely way such that we can ensure that we do not lose the capabilities, and that we get the legislation on the statute book before the recess.

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

Like many Members, I am instinctively uncomfortable about rushed emergency legislation, and also a little uncomfortable if there is too much consensus among those on all the Front Benches on any piece of legislation. However, I welcome what the Home Secretary has said today. She is right—it is a narrow and limited Bill that is only a precursor to other legislation. In my role as a junior member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, may I take this opportunity to assure all Members of the House that we take incredibly seriously our responsibilities to make sure that our security services act only in a legal and a necessary and proportionate manner?

Metropolitan Police

Mark Field Excerpts

Wednesday 19th March 2014 Westminster Hall

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

I congratulate the hon. Member for Wells (Tessa Munt) on bringing up this difficult, complicated case; it is greatly to her credit that she has done so. It would be easy for all of us, in this age of political correctness and in the light of some of the allegations, to sweep it under the carpet. That is not to say that there are not fundamental, general problems with the Metropolitan Police Service, which I want to deal with more generally, having been a Member of Parliament in London for 13 years. It is perhaps ironic that the MPS has, with good cause, great sensitivity about race-related incidents—I shall talk a little about the Stephen Lawrence affair in a moment or two—but that in spite of that sensitivity it seems to be engulfed in controversies, such as the one that has been outlined in detail this morning. The hon. Lady described an appalling state of affairs, and I hope that the Home Office will pay considerable attention to what happened.

It would be an understatement to observe that the Metropolitan Police Service did not enjoy its happiest decade or so in the noughties and beyond. It is still deeply damaged by revelations over the Stephen Lawrence case, which, distressingly, continue to this day. The organisation was of course brought into fresh disrepute following the controversial shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes in Stockwell in July 2005, and the manslaughter in my constituency of the newspaper vendor Ian Tomlinson some three or four years ago. I am sorry to say it, because like many people from the right of the political divide, my instincts are to favour authority, including the police service, but I have been worried; I have spoken many times in the House and written articles on my grave concerns about the way the Metropolitan Police Service has operated, and about failings by its leadership. Frankly, there have been mendacious and at times calculated attempts by senior figures in the Met to disguise what happened during various events, including those we have heard about today, and to influence public opinion in its favour.

In the case of Jean Charles de Menezes, we were told at the outset that he was an illegal immigrant who bore resemblance to a terror suspect; that he had vaulted a ticket barrier; and that traces of cocaine were found in his urine. The picture was not entirely dissimilar in the less well-known case of Ian Tomlinson. When the newspaper vendor died of a heart attack on the streets of the City of London in April 2009 during the G20 protests, most people probably instinctively had faith that the police were doing their best in difficult circumstances—and the police do operate in difficult circumstances, as we all know. After people had witnessed sanctimonious street warriors antagonising police officers, a sharp shove to an obnoxious protester would not have made headlines, had the victim in question not died. The official line would be that a stressed officer in a tense situation lashed out, hitting an innocent person in the mêlée. Following the clash, the man walked off, and died only later of a heart attack, as the riotous crowd prevented him from getting medical attention.

The problem, of course, with that version of events, as put out by the Metropolitan Police Service at the time, was that it was plainly untrue. Fortunately—in contrast to the position in the case set out by the hon. Lady—there was a substantial amount of CCTV footage, which was not indiscriminately destroyed by the police. Therefore video clips of the incident appeared later, revealing that the victim had been hit across the legs with a baton by a masked police officer in what was clearly an unprovoked attack. A subtle shift in message followed, through the selective leaking of information about Tomlinson’s background and behaviour. I am very sorry to say that was clearly not an isolated incident for the Metropolitan Police Service. Its apparent relationship with the media continues, and it seems to think it needs to be able to put out its own line on stories, as has been shown in various incidents that I shall refer to.

The Tomlinson matter was of course of some concern to me. I was reassured within days of the incident in a private meeting with the Independent Police Complaints Commission that a thorough investigation of the background to the incident was under way, yet the IPCC’s handling of the case came into question, as did its handling of the case that we heard about this morning, particularly in relation to its cosiness with the police in the capital.

Appalling as both the de Menezes and Tomlinson incidents were, I believe that it was the subsequent public relations management of the events, and the police culture that that revealed, that so harmed confidence, trust and faith in our law enforcers. In the case of de Menezes, I have always suspected that the public would have forgiven the Met had it immediately admitted that a terrible mistake had been made. Similarly, in the Tomlinson case, where media hyped the prospect of attacks by rent-a-mob anarchists, we had a situation not entirely removed from the frenzied situation on the streets of London in July 2005, when the fear of Islamic terrorism loomed large. Once again, I believe that the decent majority of the public would have been happy to accept that the Metropolitan Police are unable to micro-manage the conduct of all their officers at all times. It was the spectacle of coppers deliberately closing ranks and trying to distort the truth that utterly undermined the police force.

After both incidents, we were assured that lessons had been learned, so it has been incredibly disheartening to see controversial events in the current decade handled in a similarly opaque, if not outright deceptive, way. I refer, of course, to the shooting of Mark Duggan on the streets of Tottenham in August 2011 and the so-called plebgate incident a year or so later, which led to the political demise of a Cabinet Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell), after his fateful encounter at the gates of Downing street with a dishonest police officer.

On the Mitchell affair, although similar minor tussles occur between police and members of the public each and every day in our city, the damaging aspect of the encounter was that it reinforced the view that the Met goes to great efforts to protect its own, even if that is at the expense of the truth coming out. This makes it difficult for the public to trust that the organisation and its members are bastions of justice for the ordinary man and woman. In addition, when the Met’s top team is embroiled in such squabbles, focus inevitably rests on handling the media and careful construction of a PR narrative, rather than on fighting crime. Londoners can be forgiven for not seeing the plebgate row as especially critical to dealing with the problems on the streets, but none the less, it reflects a deep-seated mendacity in the police’s approach.

Even if Londoners are unconcerned about the fates of Messrs Duggan, Mitchell, de Menezes and Tomlinson, or of the territorial support group officers to whom the hon. Member for Wells referred, such incidents make even middle-class, Tory-voting residents in my constituency doubt the word of the Metropolitan police in a way that would have been unimaginable only 15 or so years ago. Londoners are, I am afraid, finding it increasingly difficult to trust that our law enforcers are law-abiders. Indeed, it is remarkable that many middle-class Londoners who would never previously have questioned the police are now inclined to think again.

At the time of the Tomlinson investigation, The Daily Telegraph advised:

“As a newspaper, we have a long record of defending the police even in the most difficult circumstances...Yet it is becoming increasingly difficult to do so, especially when the police themselves seek to cover up the failings that inevitably beset any organisation.”

Those words could have come from the mouths of many dozens of my Conservative colleagues, and they have certainly come from mine. That whole culture has to stop. For sure, there will always be mistakes, and it would be completely wrong for the errors of a few to undermine the elements of excellent police work done by the many. There is no excuse, however, for the mendacity apparent in the attempts at manipulation of public opinion that follow too many high-profile, controversial Metropolitan police slip-ups.

The immediate reaction of the Met’s leadership should always be transparently and without favour to seek out the truth, to isolate problems and to apply the rule of law to its own officers when necessary. It is understandable and inevitable that the initial police instinct is to close ranks when confronted by public aggression. The leadership, however, should recognise that the majority of those whom they police by consent—thankfully in this country we still have a passion for the notion that policing is by consent—are reasonable and understand some of the real pressures that the police find themselves under, in particular here in the capital city. Only by being honest and transparent with the public when mistakes have been made can trust be restored in the Metropolitan Police Service.

Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism

Mark Field Excerpts

Tuesday 10th December 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

I rise briefly to support the Government motion.

I take on board the comments that have been made by the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson). It is right that we proscribe an organisation only after a great deal of thought and when there is a lot of evidence.

As a central London MP, I want to say how lucky we are that the relations between different cultures and races in this country are so good. We too often take that for granted, particularly given the situation in many other western countries, including in the United States and other European countries. The melting pot in my constituency and throughout London operates very well. There is very little evidence of home-grown terrorism, although we rightly clamp down on it where possible.

In such debates, it is right to consider with the utmost seriousness the suppression of such groups, but we must also recognise that community relations in this country are incredibly good. That is a credit to this Government, but also to the last Labour Government. The Prevent strategy has made a real difference to communities at large and within our campuses. It is in that context that I support what the Minister is doing.

Intelligence and Security Services

Mark Field Excerpts

Thursday 31st October 2013 Westminster Hall

[Dr Huppert]

I thank the right hon. Lady for her intervention. No one is saying that we should make illegal the collection of communications data; that would be a problem. She is also right to say that we need evidence; we cannot have a vacuum. That is exactly why it is helpful to know some of what is being said. We have heard people who say that we should never publish anything that would inform this debate. I want an informed debate, and I am pleased that we can have one.

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman refers to the Stasi and to the different cultural approach that we have here in the UK towards many of these issues. A view that is shared by people with a similar mindset—perhaps it is one that he thinks is not true—is that somehow the intelligence agencies are able to intercept at will. Will he go into some detail about precisely the protection—the amount of warranty and the legal framework—that is absolutely necessary before any internet account or telephone can be tapped?

[Dr Huppert]

The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point, and there are a number of routes to that. For communications data, he will be aware that no warrant is required. He will also be aware that, with the sole exception of evidence collected by local councils under RIPA, there is no judicial oversight of any kind at any stage. I am not aware of exceptions to that, and that is a weakness. There is an internal process—I do not doubt the good intentions of the people who work on this—but there is no independent external oversight from a judicial process, which is what many of us would like to see.

Let me return to the ISC. It works extremely hard, but its reports are redacted by the security services and the Prime Minister, and it is hard to know whether that is done in the interests of national security and not just to avoid embarrassment. Sir Francis Richards, a former senior intelligence official, has said that it is

“not a very good idea”

for an ex-Minister to head it. There is the problem of people being asked to scrutinise the consequences of decisions that they made, and that makes it hard to develop the right sort of relationship.

The ISC is under-resourced and not properly accountable to Parliament. There is a real issue to understanding the detailed technological components of much of this. I am not certain whether there is enough support to ensure that members understand the consequences of fake secure socket layer certificates and how phishing or man-in-the-middle attacks work. I am sure that the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears) will be happy to explain them when she speaks later.

We need better scrutiny generally and not just of the Intelligence and Security Committee. We keep hearing messages about the risk of “going dark”—we heard all about that in relation to the draft Communications Data Bill. It is simply not true. There is far more information available now to the intelligence and security community and to the police than at any time in the past. People now carry mobile phone devices that keep track of where they are almost constantly. I do not blame the agencies. Of course I can see the argument that there will always be for having more information, but we must provide a counterbalance. Dame Stella Rimington, former head of MI5, said:

“It’s very important for our intelligence services to have a kind of oversight which people have confidence in. I think that it may mean it is now the time to look again at the oversight.”

I agree with her.

We have seen further calls for even more information to be collected. The previous Government established the interception modernisation programme to create a vast database designed to log all details of text messages, phone calls and e-mails in the UK. In the interests of cross-party unity, I will not go on about other authoritarian measures: the drive for 90-day detention without charge, ID cards, control orders and allowing people to be forcibly relocated. They are all now things of the past, and I am pleased that that is the case.

Given such concerns, I was pleased with much of the coalition agreement. We Liberal Democrats insisted on a particular element, which was a commitment to ending

“the storage of internet and email records without good reason”.

That was accepted by both parts of the coalition. I am not sure whether the Home Secretary saw that, because she then pushed ahead with the draft Communications Data Bill, which would have required the storing of e-mail and internet records for everybody, which blows a hole through the idea of “without good reason”. It was envisaged that an extra £1.8 billion would be spent over 10 years to keep those extra records. That would have allowed the Home Secretary to require internet service providers to keep track of every website that everyone in the country goes to—everything that we do on Facebook or Google—with a huge growth in surveillance.