Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

Tuesday 15th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Security and Immigration (James Brokenshire)]

As the House has heard, communications data are information relating to the who, when, where and how of communications, but not to their content. These data are crucial to the work of both law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies.

As a result of the recent European Court of Justice judgment, we need to ensure that communications companies in the UK continue to retain this key information. The Bill will replace the data retention regime currently set out in the UK’s Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009, and preserve the status quo in relation to the retention of data, while responding to certain points made in the European Court judgment. Let me make it clear that the Bill will not create any new powers or obligations on communications companies beyond those that already exist.

Clause 1 will create a power for the Secretary of State to give notices to communications service providers to require them to retain relevant communications data. As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has already made clear, the Bill does not enable the retention of any data which cannot already be retained by communications service providers under the existing data retention regulations.

[Dr Julian Huppert (Cambridge) (LD)]

Will the Minister make it absolutely clear that there will be no change for data retention by overseas providers and that overseas companies will not be ordered to retain data?

[James Brokenshire]

As I have said, the law will be exactly as it now stands. My hon. Friend will know that there are provisions relating to extraterritoriality, and we will come on to the relevant clause later. He will understand that we have a relationship with communications service providers in the UK about their retention of data and that, in the regime under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, the Security Service, the police and listed bodies can make specific requests for the purposes set out in RIPA.

It is important to stress that those defined purposes are contained in existing law. To emphasise a point I made on Second Reading, the Bill is not about extending the current situation. Although the European Court of Justice commented on the data retention directive, we had already legislated in a number of ways to ensure that issues of proportionality and necessity are considered in framing requests. We have obviously reflected carefully on the judgment; hence some of the provisions, which I am sure we will come on to in Committee.

[Dr Huppert]

I just want to ensure that I understand the Minister’s answer. Perhaps I did not phrase my question well. Does the clause provide the power to issue a retention notice to an overseas provider in respect of information that is flowing overseas? That would be something new and I would be grateful if he could rule it out. That is not currently the practice and I hope that he will confirm that it will not be the practice.

[James Brokenshire]

It is certainly not our plan or intention—indeed, it is not part of our process—to make those sorts of requests. As the hon. Gentleman knows, we make requests for communications data to be retained by companies in the UK. He knows of the processes and the safeguards that exist in respect of the specific requests that are made by the different agencies, and of the tests that need to be satisfied.

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend accept that the impact of the European Court of Justice judgment is enormous because, in a nutshell, it will continue to be the law of the European Union irrespective of whether we pass the Bill?

[James Brokenshire]

Obviously, we have considered carefully the impact of the European Court of Justice judgment, the European convention on human rights and other parts of the law in examining the position. That is why we have considered the Bill so carefully. The additional safeguards and provisions that have been written into the Bill reflect that consideration. We remain confident that the provisions meet the legislative requirements.

[Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

May I refer the Minister back to the question that was asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash)? Does this debate not underline the importance of the report of the European Scrutiny Committee on establishing the supremacy of Parliament? I am afraid that the Minister’s response was not absolutely clear. I think he said that the Government are “confident”. Surely on matters as important as the freedom of the individual and national security, we should be more than just confident; we should be sure of the supremacy of Parliament.

[James Brokenshire]

As my hon. Friend knows, legislation is always subject to court challenges. That is the nature of our constitution. The House often reflects on changes that are made to the law as a consequence of decisions that are made in our courts. There is a separation of powers between the legislature, the Executive and the judiciary.

We have reflected carefully on the European Court of Justice judgment on the directive. It is important to state that that judgment related not to our domestic legislation, but to the directive. Obviously, the Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009 were made to implement the directive. We believe that the regulations remain in full force and effect, but the questions, doubt and risk have arisen because of how the industry and others have looked on the judgment and the regulations. Although we assert that the regulations remain extant and in full force and effect, it is essential, given the questions and points that have been raised, to deal with the risk and put the matter beyond doubt.

[John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) (Lab)]

The Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights made the extremely valid point that it would have been useful if the Government had published details of how the legislation complied with each of the points that was raised in the judgment. May I take the Minister back to the point that I made earlier about paragraph 58 of the judgment? Will he point me to the place in the legislation, the regulations or the Bill that addresses the point in the judgment about providing exceptions for

“persons whose communications are subject…to the obligation of professional secrecy.”?

[James Brokenshire]

I know that point has been raised, and the hon. Gentleman will see that clause 1(4)(f) enables the provision of

“a code of practice in relation to relevant requirements or restrictions or relevant powers,”.

The intent is to have a statutory code of practice that will sit alongside the regulations, and there is scope to ensure that the issues relating to confidence highlighted by the hon. Gentleman are addressed in that manner. We are putting in place a legal mechanism to address his concerns and the points raised by the court.

[John McDonnell]

I am trying to be helpful. When will that code be published, and how will it be scrutinised?

[James Brokenshire]

We are seeking to ensure that the code is drafted effectively, and we are looking at ways that that scrutiny can take place, given the import we have mentioned. We will certainly look to engage appropriately to ensure that issues such as those highlighted by the hon. Gentleman on confidence, professional positions and matters such as legal professional privilege are contemplated and reflected on. Codes of practice already exist and it is now about putting that on a more statutory footing to give it statutory teeth, but I recognise his point.

[Sir William Cash]

My hon. Friend referred to our courts, and I am sure that by that he meant our domestic courts. Unfortunately, that is not what we have to grapple with here. The issue is what our courts may be able to do, because they are bound by section 3 of the European Communities Act 1972, which states that we must have regard to, and indeed implement as an obligation of European law, judgments of the European Court. The data retention directive is European Union law, so the regulations and replacement regulations are all derived from that assertion of the supremacy of European law. As my hon. Friend will know, I am deeply concerned about that and I hope we will come on to it later. The bottom line is that we are not able to ensure that the Bill will be effective against any European Court judgments.

[James Brokenshire]

Part of the reason we are introducing the Bill is to give that fundamental statutory underpinning in primary legislation. The questions raised have been as a consequence of the linkage between the old data retention regulations, and whether they are reliant on the data retention directive being in force and effect. We have asserted clearly that we do not accept that that is the case, but because of those questions we judge it important to deal with that uncertainty and risk, and ensure that that is stated clearly in primary legislation.

[Lady Hermon (North Down) (Ind)]

I am happy to support the legislation, but I would like to clarify one small but important point in relation to Northern Ireland. The Bill makes it clear that it extends to Northern Ireland, but the Minister will be aware that policing and justice are devolved matters. Which aspects of policing and justice or reserved matters does the Bill cover?

[James Brokenshire]

Given the nature of the legislation, we are clear that it is reserved, so it does not require a legislative consent motion, for example, to be passed. It clearly has that approach, given the interception powers and the communications and national security issues inherent in the powers under RIPA and reflected in the Bill. We are clear that it is a reserved piece of legislation, so it will be passed by the House without the additional requirement that may otherwise be the case.

[Dr William McCrea (South Antrim) (DUP)]

In the light of that, the Government accept that this is a reserved matter and I am happy that that is so, but were discussions held on that with the Northern Ireland Executive before the Bill was brought to this House?

[James Brokenshire]

We have kept the Northern Ireland Executive up to speed with the proposals, sending them details and setting out our legal analysis. As this is a reserved matter, we have a slightly different relationship than might otherwise be the case if it were a devolved matter. I hope that that is helpful. It is important to state the benefits of the clause and the regulations that will sit underneath it in respect of the whole of the United Kingdom. It has effect in Northern Ireland, Wales, Scotland and England, and will be instrumental in guarding our security and bringing those who may harm us to justice. I recognise the particular interests that have, understandably, been raised by representatives from across the United Kingdom.

The clause creates a power for the Secretary of State to give notices to communications service providers requiring them to retain relevant communications data. As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has made clear, the Bill does not enable the retention of any data that cannot already be retained by communications service providers under the existing data retention regulations.

[Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

Clause 1(2)(b) states that it will

“require the retention of all data or any description of data”.

Should the Bill have said, “require the retention of all communications data or any description of communications data”? As drafted, it seems broad and completely open to interpretation.

[James Brokenshire]

My hon. Friend needs to understand that clause 1(2) is framed in the context of clause 1, which makes it clear that it relates to “relevant communications data”. It has to be read in the context of the interrelationship between clause 1(2) and clause 1(1), which I think provides the necessary clarification and context.

The Secretary of State may give a notice only where she considers the retention requirements are necessary and proportionate for one or more of the purposes set out in RIPA. These include national security, preventing or detecting crime, and the interests of public safety. The clause also enables the Secretary of State to make regulations that will replace the existing data retention regulations. Those regulations will, among other things, set out the process for serving a data retention notice and the safeguards that must be put in place to protect the data. To give Parliament the opportunity to scrutinise the details of our proposals, we have published a provisional draft of the regulations. They are available in the Vote Office and have been made more widely available.

[Sir William Cash]

Is my hon. Friend aware that Professor Steve Peers of Essex university—he is an expert in this field, as I am sure my hon. Friend knows—has drawn attention to the objection by the Court of Justice to the requirement to retain all communications data? The fact that the directive required all data to be retained from all subscribers was the first of the considerations taken into account by the Court in reaching its conclusion that the directive was disproportionate.

[James Brokenshire]

If my hon. Friend reads the judgment, he will see that the Court upheld the principle of retention of data as contemplated in the Bill. A number of frameworks on the purpose for which data are retained were referred to, but we are clear that the regime the House is contemplating this evening, in the context of the Bill and how it sits alongside the existing regime of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, does provide a legally robust approach to enable our police, law enforcement and security agencies to combat organised criminality and to provide the national security that is needed. The powers we already use are intrinsic to delivering on that. The Bill makes it clear that regulations cannot specify a retention period longer than 12 months. We reflected on the judgment of the Court. As the Home Secretary said in her opening statement on Second Reading, different time periods could be allowed in relation to specific types of data.

We are maintaining that focus on proportionality and necessity not simply in terms of giving a notice, but in keeping it under review. The European Court considered that the period of retention should be based on objective criteria to ensure that it is limited to what is strictly necessary. On the basis of law enforcement surveys in 2005, 2010 and 2012, we consider that a maximum period of 12 months strikes the right balance between the ability of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to investigate crimes and an individual’s rights to privacy. Unlike the current regime, under which all relevant communications data is retained for 12 months, this approach will mean that data could be retained for a shorter period than 12 months if considered appropriate, and that different types of data could be retained for different periods.

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making a perfectly good and sound case and I am pleased that he used the phrase “the necessity of proportionality”, which is crucial. But does he accept that there is no longer a clear-cut distinction between data and content? The worry of many outside this House, therefore, is that there will be an opportunity for ever more power to be retained by CSPs and thus by the state. Can he give us some assurances that the Government will keep this matter constantly under review?

[James Brokenshire]

My hon. Friend has expressed his views on a number of occasions on the need for continued focus on the balance between individual freedoms and collective freedom, because that collective freedom relies on our being able to conduct our affairs and to live our lives free from those who would do us harm. Sometimes people have sought to describe them as if they were in parallel, but I see them as mutually reinforcing; security and liberty must go hand in hand to develop and defend the fundamental principles that we have as a society, so to frame it separately misses the point.

My hon. Friend raises the important issue of how technology is evolving; it is constantly changing. That is why we see the import of the review by David Anderson, the independent reviewer of counter-terrorism legislation, to look at the issues more broadly, and at existing legislation and capabilities. We will come on to that, I am sure, in some of the subsequent debates in this Committee where that might be teased out in further detail, but my hon. Friend makes an important point.

[Sir William Cash]

May I make one last intervention?

[James Brokenshire]

One last go.

[Sir William Cash]

I am extremely grateful. My hon. Friend is pursuing doggedly what I believe to be a fundamentally and ultimately erroneous assumption, as will be discovered in due course, Does he accept, as everybody else appears to, that this Bill will be within the scope of EU law and that the charter of fundamental rights and the general principle of EU law will continue to apply, and that, as he correctly pointed out when he referred to primary legislation, the only way in which we can avoid running into difficulties with European Court judgments that we do not want—which, clearly, is what the Bill is about—is by using primary legislation, such as this Bill, to disapply the provisions of European law that come through sections 2 and 3 of the European Communities Act, and that it has to be notwithstanding those provisions?

[James Brokenshire]

I know the clear position that my hon. Friend has enunciated on many occasions in the House. There will be wider debates and discussions on the position of the European Convention and a British bill of rights, with which my hon. Friend is very familiar and which I personally support to ensure that our domestic law is framed properly in the context of convention rights. However, we have reflected carefully on the judgment—the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) described it as dense and complicated—which the Bill reflects on in the nature of the obligations set out therein. We have judged that primary legislation to avoid any uncertainty is appropriate and necessary, given the huge reliance that is placed on communications data and the right to be able lawfully to intercept for the prescribed purposes. I am sure that the wider debate—and the Select Committee that my hon. Friend chairs—is focused on the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice over matters that are opted into and the position post-December 2014. We have reflected carefully on the application, scope and enforceability of the Bill and its compliance with relevant legislation of whatever kind, and we are confident that it meets that challenge.

Given that the European Court was considering only the data retention directive and not how member states implemented it, it did not take into account the rigorous controls in place in the UK as part of its judgment. Access to communications data in the UK is stringently regulated and safeguarded by the Regulatory and Investigatory Powers Act 2000. Data are retained on a case-by-case basis and must be authorised by a senior officer, at a rank stipulated by Parliament, from the organisation requesting the data. The authorising officer may approve a request for communications data only if the tests of necessity and proportionality are met in the particular case.

Our system was examined in detail by the Joint Committee on the draft Communications Data Bill, and it was satisfied that the current internal authorisation procedure is the right model. However, to ensure that communications data cannot be accessed using information-gathering powers that are not subject to the rigorous safeguards in RIPA, the Bill ensures that data retained under this legislation may be accessed only in accordance with RIPA, a court order or other judicial authorisation or warrant.

Hon. and right hon. Members who followed the discussions surrounding the draft Communications Data Bill will be aware that communications service providers are also able to retain communications data on a voluntary basis under a code of practice made under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. This clause ensures that the regulations made under this Bill can apply the same security safeguards and access restrictions to data retained under that code. I therefore believe that the clause should stand part of the Bill.

[Mr David Hanson (Delyn) (Lab)]

I welcome you to the Chair of this important Committee, Sir Roger. I shall not detain the Committee for long because, given that we broadly agree with the Government’s approach on this key issue, the Opposition have not tabled any amendments to clause 1.

As the Minister said, the stated context for the Bill is the continued threat from serious organised crime and potential terrorist activity. Given that the European Court of Justice struck down the regulations because they were neither proportionate nor objective, we have taken the view that we need to look at how to frame legislation that will be proportionate and objective in respect of the retention of data.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Alan Beith]

I have only remembered the case because my hon. Friend made the same point on a previous occasion. He has not been slow to point that case out. It is worth remembering—this may not be an approved thing to say—that the European Court is not always entirely consistent from one judgment to the next in the way that it applies its principles. It is important that we make it absolutely clear that we have a set of rules to ensure that the Government only require the retention of data when they have good purpose for doing so, and they only retain those kinds of data for which there is good purpose. Access to that data should be the subject of stringent conditions. In essence, that was what the European Court judgment was about, and the Government are meeting those conditions in the way that they have framed this legislation. That is not to say that they could not be open to challenge; perhaps they will be at some point. If that challenge is made, we should make it quite clear how important the distinction is between retention and access to data.

[James Brokenshire]

My right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) makes his point well. He talks about the retention of data, the security and assurance that is provided and the separate regime that relates to access to data and how that is reflected in the Bill’s provisions. Those provisions relate to the retaining of data, the safeguards that exist and some of the steps that we propose to take in relation to the Information Commissioner and the powers that he has to ensure that the data are retained securely. Then there is the separate regime that relates to the rights of different agencies, as set out in legislation, to gain access to that data. My right hon. Friend understands that concept and expressed it well.

My hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) has highlighted the point about seeking to put beyond doubt that any legal challenge to this Bill should be considered by this Parliament and by the courts of the United Kingdom. Given the backdrop to this legislation—the data protection directive—and the approach that the European Court of Justice has taken in striking down the directive, I suppose I can understand why he is motivated to raise these issues in the Committee this evening. His comments raise broader points about the European Communities Act 1972. Our membership of the EU is wider than this Bill, and I respect the consistent way in which he has advanced those issues in the House.

We have considered carefully the existing law and legislation, and we have reflected on the European Court of Justice judgment in seeing what further measures can be put into effect to reduce the risk of challenge. That risk of challenge is most likely to heard within the UK courts than the European courts, as that is where challenge to the legislation might be flagged up in the first instance. Legislation is challenged in our courts from time to time. We believe that we have considered carefully the compliance of the Bill with the necessary regulatory requirements and remain confident that it meets those requirements.

[Sir William Cash]

I simply ask the Minister whether he accepts—he has more or less done so—that there is a risk that the sort of principles that were applied in the case of the Merchant Shipping Act could apply to the Bill as drafted, and that the only way of dealing with that would be to employ the “notwithstanding” formula to ensure that the Bill actually survives for the reasons of terrorism, national security, child pornography and child abuse that were properly mentioned earlier. Does he accept that what I am proposing is effectively to sustain the provisions of this domestic enactment and that I am not just making a general speech about the sovereignty of the UK Parliament?

[James Brokenshire]

I understand my hon. Friend’s points. I am always sympathetic to the aim of having clarity in legislation, which is why we are taking the Bill forward this evening. I do not want to discuss an amendment that we have not yet reached, so I hesitate to engage further in that context, because it would be inappropriate. However, amendments need to be considered carefully for their unintended consequences. Legislation is always subject to legal challenge of whatever kind. I am talking about not only this Bill, but all forms of legislation. The separation of powers between this place, the Executive and the judiciary is part of our constitution and part of how legislation, of whatever nature, can be challenged in our courts. While I understand his desire to try to avoid that through express language, I do not think he is able to rule out challenges before our courts for a whole host of different reasons.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

[The Temporary Chair (Sir Roger Gale)]

Before we move on to clause 2, I should inform the House that the Home Secretary has tabled new clause 7 and amendments 7 and 8, which the Chairman of Ways and Means has selected. They will be debated with the amendments and new clauses relating to clause 6. I am advised that copies are available in the Vote Office.



Clause 2

Section 1: supplementary

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[James Brokenshire]

Clause 2 sets out the meaning of various terms used in clause 1 and includes provisions that underpin and support the application of the powers contained in that clause. In particular, the definition of “relevant communications data” in clause 2 limits the communications data that can be retained to those specified in the existing data retention regulations: the data that are already being retained by service providers in the UK. To be absolutely clear, the Bill does not extend in any way the types of data that we will be asking service providers to retain.

The capability gaps identified and discussed during scrutiny of the draft Communications Data Bill will not be addressed and will continue to grow, impacting on UK law enforcement. As important as that matter is, I am sure that the Committee will agree that fast-track legislation is not the appropriate vehicle for considering addressing such gaps. The Prime Minister has made it clear that it is important that the issue is addressed in the next Parliament.

The clause also provides that the regulations made under clause 1 must be made under the affirmative procedure. We have placed in the Library a draft of the regulations that we intend to make, which will give Parliament the maximum possible opportunity, given the urgency of the matter, to consider the detailed contents of the regime before secondary legislation is taken through.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3

Grounds for issuing warrants and obtaining data

[Mr George Howarth (Knowsley) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 1, page 4, line 19, at end insert—

‘(5) In section 25 (interpretation of Chapter 11), subsection (1), after “in accordance with subsection (2);”, insert— ““economic well-being of the United Kingdom” is defined as the security of critical national infrastructure, the conduct of defence contracts, the development, manufacture and design of UK defence systems, and the stability of the UK currency, banking and financial systems.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hanson]

I will make a short contribution in support of my right hon. Friend the Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth), who I think made some extremely valid points in relation to amendment 1. I believe that the Government should at least look at it favourably and give a positive response covering the issues he raised. He indicated that issues such as defence contracts and national infrastructure are crucial to the United Kingdom’s infrastructure. I simply want to endorse his points.

I have one question for the Minister on clause 3. I think I know what it means, as I think most people do, but it would be helpful if the Minister outlined what he believes the statement

“relevant to the interests of national security”

means in practice. The clause gives the Secretary of State powers

“in circumstances appearing to the Secretary of State to be relevant to the interests of national security”.

An explanation from the Minister would be helpful, because I have received some representations on what it means, and my hon. Friend the Member for North Ayrshire and Arran (Katy Clark) has made the point that it could be defined very widely. I think that it would help to reassure those outside the House if the Minister could give some clarity today by putting on the record what I think we already know.

[James Brokenshire]

I thank the right hon. Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth) for tabling the amendment and giving us an opportunity to look in detail at clause 3 and at the importance of the economic well-being purpose currently retained in RIPA. Let me set out a little more context. Clause 3 translates into primary legislation a constraint—it is intended to be a constraint—on the exercise of this purpose that is already provided for in the codes of practice issued under section 71 of RIPA. It effectively puts those statements into primary legislation. It requires that an interception warrant is only issued, and access to communications data only authorised, for the purposes of economic well-being where there is also an independent national security justification for the authorisation. It is intended to be read in that context. I hope that explanation is helpful as we explore some of the language in the Bill.

Clause 3 does not mean that economic well-being for the purposes of RIPA is synonymous with national security, but the amendment gives us the opportunity to underline the fact that there has to be that connection between the two, which obviously is relevant in determining whether or not the powers under RIPA can be exercised for the statutory purposes. Along with national security and the prevention and detection of serious crime, protecting the UK’s economic well-being is one of the statutory functions of the security and intelligence agencies, which are set out in the Security Service Act 1989 and the Intelligence Services Act 1994.

I understand and recognise the points made by the right hon. Member for Knowsley. I think that this debate has been quite useful in airing some of the cyber-security and cybercrime issues that I know he has raised in the House on a number of occasions. It has also highlighted our reliance on information communications technology, which is now a core part of our national infrastructure. I think that there is read-across into other legislation. I understand that he tabled the amendment on a probing basis, but I think that it requires careful thought.

A definition of economic well-being is reflected in the legislation I have mentioned—RIPA being the key focus for this evening’s debate—but it is also important to acknowledge its context as a well-established principle in law. Its origins lie in the European convention on human rights, which provides for exceptions to article 8—the right to a private and family life—when it is in the interest of the economic well-being of the country. Many aspects, therefore, are wrapped up in the broad context of how the definition has come about and the interpretations of it. Case law may also sit alongside this provision in determining the scope and ambit of the definition, so seeking to clarify it may have unintended consequences.

[Katy Clark]

The Minister will be aware that in the past the security services have taken a great interest in political campaigns and, indeed, industrial matters. I mentioned the miners’ strike in my previous intervention. Will he give an assurance that the proposed legislation will not be used against political activists or, indeed, trade union activists in situations similar to last year’s Grangemouth dispute and the miners’ strike?

[James Brokenshire]

It is always difficult for Ministers—not just me; this has been the case with successive Governments—to comment on security and interception matters. Perhaps it will help the hon. Lady if I explain that what we are doing tonight is strengthening the position by underlining that the purpose has to be connected to national security, so it is not simply a question of economic well-being. The fact that we are putting that into legislation is an important development, as my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) has said.

I am sympathetic to the amendment in principle, as it seeks to provide clarity on the meaning of economic well-being in law. In many ways, I think it seeks to address some of the points raised by the hon. Member for North Ayrshire and Arran (Katy Clark). David Anderson may wish to reflect on it in his review of existing legislation and new legislation capabilities. Indeed, the privacy and civil liberties oversight board may also wish to address the issue of clarity. My simple point is that it needs to be done with care, given the other legislation I have flagged up and the broader context of the European convention on human rights.

[Sir Alan Beith]

Ought we and the hon. Member for North Ayrshire and Arran (Katy Clark) not to be celebrating the fact that for the first time in statute we are narrowing and specifying the circumstances in which economic well-being can be used as a justification? In other words, there has to be a national security element to it, not just a general feeling that some piece of information would be helpful for our economic well-being.

[James Brokenshire]

The right hon. Gentleman makes an important point. We are putting this provision front and centre in primary legislation. I hope that that is helpful in giving an assurance. National security is clearly a pretty high bar to reach, so framing the economic well-being argument in those terms should give an assurance that this is not something that would be relied upon lightly.

[Katy Clark]

The concern that many have is that, in the past, national security has been considered to be a catch-all. Indeed, the miners were considered to be the enemy within, and much of the rhetoric we hear from Government Members considers trade union activity and people who use democratic means to assert their rights to be a threat to the state. That is what I am trying to seek assurances about from the Minister. He is asking us to pass emergency legislation, but he seems unable to provide any assurances as to how it will be used in industrial situations.

[James Brokenshire]

I am genuinely surprised that the hon. Lady has made her point in that way, because the Bill is about strengthening governance and oversight. Sitting alongside the Bill in relation to the retention of communications data, there will, in addition, be a statutory code of practice, while the Information Commissioner has the right to look at further audit and oversight of data retention, and the interception of communications commissioner can consider the use of the powers. That should give independent assurance to not just the hon. Lady but others who, reasonably and legitimately, want to know that such powers are not abused or expanded.

Our governance and oversight of communications data and interception have been strengthened and enhanced over the years, as the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) said on Second Reading. Equally, in relation to wanting to know that the tests are adhered to in relation to a Secretary of State effectively authorising a warrant for interception, the oversight of the interception of communications commissioner should provide a great deal of assurance.

I have always recognised that people should be able to uphold their industrial rights, including the right to form a trade union. I certainly do not in any way intend this debate to get into such an issue. Indeed, from his speech, the right hon. Member for Knowsley understands that the Bill’s provisions will tighten important rights in existing law. The point concerns whether there is a need for any further clarification. The comments of the hon. Member for North Ayrshire and Arran on the right hon. Gentleman’s amendment highlighted the tricky nature of trying to frame the Bill correctly and the potential for unintended consequences in that context.

[Sir Alan Beith]

May I just hammer the point home? Economic well-being would not be mentioned in the Bill were we not providing a greater safeguard than has ever existed before or under RIPA to ensure that the power is used only in relation to national security.

[James Brokenshire]

Absolutely. My right hon. Friend makes a very good comment for me to conclude on. Clause 3, which will provide such strengthening, has given us the opportunity to have a constructive and helpful debate.

[Mark Field]

rose—

[James Brokenshire]

I will give way one last time before I sit down.

[Mark Field]

The debate has been worth while. I have some sympathy for the hon. Member for North Ayrshire and Arran (Katy Clark), who made a legitimate point. Equally, however, it is quite right that the Minister cannot give a categorical assurance along the lines that she ideally wants. Clause 3 tries to ensure that economic well-being must be underlined by national security. I hope that it goes some way to giving confidence not just to the Members in Committee, but to our many constituents who feel very strongly about this matter—trying to narrow the scope of the Bill and therefore of the power of the state.

[James Brokenshire]

My hon. Friend makes his customary point about ensuring that there is such clarity. I am sure that we will return to this issue, but for the reasons I have outlined, I hope that the right hon. Member for Knowsley is minded to withdraw his amendment and that the clause will stand part of the Bill.

[Mr George Howarth]

I will be brief. I am happy to withdraw amendment 1, which I tabled as a probing amendment. The Minister’s last point is perhaps the most significant one. I do not think that we have a clear enough understanding of the scope of economic well-being, although it is reassuring to know that in this context it must be related to national security. We have had a reasonable debate. We have not reached any firm conclusions, but I am comforted by the fact that the issues will be discussed by David Anderson and others, and I hope that we can move the issue further along before there is any fresh communications data legislation. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4

Extra-territoriality in Part 1 of RIPA

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[James Brokenshire]

The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 allows the Secretary of State to issue interception warrants and allows those warrants to be served on persons who can assist in giving effect to them. Anyone who is providing a public telecommunications service who is served with a warrant is obliged to give effect to it. It has always been the case that that applies to any company that offers services to customers in the United Kingdom, irrespective of where it is based.

The territorial extent of RIPA has perhaps never been as explicit as it should have been. As a result, some overseas companies have started to question whether they are obliged to comply with warrants that are served on them. Our judgment is that that situation has reached a dangerous tipping point, and that it is necessary to put it beyond doubt that RIPA applies equally to public telecommunications services that are located overseas and those that are headquartered in the UK.

The clause makes clear Parliament’s intention that RIPA should have extraterritorial jurisdiction. It does that in three ways. First, it specifies that an interception warrant may be served on a company that is located overseas, and that a company providing telecommunications services to customers within the United Kingdom, but which is located overseas, has a duty to provide assistance when served with that warrant. Secondly, it specifies that a notice that is issued under section 12 of RIPA may be given to a company that is providing telecommunications services to customers within the UK, but that is located outside the UK. Such a notice would require the company to put in place the necessary infrastructure to give effect to interception warrants. Thirdly, it specifies, as has always been the case, that a notice under section 22 of RIPA for the provision of communications data may be served on a company outside the UK.

The clause specifies the means by which the serving of a warrant or the giving of a notice may be effected. It also makes clear the obligation to comply with a warrant or notice, and the means by which that obligation may be enforced.

[Dr Huppert]

Will the Minister make clear what consequences the clause might have for overseas providers? Is there any possibility that a section 12 order could require a foreign company to install surveillance equipment on its network? Does the Minister have the powers to do that?

[James Brokenshire]

I hope that the hon. Gentleman will understand that I cannot comment on surveillance techniques. However, I restate clearly that the Bill and, in particular, clause 4 do nothing more than is already the case in respect of the requirement to serve notices and the ability to issue warrants to overseas providers.

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

May I confirm, for the benefit of the Committee, that what the Minister has just said about the intention being that RIPA should extend extraterritorially in these respects is entirely accurate? If hon. Members look at RIPA itself, they will see that section 2(1), which provides definitions, states that

“‘telecommunication system’ means any system (including the apparatus comprised in it) which exists (whether wholly or partly in the United Kingdom or elsewhere)”.

That is but one example—there are many to which I could point—that shows that the clear intention of this House and the other place was to make this part of the Act extraterritorial. Indeed, we thought that that would be the effect of the Act.

[James Brokenshire]

I am very grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for providing that clarification and for highlighting that provision in section 2 of RIPA, which gives a sense of the extent and nature of the provisions that were contemplated when it was introduced. It was thought that it would have extraterritorial effect. Given legal challenges, other court cases and the language used in the legislation, we think it right to put that beyond doubt. That has always been the intent and practice for this measure; I repeat that the Bill does not extend the position but restates and asserts what has always been the case in the legislation. Those who may be subject to notices or warrants should understand clearly that it will apply to them if they are outside the UK.

[Mr Dominic Raab (Esher and Walton) (Con)]

I am interested in the practical application of this measure. What happens if a foreign IT provider refuses to comply, and uses encryption or another security mechanism effectively to flout the relevant order? What practical steps will the Government seek to take?

[James Brokenshire]

The approach we have taken is to promote co-operation, and stating as clearly as possible that the legislation has extraterritorial effect is a key part of that. Ultimately, given the clarity provided in the legislation, a company that did not comply with a warrant or notice served on it would be open to court challenge.

[Dr Huppert]

Perhaps my previous question was not clear. A number of companies are concerned about the important issue of how section 12 orders would be interpreted. RIPA currently deals with powers to enable companies to make lawful intercepts. Will the Minister confirm that if a company—a webmail provider, or whoever—can provide legal intercept, he is not claiming powers to require them to put specific equipment on their networks?

[James Brokenshire]

Perhaps I did not explain this clearly to the hon. Gentleman, but we are not intending to add additional powers to compel. I suppose he is trying to elicit whether the measure is a means of getting more data retained outside the UK—he raised that point in the previous debate on this issue, and again I may be misunderstanding him. I reassert that the Bill contains nothing that in any way extends the existing reach of section 12 of RIPA. Other than reasserting the position on extraterritoriality, it does not in essence change section 12 at all. If that does not answer his point, he may wish to write to me on the matter.

The clause provides that where a warrant has been served on a company outside the UK, the law in the country where the firm is located must be taken into account when determining whether it is reasonably practicable for that company to give effect to the warrant. The clause also makes it clear that the court should consider what steps the company has taken or could take to avoid such a conflict arising. It does not extend the powers of law enforcement or security and intelligence agencies. It simply puts beyond doubt the fact that sections 11, 12 and 22 of RIPA apply to telecommunication service providers that are based outside the UK but provide services to customers in the UK.

[Mr George Howarth]

I raised this point on Second Reading but I do not think the Minister had an opportunity to respond. In clause 4(6), proposed new subsection (3B)(a) and (b) covers the circumstances of delivering a notice to the sort of companies he has just described. Paragraph (a) states

“by delivering it to the person’s principal office within the United Kingdom or, if the person has no such office in the United Kingdom, to any place in the United Kingdom where the person carries on business or conducts activities,”

and (b) states

“if the person has specified an address in the United Kingdom as one at which the person, or someone on the person’s behalf, will accept documents of the same description as a notice, by delivering it to that address.”

I am sorry to read that out, but it provides the context.

The example I used earlier was of a relatively junior member of staff in a billing office in Liverpool for Google or one of the other communications service providers, and my concern is that they could end up having a notice served on them and be put in an invidious legal position. I hope that I am wrong about that and that the Minister will be able to reassure me. The provisions seem entirely appropriate for a senior member of staff.

[James Brokenshire]

Provisions on a person having a specified address, such as proposed new subsection (3B)(b), refer to a situation where lawyers accept service, proceedings or notification on a person’s behalf. In essence, the Bill gives effect to such clarification.

[Mr George Howarth]

The Minister has provided the reassurance I was looking for, so at this point I can say that I am perfectly happy with the clause as it now stands.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Huppert]

I have two questions and I would be grateful if the Minister provided a written response to them, to ensure we get a clear answer. First, may we have a written confirmation that there would be no power to force foreign companies to install surveillance equipment on their networks if they are able to provide the intercept that is needed? Secondly, will he confirm the impact of subsection (4) and make it clear that, if a foreign company is under an obligation not to provide such data—if it would, in fact, be a criminal offence for them to comply—no such requirement would be made by the Government? That would put people in the invidious position of having to face criminality on one front or the other. If the Minister wrote to me with confirmation on those points, that would be very helpful.

[James Brokenshire]

I will respond briefly to the points made in the debate. On the latter point, I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) will have noted the reference I made to companies’ reasonable ability to comply and the consideration that would have to be given in particular to conflict of law issues, but I will see if I need to supplement that in some way.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Brokenshire]

Clause 5 is a simple but necessary part of the Bill that puts into law an important clarification. Today people communicate using a range of web-based services and applications. As the scale and diversity of these services have grown, there should not be any uncertainty about whether a communications service provider to users in the UK is covered by the definition. RIPA was written in a technologically neutral way to allow for developments in the way in which services are delivered. We believe that web-based services such as web-based e-mail, messaging applications and cloud-based services have always been covered by the nature of the definition. Clause 5 simply clarifies how this definition should be interpreted and makes it clear that these services are covered by the definition of a telecommunications service.

Some have asked whether this is extending the definition in some way. I want to make it absolutely clear that that is not the case. We are not changing the existing definition, which remains absolutely as it stands in RIPA. The Bill clarifies how the current definition should be interpreted, but a clarificatory provision of this kind cannot change or extend the meaning of the definition in RIPA to capture new services. This provision simply makes it explicit that the existing definition includes so-called over-the-top services such as webmail and instant messaging for the purposes of that interception. In many ways, it has been the industry itself that has welcomed this clarification and restatement of the existing legislation, which is why I think it is important to give that clarity to the House and to the industry generally. It does not extend the scope of RIPA; instead, it restates and provides clarification in terms of the existing definition, which remains as it was before.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

Commencement, duration, extent and short title

[Mr Hanson]

I beg to move amendment 3, page 6, line 41, at end insert

“and is subject to a reporting requirement as set out in subsection (1A).

(1A) The Commissioner for the Interception of Communications must report on the operation of this Act six months following commencement of this Act, followed by subsequent reports every six months.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Caroline Lucas]

I spoke a lot in the debate earlier and was not going to speak again until my colleague, the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), reminded us of how this debate looks to the public outside this place.

As we have all said, this issue is of huge importance. Almost no issue that we deal with affects people as directly as their personal communications, and, therefore, is as sensitive. That is why it is so negative that we have given the impression that we simply do not care what people think. The public are pretty disengaged from MPs and Parliament, and do not have much respect for what goes on in this place. Today was an opportunity to begin to build bridges with them and to demonstrate that we can take these issues and their concerns seriously, and I feel so sad about the fact that Parliament seems to have flunked it. We have decided not to build bridges and have given the public the impression that we do not take ourselves seriously, so why should they take what we do in this place seriously?

Many arguments have been advanced on why it is not necessary to pass the Bill in such a short time. There is no serious argument that this is an emergency. If there were, it would have been dealt with three months ago. People can see through that. Their concerns and disillusionment with this Parliament will be redoubled by this process, instead of being addressed by it.

One reason why I support amendment 2 to the sunset clause is that it would rescue something from this unhappy state. If we at least said that over the coming months, we will do this piece of work properly and a review will happen, we could build some confidence among the public. As it is, I regret to say that we have lost yet more public confidence today, at a time when we can least afford to do so.

[James Brokenshire]

I will speak to Government amendments 7 and 8 and new clause 7, which were tabled by my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary. I will also address the provisions that have been tabled by Opposition Front Benchers before turning to the issues with the timetable and the sunset clause.

The Government amendments provide for a review of the powers and capabilities. I am grateful to the right hon. Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson) for his comments about Opposition new clause 1, which relates to the same topic and sets out the terms of a review of the legislation. There is no difference of principle here. [Interruption.]

[The Temporary Chair (Mr Jim Hood)]

Order. I can hear murmuring. I have a wee bit of industrial deafness from a previous life, but even I can hear it. I notice that a lot of conversations are taking place. We have had a long debate. The Minister is summing it up and I hope that Members will give him the best of order.

[James Brokenshire]

Thank you, Mr Hood.

New clause 1 shows that there is overlapping ground on the review. There is no difference of principle in that regard. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary announced in her statement last week that we would review the interception and communications data powers that we need, as well as the way in which those powers and capabilities are regulated, in the full context of the threats that we face. I am pleased that the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson, QC, has agreed to conduct the first phase of that work. Our amendments give that work proper statutory footing, and set out the issues that the review will need to cover. It will deal with the powers that are required in the light of the threats we face and how they are regulated, and it will require the independent reviewer to report before the next election. Crucially, it will require the review to take account not only of the threats we face, but also of the safeguards required to protect privacy, and the impact of changing technology on the work of the agencies to keep us safe.

On that basis the Government have tabled amendments that achieve what I believe the Opposition were seeking to do in their amendments on this matter. The amendments make that explicit and address the points that the right hon. Member for Delyn set out in his initial contribution. I think he said that he may be warming to new clause 7—sufficiently warmed, I hope, to withdraw new clause 1.

The periodic review of the legislation is important in assuring the House and the public that appropriate safeguards are being ensured, and that operations of communications data and lawful intercept are being conducted properly and appropriately. Should the Bill pass through the House, it will not extend the reach and remit of such measures, as some who have made earlier contributions have perhaps feared. I agree with the Opposition that while this legislation remains in statute until the sunset clause kicks in—in our view at the end of 2016, and I will come on to the specifics of that—and while reviews are being conducted, the provision of information from the interception of communications commissioner on a more frequent basis might help inform those making observations on the operation of and any deficiencies in the law on interception and communications data capabilities.

The right hon. Member for Delyn and those on the Opposition Front Bench have tabled a number of alternatives and amendments, and the Government are happy to accept new clause 6 and related technical amendments 4 and 5, alongside amendment 6, which adds to the long title of the Bill. Indeed, I think I should also formally move those amendments to ensure that they do not fall outside any timeline we may have. As I said, the Government are content to accept those amendments, and I invite the right hon. Gentleman to withdraw new clause 2 and amendment 3, which would have dealt with the same issues.

A great part of this debate in Committee has focused on amendment 2, which would bring forward the date at which the Bill ceases to have effect to 31 December this year, rather than the current date of 31 December 2016. With the greatest respect, and acknowledging the points that have been made, I do not believe that that is the most effective way to proceed and give the House the information to assess the broad issues of communications data effectively. We have set in train and committed to have an independent review from the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation on the broad area of communications data. If that review is concluded, the House will be better informed in assessing the balance of privacy and capabilities that exist, and considering how technology has changed and may impact on what is necessary. The independent review will be instrumental in providing that information, and in informing the next Government after the general election as to how to proceed on that basis.

The Prime Minister has said that he thinks that a Joint Committee should be established to take that review forward and have that additional scrutiny. We therefore have the long-stop date, which is a termination date in 2016. That does not get renewed; the legislation ends at that point to give this House and the other place appropriate time to legislate in the context of those reviews, as well as for further scrutiny or consideration by the Joint Committee.

[Mr Davis]

The Minister is conflating two issues that amendment 2 seeks to deal with. First, this House has not had the time to research, consult and debate this issue. Secondly, the technology underlying the problems we face is changing. It is not mutually exclusive to address the first issue—lack of debate, consultation, research and knowledge—through, in proper, slow time, a consultative process in September and a proper Bill procedure in the autumn, and later, if he thinks it fit, to come back to the House with another review. That would at least allow the House to make its decision on a proper basis. If he allowed that, I would be happy to vote for Third Reading today. If he does not allow it, I am afraid that this is an undemocratic process that none of us can support.

[James Brokenshire]

We are going back over ground addressed on Second Reading and in the programme motion debate, but it is worth restating the fact that the Bill does not extend powers that this House has already granted through RIPA. It effectively restates what is already existing law. The legislation does not, therefore, seek to create something new, but simply restates what is already being operated, giving it clear legal underpinning in the context of the ECJ decision and the pressures from industry and others in terms of challenge.

On the need to act now, I say again that no Government embark on emergency legislation lightly. No Government seek to use fast-track legislation unless they judge that it is necessary. Our real concerns are that we have reached a tipping point regarding co-operation on lawful intercept and the risk that our essential powers on communications data, which are used day in, day out by law enforcement and the security agencies that protect this country, will simply not be available. That could occur at any time between now and the long-stop date that the right hon. Gentleman and others are suggesting in relation to December 2014. That is why the Government have judged that emergency legislation is appropriate and why we think it necessary to have a review: to ensure that this House is properly informed of all the issues to legislate carefully in a sensible way by no later than 31 December 2016, when this legislation would cease to have affect.

These are complicated matters. We need to act swiftly to deal with the particular challenge we face and to avoid the damaging loss of capability that confronts us. However, I do believe a longer-term considered approach is appropriate, hence the reason for having the review and for providing assurance in relation to the commissioner for the interception of communications and his reports on operation. There are already a number of reviews in the system. The Intelligence and Security Committee is conducting an inquiry, as is the Royal United Services Institute.

There is also the further review, which is to be led by David Anderson, of the communications data and interception powers we need, and how they are regulated in the light of the threats we face. As I have indicated, the Bill will set this out in legislation in terms, but he needs to be given some time to conduct this work. New clause 7 asks him to complete his work by 1 May 2015. That being so, I can see no point in requiring Parliament to return to these issues almost as soon as we return from the summer recess, without the benefit of the work we have set in train. Any such legislation would also inevitably require an accelerated timetable. Rather, we believe that Parliament needs to consider these issues properly after the election, drawing on the outcome of the reviews that are in train and with the ability to consider everything at a normal parliamentary pace. Accordingly, I invite the hon. Member for West Bromwich East (Mr Watson) to withdraw amendment 2, so that we can have this process recognising the needs now and recognising the need for further review and for the House to return to these matters in the light of that informed basis.

[Mr Hanson]

We have had a useful debate on the amendments. The Opposition had two objectives in tabling our amendments and new clauses today: first, to secure a review of this Act, if passed by this House and by the House of Lords, within six months and then every six months following that; and secondly, to put it on the record that we need to have a wider examination of the whole of the intercept evidence-data collection issue. I think we have had a meeting of minds on that issue. With that in mind, I am happy to withdraw amendment 3 and to support new clause 6, and to ask the Government to accept that as they have indicated they will. We will then support Government new clause 7, which meets our objectives. There are other consequential amendments but, for clarity, that is my objective. It would be helpful, given what the Minister said, if we proceeded on that basis.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: 4, page 7, line 1, leave out “5” and insert

“(Half-yearly reports by the Interception of Communications Commissioner)”. —(Mr Hanson.)

[The Temporary Chair (Mr Jim Hood)]

I call the Minister to move amendment 7 formally.

[James Brokenshire]

On a point of order, Mr. Hood. I believe that amendment 5 is a technical amendment that may also be required. I do not know whether that will be dealt with now or later.

[(The Temporary Chair (Mr Jim Hood)]

That is not a point of order. I can tell the Minister that we will take amendment 5 after we deal with amendment 7.

Amendment made: 7, page 7, line 1, after “5” insert

“and (Review of investigatory powers and their regulation)” —(James Brokenshire.)

This amendment is consequential on NC7

Amendment made: 5, page 7, line 2, leave out “5” and insert

“(Half-yearly reports by the Interception of Communications Commissioner)” —(Mr Hanson.)

Amendment proposed: 2, page 7, line 2, leave out “2016” and insert “2014”—(Mr Watson.)

Question put, That the amendment be made

--- Later in debate ---

20:21

Division 37

Ayes: 56

---

Labour: 27
Conservative: 15
Scottish National Party: 6
Social Democratic & Labour Party: 3
Plaid Cymru: 3
Liberal Democrat: 2
Independent: 1
Alliance: 1
Green Party: 1

Noes: 454

---

Conservative: 224
Labour: 185
Liberal Democrat: 39
Democratic Unionist Party: 5

Clause 6, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Huppert]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. Unfortunately, the approach taken for, I believe, many decades has been not to tell people. We have always been told, “We can’t tell you what’s being done at the moment, but we need more.” If we were told and there were transparency, the public could make a much more sensible judgment about what was needed.

New clause 3 highlights what I would expect to see as part of new transparency reporting. It contains requirements to ensure that information is available about the offence being investigated, so that we can find out if it is about children applying to the wrong school or speeding offences, as opposed to national security matters, how long the data have been requested, so that we can work out how long they should be kept for—is it usually used after a week or a year?—and what sort of data they are, so that we know whether we are talking about reverse directory look-ups or rather more personal information. I hope the Minister will be able to reassure me that that is his intention.

I should say that both my new clauses were inspired by Big Brother Watch, which I have been working with on this whole Bill and which particularly wanted to make these points clear. New clause 4 deals with the problem that a number of organisations feel they cannot publish their transparency reports and say what they have been asked to do for fear of violating the legislation against tipping off. I understand why there is a concern. The Government do not want companies to say, “The following things we are reporting to the Government, but these things are perfectly safe; we will not tell the Government about them.” We want companies to be able to publish that anonymised information, so I hope the Minister will be able to confirm that companies can safely publish it as part of their transparency reports without fear of being prosecuted.

I look forward to hearing the Minister’s reassurances on both those aspects.

[James Brokenshire]

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) for tabling these new clauses to enable a debate about transparency and the information provided in the exercise of powers under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. He will know that the Government—the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister—announced last week that we intend to introduce annual transparency reports relating to the exercise of powers under RIPA. That report will provide as much detail as possible, but without undermining the effectiveness of the agencies or posing a risk to national security.

The point I would make to my hon. Friend is that if we had individual companies giving details, that might give an indication to those who would do us harm, who might ask themselves, “Well, which ones aren’t doing that and which direction should we go in?” This therefore has to be done with care, given the nature of transparency, but I endorse his point about the need for more information to be provided, so that the public and this House can have confidence in the utilisation of the powers set out in the legislation.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

Will my hon. Friend take on board the point I made in my intervention a few moments ago? Although one fully accepts that one cannot give full statistical data about these sorts of activities as they relate to national security, the point that the hon. Member for Cambridge made—that the majority are about serious crime rather than national security—ought to give us the opportunity to set out many case studies that would improve the public’s understanding of why it is so important that we have these data.

[James Brokenshire]

I know that my hon. Friend understands the importance of communications data in the fight against organised crime, as 95% of the organised crime cases that have been brought before the courts have relied on those data. He will also be aware of some of the surveys that have been run to indicate the proportions of communications data that are used and how they are broken down. For example, a survey in 2012 showed that 51% of communications data used to investigate sexual offences were older than six months. It is that type of information that, if we had further detail, would give that sense of how communications data are used to reassure the public and others in respect of the utility of the powers that are there. That certainly touches on one of my hon. Friend’s points.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Huppert]

The Minister talked about that two-week snapshot from 2012. Is that the most recent survey that looked at the age of the data? Does he agree that it would be really helpful to have more up-to-date information about the age of the data are that used?

[James Brokenshire]

My hon. Friend argues for a different approach. He talks about a limited period and then about the need to safeguard that information following an event. I do not agree with him on that, as that is a separate debate. However, I agree that where we can see accurate data being provided, we seek to surface that as much as possible as part of the approach on transparency.

As the commissioner made clear in his report, the Home Office was working with him to improve the statistics collected by public authorities. He identified a number of further elements in his report, including the total number of applications submitted, the total number of items of data requested, the total items of data broken down by statutory purpose for which they were required and the total items of data broken down by crime type or other purpose for which they were required, which is the point that my hon. Friend has just made.

We are working with public authorities to ensure that most of these statistics are already being collected by them, and are progressing work to agree on the relevant practicalities such as agreed nomenclature that would enable those that had not already been collected to be collected. Transparency is important in ensuring continued public trust in the agencies and police forces that have been granted intrusive powers. However, transparency does have limits. We should not commit to such transparency that would publicise police and other sensitive investigative methodology, because explaining exactly how our investigators do their job will naturally lead to terrorists, criminals and others who wish us harm knowing how to avoid detection. We must also be careful not to weigh down investigators with too much bureaucracy such that they cannot perform the important function of preventing and detecting crimes and keeping us safe.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I appreciate that my hon. Friend is mainly talking about the gathering and publication of statistical data, but it would not involve much effort for police forces to collate even half a dozen or a dozen cases per year that are reported in the press to show how these communications data are used in individual cases. A few good examples that have already been published would go a long way to help the public understand how important this methodology is.

[James Brokenshire]

In highlighting case studies, my hon. Friend makes an important point. A number of case studies involving serious murders have already been referenced in the debate this evening. Indeed, the shadow Home Secretary highlighted a case in which a young person who was safeguarded was effectively prevented from killing themselves. Such examples highlight the absolute import and value of communications data and the way in which our emergency services, police and others rely on them, not just to solve crime and to protect the public from those very real threats that we understand from a criminal law and a counter-terrorism perspective, but to protect children and vulnerable adults from harm. The ability to identify where someone may be through tracking the communications data can literally be a matter of life and death. My hon. Friend is therefore right to suggest we can draw on case studies to provide greater explanation. In the appalling Soham murders, for example, communications data were instrumental in bringing those responsible to justice. Such cases highlight the significance of the use of the powers.

I recognise the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge, but I am unable to accept his new clause tonight. I can make it clear, however, that I do not resist increased transparency; indeed, it is the reason we have agreed to bring forward annual transparency reports. Such a level of detail can be considered in different ways, and in amending the code of practice on the acquisition and disclosure of communications data later this year, we can ensure that the appropriate text is included in statutory guidance, for example. Parliament will have a chance to return to the issue soon in that context. There are perhaps other ways in which we can reflect further on getting the balance right.

My hon. Friend made another point that may in fact relate to section 19 of RIPA, rather than to the section he suggested, concerning the illegality of disclosing the existence of a warrant under that section. To do so would risk exposing the existence of an interception capability and, crucially, the potential lack of such a capability, which would indicate to criminals and terrorists, who may wish to exploit such a gap, which communication services they may be able to use to conduct their illicit activities without detection. I believe that my hon. Friend seeks to ensure that where such a disclosure is made as part of an annual transparency report issued by the major service providers, a defence will be available to them in any subsequent legal proceedings.

The Government believe that, as at present, it is for the interception of communications commissioner to publish the total number of interception warrants. The commissioner has expressed his concern about the nature of the transparency reports, particularly with reference to requests for communications data. In his annual report for 2013, the commissioner is clear that statistics from transparency reports should “be treated with caution” as they may “lead to misleading comparisons”. Indeed, it would not be helpful to the public for there to be numerous sources of information on the number of requests or warrants when there is a lack of clarity and consistency as between each source. We are doing everything that we can, working with the independent commissioner, to improve the transparency of how such powers are used, but the additional provision would not help to give the public greater clarity, so I invite my hon. Friend to withdraw new clause 3.

[Dr Huppert]

I thank the Minister for his comments. The move towards greater transparency will benefit us all, including the Home Office. I do not quite agree with some of the points that he made towards the end of his speech. Many companies are doing well publishing transparency reports, which is helping to move the agenda forwards, but in the interests of time, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 5

Effect and justiciability of this Act

‘For the avoidance of doubt and notwithstanding sections 2 and 3 of the European Communities Act 1972, this Act shall have effect and shall be construed as having effect and shall be justiciable by the courts of the United Kingdom.’—(Sir William Cash.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Sir William Cash]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I am grateful to be called at this late hour. This new clause is important. I look to the Home Secretary; she knows exactly where I am coming from and where I am going. She may believe that we will be defeated on this new clause, but nothing will prevent me from making the point, which is that the Bill could become pointless. The difficulty, which she understands—I am sure that her advisers have already explained it—is simply that clauses 1 and 2 will enable the Home Secretary to serve a data retention notice on public telecommunications operators and to make secondary legislation governing such notices. However, there is a real possibility that the precise meaning of the European Court of Justice’s Digital Rights Ireland judgment has the effect of potentially eviscerating the Bill.

Professor Peers of Essex university draws attention to the objection by the Court to the requirement to retain all communications data. The fact that the directive required all data to be retained from all subscribers was indeed the first of the considerations taken into account by the Court in arriving at the conclusion that the directive was disproportionate. The problem is that it is within the framework of European law. This Bill is within the scope of EU law and so is the charter of fundamental rights, and the general principle of EU law will continue to apply. What that means in practice is very simple: sections 2 and 3 of the European Communities Act 1972 have the effect of ensuring that the retention directive, its replacements and all that follows from it are and have to be implemented in UK law. The United Kingdom also has an obligation under the voluntarily enacted 1972 Act to accept the jurisdiction of the European Court.

The European Court has already adjudicated on this matter, but the problem is that within the framework of this Bill there are grave uncertainties that have already been expressed by myself and others during these proceedings. The bottom line is therefore whether we are to make uncertainty more uncertain by providing for a situation in which we enact a Bill that might be challenged by the European Court through arrangements that some people who do not like its provisions might decide to entertain. If they do so, it will go back through the Court of First Instance and then the Court of Appeal before going to our own Supreme Court and being referred to the European Court of Justice. As with the Merchant Shipping Act 1988, which was struck down by our own High Court in pursuance of the European Communities Act 1972, which is a voluntary Act, the net result if the European Court of Justice makes such a determination will be that the United Kingdom will be faced with this Bill being struck down as enacted.

I do not need to say any more, because I have made the point throughout our proceedings. I implore the Government to take note of the new clause, which has been carefully considered by some very senior lawyers, both academics and practising lawyers. They are convinced that the Bill is at risk and so, as I did with the enactment of the Lisbon treaty, I tabled a provision that said that notwithstanding the European Communities Act the charter of fundamental rights would not apply. The Home Secretary might smile now, but I have to say to her that that is now a serious choice for the Government. Either they except the charter of fundamental rights or, through amendment of the 1972 Act, they should ensure that the charter of fundamental rights does not apply. That also applies to these provisions and I need say no more for the moment. I sincerely trust that the Minister will give a positive response.

[James Brokenshire]

My hon. Friend has raised these points during the course of the debate and I note the points that he makes, but I restate my previous points. The Bill is intended to give greater legal certainty through the statutory underpinning it provides rather than by relying on secondary legislation with the challenges and risks that might face in the future. We have framed the legislation in the context of the ECJ judgment. We have reflected on it carefully and believe that it is robust in its construction. I note that my hon. Friend will continue rightly to challenge on these European issues, but I hope that in the context of today’s debate, he will be minded to withdraw his new clause.

[Sir William Cash]

I wish to press my new clause to a Division.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

21:00

Division 38

Ayes: 25

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Conservative: 17
Democratic Unionist Party: 5
Labour: 2
Alliance: 1

Noes: 440

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Labour: 195
Conservative: 193
Liberal Democrat: 42
Scottish National Party: 5
Social Democratic & Labour Party: 3
Plaid Cymru: 3
Green Party: 1

--- Later in debate ---

[The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mrs Theresa May)]

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Third time.

We have had a lively and constructive debate today on the urgent need to ensure that communications data continue to be retained, and to clarify the law in respect of interception for communications service providers.

I thank all those who have contributed to the Bill during its various stages so far. I also want to place on record my gratitude to those who have recognised both the need for this legislation and the reason it is so important that we see it enacted quickly.

We discussed the Bill earlier today on Second Reading and it has just been scrutinised in Committee. I thank the Opposition for the support they have given to the Bill and their recognition of the importance of the issues it deals with. I also thank the Clerks of the House and all those involved in supporting us and enabling us to do this business in one day. Particular thanks are due to my hon. Friend the Minister for Security and Immigration for the excellent job he has done in taking the Bill through its Committee stage, and to the right hon. Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson) for his contributions on behalf of the Opposition.

I do not want to rehearse in detail all the arguments that have been made, but I remind Members that the Bill deals with two urgent issues, including the response to the European Court of Justice decision in April, which struck down the European data retention directive. That has created uncertainty among communications service providers about the legal basis for the retention of communications data in the UK, which is a crucial resort for law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I am sure the Home Secretary knows that I am, in general, supportive of the Bill, but, in the light of the vote we have just taken, what sort of guarantee can she offer the House that the same European Court that struck down the previous situation will not strike down this Bill as well?

[Mrs May]

As I indicated earlier, and as I think others have indicated during the course of the various debates we have had today, the European Court of Justice did not strike down the ability to retain data. It recognised that the ability to retain data was necessary and it recognised purposes for which those data could be retained. What it did in its judgment was say that the data retention directive was drafted too broadly and it challenged its scope.

Of course, it was always the case that regulations here in the United Kingdom had been drawn more tightly and narrowly than the data retention directive. We are able to put through this Bill with confidence because not only were our data retention regulations drafted in a way that met many of the issues that the ECJ raised, but we have made some changes to ensure that we meet the extra requirements that the ECJ made on us. That is what gives us confidence in the future of this legislation.

We have heard a number of examples today of how important it is to have the ability to retain and access communications data. It is vital for piecing together the activities of suspects, victims and vulnerable people, and ensuring that serious criminals and terrorists can be brought to justice. This Bill will clarify the legal basis for us to oblige communications service providers to continue retaining communications data.

At the same time, we need to put beyond doubt the legal obligation on companies that provide services to people in the UK to comply with our laws on interception, regardless of where they are based. As we know, the communications services used by us all are increasingly provided to the UK by companies based outside the country. Interception, which can take place only within strict limits and with a warrant authorised by the Secretary of State, can prove vital when investigating the most dangerous criminals or defending the security of the United Kingdom.

In the absence of explicit provisions in legislation, some overseas companies have started to question whether the law applies to them, so we are clarifying the law. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 was always intended to apply to any company providing communications services to the UK, as the provisions in the Bill make absolutely clear. The Bill does not introduce new powers, or extend the reach of law enforcement or security and intelligence agencies in any way. It responds to the European judgment, clarifies the existing provisions of RIPA and ensures that the police and security and intelligence agencies can maintain essential capabilities to fight crime and protect the public.

The Bill does not replicate the draft Communications Data Bill. As I have said several times, I continue to believe that its measures are absolutely necessary, but this Bill is not about what was in the draft Bill; it is about ensuring that we retain the capabilities we have at the moment. It will be for the next Parliament to debate other extensions in relation to communications data, as in the draft Bill. We know that that debate will take place because this Bill has been “sunsetted”. It will therefore be necessary for the Government to look at the issues after the election. Indeed, that will be on the basis of informed debate, following the review undertaken by David Anderson, as agreed.

The Bill will ensure that the job of those who protect us does not get even more difficult; that they can continue to use powers that are part of everyday policing; that they remain able to find vulnerable people at risk or in danger; and that they can maintain the use of vital capabilities to solve crime, save lives and protect the public from harm. It will ensure that our police, law enforcement agencies and security and intelligence agencies have the capabilities to do that. I now invite the House to pass the Bill and send it to the other place, and I commend it to the House.

--- Later in debate ---

21:43

Division 39

Ayes: 449

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Conservative: 214
Labour: 191
Liberal Democrat: 38
Democratic Unionist Party: 5

Noes: 33

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Labour: 16
Scottish National Party: 6
Conservative: 3
Social Democratic & Labour Party: 3
Plaid Cymru: 3
Liberal Democrat: 2
Independent: 1
Alliance: 1
Green Party: 1

Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.