Combat Air Strategy

Madeleine Moon Excerpts

Tuesday 17th July 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

I welcome the statement and the combat air strategy, but I say to the Secretary of State that it is deeply worrying how often we have gone to America to buy our fighters. Will we be looking to British industry to provide the AWACS aircraft, because these advance warning aircraft should be British-made and British-built?

[Gavin Williamson]

We always look at how we can do the very best for delivering for British industry, and at how to make sure that we have the capabilities that the Royal Air Force, the Royal Navy and the British Army need to do their job.

Counter-Daesh Update

Madeleine Moon Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd July 2018 Commons Chamber

[Gavin Williamson]

The Government continue to keep a close eye on all those people who are travelling from the region through other third countries with the intention of returning to the United Kingdom. I am sure that my right hon. Friend will also appreciate that the Government keep a very close eye as to the activity and the movements of such people.

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

What steps is the Secretary of State’s Department taking to counter those in Daesh, al-Qaeda and their affiliates who are now creating chaos across the swathe of sub-Saharan Africa, forcing much of the people movement towards the Mediterranean and on to our shores? What are we going to do there to again destroy Daesh?

[Gavin Williamson]

I am sure that the hon. Lady is very aware of the work that we have already announced, working with our partners, the French, as well as many other NATO countries, on dealing with the increasing problem of Daesh in the sub-Saharan region and with how it could migrate into Europe. We will continue to work very closely with the French and other NATO partners. The Government continue to look at how we can work more closely with other countries, such as Nigeria and Libya, to ensure that we do not see this migration of terror and the spread of Daesh into ungoverned areas.

NATO

Madeleine Moon Excerpts

Wednesday 20th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Nia Griffith]

We have made our position on the nuclear deterrent absolutely clear. We support the nuclear deterrent and we support NATO. That is our party policy.

I think that I had just mentioned the isolationist US Administration.

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

On that point, there is a huge danger that we spend our time focusing on the President’s tweets and not looking at what America is actually doing. Certainly at the moment, its financial contributions, its people contributions and its commitment to NATO are higher than they have ever been. The support that the NATO Parliamentary Assembly receives from members of Congress such as Mike Turner, Joe Wilson and Jennifer González-Colón is absolutely 100% towards the NATO alliance. It is dangerous to see the US totally through the prism of the President.

[Nia Griffith]

I thank my hon. Friend not only for the work that she does on behalf of this Parliament in respect of NATO, but for making a very valid point and clarifying exactly the position that we do seem to have at the moment with the United States.

It is all the more important for the UK to use our voice, through organisations such as NATO, to be a force for good in this world. It was the same internationalist outlook that inspired Ernest Bevin when he said:

“In co-operation with like-minded peoples, we shall act as custodians of peace and as determined opponents of aggression, and shall combine our great resources and great scientific and organisational ability, and use them to raise the standard of life for the masses of the people all over the world.”—[Official Report, 12 May 1949; Vol. 464, c. 2022.]

I sincerely believe that NATO can still be that stabilising influence in an ever-changing world, and a strong and resolute force for the values of democracy and freedom that we cherish.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald]

Yes, indeed. In his opening remarks, the Secretary of State mentioned that previous SDSRs made no mention of Russia and, indeed, that the most recent one made no mention of the fact that Britain is an island, and these things really matter.

As I have mentioned, NATO now faces external and internal threats—the latter is wholly unprecedented—but it faces them against the backdrop of an entirely broken United Nations Security Council. It is regrettable that, despite repeated calls from the Opposition Benches urging the Government to knock heads together and return some order to the Security Council, they still do not appear to have done so. What of the internal threat? The US President has long criticised the alliance for the amount that the United States contributes. That has been adumbrated by the Secretary of State, and I take on board the points made by the hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon). She made a valuable point, but at the same time, we cannot ignore the White House, although I appreciate her expertise as a Member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

It is not a new occurrence that the United States provides almost three quarters of direct contributions to NATO, and a substantial amount of indirect contributions on top of that. This has been a source of ire for the Trump Administration, who have openly accused other member states of not pulling their weight. So all eyes will indeed be on Brussels this month. Will the President come in like a wrecking ball, or will he come in as an opportunist, seeking to improve relations after an incredibly testing G7 summit?

Last week at Defence questions, the Secretary of State emphasised Secretary Mattis’s explicit and unwavering commitment to NATO and to European defence. That would be somewhat encouraging if only it were reflected in the discourse of President Trump, who continues to lambast the alliance through the lens of his “America First” politics.

[Mrs Moon]

There are other dialogues taking place that are equally important. In the last week alone, we have had General Ben Hodges here for the land warfare conference. Lieutenant General Joe Anderson was here, and Admiral Foggo was here as well. So there are other dialogues happening that are equally important. Again, I would caution about the President’s tweets, as opposed to what others are actually doing.

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald]

The hon. Lady is of course right to put these things on the record, and I recognise exactly what she is saying, but this is not just about Twitter and, as I say, we cannot ignore the White House. These are speeches that the US President has made on the campaign trail and since he assumed office. Given the way in which the President operates, I am sorry to say that everything could change any day. However, I do take the hon. Lady’s point—she is absolutely correct.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

It is wonderful to see how many right hon. and hon. Members have turned up for this debate, and I want to use the brief time available to me to consider the political threats. We have talked a lot about the military threats to the alliance, but we need to address a particular political threat, and I am not just talking about the rise of populist politicians and political parties that is straining the trust between NATO members and the accepted common values and aspirations across the alliance, which is a real threat. We must remember that we live in democracies, and democracies sometimes throw up leaders with whom we perhaps do not agree and whom we sometimes strongly oppose, but the point of a democracy is that, within the establishment of a Parliament, there is an opportunity for likeminded people to come together to discuss, debate and demonstrate a different way forward. That is what the NATO Parliamentary Assembly gives to us all.

The hon. Member for South Dorset (Richard Drax) talked about the European Union. In this place, we often mistakenly say that the European Union and NATO are separate entities, but they are becoming increasingly close. That closer alignment is being complicated by political decisions within the individual members of the alliance, by Brexit, by the refugee and migrant crisis and by different domestic political priorities and coalition tensions. We must not forget that.

More importantly, however, we must address the disaffection of our own population. Canada did a poll recently with Ipsos MORI and found that only 40% of the population understood what NATO was, that 71% of women had no understanding of the NATO mission and that 71% of millennials were unaware of what NATO is. I am a member of a NATO working group that wrote to member states to ask how, and in what subjects, the role of NATO in the defence and security of the Atlantic alliance is taught in schools. Only 18 countries replied, and the UK was not one of them. The UK could not spell out how we do it. We are writing again, and I hope the Minister will join me in making sure that the Department for Education responds and looks at the issue.

We found that there is definitely an east-west divide. In the western part of the alliance, there is a lower understanding of NATO, which is taught as if it is a history lesson only about the cold war. Estonia, in contrast, teaches global security and NATO in an elective course on national defence and has a new course on cyber-defence in its schools. Latvia includes security matters in social sciences, and it distributes information packages to schools and libraries explaining the myths about NATO. The Lithuanian Ministry of Defence has an education programme on national security and defence devoted to NATO. And in Poland, core curricula at primary and secondary schools teach issues related to security and defence.

[Mary Creagh]

I pay tribute to my hon. Friend’s brilliant leadership in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and to the work she does there. Does she agree that a brief history of NATO would be a more useful addition to the GCSE history curriculum than the current subjects: crime and punishment and the history of Britain’s great houses?

[Mrs Moon]

I hope that people in the Department for Education are listening to my hon. Friend, because it is essential that we reawaken the British public’s understanding of the nature of the threats we face. We have taken our security for granted, and too many of our citizens no longer see the risks and, indeed, no longer trust their Government to accurately portray the risks to them. That has been fertile ground for Russian disinformation campaigns and cyber-attacks. In fact, in some respects, the most horrific thing about the attack in Salisbury is how many people have said to me, “Oh, it was MI6.” They actually believe we carried out an attack on our own soil, on ourselves. We have to wake up to that and we have to deal with it.

The alliance is very good at addressing military weaknesses, but we are not very good at looking at how we ensure we take our populations with us. The disaffection of our public, their lack of recognition of the infiltration of our social media and cyber, and the attacks on our values, our politics and our alliance must be dealt with. We cannot carry on like this. We are like the frog in the water, and there is a risk we are not noticing that the heat is rising.

In relation to Brexit, our priority must be for the UK to reassure our allies not only of our total commitment but of our enhanced commitment to the NATO alliance, and that we will remain a strong, effective and committed partner. Finally—

[Mr Speaker]

Order.

Galileo Programme

Madeleine Moon Excerpts

Thursday 14th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Guto Bebb]

My hon. Friend makes a crucial intervention, and this decision will be welcomed in very few European capitals. However, the question depends on the unlikely situation of the United Kingdom not responding to the current situation by developing its own capability. My hon. Friend said that such capability is crucial for our armed forces, and I find it inconceivable that Parliament would allow such a situation to arise. I am sure there will be cross-party support for any decision we take to ensure that that capability is available to our armed forces.

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

This decision has immense implications for the security of our region, and it is frightening to think that our missile defence capability and our ISTAR capability could be damaged in this way. I commend the Minister for the tone in which he has responded to the debate this morning. It is imperative that that reasonable tone continues, as well as a recognition that Britain remains as committed as ever to NATO and the defence of Europe. This issue also has implications on further discussions that we will need on Permanent Structured Cooperation—PESCO—and the European Defence Fund. How does the Minister see our ability to let the Commission, and others across Europe, understand the grave implications for regional safety and security that this small-minded decision has led to?

[Guto Bebb]

I thank the hon. Lady for her kind words, and I commend her for her fantastic work on behalf of our armed forces and for her contribution to defence issues in this House. She rightly touches on the impact of this decision on the security of the whole of Europe, including the United Kingdom, and I hope that in bilateral discussions with colleagues in other countries, she will highlight the dangerous nature of this decision. She asked about the European Defence Fund. Bilateral discussions with my counterparts have indicated that they would like us still to be involved with that, and we have been clear that that is our intention. Does this decision throw doubt on that? I think the answer is yes. Will we carry on negotiating and discussing in a constructive manner because we believe strongly in the common defence of Europe? The answer to that is also yes and I hope the hon. Lady will continue to support us in our endeavours.

Oral Answers to Questions

Madeleine Moon Excerpts

Monday 11th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mark Lancaster]

I am grateful for that question as it gives me the opportunity to highlight that we have invested and continue to invest in cyber-capabilities, including with the opening of the defence cyber-school in March, a £40 million investment in a new cyber-security operations capability, and £265 million towards a new cyber-vulnerability investigation programme.

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

The further east one goes, the greater the awareness of the cyber-threat in individual countries. Lithuania, Estonia, Poland and Sweden have all published advice on how to deal with that threat. What do this Government intend to do to build resilience among the British people and understanding of botnets, hacktivists and all the other ways in which Russia is attacking our political and social institutions?

[Mark Lancaster]

I think that we are well on our way. The 2015 national security strategy reaffirmed cyber as a top tier 1 risk. That was precisely why we opened the NCSC, which helps to co-ordinate the work of government and the private sector. It is also why we now consider cyber to be essential in our armed forces’ core skills.

Oral Answers to Questions

Madeleine Moon Excerpts

Monday 5th March 2018 Commons Chamber

[Guto Bebb]

I thank my hon. Friend for her question and pay tribute to BAE for the work that is being done in her constituency. She is absolutely right to highlight the importance of keeping skills in the United Kingdom. Members from all parts of the House should be proud that the Ministry of Defence is responsible for more than 20,000 apprenticeship opportunities throughout the United Kingdom, as it highlights again that Ministry of Defence procurement leads to high-quality, skilled jobs in all parts of the UK, including Chelmsford.

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

What impact does the Minister see coming from his attempts to increase innovation in defence suppliers if the UK withdraws from REACH, the European regulation on the registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals, and if the free movement of scientists and engineers is not part of the Brexit agreement? Certainly, defence companies have expressed grave concerns to me about that.

[Guto Bebb]

This Government want to continue the free movement of people with relevant skills. The MOD is already engaging with the REACH issue. As it happens, I will be meeting relevant companies tomorrow to discuss the matter. I fully understand the hon. Lady’s concerns, but the MOD is on top of the issue and is looking at it closely. I am confident that we will have an agreement that will benefit both the United Kingdom and our European Union partners.

Ministry of Defence

Madeleine Moon Excerpts

Monday 26th February 2018 Commons Chamber

[Sir Edward Leigh]

That is a good point. Again, I hope the Minister replies to it. It may be a case of when times change, procurement policies change, but will that result in more pressure? What I am saying—several Members, particularly my hon. Friend, have made this point in their interventions—is that the defence equipment plan has no leeway to cope with new equipment requirements resulting from emerging threats. As the National Audit Office’s investigation of the plan put it:

“The Department’s Equipment Plan is not affordable. It does not provide a realistic forecast of the costs of buying and supporting the equipment that the Armed Forces will need over the next 10 years.”

If it does not do so, what is it for? The NAO continues:

“Unless the Department takes urgent action to close the gap in affordability, it will find that spending on equipment can only be made affordable by reducing the scope of projects”.

We have had training exercises cancelled, and we know that soldiers, sailors and airmen need to keep active so that they are fully trained and at the ready. Cancelling training exercises is short-sighted and a false economy.

Just to be fair for a moment to the MOD and the pressures it is facing, we are not the only ones having problems. Documents linked to Die Welt newspaper show that the German military has secretly admitted that it cannot fulfil its NATO obligations. The Bundeswehr was due to take over the rotating lead of NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, but despite committing 44 Leopard 2 battle tanks to the force, it was revealed that only nine are operational. It begins to look as though the arrangements for the conventional defence of Europe are a bit of a shambles.

The reality is that we are underspending, just as we did in the lead-up to the second world war. Back then, we were capable of jump-starting and expanding our defence capabilities because we faced an existential threat. God willing, we will not face that kind of threat in the coming years, though we can never rule out the possibility.

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

One of the problems with being in a NATO alliance—I know this as a member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly—is that there is nowhere to hide from our allies, and allies are noticing that Britain is withdrawing from exercises. They are concerned because they have seen Britain as an ally on which they could rely and depend. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that one of the most worrying things is the lack of credibility of our armed forces—valiant though they may be—because of the cuts we face in expenditure?

[Sir Edward Leigh]

That is a very good point. With France, and after America, we are the leading military power in Europe and we have to set an example. If we withdraw from exercises, that creates a bad impression.

I am glad to see that the hon. Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker) is here. He introduced his Backbench Business debate on defence last month and pointed out that the risks this country faces are only intensifying. If we face a multiplicity and variety of threats, surely our capabilities must reflect that. Russia is indeed a threat again, because it realised that the only way to be taken seriously is to be seen to be a threat. We treated Russia with contempt during the 1990s and it has drawn the lesson. It is a geopolitical gamble that we may not approve of, but in terms of Russian influence it has paid off. What have we been talking about for the past hour except Russia? According to some estimates, its economy’s GDP is equivalent to that of Italy or even that of Australia. Russia’s emphasis on its defence spending has made it an extremely important geopolitical player. Although we are constantly told that times have changed and that defence spending is not as important as it was, perhaps the Russian example shows that defence spending does pay off. I am not for one moment defending or approving of Russia or anything it does, but it has drawn the obvious lessons from the 1990s. There is a threat from Russia and we need to take it seriously.

Surely one lesson we can draw from the past, particularly from the lead-up to the second world war, is that, in terms of commitments, we must have a real presence. There is no point in our having a token commitment to or presence in the Baltic states; we need a real presence if deterrence is to work.

Many other threats are developing from Russia, the Chinese and other potential opponents: cyber-attacks and information warfare are all potential threats.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

It is a great pleasure to follow the fantastic overview that the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) set out of the defence estimates. For Members who do not find themselves—as many of us do—becoming defence-obsessed, due to our concerns at the lack of funding being sent into the defence of this wonderful realm, it was a fantastic primer on the concerns that we must face as a country.

I want to look at the reserve forces, an area that the hon. Gentleman also raised. I declare a sort of interest as the chair of the all-party group on reserves and cadets. I recently met an academic from the University of Bath, Dr Patrick Bury, who has been looking at the progress of the Future Reserves 2020 plan, the main purpose of which was to provide direct support to a reduced Army and to increase the reserves to 35,000. Following the meeting, I rather upset a Minister in the Ministry of Defence, who received more than 100 parliamentary questions in the lead-up to Christmas. He took me aside to remonstrate with me for giving him so much work. I pointed out that if he had answered some of the questions the first time around, there might have been 50% less questions, but that is the way of asking and pursuing parliamentary questions.

The information I will speak to in today’s debate is all provided—sometimes reluctantly, but it was provided eventually—by the Ministry of Defence following parliamentary questions. I am deeply concerned that the expenses involved in Future Reserves 2020 not only show a programme that is struggling to achieve its goals, but are such that we need either to redefine or to look at whether the money we are spending, given the outcomes we are achieving, would be better spent elsewhere. We all know that the Ministry of Defence cannot afford to waste that expense. Every penny counts in the Ministry of Defence.

To provide context and make the costs clear, what is the current reserve structure? The reserve model means that Army reservists sign a contract in which they commit to achieving a certain amount of training time, and to achieving training targets over a financial year. That involves 27 days’ training, including a two-week continuous period away, which is known as annual camp. If the reservists achieve that commitment, they are considered to be fully trained and up to date, and ready to fulfil their role in supporting the Regular Army—in other words, they are deployable—and are rewarded with a tax-free bounty cash payment.

It goes without saying that, for a reservist to achieve a high level of practice and well-honed skills, they would need to achieve that minimum level of training. It is only 27 days. Many members of the armed forces parliamentary scheme spend more than 27 days in the armed forces and do not qualify to be reservists. They nevertheless give that commitment. Unlike those in the armed forces parliamentary scheme, the reservist is not compelled to complete their commitment to get their pass-out certificate. They have only to complete a minimum of 27 days. The only compelling desire is achieving the tax-free bounty.

We can therefore use that tax-free bounty as a useful way of assessing how many people in the reserves are deployable. It is possible to be an Army reservist without achieving any training targets in a financial year, so if we want to know about the Army reserves, we need to look at how many achieve their bounties. Let us look at the cost of the programme. The easiest way to calculate the cost is to look at the bounty payments combined with the number of reservist service days claimed over the past few years. I am making a general assumption. A basic private’s pay in April 2017 was £46.42 a day—some will earn more, and therefore my numbers might be lower, but I am giving the benefit of the doubt and working on the assumption that everybody gets the minimum payment.

In 2016-17, 1,008,290 reserve days were claimed, and 14,930 reservists qualified for their bounty. That resulted in a spend of £68 million—it was nearly £69 million. In the year 2015-16, 957,390 reserve service days were claimed, and 14,990 reservists qualified for their bounty. In 2014-15, 884,050 reserve service days were claimed, and 14,270 reservists qualified for their bounty. Therefore, despite the rising costs, and despite continual recruitment, the true number of qualified reservists has remained stable, at just less than 15,000. It is not just that we are failing to meet targets year on year, as pointed out by the hon. Member for Gainsborough, but we are not increasing our numbers of deployable reservists.

The wages and the bonuses are low.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

What my hon. Friend is describing is fascinating. Does she agree that Army 2020 was really designed to give the Government political cover in the light of the reduction of the Regular Army to 82,000? It is not just a question of the retraining days; it is a question of whether the 15,000 reservists to whom she referred can actually be deployed alongside regular troops. I am told that in some cases there is no joint training at all.

[Mrs Moon]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. What we have here is a consistent pattern of only about 15,000 deployable reservists. Despite the money that has been poured into the reserve forces, we have not increased their number, but we have massively decreased the number of regulars. Our Army capability is therefore shrinking. That is something that we must be very worried about, but what worries me even more is the fact that we are spending huge amounts of money while receiving little or no return.

[Mr Sweeney]

My hon. Friend has referred to the significant reductions in the regular forces. As was mentioned earlier, a large number of former regular service personnel have moved into the reserves, but they may be doing so on a temporary basis. That may explain why so few people—in real terms—are achieving their bounty qualifications each year.

[Mrs Moon]

I intend to talk about the reserve bonus scheme in the next part of my speech. I am sure my hon. Friend will welcome that.

Part of the problem is that, despite the theory that employers would be willing, and even encouraged, to allow people to take their time to go to, for instance, the annual camp, it is not happening. As people are under pressure to remain in work and to retain their jobs, they are not willing to give those 27 days. They are not able to make that commitment.

Further inefficient costs to the Army reserve can be seen when we look at the “regular to reserve” bonus scheme and its failure to retain personnel. The scheme was introduced in 2013 as a way of enticing former regular soldiers to join the reserves in order to keep their expertise within the military and pass it on to the new reserves who were being recruited. We were retaining capability, and also using the former regulars to train the reserves. The incentive for ex-regulars to join the scheme is, again, financial: a £10,000 bonus is paid in four instalments, provided that they meet the requirements of training and attendance at each stage.

As of October 2017, 4,350 ex-regular soldiers have joined the reserves under the scheme. At first that looks like a good number, but the question is, how many have been retained? In 2017, only 480 of those soldiers achieved all four instalments, which indicates a dropout rate of 89%. I accept that that figure does not take into account the fact that entry into the scheme may be staggered over the preceding four years, but it none the less demonstrates that retention of ex-regular soldiers in the Army reserve is a problem.

I can give an example. An ex-regular soldier who turned up at my house to do a piece of work had signed up for the reserve bonus scheme, and had found that once he had left the military and started work, the pressures of civilian life—being back with his family and getting into the new job—meant that he could not retain the commitment that he had thought he would want to ease his transition out of the military and into the civilian world. These are men and women with vital knowledge and expertise who are used to military life. Their retention is vital, but even with that offer of £10,000, there is not enough to keep them and for them to commit to what is being asked. This further suggests that the current model of the Army reserve just is not working.

The situation looks bad on its own, but if the cost of the scheme is taken into account, it looks a lot worse. Breaking down the entrants to the scheme into their respective ranks and assuming this distribution follows through the key milestone payments, and using these elements and combining wages and bonuses, the scheme so far has cost just over £29 million, with only 480 soldiers reaching all four payments. I am sorry to bat on about this, and I know the figures are boring, but I am deeply concerned. We have a reducing capability in our Army. We have been sold a pup, with a promise that the reserves would fill a gap in the regular forces, but that is not happening.

Defence is an expensive business—there is no getting around that—but it is also a business in which we cannot afford to lose highly skilled and highly able individuals willing to give the time and effort to get through their training so that they are deployable. I know that many Members of this House, including the Minister, are eager to fulfil our commitment to them so that they retain their membership of the reserves and their employability. I honour, and express my gratitude for, the service of all those reservists, but are we getting value for money in a way that allows us as a country to have the forces that we need? It is my concern that we do not, and the MOD’s own figures suggest that the reserves model as it stands cannot provide us with the numbers we need.

The challenges and menaces we face are very real. Many of our platforms are not fit for purpose and the readiness of our forces is just not in place, and we have heard about the disastrous Capita contract. I appreciate that the Minister has apparently suggested that he will resign if the military is cut further, and I hope he does not have to resign, because he is a good Minister, whom we trust, rely on and respect, but we also need the Minister to hear the concerns that we are expressing.

None of us want our Army to be damaged. All of us know that our personnel can, when fully trained and fully committed, be some of the best in the world; that knowledge is shared across our NATO alliance. But we are getting weaker, and that is unacceptable. I call on the Minister to look at how we are spending in terms of the reserve forces.

[Toby Perkins]

My hon. Friend is making an important point about the numbers, but does she share my concern that a huge amount of experience is being lost from our military? There are people performing roles with a few years’ experience who would have taken 10 or 15 years to reach that position in the past, and the experience of many of them—excellent soldiers and sailors though they are—might come under pressure in the fiercest of circumstances.

[Mrs Moon]

My hon. Friend is right, and this is also making them so much easier to be bought off by companies who seek the expertise and qualifications they achieve in the military. They feel dissatisfaction when they see the forces they joined—particularly the Army—being hollowed out. That is leading many more to consider leaving.

I shall make one final comment. I have spoken to a young man who was working as a full-time reservist when I first met him. He has told me that a lot of his time as a full-time reservist was spent going out and trying to recruit. He said that one of the most frightening things was that so many of the youngsters he spoke to about joining the armed forces had no understanding of military life. They had no idea of what NATO stood for, for example. This is a wider problem that we as a country need to tackle. We need to get the message out about how invaluable our armed forces are and how critical it is that our young people should seek the life, the experience, the skills, the challenge and the satisfaction of a military career, whether as a reservist or full time.

[Mark Tami (Alyn and Deeside) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that we still need to do a lot more for people leaving the service? There are still too many ex-military personnel finding civilian life very difficult. Does she agree that we need to support them as they adapt?

[Mrs Moon]

I agree with my hon. Friend; it is difficult for people who have been in an all-encompassing environment to transition. I know many ex-MPs who have found it very difficult to transition out of this place, because it is not just a job; it is our whole life and requires great commitment. That is what the military is like as well, and that transition is grave.

I shall take no more interventions, but before I finally sit down, I want to make the point that life in the military does not mean that someone will get post-traumatic stress disorder. It worries me that that possibility seems to have got into the public consciousness. Life in the military will offer someone a chance to grow, to mature and to become an asset to their country, and I just wish that more people understood that, rather than thinking about the downsides of joining our military.

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon). As a former Defence Minister, I too can attest to being on the receiving end of a rolling barrage of parliamentary questions. This points to her great assiduity when it comes to defence matters, which she has demonstrated again in her speech this afternoon. I am glad to have been called to speak on the Defence estimates, which, for reasons I will explain, include an important change in the Government’s defence policy. I therefore believe that the estimates need to be increased. In giving important evidence to the Defence Committee last week, the new Secretary of State for Defence argued that “state on state” threats were now the primary threat to the security of the United Kingdom. This is an important shift in the Government’s position, and it has the logical knock-on effect that defence expenditure should now be increased to meet these new circumstances and the far more serious challenge that they represent.

It is important to put this change into historical context. I shall begin by going back to the 1980s, when the Berlin wall was still standing and the cold war was at its height. Britain, then as now, was a key member of NATO, and we spent about 5% of our GDP on defence, principally to deter the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw pact countries. As the Chairman of the Defence Committee, my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), has pointed out in the House before, in the 1990s after the wall had come down, we, like other countries, took a peace dividend. This reduced our defence spending to between 3% and 3.5% of our GDP.

As we entered the new millennium, the horrific events of 9/11 led to massive shifts in strategy. The United Kingdom became involved in expeditionary conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, where our forces became increasingly optimised to fight wars with a counter-insurgency element, at reach, against technologically inferior but nevertheless very determined enemies. As a result, and with the MOD already under considerable financial pressure, we optimised our force mix accordingly while deprioritising areas such as anti-submarine warfare and air defence to the point where, today, we have only 19 frigates and destroyers and have seen a major reduction in fast jet squadrons. As the process continued, by the time of the 2010 strategic defence and security review and the accompanying national security strategy, it became the Government’s policy that there was no existential threat to the security of the United Kingdom. With echoes of the 10-year rule of the 1930s, state-based threats to our security were effectively seen as no longer relevant. However, the events of the past few years have shown those assumptions to be highly erroneous.

The activities of a resurgent Russia in annexing Crimea and effectively invading parts of Ukraine have shown a Russian willingness to use military force on the European landmass in order to achieve its political objectives. We have also seen heavy Russian involvement in Syria, which the House was discussing a little over two hours ago, and massively increased Russian submarine activity in the North sea, the north Atlantic and the GIUK gap. Russia has also exerted pressure on the Baltic states, which are now members of NATO and covered by the article 5 guarantee. All of that is occurring at a time when we have reduced our defence expenditure further to where it sits today: barely 2% of our GDP.

[Mrs Moon]

I wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman is going to address our undersea cables and the risks posed by Russian submarines in particular. I was recently at a meeting at which Defence Ministers from several states expressed grave concerns about the number of Russian submarines that they were seeing off their coasts and alarm at those submarines seeking the undersea cables that come ashore in their countries. Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of that issue?

[Mr Francois]

I am sure that the Minister may want to say something about that when he replies, but he will be constrained, because it is difficult to discuss the exact details of such matters in an open forum. However, when I served in the Ministry, I was certainly aware of a potential threat to those undersea cables, and everything that I have understood since then leads me to believe that that threat has increased, not decreased, so the hon. Lady makes an important point. The Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Nick Carter, sounded a timely warning in his recent very good speech to the Royal United Services Institute about growing Russian military capability and areas where we need to bolster our own Army in response.

In the United States, the recently published defence strategy, authored by Secretary Mattis, has declared that state-on-state competition, particularly with Russia and China, is now viewed as the primary threat to the security of the United States and its allies. That important change in policy was then echoed to some degree by our Secretary of State for Defence in his evidence to the Defence Committee only last Wednesday, and it is really important that the House appreciates what he said. During the sitting, he explained that the threat to the United Kingdom from other states, such as Russia and North Korea, is now greater than the threated posed by terrorism, telling the Committee:

“We would highlight state-based threats… as the top priority”.

He went on to say that state-based threats have

“grown immeasurably over the past few years.”

When I put it to the Secretary of State at that hearing that what he was announcing—the primacy of state-based threats to our security—was a massive change in focus and that it would have a knock-on effect on how Britain’s military was structured and its readiness for war, he replied unequivocally, “Yes it does.”

That means that the defence review that is currently under way—the modernising defence programme—is now taking place against a significantly revised strategic background, in which deterring military threats from other states such as Russia, North Korea and, to a lesser extent, China is now to become the primary focus of this country’s defence policy. This new context brings with it certain important implications.

First, we absolutely must retain our independent strategic nuclear deterrent as the ultimate guarantee of our national security. All three states I just mentioned are nuclear armed, and it is important that we retain our deterrent to deter any nuclear threat against us.

Secondly, if we are to deter state-on-state threats, clearly we must bolster our conventional defences. Joseph Stalin is reputed to have said, “Quantity has a quality all of its own.” We can no longer rely on advances in technological capability always to give us the edge in any future war. We also need to make sure we have sufficient mass—the number of platforms—to deter our potential enemies. That means, for instance, rebuilding our air defences and bolstering our anti-submarine warfare capabilities to help to protect the sea lines of communication across the Atlantic, which will be vital in any conflagration on the European mainland.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

I congratulate the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) on his introduction to the debate. I agree with him that it is important to secure more such opportunities to discuss defence and how it is financed.

I do not think that anyone who follows the defence world and the way that the MOD has conducted itself over the past few years would conclude that the situation is anything other than dire. It is fair to say that the new Secretary of State realises that as well. There is also, however, a collective sense of acute amnesia, certainly among those who were Government Members in 2010, about how we arrived at this position. It is clear that the mess that the defence budget is in today is a direct result of policies taken by the coalition Government and the present Conservative Government. Seven years of ill-thought-through, rushed cuts and, on occasion, very bad decisions are now coming home to roost. The new Defence Secretary has the unfortunate task of sorting it out—a task that I do not envy, to say the least. It is therefore worth recapping how we have arrived at this position.

The Chair of the Defence Committee, the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), said that these were not political decisions. They were political decisions that led directly to the mess we have today. To ignore that is to avoid the evidence and means that we will not learn lessons for the future for how we manage our nation’s defence. In 2010, the new Conservative-led coalition implemented a number of deep cuts to the armed forces. The right hon. Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox), the then Defence Secretary, justified them by claiming that the defence budget had a £38 billion black hole, which somehow meant that rash and direct action would have to be taken straightaway. No one knows how he arrived at £38 billion. I have asked Ministers in this House to explain it on numerous occasions. The NAO and the Defence Committee could not arrive at a £38 billion black hole either, but it was used in every debate as the reason why cuts to our defence budget had to be made.

The Government stopped using the figure after a while, when they realised they could not justify it. I think it came about from a clear misinterpretation of the 2009 NAO report on major projects started under the previous Labour Government. The report was a snapshot of cost increases in 2009 and related primarily to the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers, the A400M transport aircraft and the Astute submarine programme.

[Mrs Moon]

I just wish to correct a mistake by my hon. Friend: he missed out the word “deliberate” before “misinterpretation”. I am sure he did not mean to, but it was a deliberate misinterpretation.

[Mr Jones]

It was a deliberate strategy, in the Cameron-Osborne Conservative party, to ignore the facts and spin—“If we keep saying it long enough, people will believe it.”

The 2009 NAO report said that if the equipment budget was not increased at all over 10 years, it might be possible to arrive at a figure of £36 billion. How did they then get an extra £2 billion? I think the then Defence Secretary just added some personnel revenue costs to get to the £38 billion figure. What the report actually said, however—this point was completely ignored—was that the scenario it envisaged, of the budget remaining constant in real terms over the 10-year period, would lead to a £6 billion funding gap, which could have been managed over that 10-year period.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) is right. The impression was given to the public, and to everyone else who wanted to hear this spin, that the £38 billion had to be found in year straightaway. That was a clear fabrication. We know that, because when the current Chancellor became Defence Secretary, following the resignation of the right hon. Member for North Somerset after two years, he suddenly announced that the black hole had disappeared. I do not know whether he was auditioning for his current job as Chancellor, but the idea that it is possible to get rid of a £38 billion in-year black hole in the defence budget in just two years is complete nonsense.

The Conservative Government used that as a smokescreen to allow them to cut the defence budget, as part of the Chancellor’s austerity drive, by 16%. The effect of that has been some of the decisions referred to earlier on, including the scrapping of capability such as Nimrod. Making people compulsorily redundant in our armed forces was completely inexcusable. Certainly, if the Government I was a member of had done that when I was a Defence Minister, we would have been rightly decried by the people who are always arguing for defence. Those decisions have had an impact on what is happening today. My hon. Friend the Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker) referred to the increased expenditure on the Trident programme. The £1.2 billion to £1.4 billion in additional costs happened because that decision was delayed. The deal done by the then Prime Minister David Cameron to get the Liberal Democrats on board in coalition delayed the programme, which built in costs.

[Mr Jones]

The right hon. Gentleman is nodding. He and I kept raising that and asking why that decision had not been made. The costs arriving now are because of the decisions taken by the coalition Government. I accept all that has been said about increased defence expenditure, but we cannot get away from the core decisions that have led to the problems we have today.

The 2015 pre-Brexit strategic defence and security review announced an additional £24.4 billion spending on new equipment. Some of that, for example on the P-8, was to fill the gap the Government created in 2010 with a hasty decision to scrap the Nimrod. Reference was made earlier to the civil service making decisions. I am sorry, but it was not civil servants or generals making those decisions; it was Ministers making these decisions, including the right hon. Member for North Somerset and the current Chancellor, when he was Defence Secretary. They decided to reduce the size of the Army to 82,000. I asked a retired senior general, “Who came up with the figure of 82,000 for our armed forces?” He scratched his head and said, “We were just told that that was what the figure was going to be to fit the cash envelope.” We then had the construct of Army 2020, which is a complete political cover, to try to give the impression that we are going to keep the Army at nearly 100,000. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend very eloquently outlined in her contribution to the debate, that is not only not producing the additional personnel required, but is actually costing more than if we had not done that in the first place.

Another point about the 2015 review is that, again, hasty decisions were taken in ordering the P-8. There is a gap, created by this Government, in maritime patrol aircraft. The P-8 was to be bought off the shelf—the Apache contract was announced at the same time—from the United States. That was pre Brexit. The added costs in foreign currency exchange are now creating pressures on the defence budget, and that is before we look at the effect on the economic and industrial base of our country. It may seem an easy option to buy off the shelf from the United States, but that lets our own industrial base decline, and that is what is happening. I have not yet seen any meaningful commitment by the contractors, Boeing, to create real jobs in the UK. What angers me is that if it was the other way around and we were selling equipment to the United States, we would be unable to do so without a clear commitment to jobs and investment in United States industry. That is where the MOD woefully and shamefully let down the British economy.

[Mrs Moon]

My hon. Friend will not be surprised to hear that during a visit to the Boeing factory in Charleston three weeks ago, I asked Boeing whether it regretted taking action against Bombardier and almost damaging and destroying the economy of Northern Ireland. Its response was, “We’re American, it’s what we do. It’s America first, second and third.” That is the sort of company that we were putting our trust in.

[Mr Jones]

It is. As an example, we have to look only at the sale of Airbus in the United States market. As part of that deal, it had to build a plant in Alabama, I think. We have the mindset in this country that somehow the ticket price looks cheap, but we are not thinking about the loss in tax revenue going back to the Exchequer and the fact that the defence industrial base is suffering.

Some decisions in 2015 were very strange. The Navy has been mentioned, and I accept that naval platforms are far more capable than they were 10 or 20—and certainly 50—years ago, but people are fixated on the number of hulls. The Government came up with the novel idea of having a cheap alternative through the Type 31e. This was literally just to deal with the idea that we have a certain number of hulls. I asked what the Type 31e is capable of doing. It cannot do NATO tasks and it is not clear what weaponry will go on it. Lo and behold, when I looked at the Ministry of Defence budget, I saw that there was no budget line for it at all—it has a £1.3 billion price tag on it—so again, how will it be paid for?

The Secretary of State needs to look not just at asking for more money, which the budget clearly needs, but at some of the ill-thought-out decisions. Take the P-8, for example. Buying off the shelf from the United States might look like a simple solution, but as I understand it, sonar buoys and missiles cannot be fired from the P-8 as it is configured, so we will have to redevelop the programme, adding more costs in. This is about looking at whether we have to revisit some decisions and take things out of the budget. I think that will be the case if we are to fit the budgets,

The issue of numbers is always contentious. When we were in government, I remember the hue and cry from the Conservative Front-Bench team—the right hon. Member for New Forest East was part of it—when we froze training days for the Territorial Army. The cost was £20 million. From looking at the headlines and at the way some Conservative politicians were going on, one would have thought that the world had stopped. If a Labour Government had slashed the defence budget by 16% and sacked people or made them redundant, as this Government have, they clearly would have been condemned.

It is the same old story. I understand the point that the right hon. Member for New Forest East made about arguing for defence—I have argued consistently for it in this House—but these are political decisions. When I was in the Ministry of Defence in 2010, I did not hear Conservative politicians stand up and say, “No, we do not need extra expenditure.” We were being condemned because we were not spending enough. In 2010, I did not see a single poster or anything in the Conservative manifesto saying, “We are going to slash the defence budget by 16%,” but these are the real facts and we cannot ignore them.

Let me turn to recruitment, which my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend touched upon. I do not like to say, “I told you so,” but the decision on the Capita contract for recruitment was criticised at the time. My hon. Friend the Member for Gedling raised complaints, asking why armed forces personnel were being taken out of recruitment centres and why such centres were being closed in some areas. The position we find ourselves in now was bound to happen. We have heard some of the stories. The recruitment process is not only taking a year, but given the rate at which people are being failed, it is no wonder the Government are not meeting the targets. It is now time to revisit the contract and put uniformed personnel back into recruitment centres. The Capita contract should be scrapped, because it is completely failing to deliver what was outlined.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend talked eloquently about reservists. It is time to rethink Army 2020. It was never going to work. It was political cover so that when the Government were cutting the Army to 82,000, they could still give the impression that they had an Army of more than 100,000. The issues my hon. Friend raised are not the only concern. I have never had an answer to the question about how we get formed units. How do we get training whereby regulars and reserves can train side by side to go on operations? I have not seen any evidence that that is happening in practice. If, in addition, it is costing what my hon. Friend says it is, it might be time to revisit it and see whether those resources can be put elsewhere. Let us come back to the suggestion that Ministers were asking advice from the Army about this. They were not; it was a political decision imposed on the Army.

National Security Capability Review

Madeleine Moon Excerpts

Monday 15th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Gavin Williamson]

We will continue to do everything we can to fulfil our commitment. I confess that, probably like all Defence Secretaries, I am a little greedy: I would always prefer to have larger numbers in our armed forces. In the coming months, we will do all we can to drive up the numbers through the new recruitment campaign. We hope that will attract significant uptake and an increase in the number of people joining our forces.

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

Had the Secretary of State been able to join us last Thursday, he would have heard across the House a cry for reassurance. Many of us here are also members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and represent this House and this country across the NATO alliance. I have to tell the Secretary of State that that cry for reassurance, that demand to know that we are able and capable and have the people, the personnel and the equipment to defend the NATO alliance, is shared by our allies. They are also desperate to hear the results of the national security capability review. Are the Secretary of State and the Government aware of that and of the need to reassure our allies?

[Gavin Williamson]

Yes. We need to reassure our allies that Britain will continue to play a pivotal role not only in the defence of Europe, but in actions in every part of the world, where we bring unique capabilities—the ability to make a difference, as we have done throughout our history. I am as keen as the hon. Lady to bring the national security capability review to a conclusion, so that we can set out our clear vision for our armed forces. They are the best in the world. We have to continue to invest in them. We are increasing the amount of money we spend on our armed forces, and we need to make sure that the whole world understands our commitment to delivering a global Britain.

Oral Answers to Questions

Madeleine Moon Excerpts

Monday 15th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Gavin Williamson]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right to highlight that. So often, local authorities do not understand the duties and obligations that rest on their shoulders. We are not only creating intentions to improve the lives of people who are serving in our armed forces, but putting money behind them, such as with the premium to ensure that service personnel get the right type of education for their children. However, we do need local authorities to work with the Department to ensure that service personnel benefit.

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

In 2013, the regulatory reserve scheme was introduced. Since then, we have paid out more than £29 million and benefited by only 480 deployable reservists. Would it not have been better to use that money to improve the conditions, the pay and the benefits of those in our regular forces and to retain them?

[Mark Lancaster]

I am not quite sure whether I agree with the hon. Lady’s figures, but I will go away and look at them, because I do not have them to hand. I absolutely defend what we have done quite successfully in increasing the size of the reserve. Compared with where we were three or four years ago, we now have a usable reserve, which is a very positive thing.

Defence

Madeleine Moon Excerpts

Thursday 11th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

When it comes to defence, we have to accept that without the right personnel with the right expertise and in enough numbers, the military cannot function. All the most sophisticated technology imaginable is useless if we do not have the skilled individuals to operate it. The planes cannot fly, the ships cannot sail and the vehicles cannot move without the people with the expertise. In essence, without people there is no military capability, and yet it is the people that we keep cutting.

Following the strategic defence and security review in 2010, there was a restructuring of the Army through a plan dubbed Army 2020, along with Future Reserves 2020 for the Army Reserve. The plan was refined in 2015. It proposed to reduce the number of Regular Army, or full-time, personnel from 102,000 to 82,000 and to increase the rebranded and re-enrolled reserve forces, or part-time personnel, from around 15,000 to 35,000 to make up the shortfall. On paper, that looks great. In April 2017, the Regular Army numbered 83,560 personnel and the Army Reserve 29,940. However, we need to dig deeper.

Reserve soldiers work hard as reservists, but many also have full-time jobs. They are required to complete a minimum commitment of days and training with the Army Reserve each year to be fully up to date and able to deploy in support of the regular Army. The completion of this training is not mandatory, but those who do not complete it are not considered qualified to fulfil their function during that given training year. Those soldiers who complete the training are awarded a tax-free bounty or bonus. This bonus shows how many reservists each year are ready and able to deploy quickly to support the Regular Army.

Over the last few years the number of Army Reserve soldiers has increased dramatically, from 21,030 in April 2015 to 29,940 in April 2017. That is an increase of 42% in the space of a few years. Those figures have been obtained from the Ministry of Defence through parliamentary questions. Given such an impressive increase, one would expect to see a proportional increase in those achieving the annual bounty as more and more reserve soldiers achieve their annual training targets. In April 2015, 14,270 achieved their bounty. That was 67.85% of the total Army Reserve. However, in April 2017, 14,930 got their bounty, representing just short of 50% of the total. That represents a 17.98% fall in the proportion of the Army reservists achieving their annual training targets.

The bounty is broken down into five levels. Each year that a soldier achieves a bounty, the next level is paid until they get to year five. Of the bounties awarded in 2017, 1,980 were for year 1; 1,470 were for year 2; years 3 and 4 were grouped at 1,310; and the figure for year 5 was 10,160. That is not a weighting one might expect, given the increased numbers of recruits. The numbers imply that the number of reserve personnel able to complete the training required of them in order to be considered fully up to date and able to support their regular colleagues has been pretty stable but not growing. Despite the 42% growth, the number of reserve soldiers able to fulfil the minimum commitment set out by the Government is still at the same level. The growth in the Army Reserve is a paper growth, not a real growth.

The Government’s expectation is that people will be able to marry up having a full-time job with the capability to operate at the same level as a full-time member of our armed forces. That assumption is being made as a result of a cost-saving decision to cut the Regular Army, and it is simply unrealistic. We now have a Regular Army of about 78,000 and an effective reserve strength of roughly 15,000, with both barely able to fulfil their required duties, especially as the Regular Army was previously more than 100,000 strong.

There is a further problem with the Government’s approach. We are reliant on experts to operate in a sensible and effective manner equipment that is often at the cutting edge of technology. Those skills cannot be replaced overnight. The Government’s solution was to cut those experts from the Regular Army and attempt to re-recruit them as reservists with a £10,000 incentive scheme.

As of 1 October 2017, 4,350 ex-Regular Reserve soldiers had been recruited using the bonus incentive scheme since its inception in 2013. The £10,000 bonus is broken down into four instalments, called key milestones, that are paid out over four years provided that the soldier has completed a number of days of training and tests. Considering that it equates to almost a quarter of those cut from the Regular Army in a similar period, 4,350 is a good number. However, of those who have entered the scheme, 3,320 made it to key milestone 1, 2,370 made it to key milestone 2, only 1,280 made it to key milestone 3, and just 480 reached key milestone 4 —a drop-out rate of 88.97%. Therefore, despite the offer of a £10,000 bonus, these ex-regular soldiers are also unable to meet the requirements of a full-time job while being a fully trained reservist that is capable of deployment. We risk having an undermanned regular force that lacks the skills and knowledge that come from the experienced soldiers that we made redundant, and an overworked reserve force that is doing its best to make up the shortfall while its people also try to get on with a civilian career. Once again, the apparent cost saving is elusive.

Returning once again to the ex-regulars in the reserve forces, each ex-regular at the rank of private is on a basic rate of £50 a day. Many earn much more than that, but let us just go with the basic. The total amount spent since the inception of the scheme on just wages and bonus payments is roughly a minimum of £26.3 million. For that £26.3 million, we get an 88.97% drop-out rate and only 480 reserve soldiers. That is before any consideration of the cost of restructuring both the Regular Army and the Army Reserve. We are cutting full-time capable soldiers and replacing them with people of whom we expect too much.

The Government have created a personnel problem in our armed forces that threatens to spiral out of control. We all acknowledge that the men and women in our armed forces, whether regulars or reserves, are dedicated professionals who are asked to do a difficult and demanding job, but their numbers have been cut to dangerously low levels and we are losing vital expertise. To make up the shortfall, we have put in place increased, unrealistic and unfair burdens on the reserve forces, which are also made up of honest, hard-working people, in the name of a cost saving that appears to be nothing at all.

[John Spellar]

The immensely frustrating factor in all this is that the Ministry of Defence and the services seem to be replicating exactly the same mistakes that were made in the “Options for Change” White Paper at the end of the cold war. They are pushing regulars out and creating an atmosphere in which people think that the forces are not recruiting, and they are damaging morale. Then, during the Christmas period, they spend however much they did on blitzing the airwaves to try to attract people in an atmosphere in which people are seeing those who have been forced out of our services.

[Mrs Moon]

My right hon. Friend makes an important point. Some statistics released today show that 71% of businesses in the service sector are finding it difficult to recruit from the skilled workforce, and the figure for manufacturing is 76%. We are operating in a climate where skilled people are at a premium. The armed forces had skilled people, but they sacked them and, rightly enough, the business community has grabbed them. We then tried to bring them back into the armed forces by offering them a bonus, but that has not worked. We have managed to keep only 480 of them. It is shocking, irresponsible and downright dangerous. This is an unpredictable world, and we cannot afford to play games. We are not showing our friends and allies our willingness and ability to support them and to support our own interests around the globe if we are not retaining and training our full-time personnel.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Bob Seely (Isle of Wight) (Con)]

By way of disclosure, I should say that I had the privilege to serve, in a modest way, in the Afghan and Iraq campaigns, and I remain a reservist soldier. I thank the hon. Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker) very much for securing this debate, and it is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for West Dunbartonshire (Martin Docherty-Hughes).

In this brief speech, I would like to talk about defence in the broader sense of the word, because the security of our nation rests on many things, not just on how many tanks or ships we have. At times, we can be fixated by so-called heavy metal warfare: ships, planes, tanks and so on. Physical defence is important, but it should not be seen in isolation, and today I would like to talk about security and defence in the round. Having said that, it is clear that we are significantly under-resourced and underfunded. What concerns me most in terms of Government Departments is that the Treasury seems to fail to understand that the point of having an armed force is not to use it. The Treasury seems to think that if an armed force is not being used, it can be cut—that is an incredibly foolish thing to think. It encourages our generals to look for wars to justify the existence of the armed forces, and starting wars and being politically or economically unwilling to finish them—there is some truth there as regards Iraq—is at best bad strategy and potentially disastrous for this nation.

I wish to talk about strategy and whether we have one, and about how we can improve coherence in policy making. I also want to make a few suggestions for parliamentary committees, building on some of the excellent things said by my colleagues on both sides of the House. First, on strategy, it is ironic that we have so many think-tanks in this country but we seem to lack one sometimes in our national strategy. I fear we are losing the capacity and confidence to act without clinging on to the coat-tails of the European Union or United States. Indeed, the US, despite its many great benefits as an ally, has in some ways exacerbated that problem. The great Oxford historian Sir Hew Strachan argues:

“a power which possesses overwhelming force has less need of strategy”

because it has so much power. That has resulted in thoughtlessness, definitely in Iraq and perhaps to a lesser extent in Afghanistan. We have been somewhat corrupted by that thought as well, because our strategy in the past 20 years seems to have been to cobble together just enough kit to take part at a meaningful level in a US-led coalition, so that we can have a political voice at the top table.

That strategy is now under pressure. First, the US has been disengaging—regardless of what one thinks of President Trump—slowly from Europe for the past three presidencies and the Russians are now a threat, with what they call “contemporary military conflict”, using both military and non-military tools.

[Mrs Moon]

One thing has been worrying me a great deal. A number of people have cited Russia as a growing threat, but it would be dangerous to ignore the threat from the south, which still exists. Is it therefore not time we stopped focusing simply on the threat from the east and recognised the threat from the south, which has not gone away?

[Mr Seely]

The hon. Lady makes a good point. I talk about the threat from the east because I would like to bring this in a bit later and I am trying to finish a thesis on contemporary Russian warfare. But she is right that in many ways the non-conventional warfare threat—migration and chaos—is represented in our southern flank. She makes a valid point and I thank her for it.

Post-Brexit, it is critical for our nation that we have a powerful security and defence policy, one that not only projects our identity—our values and our brand, if you like—but provides balanced and comprehensive security. Part of that is about remaining a powerful player on the world stage across the spectrum of effects. We are trying to be more holistic, and the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre in Shrivenham, with which I have done a little work over the years, has done some important work looking at national strategy in many of the joint doctrine publication documents it has written. According to the DCDC, our national strategy rests on political, military and economic power, but I wonder whether that is not quite subtle enough for today’s world. In defence, we need to be thinking about humanitarian power, governmental power, cyber capability, cultural, linguistic and informational capability and public outreach. All those tools are critical because the wars and conflicts of the past 30 years, including those we have been engaged in, show that populations have become the critical information and psychological targets. If we look at the three Russian military doctrines since 1999, their two foreign policy concepts, their national security concept and their information security concept, we see that they all put the integration of military and non-military effects aimed at civilian populations as a critical characteristic of modern warfare. Indeed, we see that in Ukraine, eastern Europe and elsewhere.

Historically, the tools of grand strategy have been held at national level. Military force is one element of that defensive strategy. Nowadays, especially with Brexit happening, we have an opportunity to rethink our national strategic culture so that we can understand how we can use our past experience of strategic culture to understand the future. Basil Liddell Hart, who was perhaps our greatest military theorist ever—I am sure that some of my right hon. and hon. Friends will know him well—said that we were champions of the indirect strategy. We had a powerful Navy and a small standing Army, and we used money to encourage others to fight. We used our alliances and set examples by our behaviour. We probably need to return more to that behaviour.

Let us consider the example of the Russian threat in Ukraine. We have parked some soldiers, some kit and around four planes—which is probably half the RAF these days—in the Baltic republics. Russia has used force in Ukraine and is bellicose towards the Baltic republics, so it is right that we put that kit there, but the most powerful threat to Ukraine is not necessarily the military threat, but the political and informational war, the co-option and corruption of its political leadership, and the trashing of its ability, confidence and statehood.

Our key weapon is not the planes or the troops—important though they are—but our ability to work with the Canadians, Americans, Germans and EU to provide a Marshall package and significant sums of money to Ukraine. We spend £13 billion on aid every year, and I apologise for saying this but much of it is badly spent. Here, though, is a major prize that we are not trying to attain. We spend probably £40 million in Ukraine, all in, including Department for International Development spending. We irritate the Russians by parking military kit in the Baltics, yet we do not seem to be thinking enough about the most powerful weapon we could have against Russian expansion, which is a stable Ukraine that looks like Poland, not like Russia. That is an example of haphazard strategic thinking.

We have an unbalanced foreign policy. DFID burns though money like it is going out of fashion. I had lots of pretty miserable experiences of DFID in Afghanistan and Iraq. I remember asking at the UK consulate in Basra how many DFID projects there were in southern Iraq and how much money was being spent. I was staggered that DFID could not provide an answer. For me, that summed up how DFID is sometimes profligate and lacks competence. I know that it does great work in some parts of the world, but sadly I have not seen the best of it.

At the same time, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is chronically underfunded and, as my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) said, the Ministry of Defence is scraping together savings in areas in which it should not be looking to make savings. Cyber-attacks are regular in Europe—in France, Germany and the United Kingdom—and the BBC, which is a critical part of our soft-power infrastructure, even at arm’s length from the Government, is funded such that it has to exist hand-to-mouth. BBC World Service TV and radio broadcasts should be funded entirely by DFID, by looking into and rejigging the definition of official development assistance.

I shall try to make progress; I do not have too much more to say. We must look closely at defence procurement. Can we please have a level playing field? Let us buy kit from other countries to save money, but some countries, such as France, have closed markets, so why are French companies allowed to bid here when we do not have the same rights to secure contracts there?

I will seek a meeting with the Minister in the near future to discuss the need for a complex radar technology demonstrator at the BAE site in Cowes in my constituency. As the Minister knows, the BAE radar factory in Cowes produces all the radars for the carriers and the Type 45 destroyers. If we want our own indigenous radar capability, we need that technology demonstrator soon.

We should use reservists more. I am delighted that the hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) made a series of eloquent points about reservists—I am one myself. We need reservists, but let us also support them. The reserve unit on the Isle of Wight was saved not through the MOD’s wisdom but thanks to the remarkable work of Captain Richard Clarke and the continuing leadership of Acting Sergeant Matt Symmans, for whom I feel a certain affinity as I was an acting sergeant for much of my Army career. It is individuals punching above their weight who are saving units from closure.

As my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East and my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (James Gray) said, there is no redundancy in our defence system. There are so few surface ships—I think there are 17. Talk to any admiral—give them a drink or two—and they will admit that the Royal Navy at its current size cannot protect the carriers. In any conflict or at the threat of conflict with peer or near-peer nations, those carriers would go home and sit in a base because they are not protectable, unless they are to be surrounded by a US fleet. They have no protection against ship-busting ballistic missiles. If we keep reducing the armed forces in terms of personnel and kit, we will encourage violence against this nation rather than deter it.

I have some brief suggestions. Can the Foreign Affairs Committee champion the need to think about strategy and hold hearings to give platforms to leading academics so that they can discuss our national strategy and defence culture? With Brexit coming up, this is a perfect point in our history to look into our national strategy. If we leave the security review to the Government, they are going to come up with the answers that they want, not the answers that we all need and want to hear. We need to rethink DFID funding and encourage DFID to take greater responsibility in a more holistic and joined-up strategy. We need to think about defence in the round.

We need all forms of power for our security and the protection and projection of our values. We need soft power, hard power and cyber power, but most of all we need an attitude of smart and integrated power. We need to study and understand how to project that smart power at a strategic, operational and tactical level. From what I have seen on operations and here at home, we still lack that, but it is not unachievable, if the Government have the ambition.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ruth Smeeth]

Not too easy. I thank the hon. Member for North Wiltshire (James Gray) very much. One important thing, demonstrated here today, is that the armed forces parliamentary scheme and the all-party parliamentary group on the armed forces inform all of us and ensure that the standard of debate in the House is as high as it can be.

I return to our amphibious capability. The proposals to cut our amphibious capability in the shape of HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark could cause tremendous harm to the adaptability and deployment options of our armed forces. Simply put, they would cut our options at a time when we need as many as possible, not fewer.

We will not adapt to this new world by running down our existing capabilities or by undermining the very people who are putting themselves in harm’s way in our defence; let us remember why they are there. But I fear that that is exactly what we are doing. It is no secret that the MOD currently faces a £20 billion black hole and the risk of further cuts. I sincerely hope that the new Secretary of State has made representations to the Treasury demanding more money from the pen pushers who worry about their air conditioning—my favourite quote of the day.

It is my very real fear that if we continue down the path that the Government have set, we may find ourselves ill-equipped to deal with what the future holds. We also need to recognise that Britain’s security does not just depend on our service personnel, vital though they are; we also need new and advanced technology platforms for them to use. A vital aspect of that is buying British, so that we can retain domestic skills to design, develop and produce cutting-edge defence technology.

In a post-Brexit world, that is more important than ever. That is why I began this year with a visit to the BAE Systems site in Brough to meet the team behind the Hawk. That was not just a chance to see some of the incredible engineering technology that goes into these aircraft; it was an opportunity to speak with the wider defence family—that is who they are: the engineers, technicians and manufacturers—who make kit knowing that their neighbours and children may well end up using it to keep them safe. They support both our own military and those of our allies, and we need to recognise that. Unfortunately, many of them are currently under threat of redundancy, owing to a lack of orders. The reality is that the MOD needs to step up and ensure that that industry has a steady drumbeat of orders, so that it can invest in their workforce and emergent technologies.

Fundamentally, however, my real concern today is that the Government are focused only on the cost envelope—trying to fill the black hole in the budget rather than investing properly in our future and what we need to keep us safe.

[Mrs Moon]

I am listening in particular to what my hon. Friend is saying about defence procurement and the need for a regular drumbeat of orders. I sometimes wonder whether the public understand the importance of keeping the sovereign capability embedded in those skills. At some point, we might not be able to call on neighbours and allies to provide us with kit and equipment. We need always to be able to provide that critical equipment ourselves.

[Ruth Smeeth]

I could not agree more, but the issue is twofold: it is also about our economic prosperity. Some 88% of defence exports come from aviation, yet we have no dedicated defence aviation strategy. We need a plan—we needed it last year, but we will take it this year, please, Minister.

By attempting to limit our capabilities according to budgetary constraints, the Government are putting the cart before the horse. The reality is that we cannot secure the defence of the realm on the cheap. If we are serious about having armed forces fit for the 21st century, we need to assess what threats we face, establish what capabilities we will need to counter them and then spend accordingly—whatever it costs. We need to stop tirelessly regurgitating the line that we are meeting our NATO target. Let us be clear that 2% is not a target, but a minimum threshold: if it proves insufficient to provide the capabilities that we need, we must be prepared to invest further.

No one can predict the future. Unfortunately, there will always be new threats on the horizon and not all of them can be foreseen. But it is the duty of Government—this Government—to ensure that we are as prepared as we can be, with the capabilities that we need.