Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Tenth sitting)
Louie French ExcerptsTuesday 17th June 2025
(1 week, 6 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Football Governance Bill [HL] 2024-26 View all Football Governance Bill [HL] 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 17 June 2025 - (17 Jun 2025)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair once again, Mr Turner. Broadly, this group deals with the first three clauses of part 9, on reviews and appeals. A key safeguard on any regulatory regime is the opportunity to challenge the regulator’s decisions. As we will discuss in subsequent groups, decisions can be appealed to the specialist Competition Appeal Tribunal, but, as a preliminary step, clauses 81 to 83 create a statutory right for anyone “directly affected” by many of the regulator’s decisions to request that the regulator conduct an internal review.
Internal reviews will involve fresh decision makers reviewing a decision. They will provide a quicker and lower-cost option than immediately pursuing litigation. That should also streamline the overall appeals process, help ensure that litigation is a remedy of last resort, and hopefully minimise burdens on all parties and on the legal system.
Schedule 10 is a list covering the majority of significant regulatory decisions the regulator will make that directly affected persons are likely to appeal. These are the decisions that can be subject to internal review and appeal to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. More operational decisions have not been captured in the list of reviewable decisions, nor have “positive” decisions, where the likelihood of appeal is negligible, such as the decision to grant a club a licence. The right to apply for judicial review still applies in the usual way to decisions not captured in schedule 10.
Clause 82 sets out that, after the regulator makes a reviewable decision, a directly affected person can request that the regulator conduct an internal review. The clause outlines the procedure for internal reviews and empowers the regulator to refuse a review request in certain circumstances, including if the regulator considers that the request is vexatious. This should ensure that internal reviews are not used as a mechanism for clubs to frustrate and slow down the regulatory process. The clause guarantees that any individual who was involved in making the original decision will not be involved in conducting the internal review. That will ensure a fair review by fresh decision makers.
Lastly, clause 83 outlines further procedure around internal reviews. The outcome of an internal review can be to uphold, vary or entirely cancel the original decision. This means that the applicable reviewer can correct a flawed or unfair decision. The regulator will have a statutory deadline of 14 days to conduct the internal review, with a maximum possible extension of a further 14 days in special cases. This should strike the fine balance between delivering a streamlined process and giving the regulator sufficient time to conduct a proper re-evaluation of the evidence. In the interests of an open and transparent appeals process, the regulator will be required to publish the outcome of any internal review.
I turn to a series of Government amendments related to appeals. Government amendment 66 will add the regulator’s decision to trigger the backstop process to the Bill’s list of reviewable decisions. This will add a statutory route of appeal for the decision. Currently, the Bill makes only a decision not to trigger the backstop a reviewable decision. Making either decision at this vital stage reviewable will strengthen the regulator’s accountability by providing competition organisers with statutory avenues to appeal.
Government amendments 67, 68 and 71 will make the board, not the expert panel, the applicable reviewer of the three distribution decisions: to trigger the backstop, to make a distribution order and to revoke a distribution order. The regulator’s board will be the regulator’s most senior decision makers and so will be best placed to make and review these momentous decisions.
Government amendments 69 and 72 will remove the statutory route of appeal for three minor procedural decisions—the decisions to conduct an investigation under clause 68, to ask questions as part of an investigation, and to not accept a commitment in lieu of an investigation. This will reduce unnecessary opportunities to hamper the regulator by appealing interim procedural steps of an investigation. It would be inappropriate to allow a club to appeal the rejection of a commitment in lieu of an investigation, as this should be entirely at the regulator’s discretion as the investigating authority.
I reassure the Committee that these changes will not limit access to justice. Affected parties will still be able to appeal the final decision—that is, the outcome of any investigation—to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. The amendments simply remove the ability to challenge and frustrate the regulator at every step of an investigation. I commend the clauses, schedule and Government amendments to the Committee.
Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. I will keep my comments brief, which the Committee and you will probably be pleased to hear. I have listened carefully to what the Minister outlined, and the natural questions that arose about the amendments and clauses relate to how she imagines perceived biases will be avoided from boards and the panels, given that the expertise required to review such decisions will most certainly mean that most people involved in the process will be from the football industry.
How will the regulator seek to avoid any perception of biases, so we can ensure that what looks like a stage 1 complaints process—it is easiest to compare this with a council—has the relevant transparency and process involved to avoid going to stage 2, which would be the Competition Appeal Tribunal? Secondly, can the Minister explain why Government amendment 72 removes the decision to exercise the power to ask questions in an interview from the list of reviewable decisions? Why have the Government made that decision?
Stephanie Peacock
I direct the hon. Gentleman to the regulatory principles, in terms of the individuals involved—whether that is the board or the expert panel—and schedule 10, which lists the major significant regulatory decisions. If we look again at the regulatory principles, we see that there is a requirement to be proportionate and to act in a fair way. I will write to him about his second question, on amendment 72, but I think that this refers to the three minor amendments we are making so that the system cannot be frustrated at each step of the way. But I will clarify that and write to him, in the interests of accuracy.
Mr French
I am happy to receive a response in writing.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 81 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 10
Reviews
Amendments made: 66, in schedule 10, page 120, line 17, column 1, leave out “not to trigger” and insert
“to trigger, or not to trigger,”.
This amendment includes a decision to trigger the resolution process in the list of reviewable decisions set out in Schedule 10.
Amendment 67, in schedule 10, page 120, line 17, column 2, leave out
“a committee of the Expert Panel”
and insert “the Board”.
This amendment provides that the applicable reviewer for a decision to trigger the resolution process is the Board rather than a committee of the Expert Panel.
Amendment 68, in schedule 10, page 120, line 19, column 2, leave out
“a committee of the Expert Panel”
and insert “the Board”.
This amendment provides that the applicable reviewer for a decision to make a distribution order under NC4 is the Board rather than a committee of the Expert Panel.
Amendment 70, in schedule 10, page 120, leave out lines 21 and 22.
This amendment is consequential on the insertion of NC4.
Amendment 71, in schedule 10, page 120, line 23, column 2, leave out
“a committee of the Expert Panel”
and insert “the Board”.
This amendment provides that the applicable reviewer for a decision to revoke a distribution order under clause 63 is the Board rather than a committee of the Expert Panel.
Amendment 69, in schedule 10, page 120, leave out lines 27 to 30.
This amendment removes a decision to conduct an investigation under clause 68 and not to accept a commitment in lieu under clause 70 from the list of reviewable decisions in Schedule 10.
Amendment 72, in schedule 10, page 120, leave out lines 35 and 36.—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment removes a decision to exercise the power to ask questions under paragraph 2 of Schedule 8 from the list of reviewable decisions in Schedule 10.
Schedule 10, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 82 and 83 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 84
Appeals to the Competition Appeal Tribunal
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
The clauses relate to the appeals of the regulator’s decisions to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. An appeals process should provide the appropriate opportunity to challenge that a regulator is acting fairly and within its statutory remit. It should also be a focused and efficient process that does not excessively delay the final resolution of decisions or hinder the regulator in achieving its objectives. Finally, while providing effective assurance of the regulator’s decision-making process and judgment, the appeals system should not unduly undermine the expert independent regulator. We believe that the appeals process, and the standard of appeals set out in the clauses, effectively balance those different considerations.
Clause 84 sets out when appeals can be made, who can bring an appeal and how they are sequenced with internal reviews. Clause 85 sets out the standard of appeal that is to be applied by the Competition Appeal Tribunal on appeal of different types of decision. The majority of decisions will be appealable on judicial review grounds, having been first internally reviewed. That will provide a streamlined process for the majority of appeals.
The regulator reviews internally to ensure that its decision is robust, and the reviewed decision can then be scrutinised by the Competition Appeal Tribunal. In judicial review appeals, the Competition Appeal Tribunal will also be able to quash flawed decisions, but not substitute the regulator’s decision for its own. That will ensure appropriate deference is given to the regulator as the expert body that is best placed to make decisions of technical judgment in the football market.
However, there are some particularly significant enforcement decisions that the regulator can take under the Bill. We expect these actions to be rare, as they are for extreme and serious circumstances only. But, if taken by the regulator, these punitive actions could have a significant impact on a person’s rights. That is why, for the six decisions, we believe that a merits appeal is more appropriate, which means that the Competition Appeal Tribunal can substitute its decisions over the regulator’s. Finally, as is standard, clause 84 also establishes an onward route of appeal of the Competition Appeal Tribunal’s decisions to the Court of Appeal.
In summary, we think that the standard of appeal, and the wider appeals process set out in the Bill, strikes the correct balance between offering appropriate scrutiny of regulatory decisions and not allowing those decisions to be constantly challenged and undermined. I therefore commend the clauses to the Committee.
Mr French
This part of the Bill is important. We have argued consistently throughout this Committee that we believe that the right of appeal will be fundamental to the clubs in the context of this Bill. But we do have concerns, as the official Opposition, that football clubs will increasingly see themselves in legal disputes rather than focusing on matters on and off the pitch.
The natural question regarding this process is really about how the Minister will help to ensure that there is a fair playing field in terms of the financial costs of going to an appeal. How will those smaller clubs have the same rights and access to such appeals when they clearly will not have the same financial means as some of the Premier League clubs?
Stephanie Peacock
My officials engaged with legal experts and senior members of tribunals while developing the Bill. That is why we have set out the Competition Appeal Tribunal process, and why we believe that it will be proportionate and appropriate for all levels of the pyramid.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 84 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 85 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 86
Disclosure of information by the IFR
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr French
Without wishing to sound like a broken record, the Opposition have raised concerns about scope creep for the regulator down the line, and how that may lead to unintended consequences. The obvious question to the Minister is: what consultation will take place with Members of this House so that we can scrutinise any rule changes and be confident that the regulator has not gone beyond the scope of the powers that we deem necessary at this point?
Stephanie Peacock
I make two points in response to that. Of course, there is the provision in the Bill—I believe we will come on to this, but we may have already covered it—for a five-year review. On this clause, the regulator must consult specified competition organisers and anyone else it considers appropriate before making, amending or replacing any rules. This is about future-proofing, and certainly not about scope creep.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 90 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 91
Regulations
Mr French
Clause 91 provides the procedural backbone to the regulatory powers contained in the Bill. It sets out how the Secretary of State—whoever that may be, should this Bill become law—may make regulations under this legislation, including who may exercise discretion under them, and the form of parliamentary oversight that will apply. In short, this clause tells us how much power the Executive has in implementing the detail of the Bill, and how much say Parliament retains once the Bill becomes law.
The clause may be tucked away in the final third of the Bill, but its importance should not be understated. It governs not only the process of regulation, but the boundaries of ministerial authority. In some areas, we believe those boundaries are drawn too widely. That is why I have tabled amendment 127, which would remove the Secretary of State’s power under clause 56(2)(b) to specify, by regulation, other sources of relevant revenue that could be brought into scope of the resolution process.
Let me start by talking about clause 91. Subsection (1) allows regulations to confer discretion on a person and to vary by purpose, or to make incidental and consequential provisions. That is common enough in legislation, but it is worth nothing that that includes financial discretion, which has material implications for how the football regulator functions.
Subsection (2) confirms that all regulations must be made by statutory instrument. Again, that is standard practice. Subsection (3) provides a list of which regulations must be made under the affirmative procedure, and subsection (4) confirms that all other regulations fall under the negative procedure.
Subsection (5) removes the hybrid procedure, even if a regulation might otherwise qualify as hybrid, effectively limiting Parliament’s ability to challenge or delay regulations in which private or commercial interests are disproportionately affected. That all gives the Secretary of State wide scope to make rules that affect both her own regulator and the football industry, with only partial scrutiny by Parliament.
Clause 56 is where this becomes far more than procedural. Under clause 56(2)(b), the Secretary of State is empowered to expand, by regulation, what qualifies as relevant revenue for the purpose of regulatory intervention. Put plainly, this is a power to change what money is up for grabs.
That is a significant power. It means that the Secretary of State can decide what kinds of revenue are subject to redistribution disputes between leagues and competitions. Today, that might mean central broadcasting income, but tomorrow it could include gate receipts, sponsorship revenue, commercial arrangements specific to certain clubs or competitions, or even transfer proceeds or merchandising royalties. In theory, it could give a future Secretary of State the ability to bring any revenue stream into scope, and thereby invite the regulator to oversee, or even compel, its redistribution. This is a constitutional concern, not just a technical one. Will the Minister please confirm whether there are any limits—statutory or political—on what the Secretary of State could define as a source of “relevant revenue” under clause 56(2)(b)? If not, does she accept that that gives the Government open-ended authority to intervene in private commercial arrangements within football?
My amendment would remove this regulation-making power from the Bill. It would ensure that the scope of financial disputes eligible for regulatory resolution is fixed in primary legislation, not adjustable by ministerial diktat. We believe that is the right balance; it allows Parliament to define the guardrails and prevents future mission creep, whereby politically contentious revenue streams are dragged into disputes between the Premier League and the EFL, or any other competitions.
This is not just about the risk of interference; it is about certainty, predictability and trust in the regulatory model. We have already made clear our concerns about how English football will run into issues with UEFA and FIFA regarding their statutes. I will not repeat that again now, but we believe that, by granting the Secretary of State the power to redefine revenue categories by regulation—outside of parliamentary debate—clause 56(2)(b), as enabled by clause 91, risks violating those principles.
Such interference has one clear sanction:
“the ultimate sanction…would be excluding the federation from Uefa and teams from competition.”
As we have already discussed, that is not a risk that should be taken lightly. If football governance is to remain independent, and if the regulator is to operate with a clear mandate, the definition of revenue categories must not be subject to political discretion; it must be set by Parliament in primary legislation, not by the stroke of a ministerial pen. That is especially true when the very mechanism in question, the resolution process, is designed to resolve disputes about money. What qualifies as “relevant revenue” goes to the heart of the matter. It is not ancillary; it is foundational.
Clause 91 may appear to be about procedures, but it is in fact about power. It determines how broad the reach of the Secretary of State will be in defining, influencing and intervening in the financial affairs of English football. In particular, through the mechanism created by clause 56(2)(b), it allows new revenue streams to be brought into the scope of the Government-backed intervention without proper parliamentary scrutiny. That is not what was promised when this Bill was introduced. We were told by the Government and this Minister that their regulator would be a light-touch and targeted regulator—one designed to uphold financial sustainability and protect supporters, not one that could be weaponised by future Ministers to remake the game’s financial settlement from above.
By tabling amendment 127, we are saying that revenue boundaries must be set in statute, not in statutory instruments, that Parliament, not the Secretary of State, should decide where the line is drawn, and that the regulator should focus on its core remit and not be dragged into every financial dispute, with a “revenue” label slapped on by regulation.
Stephanie Peacock
I believe that amendment 127 is consequential on the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup’s amendment 124 regarding our changes to the Bill to include parachute payments, which we debated last week—although I think he gave a slightly more wide-ranging speech just now. Amendment 124 would have prevented parachute payments from being considered under the backstop, and it would have prevented the Secretary of State from amending the revenue in scope of the backstop in future. I will state here what I stated last week, and what has been my consistent position, even in opposition: for the regulator to make an informed decision regarding the financial state of football, it must consider all relevant factors, and that includes parachute payments.
As drafted, the “relevant revenue” in scope of the backstop expressly includes broadcast revenue, because that is the predominant source of revenue and distributions for the relevant leagues. However, there is no guarantee that that will always remain the case. As I covered in last week’s debate, the financial landscape of football is ever-changing. No one could have predicted 30 years ago just how much television broadcasting of English football would grow, and who can predict where technology may take us in another 30 years? That is why clause 56 allows the Secretary of State to specify other kinds of revenue to be included as “relevant revenue”. This will simply future-proof the backstop mechanism.
However, as I outlined in the previous debate, there are still clear constraints and safeguards regarding this power. The Secretary State must consult with the regulator, the FA and the relevant leagues before using the power, and can use the power only when there has been
“a material change of circumstances”.
Any use of the power will be scrutinised by Parliament under the affirmative procedure.
Stephanie Peacock
I appreciate my hon. Friend’s intervention; he has put an important point on the record, and it is always nice to be able to pay tribute to Richard Caborn, the former sports Minister and my former south Yorkshire colleague. He has done a lot of work in this area; indeed, I know that he has worked very closely with my hon. Friend.
This process is simply about future-proofing. Given that this Committee has already agreed to clause 56 and disagreed to the shadow Minister’s amendment 124, all that this amendment would achieve is to remove one of the safeguards, making regulations to update the definition of “relevant revenue” negative rather than affirmative. For those reasons, I hope that the shadow Minister will withdraw his amendment.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank my hon. Friend for tabling this amendment. I acknowledge its intent to fortify the provisions in the Bill for dealing with conflicts of interest. We will cover “Minor Definitions” in detail when we discuss the next group of clauses, which includes clause 92 stand part. However, I will touch on “Minor Definitions” briefly when responding to this amendment.
As we discussed at length on day one of this Committee, when we debated conflicts of interest, it is essential that the regulator can deliver its regime free from undue influence and vested interests. The Bill already makes it clear that the regulator will be free from conflicts of interest and the Government amendments made in the other place strengthen those protections even further—indeed, beyond any doubt.
We believe that the existing definition of a conflict of interest is appropriate and will capture the correct issues. That definition is any interest that
“is likely to affect prejudicially that person’s discharge of functions”.
I reassure my hon. Friend that our definition is well precedented; for example, it can be found in the Pensions Act 2008 and the Financial Guidance and Claims Act 2018.
Stephanie Peacock
The shadow Minister is making a well-rehearsed argument. As we have discussed previously, the newly appointed chair of the regulator has been fully endorsed by a cross-party Select Committee.
Returning to the amendment, we are confident that this definition and the conflict of interest protections in the Bill, supplemented by public law principles and non-legislative measures that are already in place, provide comprehensive safeguards to identify and manage conflicts of interest appropriately. For those reasons, I hope that my hon. Friend will withdraw his amendment.
Mr French
Given the concerns that His Majesty’s Official Opposition have raised throughout the passage of the Bill in this place and in the other House, we welcome the inclusion of the review of the Act. However, the clause mentions laying a copy of the report before Parliament. How does the Minister envisage Parliament being able to have its say on the benefits or non-benefits of the regulator at that point?
Stephanie Peacock
I think we discussed this earlier. It is up to individual Select Committees whether they wish to call the independent regulator before them. I will write to the hon. Gentleman on the practicalities of laying the report.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 96 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 97
Payments into the Consolidated Fund
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 98 relates to minor and consequential amendments to other primary legislation. Those amendments are to existing Acts and are necessary for the Bill to function as intended. For example, they add the regulator to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and enable the competition appeal tribunal to hear appeals of the regulator.
Stephanie Peacock
I believe so, but in the interest of accuracy I will double check and write to the hon. Gentleman.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 98 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 12 agreed to.
Clause 99
Extent
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 99 sets out the territorial extent and application of the Bill. The regulator’s scope is intended to be limited to the top five tiers of English men’s football. That is where the fan-led review identified significant harms and structural challenges that the market had failed to resolve. Five Welsh clubs compete in the English football pyramid, four of which—Cardiff City, Newport County, Swansea City and Wrexham—would be captured in the scope of the regulator. One more, Merthyr Town, which was recently promoted to the sixth tier, could be in scope in the future. To ensure that all clubs within the English football pyramid are captured and protected equally under the same regulatory regime, the legislation must extend to both England and Wales.
Mr French
I will not seek to rehash an earlier debate on the multi-club issue that the Opposition raised. However, I urge the Minister again to look closely at how that may work in the future. I fully appreciate her point about the Welsh clubs that compete in the English structure, but, as we highlighted in previous debates, a number of Scottish clubs now have multi-club ownership with English clubs and will be affected by this legislation directly or indirectly. If the Minister gave further thought to that and let me know, it would be appreciated.
Stephanie Peacock
I will make that commitment.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 99 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 100
Commencement
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Max Wilkinson
Hon. Members are all waiting for it—this was going to be the moment that we were going to force a vote, but given that the Minister has put on record the fact that this will be considered an operational and match day issue for the regulator, so fans must be consulted on it and would probably have a veto, we are content that we do not need to press the new clause to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 17
Impact on regulator of changes in Government administration
“If the Department for Culture Media and Sport is abolished, or its functions in relation to football substantially relocated, the Government must automatically review the suitability of the continuation of the IFR and the impact that the abolition or relocation will have on the IFR.”—(Mr French.)
This new clause would require the Government to review the IFR in the instance that the Department for Culture, Media and Sport were abolished, or its functions substantially altered.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Mr French
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
We believe that new clause 17 is important, given the speculation that the Minister might soon be going somewhere else on a free transfer. On a more serious note, this is a sensible provision, given the legal requirements on the Secretary of State in the Bill. For example, there has been much speculation that if the Department for Culture, Media and Sport were disbanded, sport, for example, would end up in the Department of Health and Social Care or the Department for Education, which would mean a different relationship with the football regulator going forward. Therefore, it is important to include a review mechanism in the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
The hon. Gentleman’s new clause suggests that if DCMS were to be abolished, or if football were to be moved out of the Department’s portfolio, that should trigger a review of the regulator. A machinery of government change should have no bearing on whether there is continued need for an independent regulator established by Parliament. Just because circumstances in the sponsoring Department change, that does not mean that the regulator should be subject to a review. Machinery of government changes are common; we saw several of them under the previous Government. We do, however, believe that the regulator should be assessed and reviewed at the right time, as part of important monitoring and evaluation of the regulation.
Stephanie Peacock
I could not possibly speculate on such a hypothetical question.
I will say that clause 96, which we have already debated, mandates a review of the Act within five years of the licensing regime being fully commenced. Among other things, the review will look into whether the regulator has been effectively achieving its objectives, or whether those objectives might be better achieved in a different way. There are also other ways in which the regulator can be scrutinised and held to account by Parliament, such as through Select Committee hearings. I therefore hope that the hon. Member will withdraw his new clause.
Mr French
I have listened very carefully to the Minister’s response and to the intervention from the hon. Member for Cheltenham. Given the point that we are making about the role of the Secretary of State in relation to some of the regulator’s powers, we think that that hypothetical question is key. I gave examples of Departments that sport or football could move to, such as the Department of Health and Social Care or the Department for Education, which we think would significantly change the perspective on the business side of football. We will therefore press the new clause to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Mr French
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
This new clause is designed to improve the transparency of the regulator, ensuring that the public, football and Parliament are aware of the risks that we have discussed at length—in particular, any issues arising from international regulators such as UEFA or FIFA. We believe it is important to have transparency, and to ensure that Members understand the risk, as can football clubs. The Opposition will look to press the new clause to a Division, subject to the Minister’s comments.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his new clause. There has been a lot of debate in the House, including in Committee and in the other place, about letters received from UEFA. There have been particular concerns that the Bill and the regulator should not breach UEFA or FIFA statutes, and there is a strong feeling that we must not risk English clubs or national teams being banned from international competitions through this legislation.
Let me be clear again that the regulator will be operationally independent of the Government and will not exert an undue influence on the FA’s ability to govern the game. The extent of its statutory powers and duties will simply not allow it to do so. That is why both UEFA and the FA have confirmed that the Bill as drafted does not breach UEFA statutes. Indeed, the FA is on the record as supporting the regulator’s introduction.
The new clause would require the publication of all future UEFA and FIFA correspondence received by the regulator or the Government, or correspondence relating to the regulator. Requiring private communications to be made public would serve only to discourage honest and frank conversations with key stakeholders, and would thus stand in the way of constructive relationships with UEFA and FIFA. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the new clause.
Mr French
I have listened carefully to the Minister’s comments. The Committee should also be aware that the FA has warned specifically about scope creep, which is something that the Opposition have also been very concerned about. We therefore think it is prudent to ensure that there is transparency and awareness of risk going forward. If there were to be significant warnings from UEFA or FIFA about scope creep, the new clause is an important mechanism for us to understand that as parliamentarians, clubs and fans of football. We will press the new clause to a Division.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Mr French
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
It has been 40 years since alcohol was first banned in view of the pitch. Given the support that lifting the measure has among a number of clubs, the Football Supporters’ Association, and even some Labour MPs, we urge the Government to consider the new clause.
Jon Pearce (High Peak) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. Does the shadow Minister consider the new clause to be scope creep?
Mr French
I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point—I was probably due one of those after five days in Committee—but if we are talking about the interests of fans, we believe that this measure should be considered. Some clubs might want the option; some might want it only in certain areas—for example, excluding family areas of stadiums. We believe that fans, especially those who act responsibly, should be treated as adults. A bit more common sense around how the ban works in the modern age might stop some of the binge drinking that happens before games because fans cannot drink in the stands.
We urge the Government to give careful consideration to this option to consult. We are not instructing them to take a definite position, but just to consult.
Max Wilkinson
The hon. Member suggests that we have not sided in any Divisions with the official Opposition; the record will show that we have.
Max Wilkinson
No, several.
I have been to many football matches at more than 50 Football League grounds, and every time I have attended with groups of people who have been in the pub until the last possible moment, forcing down an extra pint—or an extra lucky gin and orange, which was a tradition that a group of my friends used to have—before a game. They did that because they knew that once they got into the ground, they were subject to ridiculous rules that meant they were not treated as adults. These people were very much adults. They were drinking real ale and talking about cricket, sport and things they had done at work that week. They were not football hooligans. We know that the majority of people who watch football matches are not football hooligans.
These rules date from a bygone era when people were concerned that everyone who went to the football was a hooligan. The atmosphere in grounds these days is entirely different from what it was back in the 1980s and 1990s, when things happened that nobody would want to see now. We are drifting in the right direction, back towards standing in stadiums—that is positive—and we need to start drifting back towards a situation in which we treat football fans as adults and recognise that the current ridiculous ban means that people are more likely to be more drunk at football.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank the shadow Minister for tabling this new clause and all hon. Members for their thoughtful contributions. I gently say to him that I think that his claims to end binge drinking would probably be scope creep.
This is a very serious issue. As the shadow Minister may be aware, the legislation in question is owned by the Home Office. My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East is right that this is a challenging issue, but I recognise that it is important and I will therefore raise it with my ministerial counterparts in the Home Office.
I hope the shadow Minister will appreciate that, as we have made clear throughout the Committee, the Bill seeks to ensure that football clubs are sustainable. It would not be appropriate for the Government to agree to review legislation about alcohol at football matches in the context of this Bill, given the significant public order implications, but I will reflect the comments from across the Committee to my counterparts in the Home Office. On that basis, I hope he will withdraw the new clause.
Mr French
I thank all colleagues for their contributions to this important debate on an issue that has real impacts on fans and stadiums around the country, as we have heard already. I have also seen some of the behaviours that have been referred to, such as people rushing to drink before kick-off or rushing at half-time to make sure that they can get a drink in. I have also travelled around Europe watching football. I am a big lover of sport, so I do travel and watch games when I go abroad. I have never come across many issues when I have been abroad, where the rules are different.
The Minister’s comments were interesting. I could make the usual joke about how for people to watch a team in red, they need a lot of drink—especially at the moment, given current form. However, the expressions of Committee members assure me that this is a live issue that they have concerns about. I think we should test the opinion of the Committee with a vote.
Mr French
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
We believe that the provisions of new clause 20 are missing from the Bill as drafted. We have debated issues involving clubs, fans and leagues, but there has been little on player welfare. In different debates, we have discussed scheduling and the impact on player welfare of the excessive number of games in different competitions. The perfect example is the club world cup taking place in America. There are also other competing demands on player welfare and the welfare of retired players, as we have discussed.
This new clause on player welfare would, within one year of the passing of this Bill, require the Secretary of State to review how to improve the welfare of football players, considering neurodegenerative diseases incurred by heading footballs, the number of games footballers have to play each season—in line with my earlier comments—and the impact on current and former professional footballers’ welfare. It is a straightforward amendment, very much in the spirit of the new duties being asked of the regulator and the leagues going forward. We would therefore be interested in the Minister’s response.
Mr Betts
Briefly, will the Minister look at something else directly related to the new clause, which is the safety of the grounds that players play at? Three years ago, the PFA approached me about a horrible incident at Bath City, where a young player went headlong into a concrete wall and suffered severe brain damage. I was surprised to find that the Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975 does not cover players, but only spectators. That is a shocking omission, although we can probably understand how it got there.
At the time, I went to see the then Sports Minister with the PFA. He was supportive, and he agreed that he would write, with the PFA and others, to get the leagues and the other football authorities to look seriously at this issue. I think that guidance was given about how they should approach ground safety for players and the dangers they could face, such as running headlong into a concrete wall with no protection between the wall and the pitch.
The Minister probably will not be able to answer me now, but will she investigate how far that guidance changed behaviour and whether it had any impact on making grounds safer for players? It is an issue. One incident caused severe damage to the wellbeing of one young player. It could happen anywhere. That was at Bath City, which is not a regulated club. It is an issue not just of regulation but of player safety, and we ought to be concerned about that.
Stephanie Peacock
I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s point, but that is a match day issue. I direct the hon. Gentleman and the rest of the Committee to the regulatory principles, which we changed under this Government to explicitly reference players. We think that that is an important change. I am afraid I cannot support the new clause.
Mr French
I have listened carefully to the Minister’s answers in response to this new clause. I fully understand the point that she is making about it being up to the sport to better govern the welfare of players, and I have great sympathy with her on that. Ultimately, however, this Bill has been brought forward because the Government believe that football has not been good at regulating itself, and so we are debating that in Committee. Given the widespread concerns around player welfare, it seems to me that on sustainability—we had a long debate about that on the first day of the Committee—and where it sits, my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne hit the nail on the head by saying that the sustainability of clubs depends very much on the sustainability of players.
While I am not going to get a violin out for Premier League stars who may be on £400,000 or £500,000 a week, there is a broader point here about how far that can be pushed and what happens to players’ health—particularly, as we have heard from families, when they reach retirement. As the Minister has mentioned, there are a number of problems. We would like to give some serious consideration to where this needs to sit, because there does appear to be an issue here. As such, I will not seek leave to withdraw the new clause, and I hope that we can return to the matter at a later stage as well.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)
Louie French ExcerptsTuesday 17th June 2025
(1 week, 6 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Football Governance Bill [HL] 2024-26 View all Football Governance Bill [HL] 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 17 June 2025 - (17 Jun 2025)
The Chair
For the avoidance of doubt, I should explain that I am not Esther McVey. For that, I apologise. None the less, we are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. I remind all Members please to switch electronic devices to silent. We will now continue our line-by-line consideration of the Bill.
Clause 57
Applications for resolution process to be triggered
Amendment made: 29, in clause 57, page 47, line 12, leave out “the application relates” and insert—
“the question or questions for resolution mentioned in subsection (1) relate”.—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment provides that a specified competition organiser may only apply under clause 57 if the conditions in clause 57 are met in relation to the qualifying football season or seasons to which the question or questions mentioned in subsection (1) of clause 57 relate.
Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 130, in clause 57, page 47, line 35, leave out subsection (6) and insert—
“(6) Condition 4 is met in relation to a qualifying football season if—
(a) a distribution agreement is in force between the two specified competition organisers in relation to the season,
(b) the distribution agreement has been in force for at least the applicable period (see subsections (7) and (8)), and
(c) no distribution order has effect in respect of the specified competition organisers in relation to the season.
(7) Where—
(a) the specified competition organisers have agreed (whether in the distribution agreement or otherwise) a period for the purposes of condition 4, and
(b) both of the organisers have notified the IFR of the period so agreed,
the applicable period is that period.
(8) In any other case, the applicable period is 5 years.”
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 128, in clause 57, page 47, line 38, leave out “five years” and insert—
“the applicable period (see subsections (7) and (8))”.
Amendment 129, in clause 57, page 47, line 41, at end insert—
“(7) Where—
(a) the specified competition organisers have agreed (whether in the distribution agreement or otherwise) a period for the purposes of condition 4, and
(b) both of the organisers have notified the IFR of the period so agreed,
the applicable period is that period.
(8) In any other case, the applicable period is five years.”
Mr French
It is a pleasure to serve under you again, Sir Jeremy, and I welcome back everyone else in Committee.
The clause sets out further details on the circumstances in which the specified competition organisers can apply to trigger the resolution process. The Government have moved on the mechanism within the backstop, which is welcomed by the leagues, but the amendments tabled in my name seek to correct some gaps in the clause. Amendment 130 would allow the relevant leagues to set a different period other than five years for the resolution process to be triggered. Amendments 128 and 129 would also allow the relevant parties to set the appropriate period for triggering the backstop.
The clause matters, not just because of what it allows, but because of what it delays. In particular, it creates a cooling-off period, a requirement that certain preconditions be met before the regulator can become involved in live disputes between football’s governing bodies and competitions. Of the conditions listed in the clause, condition 4 is especially significant. As the Bill stands, condition 4 is met only if the relevant distribution agreement between competitions—for example, between the Premier League and the English Football League—has been in force for at least five years.
We understand why the five-year test was included: the intention is to prevent the Government’s regulator from being dragged into every routine renegotiation, and to ensure that the resolution process is only triggered in relation to long-standing agreements that may have become outdated or contentious. Five years, however, is a long time in football. Broadcasting cycles, financial realities and competitive conditions can change quickly.
In that time, for example, a team such as Luton Town went from playing in League Two in the 2017-18 season, to competing in the Premier League in the 2022-23 season. Granted, the team have now fallen down the pyramid to League One again, but that helps prove that, even with parachute payments being handed out from the Premier League and potentially now being included in the resolution process, that does not stop a club from failing on the pitch or in the boardroom.
I therefore tabled amendments 128 to 130, which would allow the “applicable period” under condition 4 to be shorter than five years when two conditions are met: first, when the specified competition organisers have agreed a different period, either in the distribution agreement itself or separately; and, secondly, when both organisers have notified the regulator of that agreed period. In that case, the “applicable period” for the purpose of condition 4 becomes whatever period the organisers have agreed—rather than being fixed at five years by statute.
These are flexibility amendments, which an industry with businesses will benefit from, rather than having the inflexibility of fixing a date in statute. The Government argued that our earlier amendment to cap the pay of their new regulator was inflexible and too firmly rooted in the present day, so it would be unfortunate if the Minister were to oppose the amendment for exactly the opposite reasons. None of us would want that.
The amendment allows football’s governing bodies—the Premier League, the EFL, and others—to determine their own timelines for when they believe the regulator should be able to step in, if negotiations breakdown. It does not force earlier intervention; it simply allows the option where both parties agree. That is a consensual, common-sense reform that respects the autonomy of football’s existing institutions, while giving them the tools to resolve disputes more efficiently when necessary. It makes the clause more responsive, less rigid and more capable of reflecting the fast-moving dynamics of football finance and league relationships.
Will the Minister confirm why the Government chose to fix the five-year period in primary legislation, rather than allowing the competitions to define the appropriate timeline for regulatory intervention themselves? Does she agree that, if both parties are asking for an earlier resolution window, it is counterproductive for the legislation to prevent it? It would cause delays to the redistribution of money from one specified competition to another, which would entirely undermine the point of the regulator. If we do not pass the amendment, we risk locking football into a situation where, no matter how bad a deal becomes or how outdated a distribution agreement appears, the regulator’s hands are tied for another half a decade. They say that a week is a long time in politics, and the same is true for football. In half a decade’s time there could be—and I hope there is—a new Government, and Charlton could have returned to the Premier League and may even be in the Champion’s League final—I will try to keep it realistic; the sun must be getting to me.
As drafted, the Bill allows prolonged stalemates, growing financial resentment between divisions, and a continued lack of reform, even when both sides might privately want the regulator’s help to resolve matters. That is especially important given the recurring tensions between the certain specified competition organisers on financial redistribution, among other things. If both sides were willing to allow the Government’s regulator to assist earlier, we should facilitate that, not block it.
Regulation, especially in this context, should be a last resort, and football must be given the space to sort out its own affairs where possible. The amendment reflects that principle. It does not force the regulator into a situation early; it simply allows football competitions to agree that if things go wrong, the regulator can be invited in sooner rather than later. That is not interference but empowered self-governance, which is what we should be striving for when—as the fan-led review ultimately sought to do—we return the governance of English football back to the FA. The amendment gives clubs and competition organisers more ownership of the process, not less.
Does the Minister recognise that the amendment would incentivise early engagement and constructive negotiation, rather than prolonging the stalemates that have now become common place? Clause 57 is an important procedural gateway, but the current wording of condition 4 imposes a rigid five-year rule that may prevent the regulator from acting, even in cases where both sides want its help. The amendment would introduce flexibility and consent into the process. It ensures that the trigger point for resolution reflects the needs of the game, not an arbitrary statutory timescale set many seasons before it may actually be needed.
The amendment is limited, reasonable, and entirely in keeping with the Government’s desire for a targeted, proportionate, and respectful form of regulation. I hope that the Minister will accept the amendment based on the position she has taken on earlier amendments to the Bill.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy. I will use the opportunity presented by amendment 130 to talk to another of this Government’s changes to strengthen the Bill. The Opposition amendments would amend clause 57, which sets out how and under what conditions a league can apply to the regulator to trigger the backstop.
We will discuss clause 57 in more detail in the next group, but in brief, one of the conditions for triggering the backstop is that there has been no new distributions agreement between the leagues for at least five years. The amendments seek to reintroduce drafting from the previous version of the Bill that allowed leagues to reach an agreement to extend that five-year period. The Government removed that drafting when we introduced the Bill, because in our judgment five years is an appropriate period.
Our strong preference, of course, is for football to reach an agreement without any regulatory involvement. We have done everything in our power to push for an agreement and continue to urge everyone to find a solution that works for all of football. The five-year period in the Bill has been chosen to ensure the regulator can only intervene in cases where a sufficient agreement has not been reached for a significant period of time. We believe that this is the correct amount of time.
That is not to say, however, that the backstop will be triggered every five years. This is not the only threshold that has to be met to trigger the process. It is a two-stage test. The regulator must also see a tangible risk to its ability to deliver its objectives before the process can be triggered. If the leagues agreed a good deal for a period longer than five years, while a league could still apply to trigger the backstop, the threshold of jeopardising the regulator’s objectives would not be met and the backstop would not be triggered.
There is an inherent imbalance of negotiating power between the distributing leagues and the recipient league. Allowing industry to contract out of the backstop completely could inhibit agreements that appropriately finance the football pyramid while preventing involvement from the regulator. That would badly damage the regulator’s ability to protect and promote the sustainability of English football and leave it unable to address what is currently a clear issue in the industry. For the reasons I have set out, I hope the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup will withdraw the amendment.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Mr French
I will be brief. I echo some of the Minister’s comments. His Majesty’s official Opposition welcome any efforts to ensure that the backstop process is triggered only as a last resort and we will carefully monitor how that works in future.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 59, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 60
The mediation stage
Amendments made: 49, in clause 60, page 50, line 4, after “resolution” insert
“set out in a notice under section 59(5)(b)(zi)”.
This amendment clarifies that the question or questions for resolution subject to the mediation process are those set out in a notice under clause 59(5)(b)(zi).
Amendment 50, in clause 60, page 50, line 6, leave out
“the question or questions for resolution”
and insert
“that question or those questions”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 49.
Amendment 51, in clause 60, page 50, line 15, after “resolution” insert
“set out in a notice under section 59(5)(b)(zi)”.—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment clarifies that the question or questions for resolution subject to the mediation process are those set out in a notice under clause 59(5)(b)(zi).
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
Once the backstop is triggered, clause 60 requires the leagues to enter mandatory mediation as a first stage. As we have made clear, the Government’s strong preference is for a football-led solution to the financial distribution issues. I welcome the shadow Minister’s comments along those lines.
A mediation stage gives the relevant leagues an opportunity to reach an agreement with minimal intervention from the regulator. The stage is designed to facilitate meaningful negotiation and compromise between the parties. To this end, it encourages the leagues to appoint a mutually agreed mediator, but if they cannot, it ensures the regulator will appoint someone with the appropriate skills and experience.
The leagues can end the mediation process for multiple reasons. Most notably, the mediation—and the process as a whole—will end if an agreement is reached. However, the mediator can also end the process if it is not producing meaningful, good faith negotiations. The process can also end if it reaches the 28-day deadline. If the leagues are engaging in meaningful discussion but the deadline is reached, the mediator can extend the process by up to another 28 days.
We believe that process is flexible enough to encourage negotiation but concrete enough to ensure the backstop remains an effective regulatory intervention. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 60, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 61
Final proposal stage
Stephanie Peacock
Over the course of engagement on the Bill, specifically in the other place, we have heard concerns about the risk posed by the binary choice distribution mechanism outlined in the Bill. While I have always acknowledged the merits of the previous binary mechanism in the Bill, specifically the powerful incentive it created for the leagues to come to an industry-led solution, we want to provide the industry and its investors with the certainty they need. Although the previous model had significant strengths, the uncertainty it introduced into the process made it higher risk than other options.
We want to get this policy right and we will always be open to sensible, well-made points on the design of the regime. I thank Lords Birt, Pannick, Thomas and Burns for their thoughtful scrutiny of this part of the Bill in the other place and for their comprehensive suggestions. Their engagement has been invaluable in the continued development of this policy.
In the light of that work, we are making targeted changes to the backstop mechanism, primarily through the replacement of clauses 61 and 62 with Government new clauses 3 and 4. The new clauses will move the mechanism from a binary choice mechanism to a staged regulator determination. In our new model, the regulator can impose its own solution, drawing on the leagues’ proposals, the state of the game report and other evidence in order to best deliver the regulator’s objectives. This ensures a more collaborative, data-driven solution.
New clause 3 sets out what happens if there are still unresolved questions between the leagues when mediation ends. It requires the regulator to invite proposals from the leagues and sets a framework and timeframes for the regulator and leagues to collaborate towards a solution. The Government’s strong preference is for the industry to come to an independent solution, so the proposal stage is designed to incentivise that. The regulator will have to outline clearly the expected scope of the proposals, set by the questions for resolution that we have discussed previously. It must also set out any relevant findings from the state of the game report. That will ensure that proposals remain focused on addressing the most pressing issues facing the game.
League proposals must be shared both with the regulator and between the disputing leagues themselves. That will allow for a more fruitful negotiation, as the leagues will be more informed about each other’s position on core issues. Leagues will also be able to submit revised proposals, ensuring both sides have the best chance possible to outline their position to the regulator, and allowing the regulator the opportunity to request additional relevant information.
That structure will ensure the regulator is in the position to make the best and most evidence-based decision possible while driving the leagues closer together, encouraging them to come to their own agreement. For those reasons, I hope hon. Members will support the new clause.
Mr French
I will not repeat the comments the Minister has made, but we also believe that this new mechanism is an improvement on the previous one, in line with feedback from the other place and from the leagues. The new clause would allow modified proposals to be submitted to the football regulator and for more of a negotiated settlement rather than a binary one. The only question we have at this stage, because we will have to see how this works in practice, is about the criteria the regulator would be looking to apply when selecting one party’s proposals over another. What does the Minister envisage that will look like?
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his general support for this change. He is absolutely right to acknowledge that it comes from the other place, but also from working with various stakeholders, in particular the leagues, which have welcomed it.
The regulator must follow its objectives and duties at all times and criteria that simply restate those obligations are unnecessary. We did consider more specific criteria but did not want to be overly prescriptive, so I draw the attention of hon. Members back to the regulatory principles in the Bill and the state of the game report.
Question put and negatived.
Clause 61 accordingly disagreed to.
Clause 62
Distribution orders
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 4, in clause 62, page 52, line 5, at end insert—
“(d) must address to the satisfaction of the Regulator any issues identified by the Regulator’s most recently published State of the Game report.”.
This amendment would add the principle that the final proposal in the resolution process should address any issues identified by the Regulator’s most recently published State of the Game report.
Amendment 126, in clause 62, page 52, line 6, leave out subsection (3).
Amendment 141, in clause 62, page 52, line 11, leave out from “means” to “in” in line 13 and insert
“the first full football season in respect of which relegation revenue would be applicable”.
Amendment 5, in clause 62,, page 52, line 43, at end insert—
“(8A) Where subsection (1)(c), (4)(b), or (5) applies, the committee must make an order requiring the relevant revenue to be distributed in accordance with a proposal of its own that is consistent with the principles in subsection (2) on or before the last day of the period of 28 days beginning with the final proposal deadline.”.
This amendment would require the IFR, under the circumstances specified in the amendment, to make an order requiring the relevant revenue to be distributed in accordance with its own proposal.
Clause stand part.
Government amendments 54, 70 and 73.
Government new clause 4—Distribution orders.
Mr French
Clause 62 is, in many ways, the most far-reaching and contentious provision in the Bill. It establishes the legal framework by which the Government’s regulator, having assessed final proposals under the new resolution process we have already discussed, may issue a legally binding “distribution order”, thereby compelling parties to adopt a financial redistribution model imposed by the regulator. This is not a minor regulatory power. It is a direct intervention into the financial core of English football. While the desire to resolve long-standing disputes, particularly between the Premier League and the EFL, is understandable, the clause as drafted gives rise to very real risks of overreach, unintended consequences and potential conflict with international football rules.
Let me start with subsection (1 )(c). In the current drafting, if the expert panel finds that neither of the final proposals submitted by the parties is consistent with the statutory principles, it is required to terminate the process and notify the parties that it has done so. That is not an option; it is a legal requirement. We must ask what kind of resolution process it is, if both sides present imperfect proposals and the committee’s only course of action is to walk away. That is not resolution; that is resignation.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
The shadow Minister is speaking very clearly, and I agree with him on the potential for political interference. Does he also see within the clause any scope for market distortion because of the powers that the regulator has?
Mr French
I understand my hon. Friend’s concerns, and I note that the Football Association sent a letter to Bill Committee members over the weekend, highlighting its concern about scope creep and how that may also interfere with what the regulator is meant to be tightly governed to do.
I would like to think that we would rather solutions were made within football. It is important that backstop powers are a clearly defined last resort and that the process encourages the principle of bodies working together to find a joint solution. Let me be very clear: by defining “relegation revenue” in statute and bringing parachute payments into scope, the Government risk triggering exactly the kind of interference that UEFA explicitly prevents in its statutes. Amendment 126 would remove subsection (3) in full. That would not abolish the regulator’s ability to consider fair distribution; it would simply make clear that internally agreed mechanisms, such as parachute payments, fall outside the regulator’s remit.
James Naish (Rushcliffe) (Lab)
On parachute payments, what is the shadow Minister’s view on the balance between sustainability and giving clubs a competitive advantage? Does he not think that the regulator could have a role to play in determining the extent to which parachute payments, which have grown considerably, are getting to the point at which their size distorts their purpose?
The Chair
Before the shadow Minister responds, I remind the hon. Member for Rushcliffe that the dress code requirements for Committee are the same as for the Chamber, which means a tie must be worn. I cannot see the hon. Gentleman wearing one. If he would like to put one on before he next seeks to intervene, that might make things easier.
Mr French
I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point; I will move on slightly while he seeks his tie and then come back to his question.
We believe that such mechanisms should fall outside the regulator’s remit unless or until the parties themselves choose to make it part of a proposed solution. We believe that is a reasonable balance: it respects the autonomy of leagues, avoids placing English football at odds with UEFA compliance and helps ensure that the regulator remains focused on its core mission of financial sustainability and integrity, not financial redistribution imposed by decree.
Mr Betts
On the issue of parachute payments, as the Minister will recall we had this debate in the equivalent Committee in the last Parliament. It is absolutely fundamental. Let us go back to the objectives of the regulator, which include:
“to protect and promote the financial soundness of regulated clubs…and…of English football.”
How can it be sound that over 90% of the funds in English football go to the top 25 clubs, and that, of the money that the Premier League gives out, 80% goes to those clubs on parachute payments? There is a problem, is there not?
Mr French
As I was explaining, our preference would be for the leagues to use their autonomy to reach a conclusion. I understand the hon. Gentleman’s frustration, but I will move on.
Building on this, there remains a broader point that we have sought to create through a number of amendments to the Bill, and one that we fear the Government consistently leave the door open to—the likely empire-building of the Government’s regulator. We know that UEFA is concerned about the potential for scope creep, as is the FA in the letter referenced earlier. If this Government’s regulator expands into broader aspects of football governance, it could undermine established structures and processes of the sport. The inclusion of parachute payments in this clause, and the inflexible process in subsection (1)(c), are classic examples of the very scope creep that other regulators fear.
The clause, as it stands, is not just a domestic issue; it is a risk to England’s standing within European football, as we have said before. The Government must remember what the Bill is supposed to do. It is about ensuring that clubs are run sustainably, that fans are respected and that football’s heritage is protected. It is not about the Government’s imposing financial structures or about overriding the autonomy of leagues. It is certainly not about placing us on a collision course with UEFA and FIFA.
UEFA has made clear the potential compliance risks from the Bill, and it has warned of the ultimate sanction: exclusion from UEFA competition. Are this Government and this Minister truly prepared to jeopardise English clubs’ participation in Europe? Is the Minister so confident in her regulatory model that she is prepared to put English football on a different legal footing from that of every other UEFA member, and have English football cast out from international football? I hope not—the clubs will also hope not and the fans will not forgive it, if that were to happen.
Clause 62 is the most interventionist part of the Bill. If we are to retain it, we must amend it by removing subsection (1)(c) to allow the expert panel to act with realism and discretion. We must remove subsection (3) to ensure that parachute payments and, by extension, football’s autonomy remain protected. These are not wrecking amendments but safeguards. They ensure that the Bill delivers what it promises: a sustainable and respected football regulator without overreach, scope creep or crossing the line into political interference. We believe that the Government must take the warnings seriously about the impact on international competition. As a Committee, let us ensure that this Government’s regulator supports the game, rather than risks its place on the international stage.
Mr Betts
I want to speak to amendment 141, which has been tabled in my name. To some extent, amendments 4 and 5 have been superseded, and I accept what the Minister said earlier about the arrangements in Government new clause 4 being a significant improvement on where we were before with the pendulum arrangements in the backstop. Also, they are a distinct improvement on where the last Government were, because they allow the regulator to look at parachute payments in a particular way. That is really helpful, because we cannot address the massive disparity of funding within football, and the cliff edge that exists between the Premier League and the Championship, without addressing the issue of parachute payments.
I want specifically to look at amendment 141, because it is about timing. I want to go through what I think is the time period that we will now move towards. If the Minister thinks that I am wrong, it would be helpful if she would explain that to me. Hopefully, if we get the Bill through before the parliamentary recess, and it comes into effect fairly quickly, the regulator can begin work next season. I hope that is the intention. In the first season, 2026-27, it is probable that the regulator will be bedding in—having discussions, getting arrangements with clubs, and trying to work towards the beginnings of the licensing system. I am speculating because we do not absolutely know, but it seems to me that is the sort of way we will go.
The regulator will also be starting to work on the state of the game report; hopefully, therefore, the regulator might have it by the end of 2026. Perhaps we could do it a bit quicker—we have encouraged the Minister to make it 12 months rather than 18. But assuming that the report takes 18 months, it will appear towards the end of 2026. When is the regulator likely to be in a position to implement a backstop, if that is deemed necessary? The regulator will be having discussions in the meantime, hopefully trying to encourage the leagues to reach an agreement. Best of luck with that! If the regulator does that in a year when previously it has failed over many years, it will have done a fantastic job and I am sure we will congratulate it. But if there is not an agreement, we will get to the backstop probably at the beginning of the 2027 season at the earliest.
The problem is that because of how “relevant period” is described in new clause 49, there will then be basically two years before the backstop kicks in. On that basis, this Parliament will not see any significant distribution of funding in English football. That will not come in until the 2029-30 season, after the end of this Parliament, because of the two-year gap between the regulator reaching a decision and then the backstop being implemented. Why, if we have gone all through this process?
We know what the problems are in the English football game. We know about the massive disparities of income and about the concentration of money not merely in the Premier League but in the parachuted clubs as well. The regulator has a responsibility to address the soundness and stability of English football and of clubs within English football. We know that the Championship clubs are massively overburdened with debt, as they all try desperately to compete to get into the Premier League. If all that is the problem, and the regulator is bound to address it, does address it, and decides the leagues have not resolved it so comes to implement a backstop, why then do we sit back and wait for two years for the backstop to be implemented? That is the issue. Having failed to stop the regulator and the inclusion of backstops within their remit, it almost seems as if the Premier League has decided, “Well, at least we can stop any of this happening in this Parliament in the hope that after the election another Government will come in and save us.” It is almost as though that is what it is trying to do.
I say to the Minister, kindly and carefully: have a think about this. There is an awful lot of concern—not just in the English Football League, but among colleagues. Clubs throughout the EFL have been speaking to their local MPs and saying, “We know what the problems are. We are electing you to Parliament to resolve those problems, and you committed to do that in your manifesto. Yet with this timescale, the likelihood is that by the time you get to the end of this Parliament you won’t have solved the problem. You won’t even have put anything in place to do so.”
At the end of this Parliament, I would like the Minister to be saying, “I am the Sports Minister who has substantially helped resolve the appalling distribution of finances in English football, which cripples our game and means that clubs are exposed to enormous cliff edges that put them unnecessarily into debt, and which leads to bad practice among owners.” There are many things to stop bad practice, but we could help by resolving the issue now and agreeing on something: not how the regulator should do its job, but that once the regulator has done the job it is at least allowed to implement within a timely period.
I hope the Minister will seriously consider amendment 141 and listen to other colleagues who may want to discuss these issues as well.
Stephanie Peacock
No, I am afraid I am not in a position to do that. It is a one-year period from the end of the first season to where the order applies. We think that is a balance. It is obviously a challenging issue, with strong feelings, but formulating this part of the Bill is about striking a balance. We believe we have the right one, but I acknowledge my hon. Friend’s concerns.
Mr French
Given the previous debate, the Minister will be pleased that I am willing to withdraw amendment 125, so she gets a win out of that one. I listened carefully to her comments on removing that subsection (1)(c), and, in the light of that and in a spirit of goodwill, I will withdraw the amendment.
It would be helpful if the Minister would explain what checks and balances there will be surrounding the football regulator’s final determination. The legislation will leave it entirely up to the football regulator how best to determine the questions of resolution, with the only guardrail seemingly being that the distribution order should not place an undue burden on the commercial interests of any specified competition organiser, and the distribution order should not result in a lower amount of relegation revenue being distributed to a club during the relevant period than would have been distributed to the club during that period had the order not been made. It would also be helpful if the Minister could outline whether either of the parties would be offered the right of appeal, following a distribution order from the regulator.
Stephanie Peacock
We will come to about appeals and challenges shortly, so we might be able to explore that in further detail. I have a detailed breakdown of the process; in the interests of time, I will not read it out, but I will send a copy to the hon. Gentleman, because I think it will answer his question.
Stephanie Peacock
It is important to build safeguards into the backstop process, and clause 63 outlines what happens if circumstances arise in which a distribution order made under clause 62 is no longer viable or necessary. To provide clarity to the leagues, any distribution order will need to specify when it comes into force and how long it is in force. In ordinary circumstances, an order will remain in force until the specified period ends, but clause 63 allows the regulator to revoke an order in exceptional circumstances. The regulator might choose to do that if there was an unexpected change to the broadcast market that meant an order was no longer fit for purpose. It is important that the Bill provides that flexibility to prevent a scenario in which an unsuitable arrangement is left to stand.
Similarly, the clause ensures that the regulator will revoke an order if a league subsequently strikes a distribution deal covering the same seasons as the order. That again demonstrates the Government’s commitment to prioritising and encouraging industry-led agreements wherever possible. Whenever the regulator revokes an order, it will need to notify the parties and set out the reasons for its decision, continuing the underlying commitment to transparency at every stage of the process. I urge that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr French
I have only a brief question for the Minister in the light of her comments: how frequently does she envisage distribution orders being reviewed by the regulator, and is there a risk that clubs or competitions may face financial instability due to short-term changes to distribution orders?
Stephanie Peacock
Not very often, is the short answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question, and it might be helpful if I give a brief example. If there was a very significant reduction in broadcast revenues, complying with an order might actually threaten the sustainability of clubs in the distributing league. It is not a measure we expect to be used frequently.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 63 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 64
Review of distribution orders, payment of costs, etc
Amendment made: 54, in clause 64, page 54, line 18, leave out “62(8)(b)” and insert “(Distribution orders)(10)(b)”. —(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment is consequential on the insertion of NC4.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr French
The clause requires the regulator to periodically review distribution orders and monitor compliance. It also gives the regulator power to determine who should bear the costs of the resolution process, including mediation and the final proposal stages.
I have the following questions for the Minister. First, who is liable for the cost of reviews, and is there a cap on the expenses that can be passed on to clubs? Secondly, what criteria will determine how costs are apportioned between parties? Lastly, will the regulator be independently audited on its cost management in conducting such reviews to minimise the costs for clubs?
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful for those questions. As I said, the clause sets out the rules for how costs associated with the backstop are paid. It could, although it does not have to, allow for the costs of mediation to be passed on to the leagues. If it is helpful, I am happy to write to the hon. Gentleman with more detail. The clause sets out the regulator’s ability to pass the cost on to the leagues if it feels it is appropriate, but I reiterate the regulatory principle of proportionality.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 64, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 65
Power to require information
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 65 is the first clause in part 7 of the Bill, which covers the regulator’s investigatory powers, and relates to information gathering. It gives the regulator a power to require specified information and sets out the associated procedures for obtaining the information.
Accurate, reliable and timely information will be central to the regulator’s regime. Without a full and up-to-date picture of clubs and the market, it would not be able to regulate effectively. It would be reliant on voluntary disclosures or publicly available information, which could be incomplete, outdated or selectively presented. That is why the power in the clause is important to the regulator’s regime. The clause gives the regulator the power to issue an information notice to a person, requiring the person to give the regulator specified information that it considers necessary in exercising its functions. For example, the regulator may require information in order to monitor clubs and investigate possible non-compliance with the regulatory regime.
The ability to request information is not a unique or controversial power for a regulatory body. It is common practice among regulators to seek information from the regulated industry and from those subject to investigation. For example, the Competition and Markets Authority, the Financial Conduct Authority, Ofcom and many more all have information gathering and investigatory powers, which they use regularly. Such powers are regulators’ bread and butter, without which they would be unable to effectively regulate. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Mr French
Clause 65 allows the regulator to require persons, including clubs and their officers, to provide information that may be needed for the exercise of the regulator’s functions.
I have the following questions for the Minister. First, what are the limits on the volume or sensitivity of information that the regulator can demand from clubs? Secondly, could the clause lead to regulatory overreach if requests are too frequent or expansive? Lastly, how will the cost of compliance be managed, especially for smaller clubs?
Stephanie Peacock
We acknowledge that this is a new regime for football clubs to be operating under. They already submit information to the football authorities, and we expect that submitting information to the regulator should not be any different.
As with anything it does, the regulator should act proportionately. In this context, that means that it will consider the burden that an information request might place on a club. For example, the burden might be higher for a smaller club, so the regulator might also consider the nature of the information request. For example, the volume and nature of the information required might differ depending on the circumstances of the club.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 65 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 66
Reports on clubs by expert reporters
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
The clause gives the regulator the power to appoint a person to prepare a report on a regulated club. The person is referred to as an expert reporter, and they must have the necessary skills and expertise to prepare the report. The regulator will have expert staff and the ability to request the information it needs, but this power will allow it to draw on specialist third-party expertise and resources. For example, the expert reporter might be a firm with audit experience, where the regulator thinks that it would benefit from the firm’s ability to synthesise and analyse information gathered from the club at first hand. That could enable the regulator to exercise its functions more effectively.
The report can be on any matter that the regulator considers appropriate in order to carry out its functions. For example, the report might deal with a specific issue or with the club’s circumstances and operations more generally. The expert reporter will have the ability to require information from as many persons as necessary for the purpose of preparing the report.
The clause also covers other procedural matters relating to the appointment of the expert reporter, including rules on expenses incurred in the appointment of the reporter and requirements to co-operate with and assist a skilled person once appointed. There is precedent for such a power: the Financial Conduct Authority, for example, has the power to appoint a skilled person to a firm.
We expect that the regulator will find the power useful when it would benefit from the expert reporter’s skills to combine and interpret information gathered at first hand or on a more continuous basis over a period of time. Based on a report, the regulator may be better informed to determine whether it needs to take action on a club, or which action to take—for example, whether to impose a discretionary licence condition or to take enforcement action. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Mr French
As the Minister outlined, the clause gives the regulator the power to appoint an expert to prepare a report on a club. I have three questions for her. First, who will select the expert reporters and how with their independence be assured? Secondly, will there be cost limits or reimbursement rules in place to prevent financial strain on clubs that are required to co-operate? For example, without naming any individual companies, over the years we have seen many examples of excessive costs being applied by certain accountancy firms for such reviews. I am sure that we would not want those overburdening small clubs. Lastly, will clubs have a right to comment on or challenge a draft of the report that the expert provides before action is taken?
Stephanie Peacock
The regulator will be able, if it is thought appropriate, to provide for the club concerned to cover the costs associated with the expert reporter. That is because it will not be a commonly used tool and the cost will be specific to a single club, so, rather than all clubs picking up the cost through the levy, where possible, the regulator can ensure that the regulated party pays. However, the regulator will have discretion, and it might be the case that the club’s financial means are low and the regulator does not think it appropriate to impose additional costs on it.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 66 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 67
Meaning of “relevant infringement”
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr French
The provisions in this group all relate to infringement and the enforcement of infringements. Schedule 7 sets out the detailed definition of what constitutes a relevant infringement for the purposes of parts 7 and 8 of the Bill. It provides clarity on the types of conduct that may lead to investigation and enforcement action by the football regulator, including failure to comply with a duty under the Bill, a condition of a licence or a direction issued by the regulator. The schedule also enables further types of infringement to be specified through regulations. The intention is to provide a clear and comprehensive basis for the regulator’s investigatory and sanctioning powers.
Does the Minister think there are sufficient limits in schedule 7 to prevent the scope of relevant infringement from expanding over time without parliamentary scrutiny? Could broad definitions allow the regulator to pursue cases not originally envisaged by Parliament? How will consistency in interpretation be maintained across different clubs and cases?
Clause 68 allows the regulator to investigate whether a relevant infringement has occurred. It sets out the procedure to be followed and the types of action the regulator may take during an investigation, including seeking information and issuing notices. The clause forms part of the regulatory enforcement framework. What procedures are in place to prevent investigations from becoming unnecessarily protracted or burdensome? Could smaller clubs face disproportionate challenges in dealing with investigations due to limited resources?
Schedule 8 outlines the investigatory powers available to the football regulator in relation to relevant infringements. It includes the power to ask questions, require documents or information, and apply for a warrant to enter premises where necessary. The schedule also sets out the circumstances in which those powers may be used and the procedural safeguards that apply. The powers are designed to assist the regulator in establishing the facts of a case and determining whether enforcement action is appropriate. The provisions reflect standard regulatory practice and are intended to ensure that investigations are conducted in a proportionate and lawful manner. Does the Minister believe that there are sufficient safeguards to ensure that investigatory powers are not used disproportionately? Could the powers result in unnecessary costs or disruption to the day-to-day operations of clubs?
Clause 69 covers the outcomes of investigations. The clause sets out that the football regulator may find that there has been no infringement or, if it finds that there has been an infringement, that it may decide to take no action —possibly because the person had a reasonable excuse for committing the infringement. In what circumstances does the Minister envisage there to be a reasonable excuse, and does she worry that this risks setting a dangerous precedent? If an individual is found to have had a reasonable excuse, will that encourage others in the leagues to consider using that excuse if they are investigated? How will the outcome of an investigation be communicated to the relevant club or individual? Will the outcomes of investigations be publicly available? Once again, clause 69 raises important questions about consistency. If closure notices or outcomes are not published, what mechanism will there be for ensuring that investigations by the regulator are consistently applied?
Clause 70 sets out that the football regulator may accept an appropriate commitment from a person during the course of an investigation into certain relevant infringements. Does the Minister anticipate that that will be a regular feature? If so, what effect will that have on the football regulator’s ability to conduct an investigation? The clause clarifies that accepting a commitment does not prevent the regulator from continuing an investigation into different behaviour in relation to the same or a different relevant infringement, or starting a new investigation in relation to the same behaviour to which the commitment relates. It is therefore for the regulator to determine whether to continue the investigation. What criteria will be used to determine whether a commitment should defer or withhold investigation? Does this leave scope for inconsistencies in the approach of the regulator? If a commitment does not prevent the regulator from starting a new investigation into the same behaviour, it raises the question: why add another layer of bureaucracy when the ultimate result may be the continuation of said investigation?
Clause 71 adds provisions to clause 70. For example, it sets out that the football regulator must give the person a notice as soon as reasonably possible after it decides to accept, or not to accept, a commitment in lieu of investigation, and sets out what the notice should state. Can the Minister clarify how this notice will be given to individuals at a club? It also clarifies that the football regulator may accept a variation to a commitment, provided the varied commitment would still be appropriate. What is the process an individual would need to go through to amend or vary a commitment? Furthermore, it sets out that the football regulator may release a person from a commitment and must give the person a notice as soon as possible after deciding to do so. Many of the factors that the football regulator must consider are at its discretion, such as reviewing the appropriateness of a commitment. That raises further questions about consistency and the importance of making unbiased decisions.
Clause 72 places a duty on individuals under investigation to preserve information. The clause is key, but how will a person suspect they are subject to an investigation? Furthermore, the clause does not provide a date range up to and from when an individual must preserve relevant information. Will the football regulator adjudicate on whether information has been disposed of on purpose or accidentally? Likewise, will the regulator determine whether a document is falsified or authentic? The phrase “relevant” is broad, and it is open to interpretation by the regulator.
Clause 73 ensures that privileged communications are to be protected from the football regulator’s requirements. That is extremely important, as it covers communication between a professional legal adviser and their client to do with legal proceedings. However, will the football regulator have any powers to challenge claims that a communication is privileged? I would appreciate if the Minister could clarify whether that is a possibility. Furthermore, who will verify that a communication is privileged? Could the football regulator seek voluntary waivers of privilege in exceptional circumstances? What assessment has been made of the potential of the clause to inadvertently delay or obstruct investigation?
Clause 74—you will be pleased to know that this is my last point, Sir Jeremy—requires the football regulator to publish a notice where it has given a person an investigation notice under clause 68 or a closure notice under clause 69. Is there a timescale for such publication? How will the notice be communicated or published? Will it be publicly available? If so, will full details of the investigation be published, or will some material be redacted or withheld? Will there be an opportunity to appeal before publication to avoid reputational damage? Will clubs or individuals have the right to respond with advance warning prior to publication, if that is the case?
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his questions. I noted as many down as I could, but I will endeavour to check Hansard if I do not cover all of them. First, he spoke about scope creep. I draw his attention to my comments earlier about how any conduct that is not listed in schedule 7 as a relevant infringement will not warrant enforcement action, and how we believe a closed list of possible relevant infringements in legislation provides clarity to the regulated industry and other persons as to what conduct is not permitted. The scope therefore cannot expand. I absolutely agree that things should be done in a timely fashion. In debates on the Bill, we have talked continually about proportionality, and we would expect cost and disruption to be kept to a minimum.
On the shadow Minister’s point about reasonable excuse, I draw his attention to my previous comments that it is not about sidestepping responsibility, but about being collaborative throughout. We expect the regulator will publish some information about investigations that it undertakes. It is required to publish an investigation notice issued to a person under clause 68, as well as an investigation closure notice under clause 69. However, the Bill allows for certain information to be withheld from publication if the regulator believes the disclosure or publication would significantly harm a person’s personal or business interests. The regulator is not required to publish revenue and customs information or information that might contravene data protection legislation or prejudice the prevention of crime.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 67 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 7 agreed to.
Clause 68 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 8
Investigatory powers
Amendment made: 65, in schedule 8, page 109, line 14, leave out “a period of three months” and insert “so long as is necessary in all the circumstances”.—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment provides that information obtained by the IFR under a warrant may be retained for so long as is necessary in all the circumstances.
Schedule 8, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 69 to 74 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 75
Sanctions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr French
Sir Jeremy, you and the Committee will be pleased to know that I will not seek to repeat word for word everything that the Minister has said on each of the clauses, but I will pose a number of questions to her on each of them.
As we have heard, clause 75 gives the football regulator the power to impose sanctions in response to relevant infringements. How is proportionality assessed when deciding between different types of sanction? What is the estimated administrative cost of monitoring, imposing and reviewing sanctions? What legal protections are in place to prevent sanctions from being used punitively?
Clause 76 requires the regulator to issue a warning notice before imposing a sanction. The notice must set out the proposed action and give the person an opportunity to make representations, which is welcome, but is there an independent review mechanism if a club believes that a warning notice is unjustified?
Clause 77 requires the regulator to issue a decision notice, following a warning notice, if it decides to proceed with a sanction. The decision notice must explain the reasons for the decision and the right of appeal. Is there a process to allow clubs to challenge decision notices before they are published? What legal advice and support will be available to smaller clubs facing regulatory action?
I will move on to schedule 9, regarding sanctions overall. This schedule sets out further details on the sanctions available to the football regulator. Part 1 deals with sanctions related to information failures, including financial penalties and censure statements. Part 2 concerns infringements of substantive duties and conditions and includes suspension or revocation of licences and the appointment of a skilled person. Part 3 contains further provisions regarding financial penalties, including about daily rate calculations and enforcement of penalties as civil debts.
The schedule supports the enforcement powers in clauses 75 to 78 and provides the operational framework for sanctions. How are the levels of financial penalties determined in order to ensure fairness across clubs of different financial sizes? What checks exist to prevent excessive reliance on fines as a primary enforcement tool? Could any of the sanctions—for example, licence suspension—create unintended consequences for fans and local communities?
The Minister will be aware that I have pointed out in previous sittings the sporting competition impacts of any removal of a licence and how that may or may not affect relegation. We are interested in the Minister’s comments on how licence conditions would work when sanctions are applied.
Stephanie Peacock
The minimum period for representations on a warning notice is 14 days. A warning notice is an important procedural safeguard on the regulator’s enforcement process that ensures that the person in question can make their case. For example, that might be to explain that there was a reasonable excuse for non-compliance. We will talk about appeals in a moment. We have said throughout Committee and other proceedings on the Bill that appeals can be made.
On the hon. Gentleman’s point on cost, as well as the ability to impose significant financial penalties, including fixed penalties of up to 10% of a club’s revenue, the regulator will be able to hold a club’s senior management accountable for the club’s compliance where relevant. That means that, where appropriate, the regulator can take enforcement action against individuals as well as, or instead of, clubs. Targeted enforcement of that kind will be effective in changing behaviour, deterring non-compliance and aligning the incentives of those calling the shots with the club itself. It will also mean that sanctions do not need to unduly punish a club, and so indirectly hurt its fans, when not appropriate.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 75 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 9 agreed to.
Clauses 76 and 77 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 78
Offences
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 78 backs up the regulator’s information-gathering powers by creating information offences, including offences relating to the destruction or concealment of information and the provision of false or misleading information. The possible penalties for a person guilty of those offences include a fine or even imprisonment. The ability for the regulator to impose strong sanctions for what are clear offences should deter any person from information-related misconduct that would hamper the regulator. Information offences and sanctions are well precedented among other regulators, and their existence acts as a powerful and necessary deterrent. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Mr French
Again, I will not seek to repeat the Minister’s words. Clause 78 creates specific offences for destroying and falsifying information, providing false or misleading information, and obstruction. On summary conviction, a person who is guilty is liable for imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates court, for a fine, or both. On conviction or indictment, a person who is guilty is liable for imprisonment not exceeding two years, for a fine, or both. In relation to those offences, what evidentiary threshold must be met before a criminal offence would be pursued? Could the clause deter voluntary disclosure for fear of criminal liability? What is the projected cost to the public purse of enforcing those offences through the criminal justice system?
Stephanie Peacock
The effect of the clause is that it is a criminal offence to destroy, dispose of, falsify or conceal relevant information; to permit the destruction, disposal, falsification or concealment of relevant information; to provide false or misleading information to the regulator or an expert reporter; to give to another person information that is false or misleading, knowing that the information will be given to the regulator; and to obstruct an officer of the regulator exercising a warrant.
We are talking only about information-related offences, so it is fairly unobjectionable that persons should not be able to conceal or destroy information that the regulator asks for. The potential for criminal sanctions is normal for offences of that kind at other regulators. Those regulators tend not to have to ever use criminal sanctions, but having them available sends a clear and strong message that misconduct related to information will not be tolerated.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 78 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 79
Urgent directions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 79 will enable the regulator to give urgent directions to respond quickly to a risk of serious harm. These are directions to a person, such as a club, to take or to cease a certain action within a specified timeframe to bring an infringement to an end. Urgent directions will give the regulator a strong tool to intervene quickly where serious, ongoing non-compliance jeopardises the regulator’s objectives.
We expect compliance to be the norm and that, if necessary, most cases of non-compliance can be addressed using the sanctions set out in schedule 9. However, urgent directions will provide a more direct enforcement option to bring the most serious and potentially harmful issues to an end swiftly. Given the urgency, the regulator will not be required to give the person an opportunity to make representations. There is precedent for that among other regulators. The Financial Conduct Authority has similar “voluntary requirement” and “own-initiative requirement” powers. If a person fails to comply with an urgent direction, the regulator can apply to the courts for an injunction.
Clause 80 will require the regulator to publish certain notices and directions related to enforcement. This will ensure complete transparency around enforcement proceedings for fans, the industry and the wider public—something that has been lacking in the industry to date. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Mr French
I have some brief questions for the Minister. On clause 79, what criteria will the regulator use to justify issuing an urgent direction? Is there a risk of overreach if urgent powers are exercised without immediate oversight? Will clubs have a right to appeal or review such directions after the fact?
We believe that clause 80 mirrors clause 74 in providing a general duty for the regulator to publish various notices and statements issued under the Bill. Are there exceptions where publication could be delayed to prevent market disruption or reputational harm?
Stephanie Peacock
An urgent direction will be used only in response to non-compliance that is ongoing and of sufficient seriousness. That is reflected in the statutory threshold for the use of an urgent direction. The threshold—that the infringement must jeopardise or risk jeopardising the regulator’s objectives—is used in multiple places in the Bill as a high bar for more severe actions, for example revoking an operating licence.
A person can appeal against an urgent direction, although, as per the appeals provisions in the Bill, the urgent direction would be binding while the outcome of the appeal was being decided.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 79 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 80 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Vicky Foxcroft.)
Draft Casinos (Gaming Machines and Mandatory Conditions) Regulations 2025
Louie French Excerpts(2 weeks ago)
General CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Hobhouse. For full transparency, I refer Members to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.
The Conservative party has long championed positive reforms to the Gambling Act that will deliver further investment in jobs and leisure activities across the UK. We therefore welcome that the Government have finally listened to our calls to unlock this investment in casinos, whether in Blackpool, Birmingham or—closer to home for me—the Hippodrome in London. The statutory instrument had cross-party agreement before the election, and we will not oppose it for the sake of it today.
However, we continue to have major concerns about the rise of the gambling black market. I urge the Minister to do all she can to ensure that the Treasury does not move forward with its tax hike, which will hurt bingo halls and sports across the UK. Will she please confirm that she and colleagues at the Department for Culture, Media and Sport are making those representations to the Treasury, ahead of the end of the consultation? She will be aware of the widespread concerns across the industry. Secondly, can she please clarify why the Government are taking a different approach to machine reforms of adult gaming centres? I hope that she is also aware of the widespread concern in that sector. Some of the points in her speech may also apply to that sector.
Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting)
Louie French ExcerptsThursday 12th June 2025
(2 weeks, 4 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Football Governance Bill [HL] 2024-26 View all Football Governance Bill [HL] 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 12 June 2025 - (12 Jun 2025)
Mr Betts
It is good to have you back in the Chair with us this afternoon, Ms Butler—I am sure you are happy to be here. We are moving to further deliberation on the issue of consultation, in connection with the movement of grounds and the importance of the fans’ views. One issue is around not the desire or intention to stop clubs moving grounds at all costs, but ensuring that if ground movement happens, the fans’ interests are clearly taken into account. It is not to stop the Everton move, a little way down the road in Liverpool; it is to stop the Wimbledon move to Milton Keynes. That is what this is about—the fact that a club could be uprooted.
I have wandered around parts of London for many years, seeing Wimbledon play at various grounds. I think they played at Charlton for a time, and probably also at West Ham—they certainly moved to different places. I think Brighton played in Gillingham for a time as well. Those were temporary moves, but they should have been stopped in the first instance by not letting the club owner sell the ground. For Wimbledon, it was simply a move that took no account of where fans live or their loyalty to the club. It operated a bit like an American franchise system: “I’ve got the ownership of the club. I can move it where I want.” That is what happens in football in the States. We do not want it to happen here.
Amendment 91 is an attempt to add certain criteria when the regulator is looking at the potential to approve a transfer of grounds, including the proximity to the current home ground and the club’s other grounds, where fans live and how far they have to travel. I suppose Manchester United could locate almost anywhere because they have fans, they would claim, all over the world, and Man City fans would claim that there are more Man United fans outside Manchester than in it. But those are internal rivalries that we should not get into here. The reality for most clubs is that they have a local fanbase, and that should be taken into account before any move is deemed acceptable.
Even if the Minister cannot accept the amendment’s wording, I hope she might recognise that in reaching those decisions, the regulator must seriously take account of fans’ views—not just the view, “We don’t want to move; we’ve always been here,” but, “We don’t want to move because they’re trying to locate us 100 miles away and we simply can’t get to home games on that basis.” I hope that the Minister might think about that.
New clause 14 aims to get clubs to write into their articles of association the issues in the Bill that they have to take account of—the heritage restrictions—to ensure that they are firmly embedded in how the club operates.
Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)
I hope that everyone is appropriately refreshed after the lunch break. I will not seek to go to VAR to rehash any of the debates we had before lunch, but we have great sympathy with the points made by the hon. Member for Sheffield South East. We also believe that fans should have a strong say if clubs seek to move ground, as we have debated. The obvious questions, which we will come to in the next set of debates, are about what fan consultation and approval would look like. I know that that will be part of our heritage discussion in a moment, so I will not proceed on that now.
In thinking about some of the hon. Gentleman’s examples—Wimbledon being the most obvious one—I recall that as a teenager, or a bit younger, I would watch Wimbledon play at Crystal Palace, at Selhurst Park. They were the Crazy Gang in south London at that point, and they would often play there. So I understand his point, especially about the move to Milton Keynes and the controversy that that caused. As he highlighted, thankfully, we have not had too many examples that are similar to the American franchise system, where, in the National Football League, the Raiders have moved a number of times over the years, to different cities, depending on the financial attraction of each state.
Beyond the Man United and Everton examples, which we have discussed, there are other clubs who have moved. The one I first think of, which is closest to where I am from, is the Arsenal move a number of years ago from Woolwich Arsenal in south-east London to Islington. It is an interesting point, because a lot of the fans in south-east London are still strong supporters of Arsenal because of their generational links. For example, my brother-in-law’s grandfather was an Arsenal fan, so he is an Arsenal fan. The London example is probably not the best one, because it is simple to argue that fans can get across London fairly easily. It would be more dramatic if a club were being moved to the other end of the country, which is the point he is making—he is nodding in agreement.
I will be interested to know how the Minister and the Government view the amendments and how this issue might impact the regulator’s operations. I have a lot of sympathy for the amendments, and I will listen carefully to the Minister’s response.
Stephanie Peacock
Welcome back to the Committee after lunch, Ms Butler. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East for tabling the proposals, which seek to strengthen the protections on club heritage. The safeguarding of football heritage will be a key priority for the regulator, and there are a number of provisions in the Bill to uphold that key objective. It is vital that fans can have their voices heard at their clubs, especially regarding key heritage assets that can play a significant role in community identity and history.
That is why, as we will discuss in relation to clause stand part, clause 48 requires clubs to consult their fans and have regard to their views on a proposed relocation of a home ground. It is also why the regulator will determine whether the relocation will result in significant harm to a club’s heritage. This is not a binary decision, however, and in lots of cases will require a holistic approach and for the regulator to consider a number of factors, including not just the views of current fans, but the club’s history and the ability of fans to get to the ground. We would expect the regulator to engage and consult fans of the club, because it would be necessary to do so to ascertain the impact on club heritage. As the shadow Minister touched on, we will discuss this further in a little bit.
Amendment 91 would require the club to take reasonable steps to establish the views of the majority of supporters, rather than allowing the regulator to take the multifaceted approach that the Government think is best suited to the nuanced issue of club heritage. The importance of fan voices being heard is why the regulator spells out a number of protections for heritage assets, such as the home brand and home shirt colours, among others. Any breach of these duties would qualify as a relevant infringement by the club. Although we expect that the regulator will take an advocacy-first approach, a range of sanctions will be available.
Although the Government understand that the intention behind new clause 14 is to further entrench these duties, this legislation has been designed so that the duties apply across the clubs, with the regulator ensuring compliance. Amending articles of association can be resource-heavy and require shareholder agreement. It also does not guarantee that there will be compliance. This is not something that the Government see as an appropriate or necessary step to require all clubs to take. Instead, the Bill will protect fan consultation through other means. For those reasons, I am unable to accept the amendments.
Mr Betts
I just want to ask a simple question: why has “the Football Association” suddenly appeared at this point in the Bill? It has not been part of the requirements on the regulator until now. If I am right, it was not in previous iterations of the Bill—I may be wrong. I would have thought that the view of fans is most important. The FA does excellent work on many issues in football, not least trying to engage with England fans, but in this respect, are the fans of the club not more important?
Mr French
Clause 49 introduces a duty on regulated clubs to safeguard key aspects of what the Bill defines as club heritage. This specifically relates to changes in a club’s name, its badge and its home shirt colours—things that may seem cosmetic to the outsider, but which football fans know are part of the heart and soul of a club.
Whether it is the famous black and white of Newcastle United or the immense history of Deepdale in Preston, these things mean more than just the colour of the top or where people watch football. They are integral parts of footballing communities. They symbolise membership of something bigger than oneself. The club colours, the club badge and the home ground are all ways in which fans identify themselves as being part of a footballing family. They must be protected.
This clause is an important recognition in statute that football clubs are not just commercial entities, but cultural institutions, symbols of community identity and civic pride. As such, changes to these heritage elements should not be made casually or without due regard to those whose lifelong support gives clubs their very meaning, often across generations.
We welcome the inclusion of clause 49, which we believe is essential, but we do not believe it goes far enough. That is why we tabled amendment 111.
Mr French
Yes, I am happy to and will come on to that point. Amendment 111 would require the majority of fans to approve any such changes to a club’s official name, its badge or its home shirt colours, not just to support them. “Support” can be vaguely defined. It can be skewed by a few loud voices or specific interest groups, rather than being a genuine exercise in democracy. While consultation is important, it is ultimately no substitute for consent.
Football clubs are, by their very nature, multi-generational institutions. Most are older than the companies or corporate vehicles that now own them and some are even older than the Labour party that now seeks to impose this regulator. They existed before many of their current directors were born and will, we hope, outlast all of us.
The badge on the shirt is not simply a badge: it is a symbol of place, of pride, of glory and heartbreak, of a historic past and a hopeful future. The name of a club is not simply branding: it is geography, history and memory all in one. And the home shirt, whether it is red, claret, blue or black and white, is more than a colour scheme—I apologise if I missed any; orange for Wolves, maybe, but I am sure hon. Members get the point. It is part of the club’s identity, part of the community’s fabric.
When clubs change these things, particularly when they do so without the blessing of their supporters, they do more than upset tradition. They erode trust and sever the cultural connection that keeps that team and the English game alive. Let us not forget that when Cardiff City’s owner unilaterally changed their home shirt from blue to red, the backlash was enormous, because it was not Cardiff’s colour. Cardiff’s owners, much like the electorate, came to regret switching from blue to red pretty darn quickly. Will the Minister confirm whether clause 49 would prevent what happened at Cardiff or whether such a change could still be pushed through after a period of consultation, however superficial?
The clause imposes a duty on clubs to consult fans before making changes to heritage elements. That is better than nothing, but is quite a low bar. We have all seen what consultation can look like in practice—a web form, a vague email or a one-off survey. Then the changes proceed regardless of overwhelming opposition, with clubs claiming that consultation has been completed.
I think most hon. Members would agree that that is not meaningful engagement and it certainly does not reflect the degree of ownership that supporters rightly feel over the identity of their home club. That is why we support the amendment to move the requirement from consultation to majority fan approval—that is, in other words, a vote, or a similarly binding expression of fan will, overseen through whatever supporter representation structure the club has in place. Will the Minister set out what the Bill actually means when it states,
“the club has taken reasonable steps to establish that the changes are supported by a majority of the club’s fans in England and Wales.”?
Lincoln Jopp
The shadow Minister is making a completely reasonable amendment. We have the emblem, colours and name. Does he agree that it would be helpful if the Minister explained why the name has been taken out for different treatment from the emblem and the colours?
Mr French
I am sure that the Minister will have heard that contribution from my hon. Friend and will be able to pick up on that in her comments. He is right to identify that such a distinction has been made in the Bill.
What does this mean? For example, will an hour-long Twitter poll on what a club should do be sufficient? We have seen how clubs have sought to use X in some quite funny ways at times, but on something as serious as this, we need proper consultation. Instead, does the Minister expect that clubs will engage in a full, proper and open consultation with their fans, such as one that includes a call for evidence, votes on different proposals and genuine engagement from the clubs themselves? Otherwise, this all risks just being for show, rather than real consultation.
Why stop at just consultation? If a proposed change is sensible, justifiable and supported by a club’s reasoning, why would the club not be able to win over the majority of its fans, if the fans agree it is in the best interests of the club? Why are the Government, in this Bill’s drafting, afraid of allowing fans to have a real and final say on these matters? This is not about allowing fans to micro-manage a club; it is about recognising that the symbols, colours and names of clubs are all held in trust, not owned in a transactional sense.
Football club owners are, in truth, temporary stewards. Their role is not to reshape the soul of a club but to protect it and hopefully strengthen it before passing it on. Far too often we have seen the reverse: owners who arrive with branding ideas and marketing consultants, determined to reshape the club’s visual identity to fit a certain commercial strategy, often with little or no understanding of the local footballing tradition in that community. Supporters have had to campaign, protest and plead to get what should have been theirs almost by birthright: a say in the symbols of their club. Does the Minister agree that clause 49, if limited to just consultation, risks becoming just a tick-box exercise, particularly in clubs without strong fan representation models in place?
There is a precedent for this kind of requirement. In Germany, the so-called 50+1 rule ensures that fans retain majority voting rights over key aspects of club identity and operation. In Spain, the socios model does so too. To be clear, we are not calling for full fan ownership, but we are saying that, on issues of identity, the final word should ultimately rest with the fans. Let us remember that this amendment would apply only to three specific heritage areas: the club’s official name, the badge—or crest, depending on how we want to describe it—and the home shirt colours. This is not about banning innovation or marketing altogether. It is simply saying that, when it comes to fundamentals, supporters should have a say.
Max Wilkinson (Cheltenham) (LD)
We have seen in the past things such as the renaming of St James’ Park in Newcastle to the Sports Direct Arena, and other fans groups around the country have been furious when historic stadium names have been changed to sponsors’ names. Would the shadow Minister extend the sentiment that he is now expressing to those circumstances as well?
Mr French
I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s contribution, and that is the point that we were discussing earlier with the hon. Member for Sheffield South East. We were seeking clarification from the Government on how that would affect the consultation of fans on the relocation of stadiums or a change in their ownership. I agree that it is crucial that fans have a say in the naming and history of their ground.
Max Wilkinson
The hon. Member for Great Yarmouth (Rupert Lowe) once fell foul of this when he attempted to change the name of the Dell to the Friends Provident stadium. Perhaps we might consult him on his learnings from that experience after we have completed this Committee.
Mr French
I am not sure how to answer that. How Members decide to use their time is a decision for them, but the hon. Gentleman has made the point well. Without wishing to put off Government Members, the argument behind my amendment is deeply Conservative in some ways; it is about tradition, continuity and community. It is about respecting the past while also securing the future. It is about recognising that football is strongest when it listens to the people who love it most.
The clause is a step forward, and we think its inclusion in the Bill is important. Without our amendment, however, we are concerned that the clause will lack the legal bite required to safeguard the symbols that matter most to supporters. In truth, clubs that respect their fans would already seek that approval; the amendment would simply ensure that those who do not are held to the same standard. To be clear, no one should be able to change the name of Barnsley FC, the badge of Wigan Athletic or the home colours of Aston Villa without the backing of the very people who built the stands and carry the soul of the club every single week across multiple seasons.
I urge the Minister and colleagues across the Committee to back the amendment. Football’s future must be modern and well run, yes, but it must also be anchored in tradition, and the tradition belongs to the fans.
Stephanie Peacock
We will come on to enforcement, but a range of enforcement options will be available to the regulator, if it feels that a club is not doing what it asked the club to do.
Mr French
To add to the point made by the hon. Member for Sheffield South East, if a club—the Minister gave the example of Hull—decided that it wanted to go ahead and change its name to “Hull Tigers”, but the regulator felt that the fans had not been consulted thoroughly enough, could the regulator deduct points from a club?
Mr Betts
I hear what the Minister said, but I want to think about that. I know what her good intentions are, but I also know there may be some people out there with bad intentions; it is about making sure that they come in line with the Minister’s good intentions. I am holding back to see what further discussions we have, but this is really important. It is a wider issue: there are so many clubs with so many disparate fan groups, and owners will pick and choose if there is not certainty. That is why I raised the issue, which I think we ought to come back to, of a clear role for the Football Supporters’ Association, the body that oversees fan groups in this country. It has a neutral view of which groups are the most important and relevant in different clubs, and it can help the regulator enormously in what, in some cases, will be a challenging process of trying to identify the fan groups who really speak for fans in those clubs.
Mr French
I will not put the hon. Member for Sheffield South East at risk with his own side by talking too fondly about the comments he just made—I will not make it sound like we are trying to do a double act—but we have heard a lot of concern in our debates on the clause, and the amendments tabled to it, about how it will work. The hon. Member mentioned that some club owners—one would hope only a minority of them—would seek to expose loopholes in the Bill. That is why we tabled amendment 111, which would introduce a safeguard by requiring a clear vote and the approval of the majority of fans.
There are a number of risks for the Government with this Bill, but one of the biggest is this: if it does not protect the things it is designed to protect—in this case, the heritage of a football club and a say for fans—what is its purpose at all? If one of the examples we have discussed plays out in future, that question will be asked of the Government. In our future debates on the Bill, perhaps they can provide more clarity about their thinking, and perhaps they will incorporate some of the arguments we have made today.
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to hon. Members for their contributions. We believe that we have strengthened measures in the Bill to put fans and communities back at the heart of the game and to protect football heritage. All regulated clubs will now be required to have an effective framework in place to meet and consult regularly a representative group of fans on the specified relevant matters, including any proposal to relocate the home ground and some of the issues we have just discussed. We expect that the regulator will be best placed to understand the circumstances of individual clubs across the country. It will produce guidance to support clubs in meeting its requirements, and it will take into account things like precedent and ensuring proportionality.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 50
Duty to notify of changes in circumstances relevant to the IFR’s functions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
The clause places a duty on all regulated clubs to notify the regulator of any material change in circumstances that is relevant to the regulator’s functions, as soon as reasonably practicable. The regulator will need a complete picture of each club in order to effectively regulate. Full transparency and timely updates will allow the regulator to stay up to date on any relevant changes in real time.
The duty to notify in the clause is an ongoing duty on regulated clubs. By contrast, the annual declaration mandatory licence condition applies to licensed clubs only. The annual declaration is about creating an annual touchpoint for clubs as part of the licensing regime, rather than requiring an annual licence renewal. It will allow clubs to declare a summary of any matters that they notified, or should have notified, over the past year.
Mr French
I will not rehash the Minister’s description of the clause, but it raises a number of questions about the interpretation of the clause and the requirements on clubs. What guidance will be provided to clubs to determine what constitutes a “relevant” change in circumstances, because that is very open to interpretation? What might such a change look like? We are not trying to micromanage, but we think clubs might find it helpful to understand, even if it is via a list of frequently asked questions from the regulator, what constitutes a change of circumstances so that they do not accidently fall foul of well-intentioned drafting.
Could the duty to notify a change in circumstances be accidentally disproportionate to lower league clubs? We have discussed at length that those clubs generally do not have the same administrative resources as the big clubs. Will the regulator look to have a more flexible approach to clubs lower down the pyramid that may not have the ability to notify as quickly as those at the top?
Stephanie Peacock
We expect the regulator to look at this on a case-by-case basis. As we have said throughout, we very much intend for the regulator to be proportionate depending on where a club sits in the pyramid.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 51
Duty to keep fans informed of insolvency proceedings
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
The clause places a duty on all regulated clubs in relevant insolvency proceedings to keep fans informed of the progress of the proceedings. Any fan that has experienced their club going into administration can attest that it is a worrying and often confusing time. Although the regime will look to best protect clubs, it cannot be zero-failure. However, the clause is intended to make the process more transparent for fans when the worst happens. The duty will apply only as far as is reasonable and will not fall on the administrators or any body not regulated by the football regulator. The clause was added to the Bill in order to mitigate unnecessary worry and confusion for fans.
Mr French
I have a few questions. How will the regulator assess whether a club has sufficiently fulfilled its duty to keep fans informed? Could the requirement to disclose information during insolvency proceedings create additional reputational or financial risks for clubs? How will the clause be applied consistently while respecting confidential obligations to creditors? We have spoken a lot about insider information. If the Minister does not have the answers today, it would be helpful to get them in writing in order to understand how some of these complex legal matters might work.
Stephanie Peacock
I am happy to write to the shadow Minister. I appreciate that we added this clause; it was not in the previous iteration of the Bill. That is why I was keen to talk about reasonability. We appreciate that insolvency is a complex, fast-paced, changing and challenging situation, but we also appreciate—Members have talked about different clubs that have gone into administration—the worry for fans, so we want to keep them as informed as reasonably possible. The shadow Minister asked me for something further in writing and I am very happy to provide that.
Stephanie Peacock
The clause requires licensed clubs to prepare a personnel statement and submit it to the regulator for approval. Alongside the statement, clubs must provide an explanation as to why they consider it to be accurate. The owners and officers who control and run football clubs are vital to their sustainability. Therefore, the regulator needs to know who is running the show behind the scenes in order to implement its regime effectively.
A personnel statement must outline each of the club’s owners and its ultimate owner, as we have discussed; its officers, with a job description for each; and its senior managers and their roles. Once the statement has been submitted, the regulator will review it and decide either to approve it or to modify it. Any modification to the statement must be made in consultation with the relevant club to ensure that the statement is accurate. Once the statement is approved by the regulator, the club must publish it online, increasing transparency and accountability in football. Subsequent statements must be submitted to the regulator if an old statement becomes out of date—for example, after the departure or hiring of an officer.
Let me also highlight the role of the Secretary of State’s guidance in providing clarity to owners about who meets the definition of someone who exercises significant influence or control. We committed in the other House to producing the Secretary of State’s guidance before clubs are required to identify owners who meet that definition to the regulator. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 52 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 53
Duty to pay a levy
Mr French
I beg to move amendment 133, in clause 53, page 42, line 3, at end insert—
“(1A) But the IFR may not require a club with fewer than 10 full time equivalent employees to pay the IFR a levy in respect of a chargeable period during which the club is a licensed club.”
This amendment would exempt clubs with fewer than 10 full time equivalent employees from having to pay the levy.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 5—Opportunity for levy exemption for clubs below the Football League—
“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for a process whereby a licensed club may apply for a full or partial exemption from the levy established under section 53 if—
(a) the club’s first men’s team competes in the National League or any lower tier of the English football pyramid, and
(b) the club demonstrates, to the satisfaction of the IFR, that paying the levy would pose a significant risk to its financial sustainability.
(2) The IFR must report annually on the number of exemptions granted and the rationale for each decision.”
This new clause allows clubs in National League North and National League South to apply for a levy exemption under specific circumstances.
New clause 24—Levy exemption procedure for clubs in administration—
“(1) The Secretary of State must make regulations establishing a procedure under which a regulated club that has entered administration may apply for an exemption from the levy provided for by section 53.
(2) The regulations under subsection (1) must include provision for the IFR to determine whether an exemption from the levy should be granted.
(3) Provision under subsection (2) must require the IFR—
(a) to take account of the circumstances under which the club entered administration, and
(b) only to grant an exemption from the levy if the IFR is satisfied that the owners of the club have not taken a decision to enter administration in order to secure an exemption from the levy.
(4) In this section, a club has ‘entered administration’ if an administrator of the club has been appointed under paragraph 22 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.”
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to establish a procedure for clubs in administration to apply for an exemption from the levy. The IFR would only be able to grant an exemption if satisfied that the club had not deliberately entered administration as a means of securing the exemption.
Mr French
It is my pleasure to speak to amendment 133. Clause 53 introduces a duty on regulated clubs to pay a statutory levy to the Government’s new regulator—a mechanism intended to fund its operations and ensure its independence from Government and industry influence. The principle is not unreasonable. If clubs are to be regulated, one could argue that it is fair that they should contribute to the costs of said regulation.
However, we have two initial concerns. First, as the initial costs incurred are to be borne by the taxpayer, that does not ensure independence from Government—quite the opposite; it creates a reliance on the Government for funding and therefore for direction and sponsorship of activities. According to the Government’s own impact assessment, the regulator will cost taxpayers around £106 million until the levy provided for by the clause is up and running.
To put that in context, that money could fund the Lionesses futures fund, which the Government have scrapped, more than three times over. In what should be a fantastic and inspirational year for women’s sport, the Government are choosing to spend money on regulating men’s football instead of investing in the growth of the women’s game. I make that comparison with quite a lot of regret because I believe that it is the wrong decision by the Government, but I will stick to the Bill.
Secondly, many clubs have not asked to be regulated, and they might ask why they should pay for a regulator that seeks to stifle their operations or interfere with their performance and make them uncompetitive in the competitive world of sport. I have asked the question the Minister in previous sittings what would happen if a club chose not to apply for a licence. I am a bit unclear how that would look. According to the Government’s own impact assessment, the yearly cost to all regulated clubs in the English football pyramid will be up to around £142 million, with up to £1.2 million in one-off familiarisation costs, ongoing compliance costs of up to £35.8 million every year following the first year, and operational costs, which will be incurred every year. As I mentioned earlier, the operational costs will be funded initially by the taxpayer, before an industry levy is introduced.
That is an extraordinary amount of money to be leaving the game, especially as the Minister has recognised that money leaving the game in agents’ fees, for example, is detrimental to the sustainability of English football. The costs that the Government are imposing on clubs through the regulator clearly threaten the sustainability of some clubs, as a stand-alone issue. Moreover, as the Minister’s own impact assessment states, the costs are not expected to fall equally on each club; proportionately, they will be greater, and felt more greatly, further down the pyramid.
The impact assessment also states that factors such as
“existing levels of compliance impact the level of activity required”
by the regulator. We all know that that means more work and higher costs for lower-level clubs over the wealthiest. They will have more catching up to do than the big clubs in most instances, leaving them to bear the brunt of the Government’s regulator. It is vital that, as Opposition Members have said throughout this Committee, the regulator is not captured either financially or politically by any one interest group. However, that will now prove difficult with the appointment that the Government have made.
Although we support the broad purpose of clause 53, we must interrogate its fairness, proportionality and impact on smaller clubs. That is why I tabled amendment 133, which would exempt clubs with fewer than 10 full-time equivalent employees from the statutory levy. Regulators do not run on good will alone, and this one certainly will be no different. They need staff systems and legal support, but costs must be borne fairly and in a way that does not threaten the institutions that the Bill seeks to protect.
Clause 53 allows the regulator to determine how much is paid, by whom and how often, subject to regulations approved by the Secretary of State. It is a wide power and an open-ended one. As it is drafted, the Bill does not place any cap on the amount or impose any statutory criteria on proportionality. Will the Minister confirm whether the Government intend to introduce guidance or a statutory cap on the total amount that might be levied by the regulator, either per club or across the sector?
Given that the proposed appointee to the role of chair donated to the Secretary of State, can the Minister confirm that the Secretary of State will not make any decision on how much money can be levied in the future? As it stands, the clause effectively allows the Secretary of State to write a blank cheque to a regulator run by a person who donated directly to her leadership campaign. That alone creates the perception of a conflict of interest, for which the current Secretary of State, as we all know, is under independent investigation.
Although some Premier League clubs might be able to absorb the costs, the same cannot be said for smaller, lower-league or community-based clubs such as Barnsley, Bromley or Wigan. My amendment would create a simple, fair exemption. Any club with fewer than 10 full-time equivalent employees would not be required to pay the levy. That is not just an administrative fix; it is a recognition of football’s diversity and, in true footballing spirit, would champion the underdogs by allowing them to focus on their squads or stadium improvements that would benefit fans. A club with eight employees is not in the same universe, financially or structurally, as a Premier League club with a commercial team, global brand and multimillion-pound payroll.
Mr French
That is a fair challenge. To be clear, we are not talking about five-a-side teams. To give a straight answer, we are talking about backroom staff affected by the administration. We can see that in the wage bill at opposite ends of the pyramid in 2022-23, with the Premier League’s wage bill running at more than £4 billion and League Two’s wage bill sitting at just £96 million, or 2.4% of the Premier League’s total.
Mr French
To be completely up front, I do not have that answer in front of me, but I will find out—the team has drafted this amendment.
Without this amendment, clubs in both the Premier League and League Two could find themselves subject to the same regulatory levy. This risks creating a two-tier burden, where the most vulnerable clubs are saddled with costs that they cannot pay for a regulator that many of them do not want.
Why have the Government chosen not to introduce an automatic exemption for the very smallest clubs, and has an exemption based on staffing levels or turnover been considered? We already accept differential treatment in other areas of public policy—for example, small businesses are treated differently from large corporations, and community amateur sports clubs benefit from separate tax and regulatory frameworks. We believe that the same logic could apply here.
James Naish (Rushcliffe) (Lab)
I am sure the shadow Minister is aware that many top-flight footballers are effectively self-employed through independent companies that they set up. Does he not recognise that this amendment would create a loophole that enables football clubs to split into multiple organisations to fall short of having 10 full-time employees?
Mr French
I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point, and I know that certain players have sought to do that through advertising and other financial arrangements. We are talking about clubs at the lowest level, and we do not believe that is a particular risk of this amendment.
One of the key failings of the football system in recent years has been the concentration of financial risk at the lower levels of the pyramid. Clubs overextend themselves chasing promotion, owners gamble recklessly to stay afloat, and supporters ultimately bear the costs when that does not work and when clubs collapse. The last thing we believe we should be doing is introducing a new statutory cost that could tip the balance for smaller clubs already running on the thinnest margins. This amendment is not about letting anyone off the hook; it is about recognising scale, and recognising the difference of scale in the football pyramid.
Will the Minister please commit to publishing a full impact assessment of the levy’s distribution before regulations are laid? Without that, how can Parliament be sure that the burden will not fall disproportionately on those least able to bear it? One of the justifications for the levy is to secure the regulator’s operational independence, which is a principle that we support, but independence should never mean insulation from scrutiny. If clubs are paying the regulator’s bill, they should at least know where the money is going and have confidence that it is not being wasted.
The Minister has maintained that football regulation cannot be one size fits all, and we understand that is her reason for leaving the wording of the Bill quite open-ended in places. Clause 53 is sound in many ways, but in practice it risks imposing an undue burden on the very clubs that the Bill is supposed to help—those rooted in their communities, run on small budgets and kept alive, more often than not, by volunteers, not venture capitalists. In that spirit, I will be pressing this amendment to a vote.
Max Wilkinson
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Butler. Earlier in our deliberations—I cannot remember how many sittings ago—the Liberal Democrats made the case for extending the Bill’s scope to the sixth tier, the National Leagues. Effectively, we feel that helping those clubs up the pyramid would be useful, and on a cross-party basis, we have discussed support for the National League’s 3UP campaign, which we can take forward after Committee as a group of Members who are interested in football.
This amendment is quite simple, as it is about extending the Bill’s scope to the sixth tier. It would give clubs in National League North and National League South the opportunity to apply for an exemption from the levy, were it to be extended to that level. Clubs at that level may well not have the capacity to take on the administration associated with regulation. Such increased financial protections for lower-league clubs—those in the National League and National Leagues North and South—would align with the principles of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for taking the words out of my mouth, because I was going to conclude by drawing the Committee’s attention to a letter placed in the Libraries of both Houses when the Bill was in the other place. The letter, dated 6 March, was sent by Baroness Twycross, who took the Bill through the Lords. I will not detain the Committee by reading out the letter—Members can look at it—but it breaks down the proportions. Obviously, costs are based on the impact assessment and are indicative, so they are not meant to be prescriptive; it is meant to be an indicator. The letter may be helpful if the Committee would like more detail.
Mr French
I have listened carefully to the Minister’s arguments, and she has made some helpful clarifications. However, due to the lack of a cap, as my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne said, it is difficult to rely on the letter for what club certainty might look like in the future. We have discussed at length how well-intentioned plans can easily spiral, which is why we believe amendment 133 is important in helping to safeguard the clubs with the smallest means and those lowest down the pyramid.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Mr French
I listened very carefully to the Minister’s explanation of these amendments, which have been introduced at a fairly late stage. I hope she can provide some clarity on a number of questions.
First, was it always the Government’s intention to have these separate streams of funding, as she has described, or is this a way of expanding the IFR’s powers to charge the levy? I am unclear about why the change has happened now, because we have obviously been through a lot of consultation and the Bill has been in the other place for some time. It is not necessarily clear why these changes have come about at this stage, so I would appreciate an answer.
Lastly, when the Minister described the charges as non-leviable, the natural question was, “Who picks up the bill?” Are we talking about taxpayers, and if we are, what are those costs? Exposure to risk would obviously be a major concern for taxpayers and, I suspect, a number of Government Departments following the spending review. I appreciate her comments about how the Government believe that the functions may not be used or required, but there needs to be an answer about the risk of those non-leviable payments and what that might look like in the future.
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to the shadow Minister. First, it is certainly not about expanding, and we have been very clear that we do not want scope creep. He asks “Why now?” We have always maintained that we want the best legislation and the best outcome. We very much listened to the debate in the other place. We reflected on that, and we believe that this is just a simpler, less complex way of going about it.
On his last question, I can very much assure him that it is quite the opposite. By making these changes, the costs will not have an impact on taxpayers. We are clear about that.
Mr French
I am still unclear on that point, but I am happy to have the answer in writing. Who will pick up the bill when the levy cannot be charged to clubs, and what will that bill look like? I am not at all clear about how that will play out in practice. I am not sure whether I am misunderstanding the Minister, and I am happy to have it in writing, but I am not clear what it means.
Stephanie Peacock
I say gently that I think the shadow Minister is misunderstanding, and I am happy to write to him. The amendment means that all functions can now be covered by the levy, whereas previously there were two funding mechanisms in the Bill. It is a technical change.
Stephanie Peacock
Yes, that is the intention.
Amendment 18 agreed to.
Amendments made: 19, in clause 53, page 42, line 13, leave out “leviable functions” and insert “functions under this Act”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 22.
Amendment 20, in clause 53, page 42, line 14, leave out “leviable functions” and insert “functions under this Act”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 22.
Amendment 21, in clause 53, page 42, line 19, leave out “leviable”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 22.
Amendment 22, in clause 53, page 42, line 26, leave out subsection (4).—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment removes the definition of “leviable functions” so that the IFR may charge a levy for all of its functions under the Act.
Mr French
I beg to move amendment 105, in clause 53, page 42, line 42, at end insert—
“(6A) Once the IFR has established a levy under subsection (1) and made the required payments under section 96, the IFR must only fund its functions under this Act through its own revenue streams.
(6B) For the purposes of subsection (6A) the IFR’s ‘own revenue streams’ are any amounts payable to the IFR from regulated clubs under subsection (1).”
This amendment requires the IFR to be self-funding through the industry levy, but after it has paid its initial costs and the Secretary of State’s establishment costs to the Treasury.
The amendment would require the Government’s new regulator to be self-funding through the industry levy, but after it has paid its initial costs and the Secretary of State’s establishment costs to the Treasury, so that it is entirely self-sustaining. That is not unreasonable; taxpayers are already being squeezed by this Government, so it would be ludicrous to suggest that they should foot the bill for the Labour Government’s regulator. That is why I tabled the amendment, which seeks to place a clear financial obligation on the regulator to ensure that, after covering its start-up and establishment costs, it becomes entirely self-funding through the industry levy.
The principle behind the amendment is simple: if we are to create an independent regulator for football, its independence must extend beyond structure to include financial independence from the taxpayer. The clause gives the Secretary of State discretion to determine the mechanics of the levy, but it leaves unanswered an essential question: who ultimately pays—we have had a bit of discussion about that—and for how long? The amendment provides a clear and reasonable answer: the taxpayer may support the regulator’s launch, as might be expected, but once that is done, the regulator should stand on its own two feet.
Let us not forget the purpose of the Bill: the regulator is intended to be arm’s length, neutral and shielded from political interference. However, the Government have gone to great lengths to compromise that independence through their appointment, as we have discussed, and the principle would be fully compromised if the regulator remained financially reliant on the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, or the Treasury for that matter. Independence is not just about who makes the appointments, but about who signs the cheques.
If the regulator is to carry out its duties credibly—overseeing financial discipline, enforcing ownership standards and planning across the football pyramid for the long term—it must operate free from any perception of ministerial influence. That means being self-funding. The idea that the British taxpayer should continue to fund the ongoing operations of this new body is simply not justifiable, particularly at a time when families are feeling the squeeze and public services are under pressure. If clubs need a regulator—and the Government have decided that they do—then clubs, not pensioners in Bexley or shop workers in Barnsley, should pay for that regulator.
The amendment would also introduce discipline into the regulatory model. It would ensure that the Government’s regulator lives within its means, plans sustainably and operates efficiently, just as it will expect clubs to. We must avoid the slow drift we have seen with other public bodies, where what begins as temporary state support gradually hardens into permanent public subsidy with no sunset clause or accountability.
By requiring the regulator to repay its start-up costs and then operate independently, we would make a clear distinction between initial public investment and long-term industry responsibility. It is not unreasonable to ask that football, having accepted the need for regulatory oversight, for which many have lobbied, now contributes to that oversight on a permanent and self-sustaining basis.
That gives rise to a number of questions for the Minister. Is there a timeline for when the regulator is expected to be self-funding, or will it continue to draw on the public purse for a number of years? What provision, if any, has been made to recover the taxpayers’ outlay once the regulator begins to collect levy income? I would be grateful, as would taxpayers across the country, for reassurances from the Minister that those issues are being addressed, and that the taxpayer will not be left to subsidise the industry without a clear exit plan.
My amendment would protect the principle of independence. It would safeguard the public purse and ensure that those who arguably benefit from oversight are the ones who pay for it. Football is told that it will get a strong, credible and financially sound regulator, but taxpayers deserve clarity, discipline and fairness in how that regulator is funded. I therefore urge the Committee to support the amendment and make the regulator accountable to the industry it oversees, not dependent on the Government that created it. Let us build something that is self-sustaining, responsible, and fit for the future.
Stephanie Peacock
During our debate on the technical changes proposed by the Government, we discussed the removal of the non-leviable functions. That means that everything will be levy-funded, so there will be no cost to the taxpayer. We absolutely agree with the hon. Gentleman’s points about the regulator being self-sustaining and self-funding. The Government also agree that the regulator should not be able to borrow money at its own discretion, which is why it is already prevented from doing so in paragraph 37(2) of schedule 2, which sets out that the regulator cannot borrow money unless explicitly permitted to as part of the financial assistance from the Secretary of State. We expect that that would occur only if absolutely necessary and in extreme circumstances, and would be provided only subject to conditions set by the Secretary of State.
There is no need for the restriction to be duplicated. We absolutely agree that the regulator should be fully funded through the levy, and that is exactly what the levy is designed to do. I will come on to that in more detail when we discuss the levy under clause 53 stand part. The Bill ensures that the regulator’s source of funding for all regulatory functions is the levy. Any financial penalties it imposes through enforcement action can also be used to offset any litigation costs and reduce the burden on compliant clubs.
Mr French
I appreciate that the Minister said that she will come on to that subject in a later debate, but can she be clear about start-up costs and their recovery for taxpayers? How is it envisaged that those costs will be repaid? I appreciate the point she makes about levy contributions, but how will the start-up costs that have been incurred now, along with the cost of the shadow football regulator, be recovered, if at all?
Stephanie Peacock
I would like to address that later, if possible. I have heard the question, and will make sure the hon. Gentleman gets an answer. For the reasons I have set out, I hope he will withdraw his amendment.
Stephanie Peacock
Before I speak on clause 53, I draw the Committee’s attention to a procedural matter. In preparing for the debate, officials identified some inconsistencies in the impact assessment published on the Bill’s parliamentary web page and gov.uk. It appears that as figures were updated during the development of the impact assessment, they were not reflected in the summary of costs on one page at the beginning of the paper, which was related to the compliance cost and operational cost. The figures are correct in the main body of the impact assessment, and the total cost that those figures added up to is still correct. The inconsistencies also featured in the version submitted by the previous Government. For full accuracy and transparency, we have now corrected it, and the impact assessment on gov.uk was updated last night. We have notified the Public Bill Office to ensure the parliamentary website is updated as soon as possible, and there will be an updated version in the Library shortly.
Having provided that clarification, I will now discuss clause 53, which enables the regulator to charge a levy to licensed clubs that covers the regulator’s running cost. That follows the precedent of other regulators such as the Financial Conduct Authority, the Competition and Markets Authority and Ofcom. The levy methodology is an operational assessment that the regulator is best placed to make independently. By making football clubs more sustainable in the long term, the regulator will be providing a service to the industry. It is only fair that as a wealthy industry, football, as opposed to the taxpayer, should cover the cost of regulation, as has been well discussed by the Committee this afternoon.
The cost of regulation would represent just a tiny fraction of football’s more than £6 billion annual revenue. The industry will also benefit from regulation, which will deliver a more stable pyramid of sustainable and resilient clubs, and so help protect the commercial value of English football. The legislation puts robust checks and balances on the regulator. It will be limited to raising funds to meet a set of tightly defined costs that are necessary for regulatory activity only. It is clear in the clause what the levy covers and how the money will be used, ensuring the regulator’s transparency. As I alluded to in the discussion on Government amendments 18 to 26, all costs can now be funded through the levy.
However, the regulator will not have a blank cheque. It will be subject to numerous safeguards including annual auditing by the National Audit Office, and its annual accounts will be laid before Parliament. That and other safeguards, such as the Department for Culture, Media and Sport’s responsibility as a sponsor, will provide the necessary transparency and scrutiny to deliver value for money.
In addition, as I set out when we discussed the previous group of amendments, the clause also requires the regulator to have regard to a club’s individual financial position when setting the levy charge. Specifically, that covers the financial resources of a club and the league in which it plays. That should ensure a proportionate approach where no club, big or small, is asked to pay more than what is fair and affordable. That will be aided by the requirement for the regulator to consult all licensed clubs, which I will speak to in more detail in the debate on the next group of amendments. In addition, once operational, the regulator will have a legal requirement to set out its levy charges annually and consult all regulated clubs on its methodology.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 53, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 54
Section 53: consultation and publication
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 103, in clause 54, page 44, line 10, leave out
“As soon as is reasonably practicable”
and insert “Six months”.
The amendment requires the IFR to publish levy rules six months before the chargeable period.
Mr French
The clause sets out the consultation process that the Government’s new regulator must follow before introducing or amending the rules governing the industry levy that clubs will pay to fund the regulator’s operations, as we discussed on clause 53. The clause is designed to ensure that any such changes are not made in a vacuum and that the regulator consults the right people, provides a draft of the rules and gathers feedback before finalising anything. On the face of it, this is a welcome safeguard, but, as is so often the case with this Bill, the detail deserves much closer scrutiny.
Let us be clear: the industry levy is not a trivial matter. It is the mechanism by which clubs will fund the regulator, and the amount of levy and the method by which it is calculated or collected could have serious financial consequences, especially for clubs operating on tight margins, as we have discussed. We are talking about a compulsory statutory payment, not a voluntary contribution or a negotiated fee. Any change to the rules governing the levy must therefore be subject to robust scrutiny, proper stakeholder input and full transparency.
The clause requires the regulator to consult a named list of stakeholders as well as any others it considers appropriate. It also requires a draft version of the proposed levy rules to be published as part of the consultation. So far, so good. But—this is a significant but—the clause also includes a major loophole.
The clause states that the Government’s regulator does not need to consult at all if it considers the proposed changes to the levy rules to be “minor”. Crucially, the regulator itself is to determine whether such a change is minor. Why is the regulator being permitted to define what counts as minor without any external check, threshold or approval? That creates a dangerous conflict of interest where the Minister’s regulator becomes the judge and jury in its own process. What is minor to the Government’s regulator may be highly significant to lower league clubs, such as a League Two or National League club trying to manage a tight budget.
Once again, the Bill has a significant risk of regulatory mission creep. We must consider the cumulative effect of so-called minor changes: one small rule adjustment may seem harmless, but several such changes made without consultation could over time significantly alter the levy framework, placing new burdens on clubs without ever facing proper scrutiny. That is how regulatory creep begins, and that is precisely what the clause should be guarding against, but, as drafted, it does not.
Would the Minister consider amending the clause to define “minor” changes more clearly, perhaps by setting out objective criteria or requiring approval from the Secretary of State, Parliament or an independent panel? Alternatively, would she consider a threshold mechanism where changes with a financial impact above a certain level must trigger consultation regardless of her own regulator’s view?
I suspect that the answer to those questions will be no, which is why I tabled amendment 102, which would remove the regulator’s power to skip consultation when it determines a change to be minor. The intent behind the exemption may be practical and be—to avoid unnecessary bureaucracy—but in reality it gives the Government’s regulator unilateral power to decide whether stakeholders should be consulted on changes that could have material financial consequences.
Crucially, the definition of “minor” is left entirely to the regulator’s own judgment, as I have said. There is no objective test, no threshold and no review. Will the Minister explain why the Government believe it is acceptable for a statutory regulator to decide, on its own authority, when it is allowed to bypass the requirement to consult clubs and stakeholders that will be legislated for by Parliament? In every other walk of regulated life, such exemptions would be expected to come with clear limits or external oversight, yet in this instance we are effectively giving the Government’s regulator the ability to mark its own homework.
Let us not forget that the levy is not an optional contribution but a statutory obligation. Clubs will have no choice but to pay whatever is set, which means that even small changes could have big consequences, particularly for those lower down the pyramid. What may seem minor to the regulator may not seem so minor to a National League club balancing its books.
Does the Minister recognise that cumulative so-called minor changes could, over time, significantly increase the regulatory burden on clubs without ever triggering a formal consultation? That is the risk of leaving this loophole in the Bill. It is not just about what the Government’s regulator might do today; it is also about what a future regulator—possibly a more activist regulator, although I hope not—might decide in years to come. We need to close the door now before that risk becomes reality.
If clubs are to have confidence in the new regulatory regime, they must feel that major financial decisions will not be made without their involvement. Even the perception that the Government’s regulator could tweak the levy regime unilaterally using the exemption for minor changes could erode trust, particularly among the smaller clubs that are already concerned. Consultation must not be seen as optional; it must be the default, not the exception.
That leads me to amendment 103, which aims to improve the clarity of the Government’s regulator’s approach to any levy that it seeks to impose. The specific issue that it seeks to correct is that, under the Bill as drafted, the regulator must publish details of the levy as soon as is reasonably practicable before the start of a chargeable period. My amendment would require the Government’s new regulator to publish the levy rules at least six months before the beginning of the chargeable period to which they apply. It is about financial certainty, about clubs being able to plan and about not changing the rules on the eve of a new season.
We know that many clubs, especially further down the pyramid, operate on tight annual budgets. They finalise player contracts, ticketing strategies and community programmes months in advance. A late change to the levy rate or calculation method could throw all that into confusion. The amendment would help to give English football clubs the clarity that they need to prepare. It would ensure that levy changes are not imposed at short notice and it would enforce a principle that reasonable regulators should provide advance notice of costs.
What safeguards, if any, will the Government establish to ensure that levy changes are communicated to the affected clubs in good time? If the answer is that it will be left to guidance or good practice, that will simply be not good enough. Good intentions are no substitute for legislative certainty. Both amendments are modest, reasonable and—we believe—entirely consistent with the Government’s stated ambition to build a trusted and transparent regulator that works with clubs, not over them. We must get the process right.
Clubs must know when a charge is coming and how much it will cost them and their fans, and they must be given a chance to respond. That is what the amendments would provide—nothing more and nothing less. Removing the minor change loophole would ensure that no future regulator could bypass scrutiny at its own convenience, and the requirement to provide six months’ notice would guarantee that clubs are not left scrambling to deal with cost changes with no time to prepare. This is about good governance, fair process and fiscal discipline.
Clause 54 provides the procedural backbone for how the Government’s regulator will engage with the industry when amending leverage rules.
Lincoln Jopp
Let me provide some context. I will not name the team, but there is a team in the National League whose cash at hand in 2020 was £25,000, and by 2022 that had reduced to £9,802. We are talking about clubs with an incredibly tight financial structure. I completely agree with my hon. Friend the shadow Minister that changes may be minor to the regulator, but they will not be minor to such teams.
Mr French
I thank my hon. Friend for that valuable contribution, which gets to the heart of the amendments and what we are seeking to do. As I have said, they are designed not to undermine the regulator but to give transparency and fairness to clubs, so they can prepare their finances accordingly.
As I was saying, clause 54 leaves too much discretion in the hands of the regulator, particularly through the vague and undefined minor change exemption. We cannot create a system in which financial rules that affect the entire English game can be altered without oversight simply because the Government’s regulator says that the change is small or minor. If we want confidence, we need consistency. If we want accountability, we need clarity. Let us ensure that the Government’s regulator consults not just when it wants to, but when it needs to.
Stephanie Peacock
I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s point, but refer gently to my earlier comments. We are talking about typos and very minor changes. I give that example to show that the regulator is accountable for what it considers minor.
On amendment 103, requiring the regulator to publish the information on costs laid out in clause 54(4) six months before the chargeable period would create an operational challenge and would simply not work in practice. The regulator would have to estimate its costs for a chargeable period, having only half a year’s costs to base it on. That could lead to inaccurate levy charges, which could see the regulator underfunded or clubs needlessly burdened. The current requirement to publicise charges as soon as reasonably practicable strikes the right balance between adequate notice for clubs and operational flexibility for the regulator to ensure an accurate and appropriate levy charge.
For the reasons I have set out, I cannot accept the amendments.
Mr French
I listened carefully to the Minister’s response, which was fairly limited. I do not have enough confidence in her replies to withdraw the amendments. We are concerned about the impact on clubs and about the loophole in the interpretation of minor changes. I am not clear on the regulator’s accountability to stop scope creep. I suggested a number of options that the Government might look to adopt instead and did not hear any response to them. On that basis, and linked to some of the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne, I wish to press the amendments to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Stephanie Peacock
To achieve its objectives, which include a club financial soundness objective, a systemic financial resilience objective and a heritage objective, the regulator will need information from the relevant competition organisers. The clause places a duty on the competition organisers to provide that information, and in the event that they do not, they would be liable to be sanctioned.
A competition organiser must notify the regulator if there is a risk that the regulator may not fulfil its objectives. That is with regard to the club financial soundness objective or the regulator’s systemic resilience objective. In addition, the organiser will need to notify the regulator if it is in breach of a commitment it made as an alternative to a financial discretionary licence condition, or if a club has breached the rules of a specific competition run by the organiser.
The organiser will also have to consult the regulator if it proposes to change its own rules. That is necessary given the interaction between the regulator’s regulation and that of a specified competition organiser. The regulator wants its own regulation to be necessary and proportionate and not to overburden the clubs. It is therefore important to understand any changes in other rules that clubs need to abide by, given that they may increase or decrease the financial risk of clubs.
In all cases, the relevant information will act as an additional source of data to inform the regulator of risks within the industry and whether the regulator needs to impose additional regulation or proceed to enforcement and sanction to ensure the long-term financial sustainability of the industry. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Mr French
The clause sets out a series of duties that require various football stakeholders, including leagues and governing bodies, to notify and consult the Government’s new regulator in certain circumstances. At its core, the clause is intended to improve co-ordination and to prevent regulatory surprises, which in principle is reasonable. We all agree that where the governance of the game affects financial sustainability or club integrity, the Government’s regulator should be aware and engaged.
I will focus on subsection (6), which is a far more consequential provision than it might first appear. I believe it strikes at the very heart of one of the most sensitive and important issues in football governance: the independence of sport from Government control. Subsection (6) imposes a statutory duty on specified competition organisers to consult the regulator when they either add or remove a relevant rule of a specified competition, or vary a relevant rule of a specified competition. I note the comments of the hon. Member for Sheffield South East about when the regulator is involved in a competition and when it is not, with regard to the FA Cup. Some clarity on that would be much appreciated.
In short, the provision means that competitions such as the Premier League, the EFL and the FA Cup would be required—based on the wording of this part of the Bill—to consult the Government’s football regulator every time they change or amend a rule deemed to be relevant by the regulator itself. That might sound innocuous, but let us be clear about what it means in practice: for the first time, a politically appointed regulator, accountable to the Secretary of State, who has received donations from that regulator, would be given a formal, statutory role in the internal rule-making processes of English football competitions.
This is not a light-touch oversight mechanism; we fear it might end up being a direct institutional influence. As we know, it is not compatible with UEFA’s requirements on the non-interference of Government. UEFA statutes are clear that national football associations and their affiliated leagues and competitions must be free from political or Government control. The relevant rule is article 7bis (2) of the UEFA statutes, which states:
“Member Associations shall manage their affairs independently and with no undue influence from third parties.”
Article 9 goes on to state:
“A Member Association may in particular be suspended if state authorities interfere in its affairs in such a significant way that...it may no longer be considered as fully responsible for the organisation of football-related matters in its territory”.
It is pretty clear that the FA will no longer be considered fully responsible for the organisation of football-related matters in its territory should the Bill pass with this provision. Moreover, FIFA echoes that approach in its regulations, particularly in article 14 of the FIFA statutes, which ensures that member associations, such as the FA, remain autonomous and free from governmental or political influence. Article 15 of the FIFA statutes further requires members to be neutral in matters of politics and religion, to be independent, and to avoid any forms of political interference.
Subsection (6) brings us dangerously close to the line, if not across it. Unfortunately for the Minister, the Government seem to be on the wrong side of that line. I will press the Minister on that point, because however carefully the clause may have been worded in terms of consultation, in reality it inserts the Government’s new regulator into the core rule-making processes of the football pyramid. Once that principle is established, the scope can grow.
We know that there are international concerns about scope creep, as I mentioned when speaking to amendment 97.
“UEFA is concerned about the potential for scope creep within the IFR. While the initial intent of the IFR is to oversee the long-term financial sustainability of clubs and heritage assets, there is always a risk that, once established, the IFR may expand its mandate beyond these areas”.
Those are not my words.
Will the Minister confirm whether UEFA has been consulted on the drafting of the clause, and whether the Government have received written assurances that this level of regulatory involvement is compatible with UEFA’s independence rules? If she has, will she place a copy in the Library? If she has received any correspondence to the contrary, will she also place that in the Library so that the Committee has confidence ahead of Third Reading and can scrutinise the provision properly? What safeguards are in place to prevent this from being interpreted—either in Brussels or somewhere else—as a breach of sporting autonomy?
This is not theoretical—it is a real and dangerous risk for English football. Let us remember, in recent years, that other countries have faced disciplinary threats or warnings for perceived interference in football. We have seen federations sanctioned before. National teams and clubs have been threatened with exclusion from competitions. For example, Greece was briefly suspended from international football in 2006 after the Greek Government passed a law that interfered—that was the term used—with the autonomy of the Greek football federation, in violation of UEFA and FIFA regulations. In 1999, Moldova’s clubs and national team faced a ban from UEFA competitions, after it was deemed that there was political interference in the running of its football federation. In 2002, FIFA suspended Zimbabwe and Kenya from international competitions due to perceived Government interference in the football administrations of those countries.
Max Wilkinson
We recognise the numbers—although we Liberal Democrats now outnumber the official Opposition—so we will not press this to a vote. However, it is worth considering that, in future, we might end up in a situation where some of our bigger clubs start to try to negotiate on their own for their broadcast revenue. The Minister did not reassure me that that could not happen. As I understand it, we do not have legislation that would stop that. There is nothing in the game to stop that apart from Arsenal, Manchester United, Chelsea and Manchester City deciding to play together nicely.
Although we are not reassured, there is no point in forcing this to a vote. But we hope that the comments may be taken forward and taken into account by the regulator in future, and perhaps we will have this discussion again as and when those big clubs decide that they are going to kick up a stink and try to ruin the rest of football for everyone else. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Mr French
I beg to move amendment 124, in clause 56, page 46, line 3, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
“(2) In this Part, revenue received by a specified competition organiser is ‘relevant revenue’ if—
(a) it is revenue received as a result of the sale or acquisition of rights to exploit the broadcasting of football matches included in a competition organised by the specified competition organiser, and
(b) it is not revenue that the specified competition organiser distributes to a club by virtue of a team operated by the club being relegated from a competition organised by the specified competition organiser.”
Clause 56 introduces the framework for the resolution process, which is a formal mechanism through which the Government’s new regulator may intervene to help to resolve disputes between football authorities, competitions and clubs in certain prescribed areas. The clause is important because it sets the boundaries of when and how the Government’s new regulator may be invited, or, in some cases, compelled to step into the room on issues that until now have been managed internally within the football pyramid.
We understand the intention behind this process. It reflects years of unresolved tensions in the game between different tiers of the pyramid, between governing bodies, and, most notably, between the Premier League and the EFL. Clause 56 and the following clauses in part 6 provide the bones of a system for dispute resolution, in the hope of reaching consensus where negotiation has failed. In principle, that has merit. However, we believe that the clause as drafted risks crossing a line—not into oversight, but into interventionism. It risks turning the regulator from a referee into a participant, and that risk becomes very real when we consider what types of decisions might fall within that process.
That is why I have tabled amendment 124, which would exclude parachute payments to the regulated clubs from the scope of the resolution process, as was the case in the Bill that the Minister supported during the previous Parliament. Clause 56 is not procedural, but foundational. It defines who can apply to trigger the resolution process, namely certain governing bodies and competition organisers, and what is meant by the term “relevant revenue”. In subsection (2), this is revenue received
“as a result of the sale or acquisition of rights to exploit the broadcasting of football matches included in a competition organised by the specified competition organiser, or…from any other source specified, or of a description specified, in regulations made by the Secretary of State.”
In essence, the provisions allow disputes over financial redistribution to be brought before the Government’s new regulator, which may then facilitate a resolution or, in some cases, take further steps to impose one. The specific issue we have with the clause, which was introduced by the Government, relates to the parachute payments of financial support offered by the Premier League to clubs that are relegated to the EFL to help them adjust to the significant drop in broadcasting and commercial income. This is obviously an important point, given the wage bills and so on when clubs go down, but it is never far from being controversial. Some see the payments as being necessary to ensure financial continuity and competition in the Premier League on the way up, while others argue that they distort competition in the Championship on the way down, solidifying clubs as so-called yo-yo clubs that go up and down regularly.
Bringing parachute payments within the scope of the regulator’s resolution process, as clause 56 does, takes a significant step towards Government involvement in revenue redistribution among private members of the competition. That is not regulation; it is reallocation. In our view, it is an inappropriate function for a state-backed regulator.
The amendment does not oppose the resolution process in principle; it supports it, and in fact returns the Bill to what the Minister previously supported. Can she tell us what has changed, and why she felt the need to make the change when she previously had no issue with this part of the Bill? My amendment seeks to make sure that the Government’s regulator does not intervene in areas that are already managed by mutual agreement between competitions.
Parachute payments are, by their nature, a Premier League solution to what is often a Premier League problem. They are not imposed on the EFL or funded by it, and although their knock-on effects may be debated—I have my own views on that—they should not be subject to arbitration by a third party.
If we allow the Government’s regulator to adjudicate disputes over parachute payments, we risk setting a precedent that any form of commercial agreement, no matter how internal, can be referred for outside resolution. We believe that that would be a mistake, and would likely undermine the willingness of top-flight clubs to continue sharing revenue in any form at all. If the Minister starts this process off on the wrong foot with clubs and this is not done in the right way, we fear that resentment would set in from day one. With the top flight already questioning—
Jon Pearce
Does the shadow Minister agree that parachute payments are a very important financial factor in the EFL? From my experience as a Derby County fan—many things go back to this—I know that we ended up in administration because we chased and tried to compete with clubs that had parachute payments, and ultimately could not stay within the financial fair play regime. How does the shadow Minister see that being tackled? It is a fundamental flaw and it is driving clubs much closer to administration, and to the wall, in many cases.
Mr French
I recognise the hon. Gentleman’s experience with Derby, and I understand his point. That is why I said there are a number of opinions, and this a very controversial subject. I have engaged with EFL clubs as part of this process, and we get a variety of opinions, even before we get to asking the Premier League clubs for their opinion, so I absolutely understand his point. This amendment is about trying to exclude parachute payments from this part of the Bill, rather than trying to take a decision on what parachute payment levels should be in any shape or form. That is the distinction we seek to make with the amendment, and I commend it to the Committee.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank the shadow Minister for the amendment, as it gives me the opportunity to speak to one of the key changes made in the new version of the Bill that this Government introduced. The amendment would take parachute payments out of the scope of the backstop, as they were in the previous Government’s Bill. The regulator needs to be able to consider all relevant revenue sources as part of the backstop process to get an accurate picture of any proposal’s impact on financial sustainability. That is why it was right to amend the definition of “relevant revenue” to ensure parachute payments could be considered as part of the backstop if necessary.
The shadow Minister pointed out that I supported the Bill when in Opposition, but I draw his attention to an amendment I put down then to this effect. We have had a clear and consistent view on this issue throughout the passage of both Bills through Parliament. We believe that allowing the regulator to make more informed decisions, rather than restricting what it can consider, will help to achieve the best possible outcome for the future of the game.
Stephanie Peacock
I begin by acknowledging the comments from my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East. I appreciate him putting that on the record. Of course, we will have a fuller debate on the broader change later, so as I said, I will reserve my wider comments till we get to that point.
The backstop aims to ensure that where the industry cannot resolve the issue, revenue is distributed between the leagues in a sustainable way that furthers the regulator’s objectives. As I will set out in more detail when we debate clauses 57 and 58, it allows the leagues to apply to the regulator to intervene and help them to resolve specific issues that are in dispute between them. The issues that need resolving are referred to in the Bill as the “questions for resolution”. We will further discuss the process for triggering the backstop when we come on to debate clauses 57 to 59.
Put briefly, the triggering process requires a league applying to the regulator, showing that certain conditions listed in clause 57 are met, and putting forward a set of proposed “questions for resolution”. The other relevant league has a chance to respond to that proposal. The regulator will then consider the application and the response, and will decide whether to trigger the process. If it decides to trigger, it also decides exactly which questions must be taken forward and resolved through the backstop process. Therefore, the questions for resolution are set out at the very beginning and carry through, determining the scope of the whole process. They are the questions that the leagues discuss in mediation, as we will see when we debate clause 60, and they limit the scope of any regulator distribution order—something that we will discuss further when we come on to debate Government new clauses 3 and 4—to issues of financial sustainability.
Setting the questions for resolution is therefore a very important step that demands a clear statutory process and a rigorous approach by the regulator. That is even more important in the light of the proposed changes that Government new clauses 3 and 4 will make. Those new clauses propose a new model for the backstop—a staged regulator determination. They move away from the binary, winner-takes-all, final-offer model and increase the regulator’s discretion to devise its own solution for distributions. Because of that increase in discretion for the regulator, it is important that the scope of the distributions process is well defined from the outset, so that all parties are clear about what the regulator will and will not rule on if the leagues ultimately cannot agree to an industry solution themselves.
These amendments therefore strengthen and clarify the process for—[Interruption.]
Stephanie Peacock
I have indeed—clearly.
These amendments therefore strengthen and clarify the process for setting the questions for resolution. They highlight the importance of a league proposing specific questions for resolution when it applies to the regulator. They emphasise that if the regulator agrees to trigger the backstop, it will not take a sweeping approach and try to rule on every possible aspect of distributions. It must set out specific questions that it will resolve, and its powers are then restricted to resolving those questions.
These amendments make it clear that questions must meet certain tests in order to be resolved through the backstop. Those tests are twofold. First, the regulator must consider that leaving the questions unresolved presents an apparent threat to the regulator’s objectives. Then they must consider that the questions could not be resolved within a reasonable time by the regulator exercising any of its other functions.
The amendments clarify that the regulator need not take forward all the questions proposed and that the regulator can modify the proposed questions. They will also require the regulator to take into account representations from the other league that accompany the application. That will give the regulator the flexibility to pick out which questions it is appropriate and within its remit to address, without forcing it to either accept every element of an application or reject the whole application outright.
The amendments also set out procedural requirements. They require the regulator to consult the FA before setting the questions for resolution, ensuring that the national governing body has a chance to raise any views about the scope of the backstop process. They will also ensure that the regulator transparently sets out what questions it has chosen and how it made that decision. The questions for resolution will then be taken forward into the mediation phase. That will ensure that all parties understand the specific aims of the mediation stage.
Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Seventh sitting)
Louie French ExcerptsThursday 12th June 2025
(2 weeks, 4 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Football Governance Bill [HL] 2024-26 View all Football Governance Bill [HL] 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 12 June 2025 - (12 Jun 2025)
The Chair
Before we begin, I remind Members to switch all electronic devices to silent. We will now continue our line-by-line consideration of the Bill.
Clause 37
Matters relevant to determinations
Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 110, in clause 37, page 28, line 28, at end insert—
“(fa) whether the individual is a member of a proscribed organisation as per section (3) and schedule (2) of the Terrorism Act 2000.”
This amendment requires that IFR, in determining whether an owner or officer has the requisite honesty or integrity, to consider whether the person is a member of an organisation proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship again, Ms Butler. I welcome all Committee members back for day four. Amendment 110, tabled in my name, requires this Government’s regulator, in determining whether an owner or officer has the requisite honesty or integrity, to consider whether the person is a member of an organisation proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000.
Clause 37 sets out the framework under which the Government’s football regulator must assess whether an owner or officer of a football club meets the required standards of honesty, integrity and competence. This is an important part of the Bill. Football clubs are not like ordinary businesses, as we have discussed; they are institutions rooted in community, tradition and even national identity. Those who control them must be held to the highest standards and supporters quite rightly expect that clubs should be fit to uphold those responsibilities.
The Government’s regulator’s task in clause 37 is to ensure that persons in positions of influence over our national game are financially sound and professionally competent. However, the clause as currently drafted leaves the test for honesty and integrity open to interpretation—arguably too open. That is why we have tabled amendment 110, which provides a clear and unambiguous requirement that, in determining whether a person has the requisite honesty or integrity, the regulator must take into account whether that person is or has been a member of an organisation proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000.
Let me be clear: this is not about political views, past associations or guilt by implication, but about having a national minimum standard of moral fitness. It should be inconceivable that a person with demonstrable ties to a terrorist organisation could pass the fit and proper person test to own or operate a football club in this country. Football clubs are part of the fabric of British civil society. They are symbols of local pride and national values, and they have international reputations. To allow a person associated with a proscribed group, many of which pose active threats to our national security, public order and democratic way of life, to take a controlling interest in such an institution would be not only morally indefensible, but deeply dangerous.
This is not a hypothetical concern. We live in an increasingly globalised football economy and genuine questions have been raised in recent years about the sources of funding, ownership and political influence across the game. My amendment does not attempt to legislate morality in broad terms; it simply anchors the Government’s regulator’s assessment in existing law, specifically the Terrorism Act 2000, which provides a clear, publicly available list of proscribed organisations that Parliament has already determined pose an unacceptable risk to our way of life.
By incorporating that into clause 37, we do two things. First, we clarify the threshold for what constitutes a failure of the honesty and integrity test, giving both clubs and the regulator a clear reference point. Secondly, we send a signal to not just fans and communities here at home, but investors and foreign Governments abroad, that English football will not be compromised by individuals whose allegiances lie with organisations committed to violence, extremism or the subversion of our national interest.
Football is a global sport, but it must still reflect and uphold our national values. It is not alarmist or over-zealous to say that those who control our clubs must have a character as close to unimpeachable as possible. We are asking them not to be saints—unless, perhaps, they own Southampton FC—but to be the pillars of the community that we already expect them to be.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)
That was so bad.
Mr French
I have woken everyone up there.
Clause 37 is an important safeguard, but without amendment 110, it lacks a clear and necessary line in the sand. Parliament has already determined that proscribed organisations represent a threat to public safety and national order. That same logic must apply here. I urge the Government to accept this modest but essential amendment and, in doing so, to help to ensure that our clubs are not just well run and financially sustainable, but led by people whose values are consistent with the country, communities and traditions that they are entrusted to serve.
Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Butler. I rise to support amendment 110. I suspect the Minister might say that we do not need to cover everything and that there is a general catch-all measure in the clause, so we do not need to make this amendment.
I will draw the Committee’s attention to a similar case in my own constituency, however, where a member of the public wrote to ask if I could please hurry up his EU settlement scheme application. When we checked with the visas and immigration service, it turned out that he had been subject to a deportation order in 2017, and had indeed been deported in 2017. He had somehow managed to get back into this country illegally and make an EUSS application. He is still subject to that deportation order, yet for some crazy reason, the Home Office still have to go through his application. That is the sort of thing that we should not have to legislate for and that we should not have to state, but sadly we do.
Stephanie Peacock
It is a pleasure to serve once again under your chairship, Ms Butler. I echo the welcome back from the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup, to Committee members.
I will respond to amendment 110. I reassure the shadow Minister that the intent of his amendment is already achieved within the current drafting of clause 37, which lists the matters that the regulator must take into account when it conducts its owners and directors test. We will discuss that in more detail when we consider the next group of amendments, but I will summarise briefly now.
When assessing an owner or officer’s fitness, the regulator must have regard to any criminal convictions and proceedings, in particular those included in schedule 1 to the Serious Crime Act 2007. Membership of a proscribed organisation is an offence under the Terrorism Act 2000, and that offence is included in paragraph 2A of schedule 1 to the Serious Crime Act 2007.
The regulator will seek information and expertise from relevant organisations to help it to stay alive to both national and international concerns. The shadow regulator is already building a strong relationship with the National Crime Agency and law enforcement in general to ensure that the regulator is in a strong position to gather the information it needs.
I also reassure Members that the regulator and its staff will have the requisite measures and security clearance to be able to receive information relevant to their functions. Consequently, the current provisions in the Bill deliver the intent of the amendment. On that basis, I would be grateful if the shadow Minister would withdraw it.
Mr French
I appreciate the Minister’s comments with regard to amendment 110, which I tabled. I have listened carefully to her arguments, but it is still unclear to those of us on this side of the Committee why consideration of the Terrorism Act 2000 was not included in the list of factors set out in clause 37. We believe that is an oversight and, consequently, that the clause lacks the clarity that the amendment seeks to deliver in the Bill and that those who refer to it will seek going forward—in other words, the regulator. We will therefore press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Mr French
Clause 38 is one of the most consequential provisions in the entire Bill. It gives the Government’s football regulator the power to disqualify an individual not only from being an owner or an officer of a specific club, but from holding such a position in any regulated club going forward. That is an extraordinarily wide-ranging power, which amounts to a professional ban from participation in the administration or ownership of an English football club. That power must be exercised with the utmost care on the basis of clear evidence, robust procedural safeguards and fair opportunities for representation.
Under subsection (1), the regulator may issue a disqualification order if it is determined that a person is not suitable to be an owner of a particular regulated club. Subsection (2) extends that same power to issue a disqualification order against officers. The clause in effect makes the Government’s regulator the gatekeeper of who may or may not participate in the leadership of English football. While the Opposition accept the rationale, particularly in the light of past controversies and failures of governance, we must be careful about vesting that level of authority in a politically appointed body.
Three concerns arise. First, there is the question of proportionality. Not every failure of suitability in one club ought to trigger an automatic blanket ban from the entire football pyramid. A disqualification order is not a light matter in itself; it carries reputational consequences that may extend far beyond football. Will the Minister confirm what thresholds of seriousness must be met before a disqualification order is considered appropriate? How will the regulator ensure that such orders are not used disproportionately, particularly in cases where suitability determinations may be contested or borderline?
Secondly, there is the question of due process. The clause appears to allow the regulator to act not only in determinations it makes directly, but on decisions it is deemed to have made by operation of law. That introduces a grey area where someone might find themselves disqualified without ever having had a clear and fair hearing. There must be a full right to representation, explanation and appeal before such a decision takes effect. Will there be an express duty on the regulator to provide reasons in writing to allow for full and fair challenge after a decision has been made? Will the affected individual have the right to appeal to a genuinely independent body—one that is outside the Government’s regulator’s own structure?
Thirdly, there is a concern about consistency and transparency. The risk is of regulatory opacity. If a disqualification order is issued without published reasoning, or if standards vary from case to case, we will quickly see a collapse of confidence in the regulator’s impartiality. Will the Minister consider introducing a requirement for an annual report to Parliament listing the disqualification orders that have been issued in the preceding year, and for a publicly accessible register of disqualified individuals, with anonymised or redacted reasoning where appropriate, for transparency? Crucially, will the Minister confirm that this power cannot be used retroactively—that is, to punish individuals for matters known and previously tolerated under prior regimes, should there be a change of chairman, deputy chairman, chief executive or board members?
English football needs good owners—as a Charlton fan, I can say that with a great deal of confidence and with sympathy for other clubs that have been in similar situations. It needs competent, honest and engaged officers, and there must be consequences when individuals fall short of the standards we all expect, but clause 38 must not become a tool of regulatory vengeance, nor of political interference. The power must be used sparingly, lawfully and accountably.
Jon Pearce (High Peak) (Lab)
I declare that I am a member, and former chair, of the RamsTrust. Does the shadow Minister agree, on his point about Charlton, that we would want the use of this clause to err on the side of caution? As Rams fans, we went through a situation where an American businessman was passed by the EFL on the fit and proper person test, and the only reason he did not buy the club was because the money never turned up. This was after he had been approved as a fit and proper person. It turned out that he was a fraudster, and he is now serving 20 years in prison in the US, having passed the fit and proper person test. Contrary to the shadow Minister’s argument, it would be better if the provision was used quite strictly, because we only want the best people to be running our football clubs, which are so precious to communities across the country.
Mr French
I thank the hon. Member for that valuable contribution and for telling us his experiences as a Derby fan. There are many examples that have been drawn on in various aspects of the Committee’s debates, and I suspect that there will be more going forward. Just to be clear, we are not seeking to press the provision to a Division. The point we are making is that we want the strongest owners and fittest people to run clubs, but we also want to ensure that the regulator is seen to be acting lawfully and in a balanced way at all times, to avoid any issues of impartiality. I understand the point the hon. Member makes, which is why I have always supported strengthening ownership tests, even in the previous Parliament.
We do not believe that exclusion based on reputational judgment or politics should come into these kinds of judgment. The Government must not forget that they are regulating not just football clubs, but people’s lives, reputations and livelihoods. That demands humility, caution and a presumption in favour of freedom and innocence, unless the case for restriction is absolutely clear and overwhelming. Where there is doubt, the Government’s regulator must not fill in the blanks with its own qualifications or prejudices.
The Opposition support the need for disqualification in serious cases, but we continue to press the Government to ensure that the clause is not open to abuse, and that football remains a competitive, plural and fair environment, rather than one policed by the regulator, acting as judge, jury and executioner in uncertain circumstances.
Clause 39 empowers the regulator to give a removal direction in requiring an unsuitable owner to take all reasonable steps to cease being an owner by the end of a specified period. The exception to this requirement is when an owner did not have prior regulatory approval, and the regulator can exercise its power to make an ownership removal order within three months, starting from the determination day. The clause requires the football regulator to inform the owner of the club and relevant competition organiser before giving a removal direction. It also requires the football regulator to notify the owner and the club of the possible enforcement action for not complying with the direction.
It is because of powers such as these that the regulator must be seen as independent. If a Government regulator is to order the removal of incumbent owners, this could be seen by competition organisations as clear interference, which as we have discussed at length, and could cause many issues for English clubs, especially when competing in UEFA and FIFA competitions. I would be interested to hear some assurances from the Minister about how that might work in practice. If the Government’s regulator is to tell clubs that they must change ownership, how confident is the Minister that that will not breach the rules that we have discussed?
This goes back to a point I made in a previous sitting about something that is a theme of the clauses in this group. Giving the owner or officer of a club notice of a regulatory action that is coming will hopefully allow them the rights of representation and challenge, if they feel that they have been handled wrongfully, but it also opens up issues around insider information, particularly with regard to a club’s valuation. I suspect that all hon. Members appreciate that such a change, particularly at the top levels of ownership, will have a dramatic impact on the valuation of a club. We want to understand how the regulator will deal with that issue to ensure that insider dealing, in particular, does not become a widespread issue where the regulator is trying to enforce its actions, as provided for by these clauses. We want to understand how that will work in practice, to ensure that these clauses do not have unintended consequences.
Clause 40 empowers the regulator either to issue a removal direction to an unsuitable officer, requiring them to take all reasonable steps to cease being an officer by the end of a specified period, or to give such a direction to the relevant club, or both. It requires the independent football regulator to inform the owner, club, and relevant competition organiser before giving a removal direction. It also requires the IFR to notify the owner and the club of the possible enforcement action for not complying with the direction. I have the same question about this clause as for the previous one: how will the risk of inside information be managed?
Clause 41 empowers the regulator to prohibit an unsuitable owner or officer from carrying out specified activities or exercising specific rights and/or to issue a direction to the club requiring it to ensure that the unsuitable owner or officer does not exercise specified activities or rights. The clause provides a non-exhaustive list of such activities and rights, including any right
“to vote on any matter relating to the…club’s activities”;
appointing, terminating or changing the terms of appointment or responsibilities of any officer or employee; changing the corporate structure; and undertaking any specified actions without obtaining prior approval from the independent regulator.
Clause 41 also requires the IFR to notify the owner and the club of the possible enforcement action for not complying with the direction. Such action could seriously impair the ability of a club to function while it seeks a new owner or officers, as ordered by the regulator. As we all know, it takes a significant amount of time to find a new owner, and many may be deterred by perceived interference in English football, compared with other nations without a state regulator. Clause 41 may cause more damage to a football club than the owner, who the regulator cannot dismiss. How will the Minister ensure that the regulator uses these powers only if and when deemed strictly necessary?
Clause 42 relates to situations where directions under clause 41 would impede a club’s ability to operate effectively or comply with regulatory requirements. It empowers the IFR to temporarily appoint an officer to carry out a specified function, or redistribute functions among existing officers. It stipulates that those functions must be specified, must be for a specified amount of time, and can be revoked or varied by another order. It specifies that an interim officer is not subject to the duties and requirements placed on officers by the Bill. It also requires the IFR to notify the owner and club of the possible enforcement action for not complying with the direction.
Clause 42 adds to the fear that the regulator could erode the independence of English clubs and how they operate. It empowers the regulator to effectively govern a club while seeking to remove unsuitable officers or owners. Given the time that it takes to find new ownership, that situation could last for a considerable period and cause massive issues on the pitch with regards to investment and transfers—as we discussed in a previous sitting—and how the club functions. It would also leave the regulator wide open to criticism if its actions lead to relegation, for example, for a particular club. Does the Minister think that there is a risk that such a club could be barred from international competitions—as I suggested earlier—or that the Government’s regulator could be left wide open to legal challenge if it directly impacts a club’s performance on the pitch, or its financial performance off the pitch while such considerations, or changes of ownership, take place?
Stephanie Peacock
I thank the shadow Minister for his points, to which I will respond briefly. There are no changes in the bit of the Bill that we are talking about compared with the previous Bill, other than—as I referenced in my previous contribution—the removal of the requirement for the regulator to
“have regard to the foreign and trade policy”
of the Government. We think that removal strengthens the independence of the regulator, and I reiterate that we do not have any concerns in relation to UEFA.
The shadow Minister asked some specific questions. There are no thresholds in the Bill, but the regulator will need to act fairly and proportionately. There are robust appeals processes through the Competition Appeal Tribunal. The shadow Minister made points about the publication of information. In order to ensure that sufficient protections are in place, relevant parties will be able to express their views before the regulator makes a decision. Once the decision is made, it will take these views into account, and the regulator must publish a notice of that decision, including the rationale behind it.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 38 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 39 to 42 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 43
Ownership removal orders
Stephanie Peacock
As set out previously in the debate on clauses 38 to 42, the regulator will be able to direct an unsuitable owner to leave the club in a specified timeframe and to prohibit them from undertaking certain activities at the club in the interim. However, there is a risk that an unsuitable owner does not comply with these directions. For instance, they may refuse to leave the club or continue to use their position as an owner to damage the club. In these situations, the regulator will need sufficient powers to directly remove the unsuitable owner from the club. That is why clause 43 gives the regulator broad discretion in such cases.
The regulator can make an order containing such provision as the regulator considers appropriate to secure the unsuitable owner’s removal. For example, that could include appointing trustees, empowering the trustees to sell the club and requiring the unsuitable owner, or any other person, to comply with the trustees’ directions. However, the regulator can use this power only against unsuitable owners who have demonstrated that they are willing to flout regulatory requirements, or if they fail to comply with the directions that the regulator has made to protect the club from harm. As set out previously, in certain situations the regulator will have the power to make an ownership removal order containing whatever provision is appropriate to ensure that an unsuitable owner leaves a club.
To ensure that there are sufficient safeguards in place, clause 44 sets out the process that needs to be followed by the regulator. In particular, before issuing an ownership removal order, the regulator must publish a notice that it intends to issue the order and allow a period for interested parties to express their views. After this, the regulator must decide whether to make the order, and must publish a notice of its decision including its rationale. This helps to ensure that the views of those affected are taken into account in the decision-making process. Separately, the regulator may make rules requiring unsuitable owners to pay costs associated with an ownership removal order, such as costs incurred by a trustee appointed by an order. This power helps to ensure that the costs are borne by the unsuitable owner.
Mr French
Clauses 43 and 44 set out how ownership removal orders are to be made, and the legal consequences of non-compliance. Clause 43 matters hugely because it allows the regulator to force an individual to sell their ownership stake in a club. That is a serious and intrusive power, so we must ensure that it is used sparingly, lawfully and with robust safeguards. On process and fairness, we welcome the requirement in clause 44 to notify the person and allow representations to be made before an order is issued. However, is that enough? Will representations be meaningful, or will this just be a procedural tick-box exercise?
I have some questions for the Minister. Will the regulator be required to give full written reasons for the proposed removal? Will the owner have access to the evidence relied upon? Is there a statutory right of appeal or review, and if not, why? Secondly, on liability and legal exposure, clause 44(6) imposes the liability for costs incurred by non-compliance with an order on to an owner. What types of loss are envisaged for owners? Are they just financial, or reputational and contractual? Who decides whether a loss is caused by the non-compliance, and is causation clearly defined? Could this lead to vexatious or opportunistic claims in the future? How will this work with ownership groups, when there are multiple owners of a club?
On commercial realities, forcing the sale of a football club is not simple; in most cases, these are not liquid assets. The value depends on market conditions, the timing of the economy and sale, and obviously buyer availability and demand to purchase a football club. I therefore ask the Minister: will the regulator have a duty to ensure fair market value is preserved during a forced sale? What happens if the regulator’s actions or any delays cause the value of a club to fall? Could we see a situation where the regulator is frequently appearing in court on such claims? Fourthly, on the broader principle, the clause is in effect a power to force the sale of a privately-owned business. That is a major constitutional step. Property rights in this country matter, due process matters, and so does the rule of law. We need real safeguards, not just procedural gestures.
We want to keep football in safe hands, but the clause needs to be clearer, fairer and more restrained in its use. It must not give the regulator quasi-judicial power without necessary oversight of Parliament. That is not regulation; we believe it would be overreach. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s comments on my questions.
Stephanie Peacock
I echo the shadow Minister’s comments about the power being used clearly, robustly and fairly. I think all of us on the Committee can agree that that is absolutely right. On his question about whether the reasons would have to be written, the regulator will have to give the owner enough reasons for its decision to enable them to understand why it has been taken. That has one of the strongest appeal routes in the Bill; it can go directly to the Competition Appeals Tribunal and be heard on its merits. We think there are robust protections in place here already.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 43 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 45
Duty not to operate a team in relation to a prohibited competition
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr Betts
I want to raise one small point with the Minister. Some time ago, when we debated clause 6, I raised the ability of the regulator to take a view about the impact of new competitions, particularly the world club championship, on the legacy of important domestic competitions like the FA cup. Those competitions will now be constrained for time, with replays being abolished, because a few clubs had to go and do more things in Europe, depriving the majority of clubs of their traditional way of playing in competitions. The Minister’s answer at the time was that a regulator cannot deal with competition matters.
The headings for part 5 and clause 45 include the word “competition”. Indeed, the fan-led review came about because of the European super league, and the then Prime Minister deciding it was so awful that we needed to do something about it. Given that competition can be looked at by the regulator, does the Minister want to have another think, perhaps before Report, about whether, without putting this in the Bill, the regulator should be able to consider such matters, when clubs’ finances and their fanbases’ enjoyment are particularly affected by a competition for a few that prevents more competition for the many?
Mr French
The hon. Member for Sheffield South East has stolen some of my lines. As always, he picked up the ball and put it in the net, as would be expected of the chair of the football all-party parliamentary group. There are inconsistencies in what is being discussed, and he was right to highlight them.
Clause 45 introduces a legal duty on clubs not to enter or operate a team in a competition deemed to be prohibited by the regulator. As has been discussed, the clause is clearly a response to the threat posed by breakaway leagues such as the attempted European super league a few seasons ago. While the intention behind the duty is understandable—to protect the structure and integrity of English football—the mechanism raises serious questions about competition and proportionality, as the hon. Gentleman just touched on.
First, on the principle, we agree that the pyramid structure of English football must be preserved wherever possible. Promotion and relegation are sacred principles of our game, and competition on and off the pitch must be upheld. The competitive nature of English football is what makes it so great. This season, certainly in the Premier League, has probably been slightly dimmer because it has been perceived to have not such great competition for the Championship and in relegation, as things were determined quite early in the season.
The Opposition have some sympathy with, in particular, the National League’s 3UP campaign, which has sought to close the gap between the National League and League Two. If we are looking at how to close the gap between the Premier League and the Championship, which has been the main argument from proponents of the Bill, we must also look at the bottom half of the pyramid to see how that competition can also be improved. That is a principle of fairness and competition for which I have a lot of sympathy.
Lincoln Jopp
Does my hon. Friend agree with the analogy that, although we are all very proud of having the Special Air Service as our elite forces, the SAS cannot be created without a very large Army underneath? While the Premier League is the jewel in the crown, it simply cannot exist on its own; it absolutely needs the game beneath it.
Mr French
I will not question the experience of my hon. Friend, whose military background is far greater than one I could even dream of on a PlayStation, let alone in practice. He makes a valid point that English football is much more than just the Premier League. We take enormous pride in all the leagues in our country, as we do for British football more broadly. They are some of the most watched leagues in the world, with amazing clubs and competition. Competition across the pyramid is what we seek to promote and preserve going forward.
The proposed European super league rightly provoked outrage from fans, clubs and Parliament itself, and rightly collapsed after pressure from all those groups, but we must be cautious about giving a regulator the power to prohibit competitions on open-ended grounds. As the Minister has said, the Premier League probably would not exist in its current form if we had sought to prohibit it around 30 years ago.
James Naish (Rushcliffe) (Lab)
Does the hon. Gentleman recognise that, as there is not a level of regulation, there is increasingly a welfare issue around the amount by which players are required to shrink their off-season to continue to play football? The commercial imperatives of clubs will potentially have a detrimental impact on the quality of the game.
Mr French
I completely agree with the hon. Member’s sentiment. We will seek to debate that when we come to our player welfare amendment, because we are concerned about increasing the length of the season to generate further revenues. The tournament in America and the Asia tour that has just taken place at Man United are probably the prime examples of the impact that can have on players. The English team, in their performance the other night, sadly looked quite tired. There is an issue around player welfare that we must all acknowledge, particularly given the demands to generate more revenues for the financial fair play rules. I thank the hon. Member for making that point; I am sure we will come back to it when we reach the player welfare amendment.
On definitions and discretions in the clause, the Bill defines a prohibited competition in quite vague terms, and it is ultimately left to the discretion of the regulator. The explanatory notes state that subsection (5) sets out some factors that the IFR must consider when deciding whether to specify a competition as prohibited. What are the criteria for a competition to be deemed prohibited? Will they be set in primary legislation, by guidance from the Secretary of State or by the regulator? Is there a right of appeal if a competition is believed to have been unfairly designated as prohibited?
On international alignment, there is another issue that we must highlight. We must accept that football operates in a global ecosystem, as we have discussed. English clubs routinely participate in international and cross-border competitions, whether that be the Champions League, the Europa League or the Club World Cup, as does the national team. How does the clause interact with UEFA and FIFA competition rules? What happens if, for example, a competition is sanctioned by UEFA but deemed prohibited by the football regulator, or vice versa? This is a real issue for the regulation. We would like some clarity from the Minister on how such a conflict would be resolved, because it would put clubs in a very confusing situation.
On enforcement and penalties, clause 45 creates a legal duty not to participate, but what are the sanctions if a club does so? One assumes that it would lead to licence revocation, but what else? Would there be fines or points deductions? What penalties will the regulator look to enforce? Will they be proportionate? Will clubs be given prior notice and the chance to make representations?
On unintended consequences, we must avoid stifling innovation and competitive evolution in the sport. Not every new competition is a threat; some may bring financial or structural benefits, or benefits for fans. As I and the Minister have highlighted, we must remember that the Premier League was technically a breakaway league from the old First Division. If that happened today, we believe that the Bill and the regulator would be responsible for preventing that league, and all the attributes and characteristics that we celebrate in this country, from existing. We have to look at innovation carefully, and the answer must not always be no if there are clear benefits to the country and to the game of football itself.
We support the aim of preserving the integrity of English football, but the clause must be clearly defined, tightly drawn and fairly enforced. A law designed to stop the next European super league must not become a tool for bureaucratic overreach or political intervention by the regulator. The game belongs to its fans and its communities, not to the regulator or the governing body. I am interested to hear the Minister’s comments on my questions, particularly those about how the international system would interact with a prohibited competition.
Lincoln Jopp
I wish to build on my hon. Friend’s themes. Football has the unfortunate concept of the friendly; frequently, they are not very friendly at all. When I read the Bill, it was clear to me that the drafters had in mind the prevention of another flyaway European super league, which we have debated.
I would like the Minister to look at look at the example of a one-off friendly match. Many of our teams tour in the far east and in America, in their off-season, to generate additional revenues and expand their fan base and brand. Let us envisage a set of circumstances in which a North Korean has somehow managed to purchase an English football team, and they have the bright idea that they would like to play a “friendly” match in North Korea. It is a one-off match, but the Government in North Korea decide that they want to make a big deal of it, so it becomes the Pyongyang cup—a one-off match between the English team and the North Korean team. In the Minister’s view, would the regulator be justified in considering whether such a one-off match was a competition and therefore within the purview of the regulator?
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to Members for their contributions and will take their points in turn.
The clause applies both to existing and to new competitions. If any competition breaches the criteria, it can be prohibited, but matters such as scheduling are for competition organisers.
On shadow Minister’s points, we will come on to player welfare, to which we are all very sympathetic, just as we are sympathetic to the 3UP campaign, but it is outside the Bill’s scope and is for organisers. He asked some specific questions on the criteria; that will be for the regulator to determine. It is expected to do so based on a predetermined, proportionate, objective and transparent framework based on factors listed in the clause. For example, if a competition is not merit-based, jeopardises the sustainability of existing domestic competitions, and is not supported by the fans, we would expect it to be prohibited.
Mr French
My hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne and the hon. Member for Newbury highlighted the issue of friendlies. The Minister has indicated that she will come to that, but I do think we need some clarity as to what that might look like in practice. The end-of-season competitions are normally internationally designed, and although they may be endorsed by UEFA or FIFA, they would breach some of the conditions under the definition the Minister just gave. We need clarity about how this will work, because we do not want to put English football on a collision course with international football.
Stephanie Peacock
No, of course we do not. I totally agree. I was coming to that point. As I understand it, friendlies would be out of scope, but I am happy to write to Committee members if they would like greater clarity.
We have discussed the appeals and representations several times. The relevant competition organiser will be given a period in which they can make representations. If the organiser has concerns about the regulator’s decision to prohibit the competition, it will be able to appeal the decision. As has been discussed, the organiser can also appeal to the competition appeal tribunal.
Mr French
I thank the Minister for those remarks. I suspect that a letter of clarity would be helpful for all Members. There is a risk that FIFA, or UEFA, as we have seen with the Nations League in recent years, looks to introduce a new competition, whether at club or international level, that would contradict the regulator. As we have spoken about at length, and as the hon. Member for Sheffield South East has described, the different governing bodies of UEFA and FIFA are often in competition with our national competitions. We have to ensure that clubs are not forced to choose between a licence in the English game and partaking in international competitions. We fear that could drive acceleration toward a breakaway league, rather than prevent one.
Stephanie Peacock
I completely appreciate the shadow Minister’s comments. As I said in my opening remarks, we do not ban all international competitions automatically. We are mindful of enabling innovation in the market. I am happy to supplement my comments with a letter to Committee members.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 45 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Mr French
I am intrigued by the hon. Gentleman’s amendments. Similar sympathies apply to the situation at Reading, which is also still the case at Charlton’s Sparrows Lane training ground, which is owned not by the current owners but by two owners ago, as is the stadium. How would the hon. Gentleman’s amendments work with regards to the Everton example, where Goodison is now to be used for the women’s game? How would his amendments cover those kinds of properties? An owner might want to sell the women’s ground, even though the women’s game is technically outside the scope of the regulator.
Mr Betts
At this stage, my amendments cover the facilities that are within the scope of the regulator, so I do not think they apply to any properties that are outside the scope of the regulator. Obviously, the regulator cannot deal with things outside its scope.
I hope the Minister might give some consideration, even if the wording of my amendments are not absolutely right, to how the Bill can be better drafted to cover the point. Straying slightly on to amendment 83, there is a similar point about trying to ensure that, where there is a sale of certain assets, before they are sold, suitable alternatives are in place so that the club does not potentially lose its licence, as it has nowhere to play and train. I appreciate that I have strayed there; you have been very considerate, Ms Butler, in helping me to do that. I just thought it would help move proceedings along.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East for tabling his amendments. Prior to speaking to them, I would like to let him know that I have raised his points on a similar issue—on assets of community value—with the Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North and Kimberley (Alex Norris). I spoke to him following our Committee session on Tuesday, and he has committed to write to my hon. Friend as swiftly as possible, so I will follow up with him in a timely fashion.
Turning to my hon. Friend’s amendments, I hope I will be able to reassure him on the development of the reform. I understand the intention of his amendments, but I will explain why we intend to resist the changes to include specified properties. On extending the scope of clause 46 to include training grounds, among other properties, the legislation has carved out specific protections to safeguard home grounds against risky financial decisions or sales of the grounds. I will speak specifically to the mechanism of clause 46 and the approval process later, but the focus on the home ground is to reflect that it is often the most financially significant asset at the club. That does not mean that other assets such as training grounds or office space are not also important to the club, but that there is a specific consideration necessary for the home ground.
I understand that my hon. Friend’s amendments are likely in response to instances where owners have intended to asset strip or make reckless decisions. Members on the Committee have shared some examples, and we are all familiar with recent ones. I wish to reassure all that there are protections elsewhere in the Bill to safeguard against this. That includes an enhanced owners and directors test that will ensure that owners are prepared to be appropriate custodians of their club and its assets, as we discussed on part 4 of the Bill. If it were to become evident that an owner’s actions were likely to worsen the financial position of the club, the licensing regime gives the regulator power to place licensing conditions on the club. The regulator can also take enforcement action where such a condition has been breached or the financial plan has not been followed. Additionally, the regulator will have oversight of the financial plans and balance sheets of the regulated clubs, ensuring that the club is not putting itself in a risky position unnecessarily.
Mr French
On the point about risky situations and the risk-averse nature the Minister is describing, the Bill is clearer on disposable home grounds. I am intrigued to see how the regulator would deem a club either selling its freehold and then having a leaseback option, which we have heard has happened, or looking to move to a ground or stadium that it did not own and pay rent going forward. Would that be seen as a bad financial move or a good one by the regulator? It is not quite clear how it would work for non-disposable treatment of assets.
Stephanie Peacock
I do not want to get drawn into hypotheticals. As we previously discussed, there might be a perfectly legitimate reason for a club to move—or to move temporarily, such as for flooding. It is not an absolute power. We want to give the regulator discretion when clubs may need that for legitimate reasons. The amendment speaks to where we think clubs are asset stripping or acting in bad faith.
We would expect the power to include assets remaining in the club’s ownership and any plans to change its financial arrangements. It would be at odds with the sustainability of a football club for there to be no home ground or location to train. It is therefore implicit that the regulator would address that.
Mr French
I will not dwell on this point too much, but the implications of this amendment and the ones that we were just discussing are not hypothetical; we have seen real-life examples of where this issue has become a real one for football clubs. So, we seek some clarity from the Minister about how the regulator would act in such scenarios in the future.
As I said in my previous comments, I think the disposal of a ground is probably slightly clearer than the relocation of a ground. However, I will use the example of Coventry City football club. When they moved to the Ricoh Arena, I believe that the stadium was jointly owned by the local council and another group. I assumed that the club moved to a new stadium with the best interests of the club at heart. I had the pleasure of going to Coventry’s old stadium when Charlton played Coventry in the FA Cup, but that is a bit by the by. It was in need of improvements; most people would have thought that.
How would this measure work? We know that Coventry ran into a number of issues with the Ricoh Arena, which I believe is now owned by the Frasers Group. At that point in time, when the club moved, would that move have been deemed to be in the regulator’s purview of an inappropriate action by the previous owners? I ask that question because this is a real-life example of where it is not clear how this legislation would apply. As Parliament, we have to be clear how we intend the regulator to behave in such situations, because, as I say, that was a real-life example of how football clubs might seek to improve their stadia when they do not have the assets to do so themselves.
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his comments. I draw his attention to the discretionary licensing addition that I have referred to: the regulator can react to different situations. I do not want to be drawn on individual cases, nor do I want to pre-empt the actions of the regulator.
Stephanie Peacock
I appreciate that point, but the sale of home grounds is a primarily financial decision, separate from the decision about where the club actually plays its games. That is why there is currently no requirement to consult or obtain approval. If the club has not actually relocated, it would be caught in clause 48 and would be required to consult fans. We will come on to discuss that later.
Mr French
I must admit that—like other members of the Committee, to judge from their facial expressions—I am slightly confused by the reasoning the Minister has given in response to the hon. Member for Sheffield South East on this clause, and where the distinction lies between the ultimate decision to relocate the ground and the sale of the ground. The decisions are clearly interlinked, and I would argue that fans would have strong concerns if a club owner was seeking to sell the ground, which would in a number of instances lead to either a relocation or an impact on the club’s heritage. The sale, for example, could lead to the renaming of a stadium, and the fans would clearly have a view on how that would impact their support for the club.
I ask the Minister to reflect on the hon. Gentleman’s points, because the clause seems to lack clarity on how that distinction is being made. I understand the point she is making about the financial considerations of owners, but the Government should reflect carefully on the argument against this clause, because it is not very clear to members of the Committee.
Stephanie Peacock
I appreciate the comments that have been made, and I will take them away and reflect on them, but I ask my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East at this point to withdraw his amendment.
Stephanie Peacock
This clause sets out the duty on regulated and formally regulated clubs not to appoint an administrator without approval from the regulator. This is to ensure that administration is transparent, acts in the best interests of the club and its creditors and avoids any perceived or actual conflicts of interest. This will give all stakeholders, especially fans, confidence in the administration process.
As with clause 46, this applies to regulated and formally regulated clubs to avoid any risk of circumvention of the rules. The regulatory framework is not a zero-failure regime, so it is possible that football clubs may enter administration despite the best efforts of the regulator. There is already a legal framework for companies, including football clubs, to enter into administration, which is detailed in the Insolvency Act 1986. In many cases, the existing framework has enabled clubs to go into administration and re-emerge as solvent.
However, there are occasions where the administration of a club is not initiated by the creditors but the club itself, so it does not require a court to sanction the appointment in advance. In these circumstances, there have been occasions when some have had cause to question a relationship between the insolvency practitioner appointed as administrator and the football club. This is why, in specific circumstances, the appointment of an administrator requires the regulator’s approval to ensure that the process is transparent, and to avoid conflicts of interests or perceived bias in the appointment. By doing so, all stakeholders, particularly fans, should have more confidence that the outcome is the best one available in the circumstances for the individual club.
Mr French
Clause 47, as the Minister has just outlined, creates a new legal duty on clubs not to enter administration without the prior approval of the regulator. This is an unprecedented intervention: a regulator potentially blocking access to what is, in most sectors, a standard insolvency mechanism. We understand the intent to prevent abuse of administration as a means of dodging financial responsibility and to help protect club continuity. However, this clause raises serious concerns about the balance between corporate law and football regulation going forward.
As drafted, subsection (1) says,
“as soon as reasonably practicable after the body considers that there is a reasonable prospect of an administrator of the body being appointed”.
I would therefore naturally ask the Minister: what constitutes “reasonably practicable” and “a reasonable prospect”? We all appreciate that, in most examples, an owner’s wealth is generated not by the club itself but other business interests. It may become very difficult to determine what is “a reasonable prospect” if we are looking at business interests far from football.
Administration is recognised as part of UK insolvency law, which the Minister referred to, and it exists to help distressed businesses rescue viable parts and protect creditors where possible. Blocking access to administration could make things worse, not better, specifically if it delays actions or deters future buyers. Why are the Government confident that the regulator is better placed than insolvency professionals to determine when administration is appropriate?
On some of the practical risks, insolvency situations often develop quickly, and clubs may need to act fast to avoid a complete liquidation of assets. A duty to obtain the regulator’s approval would therefore add delay and could risk total collapse where speed might be essential. We have seen that in a number of club takeovers over the years. Will there be an emergency approval process for an administrator? Within what timeframe does the Minister expect the regulator to respond? Is there a default route if it does not respond in a quick enough time?
On consistency with company law, clause 47 effectively overrides the Companies Act 2006, creating a two-tier insolvency regime for football clubs. That is not a small step. It sets a precedent for sector-specific interference into commercial law. What discussions has the Minister’s Department had with the Insolvency Service and the Department for Business and Trade on this specific clause and mechanism going forward? Are there any comparable sectors in the UK where companies would be forbidden from entering administration without the regulator’s consent?
Lastly, on unintended consequences, could this provision make distressed clubs less attractive to investors who fear regulatory delays? I fear that it may. It may also push clubs to delay taking action, making outcomes worse for creditors, fans and staff in the longer term. It could also expose clubs to legal risks, if creditors challenge a failure to act promptly to directors. The Opposition support strong oversight, but clause 47 must not become a regulatory roadblock in moments of crisis. Football clubs must be able to act swiftly to protect their future. The football regulator should be a safeguard, not a barrier to survival. We urge the Minister to have a close look at some of those questions and hopefully provide some answers today. We fear that this clause, as drafted, may have a number of unintended consequences.
Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Vicky Foxcroft.)
Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)
Louie French ExcerptsTuesday 10th June 2025
(2 weeks, 6 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Football Governance Bill [HL] 2024-26 View all Football Governance Bill [HL] 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 10 June 2025 - (10 Jun 2025)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)
It is a pleasure once again to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. I thank the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup for his amendment. He made some important points in his contribution, including his reference to the Kicks programme. He also pointed out an event in his area where he was able to see the Premier League trophy; that is a fantastic tour involving lots of grassroots and other clubs. I was really pleased to visit one such club in Mr Speaker’s Chorley constituency, and I will take this opportunity to wish Mr Speaker a very happy birthday. I am sure that other Committee members will join me in putting that on the record.
We do not believe, however, that the change in amendment 137 is necessary. I will outline why and respond throughout my speech to some of the hon. Gentleman’s points. As drafted, the Bill gives flexibility to a club to detail what action it is taking to contribute
“to the economic and social well-being of the local community with which it is associated”.
This provision was introduced through a Government amendment made in the other place to allow the regulator to include clubs’ community contributions in its corporate governance code. The regulator will work with the industry to design the code to ensure that it is relevant to clubs, the challenges they face and the unique nature of the responsibilities associated with custodianship of a football club.
If a club details, in its statement, its work with or through its official charity, that would of course be accepted by the regulator. That is the opposite of what the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup said. He referred to scaling back charity work, but that is absolutely not what we will see as a result of the proposals.
Let me detail some of the specifics. If a club is donating to or funding bodies that are not its official charity, that is also a contribution to the community and could be included. We have tried to keep this as broad as possible. To share something from my constituency and town, Barnsley FC Community Trust is a great example of a charity that is closely connected to a club. The community trust held its conference on Monday, and I was pleased to send them a message. One purpose of that conference was to raise the charity’s profile across Barnsley. It helps between 10,000 and 15,000 people each year, who range in age from two to 100 years old. I will not detain the Committee by outlining the work that the trust does, but it ranges from education to health, social inclusion and sports participation, not just in and around the centre connected to Oakwell, but across the whole of Barnsley and my Barnsley South constituency.
Barnsley FC could use their work with the trust to show how they contribute to the economic and social wellbeing of their community, and I put on record that they very much do that in my area. But it is not just Barnsley FC that do such work; many clubs carry out great work in their communities, whether through their official charities or not. Portsmouth FC’s Pompey in the Community and the Sheffield Wednesday FC Community Programme are just two examples; I am sure that hon. Members across the Committee have examples from their communities. It is important to shine a light on those contributions to the local community, and that is why a club’s report on their corporate governance will be published online to allow public scrutiny, so that they can be held accountable for their actions, or inaction. We believe that this will encourage transparency and, as with the approach to corporate governance more widely, encourage greater action in this space.
Above all, that approach will allow flexibility for each club to comply in accordance with their resources and size in a way that is suited to the needs of their local community. Additionally, when the regulator publishes its corporate governance report on clubs, best practice can be shared with the industry. We therefore believe that the Bill, as drafted, sufficiently allows clubs to demonstrate the actions they contribute to their communities. I hope that the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup will withdraw his amendment.
Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)
It is a privilege to speak again under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. I congratulate you and the city of Hull on the Challenge cup victory at the weekend, which probably does not please Mr Speaker on his birthday, but such is sport.
Moving back to football, before the lunch break, I explained why the Opposition felt the need for amendment 137. It is a technical amendment that would make it very clear that the official charities and trusts of the clubs would count towards the corporate governance structure. I have listened carefully to the Minister’s comments and appreciate the feedback that she has given. However, we would still like to see the amendment made to provide clarity to clubs, so we will press it to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Mr French
I beg to move amendment 131, in schedule 5, page 103, line 16, at end insert—
“Agents fees
11A (1) An agents fees condition is a condition requiring a club employing an agent to cap their fees.
(2) The agents fee cap will be set by Regulations subject to approval by both Houses.”
My amendment proposes that clubs regulated by the Government’s new regulator should be required to cap the fees paid to agents, because, as many fans know, an ever-increasing amount of money is leaving the football pyramid to agents. The level of the proposed cap would be set through regulations, subject to the approval of both Houses of Parliament, and determined following consultation with clubs and leagues.
Let me set out why we believe the measure is necessary—not as an attack on agents or their role in the game, but as a proportionate, reasonable step towards a more sustainable, transparent and responsible football ecosystem. If we are serious about football reform and safeguarding the long-term financial health of clubs up and down the pyramid, we must be prepared to tackle the excesses and distortions that have taken root in the sport.
Few are more obvious or pressing than the spiralling sums paid to agents. According to the Football Association, in the year from February 2024 to February 2025, Premier League clubs alone paid more than £409 million in agent fees and intermediaries. That is more than the total broadcast revenue of a number of Championship clubs in 2022-23; or more than double the commercial revenue of several clubs for that season; or almost three times the matchday revenue of a number of Championship clubs in the same season.
This is not wages or transfer fees, nor is it investment in the matchday experience for fans—it is money paid out purely for representation costs, often for work done on both sides of a deal. To put that into context, it is more than the entire annual income of many Championship clubs combined, and this is not just a Premier League problem. Although the sums are relatively smaller further down the pyramid, the pressures are arguably even more acute for clubs with less budget.
My amendment seeks to introduce a straightforward principle—that there should be a fair and proportionate limit on the fees that clubs can pay to agents, and that the limit should be set by regulations made by the Secretary of State subject to affirmative procedure. This would help to ensure full parliamentary oversight and allow future Governments to adjust the cap based on changing market conditions, evidence from the Government’s regulator and broader economic factors in football.
There is already a strong precedent for this kind of intervention. For example, FIFA’s agent regulations now attempt to impose limits on the commissions payable to clubs and players alike, but those rules remain subject to legal challenge and uneven enforcement across jurisdictions. In the absence of effective international enforcement, there is an opportunity for this to be included in the scope of the Government’s regulator as a core part of the financial sustainability of English football.
Mr Lee Dillon (Newbury) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. I have sympathy with what the amendment is trying to achieve, but can the shadow Minister reflect on what it could do to transfers coming into the country? An agent working with Ronaldo could sell him either to an English club, where the fees are capped, or to an Italian, French or Spanish club, where the fees are not capped. Is there a concern that this would limit good players coming into the country?
Mr French
I discussed that consideration with a number of people in the game before we tabled the amendment. The hon. Gentleman mentioned the French, who already cap agents’ fees at 10%. With this amendment, we are not seeking to say what the level should be—that should be determined by the game in consultation—but we are looking for the game to help to set the cap at a level that does not have the impact that he talks about. But it is a fair challenge.
We must remember that the Bill is fundamentally about sustainability. Financial discipline is not just a boardroom concern, but a matter of public trust. Football clubs are more than private enterprises, as we have discussed. They are community institutions. They are the social glue in towns such as Bury, Scunthorpe and Southend, all of which have suffered financial distress in recent years. The idea that hundreds of millions of pounds can leave the game each year in opaque payments to third-party agents while clubs struggle to pay wages, maintain facilities or invest in their academies is becoming increasingly indefensible.
Let us be clear: no one is saying that agents do not have a role. Many provide important professional services, such as legal advice, contract negotiation and logistical support, but the current system lacks transparency, consistency and limits. There are countless examples of agents receiving commissions from both buying and selling clubs on the same deal—a structure that would raise red flags in other regulated industries as a clear conflict of interest. Without a cap, there is little to stop the agents’ arms race escalating even further.
Clubs are forced to pay inflated fees just to stay competitive in the transfer market. In some cases, they are backed into a corner by players who will not sign unless their representative is paid what they demand. That imbalance needs to be addressed, not with heavy-handed bans, but with clear, enforceable limits that ensure agent fees are grounded in reality and tied to the financial position of the English football pyramid. My amendment would allow for the cap to adapt over time, either up or down, depending on the financial context of the day.
This debate also has a clear moral dimension. Football fans—the lifeblood of the game—see money flooding out of the system into offshore accounts while ticket prices rise, lower-league clubs fall into administration, as we have heard, and local facilities are left to deteriorate without needed investment. What message are we sending to those communities if we continue to turn a blind eye to this major issue?
The problem is not new. Lord Sugar famously described agents as “ten percenters” during his time as chairman of Tottenham Hotspur. However, in recent years, that 10% has crept up; we now see cases in which agents walk away with fees amounting to 15% or even 20% of a transfer value, and in some instances with fixed payments that are totally unrelated to the value or complexity of the deal. That is not healthy, efficient or sustainable, and it is not a good use of fans’ hard-earned money.
This amendment is about putting the interests of clubs, fans and the wider game first. In fact, we believe that clubs in the lower leagues would stand to benefit the most. Although some clubs in the top flight can absorb these costs through commercial revenues or broadcast income, those further down the pyramid often spend a disproportionate amount of their limited budgets on agents. That creates a vicious cycle: less money for youth development, community outreach and infrastructure, and more dependence on short-term deals brokered by intermediaries. By capping agent fees, we would take a meaningful step towards ending that cycle. We could help clubs plan more prudently, negotiate more confidently and operate on a fairer playing field. In doing so, we would strengthen the whole system, from the grassroots to the elite.
Let us not forget that the purpose of the Government’s regulator is not to micro-manage football, but to restore public confidence and ensure long-term stability. Agent fees are a glaring blind spot in the current model. If we are willing to regulate ownership tests, financial reporting and fan engagement, surely we must also be willing to act on a financial outflow that directly threatens the viability of many clubs.
This is a proportionate, sensible and timely amendment. It allows the Government to tackle one of the most visible and controversial financial issues in football; it helps preserve flexibility; it respects Parliament; and, most importantly, it places the interests of our clubs, fans and communities above those of unregulated market actors. We have an opportunity to help reshape the financial culture of English football for the better. Introducing a cap on agents’ fees is not only a necessary reform, but the right thing to do.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup for his amendment 131. Football is a worldwide industry, and the activity of football agents continues to be a significant contributor to the financial pressures on English football, as well as internationally. We recognise that this is a key issue, which is frequently raised by the industry. Agent fees are a significant cost pressure, particularly on clubs in the Premier League and the Championship. The largest fees are often paid in international transfer activity, where regulation is especially difficult without a global framework. There are also concerns about dual representation and conflicts of interest, which can further inflate costs.
However, the regulator cannot be the solution for all of football’s woes. The Bill establishes a club licensing regime with a tightly defined scope, in which agents are not included. The fan-led review recognised that and recommended pursuing an international and game-wide solution to football agents, rather than trying to address the issue in isolation. Acting unilaterally may end up being disadvantageous to English football. It is right that we follow the review’s recommendation not to try and address the issue in isolation, which reflects the unique scale and complexity of English football’s place in the global game.
I want to make it clear that the Government acknowledge the importance of this issue, and will continue to work with the industry on agents and fees. We will work closely with governing bodies to support full compliance once legal proceedings conclude in the courts, and to drive forward our shared ambition for transparency, integrity and best practice across the game. We will keep this issue under review, but for those reasons, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.
Mr French
I have listened carefully to the Minister’s comments and acknowledge a number of the points that she made. The purpose behind the amendment was to have the discussion about the impact of fees on the game. I accept some of her points about the international nature of the transfer market. I would like to continue discussing this with her and the regulator once in situ, because I think there is something we can do here, either formally or informally, to move the game along so that it stops losing so much money to agents’ fees. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Stephanie Peacock
I beg to move amendment 64, in schedule 5, page 103, line 18, after “specified” insert
“from time to time by the IFR”.
This amendment clarifies that the IFR may specify certain elements of the mandatory licence conditions from time to time.
The regulator will attach four mandatory licence conditions—the financial plan, the corporate governance statement, a fan consultation and an annual declaration—to the operating licence, both provisional and full, of each club. This means that all licensed clubs will need to comply with those requirements.
While the mandatory conditions are basic requirements that apply to all licensed clubs as standard, elements within them can be varied. For example, the regulator can specify when a club must submit and update a financial plan, or require that a plan contains additional information. As another example, the fan consultation condition can require that clubs consult plans at specified periods, which speaks to a point that my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East raised earlier.
Government amendment 64 simply makes it explicit that the regulator can respecify these elements to the mandatory licence conditions from time to time. The licensing regime is designed to be flexible and proportionate, and the mandatory licence conditions are no different. For instance, a Premier League club’s financial plan is likely to be more detailed than one for a National League club. If a club’s circumstances change—for instance, if it gets promoted or relegated—the regulator should have a chance to respecify the mandatory licence condition to ensure that it remains proportionate.
The regulator also needs to be able to keep pace with developments in the industry and changes in best practice —for example, if there are innovations in financial plans or mechanisms for fan engagement. Government amendment 64 simply makes that explicit in the Bill.
Amendment 64 agreed to.
Question proposed, That the schedule be the Fifth schedule to the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
The clause relates to the discretionary licence conditions. Where needed, the regulator will use discretionary licence conditions to bring a club up to the required level of compliance with the threshold requirements. That will mean that the regulator is satisfied that the club can currently operate sustainably, and will be able to continue to continue to do so, in the financial, non-financial and fan engagement areas. Those conditions will be in addition to the standardised mandatory licence conditions. When applied, they will be tailored to the club’s specific circumstances and identified financial risk.
If a club is already meeting the threshold requirements set by the regulator, there will be no need to attach any discretionary licence conditions to that end. That means that the regulator can be light touch where appropriate, and that it does not need to directly intervene if a desired outcome is already being met.
Discretionary licence conditions could also be used to protect and promote the financial resilience of the football system. They will be used to resolve risks that might not threaten any one club significantly, but whose aggregated, correlated or multiplied effects may pose a significant risk to large parts of the football system or the pyramid as a whole. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Mr French
The clause formally sets out the regulator’s powers to attach, amend or remove discretionary licence conditions, which could bring a club toward meeting a threshold requirement or mitigate financial risks. It raises some concern about mission creep, so I hope the Minister will assure us that the regulator’s powers do not extend beyond those objectives. Should the regulator use the powers to effectively create new burdensome regulatory requirements, that would significantly change the purpose of the regulator.
Will the Minister please clarify what engagement the regulator will have with clubs to ensure they are aware of the discretionary licence conditions? Will there be any consultation or engagement with clubs prior to attaching or amending a discretionary condition? Will clubs have the ability to request a variation or removal of a condition? In what timeframe will that be processed?
If a club feels that a discretionary licence condition has been placed arbitrarily or punitively, how can it appeal or challenge the condition? What will the process look like, and what timescales will be used? Will the timescales be standardised, or will they be at the regulator’s discretion? Although some larger clubs may have the resources and budgets to appeal a condition, what support will be given to smaller clubs? Have the Government considered the potential merit of a tiered application based on the club’s size?
Aside from the concern about mission creep, it is important that these powers are exercised proportionately and based on evidence. Will there be any oversight of their use to ensure that happens? Subsection (4) states:
“The IFR may vary a discretionary licence condition where…the IFR considers that the condition is no longer effective, or…there has been a material change in circumstances”.
However, it fails to define what constitutes a material change in circumstances. The lack of such a definition leaves the door open for the Independent Football Regulator to vary conditions without sufficient reasons or evidence.
We ask those questions now because we are concerned about future legal cases if there is a lack of consistency and transparency surrounding how the conditions are applied. I would appreciate some answers from the Minister.
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for those questions. Throughout this process, we have been keen to reiterate that discretionary conditions must be proportionate to the club’s size and the league it plays in. We absolutely expect the regulator to engage thoroughly with a club before applying any discretionary licence conditions. Perhaps I could just draw on the conversation that we had in the previous debate in terms of fan engagement: I am hesitant to get into hypothetical scenarios, but it might be that, if a club is not effectively engaging with fans, that could be a discretionary licence condition if there is an obvious gap in what the club is doing. If the club does not believe the regulator has made a correct decision, it does have recourse through the appeals process, which is set out in part 9.
We want this to be a flexible regime so it can be light touch where appropriate. If the regulator does not need to attach extra conditions, it will not, but it will have that ability to make sure that all clubs are meeting the conditions they need to.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 22
Scope of powers to attach or vary discretionary licence conditions
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 108, in clause 22, page 14, line 37, leave out subsection (c).
This amendment prevents the IFR from being able to set licence conditions relating to the overall expenditure of a club.
Amendment 109, in clause 22, page 15, line 12, leave out subsection (5).
This amendment removes the power of the Secretary of State to amend the discretionary licence conditions by regulations.
Mr French
I rise to speak on clause 22 of this important Bill, which provides the Independent Football Regulator with powers to attach, amend and remove discretionary licence conditions for individual football clubs. At face value, this clause offers the regulator flexibility to respond to particular risks or circumstances on a case-by-case basis. However, as with all regulatory discretion, the true implications lie in how such powers may evolve over time, be interpreted, or be expanded.
In this Committee, it is our role to ensure that what begins as a sensible framework for tailored intervention does not become the thin end of a wedge that risks overreach, centralisation and, ultimately, the erosion of club autonomy. I believe strongly that English football does need reform in certain areas, but I also believe in restraint, clarity of purpose and fidelity to the principle that football clubs, however commercial they may have become, are civic institutions first and foremost. They belong to their communities, not to Whitehall, not to arm’s length bodies, and certainly not to ministerial discretion.
Clause 22, as drafted, gives the Independent Football Regulator a wide and open-ended ability to impose additional conditions on individual clubs—conditions that are not part of the baseline threshold requirements in the Bill, but which the regulator may, in its own judgment, decide are appropriate. We should acknowledge that there are circumstances in which such powers might be necessary. For example, where a club has narrowly avoided insolvency, has a particularly opaque ownership structure, or is operating under unusual financial pressures, the regulator may wish to impose temporary conditions to help safeguard the public interest, protect creditors or ensure better transparency.
That flexibility has its place. However, it must be anchored in the principles of proportionality, accountability and predictability. It is for that reason that I want to speak to three amendments that have been tabled in my name, each of which I believe would help materially improve the Bill by preventing mission creep, protecting the distinct role of the leagues, and ensuring that Parliament, not the Executive, retains the ultimate authority over the scope of regulation.
The first amendment would prevent the regulator from imposing discretionary conditions relating to a club’s internal controls—that is, the systems and procedures by which a club governs itself, monitors risks, approves spending and safeguards assets. These are matters properly for the board of directors, who have legal duties under company law, are accountable to shareholders and fans, and must answer to independent auditors.
To allow the regulator to second guess those internal arrangements and dictate how a club structures its finance team or risk-management processes would be a significant intrusion into corporate governance territory. Let us be clear: there is a distinction between requiring that a club has adequate systems and mandating the precise nature of those systems. The former is reasonable; the latter, we believe, is excessive.
We must also be mindful of the danger that the regulator could, perhaps with good intentions, begin to substitute its own preferred model of governance over the perfectly legitimate models that clubs themselves decide to adopt. For example, what works for a large Premier League club with international operations may not be appropriate or affordable for a League Two club or a community-owned side. Discretionary licensing conditions must not become a one-size-fits-all instrument that penalises innovation, tradition or diversity in club structures.
I support this amendment because it would help ringfence those areas of internal decision making that are rightly matters for the club’s board—subject to transparency and good practice but not for centralised prescription.
The second amendment that I have tabled would prevent the regulator from imposing licensing conditions relating to a club’s overall expenditure. Amendment 108 would prevent the regulator from imposing licence conditions relating to a club’s overall expenditure. This is a fundamental issue. English football operates within a competitive ecosystem, as we have discussed. Decisions about how much to invest in players, infrastructure, academies or commercial operations are matters of strategic importance for clubs. They should be driven by ambition, fan demand and commercial opportunity, not by the regulator’s view of what is appropriate spending.
We must not fall into the trap of conflating good financial regulation with financial central planning. The role of the Independent Football Regulator should be to monitor solvency, ensure robust business plans, enforce transparency and intervene when there are clear risks of harm. It is not the regulator’s job, and it should never become its job, to determine how much a club is allowed to spend. There is a world of difference between assessing whether spending is sustainable and attempting to control outright the volume of that spending.
Let us remember that the leagues themselves already impose cost controls. The Premier League has profit and sustainability rules. The English Football League enforces squad salary caps and financial fair play frameworks, and now has the new financial review panel. The regulator is not meant to replace those roles. It is not a shadow competition authority, nor should it seek to override club investment decisions, which often have complex justifications and long-term returns.
Amendment 108 would help to ensure that the regulator cannot use its discretionary power to micromanage investment levels. Such a step would go beyond the spirit and the letter of what the Bill intends to achieve. The goal is to protect clubs from existential risk, not to homogenise them or stifle ambition.
Amendment 109 would remove the Secretary of State’s power to amend the list of discretionary licence conditions by regulation. This is not a technical point; it goes to the constitutional heart of the Bill. The Independent Football Regulator must be just that: independent. Its scope, duties and powers must be defined by Parliament and subject to oversight. We cannot accept a model in which future Secretaries of State, by regulation and with minimal scrutiny, can expand the areas the regulator may interfere with. That would allow a future Government of any colour to alter the regulatory perimeter at will. Today, it might be internal controls; tomorrow, it might be club ticket pricing, political messaging or hiring policies. The clause must be narrowed to ensure that any expansion of discretionary licence conditions comes through primary legislation that is debated and approved by both Houses.
Regulatory stability is vital not only for clubs but for fans, leagues and the broader football economy. Clubs, particularly those in the lower leagues, need to be able to plan over multiple seasons. Uncertainty about what new regulatory burdens might be imposed, or fears that the regime could be altered mid-season by ministerial decree, will have a chilling effect on investment, sponsorship and ambition. Regulation must be predictable and principled, not politicised or ever-shifting. Amendment 109 would safeguard its integrity.
Clause 22 presents a risk of regulatory overreach, however well-intentioned it may be. The amendments would not strip the regulator of useful tools. They would simply place guardrails around its discretion and ensure that decisions of fundamental importance to club governance, financial independence and regulatory scope remain where they belong: with clubs, fans and Parliament.
We need a regulator that enforces minimum standards, upholds transparency and ensures financial resilience. What we do not need is a regulator that micromanages club affairs or displaces the judgment of boards and owners. Football clubs must remain free to compete, to innovate and to fail or succeed on their own merits—within a fair framework, yes, but not under constant intervention.
The amendments reinforce that principle. They are not ideological; they are practical, measured and consistent with the values that underpin the Bill. I urge the Committee to support them and, in doing so, to send a clear signal that we are legislating not to control football but to support it firmly, fairly and with the long-term interests of the game at heart.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank the shadow Minister for tabling the amendments, which I will take in turn in responding to the points that he made.
Broadly, amendments 107 and 108 concern integral powers for a financial regulator. Limiting those powers by reducing the scope of the regulator’s discretionary licence conditions would jeopardise its ability to achieve its objectives. On internal controls, the conditions cover areas such as the completeness and accuracy of reporting and information from a club, and continued compliance with the rules and regulations. If the regulator had no power to intervene to improve those areas where it was deemed necessary, it would not be able to bring a club up to its non-financial threshold requirement, and therefore the club would be unable to obtain a full operating licence.
Similarly, not allowing a financial regulator to require a club to limit its future expenditure to a sustainable amount, for example, would be self-defeating. This is a financial regulator, and it should have the power to intervene in a club’s finances if necessary, but—to respond directly to one of the points made by the shadow Minister —while it can direct the club to reduce expenditure, it cannot specify exactly how that is done, which is for the club to decide.
The regulator may only set licence conditions in such areas if a club is not meeting its threshold requirements. Any condition must be proportionate to the issue identified. The regulator must also have regard to whether the requirement or restriction is necessary and to whether a similar outcome could be achieved by a less burdensome means, as per the principles.
Mr French
I will repeat my arguments, but I listened carefully to the Minister’s response and we remain concerned about various aspects of the clause. That is why we tabled not just one, but three amendments, to try to put some safeguards and guardrails around future powers of the IFR, as I said.
Fundamentally, we believe that the ultimate responsibility for managing clubs should be that of the clubs themselves, while engaging with the fans, and we fear that without some of our amendments, the IFR will be too involved with the day-to-day running of clubs. That is why we tabled the amendments. We listened carefully to the Minister, but I am afraid that we are not fully satisfied, so we will press them to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 23 sets out the procedure for attaching or varying financial discretionary licence conditions on clubs, which ensures that clubs and competition organisers are notified and given the appropriate opportunity to engage in advance when the regulator considers that a discretionary licence condition is needed. Where appropriate, the regulator will look to allow the relevant club and league to address identified issues and risks, so that the regulator does not have to formally intervene itself. That will allow the potential for the football industry to respond to issues, reducing regulatory intervention and producing a better regulatory response and outcome. The industry may be best placed to address specific issues within the overall context of a league’s own regulatory framework.
Before any action is taken by the regulator, there will be a period in which leagues and clubs are able to make representations, and the competition organiser will also be able to give a commitment to take action in lieu of the condition being attached or varied as proposed by the regulator. Clause 24 explains in further detail the mechanism for commitments in lieu of discretionary financial licence conditions. It is a final, formal opportunity for competition organisers to offer a self-regulatory solution to a problem identified by the regulator, so that the regulator does not have to step in. It is another important aspect of the regulator’s approach, which emphasises engagement and working with the industry to minimise formal intervention where possible. The regulator will still have powers to step in if the issue is not resolved, but the mechanism will give a competition organiser the chance to present a football industry-led solution to an identified risk.
The regulator can accept a commitment if it concludes that it should achieve the same results as the proposed discretionary licence condition and it does not conflict with the regulator’s objectives. The regulator does not have to accept the commitment, although, if it does not, it must provide reasons why. If a commitment proposed by a league will not achieve the regulator’s desired outcome, the regulator can reject it, and it will retain the power to intervene directly by imposing a discretionary licence condition on a club where any accepted commitment proves ineffective.
Schedule 6 expands on clause 24 by outlining the procedure where a competition organiser gives a commitment that the regulator is minded to accept, or requests a variation to a commitment in force, in lieu of the regulator’s attaching a financial discretionary licence condition to a club. The intention, as I referenced earlier, is for commitments to provide a less burdensome solution for all parties and still address the identified risk. However, for that to be the case, it is important that there is a clear procedure for interaction between clubs, the relevant competition organisers and the regulator, and the schedule sets out that procedure in further detail. Clubs can make representations to the regulator before accepting a commitment from a competition organiser, as well as before a competition organiser is released from a commitment.
Clause 25 sets out the procedure for the regulator to attach or vary a discretionary licence condition relating to the non-financial resources threshold requirement or the fan engagement threshold requirement. The regulator must notify the club and give it a period of no less than 14 days to make representations, but the clause allows the regulator to take more immediate action in situations that are more urgent and serious: if it thinks that giving a club notice and allowing a period for representations will jeopardise or risk jeopardising one of its objectives, it can apply the discretionary licence condition immediately and without prior notice. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Mr French
Clause 23 sets out the process that the Government’s new regulator must follow when it wishes to attach or vary a financial discretionary licence condition, which are by definition additional obligations that the regulator may impose on clubs that go beyond the mandatory licensing framework. In doing so, the clause confers on the regulator considerable further discretion. As with other discretionary powers in the Bill, the risk is not merely that the regulator uses its discretion, but that it does so inconsistently, unpredictably or in a way that strays beyond its core remit. Given that the powers provided by the clause relate directly to the financial obligations of clubs, the implications for competitiveness, investment and long-term planning are significant.
Although it is welcome that the clause does not set out a consultative process for how the financial conditions are imposed or amended, the process must not be a box-ticking exercise. Clubs should be able to challenge unreasonable conditions, and the regulator should be required to justify in clear terms why any new financial burden is necessary to meet the threshold requirements. It cannot become the case that discretionary conditions are routinely imposed as a back-door method of raising standards in areas for which Parliament has not explicitly legislated.
The risk of regulatory mission creep is particularly acute in a sector like football, in which the boundaries between finance, governance and culture are easily blurred. That is why we will be looking closely at whether there are sufficient checks, balances and transparency mechanisms in the clause to protect clubs from arbitrary financial conditions. Will the regulator issue any guidance on financial discretionary licence conditions, and will that guidance be made public? Will the Minister consider requiring an annual report to Parliament detailing how many clubs have had such discretionary financial conditions imposed, varied or removed, and on what grounds those decisions were made?
Without such checks, there is a real risk of an unequal competition taking place without fans and Parliament knowing, until it is too late and UEFA and FIFA have ejected us from their competitions. That is what I most fear may happen by accident. As we have discussed at length, the Bill is already flawed in this respect, and UEFA and FIFA would intervene if the regulator caused any impact on competitiveness. I only have to highlight the example of Crystal Palace, which is currently in the press, to demonstrate that UEFA and FIFA will stick to their rules rigidly, whether we like them or not. As I said when speaking to my amendment 97, any new licensing requirements introduced by the IFR must be meticulously aligned with existing UEFA and international frameworks.
Does the Minister accept that clubs, as entities directly impacted by licensing regulations, must have a voice in the development and implementation of these requirements? As the clause stands, her new regulator will be able to attach or vary financial licence conditions that would that mean one club becomes more competitive than another. She has said that she intends for the regulator to be able to adapt to the circumstances of each club. However, we must be mindful that that would mean changing the level of competitiveness between clubs. That is the key risk. That is not a political point; it is sadly a risk and a fact of which we have to be mindful.
Let me stress-test that with a hypothetical question for the Minister on the Bill’s impact. Brighton & Hove Albion and Aston Villa will both compete in the Premier League next season, both have been in that league for a number of years, and both also compete for European football. If her regulator decided, for whatever reason, that Brighton required stricter or simply more financial licensing conditions than Aston Villa, there would be a competitive imbalance between the teams. Does she accept that fact, which is plainly obvious, and recognise that such club-by-club tailoring of rules and licence conditions is potentially a violation of UEFA and FIFA rules on fair competition? To give her a bit of time, I ask her to respond to that concern after I have spoken about the other provisions in the group.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
My hon. Friend the shadow Minister sets out his question very well. It sounds as though the situation could get very complicated, especially over time, as the regulator might impose certain conditions on certain clubs and severely distort the market. Does he have any comment on that?
Mr French
That is exactly my concern. In trying to tailor the conditions that we are discussing, there is a risk of inadvertently impacting the ability of clubs to compete on a fair and level playing field. I am concerned that that should not happen inadvertently, as the regulator evolves. That is why I keep pushing for more parliamentary oversight, so that we understand the risks. At the end of the day, fans will not forgive us as Members of this House if this goes wrong. I do not believe in any shape or form that the Government are aiming deliberately to get it wrong—I say that openly—but I fear that there will be unintended consequences, and that is the broader point that we have been trying to make in a number of the Committee’s debates.
Max Wilkinson
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. The amendment would prohibit individuals with a record of human rights abuses from club ownership. Our national game is a source of huge pride to our country and everyone in this room. It should not be exploited by individuals and regimes that want to launder their reputations using some of our greatest cultural and sporting assets.
Strengthening the proprietary tests for prospective owners and directors, with clear tests about human rights, would enable UK football to promote and protect what we know is special about our game and would promote and protect the liberal and democratic western values that we all hold so dear. It is wrong that we allow football to roll out the red carpet for despots. Let us consider a future in which the owner or potential owner of a football club is also the head of a state or a Minister in the Government of a foreign state that suppresses its own people or is involved in illegal military action, perhaps in a failed state. That owner is also clearly financially linked to activities that involve the plunder of that failed state’s mineral wealth. If that person were to be linked directly to such action, which breaches international human rights laws, would this Government, football and this country accept it? We think that we should not, and that is why we have tabled the amendment and the new clause.
Mr French
I thank the Liberal Democrat spokesperson for explaining the objectives behind the amendment, which is aimed at preventing individuals with a record of human rights abuses from owning a club. My question for the hon. Member is about new clause 8(2)(b), which states that
“the Regulator shall have absolute discretion to determine whether conduct falls within any of the categories in paragraphs (a) to (d).”
In other words, it will have discretion to determine whether such conduct constitutes human rights abuses. Given we are talking about a football regulator, the obvious question to ask is about what qualifications the regulator would need to make such a decision. What information could they rely on? Would we be looking for Government involvement in that, given that that would probably provide the intellectual experience required? Does the hon. Member for Cheltenham think it might improve the new clause to include a route of appeal against such a decision, as a matter of natural justice, so we are seen to give individuals the right of appeal if they believe that they have been wrongly classified?
Joe Robertson
I have sympathy with the aims of the amendments, but I also have a few questions. I wonder whether the wording in the Bill about “requisite honesty and integrity” might cover the issue that the hon. Member for Cheltenham is trying to deal with in new clause 8. I note that amendment 75 would do more that protect against owners with a record of human rights abuses, because it would require them to promote human rights. I obviously have no problem with people promoting human rights, but the amendment would put a duty on an owner to do something positive to show that they are fit and proper. I wonder whether that is really the hon. Member’s intention.
Joe Robertson
Once again, I have some sympathy with the aims of the new clause and I see where the hon. Member is trying to go with it. However, as it is currently drafted, it has a lot of breadth and contains vagaries that could throw up all sorts of issues. I will just deal with those issues briefly.
By the way, I like the idea of identifying “material change” to the extent that someone who may once have been considered fit and proper is no longer considered fit and proper, because of something that has happened or something that has been identified.
I have a problem with imposing a duty, particularly on some of the groups set out in paragraphs (a) to (f) of subsection (2). For example, there would be a positive duty on “club employees”, which would include some very junior members of staff. In English law, imposing a duty on someone to do something is fairly exceptional. Although I could probably tolerate imposing a duty on “officers and board members”—if people have attained that level within an organisation, they should expect duties to come with it—I could not tolerate imposing a duty on all “club employees”. That is a difficulty I have. Also, that list is not exhaustive. Subsection (1) refers to:
“ Individuals or organisations associated with a regulated club”.
That could capture a lot more people than those listed in subsection (2).
I am also slightly concerned that the duty for notification applies:
“when they”—
that is, the person—
“have evidence or information that a material change in circumstances has occurred”.
I suspect that that could open the floodgates and be misused as a means to try and potentially smear someone, or raise questions about whether they are fit and proper, based on some pretty spurious “evidence”. Such evidence could be pretty much anything—even a trivial matter. I would have hoped that there would be some sort of threshold, such as evidence that points to a strong or compelling case. “Evidence” on its own is a very, very low bar and could encourage all sorts of minor allegations that could make the job of the football regulator far bigger than it is intended to be.
Otherwise, I broadly support what the hon. Gentleman is trying to achieve.
Mr French
I thank the hon. Member for speaking to the new clause on behalf of his colleague, the hon. Member for Wokingham. The point that he made is very interesting and I have great sympathy with fans of Reading football club, who he referred to, and with fans of other clubs around the country that have fallen foul of their owners, who, I think it is fair to say, did not have the club’s long-term interests at heart. I say that as someone who has already referred to Charlton a number of times in this Committee—been there, done it, got the T-shirt. As I say, I have a lot of sympathy with fans of Reading and I hope that the future looks brighter for that club.
Even before the election, I publicly supported strengthening ownership tests. I believe them to be part of one of the most fundamental roles that the regulator should play. We should ensure the consistency of those tests between the leagues, and we should ensure that up and down the country we have the best people in charge of such community assets, and that they have the long-term interests of clubs at heart, as I believe the overwhelming majority of club owners do.
Those examples of where problems came to a head and caused significant damage to communities have proven that there is a difference in some of the tests applied by the leagues historically, with gaps and loopholes that individuals have looked to exploit. Such examples have also highlighted the need for ongoing review by the regulator about how it manages the information that comes to light. An owner might be deemed an appropriate and fit person to run a club in 2025, but changes to their financial circumstances—assuming that they have other business interests—could mean that they become more stretched, and they might be involved in other activity that comes to light, so it would be right for the review to take place as early as possible to minimise the potential damage to clubs.
My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East posited a number of important legal challenges around this point of duty. I have sympathy with the broader objective of new clause 15, but this issue of duty poses a number of risks for people who are not board-level employees or in significant roles of influence. I think that all Members would seek to avoid a situation where people disengage from a process because they are concerned about that word “duty”, and what that could leave them exposed to legally if they were to come across information, for example, but did not feel confident in passing it on. That might arise in a variety of circumstances, but I am interested to hear the Minister’s comments on new clause 15 in particular and on how we can seek to deliver the broader objective of strengthening ownership tests, without having to go down the rabbit hole of this duty element.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank the hon. Member for Wokingham for tabling new clause 15 and the hon. Member for Newbury for speaking to it, but it is already open to anyone, including all those listed in the new clause, to share relevant information with the regulator. That is in addition to the existing requirements on clubs, owners and officers, which the new clause unnecessarily duplicates.
I assure the Committee that the regulator will take credible reports about unsuitable owners or officers very seriously, whether they come from a whistleblower inside the industry or any other source. We do not need to create a separate obligation in the Bill for individuals to report information to the regulator. In fact, new clause 15 would place regulatory obligations on new individuals and organisations, thereby extending the effect of the regulator’s regime. It would take things a step further and create a duty—beyond the relevant owner, officer or club—for club employees, competition organisers, supporters trusts, the FSA and Fair Game to notify the regulator. As matters stand, anyone including owners, officers, club employees, competition organisers, the Football Supporters’ Association, trusts and supporters can notify the regulator if they have information regarding an individual’s suitability to be an owner or an officer. There is no need for any specific legislative provision to enable that. As the regulator will only regulate clubs, owners, officers and competition organisers, we believe that it would not be appropriate to obligate other persons to report any changes to the regulator. The new clause would extend the scope of the regulator.
The key point is that we do not think that that should be a duty. It is of course open to all those whom I have listed, and indeed any others, to approach the regulator, which as I say will take any reports seriously.
Stephanie Peacock
The regulator’s owners and directors test has been designed to prevent unsuitable custodians from running or owning clubs. Therefore, the regulator needs to know who a club’s prospective new owners and officers are before they buy or join a club so that they can be tested.
Clause 27 places duties on a person to notify the regulator when there is a reasonable prospect of them becoming a new owner or officer of a regulated club. This will ensure that the regulator receives advance notice that an application should be coming, and it will help the regulator prepare to act quickly when it receives the application. The clause also places the same duty on regulated clubs themselves, as another means of ensuring that the regulator will be notified.
The regulator needs to know a person’s role at the club so that it can prepare to assess whether they are suitable to be an owner or officer of that club. That is why, where the notification relates to an officer, the notification must state their proposed job title or job description, and any senior management functions they will carry out.
Enforcement measures, such as censure statements or financial penalties, are available to the regulator should it determine that this requirement has not been complied with without reasonable excuse. That will deter those who do not wish to comply with the regime. I commend clause 27 to the Committee.
Mr French
As the Minister just outlined, clause 27 requires regulated clubs to notify about prospective new owners and officers if there is a reasonable prospect of such a change. It also requires an officer’s proposed job title, job description and senior management functions. If the football regulator is not notified before the change, the club must notify as soon as practically possible.
I am slightly concerned that this could be a burdensome requirement on some clubs. Any large organisation, such as a football club, will often cast a wide net when considering such appointments, with people on the radar long in advance. I therefore ask the Minister to enlighten us on what she believes constitutes “a reasonable prospect”. For example, would media speculation that the right hon. Member for Houghton and Sunderland South (Bridget Phillipson) might move to the Minister’s Department be considered “a reasonable prospect”? There are non-political examples of how that might work too, but it would be interesting to hear what the Government believe to be a reasonable prospect.
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his contribution. As with everything throughout this Bill, we would expect the regulator to act proportionately. Where there is a reasonable prospect, it is obviously very helpful for the regulator to be informed of that, because that will, of course, allow them to move as speedily as possible. We therefore think this is an appropriate provision. The hon. Gentleman tempts me to get into other examples, but I will resist that, if he does not mind.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 28
Determination of suitability required for new owner
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
As we have heard throughout the passage of the Bill, football clubs hold unique importance to their fans and local communities, and it is these fans who lose out when clubs are exploited or mismanaged by unsuitable owners and officers. Clause 28 prohibits a person from becoming a new owner of a club unless the regulator has determined they are suitable to own that club beforehand. Prospective new owners will be required to provide an application containing information about how they propose to run a club and where club funding will come from. This will better ensure that prospective owners are clear from the outset about how they would deliver their plans for a club.
Once a complete application has been provided, the regulator can only pass the individual owner if the following requirements are met. First, the individual must meet the individual ownership fitness test. This means that they have the requisite honesty and integrity and are financially sound. Secondly, they must have sufficient financial resources. Finally, the regulator must not have grounds to suspect that the individual has any source of wealth that is connected to serious criminal conduct, including crimes such as drug trafficking and fraud. This will better mitigate against illicit finance in the game by requiring new owners to undergo the regulator’s test. Clause 28 will prevent unsuitable custodians from ever becoming owners.
Clause 29 prohibits individuals from becoming a new officer of a regulated club unless the regulator has determined that they are suitable beforehand. Once the prospective officer has provided a complete application to the regulator, it will assess them to ensure they meet individual officer fitness criteria. That means they must possess the requisite honesty, integrity and competence, and be financially sound. If the regulator is satisfied that the individual meets those requirements, it must find them suitable to be an officer of the club; otherwise, it must find them unsuitable. When making this determination, the regulator will take into account the matters listed in clause 37. By requiring new officers to undergo the regulator’s test, this clause will stop unsuitable individuals from becoming officers.
It is possible that someone might take up a position at a club without first having undergone the owners and directors test. That may be a blatant and deliberate breach of the requirement to undergo the test before joining the club. A prospective owner may act in bad faith, hoping that once they are “in”, the regulator would be more hesitant to fail them. However, in some circumstances a person may fall within the definition inadvertently or have some other relatively innocent reason for the breach. This may occur, for example, when a person inherits significant equity in a football club. Alternatively, a person may dispute in good faith whether their actions bring them within the Bill’s definition of an owner.
Therefore, where a person becomes a new owner or officer without the regulator having determined their suitability, clause 30 gives the regulator the power to respond decisively but flexibly. When the regulator becomes aware this has happened, it has two options: to either notify the new owner or officer that they are automatically treated as unsuitable, or require them to submit an application as though they were a prospective applicant. The regime cannot be allowed to be abused; the regulator must have the discretion and the teeth it needs to address harm to the sector. Clause 30 is an important step to achieving this aim.
If the regulator is minded to fail a new or prospective owner officer, clause 31 requires the regulator to give that person and the relevant club the opportunity to make representations. This must take place before the regulator makes its final decision. That will allow a new owner, officer or relevant club an appropriate opportunity to argue their case before the regulator finds them unsuitable. This ensures the regulator has all relevant information available to it, allowing it to make better decisions so that the regime is more effective.
Football is a fast-paced industry where clubs operate within constraints such as league seasons and transfer windows. Timely decisions about the suitability of new owners and officers is important for clubs’ financial sustainability. Without deadlines, we have seen league determinations drag on, unable to reach a decision. The regulator will need to conduct a thorough level of scrutiny of new owners and directors, but it also needs to make decisions in an appropriate timeframe to ensure clubs are not unnecessarily impacted.
That is why the regulator will be subject to a statutory deadline when it tests the suitability of new prospective owners and officers, which clause 32 sets out. When a complete application is provided, the determination period starts. By the end of that period, the regulator must find an applicant suitable or unsuitable. As well as providing certainty to the industry, the deadline will incentivise new owners and officers to provide the necessary information the regulator needs to assess suitability in a timely manner.
If the regulator cannot decide before the initial deadline is met, it can extend the determination period, and this will provide it with the necessary flexibility to gather more information to make well informed but timely decisions. The determination period, including the maximum amount of extra time, will be set by the Secretary of State in secondary legislation. This will ensure the regulator is bound by it—but there is still flexibility for the deadline to be amended in the future. If the regulator cannot make the decision before the period expires, the person is automatically determined to be unsuitable. This means that only owners or officers that the regulator is confident are suitable will be allowed to get involved with clubs.
The measures set out in the group of clauses will form a key part in ensuring our clubs have suitable custodians, which in turn will help to safeguard the financial sustainability of football over the long term. Therefore, I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Mr French
Clause 29 prohibits any person from becoming an owner of a regulated club without first applying to the independent football regulator and being determined suitable for that role. It requires any applicant to provide information on the proposed operation of the club, estimated costs, how those costs will be funded and the source of funding, which is a point that is been raised already in this Committee.
The football regulator must make an affirmative determination regarding the application if the potential owner is considered to have sufficient financial resources and meets the individual ownership fitness criteria. I already spoken about why I believe it is important that these fitness tests are strengthened wherever possible, but there are a couple of questions I would like to ask the Minister on this clause first.
What assurances can the Minister provide that this process will be completed swiftly and will not unnecessarily delay any ownership changes which, as we have already discussed, may need to happen very quickly when a club is under significant financial stress—to ensure wages are paid and to prevent further hardship when seeking a change of ownership?
Clause 30 sets out what should happen in the event that a person has become an owner or an officer of a regulated club without first obtaining the suitability determination from the football regulator. The clause assumes that the football regulator “becomes aware”; is the expectation that there is a disclosure from the club, or will the IFR be probing clubs, looking at news reports, Companies House and so on? It would be helpful for Members to have an insight into how that might look, because this clause does not offer a specific timeframe within which the football regulator must act at once if it becomes aware of an unauthorised appointment at a club.
It also seems that the football regulator can indefinitely extend the deadline for submitting such an application; the clause fails to clarify how many times and under what conditions. I therefore wonder whether the Minister has considered the potential effects on the stability of the club of the football regulator deeming an individual unsuitable: would that open clubs to legal or operational risk, and would there be financial consequences of those risks? It is vital that decisions taken by the regulator are independent and impartial, as already discussed, so what safeguards will there be to ensure that neither media nor political pressure is exerted on the football regulator to deem an owner unsuitable?
Clause 31 states that the football regulator must “have regard to” representations from affected clubs or individuals. What does that constitute in reality—a response, or simply a consideration? Must the football regulator provide written reasoning if it rejects the arguments made in the representation? Does this clause not lack basic safeguards and, without a framework for how representations should be made or evaluated, does it not risk leading to inconsistent decision making? Again, I fear there would be various legal challenges, given the financial implications of such decisions.
There is also no requirement, it appears, for the football regulator to consider other external stakeholders, which could include other directors or supporters’ trusts involved with the running of a club. Should an individual receive a negative determination, the legal and financial resources to make a strong representation within a specified timeframe might be considerable. Does the Minister envisage many applicants seeking legal aid or other advisory support mechanisms in such a scenario?
Clause 32 outlines several points about the football regulator’s determinations after an individual makes an application under clauses 28 and 29. The IFR seems to be able to extend its determination periods several times, but the clause fails to outline for what reason an extension might be justified and how long it should or could be. Can applicants, for example, challenge or appeal those delays, if the reason for them lay with the regulator rather than the individual club? A delay by the regulator would risk unfairly penalising applicants who were not personally at fault for it. Will there be an obligation on the football regulator to inform applicants of approaching deadlines, to ensure that they know when the determination period is nearing its end, and what oversight will there be to ensure that extensions are not routine?
Lastly, will there be monitoring of how often extensions are used and how long determinations typically take, so that clubs can start to plan for such instances where they occur? That would also give greater certainty to the leagues because, as I highlighted earlier, it is not just individuals, but clubs themselves at risk. If we think about not just the financial penalties imposed, but the points that can be deducted, there are major implications for the competitive nature of the league. I look forward to the Minister answering a few of those questions.
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for those questions. I reiterate, as I said in an earlier intervention, that the licensing is separate from the ownership. On some of his points about the extension, we have talked throughout proceedings about being collaborative and working with owners and clubs; if the regulator needs more information, it has the ability to provide an extension. Of course we would expect it to provide appropriate information of approaching deadlines or expected timelines. I will not repeat what I said in my main contribution on this group, but I did try to set out some examples where a breach is a genuine accident or someone has inherited equity, versus somebody trying to circumvent the regime. The regulator has that flexibility and a regime with teeth so that it can respond to both scenarios.
The shadow Minister posed a number of questions, so I will double-check Hansard and, if I have not answered them all, I will write to him.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 29 to 32 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
Yes, absolutely. That goes back to the discussion that we had earlier on new clause 15. The regulator will take credible information seriously.
Clause 34 provides the regulator with the necessary powers to test incumbent owners—those already in place—of clubs, where there is a concern about their suitability. It will allow the regulator to tackle any risk to clubs from unsuitable owners within the industry, while recognising that there are suitable owners already in the system who do not need to be tested. We want to ensure that the approach is not overly burdensome for the regulator, and we do not want to deter investment in the game. Incumbent owners can be assessed to ensure that they have the requisite honesty and integrity, and are financially sound enough, to own a club. If the regulator has information that gives it grounds for suspicion, incumbent owners can also be tested on their source of wealth. The regulator will need to establish if wealth is connected to serious criminal conduct, including crimes such as drug trafficking or fraud. The regulator will not remove incumbent owners because of a mere suspicion about their source of wealth. Rather, an incumbent owner must be treated as unsuitable if the regulator is more sure than not that their source of wealth is connected to serious criminal conduct. The clause will ensure that the regulator has the appropriate powers to test incumbent owners where a risk of harm arises.
Clause 35 provides the regulator with the necessary powers to test incumbent officers—those already in place—of clubs, where a risk of harm arises. As with the provisions for owners in clause 34, testing of officers is limited to cases where there is concern about suitability. It allows the regulator to tackle any risks to clubs from unsuitable officers already in the industry. Incumbent officers can be tested to ensure that they have the requisite honesty, integrity, competence, and are financially sound enough, to continue in their role.
The Government are aware that finding an incumbent owner or officer unsuitable would bring about significant consequences for that person, and may cause concern for clubs or fans. That is why, when the regulator is minded to fail an incumbent owner or officer, clause 36 gives the individual and the club concerned an opportunity to make representations before the regulator makes its final decision. That allows an officer or owner an appropriate opportunity to argue their case before the regulator finds them unsuitable. The regulator has the ability to test or re-test incumbent owners and officers, which will prevent unsuitable custodians from harming clubs over the long term, not just at the point of entry. That will help to ensure the sustainability of clubs over the long term, benefiting football now and into the future. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.
Mr French
Clause 33 places a duty on clubs to notify the Government’s new regulator of any change in circumstances relating to the current owner or an officer that could impact their suitability under the regime set out in part 4 of the Bill. On one level, it is an understandable provision. To fulfil its statutory duties, the regulator must be kept informed of material changes, as ensuring the fitness and propriety of owners and officers is a core part of its remit. However, the clause as drafted raises a number of serious and practical concerns about how such a duty will be defined, interpreted and enforced.
The first issue with the clause is its vagueness. What exactly constitutes a “change in circumstances”? The explanatory notes prepared by the Government give a small indication of what such circumstances might include, stating that
“Relevant material changes could include, for example, an officer becoming subject to criminal proceedings or regulatory action”.
That is somewhat clear, but what qualifies as “regulatory action”? Could it be an Ofcom investigation, for example? The explanatory notes add that
“new information coming to light regarding whether an owner’s source of wealth is connected to serious criminality”
also qualifies as a material, relevant change. What qualifies as “new information”? Does it mean a full-blown criminal investigation or spurious claims, potentially made by activist groups against foreign owners? How the provision will work needs to be clarified.
The Government and the new regulator must be up front, open and honest with fans and Parliament as to what those terms actually mean. We fear that the Government are deliberately muddying the waters around what the regulatory environment would look like under the Bill, and around the rules that the regulator will seek to apply. The Minister must answer whether a “change in circumstances” is limited to formal legal developments, such as bankruptcy, a criminal conviction, or something as small as a parking fine. I hope not the latter. Could the definition extend to more subjective matters such as personal, reputational issues, media allegations, or ongoing investigations? If so, I fear that the Government and their regulator would be on very shaky ground, not just because clubs would find themselves in the near-impossible position of having to second-guess what the regulator might later deem to be relevant, even when no formal wrongdoing has occurred, but because it would open up the regulator to spates of judicial reviews. As we see already, the wealthiest clubs would be able to hire the best lawyers, and those clubs that are already struggling would be subject to the personal diktats of the chairman of the Government’s regulator. That is not a sustainable, appropriate or moral way to regulate, and it is totally incompatible with the principle of legal certainty that should underpin any new statutory regime.
Furthermore, clause 33 requires that the Government be notified
“as soon as reasonably practicable”
after a change has occurred. Again, the language is open to wide interpretation. What is “reasonably practicable” for a large Premier League club with extensive legal support may be entirely different for a National League side with minimal back office capacity. We must ensure that smaller clubs are not disproportionately penalised because they lack the administrative infrastructure to track and report such changes with the same immediacy as those international brands that sit atop the English football pyramid. We must also ask whether the sanctions for failing to report, which could be very serious, potentially leading to licence revocation, are proportionate to each breach. Clubs cannot become the regulator’s enforcement arm, expected to carry out continuous due diligence on their own officers and owners, with the threat of regulatory action hanging over them if they get it wrong.
Clause 33 touches on a sensitive area: the relationship between clubs and their owners, and the role of the state in policing suitability. It is right to expect clubs to act responsibly and keep the regulator informed, but the duty must be clear, proportionate and fairly enforced to avoid lower-level staff being put in extremely difficult situations. We do not want to create a culture of regulatory paranoia, where clubs feel compelled to notify the Government’s regulator of every minor development just in case it is later deemed relevant, nor do we want smaller clubs punished for failing to meet standards that are de facto only achievable for the top tier. The Government must ensure that the clause is not a trapdoor for arbitrary enforcement, and that it supports predictability, stability and confidence in the regulatory framework. We understand the underlying principle, but we will continue to press the Minister to ensure the practical operation of the clause does not give rise to legal ambiguity, unjust outcomes or unaccountable discretion.
Before moving on, I have a number of questions on clause 33. Could the Minister clarify what sorts of events would qualify as a “change in circumstances” under clause 33? Will guidance be issued by the football regulator to ensure consistent interpretation? Will the definition be limited to formal, objective legal changes? What level of evidence or certainty will clubs be expected to have before reporting a change? Will clubs be required to report allegations or media speculation? Will the football regulator consider good-faith failures to notify or take a strict liability approach? How will the regulator account for differences in club size, structure and resourcing when judging what is “reasonably practicable”? Will there be any threshold or scaling in terms of compliance expectations for clubs of differing means?
What appeal or review mechanisms will be available to a club if the football regulator finds that it failed to notify as required? Will there be a formal process for representations or challenge before any enforcement action is taken? How does the clause interact with the broader principles of legal privilege and privacy? Will clubs be expected to disclose internal HR issues or ongoing internal investigations, even if there is no conclusion yet? Have the Government assessed whether the clause is compatible with UEFA and FIFA expectations of non-interference in the running of football clubs? I had a written response from the Minister this morning regarding her last meeting with UEFA and FIFA, which was 1 November. A lot of water has gone under the bridge since then, so we are still concerned about the broader point regarding UEFA. I would appreciate a response to that point today.
Moving on to clause 34, it empowers the football regulator to determine whether an incumbent individual owner meets the fitness criteria or has wealth associated with serious criminal conduct, if the regulator has information that raises grounds for concern. It requires the regulator to inform the owner and club before making a determination and then notify them of the outcome. If passed, more than 100 English football clubs will be subject to the regulation. It is not specified in the Bill what level of information would raise grounds for concern regarding incumbent owners. If the bar is set too low, the regulator may be immediately burdened by reviewing multiple existing owners, causing unease in English football. What level of information is required to qualify as grounds for concern? There is also no time limit for the regulator to make its assessment, so how will the regulator ensure that the threat does not needlessly hang over existing owners?
Clause 35 empowers the football regulator to determine whether an incumbent officer meets the fitness criteria if the regulator has information that raises grounds for concern. It requires the regulator to inform the owner and club before making a determination and then notify them of the outcome. As I said regarding the previous clause, more than 100 English football clubs will be regulated if the Bill passes. It is not specified in the Bill what level of information would raise grounds for concern regarding officers, of which there are even more to consider. If the bar is set too low, the regulator may be immediately burdened by the need to review multiple existing officers for each club. I ask the Minister again: what level of information will be required to qualify as grounds for concern? There is also no time limit for the regulator to make its assessment, so how will it ensure that this threat does not needlessly hang over existing officers?
Lastly—you will be pleased to know, Mr Turner—clause 36 requires the football regulator to give advance notification to an incumbent owner or officer if it is minded to find them unsuitable. Before making a final decision, the clause requires the person and club in question to be allowed to make representations, which must then be taken into account. The clause stipulates that the regulator must inform incumbent owners and officers only that it is minded to find them unsuitable, not of the reasons why. Given the vital importance of these representations, should there not be a requirement for the regulator to disclose the reasons to the person and club so that they can fully engage? I would appreciate the Minister picking up the point about the reasons, because it is important.
There is a broader point here about clubs that may be listed on the open market. My understanding of this clause is that, before a final decision is taken, the club would effectively become an insider from a trading perspective. It will be interesting to see how the Government will seek to manage that risk in terms of financial compliance, given that an issue with a particular owner or officer could have significant financial implications for a club and therefore potentially leave individuals inside that loop at risk of being involved with inside information from a dealing perspective. As we all know, if anyone is found to be in breach of inside information, it has very serious consequences. It will be interesting to see how the mechanism in this clause to inform clubs and individuals first will work with the broader notifications in the market where clubs are listed.
Stephanie Peacock
I will begin with the subject of UEFA. Once again, I can reassure the shadow Minister that UEFA is content with the Bill as drafted. He will note that, in answer to his written question, I detailed my last meeting with UEFA, which was after the Bill was published, and said that we continue to engage with officials on a regular basis.
The shadow Minister asked a long list of questions to which I will respond in writing to ensure accuracy, as I did not get a chance to note them down. We have spoken about some of the points he touched on around appeals and enforcement and will come on to debate them in further detail.
I draw the shadow Minister’s attention to the fact that, as I said in answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East, the bar is set differently for existing and new owners. I outlined points on new owners, grounds to suspect, incumbent owners, the balance of probabilities and the higher bar given existing owners’ property rights.
The shadow Minister also asked a number of questions on what information would be relevant. A parking ticket, certainly, would not be relevant, but serious legal issues or an investigation or action by a regulator—things of that nature—would be relevant. The regulator will not immediately test information in every case just because it comes in. It will make its own decision about whether the information reaches a high enough threshold for it to take action.
Information that gives the regulator grounds for concern could come in lots of forms. It does not need to be new information, as I outlined in my response to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East, but it has to call into question whether the individual is still suitable to be an owner or officer of a club. The information may be relevant if the club gets into difficulty or fails to comply with the regime. Information that is in the public domain or held by external organisations about incumbent owners could be considered grounds for concern to test an individual. It will be up to the regulator to decide whether the information meets the threshold for the incumbent to be tested.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 33 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 34 to 36 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Vicky Foxcroft.)
Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting)
Louie French ExcerptsTuesday 10th June 2025
(2 weeks, 6 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Football Governance Bill [HL] 2024-26 View all Football Governance Bill [HL] 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 10 June 2025 - (10 Jun 2025)
Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)
It is a privilege to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy, and to speak on day three—is it day three? Time flies when you’re having fun!—of this Bill Committee.
The hon. Member for Sheffield South East has explained in quite lengthy detail the aims of the amendment; I will not repeat what he has said, because it is his amendment, but I have great sympathy with his arguments. Examples, as he says, include Derby, Sheffield Wednesday, Coventry, Wimbledon—for us slightly older football fans—and of course my home club, Charlton, where as I understand it the person who owned the club two owners ago retains ownership of both the stadium—The Valley—and the training ground.
That creates a number of challenges for clubs, not only on the playing side, but behind the scenes and on the academy side. It is a real issue in football. The hon. Member highlighted some of the tensions it causes, particularly with fans, and the great uncertainty about the future of the game and the participation of those clubs. It is always extremely disappointing and frustrating when a small number of owners clearly do not have the best long-term intentions for the club or the community that they serve.
I am interested to hear the Minister’s response to the amendment and how it might work if it is agreed to. I would also like to understand how it would work for good owners who look to invest in their communities and grounds, and who ensure that clubs have new stadia, for example. The most obvious example, going into the new season, is Everton’s new stadium. We in the Opposition do not want to restrict clubs from increasing capacity and investing in communities around the country; I am sure that we will see a lot more of that, going forward, as clubs seek to increase their revenues and the capacity of stadia. Nevertheless, I have great sympathy for the arguments made by the hon. Member for Sheffield South East.
Jon Pearce (High Peak) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Jeremy. I would like to make a declaration of interest as a member and former chair of the RamsTrust. The history of Derby County and its football stadia has been raised by both the shadow Minister and my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East. In 2003, three owners bought the club for £1 each and decided to sell it to a company based in Panama. We then had to lease it back for £1 million a year. It took years to bring the club and its stadia back together. More recently, under Mel Morris, the club and its stadia were again separated. It was only this summer that they were brought back under one legal ownership, thanks to the new owner, David Clowes.
As a fan of a club that has moved from the old Baseball Ground to Pride Park, I believe the shadow Minister is entirely right that clubs must be able to move stadium. That is absolutely clear. However, it is also clear that, for many fans, the stadium is part and parcel of the community and the way of life. What I would give to be able to go back to the Baseball Ground and relive my childhood! I cannot overstate how important an emotional attachment to the stadium is. It is impossible, in most fans’ minds, to separate the two.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 16—Duty to consult fans on political statements—
“(1) A regulated club may not publish any political statements, political opinions, or issue an items with party political connotations unless it has taken reasonable steps to establish that such statements, opinions or items are supported by the majority of the club’s fans in England and Wales.
(2) A regulated club may not permit any officers or employees, when acting in an official capacity, of the club to engage in political activities or publish political statements or wear any item with political links unless it has taken reasonable steps to establish that such activities, statements, or items are supported by a majority of the club’s fans in England and Wales.”
This new clause would give fans a say on the political positions adopted by regulated football clubs.
Mr French
Amendment 104 would amend schedule 4 to insert
“the club’s political statements and positions”,
to ensure that clubs have to engage their fans on any political statements that the club might adopt. New clause 16 introduces a duty to consult fans on political statements and is an expansion of what that means in practice. As everyone can see the amendment paper, I will move on to my speech.
Schedule 4 sets out the threshold requirements that a club must meet to be granted a licence by this Government’s regulator. In essence, those are the baseline criteria that every club must pass before the Government allow them to play football. Never before has a Government been involved in deciding who can play football. This is a huge moment for English football, its governance and, most importantly, its fans. On the face of it, few would argue against the principle of minimum standards, but as is so often the case with regulation, the devil lies in the detail. In this case, the sheer breadth and flexibility that the Bill hands to the Government’s regulator raise real and pressing concerns.
I start with a central and unarguable point: clubs must be well run. No one disputes that, and thankfully, the vast majority of clubs in the country are. However, we have seen hard-working communities let down by reckless owners and weak governance—from Bury and Derby to the recent struggles at Reading, which the hon. Member for Newbury mentioned. The purpose of this legislation should be to help to protect footballing communities better and to ensure that all clubs are not only sustainable, but rooted, responsible and resilient. However, there is a clear difference between ensuring prudence and exercising control over a club.
My concern, and that of many clubs and fans, is that schedule 4 risks crossing that line. Under paragraphs 2 to 7 of schedule 4, the Government’s regulator is empowered to set requirements for financial resources, suitable governance structures, appropriate corporate plans and the ability to comply with all relevant obligations. On the surface that might seem sensible, but the provisions are broad, vaguely defined and, in practice, leave almost every detail to be filled in by a politically led regulator at a later date via licence conditions.
Let us take paragraph 4, for example, which sets out:
“The fan engagement threshold requirement is met, in relation to a club, if the club has adequate and effective means by which—
(a) the club consults its fans about the relevant matters, and
(b) the club takes the views of its fans into account in making decisions”.
However, it does not tell us what constitutes “adequate” or “effective”. Can the Minister tell us what those terms mean, or when we can expect to be told? Who defines those terms? Is this another instance of the regulator being able to set its own definitions, terms of reference and standards? Paragraph 3(2)(c) states that the Government’s regulator must have regard to a club’s “corporate governance arrangements”. I ask the Minister: what does that actually mean? We are not told, and again it is not clear. Does it mean formal board structures, independent non-executive directors and complying with the UK corporate governance code, or something else entirely? Could the Minister please clarify that for the Committee?
We fear that this schedule hands a blank cheque to the regulator to determine how football clubs, from Premier League giants to National League sides, must structure their affairs, able to coerce them into restructuring their club to fit a narrow regulatory framework that has not been voted for by the fans of any club. This is a serious transfer of power from clubs and their owners to a Government body, and we must ask: is it proportionate? Is it justified?
Max Wilkinson (Cheltenham) (LD)
Would this new clause preclude the owner or chairman, or some other executive officer or member of staff, of a football club from standing for election? I can think of one example: a former chairman of my club Southampton, the hon. Member for Great Yarmouth (Rupert Lowe). He stood for the Referendum party in the Cotswolds in 1997, shortly after he had become the chairman of Southampton football club, and he is rumoured to be joining those on the Conservative Benches soon. I wonder whether the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup would be against that sort of thing.
Mr French
I will try to stick to the footballing part of the question and not stray into the transfer market, which I believe opens today or tomorrow. When we have people camped outside Conservative Campaign Headquarters on deadline day, I will know that the hon. Member for Great Yarmouth has sent them there. In all seriousness, what we are looking to do is to talk about representations made by a club in an official capacity rather than a personal capacity. I think that there is an important distinction with what a person does in their own time. What was the party—the Referendum party? The hon. Member for Cheltenham is showing his age.
Max Wilkinson
Some would regard wearing rainbow laces for Pride as a political statement. In the hon. Member’s ideal world of football governance, would a club have to go to a referendum of its fans to work out whether its players and the club could wear rainbow laces for Pride, for example? Would that not be more pointless bureaucracy?
Mr French
We are not suggesting a referendum. We are saying that fans should be involved in the decision-making process. There is a debate around Pride and other issues, but that is not the point we are trying to make. We are trying to make sure that football clubs, wherever possible, stick to the game and that fans have a say. I have already said that we are not trying to bind clubs and prevent them from addressing initiatives that are often taken by the leagues rather than just individual clubs, but we are trying to ensure that fans have a say.
Amanda Martin (Portsmouth North) (Lab)
Does the hon. Member believe that this would include involving fans in political-financial decisions like that made by West Ham United, who donated to the Conservative party? Should fans be involved in that type of decision, or is it a decision that the board should just be able to make?
Mr French
I appreciate the point that the hon. Lady makes. I am not aware of the financial example that she gives—genuinely I am not—so it would not be appropriate for me to comment, but the crossover between politics and football is one that we have to acknowledge, regardless of party allegiance. The vast majority of fans, when they go to the football at the weekend or midweek, go to watch football and in many ways to switch off from the harsher realities of life. I am personally a big believer in politics staying out of sport, as I have said on a number of occasions.
Amanda Martin
Just for the record on those donations, in 2016 the club contributed £12,500 to the Conservative party, and in 2022, it contributed £9,000.
Mr Betts
This is a serious point, because football is about our communities. It reflects what goes on in our communities and tries to improve it. Football has a very good record of tackling racism in this country, right from the top, with the Football Association and the leagues, through to the clubs. Young kids walk on the pitch and there are “kick racism out of football” banners, and football has done good work on homophobia as well. Is the shadow Minister saying that all those matters should be put to a club’s fans in a referendum, or would we expect a club to do those things as a matter of good practice?
Mr French
I completely appreciate the hon. Member’s point. As he highlighted, clubs have done a lot of this good work themselves, so I do not believe that the Government or their regulator need to dictate on terms where clubs have that good practice already. My new clause tries to draw a line so that fans will have a say on any such issues and, in particular, on contentious ones. I do not personally believe that kicking racism out of football is a contentious issue. The vast majority of fans would absolutely support that, and have supported for many years the work that that campaign has done.
Max Wilkinson
New clause 16 specifically says that the club must establish that there is support from
“a majority of the club’s fans in England and Wales.”
That is really difficult to establish. Committee members will have been in football grounds and heard a number of opinions expressed in vociferous terms from the stands. I challenge anyone to say that it is possible to establish that a majority of fans either support or do not support any kind of political statement that might be made by a club. I just do not think the new clause works.
Mr French
I am not sure what to say about that, but the hon. Member can have his say when the Committee votes on the matter shortly. He has stated his belief.
In recent years, we have seen clubs wade into contentious debates, sometimes with noble intentions, without any formal engagement with their supporter base. Whether we are talking about a statement on a foreign conflict, domestic legislation or ideological campaigns, such interventions can divide opinion and risk alienating the people who pay their money, wear the shirt and keep their club alive. Nobody is arguing that clubs should be barred from speaking on social matters, but they should be expected to act with consent, not presumption. Fans should not wake up to find their club being used as a platform for views that they had no part in shaping. The new clause would not restrict freedom of expression; rather, it would enhance democratic accountability in football.
Mr French
I will make some progress because I am conscious of the Chairman’s time. The new clause would ensure that where a club proposes to adopt a political stance not directly related to football or the club’s commercial interests, it must first engage with its supporters through an appropriate consultation mechanism. This is about strengthening the bond between club and community, not weakening it. New clause 16 would be a simple safeguard to protect the cultural neutrality of our national game, and to ensure that football remains a source of unity, not division.
The cumulative effect of the Bill’s provisions, as they stand, is that they give the Government’s regulator enormous latitude to impose an ever-growing set of compliance obligations on clubs with little oversight or scrutiny from Parliament or fans. It is entirely possible, perhaps even likely, that clubs could find themselves constantly revising governance arrangements, redrafting financial documents and hiring compliance staff simply to keep up with the regulator’s demands—demands that are funded by the clubs. That is a concern for the entire football pyramid, but it is a particular burden for the lower leagues, where administrative budgets are tight and every pound spent on compliance is a pound not spent on the pitch or in the community.
Let us be clear: good regulation is about balance. It is about ensuring standards without stifling initiative, protecting clubs without disempowering them and learning from the past without writing off the future. There are a number of ways in which the Government could help to strike that balance.
First, we ask the Government to publish a clear definition of what each of the threshold requirements entails. It is not good enough to provide for “appropriate” arrangements. The regulator should be guarded by Parliament’s intent, not left to interpret sweeping language.
Secondly, we must ensure transparency and account-ability. If the regulator decides to change the threshold requirements—say, by requiring new climate disclosure standards or mandating support or representation on the board—that is a major policy shift. We believe that, as a sovereign Parliament responsible for passing this legislation, we should be able to scrutinise and, if necessary, prevent the Government’s regulator from making law by regulation. It should come back to the House, not be slipped through in the shadows.
Finally, we must keep a watchful eye on the cost burden. As we argued in previous debates, the Government’s regulator will not be cost-free. It is expected to fund itself through levies and fees imposed on clubs, so every layer of compliance—every extra form, every extra process —has a price tag. That price will ultimately be paid by the very fans we are trying to protect.
Kevin Bonavia
I thank the shadow Minister for giving way, and it is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Jeremy. The shadow Minister is talking about cost, yet here is another proposal that would add more cost and is effectively unworkable. This Bill is in Committee at the moment. If a club saw the changes here and wanted to lobby us to say, “We are not happy with this,” how on earth would it do that if it had to consult its fans? How do we define a political move by a club? It just does not work, does it?
Mr French
I hear the argument that hon. Gentleman is making, and he will be able to vote on the amendment shortly. Again, I appreciate your time, Sir Jeremy.
It is a shame that the Government would not accept our earlier amendment to ensure that fans know the true impact of the regulator on the price of their tickets. Football is not a normal business. It is a great national institution built on history, local pride and community loyalty. However, that does not mean it should be run by quangos. Clubs should be encouraged to improve their governance, not be coerced into uniformity. They should be supported to succeed, not strangled by red tape.
Schedule 4 is one of the most important parts of the Bill, because it defines the gate through which every club must pass before they can be allowed to simply play football. We owe it to those clubs and their fans to ensure that the gateway is firm but fair, principled but practical, and clear, not vague. That is why we will be seeking further assurances from the Minister that the Government’s regulator’s use of these powers will be proportionate, transparent and subject to proper scrutiny. Without that, we risk creating a regime that may prevent future failures, but at the cost of stifling ambition, independence and the very lifeblood of our national game.
The Chair
I should make it clear that it is not my time; it is the Committee’s time, and the Committee can use it in any way it wishes within the confines of the programme order. Secondly, the hon. Gentleman has slid ever so slightly into a debate about schedule 4 more broadly. I have not intervened to stop him, but I know he will not want to repeat all those points when we get to the debate on schedule 4 stand part.
Mr French
I beg to move amendment 112, in schedule 4, page 99, line 34, leave out “crest” and insert “badge.”
My amendment raises a point that may seem technical, but I believe it is important if the Bill is to respect the history and traditions of our great national game. There is reference in the proposed legislation to the “crest” of a football club, but as any student of heraldry or loyal football supporter will tell us, that term is often misunderstood. In fact, the correct term in almost every case should be the “badge”. A crest is a specific heraldic element part of a full coat of arms traditionally appearing above a shield and regulated under royal prerogative through the College of Arms.
That distinction may seem academic, but it is not. When clubs are challenged on their intellectual property, or when supporters are concerned about the commercialisation or alteration of the symbols that represent generations of loyalty, it matters enormously that we use the correct terminology. We are not just talking about branding. We are talking about something deeply symbolic: an identity that lives on scarves and gravestones, and in the hearts of whole communities. My noble Friend Lord Parkinson raised this point in the Lords with great care and I believe he was right to do so. He proposed that the Bill use the term “badge”, not “crest”, to ensure accuracy and to avoid the legal and cultural confusion that can arise when the wrong term is used.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
Another reason to include the word “badge”, my hon. Friend would presumably agree, is not only that is it technically correct, but it is a word used in football. It is a word that fans use. It is always helpful if legal documents in a Bill can reflect both technical and everyday wording. If the two are the same, that seems like an obvious answer.
Mr French
I thank my hon. Friend for making that point. I must admit, as a long-term football fan, that I have never heard a player say that he kissed the crest of his club when celebrating a goal. The footballing term is as accurate as the legal one, as he highlights.
This may seem a modest amendment, but it speaks to something bigger: the importance of precision, respect for history and an understanding of football not just as a product but as a tradition. If we are going to regulate the game, let us do it properly with the right words and the right respect.
Stephanie Peacock
The hon. Member’s amendment follows the extensive debate regarding heraldic terminology in the other place. I can reassure him that the Government have worked closely with the College of Arms to ensure that the term “crest” is used consistently with heraldic law, and with the FA to ensure accuracy and cohesion with industry norms, as the term “crest” is the key term within its existing heritage rules. The Government amendments made in the other place make sure the legislation remains in step with both the FA and heraldic law, and that is in addition to changes to the explanatory notes, to further clarify the point.
Although the word “crest” is used colloquially in the industry, “crests” have a very specific meaning in heraldic law. Crests can only be granted by the College of Arms and only a select few clubs have been granted one. For that reason, the legislation refers to crests, but also needs to capture other clubs and circumstances. That is why the Bill uses “emblem”.
When making these changes, the Government explored the use of “badge” instead of “emblem”. However, it was felt that “badge” would risk unintentionally only capturing the image on shirts. In examples such as Arsenal or Liverpool, the shirt features only one element of the club’s emblem, such as the cannon or the liver bird. In those instances, “badge” might capture only those elements and thereby not deliver on the policy intent of protecting the heritage associated with the entire emblem. Given those comments, I ask that the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup withdraw the amendment.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Stephanie Peacock
The two I mentioned are the basic points. The regulator has the ability to ask for further information should they want it. I think I gave the example that if the regulator is unsure about the source of funds, or whether there is enough, it could ask for more information. That will be at the discretion of the regulator—we had a well-rehearsed debate on that point last week.
We think that the requirements for a provisional licence are basic requirements that any club should be able to complete. As I was really keen to stress in the debate last week, the regulator will be keen to work with clubs to do everything it can to help them to meet those requirements.
The regulator needs to be satisfied that a club will be able to meet the mandatory licence conditions and duties on clubs once it has been granted a licence. This is a forward-looking “would comply” test. The expectation is that the provision of information and documentation, as well as the engagement with clubs as part of the application process, will be sufficient to satisfy the regulator. It should be straightforward for all clubs to obtain a provisional licence. Once they are in the regulatory system, a club will have time to improve standards up to the necessary requirements for a full licence, with the support of the regulator as needed.
Mr French
One of the points we were slightly unclear about when we had the discussion of provisional licences before was what would happen if a club decided it did not want to apply for a provisional licence. There are several clubs that are very publicly concerned about the regulator. What would happen if they were to form, say, a union and go against the regulator and refuse to apply for a provisional licence? How would that work in practice? Would they be kicked out of the league?
Stephanie Peacock
My hon. Friend makes an important point; it will be proportionate. I have met with all the leagues a number of times, and this was of particular concern to the National League. It will be proportionate, and the regulator will take that approach when dealing with the different clubs and leagues.
Mr French
I appreciate the Minister’s comments about proportionality; we will look to review that as the Bill goes forward. One question I have is about how the regulator will interact with the existing rules. The most obvious ones that come to mind are the financial fair play rules that are already in existence in the Premier League. What analysis of, and crossover with, the existing league investigations and restrictions to clubs will there be?
Stephanie Peacock
Those will be an issue for the leagues; where the leagues have rules, clubs will continue to comply with them. That is not something that the regulator will be involved with. Where there are league rules, that is for the leagues to enforce. I am happy to write to the hon. Gentleman to outline that further.
Mr French
If the Minister could outline that further, it would be really helpful. At the end of the day, we are keen to ensure that there is no confusion in the regulations for clubs, nor any duplication of purpose for the regulator. We would like to understand how that will work in practice, and I would appreciate that in writing.
Stephanie Peacock
I appreciate that point. We will come on to discuss that in relation to schedule 5, and I will give a fuller response then.
Question put and agreed to.
Schedule 4 accordingly agreed to.
Clause 19
revocation and cessation of operating licence
Mr French
I beg to move amendment 106, in clause 19, page 13, line 19, at end insert—
“(c) inviting the club to make representations about the proposed revocation, and
(d) specifying the means by which, and the period within which, such representations must be made, which must be a period of not less than one month beginning with the day on which the notice under subsection (3) is given.”
This amendment allows clubs to make representations about the proposed revocation of their operating licence.
Clause 19 concerns the revocation and cessation of an operating licence granted to football clubs. That is understandably a crucial provision that goes to the heart of how the Government’s new regulator will exercise its most serious power, the ability effectively to remove a club from the regulated football pyramid by taking away its licence to operate. Let me clear from the outset that we support an independent regulator that can intervene when standards are seriously breached but, as with all powers of this kind, the devil is in the detail. Our task in this Committee must be to ensure that the regulator’s powers are proportionate, transparent and accountable.
Clause 19 provides that the regulator may revoke a licence if the club in in breach of licence conditions or if there are grounds to believe that the licence should never have been granted. In principle, that is entirely reasonable, but the consequences of revocation, for clubs, fans and communities, are potentially devastating. This is not the revocation of a licence to sell alcohol or to host events late into the night; it is the revocation of a licence to participate in the life of a community—in many cases, the cultural soul of a town or city. That power should not be exercised lightly, so I must raise several matters with the Minister.
First, what thresholds and safeguards are in place to ensure that revocation is used only as a last resort? Will the Government’s regulator be required to consider less draconian alternatives—such as conditional compliance periods, fines or a change in ownership—before resorting to the total revocation of a licence? Secondly, what procedural protections exist for clubs facing this threat? As it stands, there is no right of appeal, which is why I tabled amendment 106, which would allow clubs to make representations about the proposed revocation of their operating licence.
These are serious matters. The Government’s regulator is empowered to act in the interests of the game and to uphold high standards of governance, transparency and financial responsibility. But with such powers must come robust safeguards, and that is where the clause as drafted falls short. As it stands, there is no explicit requirement for the regulator to notify a club of its intention to revoke the licence, or to invite the club to make representations, before such action is taken. In effect, the regulator could move straight to revocation, without a formal process that allows the club to defend itself, explain its actions or offer remedial steps. That is not due process, it is not natural justice, and in any other regulated sector such an approach would be wholly unacceptable.
Melanie Onn
The shadow Minister talks about there not being due process, but the Bill talks about a club’s failure being persistent and says that a failure is persistent if it has occurred
“on a sufficient number of occasions for it to be clear that it represents a pattern of behaviour or practice.”
It is not a one-off that results in revocation.
Mr French
I understand the point that the hon. Lady makes, but we still believe that clubs have a right to representation and to appeal, which is what this amendment seeks to put into the Bill.
My amendment would fix the problem. It would require the Government’s regulator, before making any decision to revoke a licence, to provide the club with written notice of its intention to do so, and not just stating that it will be revoked but setting out the reasons and the evidence relied on. The club would then be entitled to respond—to make representations within a reasonable timeframe, to challenge the basis of the proposed revocation and to outline any mitigating circumstances or corrective measures.
Such a mechanism would not just be fair; we believe that it is necessary. The consequences of revocation of an operating licence are profound. It would prevent a club from competing in the regulated pyramid, as has been highlighted already. That would be likely to trigger financial collapse, job losses and irreparable harm to the club’s standing and its local community. Therefore, the decision to revoke must be taken only after the fullest consideration, and that cannot happen if one side is not allowed to speak.
There is a broader point about public confidence in the Government’s new regulator. For it to earn the trust of clubs, fans and the wider footballing ecosystem, it must be seen to operate fairly and transparently. Due process, consultation and the right to be heard before sanctions are imposed are all basic principles of good governance and the basis of justice. By incorporating my amendment in clause 19, we would be helping to enshrine those values at the heart of the regulator’s enforcement powers.
I urge the Committee to consider the precedent being set. If we allow revocations to occur without a statutory right to respond, we risk creating a regulatory regime that is reactive rather than reflective—one that punishes rather than reforms. That would be to the detriment of the game as a whole, particularly if clubs are chucked out or have their licence removed midway through a season. That would cause a much greater ripple across the league system.
Let me be clear: this amendment does not seek to tie the regulator’s hands. It does not require the regulator to delay action indefinitely or to overlook serious misconduct. What it does do is ensure that any action is taken with the full knowledge of the facts and with the benefit of a fair and balanced process. As we have heard already, clubs, especially those in lower leagues, do not have legions of lawyers or vast compliance departments. Despite best intentions, they may make genuine mistakes or fall foul of complex regulations. We must allow them the chance to explain, to engage and, where appropriate, to put things right, before the ultimate sanction is imposed.
This is a measured, sensible and proportionate amendment. It aligns with principles that Members across the House support, and I hope that the Committee will support it. If we are serious about building a strong, fair and sustainable regulatory regime, we must ensure that justice is not only done but seen to be done. On my broader concerns about the drafting of the clause, I ask the Minister what transparency will apply in such situations.
Lincoln Jopp
Does my hon. Friend agree that his amendment is very much in the spirit of football? We have seen many injury time winners, when all the odds are stacked against a club, but in the dying moments they manage to rescue an almost impossible situation. So it is not only in the spirit of fairness, but in the spirit of football.
Mr French
I thank my hon. Friend for putting it very poetically. He talks about the spirit of football. I am not sure how many last-minute winners Chelsea have scored over the years, but he might have misbehaved on the terraces with joy and jubilation when it has happened. His description was much nicer than calling it the VAR amendment, which would not have been so popular across the House. His point is well made.
Will the regulator be required to publish clear criteria and case-by-case justifications for any licence revocation, so that Parliament, the press and the public can understand why the decision was taken? What consideration will be given to the fanbase—the loyal supporters who may find their club’s future in jeopardy through no fault of their own? How will we be acting in the interest of fans of English football if we do not have transparency?
We must also bear in mind the risk of regulatory overreach. Such a power as this, unless it is tightly constrained, could inadvertently create uncertainty and instability in the football ecosystem. Clubs, owners and investors must know where they stand. A stable regulatory environment, not a reactive or arbitrary one, is essential if the Government’s new regulator is to command respect, not just fear. I hope the Minister provides more clarity on how her new regulator will apply clause 19 in practice and on what guidance will be issued to ensure that the power of revocation is exercised only with great caution and care. When dealing with a matter as serious as extinguishing the operating licence of a football club, we owe it to the game and to the people who love it to think through every safeguard properly.
Mr French
The Minister has outlined the initial process before revocation is determined by the regulator. As I explained in my lengthy speech, which I will not seek to repeat, the amendment would give clubs a say if they believed a decision reached by the regulator was wrong. The Minister was clear about the tribunal approach if a club is not happy with a decision, but as I have outlined previously, my fear is that clubs will end up spending more time in court than they will focusing on the pitch and on the game. The official Opposition believe that an appeal process at that point would be more beneficial than a legal route.
Stephanie Peacock
As I said, clubs can make representations to the regulator and ask the regulator to look again, and beyond that there is the appeals process. As with all aspects of appeals process, the key considerations are the expertise of the judiciary, the tribunal’s experience and familiarity with the policy, speed and cost. We think the Competition Appeal Tribunal is the best option for balance. It is an internationally well-respected tribunal which offers time and cost-efficient options, with flexible case management to expedite urgent cases and bring in appropriate expertise. We believe that that avenue and the internal review process make adequate provision in the Bill and that the hon. Gentleman’s amendment simply is not needed.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 19 details revocation of a club’s provisional operating licence for failing to progress to a full licence, and a licence ceasing to have effect. For the revocation to occur, the regulator must satisfy itself of three things: first, that the test for a full operating licence is not met; secondly, that the club in question has persistently and without reasonable excuse failed to take reasonable steps to meet the test; and finally, that there is no reasonable prospect of the club meeting the test within a reasonable period, even if given more time. The regulator should engage with the club throughout this period. We expect that, through constructive dialogue, a solution can be found that avoids this drastic step in all but the most serious of cases.
The regulator must notify the club of its decision and provide its reasoning. Revocation must not take place before the end of the current season, to reduce as much as possible the impact on ongoing sporting competitions. A licence automatically ceases to have effect only when a club stops operating a team in specified competitions, the most likely cause being that the club is relegated from the specified competition and is therefore no longer in scope of the regulator.
Mr French
I am trying to get clarity. Again, I will happily accept it in writing if the Minister does not have the answer today. Waiting until the end of the season before revoking a licence is entirely sensible, but what would that mean for relegation and promotion? For example, if a club is mid-table and the regulator decides its licence should be revoked, that will have a direct impact on the competitive nature of the league. Has any thought been put into whether, for example, that may mean only two teams are relegated that season, because one has lost its licence? How might it work in practice?
Stephanie Peacock
Where possible, we want to reduce any impact on ongoing sporting competitions. The hon. Gentleman presents me with a hypothetical scenario. I think it would be best if I respond in writing to him.
Regarding the circumstances when a licence automatically ceases to have effect, it will only happen when the club stops operating a team in specified competition. The most likely cause of that is a club having been relegated and therefore no longer being in scope. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Mr French
I will not rehash the debate we have already had on the amendment. We were seeking greater transparency and a greater say for clubs at risk of losing their licence, which, as I have explained, is the ultimate sanction and would cause enormous damage to clubs and the communities in which they operate through job losses, and impact on the game and on fans. I would appreciate the Minister giving more clarity on how this will work in practice. These situations are hypothetical, but realistic, and would have serious consequences for not just the individual clubs, but the leagues and how they operate.
We believe strongly that promotion and relegation should be based on competition on the pitch. However, in the extreme example of a club breaching the licence so significantly that it is revoked, which might more realistically happen at the lower end of the pyramid, we need to have a greater understanding of what that means for relegation. All clubs deserve transparency in that regard. We have seen much speculation in recent years around change of ownership—I will not mention the clubs involved as some of the legal cases are ongoing—what that might mean for relegation and the significant financial consequences it may have for other clubs. It would be greatly appreciated if the Minister provided guidance on that in writing so that all Members can have a greater understanding of how it will work in practice.
Baggy Shanker (Derby South) (Lab/Co-op)
Will the Minister say whether a good licensing regime and, if necessary, revocation of licences would prevent clubs from going into full administration—as in the example of Derby County that my hon. Friend the Member for High Peak described—and the knock-on effect of that on supporters, suppliers and the local community? A licensing regime should prevent full administration and be able to deal with problem clubs at a much earlier stage.
Stephanie Peacock
My hon. Friend raises an important constituency point. I do not want to comment on particular clubs and predict the action the regulator may or may not take. We hope that the Bill will raise the bar across the board and prevent clubs from getting into difficulty, but I do not want to be drawn on the specifics.
We have been clear that this is not a zero-fail regime. I will endeavour to write to the shadow Minister regarding the complex, but important, hypothetical situation he has proposed.
Mr French
I appreciate the Minister committing to that. The example just mentioned by the hon. Member for Derby South needs fleshing out as well, because clubs get into financial difficulty as a matter of course; points are therefore deducted mid-season, as we have seen, or, in the worst cases, the club goes into administration. The tests for the licence are about financial prudence and sustainability, so the hon. Gentleman makes a fair challenge.
What would happen if a club went into administration? Would the regulator seek to change the owner to allow the operating licence to continue, for example, or would the club, having lost the licence, then reapply via a new owner? The consequences would be dramatic. One would automatically assume that a club that no longer had a licence would have to start at the bottom of the football pyramid and come back up again, as we have seen in the past. Can the Minister add clarification of that important example to her letter?
Stephanie Peacock
Absolutely. We will come on to the owners and directors test later in the Bill Committee; perhaps we can explore this further at that point. The one point I would make to the shadow Minister and to my hon. Friend the Member for Derby South is that the aim of the regulator is always to minimise disruption to ongoing sporting competitions. I will add clarification on that when I write to the shadow Minister about the complex scenario he proposed.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 20
Mandatory licence conditions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
The clause requires the regulator to attach full mandatory licence conditions to the provisional and full operating licences for all licensed clubs. These are basic and fundamental requirements of the whole regime and so apply to all licensed clubs, regardless of their individual circumstances.
The mandatory conditions vary in their aims. They are set out in schedule 5, so we will cover them in more detail, but to summarise briefly, the conditions on financial plans and annual declarations are about ensuring that the regulator has the relevant and timely information it needs to regulate effectively. That includes financial risk assessments, plans for managing financial risks, details on income and expenditure, and contingency plans in the event of a shock such as relegation.
The corporate governance condition introduces basic requirements to report against the club corporate governance code of practice published by the regulator. This reporting mechanism will mean that clubs are transparent about board structures, decision making processes and equality, diversity and inclusion.
The fan consultation condition establishes a baseline level of fan engagement that requires clubs to consult fans on specified matters. This will ensure that clubs have a framework in place to regularly meet and consult a representative group of fans on key strategic matters at the club, and on other issues of interest to supporters. This will work in tandem with the freestanding duties, such as those protecting club heritage and other key areas.
The annual declaration condition requires the club to submit a declaration on any matters that should have previously been notified, or to confirm that there are no such matters. I commend clause 20 to the Committee.
Mr French
As outlined by the Minister, clause 20 requires the IFR to attach four mandatory licence conditions to the each club’s operating licence, whether provisional or full. This includes a requirement for the club to submit a financial plan, either annually or at more frequent intervals. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s views on how frequent she believes is reasonable; is that semi-annually, for example?
The club must also submit and publish a corporate governance statement explaining how it is applying the IFR’s corporate governance code, and regularly consult its fans. I think we need some clarity about how that will work in practice. The hon. Member for Sheffield South East raised the example of Sheffield Wednesday and multiple fans’ groups claiming to represent the club. I think that that needs some fleshing out so that the regulator is clear about what that consultation looks like. Obviously, that will be different for each individual club, which should, hopefully, know its fans better than anyone else.
Last, there is a requirement to submit an annual declaration of any material changes in circumstances affecting the club. Again, we would argue that that needs to be very clear to clubs, particularly if there is any—
The Chair
Order. I hesitate to interrupt the hon. Gentleman, but, just so that he is reminded, we will get to the detail of all of this in schedule 5. Clause 20 simply introduces the schedule, so the hon. Gentleman might want to keep some of his powder dry for the schedule 5 debate.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank my hon. Friend for tabling the amendments. I know we have discussed this issue a number of times; it has always been a pleasure to do so, and I recognise its importance. Home grounds are often the most important asset that a club owns, so that is why I want to thank my hon. Friend for placing a real focus on them.
The significant financial and heritage value that grounds hold is why the Bill has strong protections to prevent home grounds being sold, used as collateral or relocated without the necessary considerations. Asset of community value status is another mechanism that a number of clubs and supporter groups have obtained for their home grounds. We would expect the regulator to welcome any club that wishes to gain community value status for an asset as another way to protect their home ground.
However, we are confident that the legislation will provide the necessary protections to address fan concerns and keep these important assets protected without mandating this status. Additionally, while assets of community value have proven beneficial for many clubs where no other protections have been in place, these amendments may place an unnecessary burden on clubs. As currently drafted, they would require clubs to either go through what can be a lengthy process with the relevant authority or make structural changes to the constitutional document of a club. Given that significant protections are already in place in the Bill that deliver the necessary safeguards, it is difficult to justify any additional measures for all regulated clubs, especially as a mandatory licence condition.
I really want to reassure my hon. Friend, as I know that home ground protections are of particular importance to him, that the Government have already committed to asset of community value reform in our manifesto, and this is something that the recent English devolution White Paper from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government commits to.
Mr French
I have a lot of sympathy for the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Sheffield South East. The Minister argues that this does not need to be addressed through the regulator, but will guidance be published for those fan groups who are keen to ensure the long-term future of their grounds? What guidance will be published to ensure that any fans in this situation have clear advice from the Government on the best routes to protect their ground?
Stephanie Peacock
I am saying that I am confident the legislation will provide the necessary protections to address fan concerns, but I also draw the Committee’s attention to the work of the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government on the specific issue of assets of community value. Of course, that does not fall into my portfolio, but I am very happy to commit to speaking to my relevant counterpart and adding to the letter that I have earlier committed to writing. This is something that I am sympathetic to, but I do not have the ability to make that commitment today. I believe that the work the Ministry is doing is very interesting and relevant to what we are discussing. For that reason, I am unable to accept my hon. Friend’s amendment, and I ask that he withdraws it.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 136, in schedule 5, page 102, line 7, leave out sub-paragraph (e).
This amendment removes the requirement for the corporate governance statement to cover what action the club is taking to improve equality, diversity and inclusion.
Mr French
My amendments would remove the requirement for clubs to include in their corporate governance statements an account of the actions they are taking to improve EDI. Although the intentions behind the provision may be well-meaning, we believe it is misplaced within the framework of a Bill that is rightly intended to stabilise the footballing pyramid, preserve our historic clubs and ensure sustainable financial conduct.
Let us be clear about what schedule 5 seeks to achieve. It introduces a requirement for clubs to prepare and publish an annual corporate governance statement setting out how the club is managed, its leadership and board structure, and the internal controls that ensure compliance with financial and operational rules. That is, at heart, a welcome and worthwhile measure that will support transparency and proper stewardship across the game. Those are principles that we have been urging the Government to apply to the regulator throughout the process of the Bill, but we believe in certain areas they have declined to do so. The inclusion, however, of a requirement for clubs to report on their actions to advance EDI veers into territory that is, at best, tangential to the core purpose of the legislation. This is, after all, a Football Governance Bill, not a vehicle for social policy experimentation.
Melanie Onn
We talked about this briefly in a previous session. The requirements in schedule 5 are exactly what would be found in any business’s corporate governance report, alongside ESG expectations. Why should it be different for football, and is it particularly the “E”, the “D” or the “I” that the shadow Minister does not like?
Mr French
In my previous career, I headed up sustainability on ESG, so I understand the hon. Lady’s point. If she will let me continue, I believe my points will answer her question.
This country’s football clubs are not arms of the state. They are private institutions, many of which are more than a century old, with proud identities shaped by the local community’s traditions and values. Their job is not to issue corporate platitudes on diversity but to serve their supporters, compete on the pitch and conduct themselves with financial integrity. Mandating EDI reporting risks turning the regulator into a cultural enforcer rather than a steward of good governance.
Importantly, however, we must also consider the burden it will place on clubs, particularly those in the lower leagues. Our amendments go to the heart of an argument that has served us time and again during the scrutiny of the Bill: the risk of regulatory overreach and overburden. Clubs in League One and League Two, National League outfits and even some Championship sides already struggle with the administrative requirements expected of them, from audit processes to licensing compliance. Adding more politically motivated reporting requirements, particularly in controversial and contested areas such as EDI, risks deepening the strain without any justification related to the Bill’s primary purpose: football. Some may argue that football has a responsibility to lead on matters of social justice, but cultural change should not be imposed by statutory mandate. Real change, where needed, comes from within; from clubs taking action because it is right for them and their supporters, not because a regulator demands it as part of its governance tick-box exercise.
We can see that with Forest Green Rovers, a club that chose, of its own accord, to take a distinctive approach to sustainability, ethics and inclusion not because a regulator told them to, but because it aligned with their leadership values and the identity they wanted to build. Whether or not one agrees with their choices, the point is that they were made voluntarily. That is the right way to foster progress in football—through leadership and initiative, not through regulatory coercion.
As we discuss schedule 5 and the role of corporate governance statements in football clubs reporting, it is important to recognise the significant work already underway in the game on EDI—work that is being driven voluntarily and effectively by the FA, Premier League, EFL and National League without an overzealous and politicised regulator interfering. The Premier League has developed its own EDI standard, known as PLEDIS. It provides clubs with a clear, structured framework to improve inclusion both on and off the pitch. It is not a mere tick-box exercise, as we fear the Government regulator will be. It is a rigorous programme of three levels: preliminary, intermediate and advanced. Clubs must earn all of those levels for evidence-based progress and independent assessment.
Max Wilkinson
The shadow Minister referenced Forest Green Rovers, which is the rival club to my town’s club, Cheltenham Town. I have nothing against Forest Green Rovers. They have vegan catering, and many people view veganism as a political statement. That is, of course, a business choice that Forest Green Rovers made and it has served them well. Based on a previous amendment the shadow Minister tabled, would he suggest that the fans should have been consulted on the move from meat to vegan food being served in the grounds?
Mr French
I am happy to answer that with a simple yes. They should have been consulted.
To date, 27 clubs have engaged with PLEDIS, and 18 have achieved the advanced level. Clubs such as West Ham United have demonstrated genuine leadership by embedding EDI principles deep within their organisation over multiple years without the need for Government involvement.
Beyond PLEDIS, the Premier League’s “No Room for Racism” campaign highlights a range of targeted initiatives, from supporting coaching pathways to enhancing representation among players and officials from diverse backgrounds. Premier League schemes such as the professional player to coach scheme and the coach inclusion and diversity scheme have supported more than 80 coaches into full-time professional roles. Meanwhile, thousands of grassroots participants benefit from programmes aimed at increasing access for under-represented communities in football, including the south Asian action plan.
Meanwhile, the English Football League has also taken proactive steps through its equality code of practice, which encourages clubs to set ambitious, measurable goals and recognise best practice through an awards system, with 10 clubs having attained silver status as of last year. The EFL’s community outreach includes programmes such as the Stronger Communities cup, which promotes social cohesion by bringing together girls from local communities and girls who have been forcibly displaced. The EFL Trust’s talent inclusion programme further demonstrates how clubs are creating pathways for young women from diverse backgrounds, ensuring that football’s future is open and accessible. All that work has taken place without the need for the Government’s regulator to interfere.
These efforts underline a key principle: real progress on equality and inclusion in football comes through leadership, commitment and initiative, not through bureaucratic mandates or additional regulatory burdens. Clubs are already stepping up in a meaningful way. That is why we argue against adding a new statutory reporting requirement on EDI in the Bill. We believe that this would risk distracting from the core purpose of the Bill—ensuring sound governance and financial sustainability within English football—while imposing burdens that may not add tangible value.
I urge hon. Members to recognise the existing achievements of football and to support my amendments, which would remove the unnecessary requirements for clubs to report on EDI action in their corporate governance statements. Fans do not attend matches to receive diversity statements. They go to support their team, share in the highs and lows, and pass on the tradition that means something to them and their community. They do so as part of a footballing community that is focused on the team they support, not the colour of a supporter’s skin, their religion or their sexual preference.
These initiatives reflect concerted efforts by the Premier League, the FA, the EFL and the National League to foster an inclusive environment in football. They demonstrate that meaningful progress on EDI can be achieved through voluntary, club-led actions rather than statutory mandates. What precisely do the Government intend that their regulator do with these EDI statements? Will they be assessed for adequacy and ranked against each other? Will penalties be imposed for perceived failure to meet EDI expectations? The risk is not just regulatory creep, but mission creep—the regulator may become an arbiter of social values rather than a guarantor of financial sustainability and good governance.
Let me be absolutely clear: we support inclusivity and fair treatment in football and beyond. Discrimination has no place in the game. Kick It Out and Show Racism the Red Card do important work, and we will continue to support that work, but not by putting extra burdens on clubs that are, in many cases, already struggling due to Labour’s decision to hammer businesses at every turn and twist.
Melanie Onn
The shadow Minister spoke about initiatives that have already been undertaken in football. Clubs have a wider role of community leadership in local communities, and is that not precisely what these rules and regulations provide for? They will ensure that clubs deliver community leadership on things that are important, particularly around community cohesion.
Mr French
As I have made clear, we believe that some of these issues are important, but we believe that they should be addressed on a voluntary basis, which is what has driven progress in the game. We do not believe that it should be mandated in statute at arm’s length by the Government. I have been clear in making that distinction in my comments.
Requiring clubs to report annually on their EDI action is not a proportionate or effective way to achieve those broader aims. It amounts to moral licensing, encouraging clubs to go through the motions rather than to take meaningful steps to foster a welcoming culture in ways that make sense for them.
My amendments would restore clarity to the regulator’s remit. They would ensure that schedule 5 is focused on what really matters: clear lines of accountability, proper oversight of directors and owners, and a robust governance structure that protects clubs from the kind of catastrophic mismanagement that we have seen in the past. Football has always been about community; it is in the dressing rooms, on the terraces and in the shared heritage of our towns and cities that the game’s values are lived. Let us not fall into the trap of thinking that they can be legislated for by line item in a regulator’s reporting requirements. It is for that reason that I tabled these amendments. I urge the Minister to reflect seriously on whether this part of schedule 5 is truly consistent with the aims of the Bill and the traditions of our national game, which is inclusive by default.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank the hon. Gentleman for the amendments, but I disagree with the attempts to remove the references to EDI from the Bill. I will outline why and then, towards the end of my contribution, I will respond to his specific questions.
The Government believe that equality, diversity and inclusion is a key part of good corporate governance. As my hon. Friend the Member for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes outlined, it is common practice. Research shows that diversity on boards and in organisations promotes better governance, decision making and transparency, all of which, in turn, contribute to improved financial sustainability. The relationship between diversity and better corporate performance is recognised by the Financial Reporting Council and the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants.
The industry is already taking action in this space, and the shadow Minister shared some examples, which I will not repeat. In November 2024, the FA published its four-year equality, diversity and inclusion strategy, titled “A Game Free from Discrimination”. It set out a long-term commitment to celebrate and promote diversity in English football, as well as an ambition to tackle all forms of discrimination in the game.
At a club level, in May this year, Chelsea’s incredible work in that area was recognised, with the Premier League awarding them the advanced level of its equality, diversity and inclusion standard—the highest level that can be awarded. All clubs in the Premier League, and some that have since been relegated from it, engage with the Premier League equality, diversity and inclusion standard initiative.
The Bill does not put EDI in football—it is already there and it is being celebrated by the industry. It is therefore right that, as a regulator that will be introducing a corporate governance code and requiring clubs to report against that, it covers EDI. The regulator will look to work co-operatively with stakeholders, draw on the expertise of the sector and add industry initiatives.
As with fan engagement, this will be a statutory baseline. Clubs that already champion equality, diversity and inclusion will not have an additional burden placed on them, other than having to periodically report on those things. Under the corporate governance code, clubs will simply be required to explain how they are applying the code and what actions they are taking to improve equality, diversity and inclusion—and nothing more. That is not onerous; it is a very helpful transparency measure, and it speaks to the question that the shadow Minister posed. I want to be very clear: the regulator is not going to prescriptively micromanage each club’s board or set targets and quotas on EDI. That is simply not the role of the regulator and would cause a significant burden to both the regulator and clubs. Ultimately, this is only a reporting requirement that all clubs should be able to meet.
Mr French
I appreciate the clarity provided by the Minister in outlining what she believes the regulator should or should not do. On quotas, can we be absolutely clear that the Government’s intention is not for there to be a mandated quota for clubs to have certain elements and different parts of the community on the board? Is that the clear intention in what the Minister is saying?
Stephanie Peacock
Absolutely. I will repeat the wording I just used in the Committee: to be very clear, the regulator is not going to prescriptively micromanage each club’s board or set targets or quotas on EDI. We will have that in Hansard twice now, so the intention should be very clear. Therefore, I hope that the hon. Member will seek to withdraw his amendment.
Mr French
I appreciate the clarity that the Minister provided on quotas, because that particularly concerns Opposition Members. As I have mentioned—I will not seek to repeat my comments—we are concerned about mission creep and scope creep of the regulator and what the Bill is designed to do. I made it clear earlier that I believe that football is inclusive and that it has done amazing work, when we compare the state of football 20 or 30 years ago with where we are today. We see that on the terraces at most clubs every single week, and we certainly see that with the national team, which most of the country comes together to support, particularly in big tournaments.
Mandating EDI reporting and turning it into a bit of a tick-box exercise—that was highlighted in some of the Minister’s comments—moves away from what we believe to be the valuable part of this work, which is to drive forward inclusivity in clubs and increase the fan base, which is good for clubs, by expanding beyond some of the traditional support of the game. We fear that having this provision in the corporate governance code, in the way it is written, will lead to unintended consequences. It will drive certain agendas, and we fear that clubs will walk into a number of traps accidentally.
We have tabled these amendments because we believe that EDI reporting, especially in certain areas where it is contested, should not be put on clubs in this way. The voluntary scheme in football has worked much more powerfully over the years, and that is proven in the experiences at football grounds around the country.
Mr French
I beg to move amendment 137, in schedule 5, page 102, line 2, at end insert
“including the club’s official charity.”
This amendment would make clear that the activities of a football club’s official charity can be counted towards it meeting the corporate governance code.
It is a pleasure to speak in favour of the amendment. The Bill as drafted does not specify that the activities of these charities—often known as community trusts—count when taking into account actions taken by the club in relation to meeting the corporate governance code, so I start by asking the Minister why the Bill does not contain explicit recognition, in the governance reporting requirements, of the work done by community trusts. I would appreciate it if she could pick that up in her comments.
As both the shadow Minister for sport and the Member of Parliament for Old Bexley and Sidcup, I am in a fortunate position: I get to see week in, week out how sport, and football in particular, can transform lives. I also get to see what that looks like in practice, not just in headlines or strategies, but on the ground—in local parks, youth centres and school halls across my constituency. I know that other Members will have similar experiences in their own.
In my constituency, we are lucky to benefit from the extraordinary work undertaken by Charlton Athletic Community Trust. It is no exaggeration to say that CACT, if we want to call it that—I do not really like that wording—has become one of the most respected and impactful community foundations affiliated with a professional football club anywhere in the country. It often wins awards at national level for that work. Its work extends far beyond the pitch and well beyond the borough of Greenwich, where the training ground and the stadium—the Valley—are located, and deep into my borough of Bexley, the wider south-east London area, and Kent. In fact, Charlton have been delivering services and support in Bexley for well over a decade.
Charlton’s community trust delivers youth services on behalf of Bexley council. It provides safe spaces and structured activities that help young people to develop skills, build confidence and stay on the right path. In today’s world, where young people, as most Members would recognise, face growing pressures and limited opportunity, that kind of work is more vital than ever.
Although Charlton are not a Premier League side just yet, one of the flagship initiatives that it runs is the Premier League Kicks programme, which operates across the borough in areas such as Thamesmead, Slade Green and Erith—places where young people often face the dual challenge of limited opportunities and exposure to risks—as well as in my area of Old Bexley, Sidcup and Welling. The Kicks sessions are free weekly football sessions, but they are about much more than just sport. They take place in safe and welcoming environments and are led by trained staff. Young people aged between eight and 18 can build confidence, learn leadership skills and receive mentoring from positive role models—often young adults who were once participants in the scheme.
What makes the Kicks programme in Bexley particularly valuable is its consistency and partnership working. Sessions are delivered year round in collaboration with the police, youth services and local schools. This is not a one-off scheme or a publicity stunt. It is part of a broader, integrated approach to youth engagement and early intervention that genuinely helps to steer young people away from things such as crime and towards the opportunities that football presents.
Charlton’s work goes far wider than just youth engagement, although I have seen that recently at Hurstmere school in my constituency and when Charlton brought the Premier League trophy to a local park. It was incredible to see the reactions of young football fans to the trophy. Just remember not to touch it—a mistake that I made on the day, and I was rightly told off.
In Bexley, Charlton are a contracted delivery partner for the council’s early help youth services—statutory support that has been delivered to a high professional standard for many years. Importantly, the trust has developed deep and lasting partnerships in Bexley and Greenwich, not only with the local authority, but with the NHS, local schools, the police and the voluntary sector. That joined-up approach is what makes its work sustainable and successful. As I said, I am sure that many other clubs around the country are doing such work.
Jim Dickson
The hon. Gentleman is outlining in great detail the amazing work done by Charlton Athletic through its club charity. Nearby Dartford football club are lower down the football pyramid, but is he aware that, none the less—typically of clubs around the country, be they in League One, the Championship, as Charlton now are, or lower down the pyramid—it does amazing work? Dartford FC educational charity does incredible work in the community. It has partnered up with ellenor hospice to raise money, and it has undertaken great public health work with Kent county council around stopping smoking. I am glad that he has mentioned Charlton’s work and given us an opportunity to raise the work done by our clubs.
The Chair
Before the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup responds, it may be of assistance if I put on record that I am prepared to take it as read that all football clubs do good work. There is no need for Members to explain it in detail.
Mr French
Thank you for your guidance, Sir Jeremy. You will be pleased to know that I am coming on to why my example is relevant to the amendment. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Dartford for raising the example of Dartford football club—a rival of one of my other local clubs, Welling United, which also do great work in the community.
In the light of your words, Sir Jeremy, I will move on to the amendment. Clubs do such amazing work around the country, and the amendment would ensure that that is recognised properly in the Bill. I hope the Minister agrees that work that such community trusts are delivering around the country, particularly in youth engagement, public health and crime prevention, should form part of a club’s social responsibility and how it is reported.
Why does that matter in the context of the Bill? Because we are legislating for a new governance framework for football, and the Government have decided that this Bill must reflect football clubs’ wider social responsibilities and recognise the real value of institutions such as the trusts, which deliver on the responsibilities in practice. As the Bill is drafted, there is a risk that such work will be seen as separate from clubs’ corporate governance responsibility, and there is a risk that a club will have to wind up its charitable organisation—God forbid—and bring it fully in-house to meet the requirements of the Bill. Allowing a club’s charities or community trusts to count towards that will allow the good work to continue growing while trusts benefit from their charitable status.
The Bill is a slight own goal, but I believe the drafting can be corrected. We believe it represents a missed opportunity for communities across the country, and our amendment would correct that by making it clear that clubs can include the work of their associated community trusts as part of how they meet their governance targets. That does not mean giving clubs an easy ride or allowing them to paper over poor performance elsewhere, but it does mean taking a more holistic, grounded approach to what good governance looks like in the real world.
When we are considering how best to shape football regulation, I believe the example set out by the Charlton trust should give us something to aim for across the country and across the football pyramid. It shows what football at its best can do when it is rooted firmly in its community and takes its social obligations seriously. Charlton Athletic may not be in the Premier League at the moment—give them another season—but through the community trust, they are leading the way in community impact. I understand that it is up for another national award this year.
That is why I believe the amendment is not only proportionate and practical, but in keeping with the spirit of the legislation. If we are serious about building a more sustainable and responsible football pyramid, we must also be serious about recognising clubs that take their community obligations very seriously, not through a statement of intent but through long-standing, properly resourced partnerships.
In Bexley, it does not matter whether you are an Addick yourself; you can come along to a Premier League Kicks session and be part of something bigger. The same is true of neighbouring Millwall, who do lots of great work in the Lewisham borough. We want this to be more than a box-ticking exercise.
There is a real risk that clubs will scale back some of that work if it is brought under the scope of the Government’s regulator. I am sure the Minister would agree that that would be an unintended consequence. Does she agree that allowing clubs to include their trusts’ work in their corporate governance statements would incentivise long-term investment in high-quality community programmes, rather than short-term or superficial schemes?
We hope that any new regulatory framework, including the establishment of the Government’s regulator, will recognise and protect the kind of local partnership work that I have described today. Will the Minister therefore tell us whether she believes that when it assesses a club’s performance, the regulator will be equipped to distinguish between high-impact, properly evaluated community work, such as I have described, and less substantive activity? Will she issue guidance that the regulator must have regard to outreach delivered through a club’s trust when assessing corporate governance?
The Chair adjourned the Committee without question put (Standing Order No. 88.)
Football Governance Bill [Lords] (Fourth sitting)
Louie French ExcerptsThursday 5th June 2025
(3 weeks, 4 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Football Governance Bill [HL] 2024-26 View all Football Governance Bill [HL] 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 5 June 2025 - (5 Jun 2025)
Max Wilkinson (Cheltenham) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Butler—it is appropriate that you are chairing given that, as I understand it, the road to Wembley runs right through your constituency. I will say only that we support both amendments. The principles that the hon. Member for Sheffield South East stated apply, and more regular reporting will clearly help the regulator to hold itself and clubs to account. On whether it should be 12 or 18 months, I think the sooner it is done, the better, and then we can get on with sorting out the state of football.
Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)
It is a privilege to serve under your chairship, Ms Butler—a half-time substitute in today’s proceedings. I will speak briefly to the amendment. I completely understand the objective that he is seeking to nudge the Government towards, which he explained well. The obvious question for the Minister is whether more frequent reporting—three years rather than five years—would mean additional costs. I await the Minister’s response, but I understand that the hon. Member is not seeking to press his amendment to a vote.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair and to serve under your chairship this afternoon, Ms Butler. I thank my hon. Friend for his amendment.
The state of the game report will be a key study into the structure and dynamics of the industry. It will help to build an evidence base to inform the regulator’s approach and decision making. I therefore recognise the intent behind my hon. Friend’s well-meaning amendments.
The state of the game report needs to be produced promptly, but it also needs to be a robust study. The timeframes set out in the Bill balance the importance of a timely first report with giving the regulator time to undertake the necessary in-depth analysis. The regulator will need to publish its first report as soon as possible or, as my hon. Friend outlined, within 18 months of the competitions in scope of regulation being specified by the Secretary of State, as an absolute maximum. For subsequent reports, a maximum of five years between publications will encourage the regulator to take a more long-term look. That should minimise unnecessary burdens on the industry and better align with the timelines for existing industry processes, such as commercial agreements. The regulator will still have the discretion—as my hon. Friend anticipated—to publish subsequent reports sooner if it considers it appropriate to do so.
I cannot accept my hon. Friend’s amendments to reduce the timings further. He asked me to go away and reflect on them, but I do not want to give him any false hope. We have put careful consideration into the time limits, which were changed from the previous Bill. They are an absolute maximum. We have had a number of conversations with the various leagues and stakeholders, and we are confident that they are the right time limits. We have made it clear that the regulator has the power and discretion to publish sooner, and we would very much hope that that would be the case for the first report in particular. For those reasons, I cannot accept his amendments.
Mr Lee Dillon (Newbury) (LD)
I beg to move amendment 139, in clause 10, page 7, line 22, at end insert—
“(iia) supporters trusts, fan groups and individual fans;”.
This amendment adds fans and fan organisations to the list of groups that the IFR must consult about a state of the game report.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Butler.
The amendment seeks to ensure that the heart of football, the fans are remembered and properly considered, and that their voices are heard throughout the Bill. The state of the game report is a key output of the new regulator. It will provide comprehensive assessment of how football is functioning. It will help to set the direction of future policy and regulation, and will be a key measure of accountability for the sport as a whole. Given that, it is essential that fans should have a say.
Week in, week out, fans give their time, money and hearts to the clubs that they love, and yet too often they are the last to be consulted and the first to be overlooked when decisions are made about the future of our national game. The amendment is about changing that. It is about ensuring that the voices of supporters are formally recognised in the process of shaping the game’s future.
Supporters trusts play a key role here. They are often the bridge between clubs and fans, with a working relationship on both sides. They are well placed to represent fans’ views in a constructive and organised way. I recently met STAR, the Supporters Trust at Reading, which represents Reading FC, the closest professional league club to my constituency. Over the years, I have been to many games as a fan, and I have seen at first hand how passionate and committed the supporters are to improve the club and represent their fellow fans. Supporters trusts such as STAR are well placed to act as that bridge between the clubs and their fanbase.
We also recognise that not every fan may agree with their trust. That is why the amendment also allows for individual fans to be heard directly where necessary. It is vital that the Bill is amended to ensure that the independent football regulator listens to supporters when assessing the health and direction of the game through the state of the game report. By formally including fans and their organisations in the consultation process, we ensure that their lived experience, insight and passion are properly reflected in how the game is monitored and improved.
Mr French
The amendment, as explained by the hon. Gentleman, seeks to add supporters trusts, fan groups and individual fans to the list of those whom the independent football regulator must consult about the state of the game report. We have absolutely no problem with the principle of consulting fans in that context, and we would expect the football regulator to wish to do so in the due course of its business, for reasons we explained in other parts of the Bill. I suppose there might be some concern about how long the consultation would take if it had to consult every individual fan, as suggested by the hon. Gentleman, but we will await the Minister’s comments to understand that in the context slightly more.
Mr Betts
Briefly, I think we are going back to a very similar discussion to the one that we have just had, but would the Minister expect—without this going on the face of the Bill—the regulator to consult fans, in particular the Football Supporters’ Association? It has done a brilliant job. It was party to the fan-led Crouch review, and it has provided a great deal of assistance in framing this legislation. I hope that the association would be seen as part of the consultation process when the regulator comes to do that.
Stephanie Peacock
The state of the game report will allow the regulator to better understand the finances and economics of the industry and its individual clubs. This, in turn, will inform the regulator’s approach and decision making across the regulatory framework.
Clause 10 requires the regulator to publish the report and sets out the topics that it must cover, including an overview of the main issues affecting English football and whether any features of the industry are jeopardising the regulator’s ability to deliver its objectives. These are deliberately broad and non-specific topics, affording the regulator some discretion as to what to cover. In essence, this means that the regulator can cover any matter that it considers relevant at the time, providing it relates to the functions of the Bill.
I would like to take this opportunity to provide further reassurance to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East on his earlier amendment. We would expect at this stage for it to include distributions, and powers lie within the Bill for the regulator to do that. I want to put that on record once again, further to our earlier debate. It will depend on which issues and features of the market are relevant to its objectives and the regulatory regime at any given time. However, the report is still constrained by its link to only matters relevant to the regulator’s function, so I reassure the Committee that this cannot be an avenue for scope creep.
The clause also requires the regulator to publish its first report no longer than 18 months after the competitions and scope of the regulation have been specified by the Secretary of State, as we have discussed. Subsequent reports must be published at least every five years after this but, as we have just debated, they could be more frequent if the regulator considers it appropriate. These timeframes balance the importance of a timely first report with giving the regulator time to undertake the necessary in-depth analysis.
Finally, the clause sets out clear consultation requirements, including an open process of inviting suggestions about the issues to be included in the report, as well as targeted consultation on a draft report, which I hope speaks to some of the comments from the hon. Member for Newbury on his previous amendment.
Mr French
I do not want to rehash the debate we had before the lunch break. We will press amendment 122 to a vote under a future clause, but we are disappointed that the Government are not willing to accept amendment 123. As we explained before the break, Conservative Members are very concerned that the regulator may impact ticket prices even further. We were calling for transparency in the state of the game report for fans and for Parliament so that they could understand the impact of the regulator on ticket prices for fans. We are disappointed that that amendment was not accepted. I appreciate the further comments that the Minister made, but I would like her to consider that in the future.
Stephanie Peacock
The hon. Gentleman said that he would not rehash the debate, but somewhat did. I have made my argument clear: ticket pricing is a commercial decision, and the Government have gone further by adding a consultation. We have nothing more to add on that topic; it has been fully debated.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 11
Football governance statement
Mr French
I beg to move amendment 113, in clause 11, page 7, line 41, at end insert—
“(7) No football governance statement may have effect unless approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament.”.
This amendment would require the football governance statement to be approved by Parliament before it could have effect.
As we know, clause 11 makes provision for the Secretary of State, whoever that may be in the coming months, to issue a statement on issues related to football and, specifically, to the Government’s regulator. While the statement is not a binding one, it walks a very fine line and could be interpreted as political interference in the governance of football. As we have already heard when deliberating on clause 7, that is a very real issue with real-life implications for English football and English clubs.
I do not want to get bogged down in the earlier debate, but I ask the Minister to accept the fact that, aside from the context of the Bill, if UEFA or FIFA deem the Government to be exerting influence on how football is run in a way that compromises the independence of football associations and clubs in line with their statutes, they can, and perhaps will, take action to exclude the nation’s teams and clubs from competition. Irrespective of the Bill, if FIFA or UEFA believe that there is Government interference in football, there is a risk that clubs could be kicked out of European competitions.
Stephanie Peacock
No one is disputing that. We are clear that the Bill does not stray into that. As I said to the hon. Gentleman, in his Government’s iteration of the Bill, the regulator had to have due regard to foreign and trade policy. We took that out, further strengthening the independence of the independent football regulator.
Mr French
I genuinely thank the Minister for clarifying. We have to understand the context in which the Bill is operating. As I said earlier, the Bill is being made not in isolation, but in a complex international football ecosystem. We have to be mindful of that in everything that we do in this Committee and in the legislation that goes forward. Will the Minister therefore accept that, even if she does not believe that it will happen, if her regulator is perceived to be exerting influence and undermining the independence of English football, both international governing bodies will exclude English teams? I want to confirm that the Government understand those risks.
Much like the Secretary of State’s failure to declare her interests in relation to her appointee to the chairmanship of the regulator, who we know donated to her, this is about the perception of undue influence and the impact that will have on how the independence of English football is viewed internationally. If UEFA and FIFA perceive that there is undue influence from whoever the Government of the day may be, they will act, as I explained already with the example of Greek football in 2006. I hope that, as the Secretary of State has now done, the Prime Minister will make sure to declare any relevant interests, as we know that the chairman also donated to his campaign.
I believe that the Minister confirmed that she understands that there is a real risk that we have to be mindful of and that if the regulator breached independence, the entirety of English clubs’ participation in Europe, and the jobs and significant revenues that come alongside that, would be at stake. That is why I have tabled amendment 113, which would require the football governance statement prepared by the Secretary of State to be approved by Parliament before it could have effect. That is a vital safeguard to prevent the perception that any Government of any colour have direct influence over the regulator.
Mr Dillon
The shadow Minister may be coming to this point. His amendment states,
“No football governance statement may have effect unless approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament”,
but on the other hand he argues for more independence for the regulator. Surely Parliament and, by extension, political parties having to vote for a resolution would introduce more politics into the independent regulator.
Mr French
I thank the hon. Gentleman for the intervention, but I am speaking very clearly about the interference of Government in football. That is very different from how Parliament acts in creating this statute and being able to check that the regulator is not putting clubs at risk, as I have said before. It is about Parliament having its say, rather than just delegating powers to the Secretary of State of the day.
By requiring that Parliament approve the statement, my amendment would ensure two things. First, there will be proper scrutiny of the Government and their policy. Mr Speaker has recently had to remind the Leader of the House, because of the way the Government have continued to ignore it, of paragraph 9.1 of the ministerial code, which states:
“When Parliament is in session, the most important announcements of government policy should be made in the first instance in Parliament.”
The amendment would require the Government to come the House to present and defend their policy, instead of hiding behind media briefings or social media posts.
Secondly, the amendment would help to mitigate UEFA’s and FIFA’s concerns about the direct influence of Government over the independence of English football. Accepting the amendment and inserting Parliament into the equation would make the regulator much more palatable for the international governing bodies.
I hope that members of the Committee will accept the amendment for what it is: an attempt to ensure that no Government of any colour can be the cause of English football’s exclusion from European or international competitions. There will come a day—the sooner the better, in my opinion—that the Labour party is no longer in government. Labour and Liberal Democrat Members must therefore be realistic, practical and honest about the situation. When there is a different Government in place, will they accept the risk of that Government being the reason that the Three Lions cannot play in the World cup, or the reason that English clubs—from Cheltenham to Barnsley or Welling, or perhaps Sheffield Wednesday —cannot compete in European competitions? That might seem a remote prospect at the moment, but it is the ultimate aim of every club to be in such competitions. That is at risk without this amendment.
If hon. Members are being honest with themselves, their constituents and football fans across the country, the answer will be clear, and they should support my amendment to help to protect English football and give Parliament a greater say.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his amendment, but I am not sure that his remarks spoke much to the detail of it. I remind him that this part of the Bill has not been changed since its previous iteration under the last Government. He has once again made his well-rehearsed argument about UEFA, but there is no risk in that regard. We have been very clear. UEFA and FIFA are happy with the Bill as drafted, and the FA has made that clear to Members of both Houses.
The purpose of the clause is to allow the Secretary of State the power to prepare a football governance statement that sets out the Government’s policies on issues related to football governance, where these are consistent with the regulator’s statutory remit. We believe that this is an important tool that the Government can use to set out their priorities in football governance, similar to the way that the Government give a strategic steer to the Competition and Markets Authority and other regulators.
We drafted the provision with appropriate deference to Parliament. Any statement must be consistent with the purpose of the Bill and the regulator’s objectives as set out in the Bill. The Committee has already considered that purpose and those objectives and has approved them. Parliament has set out the statutory remit, but it is appropriate that the Government of the day are able to set out their policy priorities within that well-defined remit without requiring parliamentary approval each time. There are also restrictions on when statements can be made, to ensure that they are not overused. Any statement must be published and laid before Parliament, so Parliament can hold the Secretary of State accountable for its content. Requiring the Secretary of State to gain approval for this statement would add an extra burden to Parliament.
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. He was new to this place at the election, so he perhaps is not familiar with the previous Bill, but as I have said, this Bill is the same as the Conservative version. On the specifics of the statement, I do not want to pre-empt what may be in there, but it could be, for example, the idea that the Government focus on growth; we have that in the objectives. I do not want to anticipate what could be, but let us be clear: this is about broad objectives, not specifics or operations, and any statement that is not consistent with Parliament’s intention in passing the Bill, as set out in the regulator’s statutory objectives and in the purpose clause of the Bill, could be challenged legally. Similar discussions have taken place in both the House of Lords—the other place—and the House of Commons, and we expect the statement to reflect the Government’s position on the regulator’s use of its powers.
Mr French
I stand to be corrected; we will look at Hansard, but one of the votes that we have had already in Committee was on an Opposition amendment to make sure that growth was clearly defined in that objective in the Bill, and it was rejected by the Government, so I am slightly confused. My hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne has asked for clarification of what might be in the report, and the Minister seems to be contradicting a vote that has already happened. Could she clarify what she means?
Stephanie Peacock
I can absolutely. I said I did not want to be drawn on the specifics of the statement; I do not want to pre-empt what is in there, but I tried to give an illustration without being drawn into the specifics. If, say, there is a general election and a new Government take power, a new Secretary of State may want to give broad direction. We as this new Labour Government have made it very clear that growth is a focus. We know that is in the Bill, so that is why I thought it was a sensible illustration to give in answer to the question from the hon. Member for Spelthorne, but I want to be very clear that I do not want to be drawn into specifics, because this could cover the approach with regulation in, for example, minimising burdens on clubs, which would tie in with that.
I simply do not think this amendment is necessary. For that reason, I ask the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup to withdraw it.
Mr French
I must admit I am slightly confused by the answer that was given. I expected the Government to refuse my amendment, but I am genuinely confused about the direction of travel now. I explained the causes of the amendment. The answer that the Minister has just given to my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne seems to contradict—other Members are nodding—votes that have already taken place on this Bill. Without rehashing the whole exchange, we wanted to put in as an objective of the regulator economic growth and growing the game of football, for very plausible reasons. The debate was around the word “sustainability”—I appreciate that you were not in the Chair at that point, Ms Butler. To hear the Minister describe the objective that was voted down by the Labour party as a key part of Government policy—that was the argument we made earlier; we could not understand why the amendment was voted against—is confusing. We are genuinely confused, so I will press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Stephanie Peacock
To ensure that the regulatory regime is as effective and efficient as possible, the football industry needs to understand what is expected of it. That is why this clause empowers the regulator to prepare and publish guidance on the exercise of its function. The guidance will be crucial to translate the legal framework in the Bill into a detailed and practical explanation of the regulator’s regime. It will ensure that the industry understands the regulatory system, what to expect from the regulator and what is expected of it. Not only will that reduce burdens, but it should improve compliance.
The clause sets out that the regulator must publish guidance about the exercise of its functions under specific sections of the Bill. It also commits the regulator to publish guidance about the exercise of any of its other functions. The regulator must consult any persons that it considers appropriate before publishing guidance for the first time and before revising guidance in the future, unless the revisions are minor. This will ensure the regulator is taking into account the views of all relevant stakeholders and experts when preparing its guidance.
Clause 13 permits the Secretary of State to prepare and publish guidance on the regulator’s functions. If needed, this guidance offers an opportunity to provide some additional detail on the regime that was not included in the Bill.
The industry and fans alike have been clear that they do not want to see ongoing Government involvement in football, as we have debated in this Committee. That is why the regulator must have regard to the Secretary of State’s guidance, but is not obliged to follow it. That is also why the Secretary of State may not revise this guidance any more frequently than every three years. This will deliver an appropriate arm’s length role for the Government, but avoid any risk of the regulator becoming a political football. The Secretary of State must consult both the regulator and anyone else they consider appropriate before publishing or revising any guidance, and must lay the guidance before Parliament. I beg to move that these changes—I mean clauses—stand part of the Bill.
Mr French
The Minister will be pleased to know that I will not pick her up on that slip of the tongue, given I made a few of my own this morning with some of the tongue twisters that my assistant put into my speeches.
As we have just heard, clause 12 requires the Government’s regulator to publish guidance about the exercise of its functions as set out in clauses 21 to 25 and the outcomes it seeks to achieve, and to consult appropriate persons before publishing that guidance.
I have a few questions. Will the Minister clarify when she expects her regulator to have translated its powers and duties into a detailed, cohesive and practical explanation of the IFR regime, and what she believes detailed and practical mean for the clubs, so they can understand that?
Clause 13 permits the Secretary of State to prepare and publish guidance on the Government’s regulator’s exercise of its functions under the regulatory regime. This guidance would aid the Government’s regulator in interpreting the intention of legislation when designing and implementing its regulatory regime. It would be non-binding, but the Government’s regulator must have regard to it when exercising its functions.
There was an interesting debate between two lawyers on this Committee about where those lines are drawn. They have both made their arguments for the record, so I will not go back into that, but the clause does stipulate that revisions to guidance may not be made
“more frequently than every three years”
unless there is a revision to the Bill, or the revision is pre-agreed upon between the Secretary of State and the Government’s regulator. It also requires the Secretary of State to consult both the Independent Football Regulator and any appropriate persons before publishing or revising any guidance and laying it before Parliament, unless the revisions are minor.
The Minister will be aware that in the previous sitting I pressed her about that parliamentary role; I will now do so again. Might we have some insight into where, when the reports come back to Parliament, the Government plan to publish them? On Tuesday I asked the Minister whether that would be the role of the Culture, Media and Sport Committee, or of the Public Accounts Committee, given the financial aspects and the costs, and the role of the Comptroller and Auditor General, or whether that would be on the Floor of the House. We really would appreciate, as the official Opposition, some guidance on where the Government plan to publish those reports, so that everyone in the House may have a clear understanding of the direction of travel and where those reports will be available to be read.
While the guidance may not be binding, the clause highlights the blurred lines between Government and regulator, particularly when the appointee was a political appointee, as we know. How will the Minister ensure that any guidance published by the Government is not interpreted as Government intervention, and that the regulator remains free to act independently while not bringing in those risks that we have discussed today?
Mr French
I beg to move amendment 134, in clause 14, page 9, line 3, at end insert—
“(aa) the cumulative impact of the costs imposed on clubs through compliance with the IFR’s regulatory regime, and”
This amendment would require the IFR to include in the annual report an account of the financial costs imposed on clubs through its regulatory requirements on them.
Let us see whether we get a different outcome on this vote, although I will not hold my breath—I had a wry smile from at least one Member. The amendment seeks to insert reference to the cumulative impact of the costs for clubs from compliance with the IFR’s regulatory regime. The clause makes provision for the Government’s regulator to publish an annual report
“As soon as reasonably practicable after the end of each financial year”.
I will start with a question to the Minister: what does she envision an unreasonable delay to be in the submission of said report? I think we all agree that six months could be unreasonable, for example. I do not ask for a specified time limit of the Minister or in the Bill, although it might be reasonable for the Government to include one; I ask for a rough indication of how long fans will have to wait every season to see what the Government’s regulator is doing. I hope she will give such an indication today in Committee.
Subsection (2), as drafted, lists what the Government’s regulator must include in its annual report. However, we believe that that list is incomplete and requires the amendment tabled in my name. I moved the amendment to require the Government’s regulator to include in its annual report an account of the financial cost imposed on clubs through its regulatory requirements on them.
Increases in regulation have costs for businesses, regardless of the industry or of the intent. The Government and their regulator will ensure that all clubs, as businesses too, will see their costs increase. We have had a lot of debate about where that cost may end up, but I do not think anyone disputes that the costs will rise. First, costs might come from the Chancellor’s tax rises, which we have discussed—whether that is national insurance, wage increases or the energy costs that clubs have to pay. At the elite level, people may be less concerned if they think about the finances of a Premier League club, but such costs have a bigger impact on those lower down the pyramid, all the way to the National League, which will be in scope of the regulator. As we have said consistently, we are very much concerned about the impact on football’s finances and the negative decisions that may result for fans and clubs around the country.
Secondly, but linked to that, there is the ever-increasing cost of red tape, not just that introduced by the Bill, but more broadly. Clubs have to comply with the regulations of the leagues that they play in and of the FA, and now they will have a regulator as well. There are a number of compliance costs, and other legal matters that have been discussed in this House in more recent months will also add cost to clubs up and down the country.
Football might have changed over the years, but I am afraid that the Labour party has not. We believe that the Government have focused too much on their left wing, and left themselves exposed in the midfield and at the back.
Mr French
The hon. Gentleman liked that.
At the heart of the Bill is the ambition to secure the long-term sustainability of English football clubs across the pyramid. That is a commendable—perhaps even noble—objective. However, plain as day, as we have discussed, it will increase costs for every single fan across the country. We need to know how much that cost will be. As the Government attempt to deliver that goal, we must not lose sight of a fundamental truth: regulation is not free. Every new obligation, every form to be filled and every audit to be passed has a cost, financial and operational, that ultimately lands at the door of our football clubs and is then passed on, I am afraid, to fans.
As I have said in previous clauses, many clubs, in particular those in the lower leagues, already operate on a knife edge and in certain circumstances on a shoestring budget. For them, even modest extra compliance burdens can pose fundamental, existential challenges. Those in the lowest leagues—the National League and below—would welcome the improved odds of, for example, perhaps being able to compete in the EFL. As things stand, however, the National League 3UP campaign has been ignored.
The National League clubs that I have spoken to are keen for the 3UP campaign to be included, because they believe that closing the gap on competition should be a conversation not just between the regulator and this Committee about closing the gap between the EFL and the Premier League—a constant theme of our discussion—but about closing the gap at the bottom of the pyramid. Clubs in the National League would have an increased chance of getting into the English Football League. Given the number of clubs in the National League that were previously in the English Football League, we can all understand why the campaign has grown in momentum among the National League clubs. For any Members who were not aware of it, that is the 3UP campaign.
That is not helping the financial sustainability of the clubs that are fighting hard to return via promotion to the Football League or to be promoted for the first time—those that have lofty ambitions to go further up the pyramid. Those in the National League that are, as a direct result of their situation, most impacted by some of the new bills that have been imposed by various actions of the Government, deserve to be able to see why they have those costs and who is causing them. The amendment gets to the heart of that.
At the moment, most fans have an owner they can point to—and blame, if they wish, for their financial failures, as well as their successes on the field. They can campaign to get them out, as Manchester United fans continue to do regarding the Glazer family, for example, or they can sing their praises from the rooftops, as Newcastle fans have done in recent months after their historic success on the pitch. However, this Government’s regulator will blur the lines about who has caused financial instability, because the actions of the regulator will not be as transparent as we believe they could be.
James Naish
I am conscious that we will have several more days of discussion, so I would be grateful if the hon. Gentleman could clarify exactly how this body would have been funded under the legislation of the previous Government. He keeps talking about the costs of the regulator under this Government, but how did he think it would have been funded under the previous Government?
Mr French
That is obviously not what this amendment is about. It is about transparency. It is not about the overall cost, but about the transparency of the cost. The hon. Gentleman asks about how things would have been funded before, but we have to accept that we are in different economic circumstances. A number of costs have impacted clubs already. I am talking about the cumulative impact of Government policy—the Minister has heard me say this in a number of debates, including in the debate on swimming yesterday—on clubs from the elite level all the way down to the grassroots level. The point is that there are now extra costs from the regulator, on top of the national insurance increase, which we think has probably been the biggest change, the changes to business rates calculations, which have negatively impacted a number of businesses, and wage increases. Hon. Members may or may not agree with those costs, but we are talking about their cumulative impact.
Because it is ultimately funded by the clubs, the regulator will increase those costs. The hon. Gentleman talks about how we perceived it would be paid for. The clubs will pay the costs of the regulator—that has not changed—but we are trying to get at the cumulative impact. We want transparency about that impact on clubs, including for Parliament, so that we, as hon. Members who represent constituencies around the country, can have informed debates about the impact on English football of the decisions that we make in this House. As Members of this House, it is not unreasonable to want to understand the impact of our and the regulator’s decisions. Whether or not hon. Members agree with the amendments, they make it quite clear that we are calling for transparency on the costs of the regulator.
Lincoln Jopp
It is important for the House to understand that once an organisation is in the hands of the regulator, it has no choice. I was a director of a company that was applying for an operating licence from a national regulator. It cost millions of pounds, and we never achieved it—we tried three times, and never got there. As long as the regulator is doing its regulatory work, that is okay as far as it is concerned. There can be circumstances in which regulators, as long as things are being done by the rulebook, do not care about the growth of their industry. The amendment is a reasonable counterbalance to that, and would ensure that the regulator understands the financial burden it is putting on teams.
Mr French
I thank my hon. Friend for sharing his experience of regulation more generally. He highlights an important point about growth, which we were trying to get at with our earlier amendment and which we have discussed again this afternoon. Unless the regulator has a clear growth mandate—as I said in the previous debate, I understand that the Chancellor is consulting regulators for growth ideas—it may not seek to stick to it, and it could therefore become obsessed with other issues and regulations. This amendment is not trying to alter what the regulator does; it is just trying to ensure that we have information on costs so that Members of this House can understand the impact. Again, I believe that is a valuable tool for us to have.
Melanie Onn (Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes) (Lab)
The shadow Minister is talking about growth. Does he accept that growth has been included as a secondary duty in clause 7?
Mr French
I do accept that, but as we made clear in the earlier debate, we want growth to be included in the Bill as a primary objective. The hon. Lady has just said that it is a secondary objective, but why is it not a primary objective of the regulator to try to grow the economy of football? We have previously argued that it should be, and I do not want to rehash that whole debate, but that is the distinction that we are making. The hon. Lady quoted the secondary objective, but we have said that it should be primary.
Melanie Onn
On that point, the fact that growth is in the Bill means that it is a clear obligation on the regulator. The expectation is that the regulator would then be obliged to consider the desirability of avoiding
“adverse effects on the financial growth of…English football.”
That seems perfectly plain in the Bill.
Mr French
I respectfully disagree with the hon. Lady. That is obviously her opinion, and we have made a counter-argument and point of debate, which is what this House is for. We believe that growth should be a primary objective. Before the break, we also outlined at length one of the risks of adverse impacts on growth, which was her second point. We have substantially highlighted the impact that English clubs being excluded from European competitions, or the national team being excluded from international competitions, would have on the growth of the game. We have made that argument quite clear. Government Members may not agree with those risks or the points that I have made, but we have been quite clear on why we believe that growth should have been included in the primary objectives.
I will return to the amendment, because I am at risk of getting a yellow card this afternoon. We believe that this Government’s regulator will blur the lines on who has caused financial instability, as the actions of the regulator are being kept behind closed doors unless this amendment is agreed to. Not only have the Government appointed one of their Labour donors as the regulator’s chair, as we have already heard, but they are now trying to deny English football fans the information to which they are entitled to judge for themselves the success of the Government’s regulator in delivering financial stability, or instability. For supporters, increased costs mean higher ticket prices, fewer community programmes and cutbacks to the very things that make their clubs more than just businesses. They are at the heart of the community, which I believe most people will agree with.
We have already seen the regulator begin to grow in size. While the Minister refused to confirm the number of staff that she expected her regulator to end up employing, she answered my written question after our deliberations in this Committee concluded, which I appreciate. The Minister confirmed that, as of 1 June, the shadow football regulator had 42 employees, 11 of which had previously been employed by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, and 2 had formerly advised the Department. I make that point because the shadow regulator has already seen a 10% increase in headcount since the Minister in the other place answered a similar question back in January. We know that the Government are hiring more people, and we are still not clear on how big it will become or what the subsequent costs will be.
If that is the direction of travel, transparency on the cost burdens to clubs is not a nice-to-have but absolutely essential to understand how successful an impact the regulator is having. My amendment would introduce a simple but essential safeguard so that Parliament, clubs and, most importantly, fans could see in plain terms what this Government’s regulator was really costing. That scrutiny and transparency will encourage restraint, discipline and proportionality in the way in which the Government’s regulator operates. That, in turn, will help reduce its burden on clubs and thus make football more sustainable—I believe that was the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne in his earlier intervention.
We do not want to replace one form of financial instability with another, where well-meaning but poorly monitored regulation drives costs even higher, disproportionately affecting those least able to bear them. This is not about opposition for opposition’s sake; it is about delivering sustainable regulation that supports, not stifles, the game that we all cherish. For that, we need proper accountability of the regulator.
As I said on Tuesday, I do not believe that many people think that regulation has been done well in this country over the past 20 years. We can talk about whom we want to blame, but I argue strongly—this is not a party political point—that regulation has not been done well and that Parliament has devolved too much power to unelected people who are not held accountable for their decisions. I want to avoid that at this point in the Bill. We are setting up a new regulator—I am sure that will happen—so let us ensure that it is accountable to this House, that we do not make the same mistakes as in the past, and that we have accountability and transparency on cost and direction of travel.
Stephanie Peacock
Clubs may well do that, absolutely, but the amendment goes further than is needed and I will continue to make the case as to why I simply do not think it is necessary. It could involve the lengthy and onerous process of identifying and separating compliance costs from their overall operational costs. Reporting on compliance costs would drive up those costs unnecessarily. The regulator and Department will already be required to undertake monitoring and evaluation of the impact of regulation; that includes the review of the Act by the Secretary of State as per clause 96. For those reasons, I cannot accept the amendment and I ask the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup to withdraw it.
Mr French
We tabled the amendment because, as my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East explained, it is in the interest of driving transparency for fans and clubs, and for Members to see the effectiveness and impact of the regulator. As my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne explained, it is highly likely that most clubs captured by the top five leagues of the regulator will have reports in their board rooms that explain the costs of regulation and compliance costs. As I said earlier, they have to report on a variety of functions for their league credibility, so it is not unusual to expect them to be able to account for how much this extra regulation will cost, nor is it unusual to expect us to have transparency on the impact of the Government’s football regulator on the football pyramid from the bottom to the top. We will press the amendment to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 14 requires the regulator to report annually to Parliament on its activity for that year. As with all public bodies, the regulator must arrange for the report to be laid before Parliament by the Secretary of State for purposes of transparency and scrutiny. The Secretary of State will have some flexibility to direct additional material to be included with the annual report. That will help ensure that the regulator captures all relevant information in a year, and allow the Government and Parliament to properly scrutinise its performance.
Stephanie Peacock
I do not believe so. I have written to the shadow Minister and will double-check the correspondence. The report will help to ensure that the regulator captures all relevant information in a year, thereby allowing the Government and Parliament to properly scrutinise its performance. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 15
Operating licences
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Max Wilkinson
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Butler. I reassure the Government Whips that the hon. Member for Sheffield South East and I have not been collaborating, but we have clearly been speaking to the same fans’ groups, who are very supportive of the Bill. There is a very simple principle here: some clubs may struggle with the regulatory burden, as has, I think, been expressed by all Members during the discussion. The way of solving that is not to take the steps that the Conservatives have suggested; it is for the regulator to take a reasonable view on how it might support those clubs.
New clause 6 may well not pass, but I hope that the Minister takes away the message to work with regulators, so that the regulator, when it is set up, is in a position to support the smaller clubs that have maybe only a few full-time members of staff, or even fewer than that. We back the expansion of the regulator to the sixth tier as well; in those circumstances, it would be particularly important that such support was available.
Mr French
That was a strange intervention.
New clause 2 and new clause 6 would require the independent football regulator to provide assistance to regulated clubs seeking to obtain a provisional licence, clubs with a provisional licence seeking a full licence, and unregulated clubs that are reasonably likely to become regulated in the next football season. The new clauses would also require the independent football regulator to provide reasonable and proportionate assistance to regulated clubs in their efforts to continue to comply with their licence conditions.
The sentiments behind both arguments are not bad ones. We have made strong arguments already about our concerns regarding costs for clubs lower down the pyramid. I do, however, question the contradiction of being concerned about clubs in National League South and North, but wanting to get them in the scope of the regulator—we disagree with that. I have a few questions about the new clauses that I hope either the hon. Member for Sheffield South East or the hon. Member for Cheltenham might be happy to answer, just so the Committee can understand.
Given that the new clauses would require the independent football regulator to provide reasonable and proportionate assistance, we would be interested to know what assistance those hon. Members think might be reasonable or proportionate for clubs to require, and whether the independent football regulator is to provide them in the different instances covered by the new clauses. How would the independent football regulator’s liabilities towards clubs under the new clauses be determined and enforced? How would it be funded? That would be a question that all clubs would ask.
In a feedback loop that I am sure the hon. Member for Sheffield South East is aware of through his chairmanship of the football all-party parliamentary group over many years, one of the arguments that a number of clubs make is, “Why should I pay for someone else to come and try to take my place in the league that I am in?” That is part of the competitive nature of football. Although there is cross-club working in a number of areas trying to help clubs, often, the same clubs are competing against each other. We would need a bit of clarity on how the additional provision of help would be paid for. Would the cost be passed on to other clubs? Leaving aside those questions about what that may look like in the future, we understand the sympathies expressed in the new clauses to try to help clubs further down the pyramid, so that they are not excluded based on the fact that they cannot afford to apply for a licence.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East and the hon. Member for Cheltenham for tabling new clauses 2 and 6. The Government recognise the intent behind them, and we agree that the regulator should help clubs to comply with regulation as much as is reasonably possible. It is in everyone’s interests for clubs to become compliant quickly and with as little additional burden as possible. It is vital that the regulator helps clubs get to grips with its regulatory regime, which is why we have been very clear that the regulator will operate an advocacy-first approach, and why provisions for a collaborative approach are already in the Bill.
For example, the regulatory principle of clause 8(b) encourages the regulator to co-operate and constructively engage with clubs. Regulatory principles (c) and (d) encourage the regulator to ensure that any action is proportionate to the benefits expected from it.
In relation to the specifics of the new clauses, we disagree with any provision that would require the regulator to provide financial assistance to clubs to comply with requirements imposed by the regulator. That would amount to redistribution by the back door, given that the Independent Football Regulator would be levying some clubs in order to provide financial assistance to others. That is not the regulator’s role, and we do not believe it should be. On training, the regulator can work with clubs to ensure that they fully understand the regulation and what is expected of them. Of course, in cases where this is necessary, the regulator can appoint a skilled person to assist the club in resolving issues in respect of a relevant infringement. For the reasons that I have outlined, I am unable to accept the new clauses and I hope that they will be—
Max Wilkinson
I echo what was said by the hon. Member for Sheffield South East.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 16
Application for provisional operating licence
Mr French
I beg to move amendment 99, in clause 16, page 10, line 10, leave out subsection (c).
This amendment prevents the IFR from requiring information from clubs in the other than the personnel statement and strategic business plan specified by the Act, when applying for a provisional operating licence.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 100, in clause 16, page 10, line 25, leave out subsection (b).
This amendment prevents the IFR from requiring information in the strategic business plan not specified by the Act.
Mr French
Clause 16 is about the application for provisional licences, and this debate builds on the previous debate about costs. The way in which clause 16 is currently drafted is a textbook example of how the Government have left the door open to scope creep from the regulator. This clause gives the Government’s politically led regulator the power to set its own rules on what documents clubs must provide when applying for a provisional operating licence. On the surface, this may sound like a mere procedural point, but it in fact is emblematic of a broader concern: the unchecked expansion of regulatory scope—scope creep—that could come to characterise this regime if we are not careful. In fact, it may no longer be appropriate to define it as “scope creep”, as there is nothing subtle or creeping about it. The Bill actively, in different places, encourages the Government’s new regulator to build its own football governance empire, as other regulators have done. It would be better now to define some of this risk of scope creep and to avoid such scope imperialism in the future.
That is why I tabled these two amendments. Amendment 99 would prevent the Government’s regulator from requiring information from clubs, other than the personnel statement and strategic business plan specified by the Act, when applying for a provisional operating licence. Amendment 100 would prevent the Government’s regulator from requiring information in the strategic business plan that is not specified by the Act.
At this early stage of the Bill Committee, I am already at risk of sounding like a broken record.
Mr French
I am sure the Government Whip appreciates my comments more than that. The Government’s Bill, alongside the unprecedented and seemingly unlimited powers that it grants to their regulator, is, as we have argued already, putting English football at risk. The Government have assured us that their politically led regulator will be proportionate and risk-based, but the Bill as drafted grants it significant scope to expand its own powers, with limited checks on that unaccountable and seemingly unstoppable expansion of power, and the Minister did say in her previous comments that Parliament will not get a vote on this, so Members need to be aware of this as we go forward. The Government’s regulator is in prime position to commit a regulatory land grab that would belong more in a war documentary than in a sport that is supposed to be independent of the state.
We have seen this before. Regulators rarely stick to their lane; just look at Ofcom, who attempted to remove former colleagues from their role as broadcasters. They were found to be in breach of their own rules, so Ofcom changed the rule. What is to stop this regulator doing the same? Over time, objectives change and bureaucracies grow. What begins as a modest remit to protect financial sustainability can turn into a permanent presence in the boardrooms of clubs, pushing even more conditions, even more reporting requirements, even more intervention —all in the name of “compliance”. We believe that that is dangerous for sport, as a general rule. My hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne also explained how his experience of regulations supports our concern.
Clause 16 allows the regulator to require whatever documents it deems “appropriate” for a provisional licence application. That may include business plans, financial forecasts, ownership structures, or other forms of club data. Crucially, the Bill does not limit what can be asked for. Nor does it require that these requests be proportionate, standardised, or even necessary to the specific risk posed for each club. We believe that this Government have written their regulator a bit of a blank cheque in this area—one that empowers them to define their regulator’s own administrative burden and impose it unilaterally on clubs without giving clubs a say in how that starts to look, going forward, or the issues that it may create in clubs. As I have commented and other Members have commented, that is a particular issue for clubs lower down the leagues, particularly those in League One and League Two, or the National League—clubs that already operate with small margins and stretched resources. We have to remember that while some of this legislation is clearly aimed at the top level—the Premier League level—all clubs will be required to provide documents to the regulator. We must remember that those smaller clubs that may not have big human resources departments will be required to present their homework. Forcing them to comply with excessive or bespoke documentation requirements—there could be uncertainty about what those requirements will look like, going forward—drawn up by a regulator that answers to no shareholders, no supporters and, once set up, only loosely to Parliament—no vote for Parliament—will hit those least able to absorb the resource costs and financial costs the hardest.
More fundamentally, it sets a dangerous precedent. If the regulator is given the power to define its own gatekeeping rules without parliamentary oversight, we create a system where compliance is dictated not by statute but by bureaucracy. Once that door is open, it rarely swings shut, as we have seen with other regulators. We know how these things go. One year it is audited accounts. The next it is fan engagement reports, community impact statements, net zero transition plans perhaps—all well-meaning, but all cumulative, and all irrelevant in practicality to whether a club should be granted a provisional licence to play football.
The way that the Government have drafted and introduced the Bill and conducted themselves during this process shows that they have forgotten the key part of this debate: playing football. They have become more concerned, we believe, with the minutiae of football governance. It is clear that they have put favours over fans in their appointment, cronies over clubs and bureaucracy over the beautiful game as they seek to make it almost impossible for clubs to actually get on with playing football. We must not lose sight of the fact that this is about playing football.
Let me be clear again: we are not opposing things for opposition’s sake, but we will provide a robust and thorough challenge to areas of the Bill that we believe will have unintended consequences. What we must resist is a system where clubs are treated as supplicants—forced to second-guess what information a regulator may require, fearful that an honest administrative error might cost them their licence, or worse, the future of their football club. Currently, clubs are at real risk of being sacrificed on the altar of bureaucracy by this Labour Government.
I urge the Committee to vote in favour of these amendments that would remove the ability of the Government’s politically led regulator to increase its own powers and remit without any oversight. This clause as drafted by the Government includes no provision for Parliament or even for the Secretary of State—whoever that may be in the coming months—to reign in their regulator and reduce their powers, if need be. Once passed, reversing an expansion of power by the regulator will be exceptionally difficult.
This Government promised us and fans a light-touch, risk-based independent regulator. That was before they appointed their own donor to be chair and then returned the favour, we believe, not only by giving him a fairly large part-time salary, but by giving him a fairly blank cheque about how to increase his power over time, as they have voted against amendments requiring more transparency, and we believe the interests of football fans.
It is clear that the Conservatives want to protect fans, and we will press these amendments, which seek to limit the power of the regulator going forward, to a vote.
Mr French
The Minister is trying to suggest that everything is the same, but the Secretary of State has literally nominated a Labour donor who donated to her and the Prime Minister to chair the regulator, so the situation has clearly changed. The appointment is now the subject of independent inquiry; they are under investigation for the appointment. The Minister has been landed the role because the Secretary of State has recused herself, so the situation has clearly changed and it is clearly a political appointment.
Stephanie Peacock
The hon. Gentleman can make that well-rehearsed comment, but I specifically said there are no changes to this part of the Bill. I am focused on what we are talking about, and the parts of the Bill that amendments 99 and 100 relate to have not been changed. He also said that he would not oppose just for the sake of it, but that does seem to be what he is doing.
Stephanie Peacock
Indeed, a number of Conservative Members are on record as supporting this policy; it is just sad that the ones sitting opposite seem to have forgotten the manifesto they stood on.
Mr French
Sorry—Government Benches. Members of this Bill Committee have been appointed to it to scrutinise the Bill based on the situation now. The argument that seems to be coming from the Government Benches is that, under a new Parliament, we are unable to criticise or challenge the Bill because of what a previous Government proposed. We have already explained why we believe that the situation has changed, and why we have concerns, so we are well within our rights to table amendments. If the Opposition party does not agree with the Government, that is their decision to make.
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful, Ms Butler. I completely appreciate the point the shadow Minister is making, but he seems to be missing the point I am making that this part of the Bill has not changed from the previous one. I will now outline why we do not think amendments 99 or 100 are appropriate.
We do not think it is right to remove the ability of the regulator to require additional information from clubs during the application process for a licence. It is only right that the regulator can specify any further information or documentation it may need in order to properly assess whether a club needs the test for a provisional operating licence. It may require further information to assess a club’s circumstances and whether it will need to tailor any mandatory licensing conditions, or attach any initial discretionary licence conditions to the club.
Specifically on amendment 100, the criteria listed in the Bill are non-exhaustive, and the regulator should have the flexibility to request additional information from a club regarding its business plan when necessary. In line with the regulator’s principles, any request for information will, of course, be proportionate, and the regulator will co-operate and engage practically with the club. The regulator will not be asking for any information that is not in the scope of the provisional licence; there would be no reason for it to do so. However, there is an appeals process.
To end with an example, if a club puts forward a business plan and something seems out of the ordinary, the regulator may wish to ask where the funds are from. We think that that is perfectly reasonable, and it was in the previous iteration of the Bill.
Mr French
I appreciate the points that the Minister is making. Another point that I made—this is not political—was about the standardisation of requests, which would allow clubs to prepare on the basis of what they expect the regulator to ask and ensure consistency between clubs. Will the Minister tell us how that might work?
Stephanie Peacock
Standardisation is not appropriate in this context, because the extra information may relate to discretionary licence terms, which will be tailored to a club. It is therefore not relevant.
For the reasons I have given, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment.
Mr French
We are concerned about unchecked powers, as we have explained at some length, and believe that the House should be able to check those powers. We are concerned about the lack of standardisation. I fear that, by treating clubs differently depending on their circumstances, the regulator will be left open to legal challenge. Some clubs have the financial resources to challenge a league, and will have the resource to challenge a regulator. We have seen that with certain clubs in the Premier League—I will not mention the cases, for legal reasons. Some football clubs are willing to challenge their regulation in court. We fear that, without standards for what is asked of clubs, there could be more legal challenges down the line. For those reasons, we will press the amendment to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Mr French
I beg to move amendment 101, in clause 17, page 11, line 27, leave out subsection (9) and insert—
“(9) The IFR must make the decision whether to grant a regulated club a provisional operating licence within the period of one month.
(10) The IFR may extend the period in subsection (9) by no more than two weeks if it requires more time to consider the application due to—
(a) unusual staffing pressures, or
(b) discrepancies or abnormalities with the application.
(11) If the IFR extends the period as per subsection (10), it must give a notice to the relevant club stating—
(a) that the period has been extended,
(b) the length of the extension, and
(c) the reasons for the extension.”
This amendment places a time limit of one month for the IFR to decide whether to grant a provisional operating licence.
The amendment would require the independent financial regulator to make the decision whether to grant a regulated club a provisional operational licence within a period of one month. The independent football regulator would be able to extend the period by no more than two weeks if it required more time to consider the application, whether that be due to staffing or other issues. If the independent football regulator extended the period, it would have to give notice to the relevant club explaining why.
Clause 17 is where we find the initial provisions that give the Government’s regulator the power to grant provisional operating licences and the conditions that must be satisfied for a football club to be granted a such a licence. The Government’s regulator must be satisfied that the club applying will comply with the free-standing duties on clubs as set out in part 4, comply with the mandatory licence conditions set out in schedule 5, and operate a relevant team.
On the face of it, the clause seems necessary. There should be a safety net for clubs that have uncertain futures but cannot afford to pause operations while a full licensing determination is made. In that sense, the provisional licence acts as a regulatory bridge which, if implemented properly, can be an essential tool for avoiding the kind of cliff-edge collapses that we have sadly seen in years gone by. Clubs such as Bury and Macclesfield, where administrative or ownership crises rapidly spiralled and led to total collapse, might have benefited from such a mechanism. I pay tribute to all the fans and campaigners who have fought so hard for a regime that intervenes earlier rather than only when it is too late. As I have said, I believe that all Members would have preferred football to have got its act together and for our not to be doing this today, but we are where we are.
Although I support clause 17 in principle, I want to raise concerns about how it is drafted and how its powers might be used in practice. First, the clause gives the regulator significant discretion in determining whether to issue a provisional licence and under what conditions. Subsection (1) provides that a licence may be granted—not must—even where a club applies in good faith and has satisfied the initial criteria. That may be appropriate in some circumstances, but it raises the risk that clubs could be left in a holding pattern, awaiting a decision for weeks or months on end with no firm timetable and no recourse to receive an outcome from the Government’s regulator.
Secondly, the measure allows the regulator to impose any conditions it considers appropriate when granting a provisional licence. We absolutely recognise the need for the independent football regulator to have flexibility, particularly when dealing with clubs that may be in financial distress or suffering from poor governance. However, as currently drafted, the clause presents a clear and present danger to English football. As I have highlighted already, we believe that imposing different rules on different clubs will create issues for the regulator going forward, legally and particularly in relation to independence and European competitions, but Members will be pleased to know that I will not go into that again. We must also guard against the risk of disproportionate or arbitrary conditions being imposed, particularly if they are unchallengeable or unclear for clubs. I would appreciate it if the Minister could confirm whether a club might, for example, be required to restructure its board to get a provisional licence? Would it be forced to accept certain ownership conditions, and would it be required to provide reams of documentation within a short period just for the provisional licence? These are not hypothetical questions but real-world concerns that clubs will have, particularly at the lower end of the football pyramid. Many such clubs, as I have already outlined, lack the administrative bandwidth to deal with complex regulatory demands at short notice.
That is why the official Opposition have tabled amendment 101, which would ensure that the Government’s regulator must reach a decision on a provisional licence within one month. We fear that, without a time limit, clause 17 risks becoming an instrument of delay, rather than one that supports and creates certainty for clubs by providing a regulatory bridge. Crucially, there is no requirement in the clause as drafted for the regulator to explain why a provisional licence has been refused or revoked. That, again, undermines transparency, and if a regulator is to command trust and credibility, particularly in the emotionally-charged world of football—in its good moments and its bad—it must be seen to be operating with both fairness and openness.
We understand that a decision can be appealed as a “reviewable decision” under clause 81. However, that does not provide transparency for fans, and an appeals process increases uncertainty for clubs. Fans and clubs deserve a Government regulator that acts swiftly, proportionately and, above all, transparently. Clause 17 is the beginning of that promise, but it must be shaped with care.
Jim Dickson
Does the hon. Member think that there is any contradiction between his desire, as set out in the amendment, to see decisions made incredibly quickly and his desire that he expressed earlier to see the number of people employed by the regulator limited to 50?
Mr French
No, I do not, and I think the hon. Member slightly misunderstands what the measure is about. It is about the provisional licence, not the full-fat licence. I am not asking the regulator to rush a decision on whether a club should be granted a long-term licence. We are asking for some certainty and some time limits to help with that bridging. We have already said that we are concerned about the size of the regulator, but we want clubs to have some certainty around timeframes and not to be left in limbo for too long.
Our belief that clubs should have certainty was why we tabled amendment 101, which would establish a time limit of one month for the Government’s regulator to decide whether it will grant a provisional operating licence. This is supposed to be the main focus of the regulator, so we believe that it is reasonable to expect that it fulfils that function efficiently. This would be an important and proportionate safeguard. It would not diminish the regulator’s authority, but rather ensure that it is exercised in a timely, effective and accountable manner. It is about introducing clarity, certainty and discipline into a process that, under the Bill as drafted, risks becoming needlessly opaque and potentially open-ended.
We must remember what the provisional licence mechanism is designed to achieve. It is not the final or comprehensive licence that will be granted to a club, as I have just said. It is a stopgap—a holding measure meant to ensure continuity of operation for clubs while their full licensing application is under assessment. In short, it is there to prevent disruption, not to prolong it. Thinking about the footballing element to this, a club that was held in limbo, unable to play, would create a lot of issues for the league and the season overall.
As it stands, the Bill provides the Government’s regulator with no firm timetable or obligation to act within any defined period when it comes to a provisional licence. That raises two concerns. First, it risks leaving clubs in regulatory limbo, especially those already in difficult situations. That is not just a matter of administrative inconvenience. For clubs living hand-to-mouth, as many sadly are, uncertainty over their licensing status could mean missed deadlines for investment, lost commercial deals or even delays in paying staff and suppliers. In the worst cases, it could trigger crises and the very things that the Bill was supposed to prevent.
Mr French
I thank the hon. Member for that point. Transfers are a key aspect. If a club is in limbo, it could arguably be at a much bigger disadvantage when the season starts if it had not been able to make transfers because it was uncertain about whether it could compete in the competition. The point is well made.
Secondly, the absence of a defined period creates a lack of accountability within the regulator itself. As we have discussed, the regulator cannot be scrutinised in the way that we would have hoped. We know that the Government do want it to be strong, but with strength must come accountability and transparency. If it is to command the trust of fans, clubs and local communities, it must be seen to act with purpose, not with delay.
We know from numerous examples across different industries that when regulators are left without timetables, backlogs just build up. I will not name examples because I am conscious of time, but we know that it happens. My amendment proposes a time limit of one month—a full 30 days—for the regulator to determine whether a provisional licence should be granted. That is not a rushed timetable; we believe that it is a reasonable one, especially considering that when a club applies for a provisional licence, the key facts will likely already be known by the regulator. Again, this is not designed to be a forensic financial autopsy, but a short-term stabilising mechanism.
Let me also be clear that the time limit does not bind the regulator to approve an application within a month; it simply requires a decision one way or another within that time. That allows the Government’s regulator to reject unsuitable applications if needed—hopefully not—but it removes the damaging uncertainty of a process that otherwise could drag on indefinitely. We must not forget who bears the cost of delay. It is not just the club executives and directors, but the fans, players and staff. We have just heard about transfers, which are a great example. It is about the people who turn up on a Saturday afternoon come rain or shine, the people who run the club shop and the ticket gates, and the people whose local economies benefit from having a club that is alive, operating and secure.
The amendment also supports the broader aim of stability in football. A system without timelines invites inconsistency and subjectivity. One club might be processed in a week, and another in six. That cannot be right. We owe it to clubs at all levels, from the top of the Premier League right the way down to the National League, to create a system that is predictable and fair.
Finally, good regulation is not just about the rules but about responsiveness. It is about a regulator that can act promptly, efficiently and in partnership with the people it is overseeing. Our amendment does not weaken the regulator; it makes it better. It strengthens the trust between the regulator and the regulated. It gives clubs the certainty that they need to plan, invest and survive. After all, that is what the Government say is the intention of this regulator. I hope that hon. Members will support the principle behind the amendment. We have heard some of the issues that may arise if not.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank the shadow Minister for tabling amendment 101. I will outline the reasons why we will not accept it, and then I will respond to some of the questions that he raised.
The Bill ensures that the regulator has the necessary flexibility to ensure that all clubs that meet the test for a provisional licence will be given one. Introducing an arbitrary statutory timeframe of one month for the regulator to make a decision on a club’s application would remove that flexibility. Only the regulator can know what the process of assessing applications might entail or how long it might take, so it should have the ability to set in rules the period within which it will make a decision, the period of any potential extension and the circumstances in which an extension will be granted. The regulator will engage with all clubs prior to the application for a provisional operating licence to ensure that the process is as smooth and efficient as possible, and its regulatory principles encourage it to act in a timely manner.
I turn to some of the specific points that the hon. Member made. There will be no requirement to restructure the board to get a provisional licence. As I outlined in my opening remarks, the regulator will take an advocacy-first approach. Clubs will be asked to submit basic information and documentation, and to show a readiness and willingness to work with the regulator. I draw the hon. Member’s attention to clause 17(4)(b), which says that if, for whatever reason, the regulator does not give a licence, it would have to give reasons. Even in that scenario, which I highlight is hypothetical, enforcement might take place, but it would not prevent the club from playing. For these reasons, I ask him to withdraw his amendment.
Lincoln Jopp
The Minister just said something that I am not quite clear about; perhaps, given my hon. Friend’s experience, he could explain it to me. If a club gets promoted to the English Football League—the happiest day of the club’s history—it then has to apply to become regulated, but if it does not have that licence by the beginning of the next season, the Minister just said that it can play. Where should I look in the Bill to understand the latitude that clubs have to play in the English Football League without regulation?
Stephanie Peacock
Of course. The shadow Minister referred more than once to clubs not being able to play. As I said, this is an advocacy-first approach; the regulator will work with clubs to make sure that they can reach the provisional licence requirements. It is a basic set of requirements, and they do not have to meet it to receive the provisional licence; they just have to show a willingness and an ability to do that. In the hypothetical scenario that they do not, enforcement may happen, but they will not be prevented from playing. However, we do not anticipate that happening, because at the provisional stage, the regulator will work with them to make sure that they can do that. I want to be very clear—perhaps the hon. Member for Spelthorne misunderstood what I said—that the regulator will work with teams to make sure that they can get that provisional licence.
Mr French
That was a rather long intervention, but I suspect it was probably needed. I appreciate the clarity from the Minister on that point, but in terms of the time limit, we are concerned about the impact of the uncertainty relating to the provisional element. In this situation, we would like that to be a focus of the regulator, given that it is being set up for exactly this kind of work. We will therefore press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Stephanie Peacock
We do not anticipate that happening. Enforcement would take place, but we do not want the regulator to stop clubs being able to play. I am outlining how the regulator will do everything it can. The information is fairly basic, and the aim is to move as quickly as possible, so we anticipate clubs being able to receive that provisional licence.
Clause 18 establishes the second step of a two-step licensing process designed to ensure a smooth transition to regulation. Being granted a full operating licence should be the aim of all clubs in scope of the regulator. The full licence means that the regulator is satisfied that the club meets all relevant requirements, including the threshold requirements. For a club to pass the test for a full licence, the regulator must be satisfied that the club
“meets the threshold requirements set out in Schedule 4”
and is complying with and
“would continue to comply with the mandatory licence conditions”
and the free-standing duties on clubs set out in part 5. Finally, the regulator must not have determined
“that any person who is an owner or officer of the club is not suitable”
for the position they hold.
The clause also details the power that the regulator has to extend the provisional operating licence for a club. That will be done only if the regulator believes that the club does not meet the bar for a full licence at present, but will do if given more time. Clubs will have had time and support, while provisionally licensed, to ensure that they can meet the higher bar for a full licence. Once the club has a full licence, it will not have to be periodically reviewed. Instead, the regulator will continue to monitor and supervise the club. There will be an annual touchpoint in the form of an annual declaration, in which the club will notify the regulator of any relevant changes. That will minimise burdens while still ensuring that the club continues to adhere to the necessary requirements, including requirements that ensure that fans’ best interests are at the heart of the club’s decision-making process. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Mr French
The Minister has outlined clauses 17 and 18 at some length. We had a lengthy debate on clause 17 in relation to our amendment 101. We are naturally disappointed that the amendment, and the time limit that we seek for the provisional licensing, was not agreed to. However, in the interests of time, I will move on to clause 18.
Clause 18 sets out the process by which the Government’s regulator may grant the full operating licence to a club, which is a crucial stage in the proposed licensing regime, with significant long-term implications for the structure, stability and future of the English game. This clause is where the Government’s regulator transitions from assessing provisional eligibility to giving a formal stamp of approval for a club’s longer-term competition and compliance. However, the clause raises several questions that the Committee must interrogate, and that I hope the Minister will be able to answer—not least whether it achieves the right balance between regulatory assurance and operational flexibility.
Under the clause, the regulator may grant a full operating licence only if satisfied that a club meets the relevant conditions of eligibility. That is right and proper, and clubs should be expected to operate on a stable financial footing, meet appropriate governance standards and protect the game’s integrity. But I am concerned about the breadth and, in some respects, the open-ended nature of what those conditions of eligibility might come to mean in practice.
We must be alive to the risk of regulatory overreach, as the Opposition have highlighted, and we should all recognise that bad regulation is worse than no regulation at all. If clubs are to be subject to vague or ever-changing thresholds, with little recourse or clarity on what is required, we risk imposing a level of uncertainty that could deter vital investment, discourage long-term planning and undermine the very sustainability that the regulator seeks to ensure. That is why the Opposition will—as we already have done in Committee—continue to press for greater transparency around the costs and cumulative burdens that flow from the action of the regulator; and it is why we believe that the regulator should not have unfettered discretion to shift the goalposts without clear parliamentary scrutiny and approval. As I have said, we should not write blank cheques to a politically led regulator.
Another issue with the clause is timeliness. As we have explained, clubs will need to plan ahead, financially, structurally and operationally. If the licensing process drags on, it risks becoming a bottleneck and not a safeguard for clubs around participation. We tabled amendments that would ensure timely decision making on provisional licences, and the same principle must surely also apply to full licences. However, we appreciate the different context within which a full operating licence will exist. That is why we have not tabled an amendment to this clause with a specific deadline. We understand that full licences will take slightly longer.
Moreover, there is a danger that the full licence becomes a tool for undue influence. We have spoken about our concerns about the impact that that may have on the statutes of UEFA and FIFA—in the interests of time, I will not go into that again. If clubs feel under pressure to comply with this new licensing regime to be able to play in English football, there may be a concern about them breaching other regimes, such as UEFA and FIFA, and, again, they may fear expulsion from those competitions.
One club asked me this question, although it was a tongue-in-cheek comment, so I will not name them. If a Premier League club decided not to apply for a licence, would the Government look to exclude it? There is the risk that, if a club feels that it will not be able to compete in Europe, for whatever reason, it may choose what this Bill was originally intended to stop: the European breakaway league.
I am not sure that the club would do that, as it was a tongue-in-cheek comment, but what would happen if a club says, “We are not going to meet these conditions, and therefore we will not apply for a licence”? Would the Government or regulator be willing to kick that club out of the Premier League? Even though that question is hypothetical, we need to know where this might lead, because we are talking about a regulation that will have an impact. If the Minister can answer where she thinks that club might go, I would be particularly interested in that.
We are also concerned about the future interpretation of eligibility and how that may veer into what we believe to be subjective decisions, or where the Government’s regulator will take on new powers as it enters mission creep. As such, I would appreciate it if the Minister will confirm that there will be no demands, for example, on clubs to provide diversity quotas, net zero targets or enforced political campaigns, all of which stray beyond the regulator’s core remit of financial sustainability and good governance. Let us not forget that football clubs are not franchises, as they are in the American sport system. Our clubs are community institutions with long histories and unique identities. They are not all cut from the same cloth.
Melanie Onn
Would the shadow Minister consider the kick racism out of football campaign to be political activity that clubs and the regulator should not be involved in?
Mr French
I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention, but that is not the point I was making. I am talking about quotas, which is a slightly different thing. We do not think that the regulator should be insisting on quotas, and that is very different from Kick It Out, which has made incredible progress for football over the years. The hon. Lady has raised a very different point, so I will not go down that rabbit hole.
I am sure that the Minister would agree that what is best for Barnsley FC is not necessarily best for Bromley FC or Bristol Rovers. Each club has unique characteristics and should be treated as such. However, we feel that the Bill, as drafted, could lead to clubs being lumped in the same direction. We believe in the equalisation of treatment, but each club should not be treated exactly the same when there are clear differences, whether that be in league structures or financial positions.
We are concerned about parts of clause 18, but we believe that it is an important part of the licensing structure that must be implemented with care, proportionality and consistency. It is essential that the Government’s regulator operates with discipline, sticking to those statutory objectives, resisting the temptation to micro-manage and always keeping front of mind the importance of stability, continuity and respect of football’s unique heritage. We support the principles of the clause, but I would appreciate it if the Minister answered some of my questions about what may come in the future and what the Government would do if a club decided not to apply for a licence.
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his comments. A number of the points that he made have been well debated over the last few days in Committee, so I will not be engaging in them. I will not be engaging in hypotheticals either. We have been very clear that we simply do not want scope creep. The two-step process of the provisional and full operating licence means that clubs do not need to make substantial changes in a short space of time. We absolutely appreciate that it could be difficult for some clubs to meet threshold requirements, and the regulator will very much work with them. The regulator will have a balanced and proportionate approach, centred around advocacy first.
Mr French
I appreciate that I was asking about a hypothetical situation, but it is an important hypothetical. We are talking about a structure going forward in which clubs will be required to have a licence, and we have had some exchanges on that. This is a serious question: what would the football regulator do if a club said that it did not want the licence, and it did not believe it had to have one? Where would that legally leave the club and regulator? Even though it is hypothetical, it is very important to what we are debating in the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
I disagree that it is an important hypothetical. We can come on to talk about enforcement later on, but we are talking now about the regulator’s approach, which will be balanced, proportionate and centred around advocacy.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Vicky Foxcroft.)
Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting)
Louie French ExcerptsThursday 5th June 2025
(3 weeks, 4 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Football Governance Bill [HL] 2024-26 View all Football Governance Bill [HL] 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 5 June 2025 - (5 Jun 2025)
The Chair
We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we begin, I remind Members to switch their electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are not permitted. We will now continue our line-by-line consideration of the Bill.
Clause 7
The IFR’s general duties etc
Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 97, in clause 7, page 5, line 27, at end insert—
“(d) conflicts with any regulations or rules of international football governing bodies, including FIFA and UEFA.”
This amendment requires the IFR to exercise its functions so as to avoid conflicts with the regulations and rules of international footballing bodies.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner, and to open day 2 of the Committee’s consideration of the Bill. On day 1 there was extensive debate about an issue that I am sure we will also get into today. We Opposition Members were keen to ensure that the Government’s new football regulator will improve transparency, help reduce costs to clubs and fans and stop political interference in football. It was disappointing that Government Members did not support those objectives.
Amendment 97 seeks to ensure that there are no conflicts with any of the regulations and rules of international footballing governing bodies, including FIFA and UEFA. It clearly requires the Independent Football Regulator
“to exercise its functions so as to avoid conflicts with the regulations and rules of international footballing bodies.”
As we know, UEFA has written to the Secretary of State to set out its concerns with the Bill. The letter came after the Government introduced the expanded version of the Bill. It is disappointing that the Government continue to refuse to publish it so that all Members can have an informed debate about the risks that UEFA outlined. I will not go over that debate again—I might get a yellow card if I do. The amendment would require the Government’s regulator to exercise its functions in a way that avoids conflicts with the rules, statutes and regulations of international football governing authorities, especially FIFA and UEFA.
The amendment is designed to protect the regulator’s ability to carry out the functions that the Government have assigned to it without inadvertently triggering consequences that could seriously damage English football’s standing in the international game and, in the worst-case scenario, lead to English clubs being removed from the Champions League and—perhaps more seriously—the national team being banned from competitions such as the European championship and the World cup. Let us make no mistake: if the Government’s regulator were to exercise its powers in ways that contravene the established framework of global football governance, the ramifications would be swift and severe.
A particular area of concern stems from one of UEFA’s fundamental requirements, which is that there should be no Government interference in the running of football. As hon. Members might know, under FIFA’s rules, any form of what is deemed undue third-party interference in the affairs of a national football association can result in disciplinary action. That can include suspension of the football association itself, exclusion of clubs from European competitions or the ineligibility of players to represent England in FIFA-sanctioned tournaments such as the World cup.
Max Wilkinson (Cheltenham) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr McCartney—[Interruption.] I am sorry, Mr Turner. Let the record show that I am living in the past—perhaps not as far in the past as some Opposition Members. My concern about what the shadow Minister is saying is that the Opposition seem to be keen on setting a higher bar for football than they would for areas of general law when we are talking about interactions across national borders, with the European Court of Human Rights and the European Union in mind. Will he reflect on that?
Mr French
The Lib Dem spokesman makes an interesting comparison. As I said in the Committee’s debate on Tuesday, my focus is on football, and I am outlining with this amendment my concerns about the interactions of a sport with other international competitions. I will come on to explain why football in particular is interwoven with international principles. The majority of fans want to focus on the sport, rather than politics. I am sure that there are many more debates to be had on issues such as the ECHR in the rest of this Parliament. I will stick to football today, but I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s comments.
UEFA’s ultimate sanction would be excluding the federation from UEFA and teams from competitions. That risk is very real: it has happened before and can happen again. In 2006, the Greek football federation was banned from European competition. People might argue that I am trying to scaremonger, but I am trying to highlight that this is a real risk.
It is important to clarify what FIFA and UEFA mean by “third-party interference”. It is not a casual term; it is clearly defined in their statutes. It refers to instances where public authorities, including Governments or regulators created by Government legislation, exert influence over how football is run in a way that compromises the independence of football associations and clubs. Examples include dictating the appointment or removal of club directors—which the Bill does—influencing the outcome of football disciplinary procedures and imposing governance models that conflict with internationally recognised standards.
Any new licensing requirements introduced by the IFR must be meticulously aligned with existing UEFA and national frameworks. It is therefore important that the IFR’s licensing criteria are complementary to football and created in full consultation with clubs and any other affected parties. Does the Minister accept that clubs, as entities directly impacted by licensing regulations, must have a full voice in the development and implementation of those requirements? What consultation are the Government or their regulator currently undertaking on these regulations?
Let me be clear: I understand that the creation of the IFR in and of itself is on the borderline of what constitutes third-party interference. We are taking great care to help the Government to redesign a regulator that is fully independent of Ministers and professionally competent. However, in the absence of clear statutory guidelines to avoid conflicts with international rules, there is a risk, or perhaps even an inevitability, that the Government’s regulator may, at some point in the future, cross a line drawn by UEFA or FIFA.
Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. The shadow Minister is making a pertinent and important point. If the independent football regulator were inadvertently to cross lines into the jurisdictions of UEFA or FIFA, it could be catastrophic for English football. Clearly, that is not the purpose of the regulator. Given the success of many English teams in Europe, that would have serious ramifications. I genuinely think that the shadow Minister’s amendment is meant to be helpful and is incredibly important.
Mr French
I thank my hon. Friend for making that point. That is exactly what we are trying to do. This is not a wrecking amendment; we are just trying to tighten the Bill to ensure that no conflict arises that would damage the participation of English clubs or the national team in future competitions.
We know that UEFA is concerned about the potential for scope creep and that the Government’s regulator may expand its mandate beyond its loosely defined current competences. That expansion, intentional or otherwise, into broader aspects of football governance could undermine established structures and processes of the sport and amount to Government interference.
That is why my amendment is needed. It would place a duty on the regulator to abide by long pre-existing international frameworks within which English football exists. It requires the Government’s regulator to ensure that, in pursuing its objectives, it does not create legal or procedural clashes with the statutes of FIFA and UEFA. Legislation that compromises the FA’s autonomy as the primary regulator of football in England would be non-compliant with those international statutes, which are upheld and enforced rigorously across Europe and globally.
Some may ask why Parliament should concern itself with the rules of unelected international bodies. Why not simply legislate as we see fit and allow the regulator to act as robustly as necessary? On the surface, that is a fair political question, but we must recognise the reality of football governance. FIFA and UEFA are not advisory bodies; they are the organisations through which our clubs gain access to international competitions, including European competitions. They are custodians of the World cup, the European championship and the Champions League, to name just a few. Their statutes form part of the accepted legal architecture of the global game and all member associations, including the FA, are bound by them.
Max Wilkinson
My hon. Friend the Member for Newbury has suggested that that approach means that the Conservative party is happy being a rule taker, after all. Is that the case?
Max Wilkinson
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the way in which our FA has been involved in the making of those rules is a little bit like some other supranational organisations that we were a member of in the past—for example, the European Union?
Mr French
I would argue very strongly that when the English football team finally wins the World cup, it will get much more out of FIFA than this country would ever get out of the European Union.
English football does not exist in a vacuum, but the Bill acts as if it does. The global football ecosystem is fantastically complex, but the Bill is simple, clunky and—I am afraid to say—full of holes, which would potentially leave English football to drown among its international competition. I also fear that it will create even more legal cases, whereby clubs end up spending more time in courts than they do focusing on the football matches themselves.
To act as if we can disregard those international rules, or to suggest that a domestic regulator can impose conditions without reference to them, would be to invite precisely the sort of jurisdictional collision that could see English football punished because of the good intentions of Members of this House. We cannot just pander to the politics; we must be practical about the potential havoc that the Bill will wreak across the English football pyramid.
If FIFA or UEFA were to exclude English clubs or the national team from international competitions as a result of perceived third-party interference, the consequences would be nothing short of catastrophic. As hon. Members will know, the Premier League generates more than £6 billion in revenue annually, with over £1.8 billion coming from overseas broadcasting rights alone. In fact, I understand that the Premier League is the first sporting competition in Europe to generate more from its international broadcasting rights than it does from its domestic rights.
Lincoln Jopp
I suspect that Government Members will oppose the amendment. Given that, does my hon. Friend think that it would be reasonable of me to ask the Minister the extent to which UEFA has seen the Bill and signed it off as something that does not constitute political interference either way?
Mr French
I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. That is something that we discussed at some length during the Committee’s first sitting. It is disappointing that all members of the Committee, including my hon. Friend, do not have access to that information to help them to make informed decisions.
I appreciate some of the what-aboutery and counter-arguments that are made, but, as I have said, I will defend the right of Committee members to have full access to information. It is so important, in particular given the Committee’s function in respect of this legislation, that its members should have full and frank information. It is disappointing that that has not been disclosed so that we can fully understand all the risks.
The Premier League’s broadcasting rights are in no small part predicated on English clubs’ participation in the Champions League and the Europa League. Exclusion from those competitions would make our top clubs less attractive to global audiences and sponsors, shrinking the broadcast value of the league and undermining its international appeal.
Without wishing to confuse my sporting metaphors, that would have a knock-on effect further down the pyramid. If the Premier League makes less money, there is less money to distribute to the English Football League or the National League, which we will come on to when we consider other parts of the Bill. The Champions League alone contributes more than £300 million each season to English clubs, not including the knock-on commercial benefits. For top clubs, it accounts for up to 20% of their total revenue. Stripping that away would lead to cost-cutting, player sales and job losses, not just in clubs themselves but across the local economies that depend on matchday trade and revenue.
The FA also receives critical funding linked to England’s participation in international tournaments, as I know a number of pubs do; for example, when we are in the Euros in the summer, that normally means that the economy receives a boost. A ban from the World cup or the European championship would not only harm national pride but cut investment in grassroots football, which is often funded in part through FIFA’s global redistribution programmes or revenues generated by the national team.
Lincoln Jopp
Mr Turner, you will have seen the declaration of interests that I made on Tuesday. I seek the Committee’s indulgence; this is the only gratuitous intervention that I will make. Can the shadow Minister remind the Committee of the identity of the only team who have won every major European trophy, having recently won the UEFA Conference League?
Jim Dickson
I wonder whether any Opposition Members are able to assure us that, in winning those trophies, the club stuck to profit and sustainability rules as other clubs have done.
Mr French
I am genuinely surprised that the hon. Member did not talk about Crystal Palace’s success in the FA cup final. I am sure his point is noted by the Committee.
More broadly, the football industry supports around 100,000 jobs in the United Kingdom, contributes more than £7.6 billion to GDP and delivers £3.6 billion in tax revenues annually. A major disruption to international participation because of this Government’s regulator would clearly put a serious dent in all that. In short, any move that risks our relationship with UEFA and FIFA is not just a sporting gamble but an economic one, and a profoundly reckless move for any Government to take.
We must also consider the practical impact on clubs and fans. Imagine a scenario in which the Government’s regulator intervenes in the ownership model of a particular club in UEFA competitions and in doing so breaches UEFA’s licensing criteria. That club could find itself barred from the Champions League, the Europa League or other leagues through no fault of its own. Fans, players and club employees would suffer, and the club’s value and viability undermined, all as a result of a conflict that could and should have been avoided through foresight and careful drafting of this legislation.
There is precedent for this kind of statutory provision. In sectors such as financial services, we have long recognised the need for domestic regulators to align their actions with international frameworks that they are part of. The Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority operate in a global regulatory environment and Parliament has provided them with duties and powers that reflect that reality. This is not a novel concept; it is standard practice where cross-border frameworks exist. As the Government have chosen to model their regulator on those in financial services, perhaps the Minister can tell us why they have not done so in this regard.
Football is different. It is more internationally integrated than most sectors. Rules are more intertwined and clubs more interdependent on foreign clubs for competition, particularly at elite level. English clubs compete weekly in cross-border tournaments—for example, when Arsenal sadly lost to Paris Saint-Germain, who went on to win the Champions League. What a final that was. Players move freely between jurisdictions. Broadcasting rights are sold and consumed around the globe, as we have heard. Football’s regulatory framework must reflect that international dimension, not wilfully ignore it.
Some will say that the amendment is unnecessary because the regulator can use its discretion to avoid conflict, but without a statutory duty, it could operate without full regard to the consequences abroad. The amendment would place a clear and proportionate duty on the Government’s regulator—something that its leadership would be required to consider in every decision they take.
Importantly, the amendment would not hand international bodies a blank cheque. It would not bind the regulator to follow their rules blindly or to give up domestic responsibilities. What it would do is make sure that the Government’s regulator takes those rules into account and, wherever possible, avoids direct conflict. That is entirely reasonable and, in my view, essential to the credibility and effectiveness of the Government’s regulator.
We do not want to create a regulator that acts in splendid isolation. We want a regulator that defends English football’s integrity but also safeguards its place in the global game. It would be the height of irony if, in the process of attempting to strengthen our domestic football pyramid, we inadvertently isolated it from the wider footballing world, solving one problem only to create a much worse one. The amendment would act as a safeguard and send a signal to fans, clubs and international partners alike that we in Parliament understand the integrated nature of modern football and legislate accordingly.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Turner. Amendment 97 is objectively reasonable; the Government, in setting up the independent football regulator, should want to do so in compliance with any FIFA or UEFA rules, in order to secure our national teams’ places in international tournaments.
There is a genuine risk that the football regulator may conflict with FIFA and UEFA rules, not least in the political appointment of its chair. I know that the Government do not think that it is political to appoint a chair who, in the current circumstances, donated to the Prime Minister’s leadership campaign, but FIFA may take a different view. If FIFA takes a different view and seeks to ban our national sides, the Government will not be able to do anything about it. This is the moment to enshrine in law that the regulator must comply with FIFA and UEFA rules.
We can delve briefly into what we think FIFA might deem political. In 2016, FIFA fined domestic teams, including England, for wearing an armband with an Armistice Day poppy because, in FIFA’s view, the poppy is a political symbol. I think that is madness, and pretty much everyone in this country thinks it is madness, but that was FIFA’s view, and it levied a fine. I think that, after negotiation, FIFA has since changed its mind—but if that was its view of the poppy and all sorts of symbols that most ordinary people would not think of as political, I am concerned about what it will think about a football regulator that has a chair appointed by Government, who in this instance also donated to the leadership campaign of the Prime Minister of the day, and who may then exercise a decision over ownership of a particular club in this country. I suspect FIFA may think that is political and conflicts with the ability of England and other home nations to compete in international events. The Government can deal with that very simply.
Joe Robertson
I, and I suspect a lot of fans, would not be comfortable if there was a negotiation between FIFA and the Government—by the way, the current Secretary of State received money from the current preferred candidate—about the viability of the England national team playing in an international tournament, when what they were negotiating about was the suitability or decision making of a political donor to that Government. That is not healthy. It does not satisfy me.
I would much prefer that there was a provision in the Bill that clearly stated that the football regulator—that is more than just the chair; it is the entire body—must not do anything that
“conflicts with any regulations or rules of international football governing bodies”.
By the way, this is about far more than just politics; I use the political issue as an example, but there are many other ways in which the regulator could conflict with FIFA and UEFA. I am sure that nobody here intends that it does, so let us build that into the Bill.
Mr French
A point that is being slightly missed in this exchange is something that I mentioned in my speech: the impact and risk for clubs and whether the line is crossed. In particular, the qualification for the Champions League each year in the Premier League is a huge source of revenue, as I explained. Having that risk at play could deter the inward investment into clubs that we know is key to the future success of English football, as we have already seen. Does my hon. Friend agree?
Joe Robertson
I agree with the shadow Minister. I suppose there is a not-too-fanciful theoretical situation in which the football regulator makes a decision on the ownership of a club that has otherwise qualified for the Champions League, and that decision was made by a body headed up by someone who had donated to the Prime Minister of the country. I think that that would be a problem. However, if clause 7 were amended, he would have to recuse himself, or the body would have to deal with it in a different way. My hon. Friend demonstrates perhaps the most likely scenario and the most powerful justification for backing the amendment. I urge all Members to do so.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)
It is a real pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. I thank the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup for his amendment. I understand that its intent is to put beyond any doubt that the Bill and the regulator will not breach UEFA or FIFA statutes, and so will not risk English clubs or national teams being banned from international competitions. I will set out why we do not think the amendment is necessary, and then I will respond to some of the questions that hon. Members posed during the debate.
I assure the Committee that the amendment is not necessary. UEFA and FIFA statutes require that the FA manages its affairs without undue influence from third parties and remains independent of political interference. The regulator will be operationally independent of the Government and will not exert undue influence on the FA’s ability to govern the game.
The shadow Minister asked about consultation. Through the observer role on the regulator board, there is an explicit requirement to consult the FA. The extent of its statutory powers and duties will not allow it to undermine FIFA’s or UEFA’s statutes. That is why—to answer the question from the hon. Member for Spelthorne—UEFA has confirmed in writing to the Secretary of State that the Bill as drafted does not breach UEFA statutes. The FA has also confirmed that directly to Members of both Houses, and it is of course publicly supportive of the Bill.
Rather than protect English football, I am afraid that the amendment would have serious unintended consequences. It would put the regulator in a position of deference to a private international organisation—a point the hon. Member for Cheltenham made eloquently a number of times. That would not only undermine the sovereignty of Parliament, but leave English football in a very weak position. UEFA has confirmed that the amendment is not needed, and it would undermine parliamentary sovereignty; for those very straightforward reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup to withdraw his amendment.
Mr French
Although I do not doubt the Minister’s sincere belief in the assurances she has given, I am afraid that unless we have evidence that gives the Opposition certainty about them, we will not withdraw our amendment. We are very concerned about the future participation of English clubs in Europe and of the national team in European and world competitions for reasons that I outlined in my speech—in the interest of time, I will not repeat them now.
I note that the Minister was very careful in her wording when she talked about what was said in the letter from UEFA. She talked about the Bill “as drafted”. The Opposition are extremely concerned about scope creep from the regulator, and much of our contributions have focused on the fact that the future regulator may take a decision that is not in conformity with the rules of FIFA and UEFA, which this House would then have few means to change. That would put at risk clubs, investment and jobs in clubs up and down the country. That is why I will press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Mr French
I beg to move amendment 98, in clause 7, line 35, at end insert—
“(3A) The IFR may not redistribute revenue, income or any monies from one regulated club to another regulated club.”
This amendment prevents the IFR from redistributing any funds from one club to another.
Again, it is a privilege to speak under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. I promise that this speech will be slightly shorter than the last one—people will be pleased to know that.
Amendment 98 would make it explicit that the Government’s regulator should not engage in the practice of redistributing income or revenue from one club to another. This is a necessary and prudent safeguard and goes to the heart of how we preserve competitive integrity, protect private investment and ensure that the scope of the regulation does not veer into a form of creeping central planning in our national game. Nowhere in the Bill as it stands is it clearly ruled out that this new public body—run by an appointee of the Secretary of State, as we have heard—could compel the transfer of funds between clubs in the name of sustainability, redistribution or solidarity.
That is why the amendment is so important. It would place a clear statutory limit on the power of the Government’s regulator. It would ensure that the regulator could not, in any circumstances, divert resources from one privately owned club to help to subsidise another. It would preserve the principle that the money earned by clubs—through good management, fan support, on-field success or commercial acumen—belongs to those clubs, not to a central authority acting as some sort of financial equaliser. Although I am sure that hon. Members will say that that will never happen, it is important that we, as Members of this House, make sure that it never does. If Members believe that it will never happen, making this amendment to the Bill will not affect the operation of the Government’s regulator. There is no reason to oppose the amendment, other than political goal scoring.
This issue goes far beyond football; it touches on the fundamental principles of ownership, competition and economic freedom. As we have heard, private investment in English football has helped to transform the game. Whether in the Premier League or lower leagues we have seen owners, both domestic and international, commit hundreds of millions of pounds to develop stadiums, invest in training grounds, nurture local talent and grow their clubs responsibly. That investment has come in the expectation of fair competition and the ability to retain the fruits of one’s success. We all know that it has not always been done with the best intentions, but the Government have decided to bring in a regulatory sledgehammer to crack this particular nut. A small minority of owners should not be responsible for upending the entire English football system, which has stood and evolved over more than 100 years.
If the Government’s regulator is granted the power to override that and to redistribute revenues forcibly between specific clubs, that risks undermining the very conditions that made English football the most watched and commercially successful league system in the world. It sends a chilling message to investors that success may be penalised, ambition discouraged and financial reward diluted in the name of a central diktat. It would also, as I said when I moved amendment 97, demonstrate a total violation of the independence of English football from a Government regulator, which would assuredly constitute a violation of UEFA and FIFA rules, in turn leading to the expulsion of our clubs from competitions, as we have just discussed. UEFA states that mandating redistribution that affects
“the competitive balance in the game and wider European competition would be of concern to us. We also fear that having a third party intervene in redistribution would likely prevent amicable solutions being found.”
It is not difficult to imagine where that could lead. A well-run League One club, generating income from smart ticketing and loyal fan engagement, could find its revenues skimmed off to support a rival that has been less prudent or less entrepreneurial with its fan engagement. A Championship club breaking even through hard decisions and local investment could be told that its television share will be trimmed to subsidise losses made elsewhere by a less prudent board or chairman. That is not regulation, but redistribution by bureaucratic diktat.
Let me be clear: I am not opposed to the redistribution of moneys in English football. Voluntary redistribution negotiated by clubs, leagues and the FA is a long-standing and respected feature of the game, but there is a profound difference between clubs choosing to support one another and the Government’s regulator imposing that from above, using statutory powers to shift money between private enterprises without consent.
Max Wilkinson
In some countries, television deals are struck directly between broadcasters and clubs. If that happened in this country in the future—were Manchester City, Arsenal or Liverpool to strike a direct deal—would we not end up in a situation where the regulator might have to consider redistributing directly from one club to ensure that the redistribution that the hon. Gentleman argues for can take place?
Mr French
I understand the Lib Dem spokesman’s point, but in my understanding, that would be the responsibility of the leagues. That is not what we are trying to block with this amendment; we are trying to block club-to-club forced redistribution. That is an important distinction, and I will come on to explain why.
I do not believe that this is a theoretical concern. The regulator’s objectives include financial sustainability. One can easily imagine a future regulator interpreting this objective to mean that it should balance resources across the pyramid, effectively redistributing funds to prop up weaker clubs. Without this amendment, nothing in legislation explicitly prevents such a scenario.
Some may argue that redistribution is needed to make the game fairer—I understand that point—but fairness in football has always been earned through competition, not imposed through central control. We must be very cautious about importing the language and logic of equalisation into a sport that depends for its vitality on aspiration, competition and merit. Sporting competition is a hill that I am willing to die on.
It is also worth noting that forced redistribution between clubs would create perverse incentives. It would reward financial mismanagement and punish prudence, and it would create a moral hazard where clubs are less motivated to balance their books if they believe that the regulator will require others to bail them out. That is not a path to sustainability; it is a recipe for mediocrity, or worse, disaster.
The principle at stake is clear: the role of the regulator is to set standards, ensure compliance and uphold integrity, and not to act as a central accountant deciding who deserves what. If clubs wish to strike revenue-sharing deals through their leagues, they may do so. The amendment draws a line: it protects club autonomy and supports continued investment in the game, and it ensures that the Government’s regulator—whatever its remit ends up being—respects the rights of clubs to manage and retain their own finances.
Stephanie Peacock
It is a pleasure once again to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. I thank the shadow Minister for the amendment and the chance to clarify the Government’s position on the redistribution of revenue. Let me be clear: the backstop process will apply only to revenue received by the leagues. That is already explicit in the definition of “relevant revenue” in clause 56. It does not allow the regulator to include individual club revenue that is not relevant for distribution agreements—for example, shirt sales. The amendment is not necessary to ensure that. It would call into question the regulator’s powers under the backstop process. Although that process is about resolving distribution disputes between the leagues, not individual teams, the money received by the leagues is ultimately distributed to their member teams.
Stephanie Peacock
The clause sets out the general duties of the regulator to define when and how it can act. The regulator must act in a way that, in so far as is reasonably practicable, is compatible with the purpose of the Bill—to protect and promote the sustainability of English football—and that advances one or more of its objectives. As part of that, the clause requires the regulator to, where appropriate, take certain things into consideration when it acts. As the regulator is required only to “have regard to” these things, it is not strictly bound by them, and so its operational independence is not undermined.
The regulator must consider some key outcomes in the football market, beyond its primary objectives. Specifically, where possible, it should have due regard to the desirability of avoiding indirect impacts on: the sporting outcomes of regulated clubs; the competitiveness of regulated clubs against other clubs, which includes overseas competitors; and investment into, and growth of, English football. That recognises that there are other features of the market that should be protected. We want a sustainable football pyramid, but not at the expense of the exciting, competitive product that continues to attract so many viewers and investors. We have explicitly added growth to this provision. The regulator will not actively pursue these outcomes, but it will be mindful of unduly harming them while it advances its statutory objectives.
The regulator must also have regard to five further things when exercising its functions. They include its regulatory principles, which guide how it should operate, its own guidance and the guidance from the Secretary of State, the most recent state of the game report, and the most recent football governance statement from the Secretary of State. We will discuss some of those points later today. I commend the clause to the House.
Mr French
It is disappointing that our amendments, which were tabled in a constructive manner, not a political one, have not been accepted. We remain concerned about some of those risks to the future of English football, but we will not seek to divide the Committee on this clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8
The IFR’s regulatory principles
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
The regulatory principles outlined in this clause are designed to guide the regulator to exercise its functions appropriately and in the manner intended by Parliament. The regulator must have regard to those principles when acting. The first principle encourages time and cost efficiency in everything that the regulator undertakes, encouraging swift action and value for money. The second principle encourages the regulator to co-operate with both those it regulates and those who will be impacted by its decisions. That reflects that the ideal regulatory environment is one where all stakeholders are working towards the same goals. Therefore, where the Bill says that the regulator should consult other relevant persons, we would expect that those affected by its decisions, such as fans, players, and representative groups, would be included when appropriate.
The third principle encourages the regulator to consider, before acting, whether the intervention is necessary, and if the same outcome could be achieved in a less burdensome way. That steers the regulator to take a light-touch approach to regulation where appropriate. The fourth principle encourages proportionality. The regulator should always look to choose the least restrictive action that still delivers the intended outcome, and be able to justify why any burden is worth it for the benefits expected. The fifth principle encourages the regulator to acknowledge the unique sporting context in which it is regulating. For example, it should consider the existing rules and burdens that clubs are subject to, and that market features such as transfer windows impose unique constraints on clubs.
The sixth principle encourages the regulator to apply regulation consistently, while still ensuring that requirements are appropriately tailored to a club’s specific circumstances. A Premier League club and a National League club operate in very different ways and face very different risks, and the regulator should and will take that into account when regulating, as I heard when meeting representatives of the Premier League, the EFL and the National League. The seventh principle encourages the regulator to hold the individuals responsible for making decisions at a club accountable for the actions and compliance of the club. For too long, clubs and fans have suffered the consequences of bad actors and mismanagement by the individuals calling the shots.
The eighth and final principle encourages the regulator to be transparent in its actions. It is important that the regulator and its regime are open and accessible to the industry, fans and the general public. I commend the clause to the House.
Mr French
I will not seek to repeat all the objectives that the Minister outlined for clause 8, but I will make some comments on each principle, and pose some questions to which I hope she can provide answers.
As the Minister described, clause 8 outlines the eight operating principles that guide the regulator’s approach. First, the Government’s regulator should be on time and cost-efficient, which is why I have tabled amendment 101 to clause 16. Secondly, the Government’s regulator should take a participative approach to regulation, helping to co-ordinate and co-operating with clubs and competition organisations, as well as engaging with players, fans and others. That relates to an amendment that we will come to shortly.
Thirdly, the Government’s regulator should be light touch in its approach to regulation, wherever possible. Sadly, we Opposition Members believe that that is now highly questionable due to some of the new parts of the Bill, which we raised concerns about in the first day’s sitting. Fourthly, the Government’s regulator should be proportionate in everything it does. Again, we have concerns about that and we have outlined some of those already.
Fifthly, the Government’s regulator should acknowledge the unique sporting context in which it is regulating, aiming to minimise any potential disruption to sporting competitions. I will not go through the debate we just had around UEFA international competitions, but I again highlight some of my earlier questions that I put to the Government on Tuesday about how this regulator is benchmarked against other regulators, because, in a sporting context, it is the first of its kind. It is very difficult for us to understand where the Government are moving towards, whether that is about resources, the size of the regulator, or the future direction, and we would like some clarity on that.
Sixthly, the Government’s regulator should apply the regulation consistently. We all hope that the regulator will do that in the future. Seventhly, the Government’s regulator should, where appropriate, hold individuals responsible for the actions of the club. That is absolutely right. There are clauses that seek to do that, and, as we have heard, to identify the appropriate officers and senior directors for different components of the club.
Eighthly, the Government’s regulator should be as transparent as possible in everything it does. Disappointingly, Government Members voted against the transparency amendments that we tabled, which, again, were not political; they were aimed to future-proof the transparency regarding how the regulator operates. I fundamentally believe that Members, regardless of what party they belong to, should be able to have all the information to make informed decisions on the benefits to their constituents.
Many of the principles in this clause are generally welcome, but I seek clarity from the Minister on a few matters. Does she think that these principles are strong enough to prevent the regulator from jeopardising the future participation of English clubs, particularly abroad? The fifth principle states that the regulator “should” aim to minimise disruption. Surely—we believe—it “must” avoid disruption, because of the risks that I outlined in previous amendments.
Lastly, none of the principles reference or reinforce the regulator’s independence. Why is there no principle regarding the regulator’s independence from the Government and politics at large, for the reasons we have outlined?
Stephanie Peacock
I thank the shadow Minister for broadly welcoming the principles. I will address a couple of those points, but without rehearsing this whole debate. Independence runs throughout this Bill; it is very clear that it is an independent football regulator, and we will talk about some of the safeguards for that in future debates.
The principles that we are debating are the same as they were under the previous Bill, with one exception: the third principle has been added, which is about making this less burdensome and which steers towards a light-touch regulator. I think that Members across the House would welcome that.
I will not rehearse the conversations we had on the make-up of the regulator—on staffing and so on, which we spoke about that the other day—but the shadow Minister touched again on UEFA. I gently remind him that we removed the need for the regulator to have regard to Government’s foreign and trade policy when considering club takeovers. We took that out of the previous Bill, and that is clearly welcome in the context of that UEFA debate. We are therefore confident that these are the right principles to guide the regulator to do a good job.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill
Clause 9
Transfer schemes
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
We are committed to establishing the regulator as quickly as possible post the passing of this Bill. To that end, the regulator is currently operating in shadow form in the Department for Culture, Media and Sport in parallel to the passage of this Bill. This is a precedented approach; for example, the Trade Remedies Authority was run as a shadow function out of the Department for International Trade before it was formally established by the Trade Act 2021.
The shadow football regulator has started work to develop the regulator’s policy and guidance, engage with stakeholders, and undertake the necessary corporate activity to build an organisation, such as recruitment and procurement. That will enable the regulator to hit the ground running once it is legally established. The shadow regulator, of course, was established by the previous Government, as they clearly also recognised the importance of the regulator being ready to operate as soon as possible once the Bill receives Royal Assent.
On the creation of the regulator, it will be necessary for the property, rights, liabilities and staff held by the shadow regulator within DCMS to be transferred to the regulator. The most appropriate vehicle for effecting these transfers will be a statutory transfer scheme, as has been used in similar situations involving the transfer of assets following the transfer of functions between public bodies. The details of such transfers will be determined at the point of transfer.
Mr French
As we heard from the Minister, the clause relates to the transfer of staffing, resources and property to the Government’s regulator in the future. I would like to ask her—this goes back to an earlier conversation on the potential direction of travel, size and scope—how many staff will be transferred? What resources or properties are we talking about, so that taxpayers can understand, and what cost will there be to the taxpayer? Hopefully, those are fair questions.
We did seek to put an employee cap into the Bill to help to maintain value for money for taxpayers. I think that was a fair proposal, but Members did not agree with it or with the number of 50 that we put forward. However, the principle of trying to cap the size of the regulator is fair, especially given the size of some of the regulators that were described in comparison—I believe one had 900 members of staff. Most members of the public would be alarmed if the football regulator ended up anywhere near that, let alone a tenth of it. We are concerned, so I ask the Minister again, given the impact on costs to football clubs linked to the regulator, how big the Government expect it to grow. Can she also answer the questions that were raised about what will be transferred on day one?
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for those questions, which somewhat rehearse the previous debate on the staffing of the shadow regulator. He should have received an answer to the written question, and we spoke about this last time; as of 1 June, it has 42 staff. I cannot comment on exactly how many staff there will be at the point of Royal Assent. In my remarks, I said that upon the creation of the regulator, property rights, liabilities and staff will be transferred. I am happy at that point to write to the shadow Minister, but I will not speculate now.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 3 agreed to.
Clause 10
State of the game report
Mr Betts
I beg to move amendment 2, in clause 10, page 7, line 6, at end insert—
“(d) an assessment of any existing and effective financial distribution agreement against the principles set out in section 62(2);”
This amendment would require the state of the game report to make an assessment of any existing and effective financial distribution agreement against the principles set out in distribution orders for the resolution process.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. We are finally starting to get on to the football issues in the Bill. The state of the game report is obviously a key element. It will shape how the regulator operates, and eventually, the financial distribution, which we will come to later in the Bill. So the report is really important.
Amendment 2, without undermining what is already in the Bill in any way, simply ensures that the financial distribution as it exists, and as it might exist according to the principles laid out in further clauses of the Bill, is taken into account when developing the state of the game report. It brings a symmetry to the whole process, so that the state of the game report looks at the financial distribution, and when we come to the financial distribution, it goes back to look at the state of the game report. It is a simple amendment that makes the Bill coherent as a whole. I hope that the Minister might at least consider it when looking at how the Bill might be improved.
Mr French
I thank the hon. Member for tabling this amendment. As I said in a previous sitting, we have a lot of respect for the work that he does chairing the football all-party parliamentary group.
The amendment would require the state of the game report to assess existing and effective financial distribution agreements against the principles. My understanding is that the amendment would therefore require the Independent Football Regulator to assess existing agreements against the principles in clause 62(2)—namely that they
“(a) should advance the IFR’s objectives,
(b) should not place an undue burden on the commercial interests of either specified competition organiser, and
(c) should not, if a distribution order were made in accordance with the final proposal, result in a lower amount of relegation revenue”—
also known as parachute payments—
“being distributed to a club during the relevant period than would have been distributed to a club during that period had such a distribution order not been made.”
There are a lot of words there.
Mr Betts
I think I am reassured by what the Minister is saying. It is obviously quite a complicated area, and it links in to what comes later in the Bill. Maybe we can pursue this later. I want to be certain that the regulator has these powers, because I believe that much of the concern among football fans is around the current distribution of revenue, and we must ensure that when we have finished with the Bill, it sorts that problem out. At this stage I will not pursue this to a vote, but we will have discussions about distribution in due course. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Mr French
I beg to move amendment 123, clause 10, page 7, line 6, at end insert—
“(d) an assessment of the impact that the IFR’s activities have had on the price of match tickets.”
This amendment would require the IFR to include in its state of the game report the impact that its regulatory activities have had on ticket prices.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to debate amendment 122, clause 14, page 9, line 3, at end insert—
“(aa) the impact that the IFR’s activities have had on the price of match tickets, and”
This amendment would require the IFR to include in its annual report the impact that its regulatory activities have had on ticket prices.
Mr French
Clause 10 provides for what is described as a state of the game report—a new mechanism by which the Government’s regulator is expected to take stock of the health, direction and trends within English football. It is, in theory, a very valuable exercise for both fans and clubs. Done well, it offers an opportunity to review not only the financial condition of the game but its accessibility, integrity and future direction. But for the clause to serve its purpose, the report must include those issues which matter most to the people who sustain our national game—the fans that it purports to protect. That is why I wish to speak to my amendments 123 and 122.
Amendment 123 would require the state of the game report to include an assessment of the impact that the regulator’s activities have had on ticket prices. Amendment 122 is tabled in a similar vein, and would require that same assessment to appear in the regulator’s annual report as well. These are modest and reasonable proposals, but they are also very important.
The cost of attending football in this country has risen markedly in recent years. For millions of supporters, particularly those attending with children or travelling away from home, football is no longer the affordable pastime it once was—we have seen those protests in the stands and outside grounds on a number of occasions this season. While the causes are complex, it is certain that increased regulatory costs, compliance burdens and mandated structural changes may be passed on, directly or indirectly, to the supporter at the turnstile. If we are to create a regulator with statutory powers over finance, governance, and club operations, surely it is not too much to ask that we track the real-world consequences of those interventions.
Max Wilkinson
I think the hon. Gentleman is arguing that ticket prices are already going up anyway. Football clubs are raising their prices—in some cases, as fan groups have argued, in the case of Manchester United, for example, unnecessarily—and are discriminatorily against people who have disabilities. Certain concession tickets are being removed already. I wonder whether he might reflect on the free market as it currently operates in football, or whether that is failing already, so that the regulator actually is trying to solve some of these problems by ensuring that fans are properly engaged with on these matters.
Mr French
I absolutely understand the point that the spokesman for the Liberal Democrats makes. One of the extreme examples, which he used, of Manchester United—if I remember correctly, the owner involved was one of the people who were coming out in support of a Labour Government before the last election, so it will be quite interesting to see what the Minister says about the behaviour of said advocate of the Labour Government in that regard. He makes an interesting point, because fans are being impacted by ticket prices; we all understand that. It is about, as I have consistently tried to say—it is a theme of our amendments—ensuring transparency about how the regulator is or is not impacting the game. We believe the amendment represents a fair and reasonable request—that someone marks the regulator’s homework so that we can understand the impact.
Mr Lee Dillon (Newbury) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. By what measure will it be possible to work out that the cost of the Independent Football Regulator has a direct consequence on the price of tickets? For example, a club could look to recoup any losses from a regulator by increasing shirt sales, or by putting 10p on a pint on the commercial sales that they get as part of their matchday revenue. Is this amendment more politically motivated, to try to pass blame on to the IFR for any matchday ticket pricing, rather than to understand the true cost of the independent regulator to football clubs?
Mr French
I thank the hon. Member for that intervention. As I said, it really is about transparency. We believe that we, as elected Members of this House, need to have an understanding of the impact that the regulator will have on the ultimate person, which in this case is the club’s fans. That is what the amendment seeks to do.
I understand the hon. Member’s point, and I did say that the causes of price increases are complex. I will not read out all the figures, but clubs’ costs have increased just this year, whether because of energy bills, national insurance or wages. We are concerned about the burdens and requirements that the regulator will impose on clubs increasing their costs and about those being passed on to the end fan, who is already under significant pressure.
Ticket prices are not an incidental issue; they are a barometer of whether the game remains accessible to its core community. We know that regulation drives up prices, through compliance costs, as I have said, and by reducing investment and squeezing margins even further. The Government must have the courage to recognise that and to adjust course if necessary by ensuring greater transparency about costs. Requiring the regulator to report on that, in its general state of the game report and its annual report, would embed an essential feedback loop in statue. It would ensure that the impact on fans was not an afterthought, but a standing obligation for the regulator.
It is not enough for the Government’s regulator to simply say, “We have improved governance and we ensure sustainability,” if we then learn, in the same breath, that the average family can no longer afford to attend any more games. Football cannot become financially sustainable by pricing out its own supporters: I suspect all Members would agree on that point. I would add that ticket affordability is a deeply traditional concern. It goes to the very heart of football’s place in English lives. Fans must not be priced out of their favourite club in the name of regulation. If we forget that, we forget the point of the Bill, which is the fans.
Let me also stress that the amendment does not restrict the regulator. It does not tie its hands; it simply requires transparency. It says to the Government’s regulator: “If your actions are driving up the cost of entry to the game, tell us, tell the fans and tell Parliament.” Then, we can at least have an honest discussion in this House about whether those actions are justified or proportionate. That is especially important when we consider that many of the regulator’s decisions, whether on licensing, financial rules or ownership models, will almost certainly have financial consequences. Clubs will find ways to balance their books, as the hon. Member for Cheltenham just intervened to say, and if the regulation increases their fixed costs, the easiest lever to pull is ticket price. That is not conjecture; it is basic economics—although we know that some members of the Labour party struggle with that.
In the end, these two amendments ask only that we shine a light on the question that supporters ask every season: “Why is it getting more expensive to watch my club?” If relegation is part of the answer—[Interruption]—or rather if regulation is; relegation is definitely part of the answer—then we have a duty in this House to know and to ensure that we make laws that shine a light and ensure transparency for everyone to understand.
Lincoln Jopp
I rise as someone who currently has an invitation in my inbox to renew my season ticket for an eye-watering £950. I would love to know where all that money goes, as the shadow spokesman said, and why the price has gone in the direction it has.
The amendment should not be seen as counter to the regulator. There was significant pushback from the Government Benches when we tried to amend the regulator in terms of size and pay, and we also discussed the budget. If, in a regulated environment, the ticket price went up from £950 to, say, £980, then this amendment would ensure that fans were made aware that that 30 quid had gone on being part of a regulated industry. That is a perfectly reasonable thing for us to want to communicate with the viewing public. Equally, it would create a relationship between the fan and the regulator that might not otherwise be there, so I support the amendment.
Max Wilkinson
It is not clear to me that Ashford Town (Middlesex) would be one of the clubs covered by the regulator. I am not sure what division they are in, but I do not think they are in the top five at the moment, although I wish them well in the forthcoming season and their efforts for promotion.
Mr French
I am not going to guess what league that club is in, but I am sure they are brilliant, whoever they are. I will not seek to offend anyone’s club by not knowing what league they are in. But the fundamental premise of the argument that the Liberal Democrats are making is that this amendment would give bad owners, if we can describe them as that, a get-out clause to blame the regulator for decisions that they are making. I think that is the argument, and the hon. Member is nodding, but this amendment would, if anything, help to shine a spotlight to stop them making that argument, because they can do that regardless of the amendment. We know that a regulator will come in. The Labour party has a huge majority; the regulator is coming, so the same owners, using the same principle he has just argued, could still make that argument, regardless of this amendment, because they know that they will have extra duties. The amendment simply seeks to ensure that fans and ticket prices are at the heart of the reporting that we see in the future, as Members and as fans as well.
Max Wilkinson
We are seeking to avoid the guarantee that what has been described will happen. As I have said, I think it will be impossible for the regulator to know, so it will be putting a finger up in the air and saying, “We think it has been 50p per ticket in League Two” or in the National League, and it may be £1 per ticket in the Premier League. But the regulator will not know. We cannot know now; it will not know in the future. Only the people who own the football clubs will be able to say, and it is obvious what they will say; we will be giving them a get-out. We strongly oppose this amendment, for those reasons.
Stephanie Peacock
The amendments from the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup regarding ticket pricing touch on an important issue that I recognise is very important to fans. I reassure fans that the Bill will increase clubs’ overall accountability, including on this important issue. However, the annual report is not an effective place to address ticket prices.
Ticket pricing is fundamentally a commercial decision, and it would not be appropriate for the regulator to interfere with the commercial decisions of a private company. That is why the regulator will not intervene on this issue, aside from ensuring that clubs consult their fans on ticket pricing. It may well be that the regulator chooses to look at ticket pricing as part of the state of the game report, but mandating that it reviews the effect of its regulatory activities on ticket pricing as part of the report would be unnecessarily prescriptive.
Ticket pricing is ultimately a matter for clubs and is driven by many factors, but we do think it vital that fans are consulted and can have their voices heard. That is exactly why this Government amended the previous Government’s Bill to add an explicit requirement that clubs must consult their fans on ticket pricing and take their views into account as part of fan engagement. That is the way to ensure that fans can have their voices heard on such an impactful issue.
The amendment seems to assume that the cost will be passed on to fans in the form of higher ticket pricing. I want to be clear, as I was on Second Reading, that that would not be a proportionate response by clubs. If clubs increase ticket pricing, it will not be because they cannot otherwise afford to pay the regulator’s levy. As mentioned before, the cost of the regulator will be tiny compared with the vast revenue of the game, and the cost of the levy will not be among any club’s top area of expenditure.
Every measure has been taken to ensure affordability. No club will be charged to the point of needing to increase ticket pricing, and no fan will be subject to price rises without having their voice heard—I associate myself with the comments of the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Cheltenham. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup to withdraw his amendment.
Mr French
It is rather disappointing that the Liberal Democrats and Labour seem to be against the principle of transparency for fans of the impact on ticket prices, given that the issue is so pertinent to fans across the country. As Conservatives, we want to stick up for those fans. We understand the costs of going to a game, as my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne said—I will not criticise his choice of club. Going to games and season tickets cost a lot of money for the average fan, and we have seen the impact of that. One example was the cost for Man City fans of coming down to the semi-final. Part of Wembley was empty because fans were saying that they could not afford the costs, because of the times of fixtures, although that is a slightly different point. We have to be mindful of the impact on ticket prices.
Mr Dillon
Supporters’ trusts and football fan bodies across the country support the establishment of a regulator, because they can see what the greater good is. Does the hon. Gentleman not accept that, even if there was a small increase in ticket prices, fans across the country would rather that there was a regulator tackling the systematic issues of football and accept that a small charge might be added to tickets? Their driver is for fairness across the game.
Mr French
That fans would be happy to accept higher prices is a brave argument to make, and it is not one that we are willing to accept. More broadly, we believe that Parliament must be able to scrutinise how much regulators, whether they are arm’s length, more direct or independent—however we label them—cost taxpayers and, in this case, fans. We believe that the sovereignty of this House demands a transparent report that Parliament and the public can analyse. We must understand the impact on ticket prices for fans. As Conservatives, we will stick up for fans today.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Swimming Facilities
Louie French Excerpts(3 weeks, 5 days ago)
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Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)
Thank you, Ms Jardine—excellently chaired, as always. I would like to start by thanking my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East (Joe Robertson) for securing this important debate. We have had some excellent contributions across the Chamber. He spoke passionately about the case for more investment in swimming facilities across England. He also had brilliant contributions from colleagues in Scotland about important safety issues, particularly in open water swimming. I wholeheartedly agree with a lot of the arguments that have been made. I thank Swim England and those in the Swimming Alliance who are here today for their ongoing engagement with us as the official Opposition.
Swimming, as we have heard already, is a valuable life skill. Going for a swim can keep people of all ages fit and healthy, both physically and mentally. Knowing how to swim can save your life or someone else’s. That is why it is rightly part of the national curriculum. But, worryingly, we have seen a decline in young people’s swimming capabilities following the pandemic. According to Swim England, nearly a third of children leaving primary school cannot swim confidently, safely and unaided over 25 metres. As the sports body warns, there is a risk that many in this generation will simply not learn to swim. The complex causes of that are often seen in London, where swimming facilities are actually a lot better than other parts of the country.
Jamie Stone
I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will share my dismay that death by drowning is twice as common per head of population in Scotland as it is in England. Does that not say something about the under-provision that we currently have north of the border?
Mr French
Sadly, it does. Parts of the Swimming Alliance are looking very closely at the open swimming element because of the tragic examples where people lose their lives. We have to be conscious of that as we go into the summer months across Great Britain, when people are more likely to swim in open water.
We have sadly seen the closure of too many swimming pools in recent years, with the number of new pools opening being only half that of those that have closed. It is a trend that the previous Conservative Government fought hard against. In 2020, we launched the £100 million national leisure recovery fund to keep leisure centres open in more than 260 local authorities.
More recently, in 2023, when rising energy prices threatened to close more swimming pools, we launched the £80 million swimming pool support fund. That crucial funding helped 102 local authorities to cover the spiralling costs that threatened to reduce and close even more facilities. Importantly, it funded nearly 550 projects across almost 350 leisure facilities to help them to reduce their energy bills. Those facilities included two in my home borough, the London borough of Bexley, where swimming remains very popular among my constituents. It is also where I learnt to swim, at the Crook Log leisure centre—not very well, I must say, although that is not a comment on their swimming lessons.
We invested to protect swimming facilities, but I now fear that, sadly, the trend of closure could accelerate under this new Government without new proposals coming forward. Schools struggling with the cost of the Labour Government’s national insurance increase might not be able to afford travel costs to local swimming pools. I am worried that the school tax will impact the areas of the country where the private pool in a school is the only swimming facility available, and about how that may impact local clubs looking to use it.
Councils are also braced for more spending pressures as inflation rises again and will struggle to keep public facilities afloat under Labour. My council has been hit with a £5 million extra cost this year just because of national insurance. Leisure facility costs are still rising, as we have heard, thanks in no small part to similar tax hikes. We have only to look at the letter from a number of providers that was made public yesterday to see their concern about the Government’s inaction.
While I appreciate that some of those matters are beyond the brief of the Minister for Sport, they are a consequence of her Government’s decisions. It is against that backdrop that she needs to lay out the Government’s plans to not only prevent more closures but open more swimming facilities, particularly in underserved communities around the country. What representations has the Minister made to the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government about the potential impact of council finances on swimming facilities? Will the Department for Culture, Media and Sport continue to provide capital funding to improve energy efficiency at our leisure centres and pools? What is her plan to reverse the trend of swimming pools closing, and promote open swimming because of the safety aspects that we have discussed, so that every generation has a chance to learn to swim?
This is an important issue for not only people’s health and wellbeing, but Britain’s sporting prowess. We all know the amazing British Paralympic and Olympic athletes and the representations they have made at the elite end of the sport. This is something that this Government must address to ensure that everyone can swim safely, and we will hold them to account to ensure that that happens in the years to come.