Lord Moynihan
Main Page: Lord Moynihan (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)(2 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I declare an interest as a former Minister for Sport, having piloted the last major football legislation through another place to enact safety measures and a football licensing authority to make our grounds safe again after very dark years. I know how challenging that can be and my sympathy, admiration and very best wishes go to the Minister.
Fast forward 30 years to 23 April 2021, when Prime Minister Boris Johnson proved decisive in taking down the European Super League. As fans, players and pretty much everyone except the breakaway club owners reacted with outrage to the idea of the European Super League, the Prime Minister called for a “legislative bomb”. However, this is more than a legislative bomb to take down a European football super league. It is a hydra of a Bill that is, as we have heard today, in danger of growing and growing.
It is a Bill eagerly seized upon in the DCMS to deliver 150 pages of new law, with 100 clauses, 12 schedules and a raft of delegated powers turning what should be light-touch regulation focused on one issue into far-reaching government and regulatory financial control of our national game. The Bill is so far-reaching that, in Clause 92, the Government believe that they, not the regulator, should have the power to amend the definition of the season. I quote from the government memorandum:
“In order to future proof any changes to the footballing calendar, the Secretary of State has the power to amend the definition of ‘season’”.
Why does the Secretary of State, by law, have to make a Statement to Parliament on the governance of football every three years? That is a far more onerous responsibility than those of the Ministers responsible for Ofwat, the Office for Road and Rail, Ofgem or Ofcom.
We have the potential—this is a very sad reflection—for government intervention marching straight through the front door. My concerns are found not just in the Bill, and I ask noble Lord to please read the memorandum from the DCMS to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. The Government and the Secretary of State have delegated powers to alter the Bill in secondary legislation—after we have passed it—on the purpose, overview and key definitions of the Bill, the work of the independent football regulator, the operating licences, the suitability of owners and officers, the distribution on revenue, and the list goes on. These are not powers to the regulator; they are powers to be retained by the Secretary of State through secondary legislation following the introduction of the Act. We know how tough it is to amend secondary legislation and that is what really concerns me.
If we take the memorandum into account, we have a Bill peppered with financial uncertainty and interventionist powers, which, as my noble friend Lord Maude said, could potentially, and tragically, split the Premier League, putting at risk the £1.6 billion that goes into football and damaging the much-envied Premier League that has successfully supported the five tiers and the rest of the game in our country.
All of this is without a clear answer to the following question: what is so broken about a professional sport which has seen only seven liquidations since 1945? What is so broken with the highly successful Premier League that has led the Government to create a regulator so large that the impact assessment says it would require operational costs, initially paid by the taxpayer, not of £1 million, nor of £10 million, but of up to £106.8 million over this and the next Parliament? Much to the delight of the competing leagues in Europe and the emerging football nations in the world, we stand, unless we are very careful, on the precipice of a new era in football governance, with potentially onerous financial regulation being introduced, as set out in this memorandum. I am seriously concerned and genuinely hope I will be proved wrong.
I believe that this is no longer about the super league; it is a far-reaching and potentially intrusive affront to the very principles of competition and spirit on which the national game thrives. To demonstrate that, the Secretary of State, who tries to persuade us that the Bill simply provides the framework for the independent regulation of sport, has, in the memorandum from the department, put a total of 42 delegated powers in the Bill, including Henry VIII powers. It is maybe not surprising that we have not heard back from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in advance of Second Reading. I declare an interest: I had the privilege of serving on that committee. The members are probably taking the rest of the government-defined season to recover from the plethora of secondary legislation and Henry VIII powers, each one of which I would urge both sides to consider in detail in Committee.
We already have the laws of the land which provide the legal framework in which professional sports and businesses operate. Football is a wonderful game of passion, innovation and excitement. It should not be the role of government or any regulator to impose its financial will on the Premier League or dictate how clubs should operate. Turn down that route and we are, sadly, in danger of choosing an uphill path to mediocrity, to the disbelieving pleasure of competitor leagues around the world. Place arbitrary restrictions on how clubs can invest and you risk depleting them of the very oxygen that allows them to thrive. Let us be clear—and here I agree fully with the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor—that the essence of football ownership lies in the relationship between the club, the community and the fans. Ownership is something we should be very careful about if we are asking government to dictate powerful regulatory decrees outside competition laws. If a club prospers, let it be allowed to enjoy the fruits of its success.
It may be unpopular to predict, and I do so with a heavy heart, but I anticipate, sadly, that those who front up the regulatory authority will one day become the despised target of tens of thousands of fans as the ownership structure of Premier League clubs comes under strain. I am not against measures to support the aspirations of the fans, which I think are important, but against untrammelled government and regulatory financial interference, which has the potential to reduce the levels of finance reaching down through the pyramid.
This country has an outstanding record of success in sport. It has built an international reputation on the understanding that government intervention in sport, amateur and professional, must be minimal. Because of this Bill, our involvement in international football is now for the first time under laser-focused scrutiny in FIFA and UEFA. As we have seen, if UEFA does not agree with clauses in the Bill which threaten football’s autonomy—the clearly implied objective of too much of the Bill, as set out in the memorandum—when asked to jump, the Government will have to say, “How high?”
Nobody denies that there are problems to be solved in football, just as there are in all sectors of the economy. The introduction of this football regulator with the unprecedented financial powers set out in the Bill and the memorandum will, I fear, be a blight on the game and see the steady decline of investment in our clubs, to the ultimate detriment of the Premier League, the EFL and our standing in world football.
Regulation and onerous legislation are no substitute for existing competition law, and threaten autonomy. The Bill has the inherent danger of suffocating the role of ownership and accountability. The backstop and the proposals on parachute payments provide a false promise of financial prudence. Former Prime Minister Boris Johnson launched the idea of a legislative bomb. We in this House have a duty to do our level best to defuse any layers of financial regulation that could damage the success of our pyramid structure in football—the EFL and the Premier League—and all those factors set out by my noble friend Lady Brady, who shares with me a passionate interest in the future of our success in the game, both nationally and internationally.
Lord Moynihan
Main Page: Lord Moynihan (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)(2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I speak to my Amendment 3, and in so doing will cover a number of other amendments in the group. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, that I see this as a Bill that is almost uniquely all-party. Both Front Benches are in favour of it. One introduced it in another place, albeit for another purpose; the Prime Minister at that time talked about dropping a legislative bomb in the path of a possible breakaway super league. It has morphed quite considerably since that time to take into account many other issues.
In a sense, it is a Bill of two parts, and they have not always completely aligned. On the one hand, there is the role of the regulator with regard to the financial success or otherwise of English football. We will come to what that means in a moment, because it is fairly important. On the other hand, there are the many recommendations that came out of the fan-led review. The noble Baroness and I have both been around a long time; it is about 40 years since I started in the other place, and I have rarely seen a Bill with 340 amendments tabled from all sides of the House before we got to Committee. That is because many Members of your Lordships’ House are interested in the fan-led review; equally there are those—I echo the words that she has just said—who are concerned indeed that a regulator should not diminish or damage the success of the football league on which the waterfall payments depend. The more successful that Premier League is, the better for football and the better for everything that we are looking at.
My noble friend in sport—dare I say that?—the noble Lord, Lord Mann, looked just a moment or two ago as if he felt that spending too much time on the Bill was nearly as depressing as three minutes before the end of the Swansea-Leeds game at the weekend, and some noble Lords opposite look as though that is how they feel. However, at the weekend he was awakened by a wonderful goal that led to a 4-3 victory by Leeds, which we both celebrated.
I want to focus first on the important issue of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, because it is important that we recognise and understand clearly what it stated. It said:
“The fundamental purpose of the Bill is to ‘protect and promote the sustainability of English football.’ … One must go through a series of definitions only to find that the Bill does not, after all, provide the definition of English football. Ultimately, the meaning of ‘English football’ depends on regulations to be made in due course by the Secretary of State—albeit by the affirmative procedure”.
The report stated:
“‘English football’ means ‘all regulated clubs and specified competitions, taken together’. A regulated club means a club that operates a relevant team. A relevant team means a team that is entered into, is a member of, or participates in a specified competition. A specified competition means a competition specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State”.
That means that the meaning of English football is deliberately left unclear on the face of the Bill that we are debating in this critical Committee. The answer will emerge only after the Bill is enacted, when the Secretary of State makes regulations to fill in the definitional gap left in the meaning of “specified competition”. As a result, the remit of the new regulator is presently unclear. The report goes on to conclude with a recommendation that
“the power of the Secretary of State in clause 2 to define ‘specified competitions’ should be removed from the Bill. Government policy is clear—that the top five leagues of the men’s professional game should be regulated. This policy should appear in primary legislation, not be relegated to secondary legislation”.
My noble friend who has just spoken from the Back Benches is also aware that, as we have discussed, there is a question of hybridity about the Bill. When the Minister comes to respond to this set of amendments, I would be grateful if she could say, first, what she intends to do to give clarity to the issue of English football and what it means in the context of this legislation and, secondly, answer the question on hybridity. Until we have answers to those two questions, we have a number of challenges. I think there is widespread agreement across both sides of this House that there should not be a whole series of major decisions left to secondary legislation. They should be in the Bill and we should be considering them in detail as we progress.
On the question of sustainability, which is key to this series of amendments and the first part of this legislation on the role of the regulator, I hope that Amendment 12 in the name of my noble friend Lord Maude commands widespread agreement across the House. It provides that football needs to continue
“to be globally competitive in relation to audience and quality … to attract significant domestic and foreign investment …. to grow economically in terms of commercial revenues, domestic and international broadcasting agreements, and asset and enterprise values”
and continue
“to produce industry-led agreements on the distribution of revenues”.
Capital will travel overseas if that is not the case. Fans will benefit from ensuring that they and their clubs see success in English football, and that success is driven by a successful Premier League.
We can debate at length how much money flows through to the rest of English football but, unquestionably, the more successful the Premier League is, the better for the fans and better for the clubs that should benefit from that. The regulator is appointed in part to opine on that relationship, so it is critically important that the regulator takes into account the success of the Premier League and of English football. Indeed, the Prime Minister is very much on that page as well. He has recently pledged to get rid of regulation: his view is that he would
“do everything in my power to galvanise growth including getting rid of regulation that needlessly holds back investment”.
So we need to explore in detail the powers of the regulator and what it is going to do—and immediately, that is a highly complex area of regulation.
The regulator that we are appointing here also has to work alongside the regulations put in place by the Premier League, the EFL, UEFA and FIFA. We have already seen what happened when UEFA came forward and said, “We don’t like one of the powers that you’re giving to the regulator”. The Government immediately said, “You’ve told us to jump—how high? We’ll remove that from the Bill”. We therefore have a highly complex tapestry of regulation and are adding significant further regulation to that. I am going to look, in further deliberations of this Committee, at how we align the work of the regulator to the UEFA financial fair play regulations.
The point that the Minister made in Committee was really about the number of Premier League clubs that have been in trouble over the years. She kindly referenced and name-checked my comment in her letter, which we have very much appreciated today. She said:
“The Noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, referenced there having been ‘only seven liquidations since 1945’. For the fans and communities who bore the brunt of those failures, that is seven too many. There have also been over 60 instances of professional clubs entering administration since 1992”.
Yes, I agree that there have been seven liquidations since 1945 and seven too many, but that is nothing like the number of liquidations and insolvencies we see in society at any given time. The numbers for the country at large are substantially greater and football has been highly successful. Only last year, something like 25,158 companies went into liquidation in the country at large, with 2,827 of those being compulsory liquidations.
So I think that the success of English football has been underestimated by the Minister and by those have been compiling the arguments that, in some sense, we should not on the face of the Bill recognise the importance of growth, financial success and financial sustainability, which are at the core of the amendment that I have tabled.
With those initial comments, I will just add one other very important point for the consideration of the Committee. All the indications are that in France, which has far greater regulation, and in Germany, which has much greater regulation as well, there is no evidence that that regulation has forestalled the insolvency of some of the clubs made insolvent under those two regulatory bodies. On the contrary, it is not the regulation that stops insolvency after all. I am very happy to give way to the Minister on this. If there is a club that seems to be in financial trouble, what will the regulator do about it? At what stage will he or she intervene? At what stage will they therefore state whatever steps they feel should be taken at that point?
That is not on the face of the Bill because, no doubt, it is the Minister’s view that that should be left to regulation and it is up to the regulator. But the reality is that you appoint a regulator only if you really believe there is a serious problem and you know exactly what that regulator would do in any given circumstance. That has not been the case in either France or Germany, which are the two major case studies relevant to us at this stage. So I would echo the points that have been made. We need to make sure on face of the Bill that the regulator recognises that football should be as successful financially as possible, and that nothing the regulator does should inhibit the success and growth of the financial success of football. With those comments, I am supportive of both my noble friend Lord Maude’s amendment and, clearly, my own.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak in Committee on the Bill, and obviously at Second Reading as well. I put on record my thanks to the Minister for her helpful and comprehensive letter today, which also referenced my reference to Woolworths. I think she might have misunderstood what I was saying, but we will let that pass.
I will focus specifically on Clause 1, which is the centre of this Bill: it is the cause, the purpose and the raison d’être of this Bill. As I mentioned at Second Reading, if you cannot adequately identify what the problem is that you are seeking to solve, you are very unlikely to reach an efficacious solution. This Bill—this Act, assuming it gets Royal Assent at some point—will be a living document. It will be the Government, the state, via a large regulator with unique powers, intervening in what hitherto has been a very successful commercial activity—perhaps one of the most successful commercial and business activities in the whole of our country, and certainly one that is globally very well regarded.
Therefore, it is incumbent on the Government to look seriously at the excellent amendments put down by my noble friend Lord Parkinson and to take on board some of the points raised by my noble friends Lord Maude, Lord Moynihan and Lord Hayward. The odd thing is that the Bill is drafted in such a way that it ignores some of the key points made in the impact assessment. The first page of the impact assessment contains a commitment to “improve financial sustainability”, which is in my noble friend Lord Moynihan’s amendment. However, in the Bill the wording is quite opaque and that wording does not appear.
Equally, focusing narrowly on Clause 1—which is the reason the Bill is coming to this House—I note that it seems odd that the local community is not defined in primary legislation. Ministers will say, “That’s because we need the leeway to bring forward subsequent secondary legislation and statutory instruments for unusual circumstances”. That is not an ignoble or unfair interpretation, but it is a difficult proposition to put to this Committee when we have to judge what is in front of us and not what might happen in the future in a very complex market model. So that omission is still problematic, which is why I repeat it from Second Reading. The other issue is that clubs’ fans are not defined definitively in the Bill, probably for the same reason.
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 5 and 24 standing in my name. In the spirit of cross-party support for this Bill, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Watson of Wyre Forest, for moving my amendment so eloquently. Should the Minister be in complete agreement with him, I think we could curtail this debate immediately and place the wording on the face of the Bill, since what I was looking for was exactly what he sought—namely, to insert
“within the rules laid down by UEFA, FIFA and the International Olympic Committee, relating to the autonomy of sport from government influence and control”.
Since there surely can be nobody who does not want to see us continue to play in UEFA competitions and the World Cup, to make that clear on the face of the Bill, as the noble Lord, Lord Watson of Wyre Forest, spoke to, is important.
Why is this being raised? It is being raised because UEFA has already—before we even got to Committee—raised specific concerns about the Government’s proposal to establish an independent football regulator, emphasising potential government interference in football governance. UEFA made four key objections, as I understand it. I have not had sight of the letter, but perhaps the Minister could confirm that in her response. First, it talked about the autonomy of football governance. UEFA insists that football should be self-regulated without external government influence. As I understand it, in the letter from the UEFA general secretary, Theodore Theodoridis, he stated that there should be
“no government interference in the running of football”.
The second point that he made was about the impact on UEFA competitions. UEFA warned that government interference could lead to the exclusion of English federations and clubs from European competitions, including the Champions League and the European Championships. This concern was highlighted in communications to UK officials, where UEFA emphasised the risks associated with the proposed regulator’s powers.
The third concern that UEFA expressed was on the regulatory powers and the competitive balance, which was referred to in earlier debates this afternoon. UEFA, as I understand it, is apprehensive about the proposed regulator’s backstop powers, which we will come to at a later stage of the Committee’s proceedings. Those are powers to intervene in funding discussions between the Premier League and the English Football League. UEFA argues that such intervention could disrupt the competitive balance and hinder amicable solutions within the football ecosystem. This is interesting; the point was made earlier about the comparison between the German system and the system that we have here. The reason I made that comparison was that Germany has possibly got the most regulated football in Europe in terms of what they call the Sonderweg, which translates as the “special unique past”. It is based on financial regulation and measures, including the 50-plus-one rule.
The point I was making was that the insolvency levels and the financial position of clubs within Germany and the UK are broadly similar, so it is not the regulation that impacts on that. UEFA has therefore concluded, comfortably within its own rules, that Germany, under its regulation, satisfies UEFA’s criteria. However, it raised a fourth point about licensing and club ownership. The proposed regulator would have had the authority to implement a licensing system for clubs and influence club ownership decisions based on the UK’s trade and foreign policy. That was the specific point withdrawn—removed—from the original Bill, and UEFA made it clear that it feared this could lead to fragmented governance across Europe and undermine the independence of football clubs.
These concerns that UEFA has brought forward are very serious. They would have a significant impact on our ability to play in the Champions League and the European Championship—indeed, if we apply the same logic to FIFA, in the World Cup as well. The preservation of the autonomy of football governance is therefore incredibly important. I hope we all agree that in introducing a football regulator nothing should jeopardise the autonomy of football governance and that we are within the rules and regulations set out by UEFA, which are comprehensive, as well as within FIFA’s. There should be nothing that could allow a regulator to overreach that boundary and thus disrupt the sport’s established structure.
I agree that we want to see our clubs competing at the highest level, and the national team as well. Earlier, the noble Lord said that the level of regulation in France, and indeed in Germany, was much tougher than anything that we are going to have in the Bill. But those countries have not got into difficulties, given the regulation that they have, so I do not really see why we should either.
My point was that that is not the case. I do not want to go back into our debate on the first group, but the financial stability in the English system is no different. It is very similar to the financial stability in both the French and German systems. The levels of insolvency are, broadly speaking, the same. It is therefore not the level of regulation that is creating financial stability. If it was, the argument that we needed more regulation to create financial stability would hold water, but in practice it does not.
My point on this set of amendments is simply that if we all agree on this legislation and the role of the regulator, which is not comprehensively defined in the Bill, despite its length—the Minister has said, rightly, that we do not know the details of how the regulator will use its powers in any given situation—the one thing we can be sure about is that we do not want that regulator ever to use its powers in contravention of the UEFA and FIFA guidelines, by which we would have admission to play in European competitions and the World Cup. Should that be the case, there should be no difficulty in placing in the Bill that the whole operation of the regulator should be
“within the rules laid down by FIFA, UEFA and the International Olympic Committee, relating to the autonomy of sport from government influence and control”.
I added the International Olympic Committee because the same principles of autonomy apply, albeit that the British Olympic Association does not enter a men’s football team at present. It certainly enters a women’s football team and would wish to continue to do so. The Bill would enable, by secondary legislation if necessary, the Government to include the women’s game within the scope of this Act, as it would then be. I am thus also looking to have protection of
“the autonomy of sport from government influence and control”
in the Bill for the International Olympic Committee. For those reasons, I put these two amendments before the House. I beg to move Amendment 5.
As per the FA articles of association, the FA is established to promote and govern the game of association football. This Bill will not affect the FA’s ability to do that independently without undue influence, so it will not breach UEFA and FIFA statutes as they are currently drafted. The FA gave all evidence to this effect to the Committee in the other place, during the passage of the previous Bill.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for what I am sure is a completely genuine and committed response to the many points that have been made. However, I hope she will understand that it worries this Committee to hear that fans might be alarmed by something, so we must not show it to them”.
That is not what I said. My point was that this conversation and this debate may be alarming, and I believe it is unduly alarming to fans, although nothing in this Bill would preclude us from international games, whether that is English clubs or the national team.
I am sorry, but the Minister was very clear in her response to my noble friend that the publication of the letter might cause alarm, and that that was one of the reasons why it was not to be published. If I misunderstood, I apologise to the Minister, but I would simply say that, if there is no alarm from the letter, why not publish it? Why not place the letter in the House of Lords Library so that we can review it?
Lord Moynihan
Main Page: Lord Moynihan (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)(1 month, 4 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this amendment, on the potential harms of overregulation, goes to the heart of this whole Bill. What we are discussing in this Committee is not just the role of a new regulatory body but the future of English football in its totality. The Bill introduces a complete overhaul of the entire system of English football. It creates an entirely new organ of state apparatus, which will no doubt introduce copious amounts of onerous rules and regulations that clubs and leagues will be forced to comply with—in addition to the already stringent rules that the leagues impose on clubs themselves.
The Premier League has a handbook on its rules and governance procedures that is 768 pages long. Contained within this vast document are reams of rules, regulations and duties relating to matters such as club finances, tests for the prospective owners and directors of clubs, the disclosure of relevant interests by club officers, requirements for directors’ reports, and so on. Under rule E.22, the league has the power to impose financial penalties, and under E.37 it can deduct points from clubs which violate those rules. All the things that the Bill seeks to address are already covered by the Premier League.
It is not just the Premier League that does this. The EFL already has an established financial regulation department, aptly called the club financial reporting unit, which monitors and ensures financial regulations that EFL clubs must abide by. The EFL can and does hand out penalties to clubs that fail to meet its standards. For example, in May 2023 Wigan Athletic FC was deducted four points, beginning the 2023-24 season on minus eight. That was because the club failed to comply with the EFL’s requirements that the club deposit 125% of its forecast monthly wage bill into a designated club account. In fact, in that season there were 15 disciplinary and enforcement proceedings against clubs by the EFL for breaching its rules. That existing self-regulation has clearly been effective. Despite some high-profile cases of failure, the vast majority of the time the current regulations do serve their purpose.
Since 2012, when the financial rules were strengthened, only six Football League clubs have gone into administration and only seven football clubs have been completely liquidated since 1945—these are remarkable numbers. Compare that to the finance industry, whose insolvency figures dwarf that of football. In the 12 months to September 2024, there were approximately 500 insolvencies in the financial services sector alone, according to the Insolvency Service’s official statistics. We talk about breakaway leagues, and yet we must not forget that the European super league was stopped in its tracks by the fury of the fans and the power of the current league regulators of football. Is that not a clear example of the self-regulation of the sport working very effectively?
It is not clear at all that self-regulation has failed. I put it to your Lordships’ House that English football is one of the great success stories of private regulation. The leagues already impose their own rules, which hold clubs to account for their actions. They have robust mechanisms for punishing those clubs that do not act appropriately, and the evidence of the success rate of football clubs proves that that has indeed worked. So I ask the Minister: why strangle the flourishing industry that is professional football?
I also point out that that seems to be the view of the Prime Minister. As my noble friend Lady Evans of Bowes Park noted at Second Reading, the Prime Minister himself said at the recent investment summit that
“the key test for me on regulation is … growth. Is this going to make our economy more dynamic? Is this going to inhibit or unlock investment?”
He went on to say that
“where it is needlessly holding back the investment we need … we will get rid of it … we will make sure that every regulator in this country, especially our economic and competition regulators, takes growth as seriously as this room does”.
There we have it. The Prime Minister himself understands that regulation and overregulation are fraught with economic danger. If he realises the risks of regulation inhibiting investment in that arena, does he also recognise the risks of regulation and overregulation within football?
It seems we are suffering from, as Harold Demsetz termed it, the Nirvana fallacy. This is where people look at private solutions and seek to discover discrepancies between the ideal and the real. If discrepancies are found, they deduce that the real is inefficient. Their usual yet unfortunate response is that the only possible solution must surely be more regulation, more rules and more state diktats. But when we are considering whether this new regulator will actually improve outcomes for football, we cannot merely have reference to the supposed limitations of self-regulation. We must look at what this independent football regulator will become.
For that, it is particularly instructive to examine the recent report on the Financial Conduct Authority by the All-Party Group on Investment Fraud and Fairer Financial Services. That report has found that the body that regulates the entire financial sector in this country is
“an opaque and unaccountable organisation”
that is
“incompetent at best and dishonest at worst.”
The noble Lord, Lord Sikka, who is not in his place, stated that the FCA was “complacent, conflicted and captured”.
Among the litany of failures that the report identified is one that is typical of regulators of all stripes: the culture of the organisation. The APPG found that the entire professional culture of the regulator was defective, and that
“errors and inaction are too common”.
The APPG has lined up a vast array of whistleblowers, who have shed light on the problems that the FCA faces. That report is backed up by the Institute of Economic Affairs, which points out that the FCA has been able to decide its own burden of proof and then levy fines running into billions of pounds, and all without proper accountability.
I will not reiterate the entire report for the Committee, but I was not surprised at all when I read it. The behaviours and the failures as described by the APPG are all too common when it comes to state-run bodies that seek to enforce their rules on to other private entities. They are too often encouraged to go further than necessary—mission creep—and then do not act when they are supposed to.
Why would this regulator be any different? Why would the independent football regulator break the mould and challenge these hitherto proven truths? I see no reason why the IFR would improve football in this country in any way. Previous state-run regulators have clearly failed, and I have no doubt that this regulator would potentially do the same. I therefore feel it is an absolute bare minimum to require the independent football regulator to have due regard to these risks of overregulation, as enunciated in my amendment. That should not be a contentious point.
I hope that the Minister can give me cast-iron assurances that the regulator will be ever watchful of the damage that it could very well inflict on football clubs and leagues. I ask her to guarantee absolutely that the IFR would be a light-touch regulator and not delve into the minutiae of each club’s finances and everyday operations. I want her to reassure the House that not one penny of a club’s income will be wantonly redistributed to another club, which would be tantamount to asking one private business to give its own earned assets to another private business. As I described last week in Committee, that would be a moral hazard. This is a matter of profound principle that I simply cannot disregard.
For the avoidance of doubt, I say again that this is a poorly drafted Bill. It was poorly drafted under the previous Administration, and it is worse now—but at least we have the opportunity to address its worst deficiencies and improve it in Committee. I hope that the Government and this Committee understand the dangers of the path that we are heading down, and that all possible efforts should be taken to shift us away from the constant move towards more regulation and to protect our nation’s proudest cultural export from the ever-encroaching arms and dead hand of the state.
My Lords, I will speak for the first time today to support my noble friend’s amendment, because it is important to set this Bill in context.
I, for one, am not in favour of the financial regulation in the Bill. I have a degree of support for many of the amendments that came out of the Tracey Crouch review, and the propositions on fan-led change are reasonable for the Premier League to consider. What worries me is that we are introducing—the only country in the western world to do so—the imposition of regulatory control over one of our major sports. Even countries such as Russia and China, which have sports laws, recognise the overall authority of the International Olympic Committee, FIFA and UEFA. They do so in recognition that they would not be able to host or to participate in their sporting events if they did not accept that overall authority.
On the first day in Committee, it was clear that the Government were not prepared to countenance putting the important rider in the legislation that we would do nothing that would threaten the role and playing of our clubs in European competitions and the World Cup—and, if we include women’s football, in the Olympic Games too, but that is a matter for a latter amendment. I am concerned about the imposition of regulatory control, being the only country that does this, because, as was rightly pointed out by my noble friend, this does not in any way generate growth. On the contrary, it proposes a whole series of measures that will restrict the competitiveness of the clubs in the Premier League, which, in turn, will mean that the waterfall of financial support that comes through to all professional football in this country is lessened, not increased.
I speak from the position of somebody who has had the privilege of being involved in sport for 30 or 40 years. When I was interested in becoming a Member of Parliament, I wanted to go to Moscow as an athlete for the Olympic Games. Had we legislated that the athletes could not go, I would not have been permitted to go. As it was, I led a campaign for the athletes to go against the boycott that my then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, strongly supported. I felt that, under the autonomy and independence of sport and the vital principle that sportsmen and sportswomen should not be political pawns, it was right for the competitors, who wanted to go, to compete in Moscow, however much they may have opposed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as indeed I did. I recognised that to use sportsmen and sportswomen as the only way to demonstrate opposition to the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union was wrong, when people could buy tickets for Aeroflot in Piccadilly and go to watch the Bolshoi in Leningrad, and while trade and diplomatic relations continued.
The noble Lord will be aware that a lot of this detail is being worked out by the shadow regulator. I can ask for that detail. I cannot give the noble Lord explicit clarity on that tonight but I will endeavour to get a clearer answer for him before the next sitting. That may, however, not include the level of detail that he requests.
To return to the amendment in question, the duties in Clause 7 are fairly novel for a statutory regulator. These bespoke duties acknowledge the specific market features that are key to the continued success of English football, such as investment and competitiveness.
The Minister just referred to competitiveness. Some 14 clubs in the Premier League are multi-club ownership structures. Will the regulator be able to take into account the financial strength or otherwise of other clubs in the ownership structure of those 14 clubs? For example, with Jim Ratcliffe and INEOS at Manchester United, in providing a licence to Manchester United, will the regulator take into account the financial strength or otherwise of Nice and Lausanne—two other clubs which INEOS has an interest in—or is the regulator specifically and only to look at the English clubs? If it is the latter, is there not a risk of capital flight away from Manchester United in those circumstances if, for example, a significant bond was to be required by the regulator to be put up for Manchester United?
If I correctly understood the noble Lord’s point, I do not believe that clubs should be concerned about that particular instance. We will be discussing licences and licensing conditions in a later group so, with your Lordships’ indulgence, if we could wait until then, that would be appreciated.
The amendment would also require the regulator to submit a report on its effects on the financial position of regulated clubs. I reassure the noble Lord that the Bill already includes comprehensive reporting requirements on the regulator—for example, the “state of the game” report and the regulator’s annual report to the Secretary of State, which must be laid before Parliament. These reports would of course be expected to include an assessment of the regulator’s own impact on the market. In our view, the intent of this amendment is therefore already achieved in the Bill.
The noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, asked whether we are risking jeopardising English clubs’ involvement in international competitions. As I reiterated during the last debate, the Government are confident that the Bill and the regulator will not breach the statutes of UEFA and FIFA. This Bill will constitute the business regulation of football clubs in this country; it will not constitute interference in how the FA, or any international body, governs the game. For the reasons I have laid out, I hope the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, Amendment 18 covers the issue of the scope of the Bill, and particularly women’s football. The Clause 2 stand part debate will focus specifically on the concerns that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has raised for the consideration of your Lordships.
As regards the women’s game, I seek clarification from the Minister. There is, as noble Lords know, a delegated power in the Bill that allows, at any time in the future, the Secretary of State to amend the scope of the Bill and include women’s football. At present, women’s football is not covered, mainly because of the future of women’s football review, which recommended that women’s football be given a chance to self-regulate. However, it noted that the market shares some similar problems with the men’s game, and, given that the policy intent was that the regulator should not regulate women’s clubs—
I am mindful of the fact that the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, is not here. She and I, and others, have an amendment specifically addressing the issue of the place of women’s football. Would the noble Lord withdraw his amendment this evening so that the noble Baroness could at least be here to take part in that debate? I know it is very close to her heart and I am trying to save us from having two debates.
I appreciate that. I will considerably curtail, so I do not need to come back to repeat what I have just said, and simply put a number of very brief questions. Unfortunately, that was not of my doing, as the noble Lord knows, and the powers that be will no doubt look rather more closely at future amendments to make sure that there is no overlap.
I simply ask the Minister one question: what specifically would need to happen for the women’s game to be added into the proposed regulatory framework? I will leave it to the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, and others, to explore in more detail questions surrounding the ownership of clubs, which regard both women’s and men’s participation as equally important, and therefore the fitness of directors tests, et cetera. To assist the process of speeding up matters in your Lordships’ Committee this evening, I will not ask any further questions on that but will leave it to the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, and the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, to consider that in greater detail.
I turn to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which is absolutely relevant to Clause 2—unless the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, has identified a further group of amendments that we can tie this in to. Clause 2 is really important, because it gives the Secretary of State significant powers through secondary legislation. As the Minister knows, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee is a highly respected Committee in this House, and we have a senior member of that committee present this evening. I declare an interest, having served on that committee.
There was real concern that the meaning of English football as defined in Clause 2 was left unclear in the Bill. We covered that briefly at an earlier stage but, to cut to the point, their comment was:
“The policy intent has always been that”
the clubs in scope of the regulator’s remit
“should currently be the top five leagues of the men’s English football pyramid only”.
Given that, it is somewhat concerning that there is so much scope given to change that in secondary legislation, without the opportunity we would have of considering the benefits, or otherwise, of any significant changes to the Bill, which would be really significant. Therefore, it was not surprising that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee stated:
“The argument that something should not be fixed in primary legislation because it might need changing in future would be an argument against having any primary legislation”.
That is a fairly powerful point for that committee to make in the context of this Bill—indeed, of any Bill brought before your Lordships’ House.
The committee continued:
“The current system of leagues works well. If it were enshrined in primary legislation, it could still work well and, if it ceased to do so, the primary legislation could be amended. Primary legislation is constantly being amended”
to be
“fit for purpose”.
So I very much hope that the Minister will take careful note of the advice offered by that committee. It is very rare that we would ignore that committee or reject the most important recommendation that it has made. It makes a very strong point there. This is an enabling Bill. Clause 2 gives wide-ranging remits to consider the inclusion of women’s football to the Secretary of State—not, by the way, to the regulator. Equally, it is clearly a Bill about the men’s game, which brings forward clear primary legislation on the role of the regulator in the context of the men’s game.
That being the case, I see no reason why this legislation should not be very clear about its purpose and not leave it open to secondary legislation, which gets far less attention in your Lordships’ House. We know that from both sides of the House, whoever has been in Government: it is easy to slip through secondary legislation. We cannot deal with it clause by clause; we either accept it or reject it and we do not have a Committee stage on it.
The two powers vested in the Secretary of State under Clause 2 are of such importance that I very much hope that the Minister will take away the points I have just raised and give further consideration to putting the Bill’s intent clearly within it, rather than leaving it to future secondary legislation. I beg to move.
My Lords, in thanking the Minister for her response to these points, I am more convinced than ever that having a probing amendment that Clause 2 should not stand part of the Bill has been borne out by the exchanges that we have had this evening.
First, there are clearly too many powers that have gone into secondary legislation and those powers delegated to the Secretary of State now have a completely different light on them. The question of hybridity is absolutely relevant. If we do not know what we are talking about within the Bill because it is potentially hybrid, and we cannot put on the face of the Bill the government plan—which, incidentally, was the same as the previous government plan—to enshrine the top five leagues of the men’s game in legislation, then we have a serious problem.
My concern is amplified by the fact that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee was clearly unaware of the exchanges that have taken place this evening or, indeed, of any briefing that could have been given to the committee by the Government; it clearly did not happen. So it is not surprising that in its report it stated:
“It is not clear why a monopoly granted by secondary legislation would be less significant than one granted by primary legislation”.
The answer to that is quite clearly one of hybridity.
Therefore, in not pushing my amendment this evening, I nevertheless request that the Government write not only to members of this Committee but to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, setting out in some detail their response to the exchanges that have taken place this evening, so that these issues can be addressed with clarity. Frankly, it is not surprising that, without that clarity, the committee commented:
“The argument that something should not be fixed in primary legislation because it might need changing in future would be an argument against having any primary legislation”.
The committee does not make comments such as that flippantly but it would make them in the absence of a full understanding of the reasons behind the Government’s position as to why they have not put the top five leagues from the men’s game in legislation. That applies to Amendment 19 as well as Amendment 21.
I very much hope that in my not pressing Amendment 18, the Government will take it away and give due consideration to what has been said this evening and write to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee with an updated view. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Moynihan
Main Page: Lord Moynihan (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will very briefly support my noble friend Lord Parkinson’s Amendment 19. I do so as chairman of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, although the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, chaired the relevant meeting in my absence. My noble friend’s amendment addresses a serious issue. I would have thought that, given the committee’s report on this, the Government would have at least considered the arguments and sought to alter them.
As noble Lords have noted, our committee’s eighth report highlighted that this Bill, as drafted, does not make the fundamental definition of English football clear. The committee was concerned because this Bill leaves us wanting. It leaves us with no definition in primary legislation of what it seeks to address; it is a Football Governance Bill that does not define what part of football it will govern and leaves such a key part of the definition of the Bill to come later in secondary legislation. As my noble friend has pointed out, certain parts of it say that the secondary legislation, if it were to be hybrid, should be ignored as hybrid. That gives a very wide-ranging power which we should be cautious about.
The memorandum explains that
“the rationale for regulatory intervention is based on market failures in the professional men’s game, and problems or harm that most typically and markedly arise in clubs of a certain size and type (typically professional clubs)”.
It then gives four different reasons why the Bill does not explicitly state that it intends to regulate the top five tiers of the professional men’s game. These reasons have been covered by other Members, so I will not go over them.
The Government argue that they need to define the scope in secondary legislation to allow them to change it in future. However, should they need to amend which leagues are in scope, they could still amend primary legislation to alter those leagues by statutory instrument. There is no change to that in my noble friend’s amendment. We have seen hybrid Bills before. I took one through the other place as Secretary of State for Transport, dealing with a rail link from the West Midlands to London. They are more complicated, but people know how to do them and know what regulations need to be abided by.
This amendment is not asking us to decide whether the Bill is hybrid; the Government are being asked to accept that there is inherently a form of hybridity in this Bill regardless, and that they must therefore allow it to go before the Examiners to see what they find. The Government should give very careful consideration to what the amendment says.
My Lords, my noble friend Lord McLoughlin has made an incredibly important point. While I do not think that this is the moment for us to test it, we should give due consideration to whether this ought to go before the Examiners after Committee and before Report, particularly because the Minister has today said that the leagues are not confused about which leagues this legislation applies to.
We are grateful to the Minister for writing to us today. She stated in her letter that:
“The initial intended scope of the top five tiers of Men’s English football is built on a strong evidence base and extensive consultation with all key stakeholders”.
Nothing could be clearer about exactly who this Bill is meant to refer to. Yet, in this whole long Bill, there is no reference to the five tiers of men’s English football and we have no idea whether the Secretary of State will ultimately keep to that or not. We are going through legislation about which we have no clarity to whom it refers. That is, if not unprecedented, extremely rare. It is important that we heard from my noble friend Lord McLoughlin, not least because, to repeat what his committee said in its report:
“The argument that something should not be fixed in primary legislation because it might need changing in future would be an argument against having any primary legislation”.
I urge the Minister to listen carefully to my noble friends and to make sure that the Government at least place what we are talking about in the Bill, so that we know which clubs it refers to and where the onerous powers contained in it for the potential state-appointed regulator will fall. Without that, we are talking in a vacuum.
My Lords, one of the amendments in question is in my name and that of my noble friend. I am surprised that Members opposite think that the previous Conservative Government would have introduced a hybrid Bill. I remind the House that this Bill is almost identical to the one they introduced and I am surprised that they thought that that might be hybrid. That Bill was discussed in another place at quite some length, but this question was not raised. As I understand it, the Bill would not have received a Second Reading had it been deemed to be hybrid at that time, so I do not think there is any question that this Bill is hybrid now. It can be made hybrid only if one House or the other passes an amendment that makes it so.
My Lords, in moving my Amendment 27, I will also speak to my Amendments 28 and 29. These amendments seek to omit reference to the “influence” a person can have over the activities of a club being considered for a licence to operate as a professional football club in England.
Walking through this maze of state-imposed regulation on professional sport, for the purpose of the amendments I assume that the Government intend to allow the government-appointed regulator to determine who is a fit and proper person to be granted a licence on the question of their “influence” over a club’s activities. If we try to seek clarity in the Bill, we are immediately referred to Schedule 1, where, in keeping with this hydra of a Bill, we are once again left totally in the dark. It says, at page 83:
“The Secretary of State must prepare and publish guidance about the meaning of significant influence or control for the purposes of this Schedule”.
So the Bill continues to blindfold parliamentarians before they take the knee and kick off their important scrutinising role, which is the central purpose of your Lordships’ House.
Perhaps the best way to seek clarification from the Government is to work through a specific example. Newcastle is majority owned and financially controlled by the Saudi sovereign fund, the PIF. The PIF became the majority shareholder and de facto owner of the club, with 80% of the shares acquired in October 2021. The chair of the PIF is Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, son of Saudi Arabia’s King. MBS, as he is known, runs the Saudi Government.
For once, the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, cannot pray in aid that this is an inherited Conservative Bill, because in the Conservative Bill there was a protection against the Government-appointed regulator investigating whether, for example, the Crown Prince and chair of the PIF was a fit and proper person to exercise control over Newcastle through his chairmanship of the PIF. The current Government deleted the very protection that the Conservative Government put in the Bill that required the regulator to,
“have regard to the foreign and trade policy objectives of His Majesty’s Government”.
This removal was a direct result of UEFA’s insistence to the current Prime Minister that this protection politicises sport. When faced with expulsion from the European Championship in 2028, which, incidentally, is to be hosted in the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, and asked to jump, he said “How high?” and deleted the protection, clearly without the Government considering the consequences. This is a classic example of the need to beware of unintended consequences.
When the Prime Minister heads off to Saudi Arabia this month to promote trade and relations with Saudi Arabia, what will he say when the Crown Prince asks, “As I exercise influence over the PIF and since the PIF owns Newcastle, am I to be subject to detailed investigation by the regulator as set out in your Bill, and is there anything the regulator will not take into account about me as a ‘person of influence’ over the future of Newcastle United?”
Sadly, I can assure the Committee that for anyone who has read the Bill, the answer to Newcastle fans is that, unlike under the Premier League or UEFA rules, the Crown Prince is to be subject to investigation by the regulator. That is exactly what the Government intend the regulator to do, because they have removed the one protection it had. So let the Prime Minister be in no doubt that the answer he has to give to the Crown Prince and the PIF, which is investing billions in global sport and encouraging full British co-operation with the growth of boxing, golf, the International Olympic Committee’s Esports and tennis, to name just a few recipients of Saudi influence in global sport that is celebrated by many professional sports in this country, all of whom benefit from it.
When the Minister comes to answer, the Committee is looking for simple clarity. Yes, the regulator has full rights to use his or her many powers to investigate and opine on the suitability or otherwise of any owner who exercises a degree of influence over, for example, Newcastle United. That is just one example of such detailed and intrusive investigation which exists solely in the powers of the proposed regulator but nowhere else in football—not in UEFA, FIFA, the EFL or the Premier League. The intrusive investigation which this phrase leads to will be replicated across the Premier League unless we accept my amendments.
We have a clear understanding of the first meaning of an “owner”, which is those who control or exercise control over a club, and shareholders are a good example. However, to understand the second phrase, the concept of “influence” over a club, we need to understand what the Government mean by “influence”. What is deeply disturbing is that, from other parts of the Bill, it is clear that the definition conflicts with the approach to ownership of the government regulator, the Premier League, UEFA and the EFL, all of which would be conflicted with the government regulator’s role. I predict that it would be mired in litigation for years to come and lead to capital flight by current owners in the Premier League and other leagues, so I owe it to the Committee to explain briefly why.
The starting point is whether there is a difference in the definition of an owner between what is in the Bill and in the Premier League’s rulebook. If there is a difference, what will this mean in terms of whether a newly identified owner would have to go through a test or whether they would still be defined as an incumbent owner who, incidentally, will have to go through extensive new tests under this legislation?
This Bill tells us that the regulator must identify an “ultimate owner” as opposed to companies that have ultimate control. How is this defined in the Bill and what does it mean? At what point in the process must the ultimate owner be identified? For example, can he or she be identified for a provisional licence? I would argue that they have to be. If new individuals are identified, will they have to go through the full owners and directors tests as new prospective owners or will they be treated as incumbents?
I thank the noble Lords, Lord Moynihan and Lord Markham, in her absence the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, and my noble friends Lady Taylor of Bolton and Lord Bassam of Brighton for the amendments in this group. It is absolutely right that clubs have suitable owners, a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Evans of Bowes Park, among others. That is why a new statutory owners’ and directors’ test is a key element of the regulatory regime.
In response to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, the current tests have proven ineffective. They result in a drawn-out process that still allows unsuitable owners into the system. We have seen numerous instances of unsuitable owners and officers causing harm to clubs and detriment to their fans—that stops now. The definitions ensure that those who are responsible for clubs can be identified and tested. They cannot hide behind complex ownership structures to avoid this, as existing tests currently allow. My noble friend Lord Mann made a strong case for strong tests, and my noble friend Lord Watson of Invergowrie added his own experience of Wimbledon.
The noble Baroness, Lady Evans of Bowes Park, asked a number of questions around the owners’ and directors’ tests. In response, I will say that football authorities can still conduct their owners’ and directors’ tests if they choose to do so, but the regulator’s test is set in statute. Any owner who fails the regulator’s tests will be removed and any prospective owner must pass the regulator’s tests before taking ownership, no matter the results of the league’s tests.
Given the importance of this issue, I welcome the opportunity to clarify the Government’s position further. I start with Amendments 27, 28, and 29 from the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan. The definition of an ultimate owner is an important part of the Bill, and we are confident that we have the right definition that achieves the Bill’s aim. The current drafting takes its lead from the precedent of other Acts that use “influence or control” together, including the Companies Act “persons with significant control” regime and the economic crime Act “beneficial owners” regime. This ensures that an individual who exerts significant influence over a club, more than that of any other owner, can still be identified as the ultimate owner, even if they do not have formal legal control.
That is an exceptionally helpful and clear answer; now she has given us the Government’s view on what “significant influence” means. Why, then, do the Government not put that in the Bill, rather than simply say that at some stage in the future it will come forward under secondary legislation?
The Government’s view is that we do not need to put it in the Bill.
It is absolutely critical to achieve the clarity that the noble Lords, Lord Mann and Lord Watson, have been talking about, and I agree with them completely. What is needed is clarity for investors. It is absolutely essential that it goes in the Bill; it is critical to the definition of ownership and to the whole regulatory framework that is being placed in a hugely lengthy enabling Bill. The clubs and owners at the EFL and the Premier League need clarity. The Minister has very kindly given the Committee clarity on the definition, as she sees it, of significant influence, so what is there to resist in terms of placing it in the legislation so football clubs can consider it in detail?
I am happy to meet with the noble Lord and discuss this further, but in our view this is not required in the Bill but will become clear from the work of the regulator. We think this will be clear in practice.
This is also a term and a part of the Bill that was within the iteration of the Bill laid before Parliament by the previous Government, notwithstanding the noble Lord’s right to object to the Bill that his Government may have laid before Parliament.
I am sorry to intervene again on that, but that is actually not correct. The one area of the Bill that is actually different from the previous Bill is the requirement on the regulator to have regard to the foreign and trade policy objectives of the Government, which is why we used the example of Newcastle. The Minister has not answered the very clear question: as chairman of the PIF, does the Crown Prince, who exercises control over the PIF, now exercise control over Newcastle, and as a result would be captured by the regulatory requirements of the Bill and not by the Premier League requirements?
My Lords, earlier, I said that I was not confused. I am now slightly confused, because noble Lords were very clear earlier in Committee that any issue with the legislation that might lead to UEFA objecting to it was problematic; now, the Government have removed a part of the Bill that was problematic and objected to by UEFA, that risked us being able to compete as a country in leagues within overseas competitions. So, I am slightly confused on that point, but as I said, I am happy to meet the noble Lord.
The other point is that the Companies Act guidance on this is long and complicated. In our view, it has more detail than is appropriate for the Bill, and I assume that the previous Government took the same view.
Can I clarify this point once and for all? Anything—not just the clause on the Government’s foreign and trade policy objectives—that could put a stop to our entry into European competition or World Cup competition should not appear in the Bill. I have argued consistently that anything that would cause the independent bodies regulating international football—UEFA and FIFA—to stop our clubs competing in international tournaments should be resisted at all cost. UEFA intervened and said that the clause to which we were just referring was a political clause and should be removed from the Bill, and the Prime Minister immediately removed it—but the moment you remove it from the Bill, there are unintended consequences.
I thank everybody who has participated on this set of amendments. I heard a somewhat surprising answer from the Minister just now and I hope that it might be clarified. My noble friend Lady Evans put the question to the Committee as to which regulator takes precedence. My clear understanding of this Bill is that, through the licence procedure, the regulator we are setting up will take precedence over anything that the Premier League may choose to do. Indeed, that would be part of the contract of the licence issued by the proposed regulator, and that would take priority over, for example, the suitability and fitness tests, the degree of political interference or whatever the league might wish to do on the licensing of a club. However, I heard the Minister perhaps giving a somewhat different answer and, again, I would be grateful for clarification. A meeting is gratefully accepted and I look forward to meeting with the Minister, but, more importantly, these specific points need to be covered in writing to all members of the Committee, because I think there is wider interest than among just those whom she has kindly and graciously offered to meet.
I am sorry she did not respond to my noble friend Lord Parkinson’s question about Qatar. For the record, I am a great believer that sport is a catalyst for change. You know, when you win the right to host the World Cup, that you are shining a torch into the inner recesses of that country, which few other opportunities do. It means the world’s press and the football fans of the world are very conscious of what is happening in your country.
There is no doubt that hosting the World Cup in Qatar had significant influence on important social and employment changes that took place in that country. The fact that the ILO had an office there, worked there beforehand with the Government, was pushing for changes and continues to be there, is a great example. It is the only country in the Middle East that has that office. It is a great example of the power of sport for good and the power of sport for change. So I am sorry the Minister did not respond to that point, because I think it is an exceptionally important one.
I regret to say that I have not been persuaded by the Minister’s defence of retaining influence on the face of the legislation and yet not defining it, saying that it is for secondary legislation. It is one of many, many things that are for secondary legislation. For example, once the regulator identifies the owners and ultimate owners at the stage of the licence application, the regulator can, as the Minister said, make use of its powers under Clause 34 to determine the suitability of those owners. That includes whether the owner meets the individual fitness criteria and whether they have a source of wealth connected to serious criminal conduct. Serious criminal conduct is an extremely important concept that needs defining. If we look further towards the back of the Bill, it comes under “minor definitions” and will be for the Secretary of State to come forward with secondary legislation to define what he means by serious criminal conduct.
Lord Moynihan
Main Page: Lord Moynihan (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise to question Amendment 156 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Taylor of Bolton and Lady Grey-Thompson. It is a great pleasure to follow the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Burns, because it is a reminder to us of how much experience we have here, from a board director of a Premier League football club to regular supporters and, in the noble Lord’s case, the holder of three season tickets. I pay tribute to him and his long-suffering son and grandson.
The point that I want to make about Amendment 156 is about season tickets. I do not think anybody in your Lordships’ House would argue against diversity in staff and senior managers. The noble Lord, Lord Mann, made the good point that about 40% of Premier League players are from a BME background, but that that does not continue into senior management. That has been the case for a long time and there is clearly more work to do on that.
However, the first part of Amendment 156 talks about
“the diversity of season ticket holders”.
When I saw that, I was worried about the law of unintended consequences. How on earth do you sort out that issue? For season tickets for my team there is something called supply and demand. There are several options for having a season ticket at Manchester United, as there are at other Premier League clubs, but how do you work it out? There is a waiting list, because of supply and demand. Several thousand people are waiting to become season ticket holders, so can the Minister advise the Committee how this amendment would be looked at?
There are a limited number of seats at a ground: in the case of Old Trafford, there are 75,000 seats and a waiting list of 10,000. I have had a season ticket for many years. Recently, they changed where you could sit at Old Trafford. I was unsure for a while whether I would have a ticket for where I moved to. I was told that there was no guarantee that I would have a ticket, which, as you can imagine, was quite distressing for somebody who had been a season ticket holder for many years. As it turned out, I was lucky enough to have a ticket, in the way that several thousand were not.
There is also the option of a league match ticket book. That enables me to go to Premier League games only. There is the cup option—the FA Cup, the Carabao Cup and the European Cup options. There is also a ticket forwarding membership of £20. I mention that because, if you are looking at diversity, you may not be able to get a season ticket holder, but if you want to go and see a Premier League club, becoming a member gives you access to get a ticket. It might not be your favourite Premier League game against your local opposition or any other club in the Premier League, but anybody could apply, become a member of their local club and should be able to get a ticket for a cup game. It may not be a Saturday or a Sunday; it may be a midweek game. Diversity is in evidence at Premier League clubs. For example, accessibility for disability has been there in many clubs for many years. When I sit there before kick-off at Manchester United, I see significant diversity around me. What surprises me is the people who fly around the world to see their team play, as they do for so many other Premier League clubs.
The Premier League is the best premier league in the world for a good reason. It attracts diversity by that very principle. I would be interested in how the regulator would ensure diversity of ticket holders. I say yes when it comes to staff and senior management—I do not think anybody could disagree with that. However, it is complicated, and so much to do with this Bill is the law of unintended consequences. You cannot tell people who have been on waiting lists for many years that they cannot become a season ticket holder because of some diversity report from a regulator.
My Lords, I support Amendment 54, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, and Amendment 157, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Knight. I shall speak also to Amendment 249, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Mann, which has a lot to commend it.
Before I comment briefly on those three, I want on the record to thank the Minister. We met this morning. We are fortunate in this Committee to have a Minister who is patient, engaging, professional and, unquestionably, inclusive in her approach to many different amendments and many different views that are expressed throughout this Chamber. When she consistently says how much she is enjoying this, some of us might question that, but there is no doubt that if she is, she deserves to, because she has the respect of the Committee and certainly my respect for the way in which she has engaged with us.
I echo the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, for whom I have many decades of respect. I was completely in agreement with 50% of what he said today, but I caution him in labelling a large number of Members of this Committee as purely spouting the views of the Premier League, trying to talk this Bill out or, more importantly perhaps, breaching the admonition from the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, that because both Front Benches supported the Bill, we should not scrutinise it. He will know that for many decades I have been a passionate and independent voice for sport. My own deeply held view is that the autonomy and self-regulation of sport worldwide, be it in the International Olympic Committee, FIFA, UEFA or any number of international sporting bodies, are essential to the success of sport and ultimately those who participate in it.
I point out to the noble Lord that the whole point is that this regulator is independent. Obviously, it is influenced strongly by government decisions, but it is independent. Surely, many of the concerns that the noble Lord is expressing—as, indeed, is the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—are answered by the appointment of a sensible regulator who will act in a proportionate manner.
I only wish I could say to the noble Lord that that is what we have in front of us. Had we had the opportunity to sit with him and explore each and every clause as we have gone through this, we might have been able to say so, but that is not the case. This is not light-touch regulation. This is not even regulation that you find in the Companies Act.
Let me give the noble Lord a quick example; I risk admonition for repeating a point that I made earlier, but I will make it very quickly indeed. When you give powers to the regulator to explore not just the controlling influence of a football club but those who “significantly” influence a football club, those are very different roles. You have “controlling” in the Premier League; you have “significant influence” in the Bill. Significant influence can reach back as far as the Crown Prince, who has significant influence over the PIF, which owns Newcastle, whereas, by definition in this Bill, he does not control that club, nor would the Premier League investigate him on that basis.
So it is reasonable to accept the noble Lord’s premise—I wish it were true that this is light-touch regulation—but, in reality, this is incredibly intrusive, highly detailed regulation. It goes further than the regulation I put in place in 1990 when I was the Minister responsible for water privatisation and we were setting up Ofwat. That was light-touch regulation in comparison with this extraordinarily detailed Bill. That is the most important point driving my concern about unintended consequences—what some people call the “mission creep” of regulation.
I turn to the amendments. Given that we are going to have a Bill for the reason that the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, said—there is all-party support for having legislation of this kind—we may as well get it right. There is real merit in looking at the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett—backed so eloquently, as ever, by the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson—which would
“ensure regulated clubs have a clear, appropriate governance structure with a board consisting of executive and non-executive directors enabling decisions to be taken collectively”.
I hope that it would not be just regulated clubs. I hope that all clubs in all sports would do that, because the benefits of having both executive and non-executive directors is well known to those of us in sport—not least in the British Olympic Association, which I had the privilege of chairing.
The noble Lord, Lord Mann, has widespread support in this House for the work he has done on anti-Semitism and anti-Semitism training. I am glad that he tabled his amendment, because it gives us an opportunity to thank him on behalf of sport and on behalf of football. That work has been absolutely critical; I say this not just as a fellow Leeds fan but because, across sport as a whole, it is vital that we put equality, inclusion and diversity right at the top of what we do.
We are expected to do that outside football. I have an interest to declare as the chair of Amey, which has some 13,000 people. Almost the first thing that I did as chairman was set up an ESG committee immediately beneath the board and chair it so that I could ensure inclusion and diversity were right at the heart of our policy and were in the DNA of everybody who worked in that organisation. I do not believe that that is different from sport and I do not believe that that is different from football.
So, if we are to have legislation—which, as noble Lords know, I regret—let us get this right and listen carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, said in the first 50% of his speech, and to the noble Lords, Lord Knight and Lord Mann. There is real merit in the Minister taking this away and thinking about what we would expect to see from the regulator in this context.
My Lords, I was not intending to speak in this debate, but I am afraid that some of the comments that have been made have obliged me to do so.
However, before I come on to the amendments and the comments made in the speeches, I would just like all your Lordships to look around you. We are talking about equality, inclusion and diversity. What proportion of this Chamber is disabled, non-white, gay or lesbian? The answer is: very, very few. It is a compliment to the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, that she is a great example of what women can achieve at the top of the football tree, and that we have a female Minister responding. But I stand here, as I said in my first speech to this Chamber, as the founder chairman of the world’s first gay rugby club. It celebrated its 29th anniversary only just under two months ago and will celebrate, I expect, its 30th anniversary next 1 November.
I find it utterly unacceptable to suggest, as has been suggested, that we should not tackle the question of trans individuals in society. I am proud that I did a podcast the other week with a member of my club, who himself has undergone the process of moving from female to male. He is proud of having done it. There are issues that we have to address in society, as well as issues that we have to address in sport. I believe that on occasion it is appropriate to put things into legislation as an “encouragement” to people to behave in a certain way. It is all very well saying, “Well, we have the right policies and we’ll do it all right”, but I come back to this point: look at this Chamber.
I have not taken any guidance, as Lord Blunkett suggested, from the Premier League, and in fact, on a previous occasion in Committee, I made the point that actually the Premiers League, for all its right efforts, was not messaging correctly. I believe that that is the case here. In rugby we have had openly gay World Cup final referees and a captain of the Welsh rugby team, but we have no openly gay, top-level professional players at the moment, as far as I am aware. But football is behind the times despite the best encouragements from individuals, and it is therefore well worth while asking the question of the Minister and of the regulator, “How are you actually going to tackle these issues?”—because issues they remain.
I will conclude on the observation in relation to Rainbow Laces. Rainbow Laces has been adopted by sport throughout as a means of messaging to people as to how they should behave to other minority groups. They must continue to do so. It is not a political gesture; it is a gesture on behalf of society as a whole to other parts of society. I believe we have achieved so much, but we could achieve so much more.
My Lords, I will be very brief. In my view, these are proper probing amendments about unintended consequences—such as with Solihull—and the need to support women to get to the elite level, as well as the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson. This is not about having an argument or asking the Government to rethink anything; these are truly probing amendments asking the Minister and those who work on the Bill to look at these points and make the Bill better. I am so thankful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Markham, in that. This group gets to the nub of an issue that can be dealt with very quickly.
I will pick up on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, and refer to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Mann. My understanding is that the regulator cannot take the women’s game into account, even where, in theory, the accounts may relate to both. Indeed, on the face of the Bill, as I read it—I look forward to the Minister’s clarification—it would be possible for clever accounting to move money and, indeed, even financial exposure, across to the women’s game and therefore exclude it from the consideration of the regulator. I hope I am wrong in that. I can see that there would be ample opportunity for approaches to the accounts and the financial strength of clubs to be manipulated in a way that I am sure was not the intention of the Government or the regulator. The Minister will no doubt clarify that when she comes to respond.
This goes back to the possibility of amending the scope of the Bill in the future. In other words, as the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, said, this is exclusively a men’s regulator. I was a bit concerned about the language in the report to Parliament and to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which was prepared by the department, recommending that women’s football be “given a chance” to self-regulate. That is rather a condescending phrase to the sport. Therefore, it is not surprising that a number of people in the sport have been rather concerned that the women’s game has not been given equal opportunity. UEFA has brought in solidarity payments for the Women’s Champions League clubs to support the growth of the women’s game. That is not the case in the UK. I can completely see the arguments that people like Kelly Simmons have made: if the benefits of the regulator are as strong as the Minister has expressed to the Committee, then it could enhance and expand club licensing criteria to raise standards in women’s football—the performance of women’s football as well as medical and welfare provision.
If the Bill offers so strong a benefit to the sport as the Minister makes out, it is unfortunate that the women’s game should be put to one side and simply told it is being given a chance to prove itself and, in due course, might see the benefits that the Minister says exist in this Bill for football. That is my biggest concern. I think it is a concern felt by many in women’s football; I see the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, nodding in assent.
It is important for the Minister to address both the role of the regulator in relation to what a football club does to promote women’s football and the wider implication that many in women’s football feel: that they are being somehow excluded from the great benefits we have regularly heard about in Committee from the Minister about the game as a whole.
I hope the Minister will respond to both those points; that would be helpful to the Committee. If they are not positive responses, then this will perhaps be something we should return to at a later stage, to make sure that the women’s game is not disadvantaged by the introduction of the regulator.
My Lords, I rise to speak on Amendments 65, 70 and 72, which focus on ensuring financial support for the women’s game and protecting it from many adverse impacts resulting from the Bill.
While I respect the intention behind these amendments, I believe that they are not strictly necessary. I want to underline the significant commitment that many Premier League clubs already have to the women’s game. A vast majority of Premier League clubs operate women’s teams—including West Ham, which had a fantastic 5-2 win yesterday. We do that not as an obligation but as a genuine commitment to growing and professionalising women’s football. We all want our women’s teams to succeed, thrive and contribute to the broader success story of English football.
The truth is that not one WSL team makes any money—actually, not one even breaks even. They all lose between £1.5 million and £5 million a year, so they are currently wholly reliant on the men’s teams playing in the Premier League for their funding. The Premier League’s commitment is not just rhetorical; it is backed by meaningful action. Premier League clubs have provided substantial financial support and shared their expertise, facilities and resources. A recent example of that is a £20 million interest-free loan, which was made available to the women’s NewCo to help build a robust foundation for future growth, alongside a co-operation agreement with the Premier League to assist with growing, commercialising and attracting investment to the women’s game. The Premier League also invests £6 million in over 70 emerging talent centres across the country, to bring brilliant and diverse talent into the women’s and girls’ game from the widest possible range of backgrounds.
I thank my noble friends Lord Mann and Lady Taylor of Bolton, the noble Lord, Lord Addington, and the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, for tabling these amendments, including on the important issue of the women’s game.
I reassure noble Lords that we are completely aligned on our commitment to women’s football. As I have said previously in your Lordships’ House, I was not allowed to play football when I was at school. I could not be more delighted that my nieces can not only play football but take for granted that they can, and that they are encouraged to do so. I am as excited at the growth in women’s football as is the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson. I asked a number of questions similar to those that noble Lords asked, so I hope that the answers I have had, which form a large part of my speaking notes tonight, will provide them the reassurance that I was provided when I asked those questions in preparation for your Lordships’ Committee.
At present, the regulator will not cover women’s football. In answer to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, the regulator will not be concerned with women’s teams’ accounts even where they are affiliated to men’s clubs. However, it is empowered to obtain and consider information from a club’s wider corporate group. I reassure the noble Lord that clubs should not be able to circumvent requirements through creative accounting in the manner that the noble Lord described as potentially being an issue.
The regulator will be concerned only with the sustainability of the clubs which will be within the scope of its regime. Women’s football is in such an exciting place and we really do hope that it will be able to grow and succeed in a sustainable way. Indeed, the wider football ecosystem already provides financial support to the women’s game—a point made eloquently by the noble Baroness, Lady Brady.
The FA has a 2024-28 women’s and girls’ football strategy, which states that by 2028 it will
“secure significant additional funding and investment to support women’s and girls’ grassroots football and pyramid”,
among other things. In addition, as the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, said, the Premier League has provided a £20 million interest-free loan to the Women’s Professional Leagues Limited to help build strong foundations for the women’s game.
Can the Minister clarify what she has just said? Is she saying that the regulator would not be able to intervene in the example given by the noble Lord, Lord Mann, in introducing his amendment?
On the example of Solihull, the response I made related specifically to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, raised about the creative use of accounting being used to avoid things. My understanding is that it is empowered to obtain and consider information regarding the club’s wider corporate group where it has reason to do so. It might be worth me getting further clarification from officials and ensuring that a letter outlining that is placed in the Library so that all noble Lords are clear on that point.
Lord Moynihan
Main Page: Lord Moynihan (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as the noble Baroness just said, could we have the answer tonight as to what the state of play actually is? If we get some assurance that, “Providing we do not do X and Y, which we hope is not the intention of the Bill, we are fine”, then this will get put to bed. If the Minister can see some way of assuring us, even if it had to be on Chatham House terms or something, that would help, because we do not want there to be a problem. If we can get that assurance out there, this issue will go away. Let us face facts: it just would not exist.
We want there to be a competition. Presumably, Europe wants the Premier League there. The reason why we have this Bill is about Europe. It was because of fans protesting that they were going to lose their competition and their traditions to Europe, and politicians saying, “We’ll intervene”, which most people agreed with. If we can get an assurance that there is something solid that means we would have to do something radically different to turn this bad scenario into a living nightmare, that is fine. We cannot guarantee the future; we can deal only with the Bill in front of us. If the Minister can give us those assurances she will have my full support.
My Lords, over the weekend, I and colleagues from across the Committee wrote to the Minister and sought to be very specific about the points that have just been raised by the noble Lord, Lord Addington, and my noble friend Lady Brady. It would be helpful to the Committee—I mentioned this to the Minister this morning too—to put on record the specific concerns that could lead to differences of opinion between the two regulatory frameworks: the regulatory framework we are seeking to put into legislation and the regulatory framework that already exists within UEFA and in FIFA. Indeed, if the answer to all the points that I will raise is that there is no conflict, the Committee will be satisfied and so will I.
I would be grateful if we could have specific clarification on UEFA and FIFA’s position concerning the regulatory powers contained in the legislation. Given the extensive scope of the Bill’s powers and their potential impact on clubs and national teams participating in UEFA or FIFA competitions, I would be grateful if the Government could confirm whether UEFA and FIFA have been consulted on each of the following categories of powers: whether UEFA has specifically approved the proposed regulatory framework, particularly the revenue distribution backstop powers; the licensing framework and powers; the IFR’s independence; the IFR’s accountability mechanisms; the Secretary of State’s broad-ranging powers; the delegated powers; the financial oversight mechanisms; and the interaction between IFR rules and UEFA/FIFA regulations. If there are any areas where UEFA or FIFA has or will, in response to this request, express reservations or express modifications then I would be grateful if the Committee could be informed.
Have the Government commissioned expert legal advice on these issues? How has this impacted on the design of the legislation? How will potential conflicts between UEFA/FIFA regulations and these various powers be resolved, especially regarding revenue distribution arrangements, competition participation rules, financial monitoring requirements, the licensing system, and the extensive rule-making powers granted to the IFR? This clarification is essential for ensuring the smooth implementation of the new regulatory framework and avoiding any potential conflicts with existing football governance structures.
As my noble friend mentioned, as reported in the press, in a letter from UEFA to the Secretary of State, UEFA warned against “government interference” in football. It points out that it has very “specific rules” that guard against state interference to
“guarantee the autonomy of sport and fairness of sporting competition”.
The Bill, however, gives the regulator and the Government the following powers over football in England. I would very much welcome confirmation from the Government, not today but in due course, that in the meeting the Minister of Sport had with UEFA— referred to by the Minister on an earlier Committee day—the Minister brought these powers to the attention of UEFA and it confirmed that they do not amount to “government interference”.
My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord Mann, not least because I am a member of his supporters’ group. We also have another supporters’ group, for Leeds United. Members of Parliament in both Houses are parties to the WhatsApp group. While the public-facing position regarding the manager is always one of support, it cannot always be said that those on the WhatsApp group speak in such gentle and supportive terms of the manager after one or two defeats.
That aside, I support the noble Lord, Lord Watson. He made an extremely important point, and it was wise to pray in aid the Minister in another place regarding his Amendment 78. If we are to have a regulator, surely, in terms of financial regulation and the overall financial role, we cannot just ignore the players, let alone the fact that they are right at the heart of the game.
The total wage bill across Europe’s big five leagues—England, Germany, Spain, Italy and France—was £13 billion in 2022-23, up from 12.3 billion in the prior season. We all know that, in certain circumstances, players are brands in their own right. Many boast bigger social media followings than their clubs. Sponsors know this, investors are taking note and the clubs know it.
Only this week in the Financial Times, the IMG sports and entertainment president, George Pyne, stated:
“The players are the most valuable asset in the sport … With social and digital media, commercial opportunities today are more valuable than they might have been 10 years ago because these players are now brands in themselves”.
It is a people business; it is relationships that matter, and relationships with the players are central to the success of any football club. The noble Lord, Lord Watson, is right. If we are to have a state-appointed regulator, that regulator, in looking at the finances of the club and taking an overall view of it, must engage with the footballers and listen to their representations.
It is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, and to support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Watson. Your Lordships may expect a former TUC leader to advocate the principle of workforce engagement and consultation, but it was over a decade ago that the noble Lord, Lord Heseltine, in his report No Stone Unturned, talked about the value of what he called “shop-floor wisdom”.
It is not just a case of fair access. In my experience, there have been many positive examples of where shop-floor wisdom has made for much better decision-making. The workforce and their representatives are what I would describe as the canaries in the mine. They can see when organisations are heading for trouble from the inside, they have good ideas about how to make industries stable, sustainable and fair, and their ideas deserve to be heard. Nowhere is that more relevant than in football. When club owners and managers tell the regulator a particular story, players and their representatives can provide a crucial quality check.
They may agree with the owners; they may not. But the new regulator would benefit from hearing the workforce perspective. I have heard a lot about finances in this debate. I offer just a gentle reminder that, if you were to ask any fan, they would say that true wealth is created on the pitch. Like Labour and, indeed, across this House, the PFA proudly believes in the unifying power of football in society, and it is a guardian of those values. Players must have a right to a voice: a right, enshrined in law, to be consulted on equal terms.
I appreciate that the Minister is trying to make progress and is moving through a large number of amendments. To refer back to Amendment 78, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Watson, the Minister said that she looked forward to a further discussion at a later stage. Could she state whether she agrees with the idea that the regulator must engage with football players and their representatives? I think the mood of the Committee went a bit further than just having hopeful discussions in future, and that this was something that really should be considered to be placed in the primary legislation. Could she be a little more explicit? I know that she was sympathetic, but does she agree that that is an issue that should now be looked at in the context of the legislation?
The noble Lord might need to be content with my sympathy at this stage. I genuinely look forward to future discussions on this point.
Overall, the Government have been clear that the regulator should take a participative approach to regulation, meaning that it would co-operate constructively with the regulated industry where possible. There are some parts of the Bill—this is one of them—that directly relate to the people or organisations being regulated, rather than to stakeholders across the game more widely. The intention of the regulatory principle in question is to guide the regulator to co-operate constructively specifically with the regulated industry where possible, as this co-operative approach might not otherwise be explicit. We think that to list every possible stakeholder, or possible interpretation of fans or fan groups, that the regulator “should” ever engage with during the course of regulation, could be onerous on participants and the regulator. However, I am happy to meet my noble friends to discuss further how we can reassure fans that they will be consulted where appropriate. For supporters and their relevant representative groups it is clear that the regulator should be acting in their interests. There are several places where this is formalised through specific consultation requirements; for example, in relation to Clause 45, the prohibited competitions clause.
For decisions materially impacting players, I recognise that the game is nothing without players, as I said earlier; it is absolutely right that the regulator works with them on matters that impact them. As I mentioned, the specific regulatory principle in question is intended to steer the regulator to co-operate with the regulated population. This does not include players, as they are not themselves subject to the regulator’s regime. This would be not an appropriate place to include players, or indeed any other stakeholder group. However, I understand the desire among noble Lords to ensure that important stakeholder groups are appropriately acknowledged in the Bill.
I am sure we will revisit this topic ahead of Report and in future debates. With that said, and for the reasons I have set out, I am unable to accept the amendments in this group. I hope that noble Lords and my noble friends will not press them.
My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Addington, in Amendments 91 and 92. I support his view on having free-to-air services for certain sports. My main reason is to expose those sports to the next generation—the youngers coming through. He mentioned rugby—which is not as available as it used to be, certainly not compared with when I was young—but this applies to other sports, including cricket specifically, as well as golf and boxing, which all now have very restricted free-to-air viewing. You wonder what that does to the current generation of children, who may want to be exposed to the sport, but cannot because their parents, for whatever reason, do not have subscriptions to the various channels.
Of course, the regulator will not cover Scotland—perhaps it will have its own regulator following this—but, currently, the Scotland men’s national football matches are available only on YouTube. You could say that that is equivalent to free-to-air viewing, but it is not in any way how international football should be presented. The whole question of how sport is made available to future generations—although it is not really for our debate today—is one that we need to think about very seriously.
My Lords, I say simply that, while some very good arguments have been put forward, we have to be very careful here. The whole question of listed events that the noble Lord, Lord Addington, and I have been engaged on for many decades, let alone a year, is a complicated and difficult issue.
Currently, the Secretary of State has to opine as to whether listing an event meets the criterion of having “special national resonance”. That, in its own right, is a difficult thing for the Secretary of State to opine on. The noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, will recall that, only five years ago, the then Secretary of State made a famous speech on listed events where she put forward the idea that whenever a men’s event was listed, the women’s equivalent should be too. That brought into play a whole series of complex questions, which were important but certainly set the hares running among the people who were focused on listing events.
This is complicated further by virtue of a generational change. Young people increasingly access, and are comfortable accessing, all forms of media to watch the sporting events that they wish to see, sometimes in ways that do not necessarily follow the rules. The changing media landscape, certainly for young people, means that the listed event question may even become obsolete. I am not saying that it will but that is the sort of question that is now being posed as a result of the different patterns of media accessed particularly by young people, as opposed to our generation. I am being courteous to the noble Lord, Lord Watson, when I say that, because he looks a good deal younger than I am.
In that context, I would hesitate to push the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord McNally, as valuable as they are, to further consideration in this Bill. However, it is important and probably timely that we now look at the whole question of listed events separately because they are vital to many sports. Equally, in the context of football, and without the wider issues that I have sought to bring to the Committee’s attention, we may be too focused on one sport and not considering the wider implications of what should and should not be listed in today’s media landscape.
My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan. The amendment is probably badly worded, but I am sure the inference is about the England football team rather than league clubs and football teams. I was lucky enough to watch England win the World Cup in 1966. I was 14, and it was on television. After that match, loads of people who did not particularly like football began to play football. Geoff Hurst, Martin Peters and Bobby Moore—I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brady—show the power of that. Geoff Hurst still goes around inspiring people, even now in his later years in life. If you are speaking of putting people on committees, you could ask for no finer a person than Geoff Hurst.
If we are talking about free to air and it is a national team, that is where you will get more of an audience—to see England play live, rather than having to pay to watch it on any of the paid-for channels. The noble Lord is right: it sits with the golf, the cricket and all the other important sports. But football is our national sport, and our national football team should be live on air, especially major competitions.
My Lords, I support this amendment, which seeks to address one of the most significant and unresolved issues in football governance: the regulation of football agents. The amendment is not just about imposing stricter rules on agents; it is about protecting the financial stability of English football and ensuring that the resources within the game are directed towards its growth and long-term health.
In the last five years, Premier League clubs alone have spent a staggering £1.65 billion on agents’ fees. This represents an extraordinary extraction of wealth from the game. It is money that could otherwise be invested in stadiums, academies, community projects, et cetera. The agent market is riddled with dysfunction. The incentive structures are fundamentally misaligned, with practices such as dual representation creating inflationary pressures on transfer market fees and wages. Without reform, the unchecked escalation of agent fees will continue to threaten the financial stability of clubs, and limit the growth and potential of the industry.
While the amendment addresses a critical issue, it also highlights a broader concern: the lack of meaningful engagement from the Government on how to support English football beyond the confines of the Bill. The Bill creates significant new regulatory obligations and risks for damage within football, particularly for Premier League clubs, without addressing the areas where government action could help the game thrive. Let me be clear: the amendment provides an opportunity to have that conversation. It forces us to ask why the Government have not engaged with clubs on how to help clubs grow and succeed while addressing the inefficiencies in football or the opportunities we have to grow with government assistance.
For example, on access to talent, since Brexit English clubs have faced significantly restricted access to international talent compared with competitor leagues. Reforming these laws could reduce player acquisition costs, improve competitiveness and enhance the financial health of the pyramid. On tax incentives for investment, football infrastructure is a national asset. Other countries, such as France and the US, recognise this through targeted tax incentives for stadium development and training facilities. Yet here in the UK we have no similar framework to support clubs to make these long-term investments. These are areas where constructive government engagement could make a real difference. Yet, instead of addressing these opportunities, the Bill focuses on imposing new obligations without offering the tools to support growth or mitigate the unintended consequences. Premier League clubs would really welcome engagement on these potential growth opportunities.
Turning back to agents, the lack of effective regulation has been an ongoing issue for decades. The Premier League has already attempted to address this through initiatives such as its 2017 review into intermediaries, which identified serious problems, including the lack of qualifications, excessive influence, and weak enforcement mechanisms. While clubs are willing to take bold unilateral steps, including banning dual representation, these measures were ultimately not implemented, because FIFA launched its own reform process. However, FIFA’s efforts have stalled due to the legal challenges my noble friend mentioned, and its proposed cap on agents’ fees has been deemed unlawful in the UK. Without primary legislation, meaningful reform remains out of reach.
The amendment is therefore timely. It provides a legislative framework to ensure that agents act in the best interest of their clients, comply with FIFA regulations and disclose key information about their activities. These measures would not only bring transparency but reduce the inflationary pressures caused by the current dysfunctional system. Whether the Bill is deemed the appropriate place for action or not, I hope the Government will engage with clubs and leagues on how to pursue much-needed reform in a way that safeguards competitiveness.
In this respect, this amendment also serves a broader purpose: it highlights the imbalance in how the Government are approaching the Bill. Clubs are being asked to shoulder significant new regulatory burdens, yet there is little or no discussion about how the Government could support them in other critical areas. Whether it is addressing the dysfunction in the agent market, widening access to talent or incentivising infrastructure investment, so much more could be done to help English football grow and succeed.
This amendment addresses a pressing issue that has gone unregulated for far too long. The influence of agents on the game and the resources extracted through their fees cannot be ignored. At the same time, this amendment is a reminder of the broader need for the Government to engage with football on how to support growth and sustainability, not just impose new obligations. I urge the Minister to take this opportunity to engage meaningfully with clubs and leagues, not just on the regulation of agents but on the wider opportunities I have mentioned, to ensure that English football remains the most dynamic and competitive league in the world.
My Lords, I support both my noble friends who have spoken to this amendment.
We spoke earlier about the importance of taking into account the players—the noble Lord, Lord Watson, raised that. Agents push, not least to increase the opportunities for the players to earn money, and one of the biggest problems and the reason why we should engage with players—for example, with the Club World Cup coming up—is that further strain is placed on the elite players. Agents are directly involved in that market; they go right to the heart of the financial stability of the game.
The agent market is central to the infrastructure of professional football. If we are to have a regulator, it is inconceivable that it should not consider the impact of agents, which some see as heavily dysfunctional and others see as beneficial if regulated—FIFA has gone through huge challenges recently in terms of the overall regulation of that market.
The regulation is difficult enough, but it is impossible not to regulate football as is proposed under this legislation without the regulator taking into account the impact of agents on the financial stability of the clubs. That is the key point. To a great extent, the financial stability of clubs relies on the good working of the agent market.
I hope that when the Minister comes to respond, she will reflect on that and on the importance of this amendment, and that she will look to see whether advice, even, can be given to the regulator to ensure that this is fully taken into account, to ensure a smooth functioning of the professional football market and, above all, the financial stability of the clubs.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Evans of Rainow for tabling his Amendment 93 and giving us the opportunity to discuss the duties of, requirements for and obligations on football agents. As my noble friend established, there is no mention of agents anywhere in the Bill—it is another group, as with the useful debate we had earlier on professional players, where the Bill is perhaps more silent than it ought to be. I will not put my noble friend on the spot and ask him, as I did on that group, whether there ever have been professional football agents in your Lordships’ House—I suppose that may be a bit more likely than professional footballers. It seems I have exhausted his parliamentary, historical and sporting knowledge in this instance.
This has been a helpful area of consideration for us. As my noble friend Lady Brady set out very clearly, football agents are one of the areas that absolutely require greater consideration when we consider the regulation of English football. Attempts to bring them under the scope of FIFA and of the Football Association’s regulatory frameworks have been somewhat successful but have not been fully implemented, for the reasons my noble friend mentioned.
The role of a football agent is one of significant influence. Agents negotiate contracts, secure endorsements and guide careers. In many cases they hold the futures of young and often vulnerable players in their hands. It is therefore imperative that agents act in the best interests of their clients. My noble friend Lord Evans of Rainow’s amendment enshrines that important principle, requiring agents to abide by fiduciary duties and to avoid conflicts of interest. Such measures are not only common sense but consistent with the values of fairness and accountability that underpin so much else of the Bill.
Article 16 of FIFA’s Football Agent Regulations already sets out high standards for agents’ conduct, but adherence to these standards has been inconsistent. By incorporating them in our domestic legislation in the way that my noble friend’s amendment suggests and through the powers of the new independent football regulator, we would send a strong message that, in this country, we expect the highest standards and are prepared to enforce them.
My noble friend’s amendment also addresses transparency—another important issue. Requiring agents to disclose agreements and payments would ensure that all interested parties, including clubs and governing bodies, can scrutinise transactions. This is particularly important when vast sums of money are at stake and public confidence is on the line. Greater transparency is not just good for governance; it is essential to maintaining the very credibility of the sport.
This amendment would involve additional burdens on agents—my noble friends Lord Evans and Lady Brady were quite candid in saying that in their speeches—but we must remember that these are people who operate in an industry where the stakes are extremely high. Professional football is a multi-billion-pound sector with far-reaching economic and social implications. It is not unreasonable to expect those operating in it to meet rigorous professional standards; of course, that is what the Bill seeks to do for clubs and other parties in the sector. If the Government are willing to take the steps that they are taking to regulate clubs and competition organisers, why would they not be willing to do so with agents? I ask that neutrally because it is a worthwhile area for us to probe.
Moreover, this amendment would uphold individual responsibility by demanding ethical conduct from agents. It would reinforce accountability by ensuring that the regulator can scrutinise agents’ practices effectively and would protect the integrity of the market, creating a level playing field for clubs and players. This amendment is about protecting the players, many of whom are young people stepping into a world of vast financial opportunity but also, of course, of significant risk. By holding agents to these high standards, we would ensure that players are not exploited or misled, enabling them to focus on their careers, fulfil their potential and delight fans of football for many years to come.
I share the anxiety that my noble friends set out in terms of the behaviours that we have seen in this area. There have long been allegations of financial misconduct or bungs by agents acting in English football. An agent and senior club manager exposed by the Daily Telegraph investigation in 2016 were later suspended by the FA, having been charged with bribery—a very serious offence—so the independent football regulator must do all that is possible to avoid the corruption of the beautiful game and serious crimes such as this.
There is also the matter of fraudulent transfers, such of that of Ali Dia. In November 1996, Dia’s agent famously convinced Graeme Souness, then the Southampton manager, that he was the cousin of the FIFA World Player of the Year and Ballon d’Or winner, George Weah, which led to Dia signing a one-month contract with Southampton just a few days later. Dia played only one match in his short spell at the club: he came on as a substitute in a league game but was then himself substituted. He was subsequently released just 14 days into his contract. Dia’s teammate for that one game, Matt Le Tissier, is quoted as saying:
“He ran around the pitch like Bambi on ice; it was very embarrassing to watch”.
These are the sorts of scenarios that we want to avoid—scenarios through which clubs are defrauded and players are exploited. This is a sensible amendment to help ensure the integrity of football, which is very much in keeping with the spirit of the Bill and many of the measures that are already in it. I hope that the Minister looks favourably upon it and gives it the consideration it deserves.
My Lords, the “state of the game” report is one of those things that has been almost universally welcomed. It will look at this very big and complex industry, with a very successful top and struggling foundations—that is how the industry appears to many people.
My name appears on this amendment alongside that of the noble Baroness because of things such as social impact. We are doing this because it is reckoned to be an important subject that matters a lot to people, and we keep being told that it is a big business—the biggest invisible earner going. If we get a report that is too narrow, we will not be looking at this huge social impact and what goes on.
Many of the things that we are talking about here are out of scope of the main operation of the Bill, but they should be looked at somewhere. The women’s game is one that comes to mind, along with players, which these amendments propose would feature here. If we are not going to look at such things in the Bill, we should look at them in the “state of the game” report.
It is a huge subject that we are talking about here; we have taken on something that is quite brave. If we do not find out how it is functioning and what is going on, we will be missing a trick. I would hope that we would do this as soon as we can—having slightly more frequent reports, at least at the beginning, would not be a bad idea. The “state of the game” report is a huge opportunity for gathering a great deal of very useful information.
I support many of the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, has raised under Amendment 94. I see that the Chief Whip is in his place; he will be pleased to note that nine of the amendments that we are considering now came from the Labour Benches, and that we have reached page 6 of the Bill.
The noble Baroness made the important point that Parliament should receive and debate the “state of the game” report. I am perfectly happy for the regulator, if we are going to have one, to present the report. However, in presenting the report, full attention needs to be paid to factors relating to the community and social impacts of regulated clubs and the women’s game. It is impossible when looking at this overall—and the Bill says that:
“A state of the game report must include … an overview of the main issues that the IFR considers to be affecting English football”,
—not to consider the development in the women’s game. It is a central part of English football, as cited in the Bill.
There is one other area at which we need to look at a later stage, on which I have no intention of detaining the Committee this evening. The regulator is looking at English football clubs and the game in England, but 14 Premier League clubs are in multi-club ownership, which stretches far beyond our shores. That is much more than in any other league in Europe. That has significant impacts on the financial regulation of the game. It provides greater bargaining power in commercial contracts and increases significantly the brand reach of those clubs, while allowing for the pooling of resources. There is flexibility with player transfers and loans. Certainly, within the English game, there is prohibition control over the management of more than one club, and UEFA states that you cannot have one controller covering two or more clubs in the same European competition. All these are actually central financial issues, and they have to be considered in any assessment of the health of the game in England.
I am concerned—I hope the Minister can respond and help me with this—that, if the regulator is prohibited from looking at the impact of multi-club ownership, there is a huge amount of important material when it comes to understanding the financial health of the game in England that would be outside the remit of the regulator. If I am wrong on that, no doubt the Minister will say that the regulator is absolutely entitled to look at each and every aspect of the multi-club ownership that takes place, principally in the Premier League. I will not detain the Committee by going further, but I simply table the fact that I think it is an essential and central point in any state of the game report and of the work of the regulator moving forward, and I would appreciate any clarity that the Minister can throw on that this evening.
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 101 in my name. It seeks to address a fundamental imbalance in how we will assess the health of English football under this new regulatory framework. The Premier League has become the world’s most successful sporting competition through a sophisticated balance of sporting merit and commercial innovation. Every weekend, millions watch matches where any team can beat any other, where promoted clubs can dream of European football and where calculated ambition is rewarded. This competitive drama has created extraordinary value that benefits the entire football pyramid, yet this Bill creates a concerning issue in how we will measure success. While the regulator must produce a state of the game report, its content focuses almost entirely on identifying problems and assessing risks. There is no requirement to evaluate how a regulatory intervention might affect the very qualities that have made English football successful.
This amendment would require the regulator to assess and report on three areas: first, competitive balance and sporting merit, the foundation of football’s appeal; secondly, our international position, crucial given the growing competition from other leagues and competitions around the world; and, thirdly, our ability to attract investment, which is essential for maintaining the quality that drives broadcast value and pyramid funding.
Without proper assessment of the competitive matrix, how would we know whether regulation was inadvertently creating barriers to sporting achievement? Without tracking our international position, how could we identify whether intervention was damaging our ability to attract global talent? Without measuring investment impact, how would we spot whether regulation was deterring the responsible ambition that drives football growth? If the state of the game report is to be as Ministers have described it—the definitive evidence base of football’s health that will drive the regulator’s whole agenda—it is crucial that the report considers both the risks and the success factors. We cannot protect what we do not measure. We must not allow these protective regulatory principles to become completely meaningless.
The amendment would create crucial feedback loops. It would allow Parliament and stakeholders to identify early-warning signs if regulation begins to damage football’s essential qualities. It would provide evidence to enable the regulator to adjust its regulatory approach if unintended consequences emerge. Most importantly, it would ensure that we protect proper oversight while preserving what makes English football so special. Without this amendment, we risk creating a regulator focused solely on managing decline rather than protecting success.
I would be grateful therefore if the Minister could explain why, in her view, the state of the game report should not assess regulatory impact. Will she also explain how Parliament will otherwise be in a position to judge whether this world-first and intrinsically risky regulatory approach is going to be able to maintain English football’s success, growth and vitality?
Lord Moynihan
Main Page: Lord Moynihan (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 119A in this group. Noble Lords will recall that, on many occasions, I have been active on the appointments made by the DCMS, in particular when it came to the consumer protection Bill in your Lordships’ House and the non-declaration of the CEO of Seatwave, which was an online European ticketing marketplace that was then to be sold to Ticketmaster. The announcement of the individual concerned to the DCMS board made no mention of that, and nor was there any declaration in the House, despite the fact that Seatwave was subject to very significant criticisms about ticket touting and the impact on consumers.
I took an interest over the weekend to look in more detail at some of the appointments that have been made, to satisfy myself and the Committee that they were wholly independent of government. Could the Minister provide the Committee, in due course, with a comprehensive answer on the process that has been followed to date for each and every appointment to the senior levels of the shadow football regulator, including when and how the legal requirements for Civil Service recruitment have been implemented, namely that selections must be based on merit and on fair and open competition? Departments and agencies can develop their own recruitment approaches, but how has the governance code on public appointments been followed, including integrity, merit, openness, diversity and assurance? Who has been on the appointment boards and how many appointments have been made from outside DCMS officials?
What would help the Committee to understand the question of the degree of true independence of the proposed football regulator is to know how many of the Bill team and the paid advisers to the DCMS are going on from government to join the shadow regulator and, in due course, the full regulator. Are the shadow regulator contracts in any way tied to appointments to jobs with the full regulator? If so, how many and whose?
My probing amendment does not question in any sense the integrity or competence of the candidates concerned. But I went on LinkedIn this weekend and had the opportunity to read, as a result of a connection on LinkedIn, that one of the most senior appointments made was based, in part no doubt, on the outstanding work that was done by that individual on football governance while doing their PhD. I will give one quote from that—and, again, it is not in any way impugning the integrity or professionalism or the outstanding nature of this somewhat long PhD. With this quote, I was a bit concerned about whether the independence of the appointments was truly up to the standard we would wish to see:
“Granting an authority the power to legally regulate the football industry, compelling all English football clubs to comply with the established economic framework or risk being unable to use their football facilities, thereby prohibiting the club from playing in any football competition, either domestic or international, would transfer economic power back from the clubs and leagues to the regulatory authority, reversing the process initiated by the creation of the EPL in 1992”.
That is a fairly major statement that counterbalances the Premier League’s autonomy and would question the true independence of the proposed independent regulator.
I have not had the opportunity to read the whole thesis. I look forward to doing so, and to reading any other public documentation through LinkedIn. I think it is incredibly important that, if we are going to have an independent football regulator, that regulator has to be truly independent. All the appointments need to be made on merit, bringing in the very best people in regulation from across the country, and indeed possibly from abroad, to fulfil those important responsibilities and posts. I would be grateful if the Minister could give us the confidence that that is exactly what is being pursued.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, and the noble Lords, Lord Moynihan and Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, for putting forward these amendments.
On Amendments 112, 113, 114, 115 and 117, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, we clearly agree that producing guidance will be a really important part of the regulator’s work. It will help to clarify the practicalities of the legislation and ensure that clubs’ owners and competition organisers know what is expected of them and what to expect from the regulator. However, while I recognise the intent of the approach proposed, I disagree to some extent with the approach to guidance that the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, has suggested we take. Amendments 112, 113, 115 and 117 would require the regulator to produce guidance on all aspects of its functions. This is likely to be a disproportionate and needlessly burdensome requirement that would likely end up being more unhelpful than helpful.
There is little benefit in issuing guidance on issues that are self-explanatory or that do not have a direct impact on the industry. I will endeavour to find some examples of that type of guidance to meet some of the queries from noble Lords—for example, on every one of the regulator’s operational or administrative functions, excessive guidance would make it harder and more burdensome for clubs to understand and comply with the system, not easier, and National League clubs would potentially struggle to sift through reams of guidance to get to what was relevant to them. We expect that the regulator will publish guidance on all relevant parts of its regime, as appropriate. It is in everyone’s interests to maximise the industry’s understanding and compliance.
On Amendment 114, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, the regulator is already required to publish guidance on how it will use discretionary licence conditions, including the outcomes it seeks to achieve. We believe that this requirement is sufficient, and it will be for the regulator to determine what that guidance should look like and how best to aid the industry without unduly burdening it.
I turn to Amendments 116 and 118, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson. Amendment 116 would require the regulator to prepare and issue a code of practice for all competition organisers and licensed clubs. We do not believe that a code of practice for all clubs would allow for a proportionate, tailored approach to regulation, where what is required of a club should vary depending on the club’s specific circumstances. The regulator’s current approach of bespoke regulation will address the unique challenges and risks faced by clubs better than a list of one-size-fits-all recommended measures, and its guidance, as per Clause 12, should already help clubs to understand what is required of them and to comply.
On the points raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Brady and Lady Evans of Bowes Park, on Amendment 118, the regulator is already required to consult such persons it considers appropriate when publishing guidance. We strongly expect that this will include the FA, competition organisers and regulated clubs, since those persons will all be directly relevant to and affected by that guidance. However, we have not taken the approach in this Bill of listing every person the regulator should consult for every piece of guidance issued. To do so would, in our view, be counter to the operationally independent and agile regulator that we are trying to establish.
There may be times when different levels of consultation are necessary, or with different stakeholders. The regulator is best placed to draw the line between comprehensive consultation and needless bureaucracy, and to ensure that the correct groups are consulted on a case-by-case basis. On the specific consultation requirements in the Bill, including on guidance, the regulator has a regulatory principle that it should co-operate and proactively and constructively engage with clubs, owners, officers and competition organisers. I hope that that gives the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, some confidence around the collaborative points she raised. This amendment would require the regulator to consult on minor revisions to guidance, needlessly creating an administrative burden for the regulator and those consulted.
Finally, Amendment 119, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, and Amendment 119A, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, relate to the Secretary of State guidance in Clause 13. Amendment 119 seeks to extend the period that the Secretary of State cannot amend guidance on the regulator’s functions from three to five years. While the regulator must have regard to the Secretary of State’s guidance, as an operationally independent body it will not be obliged to follow it. The industry and fans alike have been clear that they do not want to see excessive ongoing government involvement in football. That is why the Secretary of State may not revise this guidance any more frequently than every three years. The Secretary of State must consult both the regulator and anyone else they consider appropriate before publishing or revising any guidance, and must lay the guidance before Parliament. While I appreciate the concerns of undue influence, extending this to five years, when there may be an issue that needs clarificatory guidance before then, would be sub-optimal.
On Amendment 119A, I agree that the regulator should be independent and free from government influence. I do not have the level of detail that the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, requested. However, I am confident that appointments will be made on merit. I will write to him with additional detail following the debate. Secretary of State guidance on this point would be unnecessary. The employees of the regulator will already be independent from the Government, like other regulators in the country. Independence has been at the heart of the regulator’s design, with it having sole discretion over its operational decisions. The aims of this amendment are therefore already achieved by the Bill’s current drafting.
I have noted the points from across the Committee on the amendments in this group and I am happy to discuss these further ahead of Report. However, for the reasons I have set out, I hope the noble Lords will not press their amendments.
My Lords, I rise briefly to speak to Amendment 128. We are getting to the crux of what this regulator should be about: making sure that there are sensible financial decisions, and that risks are mitigated so that they do not jeopardise clubs’ futures.
Clubs in the EFL are expected to lose around £450 million this season and are reliant on owners to fund the shortfall. If this funding is not forthcoming, it can lead to financial trauma. Only 66 of the 92 clubs that filed accounts for the 2021-22 season included data on wages and cash reserves. Nottingham Forest spent £58,606,000 on wages but had just £25,000 in cash reserves—five hours’ worth of reserves. Surely that cannot be acceptable.
My Lords, I will speak to the amendments standing in my name in this group. I apologise to my noble friend Lord Maude if I address some of the plethora of regulations, conditions and verbiage concerned. I am proposing a number of amendments that I hope will facilitate and ease the position that the Government face in this context.
I turn to my Amendment 169A. It is unclear from my reading of the licensing section of the Bill whether the IFR is expected to produce a detailed and granular set of financial rules that would be applied in a blanket way to a large class of clubs or leagues; examples include the specific liquidity ratios, the debt-to-equity ratios, operating cash-flow metrics and size of financial buffers. Or will the IFR take an entirely bespoke approach, where every club will have DLCs—discretionary licence conditions—applied according to their own circumstances? That would drive a coach and horses through the competition organiser’s ability to provide a level playing field and maintain competitive balance. The third option is that the IFR could take an outcomes-based approach whereby it produces some high-level guidance with clear outcomes that clubs must achieve and league rules sitting underneath, giving effect to these principles and outcomes. For example, the IFR could have a series of outcomes relating to working capital, transitionally financed balance sheet health, resilience, protection of assets, et cetera. Leagues could colour in these outcomes into rules.
My own strong preference is for the third option. This amendment, which characterises the third option, is designed to create space for that conversation and, hopefully, allow the Minister to say that, where existing sustainability rules are in place and working, there will be an opportunity for that kind of league-led approach at all levels within an overall regulatory framework. Therefore, my recommendation is an outcome-focused, light-touch regulation, with step-in powers where issues are identified. That is why I have drafted Amendment 169A.
I turn to my Amendments 167A, 168A and 168B. The current test for attaching and varying a discretionary licence condition sets an extremely low bar for the IFR. For example, it seems to me that the test could be met in the case of a club that is already meeting the threshold requirement, on the basis that a discretionary licence condition somehow contributes to the club continuing to meet it.
The DLC test is even vaguer as regards the systemic financial resilience objective. The DLC needs only to advance that objective. While not necessarily the intention, this risks a very unpredictable, wide-ranging and open-ended power that could have a serious impact on club finances. It is also an issue that can be easily mitigated, while still allowing the IFR to meet its objectives. Again, I seek simplicity on behalf of the clubs. I am really concerned that here the detail is so great that it will swamp some clubs.
In the current drafting, potentially the only check on endless interventions, by way of DLCs relating to the systemic financial resilience objective, will be either the IFR’s discretion—in other words, the IFR deciding it has done enough for now—or the IFR being forced to have regard to avoiding adverse effects building up as a result of excessive intervention. Neither of those seems adequate to mitigate the significant risk to English football at all levels. I acknowledge that there is discretion for the IFR to not act in this way. However, I do not think there should be an option to do so, given the very significant risks to English football that would come with the powers being used in this way.
I listened carefully to the noble Lord and, bizarrely, in preparing for the Bill, I looked at the accounts of a number of the small league clubs the noble Lord seeks to protect with this. They all have to have properly audited accounts. The clubs I looked at—they are in the National League, the National League South and the National League North—have turnovers that vary between roughly £10 million a year and £400,000 to £500,000. They are properly set-up companies that have to file reports with Companies House, et cetera, and they all go through an audit process. It seems to me that, in any event, they will supply to their auditors many of the things the noble Lord seeks and asks for. If they did not, they would not be complying with a proper audit.
The noble Lord, Lord Bassam, has made some important points and, of course, everything I have said is based on the fact that those clubs will be following that. They are basic conditions that any organisation, not least a football club, should follow. All my amendments—I have studied them carefully—seek to make it easier to ensure that the clubs follow those procedures and that the uncertainties and vagaries in the current drafting of the Bill are clarified, making it easier and more efficient for clubs to meet their obligations as companies and football clubs in the professional leagues.
The noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, posed a number of questions about the operation of Part 3 in relation to licensing functions. I will add one further question, to which I do not necessarily expect an answer today. Pursuant to UEFA regulations and delegation from the FA, the Premier League currently licenses clubs for the purposes of their participation in UEFA club competitions. I declare an interest as a season ticket holder at Arsenal Football Club—I realise that some of the other clubs supported by noble Lords would not have an interest in this matter for various reasons. My question is: will this function of the Premier League be affected by Clause 15 or any of the other clauses in Part 3?
My Lords, going through this long list of amendments, I think that we can all agree that “miscellaneous” is a good description of this group. On what is a competition, I added my name to one of the amendments, but probably should have added my name to the one about heritage. Is it a ground part of the heritage, is it part of the structure, is it what is going on? I should have put my name to this and look forward to the Minister’s reply. If we do not include this, we are missing an important part of why this Bill is justifiable.
My Lords, I support the probing amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, although not necessarily the wording of it or the outcome. It is related to something that the noble Baroness and I have worked on for a long time and which is covered in my miscellaneous Amendment 258A. It binds the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, and me to the same cause. There is still a major problem of abuse in the ticket market for football, not least for membership cards. Last season alone, in February one club had to cancel more than 30,000 membership cards. They were all in the hands of the touts. This is a massive problem now.
When we started to campaign to sort out the secondary ticket market, it was much smaller. Fifteen years ago there were some 120 professional touts. Now there are subscription groups which get together using bots to get hold of tickets, place those tickets on the secondary market and sell them illegally. Viagogo is, regrettably, used as a speculator—a ticketing lobby. From that, those tickets are sold abroad illegally with, quite often, information hidden behind the icons. This goes against the terms and conditions set by the clubs, which do a huge amount of work across football to make sure, especially at sold-out matches, that tickets do not get into the wrong hands.
My noble friend raises an interesting point. The issue of the FA Cup replays would rightly be outside the scope of this regulator. The sporting calendar and the rules of specific competitions are matters for the football authorities to manage in consultation with the appropriate stakeholders. I am not sure whether that reassures my noble friend, but we can maybe have a longer discussion about it at another point.
On Amendment 242A from the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan—apologies if I am going over paragraphs that I have already covered—the intention behind this amendment is to make sure that clubs are not overburdened with requirements to notify the regulator of every event that ever happens. We do not want this either, nor is it in the regulator’s interest to receive a flood of unnecessary information. As the clause sets out, the notification requirement relates to material changes in circumstances. It will be up to the regulator to set out what it considers to be material in guidance, which we expect it will produce on this. The regulator will already have burdens in mind when setting its guidance and enforcing this duty on clubs, given public law principles and its regulatory principles. We want the regulator to receive the information and updates it needs to regulate effectively. By raising the bar for when clubs are required to notify the regulator of changes, the proposed amendment risks doing just that.
Amendment 248, from my noble friend Lord Mann, would introduce a new requirement for regulated clubs to register with the regulator all player contracts, transfer fees and other fees annually for the previous 12 months. I reassure my noble friend that, where this information is relevant for the regulator to understand a club’s finances, it can already obtain it. All clubs will be required to submit financial plans which detail, among other things, their revenues and expenses. These plans should capture details about player contracts and transactions where this information is relevant to the regulator understanding a club’s finances. Furthermore, the regulator has extensive information-gathering powers. Should it need greater oversight of the detail set out in this amendment, the regulator can already request this information, and it would not have to wait 12 months to get it. Therefore, I am confident that the Bill already delivers the intent of the amendment.
I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, and the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, for Amendments 248A and 258A respectively, which focus on ticket prices. I understand that the noble Baroness intends to address the recent rise in clubs removing concession pricing on tickets and other such changes that have left some fans priced out of match attendance, and she highlighted concerns raised by fans from Reading. Fans are justifiably concerned, and I am exceptionally sympathetic to that. I am equally grateful for the attention by the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, to ticketing and the issue of resale. These are huge issues that matter to fans, which is exactly why the Government have made it explicit that clubs must consult their fans on ticket pricing as part of their fan engagement. This also includes engagement on other operational issues, which is intended to capture many of the issues the noble Lord has made in his amendment. It is also important to note that any unauthorised resale of tickets for designated football matches is already addressed in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. Many clubs take this exceptionally seriously and work with police and relevant authorities on it. However, the regulator should not be seen as a vehicle to fix all of football’s woes, especially those that are well within the gifts of clubs, leagues and the FA to address. On the noble Baroness’s amendment in particular, it would also not be appropriate for the Government to dictate prices or concession categories, and there is limited precedent for such an interventionist approach on commercial decisions.
Before the Minister leaves that amendment, could she very kindly advise the Committee whether the Government intend to meet their expected deadline of a consultation exercise on the abuse of the secondary ticketing market by the end of this year?
If I may, I will clarify that in writing after this session to ensure I give the right response. I am not trying to avoid it; I will ensure I give the Committee a response.
Amendment 332 is from the noble Lord, Lord Markham, and the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, also spoke to it. I appreciate that noble Lords may not welcome the use of delegated powers to amend the definition of “football season” in the Bill. However, to future-proof the Bill against any changes to the footballing calendar, we feel that the Secretary of State needs this power.
It is unlikely, but possible, that a specified competition might be organised in a unique way in the future, for which the current definition may not be suitable. For example, I am sure that noble Lords remember the impact of the 2022 World Cup on the domestic calendar. It is not beyond the realms of possibility that similar changes may occur in the future that impact the efficacy of this definition.
I am now trying to be helpful, especially in the presence of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who will be able to opine on this suggestion. The reason why the Secretary of State has this power, as set out on page 46 of the memorandum to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, is that a specific competition may be played over two calendar years. That is the current definition. If it were not to be played over two calendar years, we would not be able to proceed with the definition of “football season” set out in the Bill.
We have been looking for simplicity here. Instead of Clause 92(1) defining a “football season” as
“beginning with the day in a particular year on which the first match of any specified competition is played, and … ending with the day in the following year on which the final match of any specified competition is played”,
a simpler way would simply be to delete “in a particular year” and “in the following year”. Then we would all understand that we begin on the day on which the first match is played and end on the day on which the final match is played. We thus would not need secondary legislation through a draft affirmative resolution for the Secretary of State to come back to both Houses of Parliament, as this simple amendment could clarify it all and remove the Secretary of State from this onerous task.
I am not sure that the Secretary of State would find it onerous, because it is not intended to be used very often. However, the noble Lord makes an interesting point and I appreciate that he made it in the spirit of being helpful.
This is not a power for the Secretary of State to dictate to the industry what a season is; it is the opposite. The power as currently defined in the Bill will ensure that the definition can flex to changes in the industry. It will also be subject to the affirmative parliamentary procedure, so I hope noble Lords will rest assured that the House will be able to scrutinise any changes. I am happy to continue to discuss that further with noble Lords after Committee.
Lord Moynihan
Main Page: Lord Moynihan (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise to speak to my Amendment 244 and to support Amendment 145, moved by my noble friend Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay. My amendment seeks to formalise a duty which will prevent clubs, players and employees of clubs publishing political statements that bring division and conflict into a game that should be about generating unity.
We have seen over previous years multiple instances of virtue signalling, such as taking the knee before matches after the Black Lives Matter protests, and the wearing of certain armbands—as my noble friend has said—and laces, which are the latest attempt to campaign. I would say that it is a small “p” political campaign. I may differ somewhat from my noble friend Lord Hayward on this, so it is probably a good thing that he is not in his usual place.
Politics is not just about party politics. It is about the pernicious influence of political campaigning affecting—infecting—football, our national game. I remember the dark days of the 1970s, when a number of London clubs were perceived to be involved with the rise of the National Front and its racist politics. That gave rise, of course, to instances of football hooliganism. That was not a party-political issue, but it was a political issue. We do not want to go back to those dark days when, for instance, Millwall was associated with football hooliganism and some elements of racist behaviour.
I am not even sure that these initiatives work. The figures quoted a week or so ago in Committee show that 43% of players in the Premier League are Afro-Caribbean or Black African. They have achieved that through their skills, their abilities, their resilience and their physical fitness, not because they wore multi-coloured boot laces. UEFA already bans political statements such as these, but it has not been successful in implementing and enforcing such rules. The Government could really take a lead on that.
If the Government are so keen to have a regulator to enforce numerous other rules, many of which overlap UEFA’s rules, surely it is only right that the regulator impose rules on political statements and attempts to impose political views. My noble friend is quite right: we have seen recently the unpleasant behaviour of fans cheering on pro-Palestinian extremists; and of course, we have the ongoing debate, discussion and rivalry between Celtic and Rangers in Glasgow. That is very much a political issue.
Article 16 of UEFA’s own regulations, entitled “Order and Security at UEFA Competition Matches,” prohibits
“the use of gestures, words, objects, or any other means to transmit a provocative message that is not fit for a sports event, particularly provocative messages that are of political, ideological, religious or offensive nature.”
My own bugbear is bad language, particularly in front of children and young people. It is terrible, unacceptable, for grown men to be swearing and using really unpleasant language. However, do we really want to add into that mix the poisonous disputes of politics and political issues? I do not think we do.
Why do we not try to replicate, and perhaps enforce, UEFA’s rules in the Bill? We must remember how divisive such actions have been with supporters and fans. No one likes to be told what they should believe or how they should act. Fans themselves are diverse; they do not need to have these views forced down their throats—such as the preachy proselytising of Gary Lineker on any number of fashionable so-called progressive causes, or a pretentious new Jaguar advert which does not actually feature a Jaguar car.
Fans want to watch a football match and support a team; they do not want to be in the middle of a political bunfight. Fans turn up to watch their favourite team play, not to see a session of Parliament. For those reasons, the Minister should give consideration to this amendment. It would save us from further discord and conflict, which we do not need. Fundamentally, we have to trust the clubs themselves to do the right thing by their fans, their players and their boards and deliver good policies organically, rather than enforcing these kinds of initiatives, which have been proven not to work necessarily.
My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Jackson. What he said was exceptionally perceptive and wise. Look at Marcus Rashford, for example, who exploded on to the football scene in the UK in 2016, aged just 18, and scored on his Manchester United and England debuts, before becoming one of the country’s most exciting prospects. He became a household name at the same time and was recognised with an MBE for his work off the field, campaigning on child hunger, which he faced growing up in Wythenshawe in Manchester. He challenged the then Government in 2020, imploring Ministers to offer free meals to needy children in the school holidays.
The position for international sports federations—and, indeed, for clubs in this country—is to recognise that a balance needs to be struck, which is what my noble friend Lord Parkinson was arguing for. The balance to be struck in the Olympic movement is recognising that the IOC Athletes’ Commission opposes using athletes for political propaganda or campaigns, while providing the opportunity for them to exercise their views and opinions in official media settings or on social media accounts, which are so powerful. Surely this is not a subject for the regulator; this is a subject for clubs and the organisers of the competitions in which they play.
My Lords, in the interests of the noble Baroness, Lady Blake of Leeds, the noble Lord, Lord Mann, and me—passionate Leeds supporters—I feel that my noble friend Lord Parkinson seems to have made an error. The first Leeds United badge, which actually began life in 1908, 11 years before the formation of the club we know and love today, was originally used by Leeds City Football Club—the team that preceded Leeds United. It was based on the coat of arms of the city of Leeds and it featured three owls. In some variations, it included the Latin motto “pro rege et lege”, which translates as “for the king and the law”. The team colours, blue and yellow, also came from the city’s crest. In 1965, came the owl badge. It was considered by some to be more representative of the team known as the Owls, Sheffield Wednesday—which my noble friend did not mention; he mentioned only Sheffield United—than of Leeds United FC, despite three owls featuring on the crest of the city of Leeds. The badge would have donned the shirt of a little-known youngster by the name of Billy Bremner.
On behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Blake of Leeds, the noble Lord, Lord Mann, who is sadly not in his seat, and me, and taking only one minute of the Committee’s time, I needed to correct my noble friend Lord Parkinson on his lack of knowledge of this rather important issue of a recognised badge for Leeds United.
My point was that the 25 badges and clubs that I listed are those which have been granted through delegation by the College of Arms to the English Football League. There are many splendid but unofficial badges used by teams elsewhere in football.
Lord Moynihan
Main Page: Lord Moynihan (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)(1 month, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 173A standing in my name on the Order Paper. Here, we are referring to Clause 32, and it is the Secretary of State who will be taking a power beyond this Bill, not even by positive resolution but by using a much lighter negative resolution procedure, to determine the time period for the approval of new owners and offices. I quote from the Government’s memorandum to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which states that
“the contents of the IFR’s suitability tests may likely change, compared to when the Bill is introduced … Once the contents of the IFR’s tests are set in statute, the Government will be better placed to set the time window in regulations”.
This is, after all, an important clause which addresses the scope of powers to attach or vary discretionary licence conditions. I would have thought that the consultation period should be very specific and placed on the face of the Bill. There is a risk here that the regulator may not consult the clubs in the leagues and just hurry the process through, which I am sure is not the intention, but why on earth not put it on the face of the Bill—not only which clubs and leagues are affected—which is not part of the Bill, as we have previously debated?
The very least the Government can do on this occasion is amend this clause, given the scale of these powers, and change the scope of the manifold discretionary licence conditions that the Government, not the regulators, are imposing on football clubs here. They must consult them. It seems eminently sensible that they should consult them, and I would have thought that the Minister would be the first to say that they will consult them. If they will, I cannot understand why we would not put that in the Bill.
My amendment says simply that, before submitting a request under subsection (6), the regulator must consult, first, the clubs; secondly, “each specified competition organiser”; and, thirdly, such other persons as the regulator considers appropriate. The consultation, as it stands, is not specific enough and risks the regulator not consulting the clubs and leagues on this issue. I really do believe that there would be every intention for the regulator to do so, so let us just clarify that in the Bill so that there is no danger that the regulator would avoid that possibility. I hope my amendment gains the approval of the Minister when she comes to wind up.
My Lords, I speak in support of Amendment 173B, tabled by my noble friend Lord Hayward, who I hope feels better soon. It introduces a number of key principles for the governance of capital buffer requirements that the IFR could potentially impose. This amendment fills an important gap in the Bill. I am also supportive of other amendments encouraging the IFR to adopt an outcome-focused approach, allowing the leagues to develop detailed financial rules within the overall statutory framework, as this will help to preserve the competitive balance with the design of common rules for all clubs. I am sure that the Minister will agree that this approach reflects the light-touch model that she has been describing.
As we heard in our debate on Monday, the Bill allows for a more interventionist approach for the IFR with individual clubs, through its discretionary licence conditions. In these cases, it is important that some clear parameters are set out in the Bill to ensure that any capital buffer requirements that may be developed are workable, proportionate and reflective of football’s realities.
Football clubs operate in vastly different financial contexts, even within the same pyramid. At one end, a relatively modest capital buffer of, say, enough to cover six months of operating costs might have saved a club such as Bury, for instance. But, at the other end, the challenges faced by Premier League clubs are of an entirely different scale. For a Premier League club relegated to the Championship, or indeed a club expecting but then failing to qualify for the Champions League, I understand that the financial shock can amount to as much as £90 million to £100 million.
Crucially, the way these clubs manage such risks is fundamentally different from clubs in lower leagues. At this level, as we have heard, clubs do not rely on cash reserves alone. Instead, they utilise a range of financial tools, including player trading, which is a core part of football’s economic model, as well as secured credit facilities—often backed by guaranteed revenues—and parachute payments, which I know we will discuss later and which help with the transition on relegation.
Without explicit reference in the Bill, there is a danger that the IFR might impose overly rigid liquidity requirements that would privilege clubs with access to unlimited working capital—I am thinking, for instance, of those backed by sovereign wealth funds—while unfairly disadvantaging others. This amendment would ensure that capital buffers reflect the real-world financial tools that clubs use to manage risk, including non-cash assets, as I have just described.
The single most important liquid asset for football clubs towards the top of the pyramid is their players. As I am sure my noble friend Lady Brady can tell us, player trading is often one of the first mechanisms that they turn to when managing financial shocks—yet the Bill provides no clarity on how the IFR will treat these assets. Even when player liquidity is recognised, valuation of these assets is critical. Under current UEFA financial fair play rules, players developed through academies are often valued at zero, for instance, based on book value, rather than their actual market worth. The purpose of UEFA’s rules is different, but, if copied by the IFR for the purposes of capital buffers, for instance, this could penalise clubs such as Crystal Palace, Southampton, West Ham or Arsenal, which have brought through many talents into their first teams in recent years.
This amendment therefore seeks to ensure that the IFR adopts sophisticated valuation methodology, including proper independent valuation of players and, in particular, a proper recognition of the value of academy players. Without these safeguards, the IFR risks undervaluing clubs’ most significant assets, forcing them to meet capital buffer requirements that are, in practice, unnecessary.
We have heard many times in this Committee that the competitive balance is the lifeblood of football, but poorly designed capital buffer requirements could easily and accidentally disrupt this balance. We must avoid this outcome, so I hope that even if the Minister is unable to accept the level of specificity in Amendment 173B, she will recognise that this area of the Bill is a source of anxiety for clubs. I hope she will agree that the principles within this amendment are important and that it is the Government’s intention that the IFR pursues a tailored approach, informed by guidance, that will protect the competitive balance and investability of the English game.
I thank the noble Lords, Lord Markham, Lord Moynihan and Lord Hayward, for tabling these amendments, and the noble Lords, Lord Markham and Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, for giving notice of their intention to oppose the question that Clause 22 stand part of the Bill. Like other noble Lords, I wish the noble Lord, Lord Hayward, a swift recovery and hope to see him back for the next day of consideration by this Committee.
I will start with Amendment 172 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Markham. It is vital that the regulator has the appropriate tools to address systemic financial risks that might arise. Indeed, in recent years clubs have faced a number of systemic risks, such as during the Covid-19 pandemic, when many clubs faced financial difficulties, some of which are still felt by clubs today.
The ability to restrict clubs’ overall expenditure may be the most appropriate and effective tool in certain circumstances. The noble Lord, Lord Markham, asked about limiting expenditure, which is already used within football. Some leagues already have rules limiting expenditure on wages and limits on permissive losses. I reassure him that the regulator is further constrained when taking action here. First, we have made it absolutely clear that the regulator has the ability only to restrict overall expenditure. It cannot place restrictions around specific transactions or types of transactions, to micromanage spending in that way.
Furthermore, the regulatory principles enshrined in the Bill in Clause 8 include the principle that the regulator should act proportionately. We would expect this to be reflected in any discretionary licence condition that the regulator sets. Restricting overall expenditure might be the most proportionate and least interventionist or burdensome response to these risks. Without this tool, it might have to apply a different response that may be more restrictive or less effective.
I turn to Amendment 173A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, to which the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Addington, also spoke. While we appreciate the intent, we are confident that clubs and competition organisers would already be captured under the current wording in the Bill, of persons the regulator “considers appropriate”. As I have outlined in previous debates, the Government do not believe it is necessary or appropriate to put an exhaustive list of stakeholders in the Bill. I appreciate that the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, has a different view, but we feel that the regulator will be best placed to determine which persons are appropriate to consult depending on the decision in question. However, I look forward to further discussions with him on this point.
The regulator is required to consult anyone it considers appropriate. Failing to do so would be a breach of its statutory obligations and could result in legal challenge—
I was not for a minute suggesting that there should be an exhaustive list that should be consulted; I was simply highlighting three very specific groups of people who should be consulted, which I think the Minister agrees with. There should be no doubt in the minds of the Committee that if you simply list clubs and competition organisers and then say “such other persons as the regulator considers appropriate”, you capture everything she has just said and make it very clear that the regulator will approach and consult clubs and competition organisers—which is the whole purpose behind this clause and surely one that has her full support. Why not simply clarify it in a very simple additional nine words?
I hear what the noble Lord says and look forward to further discussions with him on that point, but we feel that the regulator will be best placed to determine which persons are appropriate to consult.
I entirely accept that there are detailed regulations, in particular in relation to money laundering, but that is a far more specific area, where there is a government system and a whole army of people with expertise to assess those matters. The question is whether we wish to make it a function of the independent football regulator to have a whole department that is concerned with this. I see the force of the principle, but I remain sceptical about it in practice.
My Lords, this is one of the best debates we have had in Committee to date. I am equally sympathetic to the points made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the interventions of the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, and the concern about the practicality of this, but none of that is covered in Amendment 200, which is in this group.
Let us just assume, hypothetically, that a state-owned entity acquiring a football club in England has an excellent human rights record and no problems with modern slavery. Under Amendment 200, it would be banned from owning a club in England because it is state-controlled. All the points that have been made are relevant and important, but Amendment 200, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, is very specific and states that:
“No state-controlled club may be granted an operating licence”.
There is no reference to human rights abuses or to any of the important issues regarding the supply chain, which have been mentioned. It simply states that a foreign-owned, state-controlled company cannot own an English football club. If we pass this amendment, immediately we would then have to divest the Abu Dhabi United Group of its majority ownership of Manchester City and Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund of its ownership of Newcastle United, to mention but two cases.
How have the Premier League and UEFA addressed this to date? They have focused on the word “control”. When the Premier League addressed the Newcastle ownership test, it received “legally binding guarantees” that the state of Saudi Arabia would not have control over Newcastle United in the event of any deal. However, the Bill goes much further. It grants powers to the regulator that are not just about control. An individual has to be considered who has
“a higher degree of influence”
over the ownership of a club. The control test that UEFA and the Premier League currently use, which is a tough test that takes up a lot of time and energy, is overridden by a requirement in this legislation—for the first time in sport—to test whether an individual has a higher degree of influence. There can be no doubt that the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, as chair of the PIF, has a very high degree of influence over that board —he appoints it. Indeed, a Minister from that board has been appointed to be chairman of Newcastle.
If we go forward and accept Amendment 200 as it stands, what would we be saying to football, to Newcastle, to the Qataris—who might want to acquire a company, which there has been much speculation about, not least in this Committee—and to Abu Dhabi in relation to Man City? It would drive a coach and horses through the current ownership of the Premier League. It would be a very serious decision by the Government to take state control over who owns the football clubs in this country.
I say that because it comes down to the degree of state influence that is behind the regulator. The Government have said:
“Regarding the scope of the tests, we recognise the trade-offs involved, and are aware of the range of corporate structures behind clubs”,
and they specifically mention here sovereign wealth funds. They go on to say:
“We are designing the legal scope of the tests with these challenges in mind”.
They call them challenges, to be faced down at the request of government. We would have an open back door in the Bill if we accepted the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, straying into foreign policy in a way that we do not currently do. We have plenty of legislation elsewhere on the statute book allowing the Government to intervene if they felt they needed to in a certain circumstance.
The Government have therefore further confirmed the scope of the regulator. To me, it is incredibly important that the regulator is not given so many powers as to require it to have direct influence. I lost an amendment on Monday night, when I asked for that at least to be defined and for consultation to go out to find out what “significant influence” means in this context. I think that is extremely important.
I have a question for the Minister. I cannot find an answer as a result of the debates we have had so far, but football needs an answer and probably needs it now. Is it the Government’s position that the Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, should be able to own Newcastle United under the definition of ownership in the Bill? It is a very simple question, with a yes or no answer. If yes, why have Ministers deliberately constructed a Bill that will quickly put him through the ownership test of significant influence, and why did the Minister confirm on Monday that she wanted incumbent Heads of State to be tested? If no then surely the Government should say so, and we should have that as part of an open debate.
I hope that, if that question is answered this evening, there will be no doubt in future about what the Government intend, not least following the Prime Minister’s visit to Saudi Arabia last week and his offer to go to a football match with the Crown Prince. It is only reasonable for Saudi Arabia and the Crown Prince to know whether he is expected to divest himself of the interest in Newcastle United or not.
My Lords, I welcome my noble friend Lord Scriven to this debate and congratulate him on making those points. When it comes to the modern slavery amendments—to take on the point from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—if other people are looking at this, surely the regulator should be able to take their opinion. Surely that would be a reasonable step. If the Bill does not allow that, I am sure we could do that quite easily.
On state ownership, I put my name to Amendment 200 because I thought that at the very least we deserved an answer. The previous Government’s Back-Benchers did not like the Telegraph under control and, let us face it, more people have heard of Newcastle United than they have the Telegraph.
This is an important point. Are we happy with a cultural asset being in the hands of a foreign power, regardless of the fact that we have a reasonably good relationship with it on most things? It is not all things, as we do not like certain things about it. That is a real question, and the Minister is being asked a series of real questions. I hope that at the end of this we will know whether these points are worth pursuing at other stages of the Bill. These questions really should be answered, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
I would be grateful if the noble Lord allowed me to take away that specific example. I will write to him and to the Committee and place a letter in the Library, so that they have a detailed response on that point.
These are all issues that the regulator will take very seriously. Where the amendments before us today go further than existing drafting, this introduces elements that we do not believe are necessarily relevant to an owner’s suitability. They would require the regulator to make a subjective and potentially speculative judgment on whether the individual has engaged in any activity that would risk bringing the game into disrepute. Where a potential dispute relates to things like criminal history, the regulator will already have to consider these things. But “disrepute” is a vague term; could it arise through an owner’s conduct in their personal life, or their political views? In the Government’s view, it would put the regulator in quite a difficult position, making a value judgment on what constitutes disrepute, which would undermine the principle of a reasoned, evidence-based test.
Turning to Amendment 199 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, the test is supported by the regulator’s information-gathering powers to ensure its determination is evidence-based. These powers will help the regulator tackle unco-operative individuals or organisations that do not provide the information. However, let me be clear: if the regulator does not have enough evidence to make its determination, the individual will be found unsuitable.
I understand the noble Baroness’s concerns about restrictions on an owner’s funds. I want to reassure her that the test requires an owner to submit financial plans and demonstrate sufficient financial resources to run the club. As part of this, we expect that the regulator will consider things such as the liquidity of those resources and their availability to actually be used to fund the club. The regulator will also need to be satisfied that the owner does not have wealth connected to illicit finance. To do this, it can conduct enhanced due diligence on the owner’s source of wealth. This would identify any links to criminality, corruption and money-laundering. We believe, therefore, that the intent of the noble Baroness’s amendment is delivered in the current drafting of the Bill. I hope she takes reassurance from this, but I am happy to meet her to discuss this if my explanation has not satisfied her.
I turn to amendment 200 from my noble friend Lord Bassam of Brighton, which the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, also spoke to. This Government are not making a judgment on different forms of ownership. We recognise that good ownership can take many forms, and it is investment from responsible owners that has been a driving factor in the success of English football. Banning any one particular kind of ownership would not, in our view, be in keeping with the flexible and proportionate approach to regulation we are proposing. I believe that this approach has broad support across the Committee. Prospective owners with state backing will be assessed against the same set of criteria as any other prospective owner, on a case-by-case basis. I hope that answers the question about Newcastle from the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson.
I apologise for intervening on the Minister’s speech, but I did ask a very specific question, which I think she has answered but I would be grateful if she could make it clear to the Committee. Through the higher degree of influence test, which we have debated and understand, and which is unique to this regulatory framework, will the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia be subject to an ownership test—yes or no?
Any owner, with state backing or otherwise, will be assessed against the same set of criteria as any other prospective owner, on a case-by-case basis.
Yes. Prospective owners with state backing will be assessed against the same set of criteria and, by requiring new owners to undergo the regulator’s test, we better mitigate against harm to clubs by preventing unsuitable custodians ever becoming owners. Giving the regulator the power to test incumbent owners where there are concerns about their suitability ensures that any unsuitable owners can be removed.
The noble Lord, Lord Scriven, raised a comparison with the legal position on media organisations. Although football clubs up and down the country are vital community assets, they are not the cornerstone of our democracy that free media is. Investment from responsible owners has been a driving factor in the success of English football, which is why we are putting in place a stable regulatory environment that will continue to attract investors with a long-term prudent approach to growing football clubs as important community assets. What is important, in our view, is that owners are suitable, and the approach to testing owners set out in the Bill ensures just that.
This has been a hugely useful debate and, although I will have to come back on a number of points, I hope my response has provided some reassurance. But, for the reasons I have given, I would be grateful if my noble friends and other noble Lords would not press their amendments.
My Lords, I hope that Amendment 180 will be much simpler, because is a bit niche and, dare I say it, anoraky in nature, for which I apologise. It would amend Clause 27 by removing subsection (7).
This subsection states that where a prospective owner or officer does not inform the regulator of their intention to become an owner or an officer
“as soon as reasonably practicable”,
that person must inform the regulator as soon as it is reasonably practicable. We probably understand the issue there. Not to mince my words, it is a slight tongue- twister. It is a bit confusing and nonsensical. In essence, it says that if someone has not told the regulator in the period when they were meant to, they must do so later
“as soon as reasonably practicable”.
I hope that this provision is a fairly simple one to tidy up. Again, I think we all understand the good intentions here, but I would be grateful if the Minister could clear that up. I will leave it to my noble friend Lord Moynihan to raise his amendments.
My Lords, I will be equally brief in proposing my Amendments 187ZA and 187ZB. The drafting of the Bill states that if the regulator takes too long to determine applications for new owners and officers, then the applicants are treated as not suitable under Clause 32(5), through absolutely no fault of their own. This is not aligned with practice in other regulated sectors. It could have an impact on that person wider than purely their involvement in the club and be detrimental to clubs that have only one potential new owner, who is deemed unsuitable purely because the regulator ran out of time.
The change that I propose to Clause 32(5) would reverse the consequence of excessive delay, addressing the inherent unfairness in the current drafting. This is aligned with how statutory time limits on mergers work, for example. If the CMA fails to make a decision within a specified timeline, the merger is automatically allowed. These are clarifying amendments; I very much hope that the Government will see benefit in improving the legislation by accepting them.
My Lords, I will say a few words about one of the amendments, but first want to follow up on what the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, was saying about multi-club ownership. He was suggesting that multi-club ownership could alleviate risk. I see the point that he was making, but we have to be clear that it can also generate risk. This is an ongoing conversation that many people in football are having. We have to consider its prevalence and the fact that it is increasing, but there are questions about how it could distort competition and lead to complications with loan deals or the sale of players. This is a big question that will loom over us in the future. It is not just a one-way issue, as perhaps the noble Lord was suggesting.
I want to say a couple of words about Amendment 201. Clause 37 says very clearly that in determining whether it considers that an individual has the requisite honesty et cetera, the regulator should have regard to whether the individual has been convicted of a serious criminal offence. Amendment 201, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Bassam, goes somewhat further and says:
“No individual with an unspent serious criminal conviction, whether or not in England and Wales, shall be permitted to own a controlling stake in, or serve as a director for, any regulated club”.
That is a clear statement of intent about the serious nature of some of the issues that have arisen about specific clubs in recent times. I ask the Minister to tighten up on this, take the prospect of owners with serious convictions very seriously and say that it should be a bar to ownership and not simply something that has to be taken into account.
My Lords, I too will speak to Amendment 204 on multi-club ownership, as the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, has made some important points and it would be helpful for the Committee to understand the position of the Government. It can alleviate risk. It is also highly complex and can make it very difficult, in terms of due diligence, for the regulator to look at an English club under this legislation without taking into account the financial exposure that a multi-club owner could have in another country with other clubs.
This is a growing trend; it is not new. A significant number of Premier League clubs and six EFL Championship clubs form part of a wider multi-club model, a structure first explored exclusively in Europe by ENIC, now the majority shareholder of Tottenham Hotspur. The rationale underpinning multi-club ownership aspirations, which underlines just how complex the situation can be, ranges from player recruitment and development efficiencies to knowledge sharing, resource synergies and brand penetration.
Furthermore, accruing interest in clubs that compete in the continent’s top leagues—those that hold higher bands and therefore score more points in the governing body endorsement system—is seen as a means for Premier League and EFL clubs to access a more eligible foreign pool of players. Having interests in multiple clubs is not a phenomenon unique to the UK; it pervades the European game. UEFA reports that clubs with cross-ownership relations account for more than a third of the top division in each of Belgium, France and Italy, in addition to England. Integrity of competition, reconciling the model with football’s rulebook, has become a complex issue for UEFA. At the centre of sport is competition, so if the same person, either a natural or a legally based entity, was to have control or influence over two rivals, there would be a risk to the integrity of competition whenever those rivals competed.
To mitigate that risk, football’s governing bodies have introduced rules to preserve the independence and integrity of competition between its clubs. At a domestic level, approximately two-thirds of European national football associations have rules directly limiting or restricting multi-club ownership. The famous article 5 of the regulations of the UEFA Champions League, on the integrity of the UEFA club competitions, stems from the governing body’s concern, which started back in the late 1990s. Article 5 regulates common ownership by prohibiting the same individual or legal entity having control or influence over more than one club playing in the same UEFA club competition. That notably includes the ability to exercise, by any means, a decisive influence on the decision-making of the club concerned.
With that brief explanation on top of the important points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, I would be very grateful if the Minister could confirm that she is completely comfortable with article 5 and will instruct the regulators not to impose any conflicting regulations in this area.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, Lord Addington, Lord Markham and Lord McNally, who I am sorry to hear is not available today, and particularly my noble friend Lady Taylor of Bolton, for the amendments in this group.
Starting with Amendment 190 from the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, I do not agree that the foreign and trade policy objectives of the Government have any bearing on suitability. Suitability should be based purely on an impartial assessment of the individual’s fitness, whether they have a source of wealth connected to serious criminal conduct, and their financial plans and resources.
My Lords, before I speak to this group, I want to be clear about who the regulator will test and clarify an earlier point I made. I will ensure that all noble Lords who participated in the second group have their attention drawn to this clarification and apologise if I caused any confusion.
Schedule 1 to the Bill sets out details on who meets the definition of an owner. The Secretary of State will also set out guidance on one of the criteria for ownership, “significant influence or control”. An incumbent individual simply meeting the definition, including if they exert significant influence or control, does not mean that the regulator is required or obliged to test them. It may test an incumbent owner if there are grounds for concern about their suitability. The criteria for suitability are clearly set out in the Bill. This applies to any type of owner, be it a state owner or otherwise.
The key point I must stress—it goes for Newcastle United or any other club, although as someone who lived for a number of years in Newcastle I am particularly keen to reassure Geordies—is that the regulator will be operationally independent of government. It is not for the Government to prejudge the regulator’s assessment of who meets the definition of owner, whether there is concern about a particular owner or the outcome if the regulator tests a particular owner.
Finally, I want to reassure your Lordships’ Committee that this Government are unashamedly pro-investment, which will drive our growth mission. We want good, long-term investors into the UK, and foreign investment is key to this. I hope that noble Lords find this clarification helpful.
I thank the Minister for that. I think it is self-evident from her comments that once you remove the foreign and trade policy objective and put in place the significant influence test, you have a massive problem in the Bill. That massive problem is that it is self-evident, as has been discussed many times during the proceedings, that the Crown Prince—as chair of and in control of the PIF, with significant influence over it—would automatically come within the scope of significant influence as defined so far in debate on a number of occasions. I have no problem with that, and I do not think that the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, has any problem with that. If that is the case, so be it, and let us be honest about it. If it is not the case, “significant influence” is meaningless, and we should come back to it on Report and simply delete “significant influence”, which, incidentally, goes far further than any other regulator in Europe.
We have control tests that are applied by UEFA, by the Premier League and across football. We do not have this significant influence test, and that is what is causing the problem. You remove the foreign and trade policy objectives and apply a significant influence test. The Minister was very clear in response to me on Monday that the Crown Prince would be absolutely full and central in any clear interpretation of that test. For the first time, she has put the definition of significant influence into the long grass as she said that it would come back in secondary legislation, that the Government do not actually know what it means and that she cannot give an answer to that in Committee or when we return on Report. But it is critical, because it comes to the very hub of political influence: what is the status of the Crown Prince? What is the status of Abu Dhabi? What would be the status of the Qataris if they wanted to buy a club in the Premier League, or indeed in any other league? My recommendation is that, given the uncertainty in the response that the Minister has just given and the absolute clarity on Monday evening and earlier this afternoon on the yes/no answer, we leave it for the time being and return on Report and analyse this in depth.
I felt I was clear, but I accept that the noble Lord has a different view. I look forward to ongoing discussions with him before and on Report. My comments related to a previous group, so I apologise to noble Lords who were not there to hear the context of my comments.
I will now move on to my remarks on this group, which—
I shall just say this, as it is so central to our proceedings this evening. Just for the record, on Monday evening the Minister said:
“Finally, on the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, the whole point of the owners’ and directors’ test, which has been carefully designed, is to ensure that club custodians are suitable for assessing an owner’s fitness—this is absolutely crucial. It is right that any owner passes the tests set out in the Bill, so it would not be fair, appropriate or responsible to exempt certain types of owners from testing … This amendment intends that owners with diplomatic status or who are Heads of State, Government Ministers or high-ranking officials of foreign Governments would not be tested”.
That was in response to my probing amendment. She went on:
“I do not need to tell noble Lords about some of the people this could exempt from testing. That means that the regulator could not consider any personal finances or criminal history, no matter how egregious. Instead, it would have to ignore these matters, so the regulator could be letting unsuitable owners in”.—[Official Report, 16/12/24; col. 140.]
In other words, all those people I have just mentioned are subject to the tests set out in the Bill, and that would include anybody who was chair of a sovereign wealth fund that had invested in football in this country. That is what we will return to on Report. I do not think it is appropriate to lengthen the discussion this evening, as it has been well aired, but it is fundamental to removing that clause from the legislation in terms of opening up a can of worms now for the Government in identifying exactly what the suitable ownership test means.
Like other noble Lords, I want to move on, but I shall repeat two sentences that I referred to earlier. Simply because an incumbent individual meets the definition, including if they exert significant influence or control, does not mean that the regulator is required to test them. It may test an incumbent owner if there are grounds for concern about their suitability. Now I think we should move on. I do not feel that is a can of worms, but I appreciate that the noble Lord has an alternative view.
Moving to the group under discussion, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, and my noble friend Lady Taylor of Bolton for speaking to the amendments. On Amendment 206, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, the aim of the clause, as he knows, is to stop the possibility of clubs leaving to join a closed-shop breakaway competition, as several clubs attempted with the European Super League in 2021. While I appreciate the aim of the noble Lord’s amendment, the clause has been carefully drafted to ensure that there is no possibility of circumvention. That is why the duty also captures formerly regulated clubs, so an owner cannot remove a club from the specified competitions in favour of joining a new break- away competition.
It is unlikely that clubs in the sixth tier of English football or beyond will attempt to join a prohibited competition, so we do not think the risk that the amendment aims to cater for is a material one. What is more, if these clubs sought to join a competition that had been prohibited by the regulator, that would undermine the heritage and history of the club and should also be condemned—so it is no bad thing that the duty would capture them as well.
On Amendment 207, in the name of my noble friend Lord Bassam of Brighton, which my noble friend Lady Taylor spoke to, I acknowledge the intent to protect the clause from any risk of circumvention. However, we do not believe it is necessary to extend the scope of the clause to the new clubs or entities that are created to take on the identity and players of a formerly regulated club in order to participate in prohibited competitions. We believe this is a remote risk. Even if a club could convince its players to do this, convince its fan base to follow them and work through the legalities, the FA’s existing requirements around the registration of clubs and players would offer sufficient protection. For the reasons I have set out, I hope noble Lords will not press their amendments.
Lord Moynihan
Main Page: Lord Moynihan (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)(1 month, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberI am not sure how many times I have said that this evening, but it is really not very many. I am trying to establish that this model has been worked on and discussed for some time. I appreciate that noble Lords in this House did not get the opportunity to discuss it under the previous Government. It is a model that has been worked through, with examples from different organisations. It encourages compromise and tries to get people to reach a deal that everybody can work through and which meets the criteria of the regulator.
A model which creates tension does not get it right. We have already heard from Rick Parry that he would trigger it immediately. This is a model that does not work. We are trying to say to the Minister that Committee is an opportunity to take it away and rethink it. It really does not stack up to be a successful model for the future of English football.
I have listened very carefully to the debate and to what the Minister has said. I understand that UEFA asked the Government to carefully reconsider the backstop mechanism, since when it has become much wider in scope and more likely to lead to the most extreme outcomes. I wonder whether she has discussed it with UEFA. Can the Minister update the Committee on the outcome of those discussions?
I have had no direct meetings with UEFA, but the Minister for Sport in the other place has. I cannot confirm what was said in the meeting, but I will endeavour to establish whether this was part of the discussion. What did or did not happen at that meeting has not been part of my conversations with people, but I will endeavour to find out. I suspect I will not get an answer to the noble Lord tonight.
Will the Minister kindly write to the Committee? This is very important indeed. The backstop has been introduced into the Bill and UEFA has expressed very serious concerns about it. Unless this can be resolved, it could threaten the existence of English clubs playing in UEFA competitions. I hope that this has been high on the agenda of discussions between UEFA and the Government. Having listened carefully to what the Minister has said, all I ask is that she write to the Committee, or early in January inform the Committee, on how UEFA has responded to this significant expansion of the effect of the backstop, which it was originally very concerned about.
To be clear, I do not speak for UEFA. It is an international organisation that is able to speak for itself. I am not aware that UEFA raised issues about the backstop specifically in the meeting with the Minister for Sport, but I will endeavour to find out. I understand from the expression of the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, that he may have more information about UEFA’s concerns than I do. However, without expecting this to be an ongoing dialogue, I will endeavour to establish the information that he requested.
I asked whether it was raised in the letter from UEFA, which sadly the Committee cannot because it is private correspondence, but it is right at the heart of this legislation. If it was raised in the letter, or in subsequent correspondence, would my friend the Minister kindly confirm that to the Committee? It would help us in our deliberations moving forward.
UEFA raised no concerns about the backstop in its most recent meetings with DCMS and the Minister for Sport, including those held since the Bill has been introduced. I hope that reassures the noble Lord on this point. As I say, I do not speak, will not speak and cannot speak for UEFA; I speak for the Government.
Ultimately, the clause is about creating transparency, which sets the tone for the rest of the backstop process. Clause 59 introduces high statutory thresholds that must be met in order for the backstop to be triggered. In particular, it sets out that the regulator must have reasonable grounds to suspect that its ability to advance at least one of its objectives would be jeopardised if the backstop was not triggered. As stated, an implicit part of this consideration would include an assessment of whether other regulatory tools could be utilised to better effect instead.
The regulator can consider what the distributed revenues will be used for and, if the basis for the backstop application is that there is no distribution agreement in place, whether this has arisen as a result of bad faith. This helps to incentivise the leagues to try to reach an agreement in good faith before turning to the regulator, and ensures that the backstop is used only where absolutely necessary. The regulator must make its decision within 28 days, although it can extend this by a further 28 days if absolutely necessary. Once the regulator has made its decision, it must notify the relevant leagues of its decision to ensure transparency throughout the process.
As we have made clear, the Government’s strong preference is for a football-led solution to issues around financial distributions. As such, the mediation stage outlined in Clause 60 grants the relevant leagues an opportunity to reach an agreement before the regulator delivers a solution as part of the final proposal stage. The mediation stage has been designed to facilitate meaningful negotiation and compromise between the parties. To this end, it encourages the leagues to appoint a mediator they both agree on, but ensures that the regulator will appoint somebody with the appropriate skills and experience if they cannot. The leagues can end the mediation process for multiple reasons, most notably if an alternative agreement is reached. However, the mediator can also end the process if it is not producing meaningful good-faith negotiations or if it reaches the 28-day deadline.
I thank noble Lords for their amendments and the well-natured debate on this important part of the Bill. I hope my reasons have reassured noble Lords and that they will not press their amendments. I ask that these clauses stand part of the Bill.
Lord Moynihan
Main Page: Lord Moynihan (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)(2 weeks, 2 days ago)
Lords ChamberI wish all noble Lords a happy new year, because this is the first time I have been here. I wish that my noble friend Lord Parkinson was joining us here instead of being in the Caribbean, from where he sends his best wishes. I really appreciate the time, effort and work that the noble Lord, Lord Birt, has put into this, although I am not sure about his statistic that 40% of the best players worldwide play in the Premier League. I would be interested in understanding where that statistic comes from, particularly as there seemed to be a Liverpool bias in that statistic.
The point behind all this, as the noble Lord said, is that a redistribution power gives unprecedented power to a regulator—unlike any other regulator in the country. As noble Lords have heard me say before, you do not see the FCA giving money from one bank to another or Ofwat giving from one water company to another. This has to be at odds with what the Sports Minister said just today—that they were looking to put in place a light-touch regulator. Instead, they are giving the regulator more powers than any other regulator in the country, which feels as if it is going in the opposite direction. The amendments in the second group seek to address that by suggesting that maybe we should not have those redistribution powers. But given a scenario in which we have those powers, the noble Lord has tried to set out a thorough and well thought-out process that is designed to foster compromise and avoid gaming. That is my concern about this.
I particularly appreciate the amendment on the criteria for settlement, which would make sure that there is a wider set of criteria in all this—looking to the competitive nature, audience appeal and continued investment. Without that, you are really just asking the expert panel to go back to the original objectives of the Bill, which are very simple and talk only about the financial resilience of the league, safeguarding heritage and financial soundness. There is a very easy way in which to achieve all those things, pointing the expert panel to saying that whichever suggestion gives the most money is going to achieve that, without having any other objectives. We could say, “Hang on a moment; going with the one that gives the most money does not at all take into account the appeal of the Premier League or the competitive nature of it all—it just makes sure that it is financially sound by giving it as much money as possible”. That cannot be right, but that is what we are setting up the regulator to do, if those are the only criteria and measures that it has to guide by. That is why I appreciate the wider set of measures set out in the amendment, which is very much a guide to how to do that, similar to the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Parkinson, which are in my name as well, on having a financial investment duty on the regulator in deciding any final proposal.
I also support Amendment 297F, which is about putting in place a proper appeals process. It is about getting as sensible, thorough and transparent a process as possible, and I look forward to hearing from the Minister how the Government would look to take on board these sensible provisions.
Before the Minister responds, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Birt, who sat through many hours of Committee and held his council until this moment, when he has made some very forceful and powerful points geared specifically towards having a co-operative, thoughtful and collaborative response to mediation. The legislation at present is not like that; it is divisive and nuclear, to use two of the words that the noble Lord used. This is one area where there can be agreement across the Committee, and I hope that there will be agreement from the Minister that we can return on Report to look at this, so that we can be more in line with other regulatory mechanisms for mediation. None is as divisive and polarised as the one in the Bill, and I very much hope that the support will be universal for the noble Lord, Lord Birt. I am grateful to him for the thought that he has given to this.
Will the noble Lord acknowledge that you can have mediation only if both sides are willing to participate? What we have seen from the Premier League in recent years is that it is not willing to do that.
I disagree with the noble Baroness on that. Through the history of the backstop powers and the parachute payments, this has been subject to consistent and constructive negotiations. Some negotiations are tougher than others; there is no doubt that in recent months and the last couple of years there have been examples of both sides failing to reach an agreement. I do not believe that putting this regulatory pressure into a binary system is going to resolve that. Yes, negotiations are tough and are frequently going to lead to detailed iterations before a satisfactory position is reached—but the last round of negotiations in particular was very close to reaching an agreement. I do not believe that the imposition of regulatory pressure is going to resolve that beneficially for the future of the Premier League, or indeed the EFL, at all.
My Lords, before the noble Lord completely finishes his point and before we get to the Minister, from whom I think we all want to hear on this, does he accept that there has not been any progress in negotiations for 18 months? That is a very long time. The Premier League has to come somewhere close to where the EFL is if there is to be some sort of progress, and there has been no progress in that time—so I am not sure that the noble Lord is right.
I am equally keen to sit down so that we can hear the Minister respond. I was party to the letter from the EFL and to the reply from the noble Baroness, who set out clearly the steps taken during these negotiations, and it is simply not true to say that over the past 12 months no progress has been made. I hope that the noble Lord will agree that the proposal made by the noble Lord, Lord Birt, is a far more efficient, professional and collaborative way in which to make progress, and I very much hope that the Minister will echo that in her response.
My Lords, my response to the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, is that the experience in litigation over recent years is that a requirement on parties to acrimonious disputes to mediate does often ensure a consensual settlement of disputes that seemed unable to be resolved—the formal process of mitigation. I declare, as I always do, my interests as counsel to Manchester City in disciplinary proceedings. I am a season ticket holder at Arsenal. I am interested to hear that the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, is in the Caribbean; I had intended to go to the Emirates Stadium tonight to see Arsenal play Tottenham Hotspur, but I decided, on the basis of their recent form, that it would be far more entertaining to listen to the noble Lord, Lord Birt, and other noble Lords.
I just make two points about the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Birt. I agree that they deserve close attention and I look forward to hearing from the Minister. The first is on Amendment 297A, on the appointment of a mediator. The noble Lord proposes that the person to be appointed must have held high judicial office. I say to him that, based on my experience, the best mediators are not necessarily those who have been judges. A mediator is not deciding anything; a mediator needs empathy and the ability to build a relationship of trust with the warring parties. I therefore respectfully suggest to the noble Lord that he may want to think about that point.
The second point that I raise with the noble Lord and the Committee is on his Amendment 297F. If I have understood his scheme correctly, there is a mediation stage, then there is an arbitration stage and then the ability for either party who is dissatisfied with the arbitration to take the matter to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. I point out to noble Lords that it is customary, where there is arbitration, that the power to take a matter that has been consensually arbitrated to a court or tribunal is very limited. That is the whole point of arbitration; it is to reduce the possibilities of further lengthy and expensive proceedings. The Arbitration Act, in most circumstances, limits the ability to go to court or to another tribunal thereafter to very specific and limited grounds. Again, the noble Lord may want to give thought to that.
My Lords, I am very pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has just returned. He will be in an exceptionally good mood as his club has just gone 2-1 up with about a minute to spare before half-time. That will put him in a good mood to support my amendment.
Amendment 327 was tabled in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Maude, who is abroad on business and apologises for not being with us this evening. It is a straightforward, simple amendment, which I hope will have support from the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor. She and I have both been concerned about the potential financial impact of the Bill, particularly on clubs in the EFL. Pursuant to her earlier intervention, I am here not on the EFL side or the Premier League side but genuinely to look at the legislation and make sure that good legislation comes out of our deliberations.
One of the areas of particular concern is the cost. This is new; it is the first time it has happened not just in this country but anywhere in Europe for a sport. It is novel, and that word is used quite extensively in the Government’s impact assessment. It is important, therefore, to have an opportunity in Parliament to consider the costs of setting up the regulator and the initial costs of regulation. That is why Amendment 327 proposes:
“Within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a review of the financial impact on regulated clubs of complying with the provisions in this Act”.
That will give us an opportunity to consider whether it is massively inflated in comparison with the expectations set out in the impact assessment or if there are cost savings. I think the noble Baroness is about to intervene, so I am happy to give way.
I am about to intervene. The noble Lord is somewhat optimistic in thinking that everything can be revealed within six months. I will make a broader point, which we are not specifically discussing tonight. The role of Parliament in holding regulators to account is where many of these considerations could usefully come in.
The noble Baroness makes an important point but, in the context of this, I think her first point was even more relevant. Perhaps at a later stage, more than six months would be appropriate; maybe a year would be appropriate. Either way, it is appropriate that Parliament has a look at the costs of implementation, not least because there will be views among parliamentarians about where that burden should fall, and whether it should fall on some of the EFL clubs that might find it difficult to afford those costs of following this legislation. It is interesting that the French regulator who covers professional football confirmed yesterday that he has five staff to do the job that we are looking to cover with this substantial regulation. He also has 18 volunteers from the leagues, including the French FA, who make up their boards and committees to do the work that we have been considering so far in Committee.
The reason for moving this amendment is the concern about the uncertainty of the additional costs to be imposed on all 116 clubs as a result of the financial regulations set out in this Bill. I am not going to go into the details of questioning each and every figure, because that would be inappropriate, but I think it is worth looking at areas of the impact assessment that lead me to worry about the potential increase in costs that this could result in, not least because there is no estimate of litigation costs involved with the regulator, and we have heard that there is quite a lot of potential litigation that could be flowing as a result of the role of the regulator.
Initially, these litigation costs in the Bill will be funded through fines and interest as a first recourse, and that is set out Clause 96; but the further costs to cover litigation would come via the levy—in other words, come via the clubs themselves, and not be a burden on the taxpayer. That could lead to perverse incentives when it comes to the advocacy-first proportionate enforcement model. The legal costs should not be underestimated when you bear in mind that in the last financial year the Premier League had some £40 million-worth of legal costs alone. We should add to that the potential for legal costs associated with what we have been discussing this evening. I hope they do not come to fruition, but it is perfectly possible that they might, with parachute payments and the backstop.
In the context of trying to establish a cost base for clubs and the government regulator, it is really important that we look in detail at the impact assessment. It addresses costs in three buckets: familiarisation costs of £400,000 to £1.2 million, covering the one-off costs to business occurring in the first year of the appraisal period; compliance costs, which potentially go up to £35.8 million over the 10-year appraisal, which are the ongoing costs to business following the first year of the appraisal period; and then the operational costs, which are significantly higher. While these operational costs will initially be funded by the Exchequer before an industry levy is introduced, the costs will subsequently be clawed back from all clubs.
The role of the regulator and the work required by clubs is based on the belief that professional football in this country is in crisis and requires government intervention to sort it out. The legislation addresses what it has set out to be perverse incentives and misaligned owner motivations which have resulted in excessive risk taking in pursuit of sporting success and promotion. Those are quotes and they are meat to any lawyer immediately before this Bill is even on the statute book. Ultimately, the Government argue that this has resulted in market failure, despite the Premier League being the most successful football league in the world and the Championship the sixth-richest in Europe. However, the Government have ignored that and believe, as is clearly set out in the impact assessment, that government intervention is necessary to correct market failure.
There are complete sections on the problems that the Government believe have led to this market failure. Briefly, in 1.2.1 on page 9, the Government believe there is a perverse incentive for clubs to overreach financially. I anticipate that will be challenged. Paragraph 1.2.2 states that inequitable distribution across the English football pyramid has exacerbated poor financial and operational management. Paragraph 1.2.3 states that unsustainable financial management exists, in the view of the Government. Paragraph 1.2.4 covers poor operational management where financial mismanagement has been exacerbated by poor-quality operational management and decision-making at clubs. That is quite a statement to address towards professional football clubs in this country.
Paragraph 1.2.5 states that clubs will need to spend more to
“take into account the interests of fans/communities”,
which currently they do not sufficiently consider. But the impact assessment does not set out how much this is, or make costs, or rectify any of the other broken aspects of professional football that I have outlined this evening. It argues that the existing regulations have “proved ineffective” and it states that the
“free market will not rectify the football industry’s problems”.
In paragraphs 1.3.2 and 1.3.5, it says that
“market failure has large spillover impacts on society”,
which it does not cost.
In paragraph 1.7.5, the FA is blamed, with the Government concluding that,
“given the inaction of the leagues and the FA, the preferred option is to establish a new statutory independent regulator rather than industry self regulation or a light touch intervention”.
That is somewhat at odds with what the Minister was saying, because she argued quite strongly that light-touch regulation was what was sought—but in the impact assessment it is made clear that the Government favours having an independent regulator rather than
“industry self regulation or a light touch intervention”.
If it is not to be light-touch intervention and it is to be heavy intervention, that will incur significant costs, and it is not clear at all what those costs will be.
This is important, because the Government are rejecting in this document light-touch intervention on the French model for comprehensive state-controlled regulation, which will cost all clubs substantial internal costs and legal costs, potentially with the cost of lawyers and outside advisers for sure, to comply with the tasks outlined in the Bill, since all clubs will need to be licensed and meet in detail all the requirements in this lengthy and comprehensive legislation. To believe that this can be done for £40 million a year under preferred option 4 over the coming 10 years is, to be quite honest, fanciful. It ignores the legal costs and the club operating and compliance costs for all 116 clubs, and it ignores potential litigation costs. It beggars belief to believe that the total central estimate for familiarisation to the clubs and leagues associated with option 4 is £800,000, or £7,000 a club on average. The compliance costs outlined in paragraph 211 are estimated at £100,000 per annum for Premier League clubs and £60,000 for all remaining clubs. I do not see for the life of me how that is possible.
However, at least the Government have added the rider that familiarisation compliance costs “may be underestimated” and that
“this is a novel and high profile area”.
It certainly is that. So, the Government suggest,
“clubs may pay more attention and buy in high-end specialist advice”.
But high-end specialist advice does not come for £7,000 a club per annum.
However, all this is predicated on the most important paragraph, paragraph 289, towards the conclusion of the impact assessment, which states:
“The Regulator will be legally prohibited from intervening in football (e.g. spend on players) or commercial (e.g. ticket price) activities, thus limiting the potential risk of deterring investment”.
We have spent dozens of hours looking into the fact that there will be detailed and intrusive activities by the regulator—understandably, to fulfil the legal requirements of this Bill. Far from not being interventionist in football, the regulator will in fact be legally required to intervene in the running of all aspects of the financing of football, including external factors such as season ticket prices and other ticket prices, in its overview of the finances of all clubs. There is nothing on the finances of the clubs in this legislation that is exempt from the consideration of the regulator, if he or she should wish to look at that in the context of fulfilling their functions under the legislation.
What it should say, as I say, is that the regulator is legally required to intervene in the running of all aspects of football—and, if that is the case, there is a whole different scenario for the costs involved for all clubs. I am not talking about just Premier League clubs or EFL clubs—I am talking about all clubs. That is why I would hope that there would be an opportunity to review the costs at six months—or it could be year—because this is the first time this has ever occurred in sport in this country. It is indeed the first time that it has ever occurred in football in the European Union, or indeed in any international body that I know of.
The statement that I have just made underpins the whole cost structure and sits uncomfortably with paragraph 298 of the impact assessment, which provides for the regulator to enter business premises in conjunction with an investigation or an actual or suspected breach of a club’s licence conditions in any form with its powers of search and seizure and the power to require specified persons to attend an interview. Given the likely cost of this intrusive legislation, I believe it is important to write into the Bill a review of the financial impact on regulated clubs of complying with its provisions, so that football fans can regularly review the true costs of government-led regulation. I beg to move.
That is a helpful clarification. The figure remains one that I do not recognise. I will go away and cross-reference with officials why I have now been told that it is not one that we recognise and is above the level we expect. I know I have committed to come back to noble Lords with a number of costs, and we can clarify that at the same point before Report.
I understand that Amendment 329 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, is a natural consequence of the noble Lord’s Amendment 19 in relation to the specified competitions, and it certainly would have made more sense to debate it then. Nevertheless, as we discussed at length previously, we understand the desire to have upfront clarity in the Bill as to which competitions will initially be in scope of the regulator’s regime.
However, as I explained during our previous debates on this issue, the Government believe the approach taken to defining the scope of the regime in the Bill is the right one. It delivers the effect intended, closing any loopholes that would allow avoidance of the regime, while also allowing for agility to respond to any potential changes in the structure of the football pyramid.
On the merits of Amendment 329, we completely agree that the Secretary of State’s power to define the competitions in scope and to amend this scope in the future should be subject to the affirmative parliamentary procedure. This will ensure that Parliament can scrutinise this important decision properly. That is why the Bill as currently drafted achieves this already in Clause 91(3)(a)(i). However, as we cannot accept the noble Lord’s Amendment 19, which was withdrawn, we cannot accept this consequential Amendment 329 either.
For the reasons I have set out, I hope the noble Lords will not press the amendments.
I am very grateful to noble Lords who have participated in this debate. I think it has been one of the best debates we have had in Committee. I particularly highlight the contribution made by the noble Lord, Lord Birt, which is very relevant to the amendment. There is a huge difference in costs between light-touch regulation that is effective and appropriate and what he has identified in the 125 pages of this overcomplex and bureaucratic legislation —let alone the secondary legislation that will flow from it. If it becomes overcomplex and bureaucratic, it becomes expensive.
To get that balance right, which was an important point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, we need regulation. But football is regulated. The FA is the core regulator of both professional and amateur football in England. It has been absolutely absent from this debate. It has said nothing, to the detriment of its reputation as the national governing body of football in England. It is very sad that it has had nothing to say and no opinion. It is there to protect the autonomy of football and really should have come to the table and provided us with its thoughts. Indeed, I know that some noble Lords have written to the FA to ask it for a briefing on the Bill, and the FA’s response has been that it does not have a view on the Bill. We have no briefing. That is exceptionally sad.
Does that not tell the Committee something about the lamentable quality of regulation that the FA currently provides?
Without a shadow of a doubt. My criticism is of the FA and its inability to be the core regulator for a professional sport. Indeed, in an earlier intervention this evening, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, alluded to the fact that we need this Bill because we need a regulator to oversee solutions that would occur. I would have intervened on him, if I had not been eagerly awaiting the ministerial response, to point out that the FA should have been first and foremost in that role. It is sad and regrettable that it has not been.
I will briefly touch on other points that have been made. Of course, for the senior clubs in the Premier League this will be a burden, but less of a burden proportionate to the clubs that the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, and I are worried about in terms of cost. UEFA compliance is onerous, for example, and much of the compliance that UEFA imposes on clubs will need to be replicated. Clubs will need to look at it carefully to see whether there is overlap. My principal concern has been one shared with the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, at an earlier stage in this Committee: how much is this going to cost?
The amendment purely looks to try to resolve that question. There is an argument that it would not need to come before Parliament but can simply be published by the regulator, drawing on information from clubs. Indeed, the regulator will have to do that, but given the huge scope in potential cost that ranges from light-touch regulation to invasive regulation, along with the length of the Bill and the associated costs, it is appropriate that Parliament reviews that. Whether that is after six months or longer—as the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, said—either way it is important. It is a one-off opportunity. After that, we will have the regulator reporting and the relevant reports coming towards Parliament.
The Minister, who has worked exceptionally hard and could not have been more helpful to Members of the Committee at all stages, said, having been handed a note from her Box—that has not been too frequent, which is to her credit as throughout this Committee she has relied very little on the Box for additional information—that the impact assessment has been based on similar regulators. There is no similar regulator in the world of sport, let alone the world of football. It is simply not possible to do that. The impact assessment is the reason I am so worried about the costs. It says:
“The proposed intervention is a bespoke, sophisticated and evidenced-based regulatory framework”.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will recognise that phrase. That is exactly the quality of advocacy I would expect from him on any occasion—bespoke, sophisticated and evidence-based—but I might suggest that it does not come particularly lightly on the purse.
As a result, the costs associated with having that regulatory regime might be very considerable, especially when the very same paragraph states that the regulator, in the view of the Government,
“will be legally prohibited from intervening in football … or commercial … activities, thus limiting the potential risk of deterring investment”.
That is exactly the opposite of what the Bill sets out to achieve. Therefore, if these figures are based on that statement, they are erroneous and illusionary. They are fanciful pipe dreams. We really need an opportunity, therefore, to review the costs of regulation for all clubs six months after the Bill has been enacted. It would be very helpful to Parliament to see what those costs are at that stage and to reflect on them. For the time being, at least, I beg leave to withdraw.
My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Markham, and express my concern about the non-appearance of this letter. We have been debating whether there is a letter or what the letter says. We have been speculating on what it might or might not say for several weeks and several sessions of this Committee.
I have carefully read the Written Answer that the noble Baroness gave my noble friend Lord Moynihan on 8 January. She does not, interestingly, pray in aid any Cabinet Office guidance or recommendations on the release of so-called private correspondence that forms a part of government policy formation. She just says that
“it would not be appropriate to publish private correspondence with any stakeholders in the Library of the House”.
If it were an individual divulging personal information in the course of their letter to a Minister or a government department, that would be a separate issue. Noble Lords will be aware that, for instance, freedom of information is quite circumscribed as to what can be released in terms of impinging on someone’s privacy, or if it would interfere with an ongoing judicial case. This is not the case. This is not a private letter; this is a letter from a corporate representative body. It may not be a government body or a non-departmental agency in the UK, but it is a representative body of some standing with a rulebook which governs the practice of football in our country.
On that basis, at the very least it is incumbent on the Government to produce that letter. If we have overegged the pudding and, in respect of the backstop, UEFA has no qualms or serious misgivings about this legislation as a whole, and particularly the backstop, I for one am happy to be disabused of my cynicism. In the meantime, we, the media, noble Lords and others in the other place when this goes there will be suspicious unless that letter is produced.
So I respectfully implore the Minister to think again and place that letter in the Library of both Houses so that we can inform a proper debate on specific issues that are germane to this Bill: in other words, the attitude of an important and prestigious organisation such as UEFA.
My Lords, an exceptionally important point was made about UEFA not being shy in coming forward. Indeed, we know that, as a result of UEFA representations, the Bill in its original form was changed. If it had such an influence, it is not unreasonable to ask to see a copy of the letter, which is clearly far beyond private correspondence. It is of public interest.
I return to the question that I put on 19 December, when I asked whether it was the Government’s intention
“to seek assurances from UEFA that the introduction of backstop powers to the proposed Football Regulator does not impact on the autonomy and independence of football’s governance as required by UEFA.”
The response was interesting:
“As set out during the House of Lords Committee Stage debate on 18 December, UEFA raised no concerns about the backstop in its most recent meetings with DCMS and the Minister for Sport”.
It does not refer to the letter. Therefore, can the Minister kindly confirm to the Committee this evening that there was no reference to the backstop in the UEFA correspondence? This was of such significance that, in its first introduction into the Committee proceedings, the Minister’s response to the Committee was that publishing the debate around the letter would worry the facts. That was the position. It was not the letter: it was the debate we were having around the letter.
I have just one very simple question, and then I will be much relieved if the answer is as I assume it will be, in the light of the answer given by the noble Baroness, Lady Twycross: that
“UEFA raised no concerns about the backstop in its most recent meetings with DCMS and the Minister of Sport.”
Can the Minister confirm that it did not raise the backstop in the correspondence it had with the DCMS, or raise any concerns referring to the backstop?
My Lords, I will start by responding to the amendments put down in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Markham, in this group, and I would like to thank him accordingly. We have not spent a great deal of time talking about some of the implications of the amendments, so I would just like to draw attention to those. The reason we will not be supporting Amendment 336 and the others in this group is that the changes put forward would severely hinder the setting up of the regulator and its ability to achieve its objectives as soon as possible after Royal Assent.
I emphasise again that my noble friend the Minister has stated that the Government have worked closely with and consulted with UEFA, FIFA and the FA throughout the development of this Bill and will continue to work with them as it progresses through Parliament, as indeed will the regulator once it is legally established, including through the FA’s observer role on the regulator’s board. This will ensure that no powers or potential actions taken by the regulator would be in breach of its own rules.
All I can say tonight is that we have debated this issue extensively on a number of occasions, and as my noble friend the Minister has set out previously, we are working with the relevant authorities to give noble Lords the reassurance they seek on the specific concerns regarding UEFA and FIFA statutes, ahead of Report. My response to the repeated requests about the letter has to be, again, that it is private correspondence and the Government do not share private correspondence with international organisations.
I shall certainly take away the noble Lord’s comments, and I repeat the response that I have had from the department in terms of the letter we have received.
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Blake. She knows that I admire her greatly, not least as a fellow Leeds supporter. The question is very simple. Would the Government be prepared to write to UEFA to ask its permission for the letter to be published?
I thank noble Lords for their contributions, and I thank the Minister. I think there was a shared view, bar the Minister, that there is an opportunity here to clear this up. It has been going on all the way through, and I must admit that, the more ducking and diving, obfuscation and avoidance there is, the more suspicious I become. We have a new reason today: for the first time, we are told that it is going to hamper the speed of setting up the regulator. The last time I looked, having a meeting with someone takes half a day or a day. It is going to cost a lot more to set it up. I am afraid that that just does not add up. Why do we not ask now? We do not need to wait until Royal Assent—why do we not show them what we are going to go through on Report? The Bill has not even gone through the Commons yet, so we could do this in parallel and it would not need to delay anything. I am sorry, but that does not really wash as a reason. That brings me back to the point that the only reason not to come clean about it all is that there is something they are trying to hide.
The other new reason is that the letter is private. The question rightly asked by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is whether we have asked UEFA whether it is private and whether it is willing to provide that letter. I feel sorry for the noble Baroness at this point, because maybe it was felt that this was one of the quieter parts of the Bill to take over from her fellow Minister. That was a bit of a hospital pass. But they do not even want to say whether they are willing to ask UEFA whether the letter is private. It is very clear: we can find out by asking whether UEFA does not want it to be published—that is a very quick question—or are the Government trying to stop it being published?
I just make the point that the only reason we are pushing this so strongly is that if the regulation set by UEFA for European league and other competitions is at odds with what we are considering in this Committee with regard to the regulation that we are looking to put on the statute book, we will have a very real problem. We have the potential for English clubs not being able to participate in European competitions. That is why this is so important.
Just to reply to that, let us be straight: is the noble Lord seriously alleging that the Government are holding back information that could exclude English football clubs from playing in Europe and the World Cup?