(4 days, 18 hours ago)
Lords ChamberAt end insert, “and do propose Amendment 2H as an amendment to Amendment 2F, and Amendment 2J as an amendment to Amendment 2G—
My Lords, before I speak to the Motion, I thank the Minister for reminding us of the anniversary of the tragic death of Stephen Lawrence. I join him in his tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, and join these Benches with his commitment to combating racism in all its forms.
While I welcome the fact that the Government have acknowledged the widespread concern over how these powers are enforced, I must express my profound disappointment that they have chosen again to strip out a robust amendment passed by this House only last Thursday that would have implemented a strict statutory ban on fining for profit. The Government’s replacement amendment under Motion A is simply too weak, offering only that the Secretary of State must issue guidance.
In recent days, the Minister—I thank him for his engagement—has sought to reassure me that this will be sufficient because the Home Office intends to draw directly on the recently published Defra statutory guidance on litter enforcement to update the anti-social behaviour guidance. Incorporating the language of the Defra guidance will not solve this problem. That Defra guidance states that
“private firms should not be able to receive greater revenue or profits just from increasing the volume of penalties”.
As Josie Appleton, the director of the Campaign for Freedom in Everyday Life—which has done so much to highlight the problems with the way in which fines are collected for PSPOs and CPNs—has rightly pointed out to me, relying on this guidance framework is fundamentally flawed. She has highlighted three crucial points that explain why primary legislation is vastly preferable. First, if the Government genuinely intend to do as they say and stop this cowboy practice, they should have absolutely nothing to fear from passing my amendment in primary legislation. Secondly, she rightly asks whether the Government are actually going to ban payment per fine and the use of tacit or explicit targets or whether they will simply fudge the issue with fine words about proportionality. The Defra guidance relies on the permissive word “should”, rather than a legally binding “must”, leaving the door wide open for these lucrative contracts to continue. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, what is the enforcement mechanism for this guidance? As Ms Appleton asks, would somebody be able to appeal an FPN—a fixed penalty notice—on the basis that it was issued under payment-per-fine arrangements? The answer is no. To mean something, the law needs to have teeth. Guidance is not strictly legally binding; local authorities and private agencies simply have a duty to have regard to it.
We cannot regulate a multi-million pound industry built on aggressive, incentivised ticketing by politely suggesting what it should do in non-binding guidance. The scale of this issue is immense. The surge in penalties is overwhelmingly driven by the 31 councils that employ private companies, which issued a staggering 75.7% of all PSPO penalties last year. With the Government pushing ahead to increase the maximum fine for these breaches by 400% from £100 to £500, this industry is about to be supercharged. We cannot allow a system that financially incentivises the punishment of our citizens to masquerade as justice. That is why I hope the House will fully support Motion A1 today.
Motion A1 puts the necessary teeth into the Government’s proposals. It would ensure that the guidance must explicitly set out how authorised persons
“can be disincentivised from issuing fixed penalty notices for the purpose of generating any direct or indirect financial benefit”.
Crucially, it would provide a real enforcement mechanism by stating in the Bill:
“Any person found to be in breach of this guidance … may have their designation revoked by the relevant local authority”.
If we are to rely on guidance-based frameworks, its prohibition on financial incentives must be explicit and there must be statutory consequences for breaching that. I urge the House to support Motion A1. I beg to move.
Again, if I answered that question, I would stray into the very issues that I do not wish to talk about, because they are issues which we have to keep under consideration. I will say to the noble and learned Baroness what I said in my opening remarks: we have sanctioned Iranian officials. We have put visa sanctions on Iranian officials. We have Iran under FIRS for registration of foreign interests. We have taken action, as is self-evident, in relation to the current crisis. I will not comment on those matters, not because I do not want to but because whatever I say on them gives an indication of what the Government might wish to do at any particular time on any particular topic, and it is not right that we give a running commentary.
I say to those noble Lords who have spoken in this debate that I welcome their support for the government amendments in lieu. I hope I have convinced the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on his amendments relating to fixed penalty notices—I suspect that I have not—and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will not push Motion D1, for the arguments that I have put.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and his colleagues on the Conservative Benches for their consistent and solid support on the issue of fining for profit. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for her consistent support throughout on the same issue. I add my thanks again to the Minister for his engagement: I do not think there has been a lack of engagement, but he is shuffling towards the finishing line; he could still do more, and more quickly, to address the concerns expressed in Motion A1. I urge him to take his department by the scruff of the neck and get this matter done with a bit more creative thinking—that is all it requires. For the reason I set out earlier, I wish to test the opinion at the House.
(1 week, 3 days ago)
Lords ChamberAt end insert “, and do propose Amendment 2D as an amendment to Amendment 2B, and Amendment 2E as an amendment to Amendment 2C—
My Lords, while I welcome that the Government have acknowledged the widespread concern over how these powers are being enforced, I must express my profound disappointment that they have chosen to strip out the robust amendment from the Bill which would have banned fining for profit in primary legislation. The Government should have retained that original amendment, which would have implemented a strict statutory ban preventing private companies from receiving financial benefits contingent on the number or value of the fixed penalty notices they issue. The Government have argued that a statutory ban risks weakening enforcement action and prefer to rely on statutory guidance to “ensure proportionality”.
We are not talking about legitimate enforcement; we are talking about a cowboy enforcement economy that preys on the public. Under the Bill, the maximum fine for breaching a public spaces protection order or a community protection order will rise by 400% from £100 to a staggering £500. Without a firm legal prohibition, that drastic increase will only supercharge an industry that profits from punishing our citizens for anodyne actions. As we know from the damning new report from the Campaign for Freedom in Everyday Life, the surge in penalties is driven overwhelmingly by councils that employ private companies, which issue a staggering 75.7% of all penalties, despite making up only 11.2% of the responding councils.
If your local authority employs a private contractor, companies that typically retain 80% to 90% of the fine income, you are 25 times more likely to be fined. Let us take the London Borough of Redbridge as a cautionary tale. In 2022, it issued just 163 penalties; in 2023, after hiring a private company, that number exploded to 3,550. When it stopped employing the company, the number of fines dropped to zero. What are these incentivised wardens fining the public for in these local authority areas? It is not for serious anti-social behaviour; they are issuing penalties for feeding the birds, for swimming, for lacking a dog poo bag and for simply standing in groups or loitering, Disgracefully, this system is also being used to target the most vulnerable, with multiple councils issuing fines for begging and rough sleeping.
By rejecting the original amendment, the Government are protecting a corrupt enforcement industry that uses financial incentives to issue unfair penalties. The Government’s replacement amendment under Motion A is simply too weak: it states only that the Secretary of State may include guidance about the issue of fixed penalty notices by authorised persons. The word “may” is not a guarantee, and general guidance about issuing notices will not stop the aggressive, profit-driven tactics that we are seeing on our streets. That is why we have tabled new amendments under Motion A1 today.
These vital new amendments demand two things. First, they change the permissive “may” to a mandatory “must”, ensuring that the Secretary of State is legally obligated to address this issue in guidance. Secondly, they ensure that this guidance cannot merely offer vague platitudes about proportionality but must explicitly tackle the practice of incentivising the giving out of fixed penalty notices. If the Government insist on regulating this through guidance rather than a direct statutory ban on profit sharing, that guidance must be mandatory, and its prohibition on financial incentives must be explicit. I urge the House to support Motion A1.
I am grateful for the contributions that have been made in response to this group of amendments, both those in lieu from the Government and the amendments tabled by Members here today. I stress that the Government agree with the sentiments behind the amendments in this group. On Amendments 2D and 2E, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, I assure the noble Lord that while the amendments say that the statutory guidance “may” include guidance about the issue of fixed penalty notices, it is our firm intention to issue such guidance. Indeed, I will be happy to share a copy of the guidance in draft form with the noble Lord at an appropriate time when it is ready.
The issue of fly-tipping has permeated through the discussions we have had in the last half an hour or so and I understand the strength of feeling on all sides of your Lordships’ House. That is why we have tabled the amendments in lieu to introduce penalty points for fly-tippers and I emphasise again to noble Lords that, in relation to Amendments 6 to 11, local authorities already have the power to seize vehicles used for fly-tipping, and courts can already impose cost orders on those convicted of fly-tipping. I should add, if I may, that Defra, with the support of the Home Office, is going to explore how the Environment Agency’s powers to address waste crime can be bolstered. We are going to consider how additional measures within the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, the Proceeds of Crime Act and other relevant legislation could achieve this. This work will ensure that the Environment Agency has much stronger powers and tools to bring criminals to justice, intervene earlier and disrupt criminal finances undermining the waste system.
Again, I am sympathetic to Amendment 12 in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, and I understand and welcome the comments from the noble Earl, Lord Russell, in relation to the Waste Crime Action Plan. We are looking at how we improve enforcement around fly-tipping. However, as I have mentioned and as I think the noble Viscount acknowledged, the amendment breached Commons financial privilege, and I thank him for accepting those arguments and not pursuing the amendments further.
I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for accepting Amendment 15A in lieu.
On Amendment 333, it is right that the Government fully consult on any changes to closure powers before making significant changes, and our amendment in lieu does that. Again, I thank the noble Viscount and the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, for their pressure in raising these issues, because it is important. I confirm what I have said to the noble Viscount already, which is that the issue is not how but when we strengthen those closure powers.
I hope I have been able to offer reassurances to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on his amendments and to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, on his. I suspect that I may not have done to the extent that they would wish, but I can only try. We have moved significantly on some of the areas in this group. I welcome the support for the changes that we have made, but I do hope that, in moving Motion A, noble Lords will listen to my wise counsel and not press their amendments.
My Lords, during the passage of this Bill, I have greatly admired the Minister’s geniality and stamina, but, sadly, this is not always matched by his delivery. I am afraid that the Government’s current approach really does not cut the mustard, and a number of mixed metaphors occur in the circumstances. The Minister said that they have a “firm intention”, but that is something of a pig in a poke and I will be asking the Government, as we proceed, to show rather more leg in this legislation, so with apologies for the metaphors, I would like to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, thanks should certainly be paid to the Minister for all her hard work in this area, but the House will also wish to thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Bertin and Lady Owen, for their hard work over many years, their persistence, their judgment and their success in a very difficult area of law and society. I suggest that although this House is very often criticised—sometimes with justification—the debates on this issue and the way we have moved the law forward with the very great assistance of the Government show this House working at its very best.
My Lords, both noble Baronesses have spoken extremely eloquently today. It has been a privilege, from these Benches, to be part of the cross-party coalition for both their campaigns. I pay tribute, as others have, to both of them for their persistence throughout the passage of the Bill.
In particular, these Benches have strongly supported the comprehensive framework introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen of Alderley Edge, who has tirelessly campaigned on non-consensual intimate images, and we welcome—this is a tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt—the Government’s concessions today under Motion G, in particular the move to place the 48-hour take-down requirement firmly into the Bill. We also welcome the Government’s decision in Motion J to include a statutory non-consensual intimate image register. As the South West Grid for Learning and the Revenge Porn Helpline rightly stated this week, embedding this register in law is a “transformative move” and a “hugely important step forward” in protecting victims at scale. Again, I congratulate the noble Baroness on securing this.
However, although we celebrate this progress, the Government’s amendments will continue to require scrutiny in two crucial areas. First, on the new statutory NCII register, the devil will be in the detail. As the SWGfL has highlighted, key questions remain around how this register will be operated in practice and, most importantly, enforced. Secondly, the Government’s amendments on image deletion orders under Motion H still fall somewhat short. During the debate in the other place on Tuesday, a Government Back-Bencher praised these amendments, believing that they would ensure that
“courts are properly mandated to destroy those intimate images”.—[Official Report, Commons, 14/4/26; col. 740.]
However, the Government’s amendment explicitly uses “may”, leaving deletion entirely at the judge’s discretion. Nevertheless, I believe that the noble Baroness has achieved a huge amount through this process. We on these Benches entirely understand why she may choose not to press Motion G1, and she should take the greatest possible pride in what has been achieved so far.
On the second half of this group, on the regulation of online pornography, I likewise pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, who has worked tirelessly to expose the appalling loopholes that currently allow commercial pornography platforms to operate with light-touch self-regulation. The Government’s amendments in lieu under Motions K and L may be said to fall short of the robust statutory safeguards that this House originally agreed on. On age and consent verification, the House voted to make it a requirement for platforms to verify the age and permission of everyone featured on their sites. The Government have taken this out, replacing an immediate duty with a
“duty to review and report”
to Parliament within 12 months, followed by unspecified regulating powers. I very much accept that the noble Baroness is somewhat wary, but I accept her view on the way forward.
Furthermore, the Government’s amendments dilute the ban on step-incest pornography. They have caveated the offence so that it applies only to depictions of step-incest where one of the persons is portrayed to be under the age of 18. This misses the point of establishing parity with the offline Sexual Offences Act, where sexual relations between stepparents and stepchildren are illegal regardless of age due to the inherent power imbalances.
The Government have also failed to match the ambition of Amendment 505, which brings us to Motion Y. In the other place on Tuesday, the Minister claimed that Amendment 505 was unnecessary. She argued that the Government’s new offence of “supplying” nudification tools, combined with future powers to regulate chatbots via Ofcom, is sufficient, but a promise to eventually introduce secondary legislation to tell search engines to reduce the visibility of these apps does nothing to stop individuals possessing, downloading and using these tools to abuse women right now.
Great weight is being placed on the “sprint” delivery plan within six months of Royal Assent to achieve greater parity between the regulation of online and offline pornography. We very much hope that this will bear fruit in due course. On the mimicking of children, as the noble Baroness has indicated, this has been quite a battle with government. She has settled on the criminalisation of the depiction of children under 16. I know that she would have preferred that it was 18, but the Government have claimed that widening it is operationally difficult and would put too much pressure on law enforcement. However, they have promised that they will commit, on the Floor of the House, to address this in the parity work via regulation but not the criminal law.
My Lords, we have heard harrowing evidence in this House on AI chatbots, including the tragic case of Sewell Setzer, a high-achieving child who was captured, coerced and encouraged to commit suicide by a companion chatbot. Today, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, gave another example. She has brought forward essential amendments to tackle this head-on by creating strict offences for supplying chatbots that produce harmful material, outlawing coercive design and holding senior tech executives personally liable. I pay tribute to her campaigning skills and absolute determination to hold these tech companies to account.
The Government’s response is entirely inadequate. They have replaced targeted primary legislation with a sweeping, open-ended Henry VIII power for the Secretary of State to amend the Online Safety Act via secondary legislation at a later date and a statutory duty to write a progress report by December 2026. The progress report will protect absolutely no one today.
Crucially, the Government’s approach focuses exclusively on illegal AI-generated content. It completely omits the harmful but technically non-illegal coercive designs that mimic human relationships and foster emotional dependency in children, and it abandons the principle of senior management liability. We need immediate ex ante risk assessments and clear statutory duties, not delayed reports and the convenience of executive powers. I urge the House to reject the Government’s Motion V and insist on the robust protections drafted by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, by supporting Motion V1.
My Lords, the Government are clearly very well meaning. They are very strong on discussion but weak on action. It is very sad that they should be so weak, and I strongly support the speeches that have been made so far.
(1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I really wish this Government would listen to common sense sometimes. Can the Minister please go back to No. 10 and explain that this is urgent?
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow noble Lords who have spoken in support of the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Owen of Alderley Edge. I rise to express our firm support on these Benches for Amendments 2 to 13, which the noble Baroness has brought forward and which I have signed, to the Government’s new clause. We also support the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin.
Like the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, we acknowledge that the Government have moved “substantially”, which I believe was the word used by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson. By tabling Amendment 1 they have accepted the principle of a 48-hour statutory take-down limit for non-consensual intimate images. I was also pleased to hear what the Minister said about ongoing hash-matching work.
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will be brief. I entirely support the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, on all her amendments. What I would say to the Government about their own amendment is that I have just had what I suppose is the privilege—although it sometimes seemed quite lengthy—of being a member of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, and I can tell noble Lords that the quality of much secondary legislation is lamentable, varying by department. A lack of preparation, of any Explanatory Memorandum explaining anything relevant, and of any impact assessment whatsoever, is extremely frequent. In the last year, we have had several secondary instruments relating directly to the Online Safety Act, none of which has been particularly impressive, and some of which have been debated on the Floor of this House—my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones will be well aware of that. We have expressed our displeasure at the way in which this has been brought forward and explained.
All of us on the Cross Benches remember the late, lamented Lord Igor Judge. What he would think about a Government of this political hue bringing forward Henry VIII powers, to the power of 10, I cannot even imagine. If he is up there, he will be smiling wryly but he will not be impressed.
My only other point is rather strange. His Majesty’s occasionally loyal Opposition were extremely good at bringing in a variety of legislation which had a lot of Henry VIII powers. They have suddenly had a conversion on the road to Damascus, for which we should all be grateful. However, we need to think very carefully before we give the Government Henry VIII powers in an area as sensitive as this, and that is doing much harm as we speak.
My Lords, I express from these Benches our very strong support for these comprehensive amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, which she has characteristically introduced so well and to which so many noble Lords have spoken so eloquently in support. I also want to express our concerns regarding the Government’s proposed alternative, Amendment 429B.
In this group, we confront digital harm that is not incidental but engineered by design. AI chatbots are no longer a futuristic curiosity but deeply embedded the lives of our children. They are designed not merely as tools but as confidantes, mentors, companions and, in some cases, explicit romantic partners. Their anthropomorphic features create dangerous emotional dependency. Without statutory safeguards, these bots can provide explicit information on how to self-harm. This is not a flaw but a design feature that drives engagement, and we cannot allow the generative power of AI to become a generator of despair.
We are not debating theoretical risks, as many noble Lords have said today. We are debating the forces that led to the tragic deaths of Sewell Setzer III, mentioned by a number of noble Lords, and Adam Raine, in the United States. Their families are pursuing legal action in the US on the basis that deceptively designed, inadequately safeguarded chatbots can be treated as defective products, and that developers should bear full legal liability when systems encourage, facilitate or fail to interrupt a user’s path to suicide.
I welcome the Government’s admission that a legal loophole exists in the UK. However, their proposed remedy, Amendment 429B, gives us a choice between the clarity of primary legislation through the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the convenience of the Executive. In contrast, the noble Baroness’s amendments provide clarity and embed safety duties in the Bill. Like my noble friend, I highlight Amendment 433, which deals with targeting the engineered features that keep children hooked. We know that bots guilt-trip users who try to end conversations. For a child, this is not a user interface quirk; it is emotional manipulation. These amendments would prohibit such coercive engagement techniques and, crucially, require bots to signpost users to help when asked about health, suicide or self-harm.
The primary legislation route offered by these amendments is the only fully viable and responsible path. If the noble Baroness wants to test the opinion of the House, we will support her in the Lobby. Should we be unable to secure her amendments, we would need to take a view on Amendment 429B. Four specific binding assurances would be required before we could consider supporting it; without them, it is nothing but a dangerous blank cheque. As changing these sections effectively rewrites the criminal threshold of the Online Safety Act, the Government must commit to the equivalent of the super-affirmative procedure for all significant policy choices, including amendments to core definitions or the expansion of duties beyond priority legal content. Standard procedures will not give this House the scrutiny needed.
Regarding mandatory supply chain transparency, we need a firm commitment that regulations will include a statutory mandate for providers to document and share their technical blueprints with Ofcom. Without this, the regulator cannot do its job. The Minister must confirm that the power will be used to tackle the issues raised by subsections (6) and (7) of Section 192 of the Online Safety Act, ensuring that chatbots cannot evade regulation simply because they lack a human mens rea. A bot does not intend harm, but it can be designed to cause it. The Minister must commit that any new regulations will explicitly disapply the requirement to prove human intent for AI-generated content. Regulations must define control across the entire AI supply chain so that accountability is not lost in a black box.
Finally, we would require a clear assurance that this power will not be used to alter the legal position of services that are not AI services. The scope of Amendment 429B must not drift beyond its stated purpose. If the Government are serious when they say that no platform gets a free pass, that must apply equally to generative AI models that, as we speak, are reshaping the childhoods of so many of our citizens. Safety by design must be the price of entry into the UK market, not an aspiration deferred to secondary legislation.
My Lords, both the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the Government are trying to solve the same problem, but with different solutions. I have to say that I find both solutions wanting. I feel that the position I see solidifying in the House is that we must accept either the Government’s amendment or the noble Baroness’s amendment, that something must be done and that this is binary, and I am not sure that I can accept that. I commend the aims of the noble Baroness’s campaign and I hope that we can find some common ground, but I have a number of questions about her amendments.
The approach that the noble Baroness has taken in her Amendments 422D and 433 is to create criminal offences for a person to create or even supply an AI chatbot that produces a selection of prohibited content. That would place criminal penalties on individuals who are involved in the creation of such a chatbot. The Online Safety Act applies civil penalties when companies violate the regulations: the companies are fined by Ofcom if they allow prohibited content to be published on their platform. These amendments would apply criminal sanctions punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment, but who is liable for these criminal penalties? Is it the software engineer who developed the chatbot? Is it the employee who presses the “publish” button that brings the AI online? Is it the senior management team who oversaw it, or the investors who commissioned it? Is it the CEO of the whole company? It is not clear to me, and it would be useful if the noble Baroness could clear that up.
The offence of supplying such a chatbot might also be problematic. If an AI chatbot app is listed on the App Store, and the AI could in some way be used by a person in the manner described, should Apple be criminally liable for that? Similarly, I have a few concerns about the risk assessment that the amendment would require AI providers to undertake. For example, proposed new subsection (5)(e) would require that a provider
“assesses the risks to equality of treatment of individuals”.
I question whether it is the Government’s role to mandate the target audience of a business product. It is worrying enough to believe that it is meritocratic to mandate quotas within organisations, but it is quite another stance to say that the very reason for a business’s existence, its output, should be directed by legislation.
As I have made clear, we do not oppose the noble Baroness’s objective of addressing the harms of AI with this amendment, but simply saying that there is a problem and that doing anything is better than doing nothing, irrespective of the problems with that something, is not a proper way to legislate. It is a recipe, I suggest, for bad law. However, I understand that the noble Baroness is trying to make the Government take action. It is up to the Government to come to Parliament with a sufficient solution. The Minister may try to say that the Government do have a sufficient solution in government Amendment 429B, but that would be wholly incorrect. I am quite shocked that the Minister has even considered bringing this amendment to the House, and I can only imagine what he might have said about it if he were standing where I am now.
Amendment 429B grants the Secretary of State sweeping Henry VIII powers to amend the entire Online Safety Act for the purpose of mitigating harms presented by AI-generated content. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, would be delighted to hear me say that this is an egregious attempt by an overreaching Government to exploit a serious issue to centralise power in the hands of the Secretary of State. It is almost unprecedented to grant a Minister the ability to amend an entire Act of Parliament. With this amendment, the Government are doing away with every bit of lip service they have paid to the importance of parliamentary scrutiny or their democratic mandate. The amendment would give not only this Government, who have made it clear that they are very happy running a centralised state with digital IDs, but every future Government the ability to amend online regulations and curtail the freedoms of providers. Indeed, a future Reform Government might go in the opposite direction and remove all regulations on AI. The noble Lord should reflect on that, too.
I ask the Minister to imagine that the glove was on the other hand: that he was standing at this Dispatch Box and I was the Minister proposing to give my Government these powers. There is no way that he would support such sweeping powers to amend an Act of Parliament by ministerial fiat. This is the Henry VIII power to end all Henry VIII powers. It cannot be allowed to make its way into the Bill and, when it is called, I will take pleasure in opposing it in the Lobbies.
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak to Amendments 404, 405, 431 and 432. In the light of the hour and the spirit of my conversations with the Minister, I will not go through my amendments in detail, nor the very long journey it has been to get here. In short, they concern earlier agreements that, in cases where a child has died, the coroner and the police should be equipped and informed to preserve data from online services.
I thank the Minister, and officials from both the Ministry of Justice and DSIT, for their engagement. Before I put on record some of my concerns, I acknowledge that, for the past few weeks at least, we have been trying to get to the same place on this. I am disappointed that we have not quite found a way to do so, and I hope that the Minister will find a way to reassure me and—possibly more importantly—the bereaved parents who have fought hard for these amendments.
Both my Amendment 404 and government Amendment 429A seek to make it automatic that, on being notified of the death of a child, a coroner issues a data preservation notice which means that a regulated service under the Online Safety Act would have to preserve the data of a child within five days. The Government have agreed to this in principle but wanted to exclude children who die in circumstances such as a road accident or in hospital as a result of illness, to which I have agreed. But, in their effort to exclude those children, they have, in proposed new subsection (1)(b) in their Amendment 429A, allowed the coroner to decide
“that no purpose would be served by OFCOM giving a notice”
under the Act
“because such information is of no relevance to a child’s death”.
That is too broad. Giving permission for a coroner to decide what constitutes “no purpose” is a bit like snakes and ladders: we are back to the problem that has plagued bereaved parents, where coroners underestimate the speed necessary to preserve data, or the scope and importance of information that might be preserved in this way. This is not a criticism of coroners. It is far beyond the experience of professionals, across all domains, to understand the range of online material available or its ethereal nature.
My second issue with the government amendment is that they have chosen to reduce the length of time that data is preserved—the preservation notice—from a year to six months. I discussed this with officials earlier today, and I understand that it is extendable, but both I and Ellen Roome, bereaved mother of Jools, feel that it is not long enough. Some 45% of inquests take longer than six months; 18% take more than a year. Reducing the time is deliberately creating a weakness in the system at a time when parents need support and must not be made anxious by watching the clock running down and worrying whether someone, somewhere in the system, will fail to extend the preservation order.
There is also an ongoing issue with conflicts between our laws and those in the US. I received a letter from Minister Narayan this week updating me about the conflict between Section 101 of the Online Safety Act and the US Stored Communications Act. The letter said:
“Interpretation of the SCA is not settled”,
there may be some variety between different US states, and
“discussions between DSIT, Ofcom and service providers are taking a place to find a path forward”.
This regime depends entirely on resolving this issue. We were promised from the Dispatch Box that this was a priority for DSIT nearly two years ago, when the previous Government were in power. It was not done then and it is still not resolved. The letter did not mention anything about discussions between Government Ministers and their counterparts in the US, upon which this finally depends. I hope that the Minister is not surprised at the level of frustration felt by bereaved parents at the lack of speed with which this issue has been pursued.
The Government have put out a press release and made assurances to bereaved parents, and now we are here at a time of night when no vote can reasonably take place. So I would like the Minister to offer to bring pack tighter wording at Third Reading. I believe it is necessary and what parents are expecting. Even if she is not able to make that commitment tonight, it is what should happen and I ask her to try to make it happen. It has been promised and I believe it must be delivered.
I do not intend to pursue my Amendment 405, but I simply ask the Minister to put on the record how the police will be better informed of this regime. I finish by paying tribute all the bereaved families who have campaigned for this change—Jools’ law—and the amendments that preceded it. We in this House are witness to your pain and your generosity in campaigning so that others do not suffer as you have.
I wish to remind the Government of what one father said the day before Committee: “I was happy with the meeting with Liz Kendall until I realised it was the exact same meeting I had with Peter Kyle the year before. Nothing had changed except the size of the room to accommodate the increased number of bereaved parents”. There is a crisis unfolding that the Government are not grasping. Sorting out this amendment is not enough, but it must be done. I beg to move.
My Lords, I rise to speak on this vital group of amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, concerning the investigation of child deaths, to which I have been very pleased to add my name. We all absolutely acknowledge that the noble Baroness has been tireless in her campaign and her support for the bereaved parents, and she is no less eloquent or persuasive even at this time of night.
The chink of light provided by the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, in Committee and the movement represented by government Amendments 429A and 454A are very welcome. However, on these Benches, like the noble Baroness we question whether they are as comprehensive as the solutions proposed in her amendments. The government amendments are substantive concessions regarding the principle of automatic data preservation, but they fall short of the immediate statutory certainty and the proactive coronial and police duties sought by the noble Baroness to ensure a comprehensive investigation into digital harms. So, while I welcome in principle the Government’s agreement to make DPNs automatic, their current drafting often leans on secondary legislation and future consultations. These amendments place the duty firmly in the Bill, providing the immediate legal certainty that bereaved families deserve in 2026.
Perhaps the most critical missing piece in the Government’s current approach is addressed by Amendment 404, which requires the police to investigate digital harm as a primary line of inquiry as a matter of routine. We cannot treat the digital environment as secondary to the physical. If a child is found harmed in a public park, the police do not wait for a consultation to decide whether to check the CCTV, yet when a child dies in circumstances which may involve social media, digital forensics are often treated as an afterthought or a secondary consideration. So the noble Baroness’s additional amendments should not be controversial. They should be accepted, fast-tracked and robustly enforced, and I urge the Minister to take them on board today.
My Lords, I too will speak very briefly, given the hour. I was also pleased to add my name to Amendment 431. For the benefit of Hansard, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, referred to Amendment 404—but I think she was talking about Amendment 431. Anyway, I am going to try to talk about Amendment 431. I agree with everything the noble Baroness said in her opening remarks.
I too will focus on subsection (4)(i) of the new clause proposed by the Government’s Amendment 429A, which reduces the time for which data would be preserved, from 12 to six months. I have been given to understand that part of the reason for that is because of the ECHR and the need to respect the privacy of those concerned, but it leaves bereaved parents in an unsatisfactory situation, and I wondered why the Government did it this way round and why there could not be a mechanism for automatically deleting any data the minute the inquest was completed and the data was no longer needed, rather than putting pressure on coroners to have to extend, and apply for an extension of, the notices. I would be grateful if the Minister could consider that.
My Lords, I will speak to this group of amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. With the finishing post in sight, I will be extremely brief.
These amendments correctly identify a crisis at the heart of our police service. There is a consensus that our police are currently drowning in a sea of unnecessary paperwork, and my noble friend Lady Doocey’s policy paper, Policing Fit for the Future, makes the case with devastating clarity. It records the testimony of chief constables, who warn that low morale and heavy workloads are being compounded by
“archaic IT systems—some over 50 years old”
that force highly trained officers to spend more time as data entry clerks than as crime fighters. The Government’s own White Paper, From Local to National: A New Model for Policing, acknowledges this failure. It rightly sets out a mission to “strip away the barriers” that prevent officers focusing on the public’s priorities. We on these Benches welcome the ambition to automate manual processes and deliver millions of hours back to the front line.
I am not going to go into detail on the amendments, but we cannot support them as drafted. They risk micromanaging the police through the statute book and could become relics of a different era within a few short years. However, I urge the Minister to take the spirit of these proposals to heart and ensure that they are reflected in the new national policing model.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for bringing forward this group of amendments. Together, they address a theme that will be familiar to many across the House: the need to ensure that police officers are able to focus their time on policing rather than bureaucracy.
Amendment 409D concerns the publication of enforcement data for a number of offences that have become a source of considerable public concern, including shoplifting, offences involving blades, phone theft and fare evasion. We lend our strong support to the amendment. Greater transparency around enforcement activity can only help to strengthen public confidence and provide a clearer picture of how policing resources are being deployed.
Amendment 409E addresses the volume of paperwork that officers are required to complete. In Committee, it was rightly observed that administrative burdens can too often draw officers away from the front line. A review of the scale of those requirements and how they might be simplified would therefore be a sensible and constructive step.
Finally, Amendment 409F raises the question of data sharing and the efficiency of the systems that underpin case preparation and charging decisions. As many noble Lords will know, delays and inefficiencies in the exchange of information between the police and the Crown Prosecution Service can slow down the progress of cases and place additional strain on already stretched resources.
There is a significant amount of work that goes into the redaction of police documents before they are sent to the CPS, often for the documents simply to be sent back because they are overredacted. Furthermore, many of the cases the police redact may not end up being prosecuted. It is clear that this is a significant waste of police time and money, and my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe is right: it would make more sense for the CPS to take charge of the redaction of documents that may enter the public domain, given that it would have a far smaller number of documents to trawl through.
Taken together, these amendments all speak to a wider objective: ensuring that the system surrounding policing work is as efficient as possible, allowing officers to focus on preventing crime, catching offenders and protecting the public. The police should be spending as much time on the front line as possible, rather than being encumbered by unnecessary paperwork. I hope that the Minister will give them careful consideration and, as always, I look forward to his response.
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, and the noble Lord, Lord Banner. I thank the Minister and his officials for all they have done on this clause. Might the Minister look at this again before Third Reading or at some other point to see whether it is possible to do what we have requested? I am grateful for all the meetings and the help we have had from everybody; let us hope that we can do something.
My Lords, we support in principle Amendments 387C and 387D, the first of which was moved by the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Banner.
These amendments address a moral and legal imperative, ensuring that assets confiscated from those who violate our laws, particularly our sanctions regime, are used to provide redress to the victims of those very same violations. My own amendment in Committee focused on a ministerial power to create a fund via regulations but Amendments 387C and 387D would place this power where I believe it properly belongs: with the judiciary. By amending the Sentencing Act 2020 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, these amendments would grant the Crown Court the discretion to award compensation for public interest or social purposes. This would ensure that, when a court deprives a defendant of the benefits of their crime, it can simultaneously direct those funds towards the restoration of the communities or individuals harmed.
As the organisation Redress has highlighted with great clarity, the UK is currently an outlier. Both the United States and the European Union have already established mechanisms to repurpose seized assets. In 2023, the US successfully transferred over $4 million seized from a Russian oligarch to support war veterans in Ukraine. Here in the UK, we have frozen assets on an unprecedented scale following the invasion of Ukraine, yet we operate in a regulatory lacuna where we can freeze and eventually confiscate but we cannot compensate effectively. Without these amendments, we are, in effect, telling the victims of state-sponsored aggression and human rights abuses that, although we will punish the perpetrator, we will do nothing for the survivor.
This is not about the convenience of the state; it is about clarity of justice. We must move away from a system that treats the proceeds of sanctions violations as a windfall for the Treasury and instead treat them as a resource for reparations. I urge the Minister to recognise that there is cross-party unanimity on this issue. Sympathy at the Dispatch Box in Committee was a start, but sympathy does not stop crime—and it certainly does not provide reparations.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, first, I thank my noble friend Lord Banner for tabling these amendments, which, as we have heard, raise questions around how the proceeds of crime may be used to benefit victims. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, for stepping into the breach today to speak to these amendments in my noble friend’s absence.
My noble friend Lord Banner has tenaciously pursued this matter for many months. The intention behind his amendments is clear: to ensure that, where criminal assets are confiscated, the courts have flexibility to direct those funds towards compensation for victims or towards wider public interest purposes linked to the harm caused. In Committee, I spoke sympathetically on these amendments. I shall not seek to repeat the points I made then but other noble Lords explored how these proposals would interact with the existing confiscation and forfeiture regimes under the Sentencing Act 2020 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. Those are complex frameworks, and any changes to them must be carefully considered, but these amendments make an important point about ensuring that justice is not only punitive but restorative. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Lords Chamber
Lord Pannick (CB)
This is another context where there has to be a fair balance between competing interests. One can easily see that the use of live facial recognition is a vital policing tool. However, as has been explained, it has an adverse impact on privacy. What concerns me is that the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act require not merely that steps taken are necessary and proportionate, which the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, rightly referred to, but it is a requirement that any restrictions or provisions in such a context must be prescribed by law.
I am very concerned that having police authorities and police officers exercising a pure discretion, without any statutory guidance or code of practice, may well fail that legal test of prescribed by law, because of the uncertainty and the excess of discretion. Therefore, the Government would be well advised in this sensitive context to ensure that there is statutory guidance and a statutory code of practice. The Minister may be unable to accept this amendment, but I hope he will be able to tell the House that steps will be taken to provide clear guidance to police authorities as to the use of this technology.
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 374, which I have signed, but also to Amendment 430, which I tabled.
The use of live facial recognition in our public spaces is an extraordinary expansion of state power that currently exists in a legal vacuum. We are not Luddites on these Benches; we recognise the utility of technology, but we must ensure that live facial recognition is a targeted tool used under the rule of law and not a blanket surveillance net that chills the right to move freely and anonymously in our streets. The use of live facial recognition technology in public spaces poses a profound challenge to our civil liberties that cannot be met purely by internal police guidance. We are witnessing a fundamental shift in the nature of British policing—a shift, if you like, from the line-fishing of traditional human observation to the deep ocean trawling of automated mass surveillance.
Amendments 374 and 430 collectively seek to provide the democratic and judicial safeguards currently missing from what the experts have called a regulatory lacuna or legislative void. Amendment 374 prohibits the use of LFR during public assemblies or processions, unless a specific code of practice has been approved by both Houses of Parliament, as my noble friends have explained. In a free society, individuals should not have to pay the price of handing over their sensitive biometric data just to engage in democratic protest. We must safeguard public privacy and civil liberties by requiring democratic oversight before this technology is deployed against those exercising their right to assembly. We cannot have policing by algorithm without democratic oversight.
The current lack of oversight creates a documented chilling effect. Research by the Ada Lovelace Institute indicates that nearly one-third of the public are uncomfortable with police use of LFR, and up to 38% of young Londoners, for instance, have stated they would stay away from protests or public events if they knew that this technology was being used. We cannot allow our public squares to become spaces where citizens are treated as walking barcodes or a nation of suspects.
Critically, Amendment 430 would establish that the use of LFR in public spaces must be limited to narrowly defined serious cases and require judicial approval. It would provide the fundamental safeguards our society requires. It would prohibit the use of LFR by any authority unless it was for the investigation of serious crimes and had received prior judicial authorisation specifying the scope and duration of its use. We must ensure that this technology is used as a targeted tool, not a blanket surveillance net.
(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 366 also stands in the name of my noble friend Lady Doocey. I have been a persistent—or is it insistent?—advocate for a specific offence of digital identity theft for many years. There is currently no criminal offence of identity theft in England and Wales—none. A fraudster can harvest your biometric data, clone your digital identity and impersonate you across multiple platforms, and at the moment of those acts they have committed no specific crime. The law does not intervene until after the damage is done.
Lord Katz (Lab)
While I understand the point the noble Baroness is making, I do not want to presage the content of the fraud strategy, which will be upon us really quite soon, or indeed what is in the legislation that will introduce national digital ID. I absolutely take the point that some people want to encourage digital ID because it gives security of identity in a digital form for deployment in a number of different areas, whether claiming a benefit, voting or whatever use it may offer—I will stop there because my expertise on digital ID does not extend much further. All I will say is that, given the comments I have already made about the Fisher review and the forthcoming fraud strategy, which will address emerging fraud risks, including identity theft, I hope that the noble Lord is content to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, and very much appreciate what she had to say. In particular, I thought the phrase “precious digital identity” was extremely important, as well as her reference to deepfakes. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for his support. As he rightly identified, I said 59% and he rounded it up to 60%. That is the figure for the percentage of identity fraud in our landscape.
The noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, said that the Government need to answer what they are planning to do. The Minister threw the kitchen sink at that question but did not really answer it. We have police training in AI and digital, but I am not sure what I am expected to understand when he starts off by saying there is perfectly adequate criminal law on this, but then tells me that they will look very carefully at this as part of the Fisher review. Which one is the answer that I should take from the Minister—that he is taking it seriously or that he is not?
We seem to keep getting the same answer. The Minister starts off by saying that there is enough criminal law to cover this—completely contradictory to the Fraud Act Select Committee—and on the other hand he says that the review will consider this very carefully. That is a series of mixed messages, quite apart from the fact that the police will prioritise their response to digital crime. How will they prioritise their response to digital crime without the tools they need—i.e. a proper criminal offence of digital identity theft?
There is some confusion on the part of the Government. I still think they have not taken this seriously, and our citizens will suffer as a result, particularly in the age of AI, which both the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies, were clear about.
If I wanted to talk to the Chief Whip or the government roster at this time of night, or if we were in prime time, I might push it to a vote. But I will not; I will withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, Amendment 367 is also in the name of my noble friend Lady Doocey, and there is rather better news on this amendment as a result of conversations with the Minister. I warmly welcome the significant movement the Government have made in this area. This is reflected both in the recent policy paper on introducing statutory defences into the Computer Misuse Act, which they have shared with me, and in the constructive meeting I recently held with the noble Lord, Lord Katz, for which I thank him.
The principle we have long championed, that a cyber security researcher’s intent and motivation should be a relevant factor in law, has finally been acknowledged. As the industry has told us for decades, the 1990 Act is a relic of a different era. It was drafted when only 0.5% of people used the internet. It is now being asked to govern a world of generative AI and industrialised cyber warfare. Its current blanket prohibition on unauthorised access makes no distinction between a malicious hacker and a white-hat security researcher. Under current law, our cyber defenders are forced to operate with one hand tied behind their backs, fearing prosecution for the very activities that keep our national infrastructure resilient. This is not just a legal anomaly; it is a direct threat to UK resilience.
However, while the policy paper is a major step forward, we must ensure that it results in robust statutory protection, not just a vague promise of prosecutorial discretion. Reliance on the good faith of prosecutors is not a long-term solution for an industry that requires absolute legal certainty. Our amendment would provide that framework—a defence where actions were necessary for the detection or prevention of crime or justified in the public interest.
I ask the Minister to address some of the following critical concerns arising from the Government’s own policy paper. Because of the time of night, I am going to abbreviate it to give him the headings and write to him subsequently. First, the accreditation bottleneck is a national security risk. The whole question of having to have chartered-level UK Cyber Security Council accreditation will create a bottleneck. The definition of “suitably qualified” suggests that only those with membership of professional bodies such as the UK Cyber Security Council will be valid, but will it recognise in due course that those with established industry experience, who may not hold formal academic credentials, will also qualify? The “no supervision” rule is operationally unworkable, and the scope of non-intrusive activity seems somewhat random.
The vulnerability duty creates a legal trap. The paper requires a researcher who discovers a vulnerability to make all reasonable efforts to report it to the system owner as soon as practicable, but the paper itself acknowledges the difficulty of identifying system owners.
The bug bounty market is under threat. The paper prohibits permitted persons from requesting or demanding payment for reporting a discovered vulnerability. The global bug bounty market, where organisations invite researchers to find and responsibly disclose flaws in exchange for payments, is worth hundreds of millions of pounds and is a cornerstone of modern cyber defence. The paper’s drafting risks chilling this entire ecosystem.
Then we have statutory versus non-statutory protections. The paper acknowledges that reliance on the good faith of prosecutors is not a solution. Can the Minister commit to placing these defences in the Bill during this Session? If not, what vehicle do the Government envisage? Could the upcoming Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill accommodate this reform? We need a clear answer on the legislative timetable.
The paper does not seem to cover the public sector—the National Cyber Security Centre itself—yet the proposed defence appears directed entirely at privately accredited individuals. That is a question that needs answering.
We cannot allow technological development to race ahead of democratic deliberation. Our cyber security professionals need the clarity of the law to protect the UK in 2026 and beyond. I very much hope that this is a moment of genuine policy momentum, so let us produce legislation that is workable, inclusive and legally certain. I am very hopeful that the Minister will continue the dialogue over this policy paper. I beg to move.
I thank the Minister for his response, and the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, and noble Lord, Lord Fuller, for their contributions. As the Minister says, this defence is at the behest of the cyber security industry. That is a very important point. This is not just a group of hackers who have decided that they need to cover their tracks; this has long been demanded by the cyber security industry. I very much hope that when the industry sees the policy paper produced by the Government, it will see that the movement towards a defence is constructive and particular and does not have the kind of loopholes that it fears.
I thank the Minister for his reassurances about future legislation. I am obviously in very good company with my noble friend in providing temptation for the Minister about the King’s Speech. We look forward to the future legislative opportunities that the Minister has described. In the meantime, I withdraw my amendment.
I rise briefly to support this amendment. This country has been good at reducing fires. It has done it by designing things and places not to burn. We have never had the same determination about designing things not to be stolen. This is all about preventing crime by design. The secondary feature is that people do not tend to steal things that have no value. There are a lot of negatives, but fundamentally, if it has value, people will steal it. They do not steal it to deprive you of it but to sell it, often to fund their drug habit. This amendment is all about taking the value out of the stolen phone.
There is some success at the moment, in that some of these phones cannot be reactivated on UK systems, but as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, they are getting activated abroad. It is hard to stop them going abroad; very small portable devices put in containers are hard to discover. Although it was mentioned that the Met and others are having good success with drones and chasing, I guarantee that one day somebody will get badly hurt—either one of the people being chased or one of the cops. Chasing is, inevitably, dangerous. This is about stopping the chase and stopping the crime.
The 70,000 crimes mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, will be a bare minimum. Many people do not bother reporting them. There is no need to report them for many people. Sometimes they lose them in embarrassing situations, and they certainly do not report it then. We are talking about a large amount of crime that can have something done to prevent it.
My final points are these. There is no incentive at the moment for the phone companies to stop this crime, because when you lose your phone or have it stolen, you buy another one from them. The £50 million-worth of phones that the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, mentioned means £50 million more for the providers of the phones. So why would they stop it? All they have is more business coming through the door. The business model is not helpful to preventing crime.
It is a common-sense measure. It is well thought out. The amendment looks like it will work, given its extent and comprehensiveness, and nobody has a better idea; or, if they have, I have not heard it. This does not cost the Government anything. It will possibly cost the manufacturers, but it will be marginal to the costs and profits they have already. It is a really good idea. It helps the police a bit, but it mainly helps the victims as it reduces their number. It means that you can walk down the street, come out of the Tube, take your phone out and not have somebody whip it out of your hand.
My final point is that it is not just about theft. Often people are injured when their phone is taken—it is violence as well as theft. Particularly with vulnerable victims, nobody knows where it will end. It can end up with a murder or a very serious crime. If we can do something about this, it will have an impact. It is achievable, and I recommend that the Government, if they do not accept the amendment, try to find a way to do it in the future.
My Lords, I rise to support Amendment 368 from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, on which he has campaigned so strongly. It addresses a crime that has become a blight on our streets: the industrialised theft of mobile devices. We must remove the profit motive from street crime. If a phone is useless the moment it is stolen, the thefts will stop. California proved it and the technology exists; the only thing missing is the will to legislate. I urge the Minister to move beyond collaboration and accept the amendment.
(2 months ago)
Lords Chamber
Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak to the amendment tabled in my name. As noble Lords know, I am terrible with the billion rules that we have in this place, so bear with me. This amendment would make a small change that would make a big difference to many residents around the country.
I shall try not to rehearse the arguments that I have made before, but we now need to reflect the reality of the housing situation in this country. With the Government’s mission to build 1.5 million homes, this reality will only become bigger—that many of our housing providers in the social sector are for-profit companies. It is a matter of fairness to make sure that the vulnerable residents that they are responsible for have the same access to the law that any resident would have, regardless of the legal structure of their landlord. To make that happen, I have proposed small changes to remove the particular words “non-profit private”. That would make a massive difference to these companies’ ability to keep people safe.
The law is at its best when it is clear and coherent. Good law should be comprehensive and unambiguous. If Parliament intends these powers to apply to housing providers, as I say, it should apply to all of them. This amendment would not alter the policy intent of the Bill but strengthen it, reinforcing the simple principle that tenants’ safety and accountability must be the same, regardless of where you live in the country. I recommend the amendment to the Government and ask for this tiny change to make sure that we can deliver safety for all our residents countrywide.
My Lords, I shall speak to the amendments in my noble friend Lady Doocey’s name and mine, which seek to ensure that the Government’s new anti-social behaviour powers are grounded in evidence, proportionality and democratic accountability, as well as to other amendments in this group.
On these Benches, we do not dismiss the misery that persistent anti-social behaviour causes, but we remain deeply unconvinced that layering yet another complex civil order on to an already confused ASB framework is the right approach. As Justice has highlighted, respect orders risk duplicating existing powers, come with limited evidence of effectiveness and lack basic procedural safeguards. They rely on a weak civil standard of proof, yet they impose severe restrictions and carry a potential two-year prison sentence upon breach.
First, in Committee, we warned that the threshold of “just and convenient” is far too low for an order that can deprive a person of their liberty and exclude them from their home. I very much welcome what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, had to say in his observations on the European Convention on Human Rights. The Minister in Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, defended that language as “familiar” to the civil courts. However, he offered a chink of light, agreeing to examine the arguments for the wording in Amendment 1, “necessary and proportionate”, to ensure strict alignment with the Human Rights Act. I very much hope that his reflections have led him to accept this higher and safer threshold today, ensuring that these orders are not used merely for administrative expediency. We need an answer to the pilot or not-pilot question raised by my noble friend.
Secondly, I return to the issue of democratic accountability. Our Amendment 2 requires that the terms of respect orders and PSPOs must be subject to a full council vote. In his follow-up letter to me, following Committee, the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, rejected this, claiming that it would introduce delays and unnecessary bureaucracy. But democratic scrutiny of civil liberties is not an administrative delay; it is a constitutional necessity. The Government’s resistance to this directly contradicts the Local Government Association’s own statutory guidance, which recommends as best practice that final approval of a PSPO be undertaken at cabinet or full council level, to ensure openness and accountability.
Currently, research by the Campaign for Freedom in Everyday Life, formerly the Manifesto Club, shows that nearly half of all PSPOs are signed off by a single, often unelected, council officer, without any democratic vote. This lack of scrutiny has led to absurd and stigmatising orders banning innocuous activities. If full council approval is already recommended as best practice by the LGA, standardising it in legislation would not be an arduous delay; it would simply force all councils to meet the standard of transparency that the Government’s own guidance expects.
As regards Amendment 3, as I highlighted in Committee and in correspondence with the Minister, there is currently no formal means to directly appeal a PSPO FPN. Citizens feel pressured into paying unjust fines to avoid financial ruin. The Government’s move to increase the maximum fixed penalty notice for PSPO and CPN breaches to £500 is highly dangerous without statutory safeguards. In Committee, the Minister suggested that, if individuals feel a fine is unreasonable, they can simply make representations to the issuing agency. This is totally inadequate; there should be a formal right of appeal.
I turn to Amendment 7 in my name, which concerns fixed penalty notices for public space protection orders and community protection notices. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for her support in this respect and for her very extensive unpicking of these ASB powers. Under Clause 4, the Government are pushing ahead with a 400% increase to the maximum FPN for these breaches, raising it from £100 to a punitive £500. Without statutory safeguards, this will simply supercharge a system that is already widely abused. This new clause addresses the deeply concerning practice of fining for profit. It stipulates that neither an authorised person nor their employer may retain any financial benefit from the fixed penalty notices that they issue.
The Campaign for Freedom in Everyday Life’s Corruption of Punishment report exposes the grim reality of the modern enforcement market. Environmental and ASB enforcement is increasingly seen as a business. Local authorities are entering into contracts with private companies, boasting of “zero financial risk” while sharing the “surplus revenue” generated by fines. Guidance and formal representations are entirely inadequate when faced with the modern enforcement market. As the Campaign for Everyday Freedom’s research also highlights, 66 councils currently employ private companies to issue FPNs, and the standard model is that these companies retain a percentage of the income, often up to 100% until costs are recovered. This creates a direct perverse financial incentive to issue as many tickets as possible for innocuous actions.
As I have pointed out to the Minister, Defra has already issued strict guidance stating that private firms enforcing littering should not receive greater revenue from increasing the volume of penalties. It is entirely illogical not to apply the same statutory prohibition to anti-social behaviour enforcement. We must ban fining for profit in the Bill. It is a time to a put a statutory end to the revenue collection system masquerading as justice.
Finally, in Amendment 12, we have proposed an annual report on the use of these ASB powers, for all the reasons I have stated that were so well expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. I entirely understand that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, is trying to achieve something very similar in her amendment. We are all aiming for much greater transparency in the use of these ASB powers, and I very much hope that the Government will go for at least one of the proposals.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, it will come as no surprise to the Minister that these Benches maintain our opposition to the Government’s respect orders. We have heard, in Committee and today, many concerns about the new regime. Our concerns are slightly different from some of those expressed by other noble Lords, in that we oppose them because we view them as simply unnecessary.
In Committee, my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower asked the Minister what the true difference would be between respect orders and the current anti-social behaviour injunctions. The response confirmed that, in the Government’s view, the only difference is that breaching a respect order will be a criminal offence, whereas breaching an injunction is not a specified criminal offence. That may seem tougher on the surface, but, in reality, it will not make any difference. A person who breaches an ASB injunction can be prosecuted for contempt of court, as they have defied an order of the court; in addition, the power of arrest can be attached to the injunction under Section 4 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. Where that is the case, a police officer may arrest a person without warrant for breaching the terms of their injunction under Section 9(1) of that Act. Furthermore, an arrest warrant may be made by the court if the person who applied for the injunction believes the person has breached that injunction.
For all those reasons, therefore, a number of avenues exist for enforcement of these injunctions. But, even if the Government believe that creating a specific criminal offence is necessary, why not simply amend the ASB injunction regime to create that offence? Why introduce an entirely new regime? Having said all that, we are where we are. In Committee, the Minister responded to my noble friend’s criticism by stating that it was a manifesto commitment. I do accept this, and that is why I suspect they will pass today unhindered.
I turn briefly to some of the other amendments in this group. I have a rather specific concern about the requirement in Amendment 2, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that a respect order may be applied for only if the local authority has agreed to do so at a meeting of the full council. Subsection (8A) in his amendment states:
“A relevant authority may not make an application for a respect order … unless the relevant local authority has complied with the requirements … in subsection (8B).
However, the definition of relevant authority in new Section B1 includes
“the chief officer of police for a police area … the chief constable of the British Transport Police”,
and a number of other authorities, such as Transport for London. What this means is that, should the police wish to apply for a respect order, they must first seek the approval of the local council. I do wonder whether this might create an overly burdensome and time-consuming requirement.
Amendment 7 from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, is, however, something I do have sympathy for. In 2024, a record 14.4 million parking fines were issued, representing a 13% increase from the previous year. There are widespread concerns about unclear parking signage, faulty machines and companies using quotas to increase the number of fines they collect. Parking firms and, indeed, councils using fines based on spurious violations simply to make money is surely not right. Where a person has violated the rules, of course the use of penalty charge notices is justified, but we should not allow them to unfairly issue fines to those who do not deserve it.
Finally, and having been somewhat critical of respect orders, I say to the Minister that I welcome his Amendment 4. As much as I may think that respect orders are unnecessary, if we are to have them, it is welcome that the Secretary of State will be required to consult on the guidance they issue.
As ever, I am genuinely sorry that I have not been able to persuade the noble and right reverend Lord of the Government’s case. We have taken the view that “just and convenient” mirrors the civil injunction regime of the 2014 Act, passed by a Conservative and Liberal Democrat Government. They are not words from a Labour Minister but from an Act passed in 2014 that we are mirroring in the Government’s manifesto commitment to introduce respect orders. I am sorry that I cannot convince the noble and right reverend Lord of that, and that I have not persuaded him accordingly. We may—although I do not know—very shortly have an opportunity to see whether anybody else is persuaded.
I am afraid that I remain unpersuaded. The Minister keeps mentioning the manifesto commitment, but the manifesto makes no mention of the liability threshold for a respect order, so it is surely perfectly legitimate to question the basis on which the respect order the Government are introducing is based.
The basis on which the respect order is introduced, and the phraseology used, is the phraseology his and His Majesty’s Opposition’s Government put in place for previous orders. I am not changing the wording of anything that, presumably, at some point in 2014 he and other Liberal Democrat Peers walked through a Lobby to vote for.
The noble Lord has got me there. Let me rephrase my challenge. The noble Lord did not support it, but the coalition Government he supported passed the 2014 Act. I like to be accurate in my barbs at noble Lords, and I hope that accuracy persuades him that, even if he did not vote for it, some of his noble friends in the coalition Government of the time did—a coalition that our side of the House did not look too favourably upon. I accept his personal position, but if there is division of opinion in this House and we test it, I shall move Amendment 4. I hope that other noble Lords will not press their amendments, but if I have not convinced them, they will put them to the test in the House.
My Lords, as a final throw, I wonder whether the Minister remembers how the Labour Benches voted in respect of those orders at the time.
My Lords, I am afraid that it is no cigar again for the Minister on this amendment. On his promise of consultation on statutory guidance and so on on the question of fining for profit, I really do not think that is going to cut the mustard. On these Benches, we want to put a marker down that fining for profit, using contractors to enforce these powers, must end. We want to test the opinion of the House, so I beg to move.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 27 in my name and in the name of my noble friend, Lord Davies of Gower, would increase the maximum sentence for the new offence of possession of an offensive weapon with intent to use it to commit unlawful violence from four to 10 years. The Bill rightly introduces this new offence to bridge a gap in existing law. At present, the maximum custodial sentence for offences such as carrying a bladed article or offensive weapon in public is up to four years on indictment, whether or not the person has intent. The new offence, as currently drafted, reflects a more serious scenario: possession with the intention to cause harm. However, this new offence carries the same maximum penalty as the existing offence, meaning that the additional element of meaning to commit damage or harm is not reflected in the prescribed punishment.
In Committee, many noble Lords highlighted this very real concern. I observed that the offence as drafted differentiates between simple possession and intentional violence. I posed a simple question to the Government: why is the maximum sentence the same for both? If the law is to distinguish between those who might cause harm and those who intend to do so, that distinction should be mirrored in sentencing as a matter of logic. Similarly, my noble friend Lord Blencathra emphasised that possession of an offensive weapon with intent to use it to commit violence or to cause fear is a profoundly serious act. He noted that:
“Such intent demonstrates a premeditated willingness to inflict harm, intimidate or destroy property”.—[Official Report, 17/11/25; col. 655.]
When these concerns were raised in Committee, the Government expressed opposition on the grounds of proportionality in raising the maximum sentence. The Minister said that four years aligns with maximum penalties for existing weapons-related offences, and that the offence sits logically between simple possession and actual use or threat. Yet this rationale effectively treats two objectively different states of mind and conduct as of equivalent seriousness in law: possessing without harmful intent, and possessing with the intent to unleash unlawful violence.
This amendment does not advocate arbitrary maximums or mandatory sentences. In fact, we have met the Minister half way in a spirit of compromise and lowered our original proposed threshold of 14 years to 10 years. I also respectfully remind your Lordships’ House that we are advocating a 10-year ceiling, not a default outcome; it is a maximum sentence only. Sentencing of course remains a matter of discretion for a court in an individual specific case. A higher maximum sentence would not mandate a longer sentence in every case. Amendment 27 would simply give the courts the discretion to impose sentences that more appropriately reflect the gravity of offences involving violent intent. This would enhance judges’ ability to differentiate between levels of culpability and send a clearer signal that society treats premeditated threats of violence more seriously than mere unlawful possession. If the Minister will not accept this amendment, I am minded to divide the House. I beg to move.
I rise to express the support of these Benches for Amendment 27, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, which seeks to increase the maximum sentence for the new offence of possessing a weapon with intent. We entirely support the creation of this new offence, which rightly bridges the gap between the simple possession of a knife in public and actually using it to threaten or harm someone. Creating a separate category for those who carry weapons with violent intent is the right approach, to target the most dangerous individuals in our society. However, as my noble friend Lady Doocey made clear in Committee, if we are to treat carrying an offensive weapon with violent intent as a distinctly more serious crime than simple possession, that distinction must logically be reflected in the punishment.
As the Bill is drafted, the new law carries the exact same maximum four-year sentence as the blanket offence of carrying a bladed article. This fails to give the courts the means to sufficiently differentiate between those who might pose a threat and those who actively intend to inflict damage or harm. As the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, stated, this is not merely a theoretical sentencing debate. We agree with the stark assessment made by Jonathan Hall KC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, in his review following the horrific Southport attack. He made it clear that four years in prison is simply insufficient when there is clear evidence of an intention to cause mass fatalities. He recommended substantially tougher maximum penalties for possessing a weapon with intent to use unlawful violence, using the Southport attack as a case study. In his March 2025 independent review on the classification of extreme violence used in the Southport attack, Mr Hall argues that where someone arms themselves with a weapon intending serious violence, this is properly comparable to terrorism-style preparatory conduct, and that the maximum sentence should be very significantly higher than existing norms for simple possession offences.
In short, post Southport, Mr Hall has been arguing that possession with intent to use a weapon in serious violence should carry far higher maximum penalties than the traditional four-year ceiling, and that a new preparation for mass killing offence, up to life, is needed to close the pre-attack gap. By raising the maximum penalty to 14 years, this amendment would provide a ceiling, not a mandatory minimum—and we would, of course, expect the Sentencing Council to issue clear guidance around how to categorise levels of seriousness, to guard against general sentence inflation. Nevertheless, the court must have the full weight of the law behind it in those, hopefully rare, cases where a lengthy sentence is deemed absolutely necessary for public protection. We cannot treat violent premeditated intent as a mere secondary factor. The punishment must be reflective of the severity of the crime, so we welcome this amendment to give the judiciary the vital tool that they need.
I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, for tabling the amendment, and to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, for moving it. I do believe that sentences should be proportionate to the offence. That is why the maximum sentence for the new offence of possession of a bladed article or offensive weapon with intent to use unlawful violence has been set at four years’ imprisonment. That, I have to say to the House, is in line with penalties for other weapons offences.
Such offences currently carry a maximum penalty of four years, including other more serious offences, such as threatening with an offensive weapon and repeat possession of offensive weapons. It is also worth noting that even though the maximum penalty is four years, the courts—judges in court after trial—are currently not giving sentences anywhere close to the upper range on the sentencing scale, which seems to indicate that judges view the maximum penalty of four years as adequate. A maximum penalty of 10 years for the possession with intent offence would therefore, in my view, be out of line with other possession offences and potentially disproportionate, given where we are.
This is not meant to be a tennis-ball political point, but I say to the noble Lord that the new offence was included in the previous Conservative Administration’s Criminal Justice Bill, and the then Policing Minister, who is now the shadow Home Secretary, spoke eloquently in Committee on that Bill in support of the four-year maximum penalty. So there has been a change; that might be legitimate and right, but the Member for Croydon South, Chris Philp, spoke in favour of the four-year penalty that the Government are seeking only a couple of years ago. That is an interesting fact, but not one that I am intending to use aggressively; I simply want to put it on the record.
The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation has given a recommendation, which the Government have accepted, in his review into the Southport attacks: that the penalty for new possession offences at Clause 27 be kept at four years if the Government consider introducing a new offence of planning a mass-casualty attack. Let me reassure noble Lords that we are considering how best to close the gap identified. However, I do not believe that there is a case for increasing the maximum penalty for the offence in Clause 27 as proposed by the amendment.
I hope the noble Lord will agree with what the Conservative shadow Home Secretary said when he was the Policing Minister and will withdraw the amendment.
(2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the amendments in this group in my name are substantially the same as those that I tabled in Committee. As the House may recall, I withdrew those amendments following concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, but today I am reintroducing them for the House’s consideration. The amendments relate to the provisions in Clauses 31 to 35, which introduce stricter two-step age verification checks for the sale and delivery of knives and crossbows bought online.
For the House’s convenience I will recap: Clauses 31 and 32, on knives, and Clauses 33 and 34, on crossbows, will require at the point of sale, or point of sale or hire, for crossbows, specific checks to include photographic identity plus a current photograph; and, at the point of delivery, photographic identity checks; and they will create a new offence of delivering a package containing a knife or crossbow to someone other than the buyer—if the buyer is an individual, as opposed to, for example, a company—so that knives and crossbows cannot be left on doorsteps or with neighbours.
These amendments clarify that the passport or driving licence required as proof of age for a remote sale of a knife, or for a remote sale or hire of a crossbow, must be a physical version. We are also again adding provisions that will allow the Secretary of State to make regulations, subject to—I hope this helps the House—the affirmative procedure, prescribing an alternative process for age verification, such as digital ID. These amendments are required to ensure that a digital ID can be used as evidence of identity wherever the physical ID is accepted.
In Committee the noble Lord, Lord Davies, raised concerns that the use of digital ID would be mandatory. However, I assure him that this is not a blanket requirement mandating the use of digital ID to purchase knives or crossbows; it is simply making provision for alternative forms of ID, digital or otherwise, to be used. This is to ensure that the legislation keeps pace with future potential developments in digital ID. I know that the Benches opposite have concerns about the Government’s plans for digital ID, but we have been clear that under those plans it will not be mandatory to have a digital ID. I hope that that helps the noble Lord. These provisions are about giving people a choice in how they verify their identity. It will continue to be possible for the purchaser to present a physical passport or driving licence, where they have one, as an alternative to a specified digital ID.
Furthermore, with the permission and support of the authorities in Scotland and Northern Ireland, these amendments also extend these clauses to Scotland and Northern Ireland.
We are amending the legislation to ensure that all contractors in the delivery chain are responsible for age and ID verification on delivery of bladed products and crossbows to residential premises. This is to account for situations where the delivery company engaged by the seller to deliver the bladed product sub-contracts the delivery to other companies. We believe that it is essential that all companies in the chain are responsible for ensuring that age and identity are verified before the package is handed over to the buyer; otherwise, regulations made under the Bill would be meaningless.
I hope that, having reflected on the debate in Committee, and given the changes and the clarification I have given, the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will be content with these government amendments. There are other amendments in the group. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will, if he so wishes, move Amendment 177. I will respond to the noble Lord once I have heard his speech. For the moment, I beg to move.
My Lords, I am not sure whether I am in order. I am looking at the noble Lord, Lord Katz, who is nodding, which is good news. I thank him; it is much appreciated. There is nothing worse than writing a speech and being unable to deliver it.
I welcome the government amendments in this group, brought forward by the Minister, concerning the remote sale and delivery of knives and bladed articles. As I noted in Committee, we on these Benches fully support the intent behind the Government’s measures in this area. We must strengthen accountability for businesses and sellers in tackling online knife sales. We welcome the robust two-step age-verification checks being implemented. It is entirely right that we ensure a consistent UK-wide approach by extending these provisions, including those relating to crossbows, to Scotland and Northern Ireland. It is vital that the law across the home nations is exactly on the same footing, so that criminals cannot exploit cross-border differences to acquire lethal weapons.
I also welcome the amendments that clarify the rules around identity documents. The requirement for a physical identity document to be shown upon the delivery of a bladed product provides a necessary safeguard. Furthermore, we acknowledge the provisions allowing the Secretary of State to prescribe alternative age-verification steps such as digital ID.
As I made clear to the Minister previously, there is no Bench more strongly against compulsory digital ID than the Liberal Democrats’, so we remain highly supportive of the assurance that analogue physical forms of identity will continue to be accepted alongside any new digital alternatives. Embedded among these amendments, however, is our Amendment 177, referred to by the Minister, on the remote sale of knives. This amendment requires that regulations mandate the reporting of bulk knife sales to the police
“in real time, or as soon as is reasonably practicable”.
In Committee, the Minister stated that he was sympathetic to the overall aim of this amendment but argued that the current duty in Clause 36 was sufficient and that exact timeframes would be handled later in regulations, following consultation. Sympathy does not intervene in a crime. We have seen cases where young people effectively act as arms traders, buying huge numbers of illegal weapons online for community distribution. If the police are to effectively track and intercept these bulk purchases, they need that intelligence immediately, not days or weeks later when the weapons are already on the streets. Amendment 177 would ensure that operational effectiveness is guaranteed in the Bill, turning bureaucratic compliance into actionable, life-saving intelligence.
My Lords, in Committee, I asked the Government to withdraw their amendments that permitted them to require by regulations the use of digital ID for age verification for the online sale of knives and crossbows. My concern was that permitting this would be the first legislative step towards mandating digital IDs. Since then, of course, the Government have conceded that digital IDs will not be made mandatory and, while I still harbour some reservations, I am now content for the amendments to be made to the Bill.
My Lords, I rise very briefly to thank the Ministers on the other side of the House. I am very grateful that they have accepted what I think was an entirely common-sense case, which the Government had already accepted in a report that was previously published. I would just say that, in what I think is now my 29th year in Parliament in one House or the other, the number of occasions when Governments and Ministers accept entirely common-sense arguments from the other side of the House and respond is so small that I cannot think of many others, so I really am grateful. It will help the police and reduce the bureaucratic burden on them. It will reduce costs for a lot of people and does not pose any harm whatever, so thank you.
My Lords, I warmly welcome the Government’s amendments in this group, which deliver on the commitments made by the Minister during our debate in Committee. As I noted at the time, townies such as myself were being educated during the passage of the Bill on what these items were. However, the logic of this measure was immediately clear when the noble Lord, Lord Brady of Altrincham, introduced his amendments, and we were very pleased to support them when he first championed the cause. We are delighted that the Government have accepted his amendments.
My Lords, I too thank the Minister for bringing forward these amendments. These measures were rightly pressed for in Committee by my noble friend Lord Brady of Altrincham, so I am glad the Government have taken his points on board and are now implementing them. These amendments will remove an administrative burden currently placed on the police—something we all support—and will pose no threat to the public. They are wholly reasonable, and we support them.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, it is very rare to have both unanimity and common sense break out across the Chamber. I thank all noble Lords for their comments, including those among townies—I associate myself with the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, as a fellow townie. It was an education and I have learned an awful lot. I thank everyone for their support.
I would say to the noble Lord before he sits down that unanimity and common sense do not always go together.
Lord Katz (Lab)
That is the point that I was struggling to make, which is put more eloquently by the noble Lord.