Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting)

Katie Lam Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Jo White (Bassetlaw) (Lab)]

Q From the moment the Rwanda deal was signed until the moment it was scrapped, 84,000 people arrived here on boats. How can you define that as a deterrent?

Alp Mehmet: Tony, you start, and then I will catch up with the question, because I did not quite hear.

Tony Smith: We may well say the same thing. The question was about the fact that the Rwanda plan did not deter anybody because we still had 84,000 people arrive. I think the reason for that was that it was never, in fact, implemented. The intelligence coming across from Calais was that the smugglers and migrants never believed that it was going to happen. Once it became clearer that the Safety of Rwanda Act had passed, and that it might well become a reality, there was intelligence to suggest that some people were thinking twice about getting into dinghies, and there was some displacement into Ireland as a result. Of course, we will never know now, because we never actually implemented it.

We had a change of Government, and the new Government made it very clear that they were going to abolish the Rwanda plan, so we are where we are, but I would have liked an opportunity to see what would happen if we had started at least some removals. We had flights ready to go. I would have liked to see the impact that starting some removals would have had on the incoming population. We will never know now, I am afraid. Clearly, we hardly removed anybody to Rwanda in the end—I accept that—but I would have liked us to at least try, to see if it had an impact.

Alp Mehmet: It was never going to be the solution. It was not going to be the way to stop those people jumping into boats and coming across, but it was going to help. There needed to be other changes. I appreciate that we are not going to resile from the European convention on human rights any time soon, but while it is there, it is very difficult to be certain that people will be dissuaded. Some will be, some would have been, and we know that some were already being deterred. It was a pity, I am afraid, that the Rwanda deal went.

[Katie Lam (Weald of Kent) (Con)]

Q We have heard today about clauses 13(3) and 14(4) exempting NGOs from criminal charges for helping asylum seekers to cross the channel. What do you think of those?

Karl Williams: If we are talking about what deterrence we might need or what pull factors there are, having charities that in some circumstances are facilitating people crossing the channel is clearly an extra pull factor—probably a small one in the grand scheme of things, but it is there. I am thinking about organisations such as Care4Calais, which provide, for example, phone-charging services to migrants who are waiting in the sand dunes and the camps around the beaches where the crossings are made. They can recharge their phones; they are therefore in contact with the smuggling gangs. I think that there is a hole in the system that needs to be closed, and I do not think that this Bill does it.

Tony Smith: There are charities and charities. Some charities are not in any way involved in facilitation; it is a pure “care in the community” exercise or function in Calais. But I think other charities are a little bit more mischievous: they might be helping people with what to say when you are near the border, how to present your asylum claim, and how to get to a beach that might not be patrolled. I would like to see more work done on that.

[Becky Gittins (Clwyd East) (Lab)]

Q Thank you to the panel for your spirited contributions so far. We know that the processing of asylum claims ground to a halt under the previous Government, which was due in part to the Rwanda scheme and to the Illegal Migration Act 2023—that being the route through which, other than the four who went to Rwanda, people were either granted asylum or returned to the country from which they came. We also know about the impact on our communities of the asylum system grinding to a halt; about the massive influx of people being placed, for indefinite periods, in asylum hotels; and about the impact that that had on our local authorities and their ability to provide services to the rest of our communities.

Given that the Bill clearly provides a deterrent to smugglers, to the people-smuggling business and to the criminal gangs in the channel by disrupting their activity, and by making it a greater expense, why do you still think it is a mistake—I think two or three of you said it outright, but you all seem broadly supportive of the Rwanda scheme—to be repealing those Acts with the Bill?

Tony Smith: There is the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, and there is the Illegal Migration Act 2023. I said earlier that I was not a great fan of the IMA, for the very reasons that you have stated: it brought in the ban too early, and people were being banned from re-entering this country before we had even removed them. That was impacting on port cases. It was a hugely difficult time, because that law put all of the eggs in the Rwanda basket. As you say, that left increasing numbers of boat people being served with a notice that they were going to Rwanda, when they were never going to go to Rwanda; they were going into the system that you described. I do not think that that was a very good idea. If we had put the IMA to one side, with the duty to remove, we could have stuck with NABA.

Then we had SORA, the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act, which would have turbocharged NABA. It would have given you a triage option: either to accept people into the asylum system quickly and process them, as you are doing now, or—for others, where you wanted to make a point that it is not okay to come across in a small boat and get to stay in the UK—to send some of them to Rwanda. That is what we could have done under NABA and SORA, and my view is that the IMA disrupted that.

Karl Williams: I suppose the asylum backlog of inadmissible people is a function of the disjunction whereby different parts of the legislation are being implemented at different speeds. Obviously the intention at the beginning was that we would have the flights going off in January or February 2023. When the ECHR injunction stopped the first flight, that derailed it. You could conceivably have had a situation in which a combination of some offshoring and the deterrent effect of that meant that the backlog of inadmissible cases did not grow. The fact that Rwanda was stalled in the courts for a couple of years, and then just did not happen at all, meant that that amount was inevitably going to increase. That was then locked in.

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[Jo White]

Q Just over a week ago, the Government announced that there will be no automatic right to British citizenship for a person who comes here illegally by boat or lorry. Do you think that will act as a deterrent to people coming here?

Professor Brian Bell: It is probably not a very strong deterrent. To repeat myself, all the evidence is that when asylum claimants think of where to claim asylum they do not have detailed knowledge of the ins and outs of the procedures of different countries. They almost certainly do not know what might happen in five to 10 years, which is the length of residence that they would need to apply for citizenship, so I am not sure it will be a significant deterrent. However, it is important to recognise that citizenship is not a right; it should be viewed as a privilege that people earn. It is reasonable for the Government to take the view that citizenship should not be given to certain people. I do not think there is anything wrong with that—it seems a legitimate observation.

[Katie Lam]

Q Perhaps on a related note, you have talked about incentives and mentioned a couple of reasons why people do not come over from France. What is your sense of why people do? Can those incentives be disrupted?

Professor Brian Bell: You would not want to disrupt some of the incentives. For example, the unemployment rate is 7.8% in France and 4.4% in the UK. The gap is slightly larger for young people than for the population as a whole. I am sure the Government would not want to change that incentive, although the French probably would. If you have a buoyant economy relative to your neighbour, at least in the labour market, that is an incentive. There is an incentive in terms of things that you would not necessarily want to change. The English language is really important as a pull factor, and the fact that there are diasporas already in the country.

There tends to be some evidence that the UK has been somewhat more successful than France at integrating immigrants into society, particularly second-generation immigrants: there is some evidence that whereas employment rates are always very poor for first-generation immigrants relative to natives, that gap narrows quite a bit in the UK when you look at second-generation immigrants. That is less true in France, so people may think the opportunities are better here.

The area where the Government could take action—and they are with the Employment Rights Bill—is that we have lots of employment rights in this country, but do not bother enforcing any of them, because we do not spend money on HMRC minimum wage enforcement teams and the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority does not have enough money to employ people to do all the work it needs to do. If the Fair Work Agency can take over and actually be beefed up, then we can enforce labour standards a bit more and that may discourage people, because one of the attractions of coming to the UK is that our looser enforcement of rules in labour market makes it easier to employ people who are here irregularly.

[Katie Lam]

Q So make it harder to work illegally or outside the rules?

Professor Brian Bell: Yes.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting)

Katie Lam Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 4th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Katie Lam (Weald of Kent) (Con)]

We on the Opposition Benches struggle to understand why the law must set out that the Border Security Commander must be a civil servant. The Minister said that amendment 10 implies the commander should not be a civil servant, but all it seeks to do is remove the requirement that they should be. If the Home Secretary and, presumably, the Home Office permanent secretary believe that the role is best filled by a civil servant, perhaps for the reasons of co-ordination that the Minister set out, so be it—they can still be appointed as a civil servant—but the legislation will mandate that they have to be, and we struggle to understand why that requirement is necessary.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I made it clear in my response to the hon. Member for Stockton West that the recruitment could be done externally. Were somebody to be appointed who was not a civil servant when they applied, they would then come into the Home Office on civil service terms, bringing with them whatever experience they had and that the recruitment process had determined would be suitable for the role. I am not sure there is much between us, unless the hon. Lady is implying that, by the act of becoming a civil servant, the commander would somehow be less effective. I do not believe that is the case, especially as the idea is to ensure that the Border Security Commander can convene the entire system across Government Departments. Having a base in the Home Office, albeit designated as a civil servant, will make that more effective rather than less effective. To be clear, if the legislation gets on the statute book, any future office holder would not have to come from the civil service. I hope that reassures the hon. Lady.

[Katie Lam]

I thank the Minister for that response, which is reassuring, but it does not quite address the concern. These issues are very difficult, and I presume the Minister accepts that it is possible that it might be better, either in due course or in relatively short order, for the commander to be operationally independent. If that is the Home Secretary’s judgment as time goes on, the Government will have to come back to Parliament to change the law. Would it not be better for them to give themselves the flexibility?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The hon. Lady implies that total independence from the machinery of government would somehow assist in the job that we wish the Border Security Commander to do. I do not agree with her in that analysis. The job of the Border Security Commander is to convene and cohere and to strategically focus, across Government Departments, with a focus on checking that our border security is as effective as it can be. I do not think that total independence is going to add to effectiveness in that context. In fact, we believe that having the commander operating out of the Home Office at a director general level, but appointed by the Prime Minister with a special place in primary legislation, is a more effective way to ensure that the commander’s basic role has the biggest-percentage likelihood of being effective.

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[Dame Angela Eagle]

I do not want to read out the job description, which was put out there ahead of Martin Hewitt being appointed last year. It is there for all to see, it is a public document. The role is very much about being able to operationally cohere the system and to make certain by the operation of the Border Security Commander’s board, upon which sit many of the other parts of Government that need to have regard to the strategy, that we decide how to take forward and deal with threats to our border security. It is not really rocket science, and I do not think that there would be much to be gained from putting the details of all of that into primary legislation.

It is important that as the threats to our border security evolve, which they certainly will do over time, that we do not find ourselves with a very rigid set of requirements in primary legislation, which is hard to change. The idea is to have convening powers to give flexibility to the commander to ensure that he can bring together all of the forces across Government that are charged with security in this area and ensure that the focus on organised immigration, crime and border security is always at the forefront of the work that they do.

[Katie Lam]

I am a little confused by some of the contributions from Labour Members. They seem to be advocating for the commander to be a civil servant, and that is fine, but that is not actually what we are discussing. The question here is whether there could be any benefit in having some flexibility for the Home Secretary to do something different, and we do not feel that that point has been answered.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Could the hon. Lady go into more detail about what she means with respect to that? I have given her an assurance that the Border Security Commander could come from outside of the civil service and be appointed from outside of the civil service, but would then take up a civil service role of convening within Government and with the support of Government. That means that we do not have to set up an entirely new independent structure and fund it separately, which would be more likely to disintegrate rather than integrate the strategic approach to this multifaceted problem. I am beginning to wonder what the hon Lady has got against civil servants?

[Katie Lam]

Nothing whatever. There are lots of parts of the Home Office where the principle is accepted, that sometimes, particularly for difficult things and things that the Department has struggled to achieve, independence can be valuable. It sounds like the Minister is saying that she does not feel that that is the case. We must accept that, but we do not have to agree with it.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is true that independence has a very valuable part to play, particularly in holding Government structures to account. For example, the independent inspectors of our detention or prison estates who are allowed to go in and publish without fear or favour regarding what they find there. That is obviously a very important role where independence matters. But in this context, the Border Security Commander is cohering the effect and the work across Government that is trying to keep our borders properly protected. That is operational. It ties into the diplomatic and political as well, although obviously Ministers have an important part to play in that too.

The hon. Lady has nothing to worry about when it comes to the Border Security Commander sitting in a civil service context given that nothing in this Bill means that anyone who was not a civil servant when they applied to the post of Border Security Commander would be excluded from consideration. Being in the civil service to begin with is not a requirement.

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[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is quite revealing that the hon. Gentleman seems to think that the natural order of things is for Ministers to be at loggerheads with civil servants and the people who are operationally charged with delivering on objectives. That may say more about Opposition Members than about the way we are seeking to achieve operational effectiveness and objectives in what we are doing.

Finally, new clause 21 focuses on the Border Security Commander’s functions in relation to tackling small boat crossings to the UK. This is an all-encompassing new clause, which goes far beyond the commander’s functions as set out in the Bill. The new clause seems to want the commander to be all things to all people.

The immediate priority is organised immigration crime-enabled small boat crossings. The Border Security Commander will, and necessarily must, evolve over time to provide the systems leadership across all threats as they emerge. Such crossings did not really emerge until 2018, but they have become embedded and more of a threat over time. Had we been discussing something like this in 2017, small boat crossings would not have featured at all. It is therefore important that our legislation allows the Border Security Commander to change approach or focus as new threats emerge. Threats evolve and change over time. Our approach accounts for that by stipulating in legislation that the Border Security Commander has particular objectives that might be important now but less important in the future. The new clause seems to me to present an overly difficult and inflexible way of moving forward.

[Katie Lam]

Presumably, it would always remain an objective to bring an end to illegal migration, as far as is practical?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Yes.

I was going to talk about what new clause 21 suggests we should do. For example, the subsection on asylum processing seems to say that the Border Security Commander should somehow take over the duty to ensure that those who arrive illegally are processed within six months—something that the Conservatives did not achieve at all during their time in Government. I am not certain why the Border Security Commander should be empowered to take over the entirety of the asylum system.

Next, the new clause states that the commander should also be in charge of immigration enforcement, and that they should do removals as well as asylum processing and defending the border. The authors of the new clause seem to think that the Border Security Commander should be not only independent, but virtually all-seeing, all-singing and all-dancing, and that they should do absolutely everything with which the entire immigration and asylum system is currently charged. That is overreach, to say the least.

The new clause also suggests that the commander should remove people to a safe third place within six months for processing. In all their years in office, the Conservatives never managed to achieve any of those things. To put them into a new clause for a Government that has been in office for seven months—a Government who were left with the most appalling mess, with an asylum system that had crashed and had massive backlogs, and with a structure in the Illegal Migration Act that made it illegal for us to process any new arrivals who claimed asylum after March 2023—and to complain that we have not sent small boat arrivals home fast enough takes the biscuit.

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[Dame Angela Eagle]

Not for the first time today, I agree with my hon. Friend. When the time comes, we will be voting against this new clause.

[Katie Lam]

The Minister perhaps slightly mischaracterises new clause 21. It states that the Border Security Commander should “have regard to”, not manage, the wider aims of the Home Office in securing the border. Why would the Minister not want the Border Security Commander to have regard to that?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

New clause 21(1)(c) talks about:

“making arrangements with a safe third country for the removal of a person who enters the United Kingdom without leave, or with leave that was obtained by deception”

and new clause 21(1)(b) mentions:

“ensuring that a decision is taken on a claim by a person under subsection (1)(a) within six months of the person’s arrival in the United Kingdom”.

If that is not asking the Border Security Commander to take over the workings of the asylum system, I am not sure I understand what the new clause is trying to do.

[Katie Lam]

The new clause clearly does not do that. The two points that the Minister just mentioned are part of a broader sentence that states that the Border Security Commander

“must have regard to the objectives”

in subsection (1). The new clause does not state that the Border Security Commander should do those things themselves.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

But how on earth could asking the Border Security Commander to have regard to those things lead him or her to deal with border security? The new clause would take away the focus in the current Home Office arrangements on immigration enforcement and the asylum system. The new clause says that the Border Security Commander must have regard to all the processes in areas of the Department they have nothing to do with. It would upend working relationships. It would make it impossible and incoherent to deliver any kind of—

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fourth sitting)

Katie Lam Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 4th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mike Tapp]

His speech—my apologies; I will not make that mistake again. It is really important that we look at what is covered in the Bill, and how it enables our Border Security Command, the National Crime Agency, the police, the border forces and the security services to act. We said before the election, in our manifesto, that we were going to take this on in a counter-terror style, so that we can get to those who are looking to launch the boats before they launch them. These clauses go some way to achieving that; I will not quote the NCA director general again, but he was very enthusiastic about that. The further clauses include acts taking place abroad and not just in the United Kingdom.

On the specific amendments, we must be clear. We do not know who is a genuine asylum seeker at the point that they seek to cross; we will not know for some time. The elephant in the room is that, even if they are genuine asylum seekers, they are in France. They are not in danger, as they would be in Sudan, and putting others at risk by preparing these crossings, facilitating them or being involved is not acceptable. Asylum seekers are not above the law, and these clauses ensure that they will be held to account.

[Katie Lam (Weald of Kent) (Con)]

As hon. Members will have read, clause 13 creates a new offence of

“Supplying articles for use in immigration crime”.

The offence has two limbs. First, that the person supplies or offers to supply those articles to another person, and secondly that, when they do so, they know or suspect that the item will be used in connection with any offence under sections 24 or 25 of the Immigration Act 1971—illegal entry and assisting unlawful immigration, respectively. I have a question for the Minister on the reasonable excuse elements of the clause. It is a defence for a person charged with this offence to show that they had a reasonable excuse. Subsection (3) defines a reasonable excuse as explicitly including that,

“(a) their action was for the purposes of carrying out a rescue of a person from danger or serious harm”,

which seems reasonable, or,

“(b) they were acting on behalf of an organisation which—

(i) aims to assist asylum-seekers, and

(ii) does not charge for its services.”

That second defence seems to the Opposition to create a large loophole in the law. Does the Minister accept that these defences will have the effect of exempting non-governmental organisations from criminal charges for helping asylum seekers to cross the channel? Why would the Government seek to do that?

The defence categorises organisations that aim to assist asylum seekers into those that do not charge for their services and those that do. Surely this criminal offence is a criminal offence regardless of who is responsible; why would it be any less criminal if someone does it voluntarily? Why is making money from something the determinant of whether it is a crime? As we heard in evidence, charities can be “mischievous”—I think that was the word used—in their activities and in how close they come to facilitating illegal crossings to the UK. Does the Minister accept that the activities of some charities can veer close to the line of facilitating illegal entry? If so, what do the Government intend to do about it?

The threshold for the defence is low. The accused simply needs to provide sufficient evidence to raise an issue, and the contrary must not be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Might that be why the Home Office impact assessment considers that between four and six prison places—I believe the central estimate is five—will be required per year once this steady state is reached? The Home Office has lauded the new powers and offences in the Bill as being key to smashing the criminal smuggling gangs, but it does not appear to consider that many people will be convicted under the new offences. How can both those things be the case?

Clause 14 creates the new criminal offence of handling articles for use in immigration crime. The person has to receive or arrange to receive a relevant article, remove or dispose of an article for the benefit of another person, or assist another person to remove or dispose of a relevant article. Again, the clause provides the same defence to the offence as clause 13 does—namely, that the action of the accused was

“for the purposes of carrying out a rescue of a person from danger or serious harm”,

or that they were acting

“on behalf of an organisation which—

(i) aims to assist asylum-seekers, and

(ii) does not charge for its services.”

I therefore have the same questions for the Minister about this defence as I did for the defence in clause 13.

Clause 15 provides a definition of “relevant article” for the purposes of the new offences in clauses 13 and 14. There are exemptions for food and drink, medicines, clothing, bedding, tents or other temporary shelters, and anything to preserve the life of a person in distress at sea or to enable such a person to signal for help. Will the Minister set out the kinds of articles that she therefore expects to be captured by the offences in clauses 13 and 14? It would be useful to know what items the Home Office, Border Force and the police specifically wish to disrupt. There is also a power in clause 15 for the Secretary of State to amend the list of relevant articles. Will the Minister explain what purpose that power serves? The list of what counts as a relevant article is almost limitless, so does she envisage that the power will be used primarily to create exemptions?

The hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire has tabled amendment 3 to specify that if a person is an asylum seeker, they cannot commit the offence in clause 13: supplying articles for use in immigration crime. It would be good to understand why the Scottish National party does not think it is possible for asylum seekers to commit that offence. How are law enforcement officers supposed to know that a person is genuinely an asylum seeker—and even if they are, what happens if their application is subsequently rejected?

The hon. Gentleman also tabled an amendment to require the commander to include in their annual report information about how they have paid due regard to the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European convention on action against trafficking. My views are the same as those set out by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West on amendment 1.

[Chris Murray]

I apologise for my longer interventions, Mr Stuart; I will try to bundle them all into this speech.

One of the most important things that we heard during evidence was from Dr Walsh from the Migration Observatory. He said that demand for cross-channel crossings is essentially inelastic. Even if the price of a crossing doubles, there will still be demand for it; people rise to meet that price. That tells us that deterrence and disruption of the demand alone will never be enough to tackle the horrors that we are seeing in the channel at the moment. We must also disrupt the supply of ability to cross the channel. That is an important part of the Bill, and these clauses go right to the heart of it.

On the point about criminalising all asylum seekers, ahead of oral evidence, I read carefully the submissions we have had from organisations I have worked with in the past. I found the testimony of the Crown Prosecution Service very convincing. It stated clearly that in addition to the primary legislation, the CPS will produce guidance that will set out both the public interest threshold and evidential test that it would seek in order for a case to go to prosecution. It was very clear that the kind of hypothetical examples set out by the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire would not meet that threshold.

On the point about decriminalising all asylum seekers, to clarify the point I was trying to make in my interventions, during a crossing anyone can declare themselves an asylum seeker. That then breaks down into different categories: someone who is genuinely eligible for asylum in the UK and will, when they go through the process, get refugee status; someone who is genuinely seeking asylum, but will not meet the threshold when they go through the process and will not get such status; and someone who knows that they are ineligible, or might be eligible on some counts, but is engaged in the criminal act of facilitating illegal entry into the UK and putting those other people’s lives in danger. At that moment, it is not possible to distinguish between those people; the asylum process is there to do that.

Were we to accept the premise of the hon. Gentleman’s amendment, it would be a wrecking amendment. I know it is not intended that way, but it would in reality be a wrecking amendment to any kind of intervention on a crossing at sea.

[Chris Murray]

The hon. Gentleman is making an important point, but I do not accept that the proposal is creating new criminal offences for all asylum seekers or for all people; it is creating new criminal offences for those engaged in the exploitation of people and the trafficking or smuggling of them across the channel in great danger. We cannot allow that to continue if we care about those people’s lives at all.

In the constituency of every single MP in this room, there will be a cannabis factory where a probably under-age Vietnamese child is working at cultivating cannabis. If they arrived in the past two years, they came across in one of those boats. Significant, serious organised crime networks are exploiting the vulnerability of those people in order to facilitate such crossings. This proposal is how we stop them doing it, and that affects every one of our communities.

I am aware that I am testing people’s patience, but I want to make two final points. The first is about the criminalisation of organisations that help asylum seekers. That is an important point, and the distinction has to be clear. I did have concerns about this measure being in the Bill, but the evidence sessions completely reassured me. The testimony of the CPS was that asking about the weather in Dover when in Calais, and those kinds of things, would not be facilitating immigration crime. The testimony that the National Crime Agency is using these measures to tackle serious and organised crime makes it clear what the purpose of the clauses is.

The hon. Member for Kent—

[Katie Lam]

Weald of Kent.

[Chris Murray]

Weald of Kent, sorry—that is quite far south for me. The hon. Lady made a point about the sector and charging for services. Some organisations out there are charitable and provide services for free, and some organisations charge enormous fees and are extremely exploitative. That is where that distinction comes from. That would be my interpretation of the legislation.

[Katie Lam]

Presumably, though, it seems reasonable to think that there could be a third category, which is people who charge fees that are not exorbitant.

[Chris Murray]

That is absolutely right—but, in my experience of the channel coast and of working in the refugee sector, those do not exist. Anyone who was to do that would probably be giving immigration advice, which is a regulated component under UK legislation. That would be structured differently from someone on the coast or on a boat or vessel, in the way that this legislation sets out. I am happy to be corrected, but that would be my interpretation.

Finally, I come to the point about mobile phones and the different things listed that can be seized when a vessel is disrupted. Last week, we heard so much evidence—there is so much evidence out there—that the crossing of the channel is the final stage in a very long process involving criminal gang networks, organised crime networks and just immigration networks that stretch through Europe, including allied countries and countries very difficult for us to have relationships with. We know that those smuggling networks are all orchestrated by mobile phone, so it is important that the Bill incorporates that.

On the concerns that the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire about criminalising the most wretched people in the world, the exemptions in the Bill are clearly humanitarian. They are clearly the kinds of things that people need to survive on a dangerous sea crossing or on their arrival. The only exception is their phone. It is because we know that the data taken from those phones is critical in the fight that phones are excluded. That is why it is important that that component remains in the Bill.

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[Dame Angela Eagle]

The provisions in clause 16 create an additional tool to act earlier to disrupt criminal gangs smuggling people into the UK. The new offence targets specified preparatory activities associated with people smuggling. These activities relate to the collection, recording and possession, viewing or accessing of information that is likely to be useful to a person organising or preparing for a journey of more than one person into the UK, where their entry or arrival constitutes an offence under section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971. These specified activities must also be conducted in circumstances giving rise to reasonable suspicion that the information being collected, recorded, possessed, viewed or accessed will be used in organising or preparing for such a journey.

This clause is levelled strongly against people-smuggling gangs and their associates. It includes a defence for someone of undertaking these specified activities for their own journey only. Also included as a defence is a non-exhaustive list of reasonable excuses, where one express excuse is conducting these activities to carry out or to prepare to carry out the rescue of a person from danger or serious harm. The maximum sentence for this offence is five years’ imprisonment.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 16, as the Minister has just set out, creates a new offence of collecting information for use in immigration crime. A person commits such an offence if a person:

“collects or makes a record of information of a kind likely to be useful to a person organising or preparing for a relevant journey or part of such a journey…possesses a document or record containing information of that kind, or…views, or otherwise accesses, by means of the internet a document or record containing information of that kind.”

This is an extremely wide set of information that is being criminalised. We understand the desire to keep these offences broad in order to capture as many offenders as possible, and we support that aim. However, if the definition is too wide, there is a risk that it becomes meaningless and therefore self-defeating. So, it is important to understand how the Minister believes law enforcement will assess whether the information is of a kind likely to be useful to a person organising or preparing for a relevant journey. Could she please explain how this test will be met in practice? It would also be helpful, for similar reasons, to know when the CPS will publish its guidance on what might meet the threshold for an offence to be committed under this clause. Finally, it is again a defence for an organisation that aims to assist asylum seekers if it does not charge for its services. So, we have the same questions and concerns about this defence as we did in relation to the preceding clauses.

[Mike Tapp]

I will quickly talk about this clause, because it is one of my favourite clauses in the Bill. Having worked in a counter-terror role in the past, I know that one of the most effective ways of preventing terror attacks on the streets of the United Kingdom is by identifying hostile reconnaissance, whether it is physical or online. That is why I am so happy to see this clause in the Bill, because it gives our authorities the opportunity to get to these vile criminals before they take to the seas.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 17 provides for the offences set out in clauses 13 and 14—the supply and handling of articles for immigration crime—and clause 16—the collecting of information for immigration crime—to apply to activities committed both inside and outside the UK, regardless of the nationality of the person by whom they are done. The activities criminalised by these offences are often carried out overseas, as well as in the UK, by perpetrators of various nationalities to facilitate people smuggling to the UK. This clause will strengthen the offences, enhancing the ability to disrupt those involved in this trade, indiscriminate of their nationality and the location of their crime.

Clause 17 also makes provisions for, where an offence under clauses 13, 14 or 16 is committed outside the UK, proceedings to be taken in the UK. For application in Scotland, this clause provides that those proceedings are to be made in accordance with the relevant processes and bodies of the devolved Administration. Finally, this clause provides that section 3 of the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878, which requires consent from the Secretary of State for certain prosecutions of non-UK nationals on territorial waters, does not apply. In doing so, the impacts of these offences are not narrowed and law enforcement is able to pursue perpetrators of these offences when committed on territorial waters.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 17 sets out that the offences of supplying articles for use in immigration crime, handling articles for use in immigration crime and collecting information for use in immigration—so the clauses that we have just discussed—apply to things done both inside and outside the United Kingdom, regardless of the nationality of the person by whom they are done. In essence, clause 17 makes these three new offences extraterritorial. Subsection (2) provides that where the offence is taken outside the United Kingdom, proceedings may be taken in the United Kingdom.

When we heard evidence from Sarah Dineley, the head of international at the Crown Prosecution Service and the national CPS lead, she said that this provision and subsection (7) of clause 18, which extends the offence of endangering lives at sea to acts committed outside the UK, create challenges. She said,

“we can obtain intelligence and evidence from our overseas counterparts at both judicial and law enforcement level…the Crown Prosecution Service has a network of liaison prosecutors based across the world…we can issue what are called international letters of request. They require the recipient country to execute the action, or to provide the information that we have asked for.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 31-33, Q30.]

However, she also said that, for these new offences to work, there has to be “dual criminality”; that is to say,

“there has to be the equivalent offence in the country that we are making the request to, and there are some gaps across Europe in establishing dual criminality for all the immigration offences that we currently have on our books.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 33, Q33.]

Can the Minister reassure the Committee that offences equivalent to those in clauses 13, 14 and 16 exist internationally in relevant partner countries so that we can be assured that the extraterritorial scope of the offences will be effective in tackling organised immigration crime? Can she name those offences or share a list? We fully support the aims of the Government but are keen to establish the efficacy of these measures in disrupting the vile work of people-smuggling gangs.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fifth sitting)

Katie Lam Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 6th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Tom Hayes]

It is an honour to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Dagenham and Rainham, who made a very persuasive case. She has stolen much of what I was going to say, which is actually quite helpful. I want to start by reflecting on the international situation, following up on the equally persuasive points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Dover and Deal about the relationship between the UK and France. It is worth reflecting on where we are. The current Home Secretary was the first to visit northern France in almost five years. Using a parallel Conservative political time continuum, that was six Home Secretaries ago.

In December, we had the meeting of the Calais Group in London, which was able to agree a plan to tackle people smuggling gangs. We have seen the Home Secretary and Interior Ministers from G7 countries, Germany included, meeting in Italy to agree a new joint action plan. We have seen the French Government appoint a new special representative on migration, Patrick Stefanini. He will work closely with our new role of Border Security Commander so that we have the closest, strongest, deepest engagement and interaction.

It is worth reflecting on that, because we are not going to solve the problem of small boat crossings on our own. We have to repair the damage done by the previous Conservative Government to our relationships with our major EU allies and partners. One of the consequences of the botched Conservative Brexit deal is that the UK no longer participates in the EU’s Dublin system, which determines which countries should take responsibility for processing an asylum claim where a person has links with more than one country, and provides a mechanism to return the person to the responsible country. That is underpinned by a shared database of asylum seekers’ fingerprints. It is chaotic that we had a deal that robbed us of the opportunity to take part in that system.

[Katie Lam (Weald of Kent) (Con)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Tom Hayes]

Let me just finish my point. We heard in oral testimony last Thursday how the extraction of the UK from the Dublin system, under those chaotic circumstances, has created a pull factor for asylum seekers seeking to come to this country.

[Tom Hayes]

I will take only one intervention.

[Katie Lam]

I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman would like to share with the Committee whether under the Dublin agreement we were net recipients of migrants or removed more than we received?

[Tom Hayes]

I thank the hon. Lady for her question, but I have another compelling statistic for her. Implicit in much of what the Conservatives say is the idea that the UK alone is carrying the burden of asylum seeker hosting, but the UK is actually fifth, behind Germany, France, Italy and Spain, in our receipt of the number of asylum seekers in the year ending September. The point I am making is that actually, contrary to much of the rhetoric that we hear in the Chamber and may be hearing in this debate that the United Kingdom is somehow on its own, shouldering all the responsibility for providing a safe place to asylum seekers, we are not. That is worth mentioning, because as a country we are trying to repair our relationships—

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Sixth sitting)

Katie Lam Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 6th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Again, I will reserve my comments on the new clause until after I have heard what Members on the Opposition Front Bench have to say about it.

The group entails clauses 27 to 29, which cover the arrangements for HMRC to supply information that it holds in connection with its customs functions. The group also covers new clause 23, which I will try and separate out so that I can try to answer the questions from the hon. Member for Stockton West, once he has put them.

Government Departments like the Home Office and law enforcement partners rely on information sharing for a range of purposes, including law enforcement and border security-related purposes. Key datasets are held by His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, many of which are held in connection with HMRC’s customs functions. Existing statutory provisions to share this information are complex, fragmented and restrictive in ways that prevent the Government from taking full advantage of technology such as modern big data analytic tools.

Clause 27 will create a new power for HMRC to supply information that it holds in connection with its customs functions to a range of recipients, including UK Ministers, Government Departments, police, and certain international partners. HMRC will be able to supply information for use for the purposes of any of the functions of the recipient.

The sharing of entire datasets and the use of customs information for more than just customs purposes will enable the Home Office and other partners to analyse the information to identify suspicious activity that would not be apparent if each dataset were considered in isolation. This will support key Government objectives, such as disrupting and dismantling organised crime groups, preventing the unlawful movement of people and goods into the country, prosecuting offenders and protecting vulnerable people, as well as the Government’s safer streets mission.

Clause 28 regulates how the information supplied under clause 27 may be used and disclosed by its recipients. The aim is to ensure that the information is fully safeguarded while also enabling Government Departments to use information received for any of their functions. That will ensure that maximum benefit can be derived from the information received.

Information shared under clause 27 is subject to a general rule: the person who receives it must only use it for the purposes for which it was supplied. They may not further disclose it to anyone without HMRC’s consent. However, there are a number of exceptions to this general rule that will enable certain recipients to use and disclose information more flexibly. UK Ministers, Government Departments and the police will be able to reuse customs information for any of their functions and further share it between themselves for specified border security and law enforcement-related purposes. Additionally, there will be extra onward disclosure permissions for the Home Secretary so that she may disclose the information to any person for use for certain immigration and customs-related purposes.

Clause 29 regulates how the information supplied onwards in accordance with clause 28 may be used and disclosed by its recipients. The aim is to ensure that the information is fully safeguarded. The clause focuses on making clear the restrictions surrounding the reuse and onward disclosure of information supplied under clause 28. Any person supplying information in reliance on clause 28 or 29 must notify the recipients of these restrictions, as they apply to the reuse and onward disclosure of the information. In recognition of the particular importance of protecting HMRC information, which can include a great deal of personal information, clause 29 extends the existing criminal offence of wrongful disclosure under section 19 of the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 to apply to any person who discloses information in contravention of these restrictions.

The intent of clause 29 is a continuation of the safeguards laid out in clause 28, while ensuring that none of the restrictions go against the spirit of the overall information-sharing provision. Clause 29 protects information from being shared beyond the provision’s intent. I will not deal with new clause 23, tabled by the hon. Member for Stockton West until he has spoken to it.

[Katie Lam (Weald of Kent) (Con)]

rose—

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Ah, the hon. Lady will speak to it.

[Katie Lam]

We welcome the powers in these clauses to share HMRC data. Border Force is responsible for clearing both people and goods at the UK border. There is international precedent for moving towards joint targeting centres for people and goods. From a law enforcement perspective and from ours, the more customs information that can be shared with UK and other Government agencies, the better. HMRC has a range of customs functions, including the collection and management of customs duty, monitoring and controlling the movement of goods, and control of cash entering or leaving the UK. HMRC is bound by a statutory framework of confidentiality and needs a lawful basis to disclose information.

Clause 27 will allow HMRC to share customs information in support of defending the security of the UK borders. The clause allows UK Ministers, Government Departments and the police to reuse customs information for any of their functions, as the Minister laid out. The clause also allows data to be shared with international organisations that have functions relating to the movement of goods or cash across international borders, or if an international arrangement makes provision for co-operation between that organisation and HRMC. We welcome the powers in clause 27. I would like to ask the Minister how often she expects these data-sharing powers to be used for law enforcement and her assessment of what practical effects the powers will have on making it easier to disrupt organised crime networks.

Clause 28, which we support, specifies the circumstances in which UK Government Departments, Ministers and the police can further share customs data. We also support clause 29 on the safeguards included in this clause. We have tabled new clause 23 to disapply data protection laws from data on those who have entered the UK illegally or are foreign national offenders. The purpose of the new clause is exactly the same as the purpose of clauses 27 to 29, which is to minimise barriers to data sharing between agencies for immigration and law enforcement purposes. We table it in the spirit of the support I have already mentioned for the Government’s aims regarding data access.

If someone has entered the UK illegally or is a foreign national offender, law enforcement for their removal is vital and GDPR legislation should not stand in the way of being able to gather and establish any necessary evidence for use in immigration appeals or law enforcement. We wish to remove the barriers to data sharing in these cases, and we know the Government want that too. We hope that they will find the suggested new clause useful.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I thank the hon. Lady for speaking to new clause 23. As she said, it seeks to disapply the protections afforded by the UK GDPR regulations to people who have entered illegally or who are foreign criminals. I think that would massively complicate data protection legislation, given that we would always have to keep an eye on who is a foreign national criminal or an immigration offender, over time as well as in the moment. That could make it harder to apply some of the data-sharing rules.

We believe that with the protections in clauses 27 to 29, we can get and share the information that we need to share, to its greatest effect, while protecting people from unlawful disclosure, without complicating things further by trying to check whether somebody is a foreign national offender or has entered the country illegally.

We have a strong history of maintaining high data protection standards. The legislation permits the use of personal data for legitimate purposes, such as immigration control, while giving the public the reassurance that such use will be subject to proportionate safeguards. Our approach will be to rely on the proportionate safeguards, rather than to disapply the entirety of data protection laws to certain groups of people who happen to be in our society at the moment. The proportionality test, with the focus on organised immigration crime, is important.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is certainly a good idea to create legislation that can actually be commenced. Otherwise, we are just all having a fun time in Committee— I can see everyone agreeing with me—and not affecting the statute book, making it easier to do what must be done or enabling the law to help with that rather than having a gigantic problem. As a Minister, I am certainly in favour of enacting laws that we can commence, and I hope that we will be able to commence large parts of the Bill as soon as it has made its proper progress through both Houses.

The UK has a long history of maintaining high data protection standards. Complicating them by trying to disapply them for certain individuals who are in our society whether we want them to be or not implies that we would have to keep very up-to-date, regular records of every single person in the country to check their status. That sounds like ongoing identity checks across the whole population, and that is easier said than done. It is not Government policy, and I did not think it was Opposition policy either. Although the new clause is well meaning, it is a complication rather than an assistance.

Where the exercise of data subject rights, such as the right to seek access to personal data, could undermine the tasks, appropriate exemptions can be applied on a case-by-case basis. Disapplying data protection rules in a blanket fashion for certain groups is unnecessary and could disadvantage some of the most vulnerable people in society, such as victims of trafficking. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Member for Weald of Kent will not press new clause 23, with the reassurance that we think that these clauses give us the power to use big data and big data analytics in a way that is in keeping with data protection laws, the GDPR and the ECHR.

[Katie Lam]

I take the Minister’s points about practicality, but in situations where new clause 23 created additional complexity, the Home Office would retain the option to adhere to the GDPR if it wished to; it would just not be forced to do so. We really think that the provision would be a useful addition and we hope the Government will consider it further. However, we do not intend to press it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 28 and 29 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 30

Supply of trailer registration information

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I certainly agree with my hon. Friend. That is at the higher end of the harms that one would hope could be prevented by more timely access to this kind of information. These clauses will ensure that those charged with securing the border and beyond can use the information in line with the range of threat types enabled by cross-border lorry movements such as the one my hon. Friend just mentioned, to ensure that the law enforcement community engaged in tackling organised immigration crime, and wider serious and organised crime, are able to tackle it at pace.

Clause 31 complements clause 30 by setting out how information received by the Home Office and the police may be disclosed onwards, with whom and for what purposes. Robust inter-agency and international co-operation is crucial to smashing the criminal gangs. Border Force routinely works with the National Crime Agency and the police for the purposes of criminal investigations connected with the smuggling of people and illicit goods, and with HMRC for customs purposes.

The police, in turn, need to be able to alert law enforcement partners to identify specific trailers of interest. Border Force and the police also need to be able to alert European law enforcement partners to intercept trailers where there might be a threat to life and in support of cross-border co-operation against illicit goods. This clause, subject to safeguards contained in clause 32, enables just such an outcome to be achieved.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 30 provides a power for the Secretary of State for Transport to supply trailer registration information to the Secretary of State for the Home Department for immigration purposes, law enforcement purposes, human welfare purposes, purposes connected with functions under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, protecting national security, and responding to an emergency. The information can also be shared with the National Crime Agency and HMRC.

We support the powers in the clause. As with the previous group of clauses, this is about being able to bring together the information held by different arms of the state to defend the border, and we wholeheartedly agree with that. I must confess that this is going to be a fairly friendly section of the afternoon, for which I can only apologise to all involved.

Clause 31 provides powers for the onward sharing of information in clause 30. It is important that that information can be shared with those exercising public functions, including those outside the United Kingdom. We also support the new powers in the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 30 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 31 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 32

Sections 27 to 31: general provision about disclosure

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clause 33 stand part.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

This group includes clauses 32 and 33, which provide for safeguards with respect to the customers and trailer registration information-sharing provisions, which we have just agreed will stand part of the Bill, as well as providing clarity about the meanings of terms within those clauses.

Clause 32 makes general provision about the disclosure of information with respect to clauses 27 to 31. That is information held by HMRC in connection with its customs functions, as set out in clauses 27 to 29, and the DVLA’s trailer registration information in clauses 30 to 31. The clause does two things. First, it clarifies that clauses 27 to 31 do not limit how information may be disclosed outside of the scope of this legislation. It does not tie the hands of a named party to disclosing information subject only to the regime established here if another information gateway exists. Secondly, it clarifies that nothing in clauses 27 to 31 authorises disclosure where it would contravene UK data protection or investigatory powers legislation. In deciding on that, the clauses are to be taken into account. Clause 32 neither treads upon other legal regimes to disclose information outside of the scope of this legislation nor permits anything that would fall foul of existing statutory safeguards—a perfect, balanced approach.

Clause 33 makes provision for the interpretation of clauses 27 to 31—the terms used, their scope and limits. First, it defines the meanings of certain terms through direct definition and in reference to other legislation. Secondly, it seeks to capture all UK police forces and bodies that might be the end users of the information, referring to a “UK authorised person” and a “UK authorising officer” for the purposes of clause 30, and defining what it means in this clause.

The use of the terms “UK authorising officer” and

“the person under whose direction and control the constable…is”

avoids reliance on references to chief constable, commissioner and chief officer, because those terms have prescribed legal meanings that exclude the commanders of the very important ports police and the even more important Mersey Tunnels police, which rely on other ranks to command. That ensures that the definitions apply to everybody, whatever the force. The ports forces and the Mersey Tunnels police are an extremely important part of defending the border, for obvious reasons.

For “UK authorised person”, the term constable, which includes special constable, is used. The clause also refers to

“other person who is under the direction and control of a person who has the direction and control of a body of constables”.

Such is the poetry of legislative diction, but lawyers know exactly what that means. Instead of police civilian staff, or similar terms with prescribed meanings, we have that rather long and convoluted explanation, which includes everybody. That is because not all forces employ police staff subject to employment contracts. Some also use police volunteers. The MOD police uses civil servants in such roles, while the Police Service of Northern Ireland has powers to use civil servants separately from employed police staff. Use of “other person” accommodates all these cases, so it is all-encompassing, and I hope we have not missed anybody out.

Thirdly—this applies only to the trailer data—we have worked with the Crown dependencies and Gibraltar to identify persons undertaking statutory functions equivalent to their UK border security and law enforcement counterparts. We have defined them as a non-UK authorised person and specified them in a table along with the authorising officers.

Finally, the clause establishes a regulation-making power for the Secretary of State to define the meaning of specified purposes related to policing to ensure that the data requirements are met today and can be updated from time to time as operational requirements evolve. Such an extension would be subject to consultation with policing bodies across the UK, Scottish Ministers and the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland, and it would require the affirmative resolution of both Houses. With those reassurances, I hope members of the Committee will be happy to support clauses 32 and 33.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 32 makes general provision about the powers of disclosure in clauses 30 and 31. Subsection (2), as the Minister laid out, clarifies that nothing in clauses 27 to 31 authorises disclosure where it would otherwise contravene data protection or investigatory powers legislation. How much difficulty does the Minister envisage these provisions causing for the sharing of information? I seek reassurance—she has offered some already—that the safeguard will not frustrate legitimate data-sharing activities. Clause 33 defines key terms included in clauses 27 to 31, and we have no problems with it.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I reassure the hon. Lady that we do not envisage the definitions causing any practical problems with data sharing and the powers defined in clauses 27 to 31.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 32 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 34

Provision of biometric information by evacuees etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

Clause 35 details the Government’s approach to the use and retention of biometric data gathered subject to clause 34. It sets out the circumstances in which the Secretary of State may use the information, mainly in connection with their duties relating to immigration and nationality, along with law enforcement and national security. In line with data protection legislation, the information will be retained only if this is necessary, and will be destroyed either when no longer needed or within five years. The clause contains important safeguards that protect the data of individuals in scope of clause 34.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 34 provides a power for an authorised person to take biometric information when the Government are in the process of facilitating their exit from a state or territory. The purpose of the power is to ensure that only those who qualify under particular evacuation schemes are able to come to the UK. The power to take biometric information should help to verify identity and conduct screening checks, as individuals in these circumstances are often undocumented. We fully support the provision.

We would be interested to hear more about whether the Government intend to take further action on biometrics, which could be brought about through the Bill. Countries such as Dubai and Singapore are investing in biometric entry and exit systems, as is the EU. The UK does not routinely capture biometrics at the border, although with the new UK electronic travel authorisation, we will collect digital photographs of all non-visa nationals, with the option of retaining fingerprint scans.

We are aware that there are logistical and financial challenges to enabling Border Force to collect biometrics routinely from all passengers on arrival and departure, but there are also substantial benefits, including helping to match illegal migrants and asylum seekers leaving the country, thereby giving a clearer picture of those who are overstaying through more accurate migration figures. We would be interested in hearing how the Government are thinking about biometrics more broadly in the context of their not extending the power to capture biometrics more widely in the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Working out the potential for electronic borders and a more sophisticated approach to the hundreds of millions of journeys that cross our borders every year is an important part of the day job of my hon. Friend the Member for Feltham and Heston. This is a more limited clause, but we are certainly investigating the potential, costs and benefits of a much more digitalised border. We are not about to introduce that through this Bill, but there will be more to be said when that work has been done in due course.

We understand the potential for making border crossings much more convenient for everybody while having more robust information about who has crossed borders, and when and where they were crossed. Some of this is about goods, trailers and a range of other things crossing borders, and ensuring that we have information on when people smugglers and clandestines cross borders, too.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 36 will enable the biometrics of persons detained in Scotland under schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 to be taken at ports, thereby bringing the position in Scotland into line with that in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

Those schedules allow an examining officer—a constable, or a designated immigration or customs officer—to stop, question, search and detain a person at a port, or at the border area in Northern Ireland, for the purposes of determining whether the person appears to be a person who is, or has been, engaged in terrorism or hostile activity. An examining officer may stop and question a person whether or not there are grounds for suspecting that the person is, or has been, engaged in terrorism or hostile activity. Those are important powers that allow counter-terrorism police officers to detect, disrupt and deter terrorism and hostile activity at the border.

The powers for taking biometrics in Scotland are contained in paragraph 20 of schedule 8 to the 2000 Act and paragraph 42 to schedule 3 of the 2019 Act. Clause 36 amends those paragraphs, removing the unnecessary restriction unique to Scotland that requires that those detained under those powers are taken to a police station to have their biometrics taken. The clause will allow biometrics to be taken much more easily and quickly in situ, rather than the person having to be transported to a police station.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 36, as the Minister has laid out, extends biometrics powers to ports in Scotland. As we understand it, immigration enforcement already has the power to take biometrics from people arrested in the UK, including at ports, if they are suspected of having entered or remained in the UK illegally. How does the Minister think that the clause will add to existing operational powers?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is a lacuna in Scotland rather than a problem elsewhere. It is simply that, in Scotland, biometrics cannot be taken except in a police station. In his 2020 report on the operation of the Terrorism Acts 2000 and 2006, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation recommended that we address the issue. We saw the Bill as an opportunity to deal with what is obviously an unintended kink, so we are ironing it out.

[Katie Lam]

That is very helpful, but I just want to check that I fully understand what the Minister is saying. The power already exists, but it is about locational flexibility—is that right?

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Seventh sitting)

Katie Lam Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 11th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mike Tapp]

I thank the hon. Member for Stockton West for his creative statement. The chaos in our asylum system and the dangerous rise in illegal small boat crossings is, of course, one of the greatest challenges facing our country, and for years the British public have been promised solutions. They were told that the previous Government’s Rwanda policy would fix the problem, but instead it proved a costly failure. It got stuck in legal battles, was riddled with operational flaws and was utterly ineffective. I will go into detail about that soon.

In 2018, 299 people crossed the channel on small boats. By 2022, the number had surged to 30,000—a hundredfold increase on the Conservatives’ watch. Despite their grand claims that the Rwanda scheme would act as a deterrent, more than 80,000 people crossed the channel after the scheme was announced, and not a single asylum seeker has been successfully removed under it—not one. It is clear that this policy failed.

Let us start with the legal reality. The Rwanda asylum scheme was not just controversial but unlawful. In November 2023, the UK Supreme Court struck it down, ruling that Rwanda was not a safe country to send asylum seekers. The reason for that was systematic defects in Rwanda’s asylum system: almost no claims from Afghans, Syrians or Yemenis were ever approved. The Court found a serious risk that genuine refugees could be sent back to danger, in direct breach of international law. Let us not forget that Rwanda has a track record here: a previous deal with Israel, mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw, led to refugees being secretly deported back to their home countries, in clear violation of human rights protections. This policy depends on breaking the law, and that is no policy at all. It is a legal and moral dead end.

That is why the Bill repeals the Rwanda scheme and replaces it with a system that upholds the rule of law. It will focus toughness where it belongs: not on desperate people, but on the criminal gangs who exploit them. Instead of wasting years in court, we will implement a legally sound system that actually works.

Further, the Rwanda scheme was not just unlawful; it was an economic disaster. As of mid-2024, at least £318 million had already been spent on this failing policy. What did taxpayers get in return? Nothing—no removals or deterrent effect, just an ever-growing backlog of cases and ever-rising hotel bills, which we have inherited. Even if the scheme had gone ahead, it would have been staggeringly expensive. The National Audit Office estimated that removing just a few hundred people could cost up to £2 million per person, yet we are expected to believe that this was a serious solution to the problem of tens of thousands arriving each year on the Conservatives’ watch.

This Government are putting an end to that waste. Instead of throwing money at a scheme that does not work, we are investing in practical measures. This approach is already delivering results: since taking office, the new Government have increased enforced removals by 24%. That shows that when we have a working system, we do not need gimmicks like the Rwanda plan; we just need competence.

This is not just about law or economics. It is also about how we treat people. A core British value is strength, but another is decency. Strength without decency is weakness, as the previous Government demonstrated. The Rwanda scheme was not just ineffective; it was cruel. It was based on the idea that people fleeing war and persecution should be someone else’s problem, no matter the risk to their safety.

Let us be clear that many of those crossing the channel are genuine refugees—they include people fleeing the Taliban in Afghanistan, dictatorship in Iran and war in Syria—but the Rwanda policy, and, it would seem, the Conservatives, did not care. The policy made no distinction, lumped everyone together and treated them as a problem to be shipped off 4,000 miles away, out of sight and out of mind—although of course it did not work.

That is not the British way. This country has a proud history of offering sanctuary to those in need, and we do not abandon our humanitarian duties for the sake of a headline and a gimmick. Of course, those who should not be here will be deported, as we are already seeing, and those who genuinely need help will receive it under this Government. A true deterrent is taking out the smuggling gangs and deporting those who should not be here. The truth is that we do not stop the boats by shouting slogans; we stop the boats by giving people an alternative.

Finally—I thank hon. Members for their patience—the Rwanda plan was never operationally viable. Even if it had survived the legal challenges, the logistics were impossible. To make it work, the Government would have had to detain nearly every small boat arrival indefinitely—a task for which we simply do not have the detention space, the staff or the legal authority. Rwanda itself had agreed to take only a few hundred people a year, which is a drop in the ocean—excuse the pun—compared with the scale of the problem. Meanwhile the real criminals—the smuggling gangs—continued to operate freely. The Rwanda plan did nothing to target them. It was an illusion of control, rather than a real solution.

This Government take a serious, workable approach. That is how we secure the border: not through wishful thinking, but through real enforcement. The Conservatives have tried gimmicks. They tried grandstanding; they tried expensive, legally dubious, headline-chasing policies, and they failed. It is time to move forward. We will uphold the rule of law, protect those in genuine need and take real action against the criminals exploiting them.

[Katie Lam (Weald of Kent) (Con)]

These are difficult problems and challenging questions. Practically every country in the western world is struggling with this and, with the notable exception of Australia, effectively none has solved it. The basic logic of the situation is that, if someone comes here illegally from a place to which it would be dangerous to return them, there are only four options.

First, they could be sent back to the country they came from. That is not legal in our current framework—even before getting to the morality of doing such a thing. Secondly, they could be put in immigration detention indefinitely. That is also not legal; a person can be held in immigration detention only if there is a realistic prospect of removal, which there would not be in this case. Thirdly, they could stay here indefinitely. That is not fair, and it is not what the public want. Finally, they could go somewhere else—a safe third country. Such an agreement was very difficult to broker; indeed, until the Rwandans agreed, many considered it to be impossible.

Clearly, the Government have little time for the Rwanda scheme and destroying it was one of the first things they did in office, but the basic logic problem remains. The last Conservative Government did not get everything right—that is for sure—but the Rwanda scheme was a genuine attempt to solve this truly hard problem, and it remains the only solution that we can see.

[Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)]

Does the hon. Lady accept that there is a fifth option? Just because someone does not have the right to be in the UK, it does not mean that they do not have the right to go to any other country in the world. The programme of voluntary returns, which massively went down under the Conservatives but has gone up massively under this Government, is part of the solution to that.

[Katie Lam]

As we have heard, people who have come here illegally are not voluntarily leaving the country. Most of the voluntary returns are overstayers or people who have not come here on small boats.

[Chris Murray]

But they could.

[Katie Lam]

But they do not. There will always be people who come to this country illegally from dangerous places. They are human beings responding to obvious incentives. Could the Minister please tell us which of the four options she thinks is the right one? Is it sending someone back to a dangerous country, which will entail a change in the law and probably leaving the European convention on human rights? Is it holding someone in immigration detention indefinitely, which has the same conditions? Is it allowing people to stay here, or is it sending them to a third country?

[Becky Gittins (Clwyd East) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure, once again, to serve under your chairpersonship, Mr Stuart. I was disappointed but not surprised to hear that the official Opposition want to keep the Safety of Rwanda Act on the statue books. I was disappointed for a number of reasons, which I will set out shortly, but I was not surprised. I have seen the way in which the Tories continue to position and conduct themselves on immigration policy. It is clear to me that they simply refuse to learn the lessons of the last 12 months. The public saw right through their Rwanda plan. They could see it for exactly what it was: a gimmick that was both unworkable and unaffordable.

Before today, I thought I would familiarise myself with the Report stage and the Third Reading of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024. At the time, a good number of Committee members, including me, had yet to be elected, but reading the debates really brings home the sense of chaos that had engulfed the Conservative party at the time. The then shadow Home Secretary, now Home Secretary, summed it up:

“What a farce…We have a Prime Minister with no grip, while the British taxpayer is continually forced to pay the price. Former Tory Cabinet Ministers and deputy chairs from all sides have been queueing up to tell us it is a bad Bill. They say it will not work, it will not protect our borders, it will not comply with international law and it is fatally flawed.”—[Official Report, 17 January 2024; Vol. 743, c. 966.]

A previous Attorney General, the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), stated that

“to arrogate to oneself the right to declare one’s own compliance with international law runs the risk of, first, other states finding comfort in our example and, secondly, undermining our own messages in other situations. That makes this not just bad law, but bad foreign policy.”—[Official Report, 17 January 2024; Vol. 743, c. 855.]

This is an example of utter chaos. The Law Society, in welcoming the repeal of the Rwanda Act, said in its evidence to this Committee that the Act

“set a dangerous legal and constitutional precedent by legislating to overturn an evidence-based finding of fact by UK courts that Rwanda is an unsafe country to send asylum seekers to.”

However, the measure made it on to the statute book. The Rwanda plan ran for two years and, as we know and have heard several times this morning, a grand total of four volunteers were sent to Rwanda at the not insubstantial cost of £700 million to the UK taxpayer—quite a remarkable feat.

While hundreds of millions of taxpayer pounds were sent to Rwanda, the legislation’s effect was felt in the UK. As a result of the fantastical Rwanda plan, huge backlogs of asylum claims were building, with tens of thousands of people in hotels unable to leave because of the design of the Illegal Migration Act. We know that the use of hotels does not represent value for money and we are moving away from it. When it comes to the idea of the Rwanda policy being a deterrent, from its inception to the announcement it was to be scrapped, 84,000 people crossed the channel in small boats. It is always difficult to measure a deterrent’s effectiveness, but that is a pretty clear indicator that a deterrent it was not.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Eighth sitting)

Katie Lam Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 11th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

It is a great pleasure to see you, the fourth Chair of our Committee, Dame Siobhain. I welcome you to the Chair. It is a pleasure to serve with you directing us.

The clause is a simple consequential one: it removes references to and amendments made by the Illegal Migration Act 2023 and the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024 when they no longer serve a purpose. During the passage of those two pieces of legislation it was necessary to amend existing Acts of Parliament, to cross-reference them and to enable enactment of the provisions within them. Few, if any, of those provisions were ever properly commenced or enacted but, since this Government intend to repeal the Safety of Rwanda Act and large parts of the Illegal Migration Act, which we spent most of this morning discussing, those references no longer serve any practical purpose. They should therefore be removed from the four existing Acts of Parliament.

[Katie Lam (Weald of Kent) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair this afternoon, Dame Siobhain, as it was yesterday afternoon. It is good to see you two days in a row.

The clause, as the Minister said, makes consequential amendments necessary as a result of the two clauses that we discussed this morning: clause 37, which repeals the Safety of Rwanda Act 2024, and clause 38, which repeals provisions of the Illegal Migration Act 2023. As we do not support either of those repeals, we do not support these revisions or agree that the clause should stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

We have had our debates about the contents of those Acts. The clause concerns truly miscellaneous aspects, although I understand the logic of the hon. Lady’s argument. I certainly hope that we will press on and agree clause 39.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The clause introduces schedule 1, which will allow the governance arrangements for the Immigration Services Commissioner and deputy commissioner to be made more flexible. That will bring them in line with other public appointments by allowing for interim or shorter appointment lengths.

Schedule 1 sets out that the commissioner and deputy commissioner are to hold office for a term not exceeding five years. That allows the appointments to be for less than five years; currently, there is a fixed five-year term. Schedule 1 will make it discretionary to appoint a deputy commissioner, allowing for the governance arrangements to remain flexible to meet the demands of the organisation. It will enable the Home Secretary to appoint a senior, experienced member of staff to act in the commissioner’s place in certain circumstances. It is to be used, for example, to ensure that cover is in place during a public appointment process where there is a vacancy in the commissioner and deputy commissioner posts. It does not replace the provision to appoint a deputy commissioner and will ensure continued regulatory oversight of immigration advisers, which is the point of this organisation.

The schedule will mean that the work of the Immigration Services Commissioner will continue and will operate more flexibly to ensure that good immigration advice is readily available. That is critical to the effective running of a coherent, efficient and fair immigration system.

[Katie Lam]

As the Minister has outlined, clause 40 inserts schedule 1 into the Bill. That provides that the Immigration Services Commissioner is not to hold office for a term exceeding five years. The current regime is based on there being a commissioner and deputy, so schedule 1 sets out that the commissioner may appoint a deputy. There is also a provision to enable a member of the commissioner’s staff to act in the commissioner’s place in certain circumstances, such as the roles of commissioner and deputy both being vacant. That effectively allows for the appointment of an interim commissioner.

As was said in evidence to the Committee, these amendments do not seem to us to have operational consequence. We will not oppose them.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 40 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1 agreed to.

Clause 41

Detention and exercise of functions pending deportation

[Pete Wishart (Perth and Kinross-shire) (SNP)]

I beg to move amendment 7, clause 41, page 35, line 32, leave out subsection (17).

This amendment would leave out the subsection of this clause that applies subsections (1) to (13) (relating to detention and exercise of functions pending deportation) retrospectively, i.e. as if they have always had effect.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The clause seeks to put beyond any doubt that the Home Office has the power to detain, in conducive deportation cases, at the earliest point. It has been doing that for many years. The clarification in the clause applies retrospectively to ensure that those who have been detained in the past have not been detained unlawfully. We do not believe they have, but this puts it beyond doubt. To clarify, this is not an extension of deportation powers; it is putting beyond doubt in the Bill the understanding of how and when these powers can be used—at the earliest opportunity, if it is a conducive deportation. The powers, including to detain at the earliest opportunity, have always existed.

If the amendment moved by the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire were agreed to, it would cast doubt on many of the arrests and detentions ahead of deportations that have happened in the past, which I do not think the hon. Gentleman would want to do. To reassure the hon. Gentleman one final time, this is not an extension of deportation powers; it is a clarification of the way that they have always been understood to work. The clause puts beyond legal doubt that if somebody is being detained pending deportation, they can be detained lawfully at the earliest opportunity. That understanding has always been the case, but the clause puts it beyond any legal doubt.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 41 confirms that the Home Office may detain someone subject to deportation from the point at which the Home Office serves the notification that deportation is being considered, when that deportation is conducive to the public good. We support this provision to allow for detention before a deportation order is signed, but that only applies if the Secretary of State has notified the person in writing. Can I seek reassurance from the Minister that the requirement for a written notice will not build any delay into the process? We also support the provision in clause 42 to allow the Home Office to capture biometrics at the new, earlier point of detention.

[Pete Wishart]

I will not detain the Committee for long. I do not like clause 41 anyway—I think the extension of deportation powers is overwhelming and I do not believe they are required—but I do not like this retrospection one bit. I have not secured an adequate explanation from the Minister about why that is necessary. I would therefore like to put my amendment to a vote, Dame Siobhain.

[The Chair]

Thank you for clarifying, as that was going to be my next question. Does anybody else wish to contribute?

[Katie Lam]

May I ask for a response from the Minister to my question?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I am happy to give the hon. Lady the assurance that she sought. If somebody is going to be detained, it will always be done with written notice, and that should not delay anything—it has not in the past.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

You are getting a lot of practice with locking and unlocking the doors and having Divisions, Dame Siobhain—it is quite exciting this afternoon.

Clause 42 modernises our powers to capture biometric information, so that we have greater flexibility over who can take that information. It will enable a wider range of appropriately trained people to take biometric information, strengthening processing resilience following instances of small boat crossings or unexpected arrivals. In a situation where it is essential to capture biometrics at the earliest opportunity and through streamlined processes, we will be able to utilise our resources more effectively. For example, the measure will enable contractors working at a short-term holding facility to capture biometrics in the same way as other contractors based in detention centres currently do. The clause also includes a power to make secondary legislation where there is a need for others to be able to capture biometric information. That is a future proofing of the legislation.

These are sensible and necessary measures to ensure that we can identify people quickly and establish whether they pose a threat to public safety if they have arrived in an irregular or illegal way.

[Katie Lam]

We are essentially supportive of clause 42, which among other things allows a person employed by a contractor in a short-term holding facility to be an authorised person to take fingerprints. The clause also includes a regulation-making power to allow other types of people to be authorised for this purpose.

May I ask the Minister how the regulation-making power is intended to be used? Are there currently other categories of people whom the Secretary of State or others in the Department would like to authorise to take fingerprints, or is this essentially a future-proofing measure, as the Minister mentioned?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

This is essentially future proofing. If another category or range of people became available, we may future proof this power and use the regulation-making power to ensure that they are taking biometrics lawfully.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 42 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 43

Articles for use in serious crime

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clauses 43 and 44 cover the creation of two new offences concerning articles for use in serious crime. Law enforcement agencies are increasingly encountering individuals in possession of, or supplying, articles suspected to be intended for serious crime. However, proving intent or knowledge for a prosecution is often difficult, as the connection to a specific crime may not be immediately clear and facilitators frequently go undetected.

To address that challenge, clause 43 introduces two new criminal offences. The first criminalises the possession of specified articles; the second targets the importation, manufacture, adaptation, supply or offer to supply of those articles where there is a reasonable suspicion that they will be used in a serious offence. The specified articles include templates for 3D-printed firearms components, pill presses and vehicle concealments. Those concealments are particularly concerning in relation to smuggling operations, as they are often used to hide individuals for irregular immigration purposes.

The accused will need to prove that they did not intend for the article to be used in a serious offence, or that they could not have reasonably suspected it—given the few, if any, legitimate uses for the articles I have just mentioned. Those offences will be triable either way, with a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment, a fine or both.

Clause 43 defines “serious offences” broadly, to include drug trafficking, firearms offences and assisting unlawful migration, as outlined in schedule 1 to the Serious Crime Act 2007. The clause strengthens the ability of law enforcement agencies to target those facilitating serious crime. It does that by closing legal gaps and addressing emerging criminal tools.

Clause 44 defines the specific articles to be included in the new criminal offences in clause 43. As I said, the articles are templates of 3D-printed firearms or their components, pill presses and encapsulators, and vehicle concealments. Law enforcement agencies have been clear that those articles are being increasingly used by organised crime gangs, and they will continue to be used unless we take action now. 3D-printed firearms templates are increasingly being used by organised criminals, and they are at present not illegal to possess. Pill presses are being used to manufacture illicit drugs, particularly benzodiazepines. Similarly, vehicle concealments have become a significant concern for law enforcement agencies, and they are used as aids in people smuggling and irregular migration.

Clause 44 also provides the Secretary of State with the power to amend the list of specified articles, allowing the law to adapt to emerging threats. Any changes will be subject to the affirmative procedure. The Home Office will continue to work closely with law enforcement agencies and other partners to monitor and update that list, ensuring that it remains relevant as criminal tactics evolve. By capturing those articles, the aim is to disrupt the enablers and facilitators who profit from supplying tools for organised crime.

[Katie Lam]

The clauses seem broadly reasonable, but we have a few questions on which I would appreciate some clarification from the Minister. Clause 43 creates two new offences: the possession of articles for use in serious immigration crime, and the importation, manufacture, and supply or offer to supply of articles for use in serious immigration crime. Could the Minister explain whether she feels that UK Border Force currently has the right capabilities to identify and intercept the harmful materials captured by the clause?

Clause 43 reverses the evidential burden of proof, in that a person charged with offences under it can successfully prove their defence if they provide enough evidence in court to raise a question about the issue, and the prosecution cannot prove the opposite beyond reasonable doubt. Could the Minister please explain why the decision has been taken to do that? The maximum penalty for the offences created under the clause is imprisonment for five years, a fine or both. Could the Minister please explain how and why those penalties were decided on?

Clause 44 defines “relevant article” for the purposes of the offences created in clause 43. Could the Minister please explain whether clauses 43 and 44 provide any operational benefit in terms of tackling smugglers operating abroad, and if so, how?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 45 amends the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to include offences related to the possession and supply of articles intended for serious crime, as outlined in clause 43. It will enable law enforcement agencies to seize the assets of individuals convicted under clause 43.

Specifically, the clause adds:

“Offences relating to things for use in serious crime”

to the criminal lifestyle schedules for England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. A defendant convicted of an offence listed in those schedules will automatically be deemed to have led a criminal lifestyle and to have benefited from criminal conduct over a period of time. That means that assets obtained or spent in the six years prior to conviction are presumed to be derived from criminal conduct and are subject to confiscation unless the defendant can prove otherwise. However, the court is not required to make that assumption if it would result in injustice or is shown to be incorrect.

Confiscation orders are calculated based on the defendant’s monetary gains from crime—known as the benefit—and the assets they have available to them when the order is made. Orders are made to reflect the amount gained from crime and can be increased if the defendant’s finances improve. Non-payment of orders can lead to the defendant returning to prison.

By including these offences in the Proceeds of Crime Act, we can target financially criminals who profit from facilitating crime, disrupting both the crime and the financial gains that support it.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 45 allows the relevant articles listed under clause 44 to be confiscated under the Proceeds of Crime Act. We support this measure.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 45 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 46

Electronic monitoring requirements

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The purpose of clause 46 is to remove any ambiguity about the court’s power to impose electronic monitoring as a condition of a serious crime prevention order or interim serious crime prevention order.

As currently drafted, the clause applies in England and Wales for any serious crime prevention order or interim serious crime prevention order, and in Scotland and Northern Ireland in terrorism-related cases only. However, since the Bill’s introduction, further legal complexities have come to light regarding the devolved Governments’ powers to impose an electronic monitoring condition. Pending agreement from the Scottish Cabinet Secretary, an amendment will be tabled to remove that express provision for Scotland. Northern Ireland’s position is still to be determined. I point that devolution complication out to Committee members and will keep them informed as those discussions develop.

Electronic monitoring serves as a deterrent, but it also improves the detection of any breaches. If the subject violates the conditions, it enables quicker intervention by law enforcement agencies. The clause outlines specific requirements for both the courts and the individual, including the obligation for the subject to consent to the installation and maintenance of monitoring equipment and to avoid tampering with it.

Additional safeguards are included. For instance, electronic monitoring can be imposed only for up to 12 months at a time, with the possibility of extension. A further safeguard requires the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice on handling monitoring data, ensuring consistency and clarity for law enforcement.

This clause on electronic monitoring for those subject to serious crime prevention orders will enhance the effectiveness of such orders and interim SCPOs, supporting efforts to disrupt serious and organised crime, reduce harm and protect the public. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 46 allows the courts to impose an electronic monitoring requirement as part of a serious crime prevention order. The clause is helpful for investigating suspects who are already in the UK, and we broadly support it. Will the Minister confirm that the requirement for electronic monitoring will apply to those who are on immigration bail? What value does the Minister feel serious crime prevention orders might have as a deterrent for those operating abroad?

Clause 46 specifies that there will be a code of practice to outline the expectations, safeguards and broad responsibilities for the data gathered, retention and sharing of information on these orders. When will that code of practice be issued, and can the Minister please outline what the Government expect to be included?

[Mr Will Forster (Woking) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Siobhain. I would like the Minister to define electronic monitoring for us, if she can. I do not believe that there is such a definition in the Bill or in other Acts of Parliament. As a result, I worry that there is confusion, so I would welcome her thoughts.

--- Later in debate ---

Schedule 2 introduces a series of consequential amendments to the Serious Crime Act 2007 to extend existing provisions to interim serious crime prevention orders. These amendments ensure that interim serious crime prevention orders are governed by the same legal safeguards and processes as full orders. Key provisions include extending protection for individuals under the age of 18, granting the right to make representations in court, and aligning rules for the duration, variation and discharge of orders. The amendments also apply to bodies corporate, partnerships and unincorporated associations, ensuring accountability if they breach an interim serious crime prevention order. Schedule 2 ensures that interim serious crime prevention orders have the same effective safeguards as serious crime prevention orders, while strengthening the legal framework for preventing serious crime.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 47 introduces a new provision for interim serious crime prevention orders. These allow the High Court to impose immediate restrictions, pending the determination of a full serious crime prevention order application. The Court can do that if it considers that it is just to do so. Can the Minister explain a little more by what process the Court will decide whether it is just? Is the criterion that it is necessary for public protection?

Proposed new section 5F of the Serious Crime Act makes provision for without notice applications. That is where the application for an interim serious crime prevention order, or the variation of an interim serious crime prevention order, is made without notice being given to the person against whom the order is made, in circumstances where notice of that application is likely to prejudice the outcome. Subsection (2) of proposed new section 5F makes provision for the Court to allow the relevant person to make representations about the order as soon as is reasonably practicable. Can the Minister explain whether that will always happen after the order is granted?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The High Court will be empowered to impose an interim serious crime prevention order if it considers it just to do so. In other words, it is not an evidential test, because the Court does not apply a standard of proof. Rather, it invites the Court to impose an order before it has heard and tested all the evidence in instances that require fast-paced action to prevent and disrupt serious and organised crime. It is therefore an exercise of judgment or evaluation. There is a precedent for this approach in interim sexual risk orders and interim slavery and trafficking risk orders, which are currently a feature of the system and work reasonably well.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 47 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 2 agreed to.

Clause 48

Applicants for making of orders and interim orders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Currently, the High Court can make a serious crime prevention order only upon application from the Crown Prosecution Service, the Serious Fraud Office and the police in terrorism-related cases. However, High Court serious crime prevention orders have not been fully utilised; between 2011 and 2021, only two applications were made, and only one resulted in a successful order. Clause 48 extends the list of agencies that can apply directly to the High Court for a serious crime prevention order, or an interim serious crime order, to the National Crime Agency, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the police in all cases, including the British Transport Police and the Ministry of Defence Police. The clause also specifies who within each agency is authorised to apply for these orders.

This extension will simplify and expedite the application processes for serious crime prevention orders, making it easier for agencies that are directly involved in tackling serious crime to make an application where appropriate. It gets rid of a gateway process that has proven to be so tight that it has not allowed very many of these orders to go forward at all. Those agencies are often best placed to apply for a serious crime prevention order as they already have an in-depth knowledge of the case.

The clause also requires the CPS to be consulted by the applicant authority, as it will continue to have responsibility for ensuring that the order is not used as a substitute for prosecution. That is a very important part of ensuring that these orders work appropriately. In practice, this clause will make serious crime prevention orders more readily available to the agencies that are most likely to use them, to ensure that this powerful tool is used to best effect to protect the public by preventing and disrupting serious and organised crime.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 48 details who can apply to make orders and interim orders, and it replaces and extends the previous list in section 8 of the Serious Crime Act 2007. Can the Minister please explain how long an application for an interim serious crime prevention order might take when made to either the High Court or the Crown court?

[Tom Hayes]

I want to reflect on where we have got up to. We have moved through the clauses at quite a pace, and that is very pleasing to see. The Bill responds to the requests of operationally and frontline-focused people in law enforcement and border security, and it is an attempt to give them the tools and powers that they need. I particularly wanted to mention that in the context of interim serious crime prevention orders, which we have spoken about in clauses 47 and 48.

That cuts such a sharp contrast with what has happened over recent years. In 2022, one Home Secretary introduced the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. At the time, the Government said that that would deter people from crossing in small boats, but it did not. In 2023, another Home Secretary brought in the Illegal Migration Act 2023. At the time, the Government said that that would turn people away from crossing the channel in small boats, but it did not. In 2024, another Home Secretary brought in the Safety of Rwanda Act, which happily we have just repealed today. At the time, the Government talked about the prospect of sending people to Rwanda, and they said that alone would be sufficient to deter people from crossing the channel in small boats. It is no wonder that that failed, too.

I wanted to set out how in 2022, 2023 and 2024 we had three separate Acts, which all aimed to do something and failed to do so. They have not delivered what operationally focused people have requested. We really need to look at how, just eight months into this new Government, we are turning the page on our asylum system and giving enforcement powers to the people who need them. We are also tidying up the statute book and ensuring greater co-ordination across the key agencies that can secure our border. I commend clause 48 to the Committee, as I do the series of clauses before it and the Bill overall.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 49 amends the Serious Crime Act 2007 to introduce a standardised list of notification requirements for individuals and bodies corporate that are subject to serious crime prevention orders. This is a process of standardisation. Currently, notification requirements are added at the court’s discretion on a case-by-case basis. The clause will standardise those requirements for all serious crime prevention orders, improving the consistency and monitoring of the orders across police forces.

We have worked closely with law enforcement partners to identify appropriate requirements. The standard list will include monitoring legitimate income, checking addresses or communication methods for signs that criminal activities are being re-established, and monitoring foreign travel to assess potential indications of a return to crime. The courts can then impose additional requirements and conditions as part of the serious crime prevention order.

For bodies corporate, a designated individual must be named to liaise with the police and provide the notifiable information—including personal details, employment, financial data and contact information—which is essential for law enforcement to ensure compliance and assess risk to public safety.

The clause includes a delegated power to add to the list of notification requirements, ensuring flexibility to meet operational needs as technology evolves. The statutory instrument will be subject to the draft affirmative procedure. Individuals who are subject to a serious crime prevention order must provide the notifiable information within three days of the order coming into force. Failure to provide information, or providing false information, will be a criminal offence punishable by a fine or up to five years’ imprisonment. The standardisation of notifications will improve consistency in managing serious criminals and improve law enforcement agencies’ ability to assess risk and therefore more effectively protect the public.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 49 sets out a prescribed set of notification requirements, so that a person who is subject to a serious crime prevention order is required to provide the police or the applicant authorities with certain information. We support the clause, although can the Minister explain why three days has been given as the deadline to respond with the notifiable information requested?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Three days seems a reasonable amount of time to allow the individual or body corporate concerned to gather the information, but also to ensure that the authorities get it in a timely way, so as to prevent any potential harm that might come from delay.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 50

Orders by Crown Court on acquittal or when allowing an appeal

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Currently, the High Court has the authority to impose a serious crime prevention order without a conviction, provided that the Court is satisfied that the person has been involved in serious crime and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the order will protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting their involvement in serious crime.

Clause 50 amends the Serious Crime Act 2007 to grant the Crown court the power to impose a serious crime prevention order on individuals who have been acquitted of an offence, or in circumstances where the appeal has been allowed, if the same two-limb test is met. There may be cases where a person is acquitted but a serious crime prevention order is still needed. This can happen if the threshold for a criminal conviction is not met but there is still enough evidence to show that the person is involved in serious crime, and that the order would protect the public.

The Crown court would have just heard the evidence of the case and would be in the best position to assess whether an order is necessary to protect the public. Again, this approach is not new; similar provisions are found in other laws, such as domestic abuse protection orders under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, and restraining orders under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, where orders can still be issued even after an individual has been acquitted. The effect of this clause is to streamline the process, enabling serious crime prevention orders to be applied more regularly and effectively in appropriate cases.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 50 allows the Crown court the power to impose a serious crime prevention order on acquittal or when allowing an appeal. Subsection (2) provides that in order to impose a serious crime prevention order in these circumstances, the court has to be satisfied both that the person has been involved in serious crime and that the court has reasonable grounds to believe that the order would protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting involvement by that person in serious crime in England or Wales. Why do both tests need to be satisfied for a serious crime prevention order to be imposed? Where these cases involve acquittal, as the Minister outlined, it might be hard to satisfy the first test. It seems to us that the second test of protecting the public is sufficient grounds to impose a serious crime prevention order.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is a two-limb test. Obviously, the evidential test for criminal proceedings is beyond reasonable doubt. There is a lower evidential test in other court instances, and it may very well be that someone who did not pass the “beyond reasonable doubt” test in a criminal trial would still be considered by the court to be involved in criminal activity, and therefore they would pass the first limb of the test. They would pass the second limb as they would still be likely to be involved in criminal activity in the future. We think that the two-limb test is an appropriate response to protect civil liberties, while protecting the public from the behaviour of those who are involved in serious and organised crime. We think that that balance is about right.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Martin McCluskey.)

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Ninth sitting)

Katie Lam Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 13th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

Finally and briefly, clause 55 confirms that the extent of the Act will apply to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The appropriate elements listed under clause 55(3) also apply to the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and the British overseas territories. Other measures within the Act, aside from those listed in clause 55(4), can be extended to the Isle of Man. Clause 56 confirms the Secretary of State’s ability to specify, through regulations, when the Bill will come into force; that the measures listed under clause 56(3) will come into force on the day on which the Bill receives Royal Assent; and that those listed in clause 56(4) will come into force two months after Royal Assent. Clause 57 confirms that the Act may be cited in short form as the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025.

[Katie Lam (Weald of Kent) (Con)]

I do not think I missed it in the Minister’s speech, although I apologise if I did. Can she advise on how many people have applied for and been granted settled status under the EU settlement scheme?

[Sarah Bool (South Northamptonshire) (Con)]

I have another question for the Minister. I believe that she said that the true cohort had about 5.7 million applicants, but I wanted to understand more about the numbers of those who would fall under the extra cohort, given that they will be benefiting from rights. Can she give a little more of an explanation as to why the issue has come to light at this point, and was not in the original drafting?

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank my hon. Friend for his question. I would probably put it slightly differently. This is an example of where we are being fair and generous—going beyond what was technically within the withdrawal agreement—because that is right for EU citizens who were here. In line with the approach that we took across the whole of Government, we should make sure that there is a smooth transition and security for EU residents here in the UK and also for British citizens in the EU.

I spent four years on the Committee on the Future Relationship with the European Union—I was a veteran, from the first meeting to the last. Early on, citizens’ rights were important and central. Policy has sometimes become a bit more difficult because of case law—we cannot always predict where that ends up—so it is right that we look at where we can make the position clear in law, which is what we are doing today.

[Katie Lam]

Just to follow up on the numbers and check that I have understood this correctly, the Minister said that 5.7 million people have a grant of status, of whom 4.1 million people have settled status; presumably the remainder have pre-settled status. Are those numbers entirely the true cohort? Are the numbers of people that we are talking about today extra to that?

[Seema Malhotra]

The hon. Lady asks a good question. The extra cohort is a minority in that. There are estimates. I am not sure whether I have here the estimate of the specific number of the extra cohort, which it is quite difficult to have an exact number on. But I will make sure that she is written to about the best estimate or the best way in which we can consider it. The extra cohort is a minority, but it is important that we clarify that their rights, too, are derived from the withdrawal agreement.

[Katie Lam]

I thank the Minister; that is very helpful. As I understand it, settled status under the EU settlement scheme entitles individuals to welfare payments, social housing, surcharge-free NHS care and more. Of those people who have been granted settled status, is the Minister or anyone in the Home Office—or indeed anyone anywhere in Government—making an assessment of how many of those individuals are net contributors to the public purse, and how many are a net cost to Britain’s taxpayers?

[Seema Malhotra]

I will just make this point first. In a sense, the new clause will have a very limited impact on access to benefits for those with pre-settled status, or limited leave, under the EUSS. To access income-related benefits such as universal credit, they would be required to evidence relevant qualifying activity, such as current or recent employment or self-employment. Those with settled status, or indefinite leave, under the EUSS already have full access to benefits where eligible.

On the question asked by the hon. Member for Weald of Kent, I know there is broader research, and there is some data but not other data, and there are different estimates, but I am sure that she will know and appreciate that the vast majority will be working. Her question is also relevant to a more general question about those who are here and have settled status: how many are working? We know that there is different research, but the vast majority are self-sufficient.

--- Later in debate ---

I ask hon. Members what criteria they would seek to apply to the establishment of additional safe and legal routes. What safe and legal routes do they believe should be in place that are not already? Have they made any assessment of the increase in numbers of people coming to the UK that might result from their new clauses? The SNP and Liberal Democrat plans risk the UK becoming a magnet for people across the world at a time when our allies in Europe are looking at curbing asylum policies. How do the SNP and the Liberal Democrats plan to stop us becoming the soft touch of Europe? Do they believe that British taxpayers should be paying more than their European counterparts if asylum seekers start coming to the UK in large numbers amidst the crackdown in the EU?

[Katie Lam]

The fundamental question of safe and legal routes seems to be that of how many people the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire thinks Britain might need to let in to achieve the aims he sets out. There are over 120 million people in the world who have been displaced from their homes, of whom nearly 50 million are refugees. That is nearly three quarters of the population of this country. On top of that, the 1951 refugee convention now confers the notional right to move to another country upon at least 780 million people, for—as well as internationally displaced refugees and modern slaves—there are all those who could potentially face a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or membership of a particular social group or political opinion, who may flee their home country. Some of those people—many of them, perhaps—are living lives that might seem to us in the UK unspeakably and unthinkably hard and sad. It is also true, though, that there is a limit to what this country is able to do to help through migration. The answer to global suffering cannot be that all those people come here.

New clause 1 calls for a strategy on safe and managed routes, but that does not reflect the challenge of these routes and the way that they are created. By their very nature, specific asylum routes are often opened up in response to specific circumstances: usually, emergencies that could not be foreseen and anticipated in a neat strategy. The hon. Member for Dover and Deal is right to highlight the work this country does with the UN to identify those in the world in the greatest need of our help and where that help, in the form of resettlement, would be most appropriate. It seems to me that it would be impossible to publish in advance a strategy for something that is mostly centred around emergencies that cannot be foreseen.

[Pete Wishart]

This has been a very good debate and we have got to the heart of some of the issues. I will push the new clause to a vote because, of all the things that those involved with the welfare of and looking after refugees and asylum seekers tell us, their main ask of this Government is to look at a strategy for safe routes. I think we are getting to the equation at the heart of all the issues that we are considering today: the demand side and the supply side.

We are supporting Government measures to ensure that they tackle the demand side—they might have useful armoury, like this Bill, to achieve that—but surely we should give even scant attention to the supply side: the reasons that so many people are coming here. The fact is that they have no other option but to get on an unseaworthy boat to sail across the channel to get to the UK, as they can only make a claim for asylum when they are based in the UK.

I am not asking the Government to open the country up to 247 million refugees. That would be absurd and ridiculous. I do not think anybody is suggesting that at all. All we are asking is for the Government to see if they could do something more to ensure that there are routes available for some of the most wretched people in the world who are looking to come to the United Kingdom, and that we do not leave them exclusively at the mercy of the people that I know the Government are sincere in wanting to tackle.

[Katie Lam]

Might the hon. Gentleman tell us how many people would be satisfactory for him and what he is trying to achieve?

[Pete Wishart]

That is a very difficult thing to say. We have some rough ideas when it comes to the Ukraine and Afghan schemes. These schemes are really worth while. We have seen them work, because there are no Ukrainians crossing the channel—we have had five individuals. It is absurd and ridiculous to suggest that every single refugee in the world is going to come, but the Government—we passed this in a clause earlier—are putting a cap and a quota on people using these safe routes. They are not interested in opening up and developing these safe routes; they want to stop and put a quota on people using them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Bool]

The Minister says that the professor is a eugenicist, but he actually explained a different relationship. It is important that that is put on record, because it is taking away from his role as emeritus professor for demography.

[Katie Lam]

I am a little surprised to see the suggestion from the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire because my sense, from the rest of what he said in the debates we have had over preceding sessions, is that he would like to see less of a distinction between British people and those who come to this country as migrants. Indeed, his new clause 5, which we will debate after this, will explicitly set this out, particularly on the question of British citizenship. A scheme like the one he proposes in new clauses 3 and 4 would have the opposite effect, since any citizen of the United Kingdom can freely move between England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, living and working wherever they choose, and can change the location of their home or employment without permission or notice from any authority. We can pass from one area to another without being stopped or questioned, without having to evidence who we are, where we are from and going, and if and when we might return.

A specifically Scottish visa programme would presumably only work if none of those things were the case. Whatever the details, it would surely involve people coming to Britain but promising only to live and/or work in Scotland, over and above the situations where such things are already implied by the specific conditions of their visa—like the university at which they are studying or the company employing them, as the hon. Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh already laid out.

How would this be evidenced, tracked or enforced? Would individuals moving from a few metres into Scotland to a few metres into England be deported? Why would this be a specialist visa programme? If our friends north of the English-Scottish border are especially keen to attract people of working age, be they migrants or not, why would this be the right solution? What steps are already being taken to attract such people, or to make it easier for them to move to or work in Scotland?

Finally, I am interested in the view of the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire on why Scotland currently has within its borders so few asylum seekers within the system. Given what he has previously said, it would be interesting to understand why he thinks that the number of asylum seekers—either in hotels or in dispersed accommodation in Scotland—is less than half of what it should be, proportionate to population of the rest of the United Kingdom.

[Seema Malhotra]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship for this important debate, Dame Siobhain. It is probably the fourth time we have discussed this matter. I want to acknowledge the persistence of the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire. He will be aware—perhaps this is one point I can acknowledge that he would have predicted my response—that we will not be introducing a Scottish visa scheme or devolving control of immigration policy. This has also been a discussion that we have had, and a point that we have made to the Scottish Government. In my remarks, I will perhaps make a few points that will be useful for his ongoing deliberations on this issue, and suggest how he may direct them towards working with the Scottish Government on some matters that it may be useful for him to be aware of.

The key point is that we must work together to address the underlying causes of skills shortages and overseas recruitment in different parts of the UK, and that is what we are seeking to do. The hon. Gentleman also knows that we believe net migration must come down—under the last Government, it more than trebled and reached a record high of over 900,000 in the year to June 2023. Immigration is a reserved matter, on which we work in the interest of the whole of the UK. The previous schemes that we have talked about have succeeded only in restricting movement and rights, and creating internal UK borders. Adding different rules for different locations will also increase complexity and create friction when workers move locations.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Tenth sitting)

Katie Lam Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 13th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Will Forster (Woking) (LD)]

I am happy to support the new clause tabled by my friend the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire. I will also speak to new clause 13, which does essentially the same thing. This issue is about fairness and reasonableness. Ensuring that effectively no refugee or asylum seeker can get citizenship is not reasonable. Refugees will forever become second-class citizens if we allow that to go ahead. I am concerned that that would deepen divisions within society by disenfranchising our newest constituents and residents. The refugees I have spoken to in my constituency of Woking are so proud when they get citizenship, and it encourages integration. Banning them from citizenship, which is what current guidance amounts to, is wrong. I am happy to support both new clauses.

[Katie Lam (Weald of Kent) (Con)]

To quote my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Essex (Mrs Badenoch), British citizenship is—or at least should be—

“a privilege to be earned not an automatic right.”

Citizenship should be available only to those who have made both a commitment and a contribution to the United Kingdom. For example, it should be a fundamental principle of our system that people who come to this country do not cost the public purse more than they contribute to it. It should also be a fundamental principle of our system that those who seek to harm this country, to break its laws and to undermine what we hold to be fair and right should never be able to become British citizens. To state something so obvious that it sounds almost silly, those who have come to this country illegally have broken the law. The Liberal Democrats and the Scottish National party are proposing that we ignore that fact.

As my hon. Friend the Member for South Northampton- shire just said, how can we possibly say that lawbreaking should not be considered when assessing whether someone is of good character? It seems to me outrageous, unfair and completely against what we understand to be the wishes of the public to turn a blind eye to the fact that someone has broken the law when it comes to determining their character and thus whether they should become a fellow citizen of this great country.

Separately, the Conservatives feel that the timeframe the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire suggests in new clause 5 is far too short. In line with our party’s wider policy, we feel that five years is not enough time to qualify a person for indefinite leave to remain. Immigration, as we are all well aware, was at well over 1 million people a year in 2022, 2023 and 2024, and net migration was at, or is expected to be, at least 850,000 people for each of those years. If we accept that the immigration policy of the past few years was a mistake, we should make every effort to reverse the long-term consequences. That is why the Conservative party is advocating that the qualifying period for ILR should be extended to 10 years, rather than the five years in the new clause.

Finally, I return to my earlier point about Scotland, the Scottish National party and the proof of its compassion as compared with its words. The hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire shook his head when I was speaking about the number of asylum seekers and where they are located. The latest data released on that is for December 2024. As I read it, in Scotland, there are 1,421 asylum seekers in hotels, compared with 36,658 in the rest of the country, and 4,262 asylum seekers in dispersed accommodation, compared with 61,445 across the rest of Britain.

I appreciate that that is challenging mental maths, so I will tell hon. Members that that means that Scotland houses only 5% of the asylum seekers currently accommodated by the state in this country. Scotland is underweight relative to population and dramatically underweight relative to size. Given everything that the hon. Gentleman has said that he and his party stand for, would we not expect the opposite to be true—that Scotland would be pulling its weight more, rather than less?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Seema Malhotra)]

I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in response to the debate on new clauses 5 and 13. I want to clarify a few points. There are already rules that can prevent those arriving illegally from gaining citizenship. In February, the Home Secretary further strengthened measures to make it clear that anyone who enters the UK illegally, including small boat arrivals, faces having a British citizenship application refused. This change applies to anyone who entered the UK illegally, or those who arrived without a required, valid entry clearance or valid electronic authorisation, having made a dangerous journey, regardless of the time that has passed since they entered the UK.

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[Matt Vickers]

Liberal Democrat new clauses 8, 9 and 10 attempt to establish a joint taskforce with Europol and provide annual reports to Parliament to reduce levels of people smuggling and human trafficking.

Most Governments accept that international partnerships and cross-border co-operation have a role to play in solving the problem, but the new clauses could restrict the Government’s ability to negotiate in this regard while creating a cost by way of the need to provide further adequate resources to enhance that partnership and participation. They would also impose a responsibility to create yet another report. The National Crime Agency has said that no country has ever stopped people trafficking upstream in foreign countries. The Australians have done it, but that was with a deportation scheme. Why do hon. Members not think that a strong deterrent—that people who arrive in this country illegally will not be able to stay—would not be more effective in stopping people smuggling?

I realise that the Lib Dems seem to think that Europe has the answer to all the world’s problems, but surely even they must appreciate the need for a deterrent, rather than an incentive. In fact, as Europe reconsiders its approach to immigration by looking at what it can do to deter illegal entries, it is even more important that we do the same, rather than becoming the soft touch of Europe.

[Katie Lam]

In the light of the comments that Government Members have made on other provisions in the Bill, these new clauses seem to us completely unnecessary. Exactly as my hon. Friend just said, they do not seem to us appropriate for primary legislation and seem more likely to constrain rather than empower the Home Secretary and Ministers in their difficult job of securing the border.

[Becky Gittins (Clwyd East) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dame Siobhain. I will keep my comments brief.

I read the new clauses from the hon. Member for Woking with interest. I understand the important point that has been raised—I think by hon. Members on both sides—about the importance of working internationally on this issue. I suppose my question to him would be: does he not think that an international outlook in tackling the issues that we have here, which is the sole purpose of the Bill, has already been exercised? In December last year, we agreed the Calais Group priority plan with our near neighbours and the joint action plan on migration with Germany. In November last year, we had the landmark security agreement with Iraq, and we also have a well-established relationship with our counterparts in France to work closely to prevent the dangerous crossings and reduce the risk to life at sea.

We have talked a lot about cause and effect, and I can really see the intention behind the new clauses. However, I question their necessity, as well as some of the suggestions made about the intention of the Government, who have really shown a pragmatic outlook about how we deter those crossings.

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[Matt Vickers]

Liberal Democrat new clause 11 attempts to remove the restrictions on asylum seekers engaging in employment. It is yet another inducement for making that perilous journey, and another selling point for the people smuggling gangs as they make their pitch with the aim of profiting from the peril of others. New clause 11, coupled with new clause 10, seems to mark out a marketing plan for those evil and immoral people smuggling gangs.

Successive Governments have maintained that easing work restrictions could draw asylum seekers to the UK because they would believe that the reception conditions were more favourable. It creates a huge potential for an increase in applications from economic migrants whose primary motivation for coming to the UK is to benefit from work opportunities rather than to seek safety.

Do the Liberal Democrats not agree that lifting the ban will act as pull factor for migrants all over the world to come to the UK? Do the Liberal Democrats understand the impact that such a policy would have on other Departments, such as the Department for Work and Pensions and His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs? If the Liberal Democrats are worried about skills shortages, what plans do they have to get the 9 million economically inactive people already in the UK into those roles? What thoughts have the Liberal Democrats put into the measure, the legal issues it may introduce with employee rights, and the further challenges it will give the Home Office in swiftly removing those here illegally to their country of origin?

[Katie Lam]

In evidence for the Bill, Professor Brian Bell, who chairs the Migration Advisory Committee, spoke about what he sees as the incentives for people to come over here from France, which is of course a safe country. He spoke of the strong economic incentives to come to the UK and the challenge that poses for any Government because it would not necessarily benefit us to remove those incentives. He said:

“the unemployment rate is 7.8% in France and 4.4% in the UK. The gap is slightly larger for young people than for the population as a whole. I am sure the Government would not want to change that incentive, although the French probably would. If you have a buoyant economy relative to your neighbour, at least in the labour market, that is an incentive.” ––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 58, Q89.]

He went on to say that there are some things that we could do that might help, such as better enforcement of our labour laws, making it more difficult for people to work illegally.

What the hon. Member for Woking and the Liberal Democrat party are proposing is exactly the opposite of what Professor Bell was saying that we should do. Allowing asylum seekers to work before their claims are approved would make it easier for people to come here illegally and make money, and so it would increase the economic incentive for people to come, which we have heard is a pull—perhaps the primary pull—for people making those life-threatening journeys across the channel in the hands of organised criminal gangs. We consider it to be deeply wrong and counter to the aim of everything we are trying to achieve in securing the border against illegal migration. It is unfair and immoral.

[Mike Tapp]

This is another rare moment of general agreement with the hon. Members for Stockton West and for Weald of Kent. We will savour this moment. I will make some quick points on the new clause. It does create an additional pull factor for those seeking to travel. We do not know who is a genuine asylum seeker until their claims have been processed. The new clause would put a lot of people who are not genuine asylum seekers into our workforce to then be pulled away when the deportation takes place. Having asylum seekers in work may also create funding for others looking to travel over on small boats, as they may send money back to others in order to come over.

The answer to this question is in what we are doing already. The Home Secretary and immigration Ministers are working hard day to day at getting the Home Office back doing their day jobs again and speeding up the processing so that those who should be in work can be and those who should not be here are deported.

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[Pete Wishart]

I wholeheartedly back the hon. Member for Woking’s new clause; I thought about tabling it myself, but he beat me to it. It is sensible and should be supported by the Committee—mainly because it is an utter waste that people with huge skills are languishing in hotels doing practically nothing all day. We host a number of asylum seekers and refugees in hotels in Perth, and I go and visit them. Can I just say to the hon. Member for Weald of Kent that Scotland more than has its share of the general number of asylum seekers across the United Kingdom? I do not know where she has got her figure from.

[Katie Lam]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Pete Wishart]

No, I will correct her and then she can come back on that. Scotland hosted 5,086 refugees receiving support from local authorities. That represents 8.3% of total asylum seekers. The population of Scotland accounts for something like 8.8% of the total population of the United Kingdom, so we are hosting almost the same number as our population share—that is quite remarkable given the distance Scotland is from where most of the asylum seekers come in. We have a proud record of supporting asylum seekers. Not only do we have our fair share when it comes to hotels, but we give free travel to asylum seekers in Scotland—something we are very proud of. I am happy to give way to the hon. Lady if she wants to come back on that, but I do not know where she is getting her figures from.

[Katie Lam]

My figures are from the Government release of the data for December 2024. I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman has those figures or can break them down, but they state very clearly: 1,421 asylum seekers in hotels in Scotland; 4,262 asylum seekers in dispersed accommodation in Scotland; and then 36,658 and 61,445 in the rest of the country.

[Pete Wishart]

I think the hon. Lady and I will have to trade these statistics privately, because the figure I have is 5,086 receiving support, and that is from the Office for National Statistics. That is where I got my figures.

[Katie Lam]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Pete Wishart]

No, I am not going into this. I know that we are testing Dame Siobhain’s patience, so we will discuss this privately and might come back to it at another date.

As well as it being the right thing to do, this new clause would also let us use the skills available to us by giving people the opportunity for employment. The people I have met in some of the hotels in Perth have brought a whole range of skills that would be easily utilised by the community in which they are placed. It makes sense to take this change forward.

In the new clause, the Liberal Democrats suggest that work should be available three months after an application is made. That might be a little bit generous. If I was drafting the amendment, I would go for the six months that has been generally agreed with the all-party groups. I think that what we have done is introduce this issue as a debate item, and I congratulate the hon. Member for Woking for that. It is something that should be seriously considered.

There have been a number of questions at the Home Office about this and from a number of Members—not just from the Liberal Democrats and the Scottish National party but from Labour. I know that we have quite a compliant set of Labour MPs on this Committee, but a number of them have raised this in debates and in questions.

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[Matt Vickers]

Liberal Democrat new clause 16 would require the Secretary of State to apply an exception to the NHS as an employer from having to pay the immigration skills charge when sponsoring skilled employees. Do the Liberal Democrats not believe that we should be recruiting British workers to work in the NHS before we look to recruit overseas workers? Do the Liberal Democrats understand that this new clause could result in the NHS recruiting more people from overseas, rather than from our domestic population, further driving up those numbers? What assessment has been done of the costs of such a scheme, and how would the Liberal Democrats seek to ensure that it was fully funded?

[Katie Lam]

The hon. Member for Woking has tabled the new clause with a view to the role that migrant health and care workers play in UK health services. We are all deeply grateful to our doctors, nurses and care workers. They do rewarding jobs, but their roles can be difficult and gruelling, too. It is true that many people in the workforce are not British but have come to this country to do that work. We must thank them for helping to keep us and our families healthy and cared for, but it is our role in Westminster to look at the whole picture and be informed but not led by individual cases.

When we look at that picture, we see that the volumes for the health and social care visa are eye watering. Since 2021, more people have come to this country under the health and social care route than live in the city of Manchester—well over half a million, of whom many are dependents. Yes, that is because these jobs are tough, but it is fundamentally because they are underpaid. To quote the independent Migration Advisory Committee,

“the underlying cause of these workforce difficulties is due to the underfunding of the social care sector.”

Immigration alone cannot solve these workforce issues. Underpaying health and social care professionals is financially self-defeating, because the money the Government save in the short term is dwarfed in the medium and long term by the costs to the state. As we have discussed this afternoon, and as the Minister has heard me say in several different settings, after five years a person who has come to this country on a health and social care visa can apply for indefinite leave to remain. If they get it, and 95% of ILR applicants are successful, they will qualify for welfare, social housing, surcharge-free NHS care—everything. That must all be paid for, and the cost is far greater than those on such salaries will ever pay in tax and far more than they save the state with their artificially low wages. Those individual workers are also at risk of exploitation as a result of the poor pay and conditions that have been allowed to endure across the sector because we have brought in workers from abroad who are willing to accept them as the price of coming to Britain.

The next, related issue with the visa is the degree to which it is abused. The MAC describes its misuse as

“a significant problem and greater than in other immigration routes”.

That raises massive concerns about the safety of the patients and vulnerable people whom the system is charged with caring for.

The rules around the health and care visa need to be further tightened, not loosened through an exemption from the immigration skills charge, and they need to be enforced. That is for the good of healthcare workers and, as should be the Committee’s primary concern, for the good of their patients and the country. Exempting NHS workers from the immigration skills charge, or indeed doing anything that makes it relatively cheaper still to hire migrant workers, will make the fundamental problem in the health sector’s labour market even worse.

[Pete Wishart]

This afternoon seems to be a bit of a Lib Dem fest because of the new clauses tabled by the hon. Member for Woking. There is nothing wrong with that; in fact, I very much approve of this new clause.

To the hon. Member for Weald of Kent—I do not like to rebuke her, because that is not the sort of Member of Parliament I am, as you will know, Dame Siobhain—I say that so many people come through the health and care route because there is real need in the whole system. We need people to come and make sure that someone has those jobs. I challenge her to visit the NHS establishments in her constituency and find out the real difficulties that many health professional managers have in securing the staff they require. This new clause is a practical suggestion to deal with a real issue in our immigration system. It is unfair that those who come to do some of the most demanding and low-paid jobs in the UK are forced to pay that charge.

[Katie Lam]

I do not disagree with the hon. Member at all about the problems in the sector. My point was that the fundamental reason for those problems is that the roles are underpaid.

[Pete Wishart]

We know those jobs are underpaid, and that is why so few people in the general community whom the hon. Lady would class as British-born are prepared to do them. We are dependent on people coming to our shores to do those jobs, and our health service would fall apart if they all decided to leave. We depend on them, and it is unfair that they have to pay that extra and excessive charge. I hope that the Government will look at this new clause, because I think it is reasonably good and one of the few that would make a significant and practical improvement to the situation.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Katie Lam Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mike Tapp]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. The hon. Member for Stockton West has made a creative argument, and I will try to bring some sense to it. First, we have to look at what the new clause would actually do for the country and our judicial system. Public hearings could expose vulnerable individuals, including victims of persecution or trafficking, to undue public scrutiny, which could deter genuine applicants from seeking justice. There are also security risks. Sensitive information about applicants’ backgrounds, including details that could endanger their families in their home countries, could be exposed.

There is also the risk of the legal system being overloaded further, given what we have inherited. Increased public interest in the hearings could lead to more appeals and challenges, which would cause more delays and inefficiencies in the system. Finally, the new clause is simply unnecessary as courts already have the discretion to allow public access when appropriate. It would remove vital judicial flexibility.

[Katie Lam (Weald of Kent) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Dr Murrison. After years of broken promises, it should come as no surprise that the public do not trust politicians in Westminster on immigration. The distrust is compounded by regular reports of individual cases in the immigration system, the most shocking and nonsensical of which are often those of foreign criminals allowed to remain in this country due to human rights laws.

The system is broken. It has been broken for many decades, and that is now plain to see. Our basic decency—our desire to do the right thing—is exploited by paedophiles, rapists, terrorists and hardened criminals, who threaten not just individual members of the public, which is terrifying enough, but the broader social fabric of our country. The news reports that we read are possible only because upper tribunal judgments on asylum and immigration are published at regular intervals. The publication of those judgments allows everyone in the country to see what tribunal judges have decided in asylum, immigration and deportation cases. Crucially, it allows us to scrutinise both their decisions and their reasoning. We can see why the judgments were made and what that says about our laws, and decide for ourselves whether we think that is right. Judges are not accountable to the public, but transparency allows everyone to see our laws in action and to form a view about whether they are the right ones.

However, upper tribunal judgments do not tell the full story. All immigration and asylum cases are first heard by a lower-tier tribunal, the judgments of which are not made available to the public. Unless the initial decision of the lower-tier tribunal is appealed, the public do not ever get access to the details of any given case. Given the absurdity of the cases that we do hear about, many members of the public will rightly be wondering what is happening in the cases that we do not see.

If we want to restore public trust in the immigration system, we must restore transparency. Publishing the decisions of lower-tier tribunals is not the biggest or most consequential change in the grand scheme of our broken immigration system, but it is a meaningful one. The public have a right to know about the way our tribunal system works, to know about the rules judges use to make fundamental decisions about immigration and asylum—about who can be in this country and why—and to see how those rules are applied in practice so they can decide for themselves whether that is right or wrong and whether it serves Britain’s interests. That is why we tabled this new clause, and we sincerely hope that the Government will consider making it part of the Bill.

[Margaret Mullane (Dagenham and Rainham) (Lab)]

It is an honour to serve on your Committee, Dr Murrison. I do not see how turning border security into public discourse on a case-by-case basis is beneficial to the process, either for those administering or presiding over the hearings, or for those subject to the tribunal process. I accept that there is an argument for greater transparency, but given the circumstances of people’s arrival at our borders—they are fleeing trauma, in a vulnerable state—I feel it is inappropriate to parade the lives of asylum seekers in the public domain.

I have every faith that the Bill will create a robust system that is effective and accountable. The new clause would add nothing to its overall strength. The hon. Member for Stockton West says that trust has been lost in the asylum system. I think it will take this Bill and this Government to bring that trust back.

--- Later in debate ---

Then the small boats crisis began, with the Conservative Government failing to do anything to stop its source, its methods or the routes. Under Rishi Sunak, they came up with a wizard idea that sending a group of arrivals to Rwanda would stop the boats. Well, we all know the outcome of that failure: 80,000 people arrived on small boats during that period. By June 2024, net migration stood at 728,000. Now we have the leader of the Opposition wanting to act tough on migration, but with her party’s recent history, how can anyone believe a word she says? All the Conservatives’ credibility is gone. This Government are focused on sorting out their mess. In my view, new clause 25 is yet another wheeze—speak big, but do little.

[Katie Lam]

How can I begin my remarks without repaying the Minister’s kind words about my clothing? This is one of my favourite jackets and I am delighted to see that it might also be one of hers.

It is no secret, as the hon. Member for Bassetlaw has just set out, that previous Governments of different parties have failed the British public on immigration. The level of immigration to this country has been too high for decades and remains so. Every election-winning manifesto since 1974 has promised to reduce migration. As my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Essex (Mrs Badenoch) has said, the last Government, like the Governments before them, promised to do exactly that, but again like the Governments before them, they did not deliver. Because of that failure to deliver, the British public may face a bill of more than £200 billion in the years ahead, unless we change the rules on settlement.

Under current rules, after just five years in the UK, migrants on work or family visas will become eligible for indefinite leave to remain. If they are successful, and 95% of ILR applicants are, they are entitled to welfare, social housing, surcharge-free access to the NHS and more. According to the Centre for Policy Studies, some 800,000 migrants could claim ILR over the course of this Parliament. Given the profile of those who are likely to qualify, that could come at a lifetime cost of £234 billion.

[Tom Hayes]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Katie Lam]

I will gladly.

[Tom Hayes]

Sorry, I coughed and laughed at the same time, partly because I think the hon. Member anticipated the point I was about to make. I will put this on the record again, as I have consistently. She may have more information to come back to me with and I will come back to her. The Centre for Policy Studies report is flawed. It has skewed information; it uses assumptions that are unreasonable and the financial modelling that ensues is therefore unreasonable. As a consequence, it feels like the Centre for Policy Studies and the hon. Member are reaching for a very large number to create the impression that there will be a very significant financial burden.

I make two additional points. First, even if that report relied on reasonable assumptions and therefore the modelling was correct, the Boris wave was caused by her party’s Government. She is nodding her head; she affirms that. I welcome that, in her speech, she has so far acknowledged the failings of that Government. Secondly, the report makes some very big assumptions about the future behaviour of the people currently in the migration system in our country. That is not a wise move, particularly when she is extrapolating £235 billion to £240 billion across a very long timeline. In fact, if we were to break it down on an annualised basis, even using the report’s flawed assumptions and flawed modelling, the figure would be far smaller. We need to have some integrity in the data that we use. Does she agree?

[Katie Lam]

As Professor Brian Bell said in evidence to this Committee—in a session to which the hon. Member for Bournemouth East has referred a couple of times—

“It is actually extremely difficult to work out the fiscal impact of migration.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 59, Q92.]

That is clearly true: forecasting the lives of millions of people over decades will obviously have a substantial margin for error.

The only way to avoid that error would be not to try to forecast in the first place. I have repeatedly asked the Home Office, over several months, whether anyone in that Department or any other—indeed, anyone in Government—is attempting to forecast the cost to the public purse of the ILR grants that will come in this Parliament. I am yet to receive an answer. To me, that clearly says that nobody in Government is thinking about the impact the issue will have and how much it will cost. When they do, I will happily use those numbers. Until and unless that happens, the modelling from the CPS is the best we have—in fact, it is all that we have.

[Tom Hayes]

This is my last intervention on this matter. I take the hon. Lady’s point entirely, but will she not acknowledge that the modelling has deep, fundamental flaws? Although it may be the only modelling and therefore the best, on the strength of what is in that report it is still not worth considering or using in parliamentary debate.

[Katie Lam]

I have already acknowledged that the margin for error is massive—that is clearly true. If everything that the hon. Member is saying is correct, I would like to see Government figures to replace the CPS figures. I think that is a reasonable request.

The £234 billion cost is equivalent to £8,200 per household, or around six times our annual defence budget, and this about not just money but capacity. Our public services are clearly already overstretched and this could push them to breaking point. If we accept, as we should, that previous Governments have failed on migration, then we should do everything in our power to limit the long-term impacts of that failure. That is why the Conservatives propose to extend the qualifying period for ILR and reform settlement rules to ensure that only those genuinely likely to contribute will be eligible for long-term settlement. That would give us an opportunity to review visas issued over the last few years. Those who have come to this country legally on time-limited visas and have subsequently not contributed enough, or have damaged our society by committing crime, should be expected to leave.

The Prime Minister has repeatedly said that the levels of immigration under the last Government were wrong and that it was a mistake to allow so many people to come to the UK. This amendment would allow the Government to limit the long-term consequences of that mistake, so why would they oppose it? It is not too late to change our rules around settlement. By refusing to extend the eligibility period for indefinite leave to remain, the Government are actively choosing to saddle the British taxpayer with a likely bill of hundreds of billions of pounds. We must make difficult decisions on this reform and the many others required in our migration system. Those decisions may be painful, especially in the short term, for individual people, families or businesses but they are the only way for any Government’s actions to match their words. The public have had enough and rightly so.

The hon. Member for Bournemouth East talked about LLR, which must be applied for every two and a half years on the existing 10-year route. That is the case only because, as it stands, the 10-year route, by design, is for those not on eligible visas. The five-year route that we here propose to change is exclusively for those on eligible visas. I therefore cannot see why, within the existing rules, there would be any requirement for LLR applications. I hope that reassures the hon. Member.

[Margaret Mullane]

The new clause is not in keeping with the provisions outlined in the Bill, which primarily focus on border security through new and strengthened law enforcement powers, providing intelligence to address organised immigration crime.

I fundamentally disagree with the context of the new clause. Subsection (2) relates to existing legislation whereby the qualification of indefinite leave to remain applies to people on skilled work visas, scale-up worker visas, entrepreneurial or investor visas, innovation founder visas, or UK ancestry visas, and people with a partner who holds citizenship. Those people are, for the most part, contributing to our society through work. If somebody has been living and working here in a skilled role, or innovating in our country—and possibly even supporting job creation—for five years, that is long enough for them to identify Britain as their home. They will have friends and community networks. In most instances, they are boosting our economic productivity. The increased qualification period set out in the proposed new clause would move the goalposts for skilled workers after years of contribution.

I will bring the conversation back to the purpose of the Bill: the Committee’s focus should be on those entering the UK illegally and those engaged in organised immigration crime, not the construction workers, nurses, doctors, investors and business owners in Britain on work visas.

[Tom Hayes]

I will speak briefly. I welcome the hon. Member for Weald of Kent’s clarification of the Conservative party’s position on the amendment, but that clarification also raises further questions; I wonder whether the hon. Lady could respond on the spot. If there is no requirement every 30 months in the 10-year period for an individual to pay fees of £2,608—or, for a child, £2,223—to the Home Office, how will the Home Office fund much of its work? The fees paid by adults and children contribute significantly to the Home Office’s budget. The point is particularly important because the Home Office has had to borrow from the official development assistance budget in order to fund asylum hotels. I worry that there is going to be a significant financial gap here, and I wonder if the hon. Lady could clarify what her costings are?

[Katie Lam]

I think the hon. Gentleman is eliding two different routes. At the moment there is a five-year route, which is for people on eligible visas, and a 10-year route. The 10-year route has LLR requirements that have to be applied for every two and a half years, and is the route that generates the fees that he is talking about. Under the amendment, that would not change; we are proposing changes only to the five-year route. The five-year route at the moment does not have LLR requirements because it is for people on eligible visas. The income for the Home Office from the same people should be no different under the amendment that we are proposing. I hope that that is clear.

[Tom Hayes]

I am happy to accept that clarification. If that is correct, I look forward to seeing more information about the particular policy, what financial costs would be involved and what the financial benefits would be.

Finally, I echo the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh about the importance of settling. We talk here about the financial costs: it is going to be more costly to our country and public services if somebody is having to go through many years of unsettled status. It is going to be harder for them to have all the infrastructure and anchors that they need within society. As a consequence, I would love to know whether the Conservatives have done any modelling of the impact of increasing the period of limbo, including—as mentioned in the IPPR report that I referenced earlier—the cost to public services when people find themselves homeless, with difficult mental health conditions or unable to take their child to the school that they want and have to travel significant mileage.

The hon. Lady and I share a desire for the integrity of data and its greater availability. In proposing the amendment, does she have access to any of that information?

[Katie Lam]

I will come back briefly. If I have properly understood the hon. Member’s question, he is asking what we think the impact will be on the number of people who would still apply for ILR after 10 years.

[Tom Hayes]

indicated assent.

[Katie Lam]

He is nodding.

Part of what we are trying to say by extending the time is that we feel that a person’s commitment to the UK before they apply for settlement should be longer than five years. If application numbers go down because people feel that they do not want to commit for 10 years before getting settlement, that is something that we are happy to accept as part of the amendment.

It seems from the numbers that we have at the moment that the number of people who would apply over an extended period would go down because fewer people would qualify under the rules that we are stipulating. The reason why they would not qualify is that they would not be making a sufficiently significant contribution to the public purse over that period. Our calculations are that all of those lost applications would be net fiscally positive.

[Tom Hayes]

In which case, I will close by saying that the Home Office data shows there is not that drop-off of people—people do not leave the country because they have to wait longer for their status. In fact, those people try to get that status by serving within our country and economy. The Home Office data, which is publicly available on gov.uk, records what the stay and departure rates are each year. I am not sure that the amendment and the policy within it are going to achieve the goal that the hon. Lady is seeking.

[Katie Lam]

I totally take the hon. Gentleman’s point, but I think he is answering a slightly different point. What we are saying is that the combination of the extension of time and the change in criteria would lead to lower applications. It is not so much about a choice on the part of the individual migrant, but a structural change within the system.

[Tom Hayes]

The very last point I will make is that I understand what the hon. Lady is saying, but that is not what my point was about. This would not be a deterrent or an incentive for people to leave the country. People would still remain in the country. The health impacts and the limbo that people would experience through their inability to settle would still create a fiscal drag.

--- Later in debate ---

This is not an immigration issue—it is nothing to do with immigration. It is a safeguarding issue, and it is about making sure that we have the best interests of children at heart. It is an opportunity to uphold our commitment to child welfare and to ensure that the UK meets its obligations under domestic and international child protection frameworks. I urge hon. Members to support the new clause and ensure that no child seeking refuge in this country is wrongly treated as an adult and then placed in harm’s way.

[Katie Lam]

On 23 January 2023, Lawangeen Abdulrahimzai was sentenced to life imprisonment at Salisbury Crown court. Nearly a year earlier, Abdulrahimzai had murdered 21-year-old Thomas Roberts in Bournemouth town centre by stabbing him to death in the street following a dispute over an e-scooter.

Abdulrahimzai was an Afghan asylum seeker who came to this country in December 2019. He entered the UK illegally, claiming to be an unaccompanied 14-year-old. He was placed in school and in foster care, but he was in fact already an adult when he came here. Not only was he an adult, but he was also a murderer, having killed two men in Serbia before coming to the UK. He should never have been allowed to come to this country and he should certainly not have been allowed to masquerade as a child.

Assessing a person’s age is surprisingly difficult, but we have a range of tools to do so—the Home Office is just not using them. If we had acted sooner, using the full suite of tools at our disposal to assess Abdulrahimzai’s age, Thomas Roberts might still be alive today. The case of Lawangeen Abdulrahimzai is particularly shocking, but it is unfortunately far from unique.

[Chris Murray]

I wonder whether there have been any new scientific discoveries in the last seven months for identifying someone’s age that the Home Office would not have been aware of over the last 14 years. Is it not the case that the methodologies used are very imprecise and do not often actually lead us, in the liminal cases, to draw the distinction that the hon. Lady is advocating for?

[Katie Lam]

I will come on to precision and the ways of determining age slightly later in my remarks.

Ahmed Hassan, an Iraqi asylum seeker, claimed to be a 16-year-old when he arrived in the UK. In 2017, he set off a bomb at Parsons Green tube station, injuring 23 people. His real age is still not a matter of public record. In 2018, a Home Office probe found that Siavash Shah, an Iranian asylum seeker, spent six weeks as a year 11 pupil in Ipswich despite being 25—the list goes on. In fact, between 2020 and 2023, the Home Office identified almost 4,000 cases of adult migrants claiming to be children—45% of those who originally claimed to be children when they arrived here—and every other person of that cohort was in fact an adult. Some were at least 30 years old. That puts British children at risk, puts genuine child asylum seekers at risk and takes valuable school and care places away from the young people who genuinely need them.

I feel this particularly keenly as a Member of Parliament for Kent, the county into which all small boats arrive. Our laws mandate that the people who come to this country illegally and claim to be under 18 must be prioritised for care equally with Kentish children. That puts enormous pressure on the system and makes it harder for our children to be cared for. That is madness when we know that half of those arrivals are in fact adults, and we must put a stop to it.

It is completely rational, albeit morally wrong, for adult migrants to claim to be children. Under-18s who come here have a greater entitlement to care and support, do not have to live in accommodation with adults, and are not subject to the same rules as adults—or the rules are applied less strictly. Of course, there are people who cross the channel without their parents who are under 18; most, though not all, are male 17 and 16-year-olds, and some are younger children. No one disputes that, and children should be treated as children, but we must be realistic about the scandalous degree to which our system is exploited by the cynical and the sinister.

We have to protect actual children, and we should use every tool in the box to do so, including scientific testing. Where people refuse such tests, the Government should be able to override that refusal. We are acting in the interests of public safety and to protect the security of our children. Labour Members have asked for exact details of the scientific methods. As my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West set out, there are many methods and several different ways of doing it. The ones that can be implemented in short order are the dental and skeletal tests.

Other methods are currently at an earlier stage of development, such as facial age estimation and DNA methylation, which is a process by which people much cleverer than me can assess how a person’s genes are read by their body, which changes with age. In 2022, the interim Age Estimation Science Advisory Committee stated that the

“teeth, clavicle, and hand/wrist or knee… have been shown to have a significant research and publication credibility and provide a consistent age range over which changes occur.”

Later, the same report states:

“The committee has relied on areas and methods that have been repeatedly tried and tested and shown to have consistency.”

As the report makes clear, and as Government Members have said, scientific age assessment is not perfectly precise and is not magic, but as my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West also correctly says, our proposal is that scientific age assessments should be used not to replace other methods and judgments, but to supplement them.

The situations that my hon. Friend and I have set out are horrifying. We can see no reason why the Government would not want to have the widest possible set of tools available to them to stop such things happening, including the option in future to bring in scientific methods that are currently at a nascent stage.

[Tom Hayes]

I thank the hon. Member for Weald of Kent for raising the absolutely horrific and awful circumstances involving Thomas Roberts, who would have been my constituent and whose mother, Dolores, is my constituent. She is racked by grief and unable to sleep at night. Her health has worsened because, as she said to the Minister and me last night in the Minister’s office, with her son being murdered, she feels that half of her whole life has completely disappeared.

I do not want to name the murderer in this debate; I name Thomas Roberts, the victim. I want to talk briefly, with your permission, Dr Murrison, about Thomas Roberts, because it is important for the Committee to know who he was. It is important for Dolores, so racked with grief, to know that her MP and the Committee are focused on what happened.

Thomas was 21 years of age when he died on 12 March 2022 in Bournemouth town centre, the victim of a stabbing by an asylum seeker. His mum has told me several times, and she told me again with the Minister last night, that Thomas was known by everyone and, when his mother wanted to go into town, to Littledown or to other parts of the constituency, he would say no, because he was so well known and he did not want to be seen by his friends out with his mum.

Thomas was an aspiring Royal Marine and, in order to become one, he was in the Sea Scouts. He was physically fit—so fit, in fact, that he would actually bench press his mum and his brother. Dolores told me that the passing of his driving test on the first go was one of her proudest moments. It is one of the things that she remembers so fondly and so closely now, as she comes to terms with her grief.

Thomas was also an aspiring drum and bass DJ, and by all accounts a very good one, who was up and coming on the south coast. If he had not made it as a Royal Marine—there was every certainty that he would—he could easily have taken up a drum and bass DJ career. He was a member of the Christchurch boxing club. He was active in his community, and deeply loving and caring about his family.

Thomas lost his life—or rather, his life was taken from him—because an asylum seeker was in our country. That begs the question: why was that person in our country? Why were they able to wield the knife that cut short Thomas Roberts’s life, and that took away all the hopes and ambitions that his mother had for him? It is because we did not have access to the necessary database to track criminality and find out more about who the asylum seeker actually was. I am deeply sad that Thomas is not with his mum, in his community, or with his friends who loved him so much, because the last Government broke our asylum and immigration system, and created the conditions for that tragic killing and other tragic killings that have happened in our country.

Scientific age assessment, as the hon. Member for Weald of Kent said, is not a magic wand; it is imprecise, as we heard from the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health. We know what works, and that having a functioning asylum and immigration system will make all the difference. I just wish we had had that on 12 March 2022 when Thomas was denied his life opportunities because of the breakages in that system.

I thank the Minister for meeting Dolores yesterday—I know that that provided her with much-needed comfort and clarity. I am absolutely confident that the Bill and its measures will make the difference that is so needed to protect our society. I also note the contribution of Councillor Joe Salmon of Bournemouth, Christchurch and Poole council, who has been such a support to Dolores and her wider community, because she will be grieving for a very long time. It is incumbent on all of us in public service to speak the truth, look at the facts and bring forward the measures that will make the biggest difference.

If I may, I will return to the question of scientific age assessments. I referred to the concerns of the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health and of experts, but I now refer to the House of Lords debate on 27 November 2023, which is worth a read if Opposition Members have not had a chance. It goes into significant detail and depth about the concerns that I had about that as a possible policy at that stage of its development.

The Minister has been clear that scientific age assessments are not off the table; there just needs to be certainty that they are an effective tool. To avoid any further deaths and injustices, we need to have the right tools to protect the people of this country, secure and protect our borders, and make sure that we are truly able to restore confidence and trust in this system and in our ability to manage who comes into our country and who stays here.

--- Later in debate ---

We should be considering what the Bill is about. I remind the Committee that the Bill is about action, and we need to ensure that what comes out of Committee is a workable and operable Bill that will do the hard work to tackle the criminal gangs that are fuelling illegal immigration, and to fix our broken asylum system.

[Katie Lam]

It was a privilege to hear about Thomas Roberts’s life. The hon. Member for Bournemouth East did himself great credit in telling us about him so movingly. Thomas’s mother, Dolores, whose pain is impossible for us to imagine, has also done his memory great credit by finding a way in her grief to talk about her son to her Member of Parliament and to the Minister.

Securing the border is a genuinely difficult job, and the Opposition are genuine in our desire to support the Government in doing that. We really believe that the new clause would help the Government to expand their ability to do that job. We deeply hope that they will consider it. I also thank the hon. Member for Clwyd East for her generous words.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I start by endorsing what my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East said about Dolores, Thomas Roberts’s mum, whom I met last night. She has gone through a searingly awful life experience. It is difficult even to think about that, let alone to offer any comfort. Unfortunately, I do not think that her experience would have changed much had scientific age assessment been in place, although the person in question had been assessed by his local authority as a child and was therefore in a separate environment from that which he would have been in had he not been assessed.

I am determined to see whether we can connect up our information about people coming from Europe, following Brexit and the disintegration of our access to Eurodac and various other pieces of information collected in Europe on asylum seekers and those arriving illegally—not all of them are asylum seekers. Reconnecting, if possible, to those databases would give us more comfort than we have at the moment. However, I emphasise that when people come to this country, we do check them against all our biometric records and the terrorism lists and watch lists that we have. It may be possible for us to do more in future.

We have had a debate about new clause 26 from the Opposition and new clause 43 from the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire on behalf of the Scottish National party. That has again demonstrated the wide range of opinion that there is at both ends of the argument whenever we consider such issues. I will deal with both arguments in my response, and I hope to find a middle way.

First, repealing section 58 of the Illegal Migration Act, which the Bill seeks to do, does not stop our capacity to do age assessments. Listening to some of the contributions from members of the official Opposition, one would have thought that repealing section 58 will take off the table—completely and utterly—all age assessment. That is simply not true. The age assessments in section 58 were about the duty to remove somebody to Rwanda; they were not connected to anything else. As I understand it, the issue with that legislation was that the then Government’s intention was not to remove children to Rwanda, so it became more important to have a way of assessing whether somebody was a child. The Safety of Rwanda Act and the IMA—the previous Government’s approach to this issue—would have created even bigger incentives for people to claim that that they were children, because they would have avoided being sent to Rwanda, not that anyone ever actually ended up there. The previous Government’s approach of deportation permanently to Rwanda actually created even more incentives for people to lie about their age.

The fact is that there are people who are genuine asylum seekers who are children, people who are not genuine asylum seekers who are adults who claim to be children, and children who sometimes claim that they are adults. When that happens, one has to look at modern slavery issues and coercive control. There are safeguarding issues on both sides of the age assessment argument. Children pretend to be adults for reasons that we can imagine, but we will not go into those, because they are not very pleasant. There are also incentives created by the way in which the Children Act 1989 deals with unaccompanied asylum-seeking children. As a Kent MP, the hon. Member for Weald of Kent knows exactly what happens with the Kent intake unit and the pressure that her own local authority has been put under. However, she also knows about the Government support that her local authority has been given to disperse unaccompanied asylum-seeking children around the rest of the country so that some of the burden can be shared.

We are dealing with people who arrive without papers. Some of them wish to lie about their age, and some have been told to lie because the people-smuggling gangs perceive it as a way for people to access more resources than they could if they were seen as adults. As the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire pointed out, the system can get it wrong on both sides. People who are children have been judged to be adults and put in inappropriate places, and people who are adults have been judged to be children and put in appropriate places. There is no guaranteed scientific way of making a judgment. We can make judgments about people who are much older, but we are dealing with that uncertain four to five-year range on either side, which is the difference between 18 and 24 or 17 and 23; you will know about that, Dr Murrison, from your work as a medical doctor.

On new clause 26, I want to reassure Opposition Members that there is already provision in law for the use of age assessment, and our repealing of section 58 of the Illegal Migration Act does not remove that provision. That is because the Immigration (Age Assessments) Regulations 2024, which followed scientific advice from the Age Estimation Science Advisory Committee in the Home Office, specify for the purposes of section 52 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 the scientific methods currently recommended for age assessment. We have retained those bits of legislation; neither the 2024 regulations nor section 52 of the Nationality and Borders Act have been repealed by the Bill, so the capacity to use scientific age assessments remains on the statute book.

The hon. Member for Stockton West did not seem to know which age assessment methods we were talking about. The 2024 regulations specify the power to use X-rays and MRIs, and that it is possible to take a negative view of the credibility of a person who refuses to consent, where there are no reasonable grounds for refusing that consent.

With those measures on the statute book, the Government continue to explore methods to improve the robustness of age assessment processes by increasing the reliability of the scientific methods being used. At the moment, we do not have enough certainty about the gap that exists in the current assessments, which are still being assessed. The hon. Member for Stockton West and the Conservative party put these things on to the statute book but then did not operationalise them. At the moment, we are doing as much work as we can to see how reliable they are, with a view to operationalising them. But as I wrote in a response to shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Croydon South, when he wrote to me about this issue, we are in the middle of that process. I hope that we will soon be in a situation to make announcements one way or the other, and those announcements will be made in the usual way.